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Chapter 96: UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR

INTRODUCTION

IN such speculative problems as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the infinity of time and space, or the limits of human knowledge, the conversation of philosophers seems to make contact with the discourse of scientists, the language of poets, and the speech of ordinary men. The philosophers usually begin at least by propounding questions which correspond to those asked by men who do not profess to be philosophers. But throughout the tradition of western thought, the problem of the universal, unlike these others, seems to have the character of a professional secret.

The various solutions of the problem of the universal are so many esoteric doctrines, each with its own sectarian name. The initiated can distinguish themselves from the novices by their proficiency in this area; and the outsider who overhears the discussion of professionals may be completely left behind, wondering as much about how the question arose as about the meaning of the conflicting answers.

No genuine philosophical problem, it seems reasonable to suppose, can be so remote from questions intelligible to common sense. If it is not just a specious riddle to amuse the experts, the problem of the universal, despite its technical appearance, should raise issues from which, in some form or other, no one can escape. Whether or not this is so can be tested by considering the various ways in which the problem occurs in other chapters under different guises and in different contexts.

In the chapter on SAME AND OTHER, we find the question how two individuals can be the same in some particular respect—how in spite of their separate existence they can share in the possession of a common nature or attribute. Anyone who classifies things or tries to make definitions may be led to wonder whether classifications are entirely verbal and definitions fictions of the mind, or whether things themselves belong together in some real community based upon an inherent sameness or similarity.

In the chapter on ONE AND MANY, the question takes the form of asking how two or more things can be one in any way. Again, both science and common sense seem able to deal with an infinite number of individuals by applying a single name to them or apprehending them all under a single concept or notion. But it may be asked what justifies the denomination of many things by one name. What unity in the things verifies the tendency of thought to unify them conceptually? Does a real unity exist in things, by virtue of their being somehow one as well as many, or as a result of the many somehow participating in a one which exists separately from them?

In the chapters on DEFINITION and SIGN AND SYMBOL the same questions are at least implicit. In connection with the object of definition, one issue is whether what Aristotle calls “the formulable essence” exists as the common nature of many individuals, or whether, as Locke suggests, definitions formulate only the nominal, not the real, essences of things. As that and related issues are faced, anyone who acknowledges the familiar distinction between proper and common names may become involved in questioning what common or general names signify and how they get the meanings with which they are used in everyday discourse.

The problem of the sameness of things distinct from one another, the problem of the one in the many or the one and the many, the problem of essences and common names, are other statements of the problem of the universal and the particular. Attention to the words themselves confirms this. The word “universal” connotes a unity—the one as opposed to the many, the common as opposed to the unique or special. The word “particular” connotes participation—the part as opposed to the whole, the member as opposed to the class. As the reference already made to essence and individual indicates, these are not the only pairs of terms which somehow correspond in significance to universal and particular, but others, like model and imitation, form and matter, abstract and concrete, are more obscure in meaning. The discussion of universal and particular throws light on them rather than gains clarity from them.

THE READER OF THE great books can witness the origin of the problem of the universal and particular as it occurs in a conversation, not between technical philosophers, but between Socrates and his friends. In the Meno, Socrates and Meno get into a discussion of how virtue is acquired. Socrates thinks it is necessary to inquire first what virtue is. Meno responds by enumerating different virtues, but Socrates is not satisfied. He wants a definition which will cover all the virtues. Even if Meno could say what justice or temperance is, that would not do, for each of these is, as Socrates says, a virtue, not virtue—a particular virtue or a part of virtue, not the whole of it.

“In searching after one virtue,” Socrates tells Meno, “we have found many… but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all.” To help Meno, who claims he is not able to follow Socrates in his “attempt to get at one common notion of virtue,” Socrates shifts the discussion to colors and figures. He warns Meno that color cannot be defined by naming colors, and that, even if he could define a square, a circle, and all other figures, he would not be saying what figure is. To proceed in this way is to be “landed in particulars.”

“Tell me then,” Socrates says, “since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure?”

If Meno were to reply, “I do not know what you want,” not much further explanation could be given. To someone who remained perplexed at this point, we could only say, Socrates suggests, “Do you not understand that we are looking for the same in the many?” Or, put in another form, we might ask, he says, “What is that [one in many] which you call figure, and which includes not only the round and straight figures, but all?”

Thus stated, the problem of the universal seems inescapable—a problem for everyone, not just for philosophers. But the philosophers complicate the problem almost as soon as it is stated. Giving his version of the history of philosophy, Aristotle offers an explanation of how the problem shifted to another level. Socrates, he writes, “was busying himself about ethical matters” and, “seeking the universal in these ethical matters, [he] fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things, but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they.”

It is at this point, according to Aristotle, that the great philosophical controversy begins. Whereas “the thinkers of old ranked particular things as substances, e.g., fire and earth, not what is common to both, body,” the Platonists or idealists—“the thinkers of the present day”—“tend to rank universals as substances, for genera are universal.” Aristotle repeatedly tries to distinguish between the Socratic inquiry and what he regards as the Platonic doctrine—the theory of Ideas. “The first to raise the problem of universal definition… Socrates,” he writes, “did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; they, however,”—the Platonists—“gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas.”

As between Socrates and his disciple, Aristotle does not hesitate to take sides. “Socrates gave the impulse to this theory of ideas… but he did not separate universals from individuals; and in not separating them,” Aristotle adds, “he thought rightly.” The issue between Aristotle and his own teacher, Plato, cannot, however, be stated by so simple an affirmation and denial.

On Aristotle’s side, it involves the fundamental principles of his metaphysics, especially his doctrine of substance, as well as his theory of what and how the intellect knows, as contrasted with the perceptions of the senses. On Plato’s side, it involves many questions concerning the intelligible and the sensible, being and becoming, the one and the many—questions the Aristotelian answers to which would not satisfy Plato.

Wherever the truth lies, Aristotle recognizes that on this issue, perhaps more than on any other, he is most sharply opposed to Plato. It is the one matter wherein he feels a conflict between devotion to his teacher and to the truth as he sees it. The consideration of the universal good, he declares in the Ethics, is made difficult “by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own,” but “while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.”

THE HISTORIANS OF PHILOSOPHY, beginning with Aristotle, attribute one solution of the problem of universals to Plato. That solution comes to be called “realism” because it affirms the independent reality of universals as separately existing Ideas or Forms. But all the commentators do not, like Aristotle, dissent from Plato’s solution. In our own time, for example, Bertrand Russell, treating of “the world of universals” in the Problems of Philosophy, says, “the problem with which we are now concerned is a very old one, since it was brought into philosophy by Plato. Plato’s ‘theory of ideas’ is an attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it is one of the most successful attempts hitherto made. The theory to be advocated in what follows is largely Plato’s, with merely such modifications as time has shown to be necessary.”

For one thing, Russell thinks “the word ‘idea’ has acquired in the course of time many associations which are quite misleading when applied to Plato’s ‘ideas.’ We shall, therefore,” he writes, “use the word ‘universal’ instead of the word ‘idea’ to describe what Plato meant… We speak of whatever is given in sensation… as a particular; by opposition to this, a universal will be anything which may be shared by many particulars… Broadly speaking, proper names stand for particulars, while other substantives, adjectives, prepositions, and verbs stand for universals.”

Russell here calls attention to another point which he thinks has too seldom been observed, namely, that universals are not exclusively signified by common nouns and adjectives, but that, in addition, there are relational universals signified by prepositions and verbs. This sort of universal, according to him, most readily shows that universals have being apart from particulars. It can also be shown, he argues, “that their being is not merely mental… that whatever being belongs to them is independent of their being thought of or in any way apprehended by minds.”

If the word “existence” implies definite location in time and space, then, Russell concludes, in the sense in which “thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist… universals do not exist.” We must say instead that “they subsist or have being, where ‘being’ is opposed to ‘existence’ as being timeless. The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being. The world of being is unchangeable… The world of existence is fleeting… According to our temperaments, we shall prefer the contemplation of the one or the other. The one we do not prefer will probably seem to us a pale shadow of the one we prefer, and hardly worthy to be regarded as in any sense real. But the truth is that both have the same claim on our impartial attention, both are real, and both are important to the metaphysician. Indeed no sooner have we distinguished the two worlds than it becomes necessary to consider their relations.”

IT IS THIS CONSIDERATION which seems to be for Plato the problem of the universal—the central difficulty in the theory of Ideas or separate Forms. As indicated in the chapters on FORM and IDEA, the separation of the two worlds—the sensible world of becoming and the intelligible world of being—always calls for some explanation of their resemblance.

Socrates sometimes refers to the doctrine of Ideas as if its truth could be assumed, and sometimes argues the necessity of a realm of immutable and intelligible being as the object of thought, comparable to sensible, changing things as the object of perception. In the Phaedo, for example, he gets Cebes to admit that the ideas, “which in the dialectical process we define as essences or true existences,” are not subject to change, but that they are “always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms.” In contrast to absolute beauty or goodness, the many beautiful or good things “are always in a state of change.” These, Socrates says, “you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind. Let us suppose then,” he adds, “that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.”

Later in the same dialogue, Socrates repeats the assumption that “there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness and the like.” No other assumption seems to him to provide as satisfactory an explanation of how particular things can be beautiful or good or have any other characteristics. “Nothing makes a thing beautiful,” he declares, “but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful.”

In later Platonic dialogues, the question of the manner comes to the fore. Though the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist refers to the “endless conflict raging” between the materialists and the idealists concerning the existence of the unseen world of ideas, he himself seems to be doubtful only on the point of how the changing things of sense participate in the immutable forms. One answer is suggested in the Timaeus. According to the story of creation which Timaeus tells, the artificer of the world made its sensible particulars copy an eternal pattern. When many things seem to be of one nature or to share the same quality, they are so by virtue of imitating the eternal forms, which are not only absolute essences in themselves, but are also the models for created or generated things.

But in the Parmenides Socrates seems unable to defend the view that “the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of them—for what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.” Nor can he meet other objections which Parmenides raises, such as the difficulty of two or more individuals participating in one idea; for if the idea is wholly in one individual, it cannot be in another, and if each of the many partake of the idea only in part, then the idea cannot be one and indivisible. “In what way, Socrates,” Parmenides asks, “will all things participate in ideas, if they are unable to participate in them as parts or wholes?”

In the course of the discussion Parmenides rebukes Socrates for being squeamish about positing absolute essences for “such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry,” as well as for things which are beautiful and good. But his main intention seems to be to leave Socrates with an unresolved dilemma. On the one hand, the difficulties with the theory of Ideas make the denial of their separate existence reasonable; on the other, the denial of their existence seems to make thought and reasoning impossible, because it deprives the mind of its proper objects.

SOME OF ARISTOTLE’S arguments against the separate existence of universals repeat the objections raised by Parmenides, to which no answer is given in the dialogues of Plato. If it were not for the fact that Aristotle attributes to Plato himself the theory he criticizes, the dialogues would leave us in some doubt as to whether it is Plato or his followers, the Platonists, who hold that theory. But whether or not Aristotle’s criticisms apply to Plato—and even if they involve some misunderstanding of his doctrine—the objections Aristotle raises help define his own position.

To say that the Forms “are patterns and that other things share in them,” Aristotle writes, “is to use empty words and poetical metaphors.” In his view, “the most paradoxical thing of all is the statement that there are certain things besides those in the material universe, and that these are the same as sensible things except that they are eternal while the latter are perishable.” To posit the separate being of the forms of things seems to him a useless multiplication of existences. To say that “there must be Ideas of all things that are spoken of universally” is to make substances of ideas.

Those who say the Forms exist would be right, Aristotle concedes, “if they are substances.” He does not think it is impossible to establish the existence of imperishable and insensible substances, but such substances, if they exist, would not stand in relation to sensible substances as universal to particular, or as one to many. His objection to the theory of Ideas is that, in speaking of absolute beauty or beauty-itself, of the Idea Man or man-itself, the Platonists do no more than add words like “absolute” or “itself” to the names of sensible things, and posit the existence of these absolutes or universals over and above the existence of the sensible particulars having the same name.

Aristotle’s own position seems to be that only individual substances exist, whether they are sensible or intelligible, perishable or eternal, and that “no universal can be a substance” or exist separately in and of itself. He does not thereby deny the reality of the universal. On the contrary, he holds that “without the universal it is not possible to get knowledge,” i.e., scientific knowledge in distinction from mere sense-perception. “All knowledge is of the universal and of the ‘such,’” he writes; yet in adding that “substance is not a universal, but is rather a ‘this,’” Aristotle indicates what is for him the central problem of the universal.

Aristotle’s theory that the mind abstracts universal concepts from the particulars of sense-experience, and that such concepts are the terms of the universal propositions constituting scientific knowledge, leaves a question concerning the object of science. If science is knowledge of real existence, not of our own concepts, and if only individual things really exist, then how can the object of science be the universal, not the individual? What is the object apprehended by the universal concept ‘man’ or ‘horse’?

Aristotle’s answer seems to be that if the universal term ‘man’ can be truly predicated of an indefinite number of individuals, it must signify something common to them all. The common nature or properties shared by a number of individuals cannot be actually universal, however, since, in Aristotle’s opinion, whatever exists in the individual—the form as well as the matter of the concrete substance—is itself individual. He finds it necessary to say, therefore, that the universal exists potentially, not actually, whenever a number of individuals have something in common.

The form which constitutes human nature, for example, is an individual form in Socrates and Callias; but it has the potentiality of being universal insofar as it is capable of being separated from the individual matter of these two men by the abstractive power of the mind. When the abstraction takes place and results in the universal concept ‘man,’ the form thus received in the mind becomes actually universal and enables the mind to apprehend the nature common to all individual men.

ARISTOTLE’S DOCTRINE THAT the universal exists potentially in individual things and actually in the abstract concepts of the mind, later comes to be called “moderate realism,” in contrast to the extreme realism of the position which asserts the actual subsistence of universals, outside of minds as well as apart from individual things. It affirms that the universal has what Russell calls “extra-mental reality,” even though it severely qualifies the real being of the universal by saying it is neither actual nor subsistent.

As Aristotle denies unqualified reality to universals, later philosophers deny that they have any reality at all. Those who are sometimes called “conceptualists” admit the existence of universals only as abstract ideas in the mind. The “nominalist” position, taken by Hobbes and Berkeley, goes further and even denies abstract ideas or universal notions in the mind. It holds that universality is a property of words alone, which manifests itself in the meaning of general or common names.

In the progressive complication of the controversy, each of the theories which has acquired a traditional title undergoes modification as it is reformulated in different contexts. This is especially true of the two middle positions which tend to lean toward one or the other of the extremes.

Locke, for example, may be called a conceptualist because he thinks that general names derive their universal significance from the abstract ideas they signify. But though he denies that by means of our universal notions or abstract ideas we can know the real essences of things, he does not deny real essences. To this extent, he may lean toward moderate realism more than a philosopher like William of Ockham, or a psychologist like William James who says, “We must decide in favor of the conceptualists, and affirm that the power to think things, qualities, relations… isolated and abstracted from the total experience in which they appear, is the most indisputable function of our thought.” Similarly, the development which Aquinas gives to Aristotle’s views, especially in the point he adds concerning ideas in the mind of God—the “eternal exemplars”—may be a form of moderate realism which, more than Aristotle’s, has some affinity with the theory of self-subsistent ideas as the eternal archetypes for sensible particulars.

Aquinas presents his own theory in the context of stating his understanding of the issue between Plato and Aristotle. “Plato supposed,” he declares, “that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible, for a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms species or ideas. From a participation in these, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species… But since Aristotle did not allow that the forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and since forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible, it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible.”

Aquinas speaks of the forms (which exist only in union with matter in individual things) as “universal forms,” even though they are not actually intelligible. “We abstract universal forms from their particular conditions,” he says, and by doing so we “make them actually intelligible.” The Platonic error, in his opinion, consists in thinking that “the form of the thing known must be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known.” From the fact that “the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and immobility,” Plato concluded, erroneously, according to Aquinas, “that the things which we understand must subsist in themselves under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.”

As Aquinas states what he takes to be Aristotle’s correction of this error, it consists in distinguishing two ways in which the universal can be considered. “First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality—i.e., the relation of one and the same to many—is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is subsequent, in our knowledge… Secondly, the universal can be considered according to the nature itself (for instance, animality or humanity) as existing in the individual.” In the order of generation and time, the potential universal precedes the actual universal; that is, the universal form or common nature exists in individual things under conditions of particularity before it exists in the human mind under conditions of abstraction.

Even as forms exist in things (though they are not actually universal prior to their existence as universal concepts of the mind), so they have a mode of being prior to their existence in things. Here Aquinas attributes to Augustine the correction of a pagan error and the substitution for it of a Christian truth. “Whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists,” he writes, “found in their teaching anything consistent with the faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith, he amended.”

Plato, positing “the forms of things subsisting of themselves apart from matter,” had supposed that, “just as corporeal matter, by participating in the Idea of stone, becomes a stone, so our intellect, by participating in the same Idea, has knowledge of the stone.” But, according to Aquinas, “it seems contrary to faith that the forms of things should subsist of themselves without matter outside the things themselves… Therefore, in place of the Ideas defended by Plato, Augustine said that the exemplars of all creatures existed in the divine mind. It is according to these that all things are formed, as well as that the human soul knows all things.”

THE SOLUTION TO THE problem of universals which Aquinas proposes seems to involve a threefold distinction with respect to the being of forms: they are (1) in the human mind by abstraction from our experience of sensible particulars; (2) in individual things; and (3), prior to their existence in things, in the divine mind.

But Aquinas himself says that in God there is no distinction between universal and particular; nor does knowledge “exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular.” The divine ideas, whether considered as the exemplars by which God creates things or as the types and likeness by which God knows them, are not abstractions and so do not have the universality characteristic of human concepts. Whereas our abstract universals do not give us knowledge of individual things in their singularity, the divine ideas, according to Aquinas, are the principles whereby God at once knows the singular and the universal.

If the universal as such is not in the divine mind, neither, in Ockham’s opinion, is it really in things—not even potentially. Everything that exists in an individual—its form and matter, all its parts and properties—is the unique and singular possession of that individual. If there were something common to two things, it would have to be one and two at the same time. As common to both, it would have to be somehow one and the same in both, yet as existing in each, it would have to be distinct in each; it would have to be as singular in each as each individual thing in which it existed. But since Ockham regards this as impossible, he concludes that “no universal really exists outside the soul in an individual substance; nor is it of the substance or the being of things, but is only in the soul.”

The old riddle thus returns in another form. If abstract concepts are in the mind—or if, as Ockham suggests, the logical “terms ‘animal’ and ‘man’ are universals because predicable of many, not through themselves, but for the things they signify”—then what in reality is the object signified by the universal term or concept? It cannot be the many unless the numerically distinct individuals are also alike as men or animals; and how can they be really alike, as opposed to being merely conceived as such, unless they have a common nature or attribute and to that extent are one and the same?

Locke puts the question another way. “Since all things are only particulars,” he asks, “how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for?” He answers that “words become general, by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction, they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea is (as we call it) of that sort.”

But if, as Locke goes on to say, general natures (or genera and species) are “nothing else but abstract ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them,” then in what way do the many individuals represented by one abstract idea have in them “a conformity to that abstract idea”? Locke’s position seems to avoid this problem. “Abstract ideas,” he writes, give us “no knowledge of existence at all.” Only particular propositions are about real existences. “Universal propositions, of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge, concern not existence.” Such propositions express nothing but “the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas.”

In addition to denying their reference to reality, Locke regards abstract ideas as “fictions or contrivances of the mind,” which are imperfect precisely to the extent that they succeed in being universal. The general idea of triangle, he observes, must be neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene, “but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist.” Where Locke seems to mean only that there can be no counterpart in reality to our general ideas, Berkeley, observing the same “imperfection” in what are supposed to be abstract ideas, denies that they can exist even in the mind. “I deny,” he writes, “that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated, or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars.”

Berkeley admits that “a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle.” He recognizes also that all our common names have general significance, but he rejects Locke’s explanation of their general meaning. “A word becomes general,” he says, “by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind.”

Does a nominalist like Berkeley escape the persistent riddle? Does it not reappear in the question which must be asked: what is there in this set of particular ideas, as opposed to some other set, which makes it possible for a general name to signify any one of them indifferently? If each particular idea were absolutely unique and had nothing in common with any other, would the universal have any truth even on the level of names?

James thinks the nominalists are somehow forced to “admit a quasi-universal, something which we think as if it were universal, though it is not; and in all that they say about this something which they explain to be ‘an indefinite number of particular ideas,’ the same vacillation between the subjective and objective points of view appears. The reader never can tell,” James continues, “whether an ‘idea’ spoken of is supposed to be a knower or a known. The authors themselves do not distinguish. They want to get something in the mind which shall resemble what is out of the mind, however vaguely, and they think that when that fact is accomplished, no farther questions will be asked.”

SOME PHILOSOPHERS DEAL with the universal and particular in a manner which leads away from rather than into the traditional problem.

To Spinoza, for example, universal terms, such as man, horse, dog, represent confused images drawn from sense-experience. They provide us with an inadequate knowledge of things. To know things adequately we must proceed “from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.” Quite opposite to the abstract universal (or indeterminate image from experience), the adequate idea is universal in the totally different sense of comprehending an infinite whole.

Hegel also distinguishes between abstract universality and “true infinity or concrete universality.” The former is “something determinate; i.e., being abstraction from all determinacy, it is itself not without determinacy; to be something abstract and one-sided constitutes its determinacy, its defectiveness, its finitude.” The antithesis of the abstract universal is the particular, the determinate content implicitly contained in an abstract universal. The synthesis is the individual; not the particular individual, but the infinite individual which is the concrete universal.

The concrete universal is neither “the universal as a common characteristic, nor the abstract universality which stands outside and over against the individual, the abstract identity of the Understanding.” It is “the universality which has the particular as its opposite, but the particular which by its reflection into itself has been equalized with the universal. This unity is individuality, not individuality in its immediacy as a unit… but individuality in accordance with its concept.” For Hegel, the concrete universal is the immanent Idea itself. It is the manifestation of the Absolute Spirit or God.

However it is formulated and whether or not it is or can be solved, the problem of the universal seems to have a critical bearing on the discussion of many other great ideas. In addition to the chapters enumerated at the beginning, we can now see that the universal, the particular, and the individual are implicated in the consideration of BEING and INFINITY, FORM and IDEA, MATTER and MIND, EXPERIENCE, INDUCTION, JUDGMENT, and SCIENCE. These chapters, in turn, do more than throw light on the various solutions proposed to the problem of the universal. They help us understand the importance of the problem—certainly to the philosophers of the western tradition. If in the broader context of connected issues, it is discovered that the proof of man’s distinctive rationality, or even the possibility of an immortal soul, may depend on the affirmation or denial of universals, at least as concepts in the mind, then, perhaps, some tolerance and patience may be won for the burdensome technicalities of the problem.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The distinction and relation between universal and particular: essence and individual, whole and part, class and member, one and many, same and other, the common and the unique

2. The problem of the universal

  • 2a. The reality of universals: their actual existence as separate forms, or their potential existence in the forms of things
  • 2b. Universals as abstractions or concepts in the human mind
  • 2c. The reduction of universals or abstractions to the meaning of general or common names

3. The problem of the individual: the principle of individuality; the concrete universal

4. Universals and particulars in the order of knowledge

  • 4a. Universals as objects of knowledge: the intuitive or reflexive apprehension of universals
  • 4b. Universals in relation to the angelic intellect and the divine mind
  • 4c. The abstraction of universal concepts from the particulars of sense
  • 4d. The distinction between particular and universal in relation to the distinction between percept and concept, or between image and idea
  • 4e. The inadequacy of our knowledge of individuals: their indefinability
  • 4f. The generality of science: the universality of its principles

5. Universal and particular in relation to grammar and logic

  • 5a. The distinction between proper and common names
  • 5b. The classification of universals: their intension and extension; their degrees of generality
  • 5c. Particulars and universals in predications or judgments: the quantity of propositions; the universal, the particular, and the singular judgment
  • 5d. Rules concerning the universality and particularity of premises in reasoning: the quantity of the conclusion in relation to the quantity of the premises

6. Applications of the distinction between universal and particular

  • 6a. Particular and universal in the analysis of matter and form
  • 6b. Universal and particular causes
  • 6c. The universality of law and particular dispensations of equity

7. Universality and particularity in relation to the distinction between the objective and the subjective, the absolute and the relative

  • 7a. The issue concerning the universality of truth
  • 7b. The issue concerning the universality of moral principles
  • 7c. The issue concerning the universality of aesthetic standards: the subjective universal

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

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1. The distinction and relation between universal and particular: essence and individual, whole and part, class and member, one and many, same and other, the common and the unique

7 PLATO: Laches, 32c-33a / Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Meno, 174a-179b / Euthyphro, 193c / Phaedo, 242c-243c / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK VI, 383d-388a; BK VII, 392a-394a / Parmenides, 486d-489a / Theaetetus, 514b-515d; 534d-536b / Sophist, 559a-c; 569d-574c / Philebus, 610d-613a 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [1a20-b9] 5b-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a; CH 24 [85a31-b3] 116c-d; [85b15-21] 117a / On the Heavens, BK I, CH 9 [277b20-278b9] 369a-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 505b-506b; CH 7 [988b34-989a5] 506c; BK III, CH 3 [998b20]-CH 4 [1000b4] 517a-518d; CH 4 [1001a18-b6] 520a-b; BK V, CH 3 [1014a3-13] 534d; CH 6 [1016b17-1017a3] 537b-c; CH 25 [1023b17-19] 545b-c; CH 25 [1023b22]-CH 26 [1023b32] 545c; BK VII, CH 10 [1034b35-1036a25] 558b-559d; CH 13 562a-563a; CH 15 563c-564c; BK X, CH 1-2 578b,d-580d esp CH 1 [1052a28-37] 578d; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a18-25] 598a; CH 4-5 599d-601a; CH 8 [1074a32-39] 604d; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c / On the Soul, BK III, CH 5 [430a10-17] 662c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 2 142a-143b; TR IX 205a-207a,c 18 AUGUSTINE: On Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 34, 670c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 3 15c-16a; A 3 16a-d; A 4, OBJ 1 16d-17c; A 5, ANS 17c-18b; Q 4, A 1, REP 3 20d-21b; Q 11, A 3, ANS 49a-c; Q 13, A 9, ANS and REP 2 71b-72c; Q 14, A 6, ANS 80a-81c; Q 16, A 4, REP 1 97a-c; Q 30, A 3, ANS and REP 1 169b-170c; A 4 170c-171b; Q 42, A 4, REP 3 227d-228d; Q 77, A 1, REP 1 399c-401b; Q 79, A 5, REP 2 418c-419b; Q 85, A 3 455b-457a; PART I-II, Q 2, A 5, REP 2-3 618d-619c; Q 10, A 1, REP 3 662d-663d; Q 46, A 1, ANS 813b-814a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 81, A 1, ANS 163a-164d; PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS 710a-711c; A 2, ANS 711d-712d; A 5, REP 2 715a-716b; Q 7, A 13, REP 3 755c-756c; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS 1025c-1032b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-333b 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, VI 8a-10a / Objections and Replies, 123a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-40 386b-388b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 9 145b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 6-8 244b-d; BK III, CH I, SECT 3 251d-252a; CH III 254d-260a; CH VI 268b-283a passim, esp SECT 32 277c-278b, SECT 36-37 279a-b; BK IV, CH VII, SECT 9 338d-339b; CH IX, SECT 1 349a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 6-19 405d-410c esp SECT 12-16 408a-409d; SECT 126-128 438b-d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 125, 507b [fn 1] 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 341b-342b 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 115b-c; 193a-200c esp 197b-198a, 199b-c; 211c-218d 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 4b-c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 24 17d-18a; PART III, PAR 184 64b; PAR 353 112b-c / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b; 182d-183c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 166a-b; 308a-312a

2. The problem of the universal

2a. The reality of universals: their actual existence as separate forms, or their potential existence in the forms of things

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 87d-89a; 113c-114a,c / Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228d-230c; 231c-232a; 240b-246c esp 242c-244b / Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a; BK IX-X, 426d-429b / Timaeus, 447a-d; 457c-d / Parmenides, 487c-491a / Theaetetus, 535a-536b / Sophist, 561d-574c / Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a; CH 24 [85a31-b3] 116c-d; [85b15-21] 117a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 22 [178b37-39] 246c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 505b-506b; CH 9 508c-511c; BK III, CH 1 [995b13-18] 514a; [995b31-996a10] 514b-c; CH 2 [997b34-998a19] 516a-d; CH 4 [999b24-1000a4] 518a-d; [1001a4-b25] 519d-520c; CH 6 [1002b11-31] 521b-d; BK VII, CH 8 [1033b19-1034a8] 556d-557b; CH 10 [1035b28-32] 559b; CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c; CH 13-14 562a-563c; CH 15 [1040a8-b4] 564a-c; CH 16 [1040b28-1041a4] 564d-565a; BK VIII, CH 6 569d-570d esp [1045a14-19] 569d-570a, [1045b8-25] 570c-d; BK IX, CH 8 [1050b35-1051a2] 576d-577a; BK X, CH 2 580b-d; CH 10 586c-d; BK XI, CH 1 [1059a39-b8] 587b-c; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a27-37] 598b; CH 3 [1070a4-30] 599b-d; CH 5 [1071a17-30] 600d-601a; BK XIII, CH 1 607a-c; CH 4-5 610a-611d; CH 9 [1086a29-b12] 618b-c 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR V, CH 5-8 307a-308c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 9, 3a; BK X, PAR 19 76a-b / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c; BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 8, A 4, REP 1 37c-38c; Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 29, A 2, REP 4 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4 170c-171b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 79, A 3 416a-417a; A 5 418c-419b; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 444d-446b; A 5 446c-447c; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; A 7, ANS and REP 1 449b-450b; Q 85, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 451c-453c; A 2, REP 2 453d-455b; A 3, REP 1,4 455b-457a; PART I-II, Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b-749a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 5, REP 2 715a-716b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS 1025c-1032b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 59d 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH III, SECT 11 257a-b; CH VI, SECT 26-27 274d-276a; SECT 30, 277a-b 42 KANT: Critique of Judgement, 551a-552c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 309a-311a passim; 873a-b

2b. Universals as abstractions or concepts in the human mind

7 PLATO: Parmenides, 489b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a; CH 24 116b-118a / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-7] 330b / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b5-9] 631c-d; BK III, CH 5 [417b17-24] 648b-c; BK III, CH 4 [429b18-29] 661c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 19 76a-b / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6-7, 269b-d; BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 75, A 5, ANS and REP 1 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, ANS and REP 3-4 388c-391a; Q 79, A 3 416a-417a; Q 84, A 1, ANS and REP 1 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 3 443d-444d; A 4, ANS and REP 1 444d-446b; Q 85, A 2, REP 2 453d-455b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 5, REP 2 715a-716b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS 1025c-1032b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-333b 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 136d-137a; 216d-217d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1 387b-388a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15 98d-99a; BK II, CH XI, SECT 9 145b-c; CH XII, SECT 1, 147b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 6-8 244b-d; BK III, CH I, SECT 3 251d-252a; CH III, SECT 6-20 255c-260a; CH V-VI 263d-283a passim, esp CH V, SECT 1-3 263d-264a, CH VI, SECT 26-51 274d-283a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 31 323c-d; CH VI, SECT 4 331d-332b esp 332b; CH VII, SECT 9 338d-339b esp 339a-b; CH IX, SECT 1 349a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 6-19 405d-410c passim; SECT 126 438b-c

2c. The reduction of universals or abstractions to the meaning of general or common names

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-56a 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 136d-137a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1 387b-388a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, SECT 32, 278a-b 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 11-12 407b-408b; SECT 15 409a-b; SECT 18-19 410a-c; SECT 122 437b-c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 125, 507b [fn 1] 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 309a-311a

3. The problem of the individual: the principle of individuality; the concrete universal

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [1a20-b9] 5b-c / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [999b24-1000a4] 518c-d; CH 6 [1003a5-16] 521d-522a,c; BK V, CH 6 536a-537c passim; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b28-32] 559b; CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c; CH 15 [1039b27-31] 563d; BK X, CH 1 [1052a28-37] 578d; BK XIII, CH 9 [1086a29]-CH 10 [1087a25] 618b-619a,c 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR VII 238a-239b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 3 15c-16a; Q 7, A 1, ANS 31a-d; Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 14, A 11, ANS and REP 1,3 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 29, A 1 162a-163b; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 50, A 4, ANS and REP 3-4 273b-274b; Q 56, A 1, REP 2 292a-d; Q 57, A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 295d-297a; Q 65, A 3, ANS 341c-342b; Q 75, A 4, ANS 381b-382a; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; A 7, ANS 384d-385c; Q 76, A 2 388c-391a; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; Q 85, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 451c-453c; A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; A 7, REP 3 459c-460b; Q 89, A 4, ANS 476c-477a; Q 115, A 1, ANS and REP 3 585d-587c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 2, ANS 711d-712d; A 3, REP 3 713a-714c; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS 1025c-1032b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, DEF 7 373c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVII 218d-228c passim, esp SECT 3 219d-220a 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6a-7a; INTRO, PAR 5-9 13a-14d; PAR 21 17a-c; PAR 24 17d-18a; PAR 26 18b-c; PAR 31-32 19c-20b; PART III, PAR 207 69b-c; PAR 229 75b; PAR 352-353 112b-c; PAR 360 113d-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 2 115d; 7 117b-c; 19 119c-d / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-157b; 158a-159b; 160b-178a esp 165a-b, 176b-c; 179c-d; 182d-183c; PART III, 285b-d

4. Universals and particulars in the order of knowledge

4a. Universals as objects of knowledge: the intuitive or reflexive apprehension of universals

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Meno, 179c-183a / Phaedo, 224a-c; 228a-230c; 231c-232a / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK V, 370d-373c; BK VI, 383d-388a / Parmenides, 489d-491a / Theaetetus, 535b-536a / Sophist, 570a-574c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c; BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-7] 330b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [987a29-b7] 505b-c; CH 9 [990b9-28] 508d-509a; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b5] 518a-b; BK XIII, CH 9 [1086a29-b12] 618b-c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 [417b17-23] 648b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 [1139b25-34] 388c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 19 76a-b / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6-7, 269b-d; BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 38 654b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 11, REP 1 84c-85c; Q 55, A 3, REP 1-2 291a-d; Q 76, A 2, REP 3-4 388c-391a; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 444d-446b; A 5 446c-447c; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; A 7, ANS and REP 1 449b-450b; Q 85, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 451c-453c; A 2 453d-455b; Q 86, A 1, ANS and REP 4 461c-462a; A 2, REP 4 462a-463a; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b-749a; Q 30, A 4, REP 2 751c-752b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 10, A 3, REP 2 769d-771b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS 1025c-1032b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 31 323c-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 308a-314a passim

4b. Universals in relation to the angelic intellect and the divine mind

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 1, REP 3 75d-76c; A 11 84c-85c; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 55, A 2-3 289d-291d; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 2 295d-297a; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4-5 444d-447c; Q 105, A 1, REP 2 538d-539c; Q 106, A 1, ANS 545d-546d; Q 108, A 1, ANS 552c-553c

4c. The abstraction of universal concepts from the particulars of sense

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 21 87d-89b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [71a1-b8] 97b-d; CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a; BK II, CH 19 [99b20-100b3] 136a-d / On the Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429b18-29] 661c; CH 7 [431b14]-CH 8 [432a14] 663d-664d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [449b30-450a10] 690c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VI, CH 8 [1142a13-19] 391b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 14, A 11, REP 1 84c-85c; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 40, A 3, ANS 215c-216d; Q 55, A 3 291a-d; Q 57, A 2, REP 1,3 295d-297a; Q 75, A 5, ANS and REP 1 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, ANS and REP 3-4 388c-391a; Q 79, A 3-5 416a-419b; Q 84 440b-451b; Q 85, A 1-4 451c-457d; Q 86, A 1, ANS and REP 4 461c-462a; A 2, ANS and REP 2,4 462a-463a; Q 89, A 4, ANS and REP 1 476c-477a; PART I-II, Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b-749a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 5, REP 2 715a-716b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS 1025c-1032b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-334d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b / Objections and Replies, 167c-d; 215b-c; 216d-217d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1-2 387b-388b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15 98d-99a; BK II, CH XI, SECT 9 145b-c; CH XII, SECT 1, 147b-c; BK III, CH III, SECT 6-9 255c-256c; CH IV, SECT 16 263b-c; CH VI, SECT 32 277c-278b; BK IV, CH VII, SECT 9 338d-339b esp 339a-b; CH IX, SECT 1 349a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 6-16 405d-409d passim, esp SECT 12-16 408a-409d; SECT 5 414a-b; SECT 97-100 431d-432c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 122 505c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 341b-342b 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 45d-46a; 115b-c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 308a-311a

4d. The distinction between particular and universal in relation to the distinction between percept and concept, or between image and idea

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 126b-c / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK VI, 386d-388a / Theaetetus, 534d-536b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 18 111b-c; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 19 [99b33-100a5] 136b-d / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [189a5-9] 264b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a28-981b13] 499a-500a; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b5] 518a-b; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b35-1036a12] 559b-c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 [417b17-28] 648b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VII, CH 3 [1147a3-b6] 397d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 16-19 75b-76b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 81, A 3, ANS 430c-431d; Q 84, A 1-2 440d-443c; A 6-8 447c-451b; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; A 3, ANS 455b-457a; Q 86, A 1, ANS 461c-462a; PART I-II, Q 17, A 7, ANS 690d-692a; Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b-749a 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, VI, 96d-97a / Objections and Replies, 136d-137a; 138d-139a; 218c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 44 389b-390a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 8-9 145b-c; BK IV, CH VII, SECT 9, 339a-b 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 6-19 405d-410c passim, esp SECT 12-16 408a-409d; SECT 126-128 438b-d 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 341d-342a 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 115b-c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 307b-311a esp 307b-308b, 311b-312b [fn 1]; 480b-484a esp 482b-483b

4e. The inadequacy of our knowledge of individuals: their indefinability

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [2b6-37] 6c-7a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c; BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-7] 330b / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b5] 518a-b; CH 6 [1003a5-17] 521d-522a,c; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b33-1036a12] 559b-c; CH 15 563c-564c; BK XI, CH 2 [1060a20-23] 588d; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356b28-35] 596b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 12, A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 14, A 11 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 29, A 1, REP 1 162a-163b; Q 56, A 1, REP 2 292a-d; Q 57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 86, A 1 461c-462a; Q 89, A 4 476c-477a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 11, A 1, REP 3 772b-773a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 312a

4f. The generality of science: the universality of its principles

7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a; BK VII, 391b-398c 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 4-5 100a-102b; CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a; CH 13-14 107c-109a; CH 18 111b-c; CH 24 116b-118a; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 18-19 135d-137a,c / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 499a-500b; CH 2 [982a21-25] 500c; BK VI, CH 1 [1026a23-33] 548b-c; BK VII, CH 15 563c-564c; BK XI, CH 7 [1064b6-13] 592d-593a 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 [1139b25-34] 388c; BK X, CH 9 [1180b13-23] 435b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356b28-35] 596b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-334d esp 334c-d 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 98c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 17-25 108a-d; APH 103-106 127d-128c; BK II, APH 5 138b-139a; APH 33 161b-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART II, 47c-d / Objections and Replies, 167c-d 33 PASCAL: The Great Experiment Concerning the Equilibrium of Fluids, 358a-b 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1a-2a; BK III, RULES 270a-271b / Optics, BK III, 541b-542a; 543a-b 34 HUYGENS: Treatise on Light, PREF, 551b-552a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH I, SECT 9, 308d-309b; CH III, SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 28-29 322a-323a; SECT 31 323c-d; CH VI, SECT 4-16 331d-336d passim 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 12 408a-b; SECT 15-16 409a-d; SECT 62-66 425a-426a; SECT 103-109 433a-434b passim; SECT 126-128 438b-d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 9 454c-455a; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT XII, DIV 132, 509c 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 14c-15a; 195d-198a esp 197b-198a; 211c-218d / Critique of Judgement, 562d-563b 45 FOURIER: Analytical Theory of Heat, 169a-b; 177a 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 120 136b-c / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d-183c; PART IV, 361a-b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 671a-672a; 861b-886a passim, esp 862a-863a, 865b-866a, 869a-871b, 873a-874a, 882a-884b

5. Universal and particular in relation to grammar and logic

5a. The distinction between proper and common names

8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 7 [17a37-40] 26d / Sophistical Refutations, CH 22 [178b38-179a10] 246c / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 10 [1035b28-32] 559b; CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c; CH 15 [1040a8-14] 564a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 9 71b-72c; A 11 73c-74b; Q 30, A 4, ANS 170c-171b; Q 33, A 2-3 181c-183c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS 424b-425a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15 98d-99a; BK II, CH XI, SECT 9 145b-c; BK III, CH I, SECT 3 251d-252a; CH III, SECT 1-9 254d-256c; SECT 12 257b-c; CH VI, SECT 42 280b-c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 11-12 407b-408b; SECT 18-19 410a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 341b-342b 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 4b-c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 310a-311a; 447b-448a

5b. The classification of universals: their intension and extension; their degrees of generality

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 535c / Sophist, 569d-574c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [1a20-b2] 5b-c; CH 3 [1b10]-CH 5 [3b24] 5d-8a / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 27 [43a25-44] 60c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 4 100a-101b; CH 19-22 111c-115b; BK II, CH 13 131b-133c / Topics, BK I, CH 4-9 144b-147b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [991a27-32] 509c; [992b9-13] 510d; BK III, CH 1 [995b27-31] 514b; CH 3 [998b14-999a23] 517b-518a; BK V, CH 3 [1014a3-13] 534d; CH 25 [1023b22-25] 545c; BK VII, CH 12 [1038a5]-CH 13 [1039a23] 561c-563a; BK X, CH 2 [1053b16-23] 580b-c; BK XI, CH 1 [1059b21-1060a1] 587d-588a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 1 16d-17c; A 5, ANS 17c-18b; Q 30, A 4, ANS and REP 3 170c-171b; Q 40, A 3, ANS 215c-216d; Q 50, A 2, REP 1 270a-272a; Q 66, A 2, REP 2 345d-347b; Q 76, A 3, REP 4 391a-393a; A 6, REP 1-2 396a-d; Q 77, A 4, REP 1 403a-d; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; A 3, REP 4 455b-457a; A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; Q 86, A 2, REP 4 462a-463a; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; PART I-II, Q 18, A 5-11 697a-703a passim; Q 30, A 4, REP 2 751c-752b; Q 35, A 8, ANS and REP 3 779c-780c; Q 46, A 1 813b-814a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 61, A 1, REP 1 54d-55c; PART III, Q 10, A 3, REP 2 769d-771b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVI, SECT 1 165c-d; BK III, CH III, SECT 8-9 256a-c; CH IV, SECT 16 263b-c; CH VI, SECT 32-33 277c-278c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 870b-871a

5c. Particulars and universals in predications or judgments: the quantity of propositions; the universal, the particular, and the singular judgment

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 1-3 5a-d; CH 5 [2a11-3a23] 6a-8a / On Interpretation, CH 7 [17a37-b36] 26d-27a / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24b16-21] 39a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 10 [77a3-4] 105d / On the Soul, BK III, CH 11 [434a16-22] 667a 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK II, CH 7 [1107a27-31] 352d-353a; BK III, CH 1 [1110b28-1111a2] 356c-d; BK VII, CH 3 [1146b35-1147a9] 397a-b; [1147a25-b18] 397c-398a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 30, A 4, ANS and REP 3 170c-171b; Q 85, A 5, REP 3 457d-458d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 76, A 1, ANS 141a-c; Q 77, A 2 145d-147c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH V, SECT 10 331a; CH VI 331b-336d; CH IX, SECT 1 349a; CH XI, SECT 13-14 357d-358c; CH XVII, SECT 8 377b-d 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 14c-15c; 39c-41c esp 39d-40a; 51d-52b

5d. Rules concerning the universality and particularity of premises in reasoning: the quantity of the conclusion in relation to the quantity of the premises

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 4-7 40d-45b; CH 24 58b-d; CH 26 59d-60b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 14 108d-109a; CH 24 116b-118a 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VII, CH 3 [1146b35-1147b18] 397a-398a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357a23-b24] 596d-597c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 86, A 1, REP 2 461c-462a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 76, A 1, ANS 141a-c; Q 77, A 2 145d-147c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 8 377b-d 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 110d-112d esp 110d-111c; 118a-c / Critique of Judgement, 540a-b esp 540b [fn 1]

6. Applications of the distinction between universal and particular

6a. Particular and universal in the analysis of matter and form

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 28 546b-c; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b28-32] 559b; CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c esp [1087a10-25] 619c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 1 [412a6-8] 642a; BK III, CH 5 [430a10-17] 662c 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV 50a-57c / Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 3 282a-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 3 15c-16a; A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 4, A 1, REP 3 20d-21b; Q 7, A 1, ANS 31a-d; Q 14, A 11, ANS 84c-85c; Q 19, A 6, ANS 113c-114d; Q 29, A 1, REP 4 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; A 3, REP 4 164c-165c; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 65, A 3, ANS 341c-342b; Q 75, A 4, ANS 381b-382a; Q 76, A 2 388c-391a; A 3, REP 2 391a-393a; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; Q 85, A 1, REP 2 451c-453c; A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; A 7, REP 3 459c-460b; Q 115, A 1, ANS and REP 1-3 585d-587c; Q 119, A 1, ANS 604c-607b; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 2, ANS 711d-712d

6b. Universal and particular causes

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a6] 98b-c / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 505b-506b; BK V, CH 2 [1014a15-25] 534b-c; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 2 24b-25a; Q 14, A 11, ANS 84c-85c; Q 19, A 6, ANS and REP 3 113c-114d; Q 22, A 2 128d-130d; Q 55, A 3, REP 3 291a-d; Q 57, A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 65, A 3, ANS 341c-342b; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3 442b-443c; Q 115, A 2, ANS 587c-588c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 9, A 6 662a-d; Q 46, A 1, ANS 813b-814a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 4, A 4, REP 1 733a-734a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 16 362a; PROP 28 365c-366a

6c. The universality of law and particular dispensations of equity

7 PLATO: Laws, BK VI, 699d-700b; BK IX, 754a-d; BK XI, 777d-778b; BK XII, 785c-786a 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK V, CH 7 382c-383a; CH 10 385c-386b / Politics, BK III, CH 16 485b-486c; BK IV, CH 4 [1292a19-37] 491c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354a26-b16] 593b-d; CH 13 [1373b1-17] 617c-d; [1374a17-b24] 618c-619a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 1, REP 2 205b-206b; Q 96, A 6 235a-d; Q 97, A 4 238b-239b; Q 100, A 8, ANS and REP 1 259d-261a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 94d; PART II, 133d-135d; 144c; 156b-c 35 LOCKE: Concerning Civil Government, CH I, SECT 6 26b-c; CH XI, SECT 135-139 55d-58a; SECT 142 58b; CH XIV, SECT 159 62b-c; CH XVI, SECT 195 70a-b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 152b-154a 38 MONTESQUIEU: The Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3c 38 ROUSSEAU: The Social Contract, BK II, 397a-d; 399b-400c 41 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 73d-74b; 77d-78a; 88c-89d; 91b-c; 96d 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 60a-c / Critique of Practical Reason, 305d-307d / The Science of Right, 399c-400a 43 THE FEDERALIST: NUMBER 78, 232c-d; NUMBER 80, 237a-b; NUMBER 83, 244b-245c passim; 248d-249a 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 209 69d; PAR 214 71a-c; PAR 216 71d-72a; PAR 219 72d-73a; PAR 223-229 73c-75b; ADDITIONS, 132 137d-138b; 134 138b-c; 141 139c / The Philosophy of History, PART IV, 364d-365a

7. Universality and particularity in relation to the distinction between the objective and the subjective, the absolute and the relative

7a. The issue concerning the universality of truth

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 86a-d / Theaetetus, 517b-532a 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5-6 528c-531c; BK X, CH 1 [1053a31-b3] 580a; BK XI, CH 6 590d-592b 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a 12 EPICTETUS: The Discourses, BK II, CH 20 164c-166c 18 AUGUSTINE: The City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 3 10d-11d; Q 16, A 1, REP 2 94b-95c; A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 65c; PART IV, 267b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 209c-212a; 240c-246a; 251d-253c; 259c-261c; 267c-d; 271b-272d; 318a-319b; 439c-440a 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 13a-c; 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 67 115d-116a 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II 1a-3b / Discourse on the Method, PART II, 46b-c / Meditations on First Philosophy, V, 95b-96a / Objections and Replies, 272a-273a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72 181a-184b esp 182b; 381-385 238b-239a / The Great Experiment Concerning the Equilibrium of Fluids, 358b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 4-7 94a-95c esp SECT 7 95a-c; BK IV, CH XI, SECT 13-14 357d-358c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, PREF, 404a; INTRO, SECT 1-5 405a-d; SECT 40 420b; SECT 101-102 432c-433a 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 8-9, 454b-455a esp DIV 9, 455a; SECT XII, DIV 126-128 507a-508a 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 36a-37b; 129c-130a; 194b-c; 202b-203c; 218d-222b; 224a-227a; 240b-243c / Critique of Practical Reason, 311d-313d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 274b-293b passim 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160b-178a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 639a-646a; 671a-672a; 880b-881a

7b. The issue concerning the universality of moral principles

5 EURIPIDES: The Phoenician Maidens [499-502] 382b 6 HERODOTUS: The History, BK III, 97d-98a 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 58a-62d / Cratylus, 86a-d / Meno, 183b-184c; 187d-190a,c / Gorgias, 271b-277c passim / Republic, BK VI, 383d-386c / Theaetetus, 525c-526a; 528b-532a / Laws, BK X, 760c 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 3 339d-340b; CH 7 [1098a25-b8] 343d-344a; BK II, CH 2 [1104a1-9] 349b-c; BK III, CH 4 359a-c; BK V, CH 7 382c-383a; BK VII, CH 11 [1152b1-3] 403c; CH 12 [1152b25-33] 403d-404a; BK X, CH 5 [1176a3-29] 430c-d / Politics, BK I, CH 6 [1255a32-37] 449a; BK VII, CH 1 [1323a34-36] 527b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 4 264a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 13 16c-d / On Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 14 663c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, A 7, ANS 614c-615a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 77, A 2 145d-147c; Q 94, A 4 223d-224d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a; 61d-62a; 91a-92b; 95d-96b; PART II, 140b; PART IV, 272c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 46b-47c; 93b-c; 115b-119d; 124c-125a; 146b-c; 209c-212a; 281a-284c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC II [254-257] 43b / Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II [51-60] 114a-b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART II, 46b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 371b-372d; PART IV, PREF 422b,d-424a; PROP 8 426b-c; PROP 64 444b 33 PASCAL: The Provincial Letters, 29b-44a / Pensées, 309 228b; 312 229a; 325 230b-231a; 381-385 238b-239a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 1-21 103d-111a passim; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 55-56 192c-193b 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 132, 509c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 330d-331c; 343d-345c; 362a-b / A Discourse on Political Economy, 369a-370a / The Social Contract, BK IV, 434c 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 173b-174a; 239a-b / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254d; 260a-261d; 264b-d; 265c-266d; 270d-271a; 273d-287d esp 275b-d, 277d-279d, 281c-283d / Critique of Practical Reason, 294c-295d; 297a-314d esp 301a, 307d-314d; 317a-b / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372b-d; 377c-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 388b-c; 390b,d-391c; 392b-393a / The Science of Right, 397a-398b / Critique of Judgement, 478a-479d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 269c-270c; 274b-293b passim / Utilitarianism, 445c-446d; 461c-464d; 471b-476a,c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 89 35c-d; PART II, PAR 107 40b-c; PAR 112 41c-d; PAR 135 47b-d; ADDITIONS, 71 127b-c; 86 129c; 131 137d / The Philosophy of History, PART II, 280b-281b 49 DARWIN: The Descent of Man, 314c-316a 50 MARX-ENGELS: Manifesto of the Communist Party, 427a-b; 428b-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 194a-195a; 213a-216c; BK XIV, 611a-c; EPILOGUE I, 645a-646c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 886b-888a

7c. The issue concerning the universality of aesthetic standards: the subjective universal

7 PLATO: Ion 142a-148a,c / Symposium, 167a-d / Statesman, 593d-595a / Laws, BK II, 653c-656b; 660a-662a; BK III, 675c-676b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 20 265a-b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VI, CH 2-3 21d-23a / Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 11, 287b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, PAR 20 24b-c / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4, REP 1 25d-26c; PART I-II, Q 27, A 1, REP 3 737b-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 230b-231c 26 SHAKESPEARE: The Merchant of Venice, ACT V, SC I [89-110] 431d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC II [454-471] 45a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 371b-372d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 105 193a 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 132, 509c-d 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 23d [fn 1] / Critique of Judgement, 476a-479d esp 479a-d; 480d-482b; 488a-492a esp 488a-491c; 513b-516b; 516d-517c; 524d-525a; 540b-542a 44 BOSWELL: The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., 202b; 362b-c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 185c-d 49 DARWIN: The Origin of Species, 95a-d / The Descent of Man, 301c-302a; 462d-463a; 569c; 571c-577d esp 573b-c, 575d, 577b-c; 595d-596a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 755a-757b; 886b-888a

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

  • Other general discussions of the distinction between the universal and the particular, see IDEA 4b(2); ONE AND MANY 1c.
  • The problem of the reality or existence of universals, see BEING 7d(2); FORM 2a, 3b; SAME AND OTHER 2a.
  • The character and conditions of individual existence, see IDEA 1f; MATTER 1c; and for the problem of our knowledge of individuals, see FORM 3b; KNOWLEDGE 5a(4).
  • Discussions relevant to the consideration of universals as objects of knowledge, see FORM 1a; IDEA 1a; KNOWLEDGE 6a(3).
  • Various statements of the theory of abstraction and of the distinction between sensory images and abstract ideas, see IDEA 2g; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 5b, 6c(1); SENSE 5a; and for the abstraction of universal concepts in relation to inductive generalization, see EXPERIENCE 2b; INDUCTION 1a.
  • The universality of scientific laws, see SCIENCE 4d.
  • Another discussion of proper and common names, see SIGN AND SYMBOL 2d.
  • The ordering of universal concepts according to their degrees of generality, see IDEA 4b(3), 5d; RELATION 5a(4); SAME AND OTHER 3a(1).
  • Universal and particular in the logical theory of judgment and reasoning, see JUDGMENT 6a; REASONING 2a(2).
  • Other discussions of the good in general and the order of goods, see BEING 3-3b; GOOD AND EVIL 5a-5d; HAPPINESS 2b-2b(7).
  • The conception of equity as rectifying the imperfection of laws which results from their universality, see JUSTICE 10d; LAW 5h.
  • Other comparisons of history, poetry, and philosophy, see HISTORY 1; PHILOSOPHY 1d; POETRY 5b; TRUTH 4b.
  • Other discussions of the true, the good, and the beautiful as objective or subjective, absolute or relative, see BEAUTY 5; CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 5a, 9a-9b; GOOD AND EVIL 6d; RELATION 6b-6c; TRUTH 7b.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

AQUINAS. On Being and Essence, CH II-IV Quaestiones Disputatae, De Anima, A 4 DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 58-59 HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL I, SECT I, CH I J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK I, CH 2; BK II, CH 3

II.

PORPHYRY. Introduction to Aristotle’s Predicaments BOETHIUS. In Isagogem Porphyrii Commenta ABELARD. Glosses on Porphyry JOHN OF SALISBURY. Metalogicon, BK II, CH 17 ALBERTUS MAGNUS. On the Intellect and the Intelligible, TREATISE I-II DUNS SCOTUS. Reportata Parisiensia, BK I-II OCKHAM. Summa Totius Logicae — Expositio Aurea et Admodum Utilis Super Artem Veterem, PART I-II CAJETAN. In De Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, IV (4-8), V-VI, XXV JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica, PART II, QQ 3-12 T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, V BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, VOL III, pp 458-497 W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL II (34-36) ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES I (9-10) WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Principia Mathematica, PART I, SECT C, D, E; PART II, SECT A BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, Terminal Essays, V — Essays on Truth and Reality, CH 3 W. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART I, CH 8, 11 MCTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, BK II WHITEHEAD. An Introduction to Mathematics, CH 2 — Science and the Modern World, CH 10 SANTAYANA. The Realm of Essence, CH 1-11 DEWEY. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 13-14 BLANSHARD. The Nature of Thought, CH 16-17 B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 4-8 — The Problems of Philosophy, CH 9-10 — Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, CH 13, 15-17 — The Analysis of Mind, LECT 11 — The Analysis of Matter, CH 27 — Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART II, CH 3, 10; PART IV, CH 8