Chapter 95: TYRANNY

INTRODUCTION

If any point in political theory is indisputable, it would seem to be that tyranny is the worst corruption of government—a vicious misuse of power and a violent abuse of the human beings who are subject to it. Aristotle’s remark that “no freeman, if he can escape from it, will endure such government,” would seem to express the sentiments of all who, loving liberty and abhorring slavery, look upon tyranny as destroying the one and establishing the other.

Certainly the word “tyranny” is seldom if ever used eulogistically. Such phrases as “a just tyranny” or “a good tyrant” are at once seen to be as self-contradictory as “a round square.” The great books of history give the impression that tyrants and despots, who vastly outnumber good rulers, are always objects of hate and fear, never of love and admiration. If there are exceptions, if there are peoples who willingly submit to or even deserve the yoke of despotism and tyranny, they are, in the judgment of ancients and moderns alike, politically primitive.

The traditional association of the word “despotism” with “tyranny” requires us to consider whether our understanding of these terms is as uniformly clear as the denunciation of what they denote seems to be universal. Are despotism and tyranny the same? It may be thought that the tyrant must always have despotic power at his disposal, power unlimited by law, so that the lawless ruler is at once both despot and tyrant. But need the despot, the absolute ruler, always rule tyrannically?

The familiar phrase, “benevolent despotism,” at once suggests the negative answer, and also some line of distinction between despotism and tyranny. Tyranny can never be benevolent. But despotism may be no worse than paternalism. While its injustice may consist in treating adults, able to govern themselves, as if they were children, it may also derive an air of justice from the fact that the despot, like the father, rules his subjects for their own good. If he treats them like slaves rather than children, exploiting them to serve his own interests, then he is not a benevolent but a tyrannical despot.

This understanding of the meaning of “despotism” and “tyranny” seems to be only partly supported by their etymology. The Greek word from which “despot” comes signifies the head of a household, the paterfamilias (as he is called by the Romans) who exercises the absolute authority of a master over chattel slaves, and of a parent over his children. In contrast, the Greek word tyrannos refers to the ruler of a state rather than a family, and is sometimes used as if it were equivalent in meaning to “king.” Yet both words carry the connotation of absolute power, and when, in addition, the subjects of a tyrant are considered to be no better off than slaves, the difference in the meaning of the two words almost disappears.

The difficulty of grasping what is essential to the nature of tyranny and despotism seems to be complicated by certain criteria, originally proposed by the Greeks, for distinguishing between king and tyrant, or between royal and despotic rule. Both Plato and Aristotle speak of the king as a good monarch and the tyrant as a bad one. Both say that monarchy, or rule by a single man, is royal when it is for the welfare of the ruled and tyrannical when it serves only the interests of the ruler. Both make lawlessness—either a violation of existing laws or government by personal fiat without settled laws—a mark of tyranny.

Yet, for Aristotle at least, some of these criteria also apply to despotism, and even to royal government, insofar as these are distinguished from political or constitutional government—government by law rather than by men. Furthermore, the association of either tyranny or despotism with monarchy—rule by one man, whether just or unjust—seems to be counter-balanced by Aristotle’s discussion of the tyranny of the few and of the many. In a monarchy, the king can turn tyrant; but so can the wealthy become despotic in an oligarchy, or the poor in a lawless democracy.

The nature of tyranny thus seems to be more difficult to define precisely than would at first appear from the almost universal condemnation of it as the worst perversion of government.

To some extent, the difficulties may be verbal. The word “tyranny” is used with many meanings, not only by the Greeks, but throughout the tradition of the great books. Some writers identify tyranny and despotism; some distinguish the two sharply. Some writers consider tyranny and despotism only in connection with monarchy; some extend the consideration to other forms of government. The words are sometimes used descriptively, without the connotation of good or evil; and sometimes they are more derogatory than descriptive.

Even when the necessary verbal clarifications are achieved, genuine issues still remain. Conflicting accounts are given of the causes of tyranny or the circumstances from which it develops. Concerning despotism, some writers take the position that it may be justified by conquest, or by the need of a people for absolute government, or, in the form of a temporary dictatorship, by emergency conditions. Not even the condemnation of tyranny seems to be unanimous, if the views of Hobbes are to be reckoned with; nor, among those who condemn tyranny, is the fairly general approval of tyrannicide free from the strong dissenting voice of Kant.

THE FOREGOING INDICATES how the notions of tyranny and despotism are involved in other chapters dealing with the various forms of government and, in addition, such chapters as JUSTICE, LIBERTY, and SLAVERY. The distinction, for example, between domestic and political slavery bears on one of the ways in which despotism and tyranny are distinguished; and the discussion in the chapters on MONARCHY and CONSTITUTION concerning absolute and limited government raises a question which must also be considered here, namely, whether absolute monarchy can be distinguished from despotism and whether it has an inveterate tendency to become tyrannical.

That question deserves immediate attention, because its answers are connected with opposed views of the justice or defensibility of tyranny and despotism. Plato and Aristotle, for example, treat tyranny as the prototype of political injustice, and the tyrant as the extreme case of the vicious man; yet there are passages which appear to have a contrary tenor. In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger proposes a good tyrant as the best means for establishing the laws. To the question, “What are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?” he thinks the legislator’s answer should be: “Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick at learning and of a courageous and noble nature”—in short, let him have temperance and every other virtue.

More readily than monarchy, democracy, or oligarchy, tyranny is the stepping stone to the best state, according to the Athenian Stranger, because it involves the greatest power concentrated in a single man. The combination of virtue and power may rarely be found, but, he says, “when the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into being, and in no other way.”

Aristotle’s classification of the types of kingship, or the forms of royal government, seems to include tyranny among them. He refers to the kind of monarchy which prevails among the barbarians who, “being more servile in character than Hellenes… do not rebel against a despotic government. Such royalties,” he goes on, “have the nature of tyrannies because the people are by nature slaves, but there is no danger of their being overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal.” Even among the Hellenes in ancient times, Aristotle points out, there was a form of monarchy or “dictatorship” that may be defined “as an elective tyranny, which like the barbarian monarchy, is legal, but differs from it in not being hereditary.”

These two forms of tyranny, Aristotle says elsewhere, “are both according to law, and therefore easily pass into royalty.” The line between king and tyrant is not, however, as shadowy as might first appear. “Kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants over involuntary; and the one are guarded by their fellow citizens, the others are guarded against them.” The forms of monarchy which Aristotle also calls “tyrannies” seem to him to have a mixed character. “They are royal,” he says, “in so far as the monarch rules according to law over willing subjects; but they are tyrannical in so far as he is despotic and rules according to his own fancy.” But there is also a kind of tyranny which, being unmixed, is “the counterpart of perfect monarchy. This tyranny is just that arbitrary power of an individual which is responsible to no one, and governs all alike, whether equals or better, with a view to its own advantage, not to that of its subjects, and therefore against their will.”

Aristotle explains his association of tyranny with monarchy on the ground that “both are forms of one-man rule, but,” he adds, “there is the greatest difference between them; the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects.” Tyrannical government is “monarchy exercising the rule of a master over political society,” and therefore deserves to be called “despotic” as well as tyrannical. When it has no admixture of royalty, tyranny is not only self-serving but lawless rule. It is “the very reverse of a constitution,” or rule by law. Except for the hypothetical case in which the truly superior, the almost god-like man is king, Aristotle seems to identify absolute or unconstitutional monarchy with tyranny and despotism, and he condemns both for violating the very nature of the state conceived as “a community of free men.”

THE LINE BETWEEN KING and tyrant is similarly drawn by Plato. Monarchy for him “divides into royalty and tyranny” according as one man rules by law or lawlessly, over voluntary or involuntary subjects. If the one man were like a god in relation to other men, it would be fitting for him to rule the state by his wisdom or science and without recourse to laws. “If there could be such a despot,” the Eleatic Stranger says in the Statesman, “he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect state,” but men “can never be made to believe that any one can be worthy of such authority.” (History suggests the contrary in such cases as Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler.)

Giving the name of “king” to the monarch who abides by and maintains established laws, the Stranger gets Socrates to agree that the ruler should be called a “tyrant” when he “governs neither by law nor by custom, but, imitating the true man of science, pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation.”

In the Republic, Socrates refers to Euripides’ praise of “tyranny as god-like,” and gives, as another reason for excluding the poets from the state, the fact that “they are the eulogists of tyranny.” Far from being god-like, the tyrannical man is described by Socrates as “drunken, lustful, passionate.” Tyrants “are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.” Oriental despotism, Hegel later writes, appears to give freedom to one man, but “the freedom of that one is only caprice, ferocity—brutal recklessness of passion… That one is therefore only a despot; not a free man.”

According to Plato, tyranny is not only the greatest evil a state can suffer, but the tyrant is also the unhappiest of men. “Will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest,” Socrates asks, “be also the most miserable?” Polus, in the Gorgias, tries to prove that, like the successful criminal who goes unpunished, the tyrant who does injustice to everybody, but suffers none, achieves more happiness than other men. But Socrates, taking the position that it is better to suffer than to do injustice, argues to the contrary that the tyrant is more miserable than those whom he oppresses.

If this is true, the confirmed tyrant is probably the man least able to perceive or acknowledge it. Plutarch reports the story of Plato’s first meeting with Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. When Plato tried to prove to him that “tyrants, of all men, had the least pretence to virtue,” and that, since they lacked justice, they suffered “the miserable condition of the unjust,” Dionysius would not hear the argument out. “He asked the philosopher in a rage,” Plutarch relates, “what business he had in Sicily. To which Plato answered, ‘I come to seek a virtuous man.’ ‘It seems, then,’ replied Dionysius, ‘you have lost your labor.’” According to Plutarch, Dionysius tried to have Plato killed on his return voyage to Greece; or failing that, to have him sold into slavery. He would not be harmed by that, Dionysius reasoned, because, “being the same just man as before, he would enjoy his happiness, though he lost his liberty.”

ON THE WHOLE, THEN, Aristotle’s and Plato’s disapproval of tyrants and tyranny seems to be unequivocal. The passages which might cause this to be questioned can perhaps be accounted for by the ancient tendency to use the word “tyrant” descriptively to denote the possessor of absolute power. Yet even in the Laws, where such usage occurs, Plato observes that kings, unable “to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power,” tend to overthrow the laws and so become tyrannical in the invidious sense of the word.

With the exception of Hobbes, medieval and modern writers are no less disapproving than the ancients. “Tyrannical government,” according to Aquinas, “is altogether corrupt” and completely lawless. It is the tyrant himself, rather than those who may rebel against a government so lacking in justice, who is “guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely.” When a king, by becoming a tyrant, “has dethroned himself and put himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them” asks Locke, “from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man who has put himself in a state of war with them?”

In Locke’s view, it is a mistake to think that the fault of tyranny “is proper only to monarchies. For wherever the power that is put in any hands for the government of the people and the preservation of their properties is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary irregular commands of those that have it, there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many… Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm.”

Tyranny is thus defined by Locke as “the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to.” Such “absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government.” Tyranny so defined may not be limited to monarchies; but, according to Locke, absolute monarchy is always tyrannical. For that very reason it is, he writes, “inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all.”

What Locke calls “tyranny” or, without change of meaning, “absolute monarchy,” Kant calls “autocracy.” But Kant distinguishes the monarch “who has the highest power” from the autocrat “who has all power.” Hegel calls “despotism” that “state of affairs where law has disappeared and where the particular will as such, whether of a monarch or a mob, counts as law or rather takes the place of law.” The writers of the Federalist use the words “tyranny” and “despotism” interchangeably, but do not vary from the definition which Montesquieu gives of despotic government as “that in which a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice.” In all other governments, even in monarchy when it is constitutional, the separation of powers puts some limitation on the power entrusted to the offices of state.

Following Montesquieu’s doctrine, Madison declares: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” He reinforces his point by quoting Jefferson’s dictum that concentrating “all the powers of government… in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic government.”

HOBBES SEEMS TO BE the one exception in the great books to this variously expressed opinion of the evil of absolute power. Locke may have him in mind when he says that absolute monarchy is “by some men … counted the only government in the world.” Certainly Hobbes would not repudiate the charge that he thinks none but absolute government feasible; nor is he dismayed by the tendency of other writers to call absolute government “tyrannical” or “despotic.” On the contrary, he dismisses this as so much empty name-calling.

In every form of government, according to Hobbes, the sovereign power must be absolute to be effective. “Though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor, are much worse.” Describing the absolute dominion of the father over his children, and the equally absolute dominion of the master over his slaves, Hobbes says that “the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution,” for unless the sovereign is also absolute, “there is no sovereignty at all.”

To the cry “Tyranny,” Hobbes replies that just as men who “find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy,” or those who “are displeased with Aristocracy, call it Oligarchy,” so “they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny.” He holds Aristotle’s Politics responsible for spreading the fallacy of regarding anything except popular government as tyrannical; and in general he blames the Greek and Roman writers for fomenting sedition against kings by treating tyrannicide as lawful.

Hobbes offers an historical explanation of the origin of these confusions. “A Tyrant,” he writes, “originally signified no more simply, but a Monarch. But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signify, not only the thing it did before, but with it the hatred which the popular states bore towards it; as also the name of King became odious after the deposing of the Kings of Rome.”

A word like “tyranny” carries only emotional force. Used descriptively, Hobbes declares, “it signifies nothing more nor less than the name of Sovereignty, saving that they that use the former word are understood to be angry with them they call Tyrants.” He is willing to make himself the object of that anger by identifying “a professed hatred of Tyranny” with “hatred to Commonwealth in general,” and by regarding the toleration of both hatreds alike as evil seeds of sedition.

IN ONE NEGATIVE RESPECT, Rousseau seems to agree with Hobbes. Not that the man who holds that only republican institutions are legitimate, in any way accepts the identification of either prince or popular government with sovereign power. But he, like Hobbes, rejects Aristotle’s distinction between the king and the tyrant as good and bad monarchs, the one governing for the good of his subjects, the other in his own interest. Rousseau contends not only that most Greek authors used “the word tyrant in a different sense … but also,” he adds, “it would follow from Aristotle’s distinction that, from the very beginning of the world, there has not yet been a single king.”

It is only according to a vulgar usage that a tyrant is conceived as “a king who governs violently and without regard for justice or law.” The more precise conception, Rousseau insists, defines the tyrant as “an individual who arrogates to himself the royal authority without having a right to it. This is how the Greeks understood the word ‘tyrant’; they applied it indifferently to good and bad princes whose authority was not legitimate. Tyrant and usurper are thus perfectly synonymous terms.”

The usurpation of power is, according to Rousseau, the root of both tyranny and despotism, but they are not for that reason to be confused. “I call him who usurps the royal authority a tyrant,” Rousseau writes, “and him who usurps the sovereign power a despot. The tyrant is he who thrusts himself in contrary to the laws to govern in accordance with the laws; the despot is he who sets himself above the laws themselves. Thus the tyrant cannot be a despot, but the despot is always a tyrant.”

Other writers distinguish between tyranny and despotism on different principles. They accept, where Rousseau rejects, the notion that tyranny is not merely a usurpation of power, but always a self-serving or unjust use of that power. They reject Rousseau’s conception of despotism as inseparable from usurpation. Absolute power can be gained and held in other ways.

Locke, for example, conceives despotical dominion as the rule of a master over slaves, or the government of a vanquished people by their conquerors in a just war. “Despotical power,” in his opinion, “is an absolute arbitrary power one man has over another to take away his life whenever he pleases.” Unlike tyranny, it is not “power beyond right,” for “the conqueror, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all that actually aided and concurred in the war against him.” Since, in Locke’s view, “a usurper can never have right on his side,” despotic dominion, when justified, is not achieved by usurpation.

For Montesquieu, despotisms constitute one of the three major forms of government, the other two being republics (aristocratic or democratic) and monarchies. Though he regards despotism as an intrinsically corrupt form of government, in which the rulers wield personal power without the restraint of law, he also judges it to be appropriate to the servile natures or temperaments of certain peoples. Like Aristotle and Hippocrates before him, he attributes to the climate and disposition of the Asiatic peoples their submissiveness to the worst excesses of despotism.

Montesquieu does not so much condemn despotism as he deplores the conditions which seem to render it necessary or natural for a large part of mankind. He does not suggest, as Mill does, that despotic government can and should serve to civilize those who are as yet unprepared for self-government. Despotism is benevolent, according to Mill, only if it prepares a people for freedom; if it tries to perpetuate itself, it is tyrannical or enslaving.

Though Mill holds the view that, relative to a free society, there cannot be a “good despot” no matter how benevolent his intentions, he also thinks that, in dealing with barbarians, “despotism is a legitimate mode of government … provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind has become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.”

Under certain “conditions of society … a vigorous despotism,” according to Mill, “is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization.” In his opinion, still other conditions justify despotism. “I am far from condemning,” he writes, “in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.” In another place, he says that “the establishment of the despotism of the Caesars was a great benefit to the entire generation in which it took place” because “it put a stop to civil war, and abated a vast amount of malversation and tyranny by praetors and proconsuls.” But in all these cases the essential point is that the despotic rule should be temporary. Mill applies the same criterion to the despotism which occurs in the government of colonial dependencies. It should aim to benefit a subject people by training them in the arts of government, and it should not seek to outlast the conferring of this benefit. “The ruling country,” he thinks, “ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs, guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure of barbarian despotisms… Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one.”

This may be the ideal, but critics of imperialism, like Swift or Marx, think that colonial policies are in fact otherwise motivated—by land-grabbing, by the desire for national aggrandizement, and by the profits to be made from the economic exploitation of colonies or subject peoples. Throughout the pages of Thucydides and Tacitus, the spokesmen for empire dwell upon the blessings which Athenian or Roman rule bestows, only to be answered by the protests of the colonists or the conquered, who seem to prefer the insecurities and uncertainties of liberty to the mixed motives of even the best despot.

AS ALREADY INDICATED, the political significance of tyranny and despotism is broader than the conception of the tyrant as an unjust king or of the despot as an absolute monarch. The reign of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens and of the Decemviri at Rome are classical examples of oligarchical tyranny. Advocates of republican or democratic institutions, like the writers of the Federalist or J. S. Mill, are as much concerned to safeguard constitutional or representative government from the tyranny of special interests—whether of a dominant majority or of concentrated wealth—as they are to protect the rule of law from the encroachments of despotism which begin with usurpations of power by elected officials.

Moderns and ancients alike fear the susceptibility of the mob to the wiles of the demagogue, who encourages their lawlessness in order to take the law into his own hands. Both Hegel and Plato see in the alliance between a scheming demagogue and an unruly populace the step by which a corrupt democracy turns into a tyranny. Though Aristotle disagrees with what he takes to be the theory of Socrates in the Republic, that tyranny normally arises from democracy in the progressive degeneration of the state, his own opinion seems to be that “tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy … in their most extreme forms” and that “almost all tyrants have been demagogues who gained the favor of the people by their accusation of the notables.”

These aspects of tyranny are discussed in the chapters on DEMOCRACY and OLIGARCHY. The traditional emphasis, however, is on the individual tyrant, whether he is an hereditary prince who misuses his autocratic power, the usurper of an established throne, or the demagogue who makes himself dictator. However tyranny arises, monarchy is the form it usually takes in the pages of history or poetry—the domination of the state by one man. But while the great political philosophers offer conflicting theories of the origin of tyranny, there seems to be remarkable agreement concerning the methods the tyrant uses to maintain himself in power.

Other political practices may vary greatly from one historical epoch to another, but the devices of tyranny seem to have a certain timelessness. When they are describing the actions of the tyrant, Herodotus, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Gibbon tell stories of iniquity, of cruelty, of cowardly and unscrupulous stratagems, so alike in detail that the reader loses all sense of time and place. Nor need he exert any effort of imagination to place the figure of the tyrant thus delineated in the setting of contemporary events.

The past also speaks with contemporary relevance in Plato’s enumeration of the tyrant’s desperate measures, his stirring up of foreign wars to smother domestic discord, his assassination of enemies, his purging of friends or followers, and his confiscation of property as well as his generally indiscriminate blood-letting. The resort to unwarranted searches and seizures, the creation of ex post facto crimes, the arrest and punishment of men without trial “have been,” writes Hamilton, “in all ages the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.” So, too, in all ages, the tyrant, fearing reprisal and revenge, lives in a state of war, turns his palace into an armed camp, and goes nowhere without a numerous bodyguard which, as both Aristotle and Machiavelli suggest, functions most efficiently when composed of hirelings or mercenaries.

The great books contain not only the record of tyrannical perfidy and violence, but also recommendations to the would-be tyrant of the best means to use for his nefarious purposes. Though Rousseau refers to Machiavelli’s Prince as “the book of Republicans,” and thinks that “the choice of his detestable hero, Caesar Borgia, clearly enough shows his hidden aim,” the rules which Machiavelli formulates for the prince seem, on the surface at least, to be essentially similar to the advice Aristotle gives the tyrant.

The end in both cases is the same—success in the effort to gain and keep power. The means, in general, are force and fraud or, as Machiavelli phrases it, the methods of the lion and the fox. Machiavelli counsels the prince “to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred.” He tells him that he should appear to keep faith without hesitating to break his promises, that he should avoid flatterers and sycophants, and that he should acquire a reputation for liberality without cost to himself. Not very different is Aristotle’s advice to the tyrant—to lop off the heads of those who are too high and to humble all the rest, to sow discord among his subjects, to impoverish the people by multiplying taxes, to employ informers, and to encourage the betrayal of one faction by another.

But in his suggestion of another course for the tyrant to take—the policy of not merely pretending, but of actually trying, to conduct himself like a just king—Aristotle seems to deviate from the spirit of Machiavelli’s maxim that the appearance of virtue is profitable so long as it does not interfere with doing whatever is expedient, however vicious. Yet even here Aristotle says that “the tyrant must be careful… to keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny.”

The best commentary on these recommendations seems to be indirectly expressed by their authors. Both Aristotle and Machiavelli draw one striking conclusion from the history of those—call them princes or tyrants—who have tried to put such rules into practice. Whether its collapse is due to the inherent weakness of might without right, as Aristotle suggests, or, in Machiavelli’s terms, to the unforeseeable mishaps of fortune, tyranny, of all forms of government, seems to be the shortest-lived.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature and origin of tyranny 1a. The lawlessness of tyrannical rule: might without right 1b. The injustice of tyrannical government: rule for self-interest 1c. Usurpation: the unauthorized seizure of power 1d. The character of the tyrannical man: the friends of the tyrant
2. Tyranny as the corruption of other forms of government 2a. The perversion of monarchy: the tyrannical king 2b. The degeneration of oligarchy: the tyranny of the wealthy 2c. The corruption of democracy: the tyranny of the masses or of the majority; the rise of the demagogue
3. The choice between tyranny or despotism and anarchy
4. The nature and effects of despotism 4a. The relation of despotism to tyranny and monarchy: the benevolence of despots 4b. The comparison of paternal and despotic dominion: the justification of absolute rule by the incapacity of the ruled for self-government
5. The contrast between despotic and constitutional government: government by men and government by laws 5a. Despotic and constitutional government with respect to political liberty and equality: the rights of the governed 5b. Despotic and constitutional government with respect to juridical defenses against misgovernment, or redress for grievances through due process of law 5c. The location of sovereignty in despotic and constitutional government: the sovereign person, the sovereign office, the sovereign people 5d. The analogues of despotic and constitutional rule in the relation of the powers of the soul: the tyranny of the passions
6. Imperial rule as despotic, and as tyrannical or benevolent: the government of conquered peoples or colonies
7. The ways of tyrants or despots to attain and maintain power
8. The fate of tyrants: revolutions for liberty and justice against tyranny and despotism; tyrannicide

REFERENCES

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Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

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For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The nature and origin of tyranny

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [863-910] 107b-c / Antigone [640-745] 136d-137c 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [429-456] 262a-b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 12b-14a; BK V, 178a-180a 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 352c-d; 353b; BK VI, 523b-524d 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 262a-270c esp 263d / Republic, BK I, 301b-309b esp 304b-c; BK VIII, 402b-c; BK VIII-IX, 411d-420d / Sophist, 554c / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 682a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 10-11 412c-413d / Politics, BK III, CH 8 [1279b16-17] 477a; BK IV, CH 10 495a-b; BK V, CH 5 [1305a8-28] 506d-507a; CH 10 [1310b39-1311a28] 512d-513c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 [1365b39-1366a6] 608b 14 PLUTARCH: Timoleon, 196c-197b / Alexander, 566a-b / Dion, 782d / Aratus, 835b-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 36b; BK IV, 72a-b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, REP 5 307d-309d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XII [100-139] 17b-d 22 CHAUCER: Parson’s Tale, PAR 67, 531b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 105a; PART IV, 273a-c; CONCLUSION, 280d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [37-114] 303d-304c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [1-104] 319a-321b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 15 174a; 332 232a-b; 871 344b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH XVI-XIX 65d-81d passim, esp CH XVIII, SECT 197 70c-d, CH XVIII, SECT 199 71a, CH XIX, SECT 239 80d-81b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 70a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 356b-358b / Political Economy, 370a-b / Social Contract, BK I, 388b-c; BK III, 419b-c; BK IV, 438c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 32d-34a,c; 111d 42 KANT: Science of Right, 450b-d 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [25-98] 1b-3a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 20, 77b-c; NUMBER 47, 153c-d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-268a; 274b,d [fn 1] 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 278 92c-93a

1a. The lawlessness of tyrannical rule: might without right

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [399-414] 44a-b 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [429-456] 262a-b 5 ARISTOPHANES: Wasps [463-507] 512d-513c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-d 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 432b-c; BK V, 504c-508a,c 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 263d-264a / Republic, BK I, 301c-d; BK VIII, 411d-416a / Statesman, 603b; 604a-b / Seventh Letter, 805d 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK III, CH 10 [1281a19-28] 478d-479a; CH 17 [1287b37-1288a5] 486c; BK IV, CH 10 [1295a9-23] 495a-b; BK V, CH 10 [1313a8-18] 515c-d; CH 11 [1314a35-37] 517a-b; BK VII, CH 2 [1324b23-41] 528d-529a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH 7, 232c-d 14 PLUTARCH: Timoleon, 196c-197b / Caius Marius, 344c-354a,c / Sulla, 382a-387a,c / Lysander-Sulla, 387b,d / Alexander, 566a-b / Caesar, 591d 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 36b / Histories, BK II, 233d; BK III, 265a-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 92, A 1, REP 4 213c-214c; Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, A 4, ANS 233a-d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 332 232a-b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH XI, SECT 136-137 56c-57b; CH XIII, SECT 155 60d-61a; CH XVI, SECT 197 70c-d; CH XVIII 71a-73c; CH XIX, SECT 222 75d-76c; SECT 232-233 78c-79c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323d-324a; 361c-362a / Political Economy, 370d-371a / Social Contract, BK I, 388d-389a; BK III, 419a-c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40c-d 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 74c-d 42 KANT: Science of Right, 450b-d 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-98] 1a-3a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 57, 177d-178a 43 MILL: On Liberty, 274b,d [fn 1] 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 278 92c-93a / Philosophy of History, PART III, 301c-302a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 8d-10d; EPILOGUE I, 647b-649d

1b. The injustice of tyrannical government: rule for self-interest

OLD TESTAMENT: I Kings, 12:1-15—(D) III Kings, 12:1-15 / II Chronicles, 10—(D) II Paralipomenon, 10 / Psalms, 72:4—(D) Psalms, 71:4 / Proverbs, 28:15-16; 29:4 / Isaiah, 1:23; 33:14-15; 10:1-3; 14; 56:9-12—(D) Isaias, 1:23; 33:14-15; 10:1-3; 14; 56:9-12 / Ezekiel, 22:27; 45:8-9; 46:18—(D) Ezechiel, 22:27; 45:8-9; 46:18 / Micah, 3:1-3—(D) Micheas, 3:1-3 / Zephaniah, 3:3—(D) Sophonias, 3:3 APOCRYPHA: Judith, 2:1-3—(D) OT, Judith, 2:1-6 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [616-630] 104d-105a; [863-910] 107b-c / Antigone 131a-142d esp [640-745] 136d-137c 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 353b; BK V, 506b-c 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 262d-270a / Republic, BK I, 304a-c; BK VIII, 413d-416a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 6 [1134a35-b8] 382b; BK VIII, CH 10-11 412c-413d / Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1267a3-17] 462c-d; BK III, CH 6 [1279a17-22] 476c; CH 7 [1279a28-32] 476d; [1279b4-10] 476d-477a; CH 17 [1287b37-1288a5] 486c; BK IV, CH 10 [1295a18-23] 495a-b; BK V, CH 10 [1310b39-1311a8] 513b; BK VII, CH 2 [1324b23-41] 528d-529a; CH 14 [1333b1-5] 537d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 [1366a3-6] 608b 14 PLUTARCH: Demetrius, 742c-743b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK VI, 90d-91a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, REP 2,5 307d-309d; PART II-II, Q 42, A 2, REP 3 584b-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XII [100-139] 17b-d; PURGATORY, VI [112-151] 62a-c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure, ACT II, SC IV [151-187] 186b-c / Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [37-114] 303d-304c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [63-110] 320b-321b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH I, SECT 13 28a-b; CH VII, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH XII, SECT 143 58c-d; CH XIV, SECT 162-163 63a-b; CH XVIII, SECT 199-202 71a-72a; CH XIX, SECT 232-233 78c-79c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-b; 361c-362a / Political Economy, 368a-b; 370a-b / Social Contract, BK III, 419b,d [fn 1] 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 35a-39d passim, esp 38a-b; 55d; 59b-61a passim; 167a-c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 39b-d 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 4, 35b; NUMBER 84, 251d-252a 43 MILL: Representative Government, 366a-370a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 8d-10d; EPILOGUE I, 647b-649d

1c. Usurpation: the unauthorized seizure of power

OLD TESTAMENT: II Samuel, 15-18—(D) II Kings, 15-18 / I Kings, 16:8-20—(D) III Kings, 16:8-20 / IV Kings, 8:7-15; 12:19-21; 14:17-21; 15:13-14,23-25,30; 21:18-26—(D) IV Kings, 8:7-15; 12:19-21; 14:17-21; 15:13-14,23-25, 30; 21:18-26 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [399-414] 44a-b / Agamemnon [1612-1673] 69a-d 5 EURIPIDES: Heracles Mad [140-274] 366b-367c 5 ARISTOPHANES: Wasps [463-507] 512d-513c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 12b-14a; BK III, 102d-106c; BK VII, 243b-c 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 264c-265d 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK V, CH 10 [1310b14-31] 513a; [1313a8-10] 515c; BK VII, CH 14 [1333b28-38] 538c-d 14 PLUTARCH: Caius Marius, 344c-354a,c / Sulla, 369a-374a; 382a-387a,c / Sertorius, 469a-470d / Pompey 499a-538a,c esp 524b-c / Caesar 577a-604d 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 1b-2a; 4b-d; BK III, 32d-33c / Histories, BK I, 195a-201c esp 197a-c 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3 Henry VI, ACT I, SC 1 [124-195] 87c-88a / Richard III 105a-148a,c esp ACT V, SC III [237-270] 146b-c 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH XVI, SECT 176 66a-b; CH XVII 70c-71a; CH XIX, SECT 212-220 74a-75d passim 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 77a-b; 78d-79b 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 408b-c; 419a-c; 424a-d; BK IV, 432c-433a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b esp 24d-25a, 27b-d; 43b-44b; 69a-71a; 111b-113a esp 111d; 386a-387d; 436a-438a esp 436c-437b; 489d-491a; 515b-518a passim 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 16, 68b-c; NUMBER 17, 70a-c; NUMBER 21, 78d-79b; NUMBER 26, 94a-d; NUMBER 28, 97c-98b; NUMBER 31, 104d-105c; NUMBER 33, 108d-109a; NUMBER 41, 133a-b; NUMBER 44, 146c-d; NUMBER 45, 148b-d; NUMBER 78, 230a-232c; NUMBER 81, 239a-c 43 MILL: Representative Government, 350d-351c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 8d-10d; EPILOGUE I, 647b-649d; EPILOGUE II, 681a-d

1d. The character of the tyrannical man: the friends of the tyrant

OLD TESTAMENT: I Kings, 21—(D) III Kings, 21 / Proverbs, 28:15-16 / Ecclesiastes, 10:5-7,16-17 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [196-243] 42b-c 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [863-910] 107b-c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-d 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 262a-270c; 285d-287c / Republic, BK I, 308c-309a; BK II, 311c-312d; BK IX 416a-427b / Laws, BK III, 671c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 11 [1161a30-b10] 413c-d; BK X, CH 6 [1176b9-23] 431a-b / Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1267a3-17] 462c-d; BK IV, CH 4 [1292a15-17] 491c; BK V, CH 11 [1313b30-1314a12] 516c-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 19 125b-126c; BK IV, CH 1, 215b-d; CH 5, 229a-b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VIII [481-495] 272a 14 PLUTARCH: Timoleon, 201b-202c / Pelopidas, 242b-243c / Lysander, 362b-365a / Sulla, 384a-c / Lysander-Sulla, 387b,d-388c / Lucullus, 409d-410d / Demetrius 726a-747d esp 742c-743b / Antony-Demetrius 780a-781a,c / Dion, 782b-788b / Aratus, 835b-836d / Artaxerxes 846a-858d esp 856b-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 20b-c; BK IV, 63d-64c; 65c-67a; 79b-c; BK VI, 87b-88b; BK XI, 102d-103a; BK XIV, 145a-d; 153d-154d; BK XV, 172c-173a / Histories, BK I, 195a-c; 197a-b; BK II, 224c-d; 233d; 238d-240b; BK III, 256d-257d; BK IV, 268b-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, REP 2,4-5 307d-309d 22 CHAUCER: Physician’s Tale 366a-371a 23 MACHIAVELLI: The Prince, CH VII, 13a-c; CH XV-XIX 22b-30a; CH XXIII 33d-34b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 3a-5a; 126b-131a passim; 337b-c; 351b-353c 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III 105a-148a,c esp ACT I, SC II [151-200] 124c-125a, SC V 128b-129c, ACT IV, SC II 133d-135b, ACT V, SC I 142d-143a / Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC II [94-214] 570b-571c; ACT III, SC I [31-73] 580d-581b 27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure, ACT I, SC IV 184c-186c / Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [50-114] 304a-c / Pericles, ACT I, SC I [92-104] 422d / Winter’s Tale, ACT II, SC III 501b-504a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK IV [366-394] 160b-161a 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 24b-25a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 364a-b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 29b; 32d-33a; 34d-39d esp 35b, 37a; 53c-56d; 59b-61a; 70c-71a; 76a; 167a-d; 388d-389c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 113c-114a; 166a-167c; 173b-174a; 189b-193c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 107a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 8d-10d; BK X, 465c-467a; EPILOGUE I, 647b-649d

2. Tyranny as the corruption of other forms of government

2a. The perversion of monarchy: the tyrannical king

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [616-630] 104d-105a / Antigone [640-745] 136d-137c 5 EURIPIDES: Heracles Mad [140-274] 366b-367c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-108c 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 352c-d 7 PLATO: Republic, BK IX, 418d-419a / Statesman, 590c-d; 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 672d-674d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 10 [1160a31-b8] 412c-d; [1160b23-33] 413a / Politics, BK III, CH 7 [1279b4-10] 476d-477a; CH 8 [1279b16-17] 477a; CH 14 [1285a17-29] 483b-c; CH 17 [1287b38-1288a5] 486c; BK IV, CH 2 [1289a26-b4] 488b-c; CH 4 [1292a15-19] 491c; CH 10 [1295a9-23] 495a-b; BK V, CH 10 [1310b39-1311a28] 512d-513c; [1312b4-9] 514d-515a; [1312b37-1313a16] 515c-d; CH 11 [1314b37-1315a11] 517b-518c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 [1365b39-1366a2] 608b 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus-Theseus, 30c-d / Demetrius, 742c-743b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK II, CH 21, 162a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, REP 2,4-5 307d-309d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 105a; 150c-151a; PART IV, 273a-b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III, ACT V, SC III [237-270] 146b-c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [37-114] 303d-304c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 15 174a 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH I, SECT 13 28a-b; CH VII, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH VIII, SECT 106-111 49a-51a passim; CH XIV 62b-64c passim; CH XVIII 71a-73c esp SECT 200 71a-c; CH XIX 73d-81d passim, esp SECT 231-239 78c-81b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-269b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK VII, 53a-c; BK XI, 75d; 77c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357b-c / Social Contract, BK III, 412d-413a; 414c-d; 419b-c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 31b; 32c-33a; 34d-39d passim; 255b,d-257a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 39b-c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 48, 157b-c 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-268b / Representative Government, 366a-c 44 BOSWELL: Life of Johnson, 195c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 286 96c-97a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173c-d

2b. The degeneration of oligarchy: the tyranny of the wealthy

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 352c 7 PLATO: Laws, BK IV, 681b-682c 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK III, CH 10 [1281a21-28] 478d-479a; CH 15 [1286b8-22] 484d-485a; BK IV, CH 6 [1293a12-34] 492d-493a; CH 11 [1296a22-b2] 496b-c; BK V, CH 8 [1308a14-24] 510b; CH 9 [1309b14-1310a12] 511d-512b / Athenian Constitution, CH 2 553a-c 14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 180c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK II, CH 21, 162a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 273a-b 27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus, ACT I, SC 1 351a-354d 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH XVIII, SECT 201 71c 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK V, 23a-25a passim 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359b-d 42 KANT: Science of Right, 450c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 57 176d-179b passim 43 MILL: Representative Government, 393d-394d 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 420b-d

2c. The corruption of democracy: the tyranny of the masses or of the majority; the rise of the demagogue

5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-425] 261d-262a 5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights 470a-487a,c esp [1111-1150] 483d-484b / Wasps [463-507] 512d-513c; [650-724] 515c-516d / Lysistrata [608-635] 591b-c / Plutus [567-571] 636a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-108c 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK VI, 516b-517a; 523b-c; 524d-525d; 533a-c 7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 411d-413a; BK IX, 416c-417b / Statesman, 603d-604b / Laws, BK III, 675c-676b; BK IV, 681b-682c 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 12 [1273b35-1274a22] 470c-d; BK III, CH 7 [1279b4-10] 476d-477a; CH 10 [1281a11-23] 478d-479a; BK IV, CH 4 [1292a4-37] 491b-d; CH 6 [1293a1-10] 492c; CH 14 [1298a29-34] 498d; BK V, CH 5 [1305a8-28] 506d-507a; CH 8 [1308a14-24] 510b; CH 9 [1309b14-1310a12] 511d-512b; [1310a25-36] 512c; CH 10 [1310b39-b18] 512d-513a; [1312b40-a8] 514d-515a; CH 11 [1313b38-1314a1] 516c; BK VI, CH 4 [1319b26-32] 523b 14 PLUTARCH: Agis, 648b,d-649b 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK III, 265a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK II, CH 21, 162a 27 SHAKESPEARE: Coriolanus, ACT I, SC 1 [1-225] 351a-353d; ACT II, SC 1 [1-106] 361a-362a; ACT III, SC 1 [140-161] 370d-371a; ACT IV, SC VI [74-156] 383a-384a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK III, 10a; BK VIII, 51a-52c 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 411a-b; 419b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 14b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 73b-c; 94d 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1, 30b; NUMBER 8-9, 45a-47c passim; NUMBER 10 49c-53a passim; NUMBER 22, 84c-d; NUMBER 43, 141d-142c; NUMBER 48 156d-159a passim; NUMBER 51, 164a-165a; NUMBER 58, 181b-182a; NUMBER 63, 192c-193a; NUMBER 78, 232a-d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 268d-274a; 298b-299a; 302b-c; 309a-b / Representative Government, 330a; 366c-389b passim, esp 377b, 380c-381d; 406c-d 44 BOSWELL: Life of Johnson, 260b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 180 148b / Philosophy of History, PART II, 273d-274a; 277d; PART III, 295d-296b; 300a-b; PART IV, 365c-366b

3. The choice between tyranny or despotism and anarchy

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 23b-24a 14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 68d-70d / Pompey, 525a-526d / Caesar, 588c-591d; 598d-599a / Cato the Younger, 638b-639a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 1b-c; BK III, 51b-52a / Histories, BK IV, 290a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 104b-d; 112b-d; PART IV, 273a-b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH I, SECT 13 28a-b; CH VII, SECT 90-93 44d-46a; CH XI, SECT 137 56d-57b; CH XVIII, SECT 203-210 72a-73c; CH XIX, SECT 224-229 76d-78a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 356b-c; 359b-c / Social Contract, BK I, 389b; BK IV, 433a-434b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 8-9, 45a-47c passim; NUMBER 16-20 66c-78b passim, esp NUMBER 16 66c-68d; NUMBER 70, 210c-d 43 MILL: Representative Government, 344c-d; 350b-355b passim, esp 351c-d; 367b-c

4. The nature and effects of despotism

7 PLATO: Statesman, 590c-d; 598b-604b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 11 [1161a11-22] 413b-c / Politics, BK I, CH 5 447d-448c; BK III, CH 13 [1284a3-b34] 482a-483a; CH 14 [1285a17-b34] 483b-484a; BK IV, CH 10 [1295a9-23] 495a-b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 51b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, REP 2 430c-431d; PART I-II, Q 17, A 7, ANS 690d-692a 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 17-18 28d-29b; CH IV 29d-30b; CH VII, SECT 85 43c-d; CH XV, SECT 172-174 65b-d 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a; 8d-9a,c; BK III, 12a-13c; BK IV, 15a-c; BK V, 26a-30a; BK VI, 33d-35a; 39d-40d; BK VIII, 54a-b; 57b-58d; BK IX, 60a-b; BK X, 68b-d; BK XV, 109a; BK XVIII, 128d; BK XIX, 137c-140c 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 387b,d-391b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 50a-b; 91a; 154b-c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81c-d; 320d-321b 42 KANT: Science of Right, 438a-b; 450c-d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 297a-b / Representative Government, 341d-344d; 367b-c; 382b-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 270, 89b; PAR 286, 96c-d; PAR 355 112d-113a; ADDITIONS, 180 148b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 161a-c; PART I, 213b-214d; 222a-c; 230a-c; PART III, 285d; 302a-d

4a. The relation of despotism to tyranny and monarchy: the benevolence of despots

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK VI, 523b-524d 7 PLATO: Statesman, 590c-d; 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 672d-674d; BK IV, 681b-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 10 [1160b23-32] 413a; CH 11 413b-d / Politics, BK III, CH 14 [1285a17-b34] 483b-484a; CH 17 [1287b37-1288a7] 486c; BK IV, CH 10 [1295a9-23] 495a-b; BK V, CH 10 [1310b14-32] 513a; CH 11 [1314b30-1315a11] 517a-518c / Athenian Constitution, CH 15 559b-c 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 9a-d / Romulus-Theseus, 30c-d / Solon, 75c-76d / Poplicola, 80d-82a / Alexander 540b,d-576d passim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, REP 2 430c-431d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 110b-111a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 131b,d-133b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH VIII, SECT 107 49b-d; CH XIX, SECT 231-239 78c-81b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART II, 74a-76b; PART III, 120a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a; 7c-9a,c; BK III, 12a-13c; BK IV, 15a-c; BK V, 25d-26c; 30a-31b; BK V-VI, 32b-35a; BK VI, 36a-b; 37a-38b; 43c; BK VII, 46a; 47d-48a; 50a-b; BK VIII, 56d-57c; BK IX, 60a-61a; BK XI, 75a-b; 75d; BK XII, 90b-c; BK XIII, 97a-b; 98d-100b; 102a,c; BK XV, 109a; BK XXV, 211c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-c / Social Contract, BK III, 419b-c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b; 32c-33a; 40d-41d; 50a; 255b,d-257a; 338d-344a,c passim; 389c-390c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 39b-40b 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-268c / Representative Government, 339a-340d; 341d-344d; 348d-349a; 351a-354b passim 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 286 96c-97a

4b. The comparison of paternal and despotic dominion: the justification of absolute rule by the incapacity of the ruled for self-government

5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [640-676] 136d-137a 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-425] 261d-262a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 35c-d; BK III, 107c-108c; 120b-c 7 PLATO: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 670c-671a; BK IV, 679c-680d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 6 [1134b8-18] 382b-c; BK VIII, CH 10 [1160b23-32] 413a; CH 11 413b-d / Politics, BK I, CH 5 447d-448c; CH 8 [1256b22-25] 450c; CH 12-13 453d-455a,c; BK III, CH 13 [1284a3-b34] 482a-483a; BK VII, CH 2 [1324b23-41] 528d-529a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 51b / Histories, BK I, 191d-192a; 193c-194a; BK IV, 290a-d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK II, CH 21 161b-162d; BK XIX, CH 21, 524c-525a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 104b-d; 109b-112d; PART IV, 273a-c 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes [1010-1060] 361b-362b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VI 36a-42a passim; CH VII, SECT 84-86 43c-44a; CH VIII, SECT 105-110 48c-50d; CH XV, SECT 170 64d-65a; SECT 172-174 65b-d 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 100b-102a; 359b-362c 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3b; BK V, 22d-23a; BK VIII, 57b; BK XV, 110a-111c; BK XVI, 116a-120a; BK XVII, 122a-123b; 124c-d; BK XVIII, 128d; BK XX, 189b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 324a-b; 357a-b / Political Economy, 367a-368c passim / Social Contract, BK II, 402d-403a; BK III, 414c-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 32b-c; 513b-c 42 KANT: Science of Right, 404d; 420b-422d; 436d-437c; 445c-446a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47b-c; NUMBER 55, 174c-d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 271d-272a; 317c-318a / Representative Government, 329c; 339a-341c; 344c; 351c-354b; 436b-437a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 93 36a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 174a-c; 198b-199c; PART III, 300c-301c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: The Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 127b-137c

5. The contrast between despotic and constitutional government: government by men and government by laws

5 AESCHYLUS: Eumenides [681-710] 88b-c 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [904-931] 122d-123a 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-462] 261d-262b 5 ARISTOPHANES: Wasps [463-507] 512d-513c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-108c; BK V, 175b; BK VII, 233a-d 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 368c-d; BK II, 425a-c; 438a-b 7 PLATO: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 667c-676b; BK IV, 681b-682c; BK VIII, 733d-734a; BK IX, 754a-b / Seventh Letter, 805d; 807b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 6 [1134a24-b8] 382a-b; BK X, CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a13-17] 445a-b; CH 5 [1254a34-b9] 448a; CH 7 [1255b16-20] 449b; CH 12 453d-454a, BK II, CH 10 [1272a35-b10] 468d-469a; BK III, CH 6 [1278b30-1279a22] 476a-c; CH 10 [1281a29-39] 479a; CH 11 [1282a1-13] 480b-c; CH 15-17 484b-487a; BK IV, CH 6 492b-493a passim; CH 8 [1293b22-27] 493c; CH 10 [1295a9-23] 495a-b 14 PLUTARCH: Caesar, 591d / Cato the Younger, 638b-639a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 1a-2b; BK III, 51b-c; 61c-62a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 1, REP 2 226c-227c; Q 96, A 5, REP 3 233d-234d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 114b-115a; 131d-132a; 149d-150a 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV, SECT 21 29d; CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c; CH XI 55b-58b passim; CH XVIII 71a-73c 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-269b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a; 8b-d; BK III, 12a-d; BK V, 25d-26c; 30a-c; BK VI, 33a-35a; 36a-37a; BK VIII, 54a-b; BK XIX, 137c-d; BK XXV, 211c-d; BK XXVI, 223c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323d-324a; 357b-c; 358b-d; 361c-362a / Political Economy, 370b-371a / Social Contract, BK I, 387b,d-391b; BK II, 400a; BK III, 408c; 419a-c; BK IV, 433a-434b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b passim; 51c-d; 154a-c; 342a-c; 592a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 73d-75a; 96d; 125a 42 KANT: Science of Right, 450b-d 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b passim 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 47, 153c-154d; NUMBER 55, 174c-d; NUMBER 57, 177d-178a; NUMBER 78, 230d-232a 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-268b; 274b,d [fn 1] / Representative Government, 338d-341d; 341d-350a esp 346a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 278 92c-93a; PAR 286 96c-97a; ADDITIONS, 171 146b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 198b-199c; PART I, 208b-c; PART II, 262a-c; PART III, 301c-302d; PART IV, 342a-d 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-d

5a. Despotic and constitutional government with respect to political liberty and equality: the rights of the governed

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [907-931] 122d-123a 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [429-456] 262a-b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-d; BK VII, 233c-d 7 PLATO: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 672d-674d; BK IV, 681b-682b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 6 [1134a24-b17] 382a-c passim; BK VIII, CH 11 [1161a30-b10] 413c-d / Politics, BK I, CH 7 [1255b16-20] 449b; BK III, CH 6 [1278b30-1279a22] 476a-c; CH 16-17 485b-487a; BK IV, CH 4 [1292a4-37] 491b-d; CH 10 [1295a9-23] 495a-b; BK V, CH 9 [1310a25-36] 512c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK I, SECT 14 254b-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 61c-62a / Histories, BK I, 189a-b; BK IV, 290a-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, REP 2 430c-431d; PART I-II, Q 17, A 7; ANS 690d-692a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 383c-d 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [769-799] 192a-b 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 19a-d / Civil Government, CH IV 29d-30b; CH VI, SECT 61-63 38a-c; CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c; CH IX, SECT 131 54d; CH XI, SECT 135-139 55d-58a; CH XV, SECT 171-CH XVI, SECT 196 65a-70c 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK III, 12b-13c; BK VI, 33a-35a; BK XII, 85a-c; BK XV, 109a-b; 112c-d; BK XIX, 142a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323d-324a; 356b-358b; 359b-d; 361c-362a / Political Economy, 370d-371a; 375b-c / Social Contract, BK I, 387b,d-391b; BK IV, 438c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 14a-c; 33a-34a,c; 91a; 522c-524a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81c-82a; 96a-d; 161c-162a 42 KANT: Science of Right, 436d; 451b-c 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b passim 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 8-9, 45a-47c passim; NUMBER 84, 251b-253d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-268c; 274b-275a / Representative Government, 339d-340c; 341d-344d; 348c-350a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 215 71c-d; PAR 286 96c-97a; PAR 297 99b; ADDITIONS, 180 148b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 161a-c; PART I, 213b-214d; 230a-c; PART II, 271d-272d; PART III, 301c-302a; PART IV, 342b-d

5b. Despotic and constitutional government with respect to juridical defenses against misgovernment, or redress for grievances through due process of law

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c; CH XII, SECT 143 58c-d; CH XVIII, SECT 202-207 71d-73a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 33a-35a; 36a-b; 37a-c; BK XI, 69d-75a passim; BK XII, 85a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 407d-408a; 424a-d; BK IV, 432b-433a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 93a-c; 94c-95c; 96c-d; 173c-d 42 KANT: Science of Right, 436d 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [52-55] 2a; [66-67] [70-71] 2b; [95-105] 3a 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE 11a,c; ARTICLE I, SECT 6 [143-151] 12c-d; SECT 9 [267-272] 13d; SECT 9 [289]-SECT 10 [303] 14a; ARTICLE II, SECT 4, ARTICLE III, SECT 1 [463-468] 15c; ARTICLE III, SECT 3 [507-511] 16a; AMENDMENTS, I-X 17a-18a; XIV, SECT 1 18d 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 44, 144d-145a; NUMBER 47-50 153c-162c; NUMBER 51, 164a-165a; NUMBER 53, 167b-168b; NUMBER 57, 177d-178a; NUMBER 78 229d-233c passim; NUMBER 83 244b-251a passim, esp 245d-246b; NUMBER 84, 251b-253d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-268b; 269a-c / Representative Government, 401d-402b 44 BOSWELL: Life of Johnson, 195c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 286 96c-97a

5c. The location of sovereignty in despotic and constitutional government: the sovereign person, the sovereign office, the sovereign people

OLD TESTAMENT: Judges, 21:25 / I Samuel, 8:4-20—(D) I Kings, 8:4-20 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [429-456] 262a-b / Andromache [464-492] 319b-c 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 107c-108c 7 PLATO: Laws, BK III, 672c-676c 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 2 [1261a23-b6] 456a-b; BK III, CH 1 [1275b22-a21] 472a-c; CH 10 [1281a29]-CH 11 [1282b14] 479a-480c; CH 17 486c-487a 14 PLUTARCH: Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 3 207a-c; Q 96, A 5, REP 3 233d-234d; Q 105, A 1, ANS 307d-309d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 97c-d; PART II, 100c-101b; 104d-106d 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c; CH IX, SECT 127-CH X, SECT 132 54a-55b; CH XIV 62b-64c passim; CH XV, SECT 171-174 65a-d 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a; 7c-9a,c; BK V, 30a-c; BK XI, 69d-75a 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK II, 395a-396a; BK III, 408b-c; 412c-413a; 419a-c; 423a-c; 424a-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b esp 25a, 26d-27c; 51a-d; 100d; 241b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 74b-d; 320d-321a 42 KANT: Science of Right, 436c; 437c-d; 439a-c; 450a-c; 451c-452a 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b esp [43-47] 2a 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE 11a,c; AMENDMENTS, IX-X 17d-18a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 22, 84d-85a; NUMBER 33, 108b-c; NUMBER 39, 125c-d; NUMBER 46, 150b-c; NUMBER 49, 159c; NUMBER 51, 164a-165a; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-269c / Representative Government, 341d-350a passim; 355b-356b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 275 92a-b; PAR 279 93a-94d; ADDITIONS, 167 145c / Philosophy of History, PART II, 272b-273a; PART III, 300a-301c; PART IV, 342b-d; 355c-d; 365c-366b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 680b-684a

5d. The analogues of despotic and constitutional rule in the relation of the powers of the soul: the tyranny of the passions

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120b-c / Republic, BK I, 296b-c; BK IX, 416a-418c; 419b-421a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1102b27-1103a3] 347d-348c / Politics, BK I, CH 5 [1254a33-b26] 448a-b; CH 13 [1260a4-8] 454c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH 1, 213d; 218a-c; CH 5, 229a-b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK VI, 87b-c 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR IV, CH 15, 304c-d; TR VIII, CH 1, 343a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IV, CH 3, 190c; BK XIV, CH 11, 386b; BK XIX, CH 15 521a-c; CH 21, 524c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 24 630c-631a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, REP 2 430c-431d; PART I-II, Q 9, A 2, REP 3 658d-659c; Q 17, A 7 690d-692a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 184b-d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure, ACT IV, SC II [82-88] 194b / Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [32-114] 303d-304c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [79-101] 321a-b esp [90-95] 321a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 54 192b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 393c 42 KANT: Judgement, 586d-587a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 233b-c; PART IV, 346a-c 54 FREUD: The Ego and the Id, 715a-b; 715d-716a / New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 838d-839b

6. Imperial rule as despotic, and as tyrannical or benevolent: the government of conquered peoples or colonies

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 1:8-14; 5 / Judges, 6:1-6 APOCRYPHA: I Maccabees, 1:41-64—(D) OT, I Machabees, 1:43-67 / II Maccabees, 5:21-7:42—(D) OT, II Machabees, 5:21-7:42 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 30b-31a; 35c-36a; 38b-c; BK V, 184a-d; BK VI, 189d; 191b-c; BK VII, 222b-c; 225d-226b 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 368b-370d passim; 379b-c; BK II, 403b-404a; BK III, 424d-429b; BK V, 504c-507c; BK VI, 529b-533a 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 8 [1256b22-25] 450c; BK III, CH 13 [1284a26-b32] 482b-c; BK VII, CH 2 [1324b23-41] 528d-529a; CH 14 [1333b38-1334a2] 538d 14 PLUTARCH: Lucullus, 409b-410b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 17c-d; BK IV, 76a; 82d-83a; BK XII, 117c-d; BK XIV, 149a-b / Histories, BK IV, 286c-287a; 290a-d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 15 521a-c; CH 21 524a-525b 23 MACHIAVELLI: The Prince, CH III-V 3c-8c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 101b-111a; CONCLUSION, 280b-281a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 440b-443d 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 13c-d / Civil Government, CH XVI 65d-70c 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 24b-25a; PART IV, 182b-183a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 56d-57c; BK X, 62b-63a; BK XI, 83c-84c; BK XIII, 96d-97a; BK XV, 110a-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359b / Social Contract, BK I, 389d-390d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 14d-15a; 18a; 23c-d; 33d-34a,c; 147a-b; 420b-d; 522c-523a,c; 550d-551b; 608b,d-609a; 620a; 632d-633a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 51a-53b passim; 216c-217a; 307a-c; 420c; 505a-c 42 KANT: Science of Right, 413d; 454d-455a 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b 43 MILL: Representative Government, 353c; 436b-437a 44 BOSWELL: Life of Johnson, 179c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 351 112a-b; ADDITIONS, 172 146c-d / Philosophy of History, PART III, 298a-299c; 301c-302a 50 MARX: Capital, 372c-374a

7. The ways of tyrants or despots to attain and maintain power

OLD TESTAMENT: Daniel, 3:1-12 APOCRYPHA: I Maccabees, 1:41-64; 10:22-46—(D) OT, I Machabees, 1:43-67; 10:22-46 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [196-243] 42b-c 5 ARISTOPHANES: Wasps [650-724] 515c-516d 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 12b-14a; 21b; 23a-24b; 25c-29b; 35c-36a; BK III, 99a-c; 102d-106c; 114c-115a; 123c; BK IV, 148a-b; BK V, 164a-c; 166c-d; 172c-174b; 179c-180a; BK VI, 187b-c; 191a-b; 192c-d; BK VII, 243b-c 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 380d-382b; BK III, 425a-426d; BK VI, 524c-d; BK VIII, 579c-590c 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 264c-265a / Republic, BK VIII, 411d-415c / Seventh Letter, 803a-b; 811b-813d 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK III, CH 13 [1284a3-b3] 482a-c; BK V, CH 10 [1310b39-1311a28] 512d-513c; [1312a9-1313a17] 515a-d; CH 11 [1313a34]-CH 12 [1315b39] 516a-518d; BK VI, CH 4 [1319b26-32] 523b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357a30-1358a1] 597c-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH 13, 244a-b 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 27c-28d / Solon, 75c-76d / Poplicola 77a-86a,c passim / Camillus, 117c-121a,c / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Caius Marius, 344c-354a,c / Sulla, 382a-387a,c / Agesilaus, 482a-484a; 489b-c; 495a-b / Pompey, 521a-b / Caesar, 580b / Cato the Younger, 636c-d / Agis 648b,d-656d / Tiberius Gracchus 671b,d-681a,c / Marcus Brutus, 809b-811a esp 810b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 1b-2a; 2c-4d; 14a-b; 21b-22b; 23c; BK II, 29d-30d; 31d-32a; 32d-34a; 35c-d; 38c-d; 40a-b; 42b; BK III, 58d-59a; BK IV, 68b-69c; 82a-b; BK XIV, 155b-156a; BK XV, 168a-c; 170c-176b / Histories, BK I, 195a-196c; 198c-199c; 200c-d; 208b-c; 209d-210b 23 MACHIAVELLI: The Prince 1a-37d esp CH III, 3c-5a, CH V 8a-c, CH VI, 9b-10a, CH VII, 11b-c, CH VIII, 14a-c, CH XV-XX 22b-31c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 51a-55d 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III 105a-148a,c / King John 376a-405a,c esp ACT III, SC IV [131-159] 392b-c 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 93 45d-46a; CH XVIII, SECT 210 73b-c 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 37a-b; PART III, 102b-103a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK X, 68b-d; BK XII, 95b-96a,c; BK XIX, 137c-139c; 140a-c; BK XXV, 212a-b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 358d-359a; 360a-b; 361c-362a; 364a-b / Political Economy, 380b-c / Social Contract, BK III, 412d-413a; 417b-c; BK IV, 432c-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-30a esp 28b, 29b-c, 30a; 42b,d-43b; 50a-51b; 53c-59b esp 54c-55b, 56a; 153c-155b; 171d; 525d-526c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1, 30b; NUMBER 8, 45a-47a passim; NUMBER 16, 66d-67a; NUMBER 25, 90d; NUMBER 29, 100d-101a; NUMBER 60, 186c-187a; NUMBER 84, 251d-252a 43 MILL: Representative Government, 366a-c

8. The fate of tyrants: revolutions for liberty and justice against tyranny and despotism; tyrannicide

OLD TESTAMENT: Judges, 3:14-4:24; 6-7; 8:1-13:1; 13:24-25; 14-16 / I Kings, 12:1-25—(D) III Kings, 12:1-25 / IV Kings, 9:1-10:11; 11; 21:18-26—(D) IV Kings, 9:1-10:11; 11; 21:18-26 / II Chronicles, 10; 23—(D) II Paralipomenon, 10; 23 / Jeremiah, 41—(D) Jeremias, 41 APOCRYPHA: I Maccabees, 1-9 passim—(D) OT, I Machabees, 1-9 passim / II Maccabees, 1-13 passim, esp 6—(D) OT, II Machabees, 1-13 passim, esp 6 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 12b-14a; BK III, 84a-d; 85b-c; BK V 160a-185a,c passim, esp 166c-167b, 171c-172c; BK VI, 208d-209b 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 387a-389b; BK VI, 523c-524c; BK VIII, 579c-590c 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 264c-266b; 285d-286b; 293b-c / Republic, BK IX, 418c-420d; BK X, 438a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK V, CH 4 [1304b31-38] 506a; CH 10 [1311a28-1312b33] 513c-515b; CH 12 [1315b12-39] 518c-d / Athenian Constitution, CH 14-19 558d-561d 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VIII [481-496] 272a 14 PLUTARCH: Poplicola 77a-86a,c passim / Timoleon 195a-213d passim / Pelopidas 232a-246a,c passim / Lysander, 366b-c / Caesar, 598d-604d / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c passim / Agis 648b,d-656d passim / Tiberius Gracchus 671b,d-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c / Demetrius, 728b-729d / Dion 781b,d-802a,c / Marcus Brutus 802b,d-824a,c / Aratus 826a-846a,c passim / Galba, 859a-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 9d-15a; 17c-d; 18c-20b; BK IV, 76a-77c; 82d-83b; BK XI, 102d-103a; BK XII, 112a-114a; BK XV, 169a-176b / Histories, BK II-III, 234b-265d esp BK II, 234b-235a; BK IV, 269b-277d esp 269d-270b; 283b-292b; BK V, 298c-302a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 42, A 2, REP 3 584b-d 23 MACHIAVELLI: The Prince, CH V 8a-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 150c-151a 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III 105a-148a,c esp ACT V, SC III [237-270] 146b-c / Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC II [90-161] 570b-571a; SC III [72-130] 573b-d; ACT II, SC I [10-34] 574c-d; [112-183] 575d-576b; ACT III, SC II [13-44] 583d-584a 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [159-240] 305a-306b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 17-18 28d-29b; CH XIV, SECT 166-168 63d-64c; CH XVI, SECT 176 66a-b; SECT 190-196 69b-70c passim; CH XVIII, SECT 202 71d-72a; SECT 210 73b-c; CH XIX 73d-81d esp SECT 223-228 76c-78a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK V, 25d-26c; 28b-29a; BK VIII, 54b-c; BK XIV, 107b-d passim 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 361c-362a / Social Contract, BK II, 402c-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 29c-d; 37a-38a; 39c-40d; 44b-c; 56b-c; 61a; 71b-76a esp 71c-d, 73b-74a; 144a-d; 246a; 420b-d; 449d-450a; 521a-b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 51a-54b; 114a-116a; 166a-167d; 216d-217d; 443b-444a; 574b-577b; 587b-588a 42 KANT: Science of Right, 441b-c; 450d-451a 43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [1-23] 1a-b; [99-121] 3a-b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 14, 62c-d; NUMBER 16, 68c-d; NUMBER 28, 97c-98b; NUMBER 45, 147d-148a; NUMBER 46, 152b-153b 43 MILL: On Liberty, 267d-268c; 274b,d [fn 1] 44 BOSWELL: Life of Johnson, 195c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 295d-296c; PART IV, 345a-b; 359a; 363d-367a 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 424d-425b

CROSS-REFERENCES

• For other discussions bearing on the nature and injustice of tyranny, see: GOVERNMENT 1d-1f; JUSTICE 9c; LAW 7d; SLAVERY 6a.
• For the relation of tyranny to other forms of government, see: ARISTOCRACY 2e; DEMOCRACY 2a; MONARCHY 4b; OLIGARCHY 3a.
• For the distinction between tyranny and despotism in terms of the distinction between slavery and subjection, see: SLAVERY 6a-6b; and for the relation of despotism to absolute monarchy, see: MONARCHY 4a-4b, 4e(1).
• For other statements of the justification of benevolent despotism or of absolute monarchy relative to certain conditions, see: DEMOCRACY 4d; GOVERNMENT 2c; MONARCHY 4e(2); SLAVERY 6c; and for comparisons of domestic and political government which are relevant to this justification of despotism, see: FAMILY 2a; MONARCHY 4a, 4e(1); STATE 1b.
• For the distinction between despotism and constitutional government in terms of the distinction between subjection and citizenship, see: CITIZEN 2b; JUSTICE 9d; LAW 7b; LIBERTY 1d; SLAVERY 6b.
• For the distinction between government by men and government by law, see: CONSTITUTION 1; LAW 7a; MONARCHY 1a(1); and for the political significance of this distinction, see: CONSTITUTION 7b; DEMOCRACY 4b; GOVERNMENT 1g(1)-1g(3); LAW 7b; LIBERTY 1d; MONARCHY 4e(3).
• For the analogies of despotic and constitutional rule in the relations of reason and the passions, see: LIBERTY 3a-3b; SLAVERY 7.
• For the analogies in the economic order of political tyranny and despotism, see: JUSTICE 8c-8c(1); LABOR 5a-5d, 7f; SLAVERY 4a-4c.
• For other discussions of imperialism, see: DEMOCRACY 7b; GOVERNMENT 5b; MONARCHY 5-5b; REVOLUTION 7; SLAVERY 6d; STATE 10b; WAR AND PEACE 6a.
• For the struggle for power and for liberty as between tyrants or despots and the people they oppress, see: LABOR 7c-7c(3); LIBERTY 6b-6c; OLIGARCHY 5c; PROGRESS 3b; REVOLUTION 3a-3b, 3c(3), 4a, 5b; SLAVERY 3c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• MACHIAVELLI. The Discourses
• —. The Life of Castruccio Castracani
• MILTON. The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth
• DOSTOEVSKY. The Possessed

II.

• MARSILIUS OF PADUA. Defensor Pacis
• LUTHER. Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved
• LA BOÉTIE. Anti-Dictator (The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude)
• MARLOWE. Tamburlaine the Great
• BEN JONSON. Sejanus
• RACINE. Britannicus
• VOLTAIRE. “Tyranny,” “Tyrant,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
• GODWIN. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, BK IV, CH 3
• SCHILLER. William Tell
• SHELLEY. Prometheus Unbound
• PUSHKIN. Boris Godunov
• DICKENS. A Tale of Two Cities
• MAZZINI. From the Council to God
• IBSEN. An Enemy of the People
• BRYCE. Address on Colonial Policy
• T. HARDY. The Dynasts
• LENIN. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
• KELSEN. Sozialismus und Staat
• TROTSKY. The Defense of Terrorism
• URE. The Origin of Tyranny
• SHOLOKHOV. The Silent Don
• MARRIOTT. Dictatorship and Democracy
• KOHN. Revolutions and Dictatorships
• MERRIAM. The New Democracy and the New Despotism
• STRAUSS. On Tyranny