Chapter 94: TRUTH
INTRODUCTION
Not everyone knows Josiah Royce’s definition of a liar as a man who willfully misplaces his ontological predicates, but everyone who has ever told a lie will recognize its accuracy. To restate the definition less elegantly, lying consists in saying the contrary of what one thinks or believes. To speak truthfully we must make our speech conform to our thought, we must say that something is the case if we think it is, or that it is not, if we think it is not. If we deliberately say “is” when we think is not, or say “is not” when we think is, we lie.
Of course, the man who speaks truthfully may in fact say what is false, just as the man whose intent is to falsify may inadvertently speak the truth. The intention to speak one’s mind does not guarantee that one’s mind is free from error or in possession of the truth. Herein lies the traditional distinction between truth as a social and as an intellectual matter. What Dr. Johnson calls moral truth consists in the obligation to say what we mean. In contrast what he calls physical truth depends not on the veracity of what we say but on the validity of what we mean.
The theory of truth in the tradition of the great books deals largely with the latter kind of truth. The great issues concern whether we can know the truth and how we can ever tell whether something is true or false. Though the philosophers and scientists, from Plato to Freud, seem to stand together against the extreme sophistry or skepticism which denies the distinction between true and false or puts truth utterly beyond the reach of man, they do not all agree on the extent to which truth is attainable by men, on its immutability or variability, on the signs by which men tell whether they have the truth or not, or on the causes of error and the means for avoiding falsity.
Much that Plato thinks is true Freud rejects as false. Freud searches for truth in other quarters and by other methods. But the ancient controversy in which Socrates engages with the sophists of his day, who were willing to regard as true whatever anyone wished to think, seems to differ not at all from Freud’s quarrel with those whom he calls “intellectual nihilists.” They are the persons who say there is no such thing as truth or that it is only the product of our own needs and desires. They make it “absolutely immaterial,” Freud writes, “what views we accept. All of them are equally true and false. And no one has a right to accuse anyone else of error.”
Across the centuries the arguments against the skeptic seem to be the same. If the skeptic does not mind contradicting himself when he tries to defend the truth of the proposition that all propositions are equally true or false, he can perhaps be challenged by the fact that he does not act according to his view. If all opinions are equally true or false, then why, Aristotle asks, does not the denier of truth walk “into a well or over a precipice” instead of avoiding such things. “If it were really a matter of indifference what we believed,” Freud similarly argues, “then we might just as well build our bridges of cardboard as of stone, or inject a tenth of a gramme of morphia into a patient instead of a hundredth, or take tear-gas as a narcotic instead of ether. But,” he adds, “the intellectual anarchists themselves would strongly repudiate such practical applications of their theory.”
Whether the skeptic can be refuted or merely silenced may depend on a further step in the argument, in which the skeptic substitutes probability for truth, both as a basis for action and as the quality of all our opinions about the real world. The argument takes different forms according to the different ways in which probability is distinguished from truth or according to the distinction between a complete and limited skepticism. Montaigne, for example, seems to think that the complete skeptic cannot even acknowledge degrees of probability to be objectively ascertainable without admitting the criterion of truth, whereas Hume, defending a mitigated skepticism, offers criteria for measuring the probability of judgments about matters of fact.
The position of the skeptic, in its bearing on truth and probability, is discussed in the chapters on KNOWLEDGE and OPINION. Here we shall proceed to other controversial questions concerning truth. But we must first observe that there is one major question which does not seem to cause much dispute. Not only do the great authors (with the possible exception of Montaigne and Hume) seem to be unanimous in their conviction that men can attain and share the truth—at least some truths—but they also appear to give the same answer to the question, What is truth?
The apparently unanimous agreement on the nature of truth may seem remarkable in the context of the manifold disagreements in the great books concerning what is true. As already indicated, some of these disagreements occur in the theory of truth itself—in divergent analyses of the sources of error, or in conflicting formulations of the signs of truth. But even these differences do not affect the agreement on the nature of truth. Just as everyone knows what a liar is, but not as readily whether someone is telling a lie, so the great philosophers seem able to agree on what truth is, but not as readily on what is true. That the definitions—of lying and of truth—are intimately connected will be seen from Plato’s conception of the nature of truth as a correspondence between thought and reality. If truthfulness, viewed socially, requires a man’s words to be a faithful representation of his mind, truth in the mind itself (or in the statements which express thought) depends on their conformity to reality.
A false proposition, according to Plato, is “one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.” Since “false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth,” it necessarily follows, as Aristotle points out, that “to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true,” just as it is false “to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is.”
In one sense, the relation between a true statement and the fact it states is reciprocal. “If a man is,” Aristotle declares, then “the proposition in which we allege that he is, is true; and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is, is true, then he is.” But the true proposition “is in no way the cause of the being of the man,” whereas “the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man’s being or not being.”
This simple statement about the nature of truth is repeated again and again in the subsequent tradition of western thought. What variation there is from writer to writer seems to be in phrasing alone, though the common insight concerning truth as an agreement or correspondence between the mind and reality may occur in the context of widely varying conceptions concerning the nature of the mind and of reality or being.
Plotinus may be an exception, insofar as his theory of knowledge involves a relation of identity rather than of mere correspondence. “The object known,” he writes, “must be identical with the knowing act… If this identity does not exist, neither does truth… Truth cannot apply to something conflicting with itself; what it affirms it must also be.”
But others, like Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Spinoza, adopt the conception of truth as an agreement between the mind and reality. Falsehood occurs, says Augustine, when “something is thought to be which is not.” According to Aquinas, “any intellect which understands a thing to be otherwise than it is, is false.” Truth in the human intellect consists “in the conformity of the intellect with the thing.” The same point is implied, at least, in Descartes’ remark that if we do not relate our ideas “to anything beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false.” Error or, for that matter, truth can only arise in “my judging that the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are outside me.” Spinoza states it as an axiom rather than a definition that “a true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea.”
Making a distinction between verbal and real truth, Locke writes: “Though our words signify nothing but our ideas, yet being designed by them to signify things, the truth they contain, when put into propositions, will be only verbal, when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the reality of things.” Precisely because he considers truth to consist “in the accordance of a cognition with its object,” Kant holds that, so far as the content (as opposed to the form) of a cognition is concerned, it is impossible to discover a universal criterion of truth.
We shall return to Kant’s point in a subsequent discussion of the signs of truth, as also we shall have occasion to return to Locke’s distinction between real and verbal truth. Neither affects the insight that truth consists in the agreement of our propositions or judgments with the facts they attempt to state, unless it is the qualification that truth so defined is real, not verbal.
In his Preface to The Meaning of Truth, James comments on the excitement caused by his earlier lectures on pragmatism, in which, offering the pragmatist’s conception of truth, he had spoken of an idea’s “working successfully” as the sign of its truth. He warns his critics that this is not a new definition of the nature of truth, but only a new interpretation of what it means to say that the truth of our ideas consists in “their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. Pragmatists and intellectualists,” he adds, “both accept this definition as a matter of course.”
“To agree in the widest sense with reality,” James then explains, “can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed. Better either intellectually or practically … Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings … that fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality’s whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will be true of that reality.”
Without enlarging on its meaning as James does, Freud affirms that the ordinary man’s conception of truth is that of the scientist also. Science, he says, aims “to arrive at correspondence with reality, that is to say with what exists outside of us and independently of us. … This correspondence with the real external world we call truth. It is the aim of scientific work, even when the practical value of that work does not interest us.”
The definition of truth as the agreement of the mind with reality leaves many problems to be solved and further explanations to be given by those who accept it. As James indicates, the theory of truth begins rather than ends with its definition. How do we know when our ideas—our statements or judgments—correspond with reality? By what signs or criteria shall we discover their truth or falsity? To this question the great books give various answers which we shall presently consider. There are other problems about the nature of truth which deserve attention first.
For example, one consequence of the definition seems to be that truth is a property of ideas rather than of things. Aristotle says that “it is not as if the good were true and the bad were in itself false”; hence “falsity and truth are not in things… but in thought.” Yet he also applies the word “false” to non-existent things or to things whose appearance somehow belies their nature. Aquinas goes further. He distinguishes between the sense in which truth and falsity are primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things.
The equation between intellect and thing, he points out, can be looked at in two ways, depending on whether the intellect is the cause of the thing’s nature, or the nature of the thing is the cause of knowledge in the intellect. When “things are the measure and rule of the intellect, truth consists in the equation of the intellect to the thing. … But when the intellect is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of things to the intellect”—as the product of human art may be said to be true when it accords with the artist’s plan or intention. Thus “a house is said to be true that fulfills the likeness of the form in the architect’s mind.”
But, according to Aquinas, not only artificial things, but natural things as well, can have truth when they are viewed in relation to the intellect on which they depend. The divine intellect which is the creative cause of natural things measures their truth, as the human intellect measures the truth of artificial things. “Natural things are said to be true,” Aquinas writes, “in so far as they express the likeness of the ideas that are in the divine mind; for a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect.”
Aquinas’ conclusion—that “truth resides primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their source”—at once suggests the profound difference between truth in the divine and in the human intellect. The difference is more than that between infinite and finite truth. The distinction between uncreated and created truth affects the definition of truth itself.
The definition of truth as an equation of thought to thing, or thing to thought, does not seem to hold for the divine intellect. The notion of “conformity with its source,” Aquinas acknowledges, “cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth.” Divine truth has no source. It is not truth by correspondence with anything else. Rather it is, in the language of the theologian, the “primal truth.” “God Himself, Who is the primal truth… is the rule of all truth,” and “the principle and source of all truth.”
In the human sphere, the definition of truth seems to be differently interpreted according as truth is made a property of words or of ideas. “To form a clear notion of truth,” Locke writes, “it is very necessary to consider truth of thought and truth of words distinctly from one another.” The truth of signs, or what is sometimes called “truth of signification,” is “nothing but the joining or separating of words in propositions as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men’s minds.” In contrast to such verbal truth, what Locke calls mental truth consists in the joining or separating of our ideas themselves in a manner to accord with the realities they represent.
For Locke, verbal truth is “chimerical” or “barely nominal” because it can exist without any regard to “whether our ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having, an existence in nature.” The signs we use may truly represent our thought even though what we think or state in words is false in fact. Hobbes takes a somewhat contrary view. “True and false,” he writes, “are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood.”
What is the cause of truth in speech? Hobbes replies that, since it consists “in the right ordering of names in our affirmations,” a man needs only “to remember what every name he uses stands for.” If men begin with definitions or “the settling of significations,” and then abide by their definitions in subsequent discourse, their discourse will have truth. From want of definitions or from wrong definitions arise “all false and senseless tenets.”
Agreement with reality would seem to be the measure of truth for Hobbes only to the extent that definitions can be right or wrong by reference to the objects defined. If definitions themselves are merely nominal and have rightness so far as they may be free from contradiction, then truth tends to become, more than a property of speech, almost purely logistical—a matter of playing the game of words according to the rules. Reasoning is reckoning with words. It begins with definitions and if it proceeds rightly, it produces “general, eternal and immutable truth…. For he that reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude in error.”
Hobbes’ position seems to have a bearing not only on the issue concerning verbal and real truth, but also on the question whether the logical validity of reasoning makes the conclusion it reaches true as a matter of fact. Some writers, like Kant, distinguish between the truth which a proposition has when it conforms to the rules of thought and the truth it has when it represents nature. Valid reasoning alone cannot guarantee that a conclusion is true in fact. That depends on the truth of the premises—upon their being true of the nature of things. Aristotle criticizes those who, accepting certain principles as true, “are ready to accept any consequence of their application. As though some principles,” he continues, “did not require to be judged from their results, and particularly from their final issue. And that issue… in the knowledge of nature is the unimpeachable evidence of the senses as to each fact.”
But not all truth may require or admit of such certification. The truths of mathematics may be different from those of physics or metaphysics, and those of philosophy or religion from those of the empirical natural sciences. It is sometimes supposed, for example, that the truths of mathematics are purely formal or without reference to real existence. That seems to be the position of Hobbes and Hume, both of whom take geometry as the model of truth. For them statements of fact about real existence are at best probable opinions. For others, like James, there can be truth in the natural sciences, but such empirical truth is distinct in type from what he calls the “necessary” or “a priori” truths of mathematics and logic.
Does the definition of truth as agreement with reality apply to all kinds of truth, or only to truths about the realm of nature? The question has in mind more than the distinction between mathematics and physics. It is concerned with the difference between the study of nature and the moral sciences, or between the theoretic and the practical disciplines. “As regards nature,” writes Kant, “experience presents us with rules and is the source of truth,” but not so in ethical matters or morality. A theoretic proposition asserts that something exists or has a certain property, and so its truth depends on the existence of the thing or its real possession of an attribute; but a practical or moral judgment states, not what is, but what should occur or ought to be. Such a judgment cannot be true by correspondence with the way things are. Its truth, according to Aristotle, must consist rather “in agreement with right desire.”
On this theory, all that remains common to speculative and practical truth is the conformity of the intellect to something outside itself—to an existing thing or to desire, will, or appetite. Stressing the difference, Aquinas declares that “truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect.” The “conformity with right appetite” upon which practical truth depends, he goes on to say, “has no place in necessary matters, which are not effected by the human will, but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action or the products of external work.” In consequence, “in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all as to what is particular, but only as to the common principles”; whereas in speculative matters, concerned chiefly with necessary things, “truth is the same for all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions.”
The problem of the criteria or signs of truth does not seem to be of equal concern to all who discuss the nature of truth. For the ancients, at one extreme, it seems to be hardly a problem at all. For William James, at the other extreme, it seems to be the central problem. In the controversy over the pragmatic theory of truth, in which James engages with Bradley and Russell, some confusion tends to result from the fact that James seldom discusses what truth is except in terms of how we know what is true, while his opponents often ignore the signs of truth in discussing its nature. The important point for James is not that truth consists in agreement with reality, but that “true ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify.” Whether we can assimilate or validate or verify an idea in turn depends upon its consequences, either for thought or action, or what James calls “truth’s cash-value in experiential terms.”
In his Psychology, James suggests another aspect of his theory of the expediency of a true idea, which he later developed in Pragmatism. Not only must our conceptions or theories be “able to account satisfactorily for our sensible experience,” but they are also to be weighed for their appeal “to our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs.” Apart from this added criterion, which became the subject of much dispute, the pragmatic theory of truth represents one of the traditional solutions of the problem of how to tell whether something is true or false. It looks mainly to extrinsic signs—not to some feature of the idea or thought itself, but to its consequences.
“The test of real and vigorous thinking,” writes J. S. Mill, “the thinking which ascertains truths instead of dreaming, is successful application to practice.” In similar vein, Bacon says that “of all the signs there is none more certain or worthy than that of the fruits produced, for the fruits and effects are the sureties and vouchers, as it were, for the truth of philosophy.” The man who supposes that the end of learning lies in contemplation of the truth will “propose to himself as the test of truth, the satisfaction of his mind and understanding, as to the causes of things long since known.” Only those who recognize that “the real and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endowment of human life with new inventions and riches,” will submit truth to the test of its leading “to some new earnest of effects.” To take effects as “pledges of truth” is, for Bacon, equivalent to declaring that truth and utility are “perfectly identical.”
Verification by appeal to observation or sensible evidences may be regarded as one way of testing the truth of thought in terms of its consequences, but it also involves the principle of contradiction as a criterion of truth. When Aristotle recommends, for example, that we should accept theories as true “only if what they affirm agrees with the observed facts,” he is saying that when the truth of a particular perception is indisputable, because the observed fact is evident, the general or theoretical statement which it contradicts must be false.
But the principle of contradiction as a criterion of truth goes further than testing theories by their consistency with observation. One of two contradictory statements must be false and the other must be true “if that which it is true to affirm is nothing other than that which it is false to deny.” Even a single statement may show itself false by being self-contradictory, and in consequence its opposite can be seen to be true. What Aristotle calls axioms, or self-evident and indisputable truths, are those propositions immediately known to be true, and necessarily true, because their contradictories, being self-contradictory, are impossible statements, or necessarily false. The truth of any proposition which is neither a self-evident axiom nor the statement of an evident, perceived fact, is tested, according to the principle of contradiction, by its consistency with axioms or perceptions.
As opposed to consequences or effects, contradiction or consistency as a sign of truth seems to be an intrinsic criterion. But this criterion is not universally accepted. “Contradiction,” writes Pascal, “is not a sign of falsity, nor the want of contradiction a sign of truth.” Nor, even when accepted, is it always judged adequate to solve the problem. It is, for Kant, a “merely logical criterion of truth… the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to discover.”
Some thinkers seem to rely upon an intrinsic mark by which each idea reveals its own truth or falsity. Augustine, for example, considers by what criterion he would know whether what Moses said was true. “And if I did know it,” he asks, “would it be from him that I knew it? No,” he replies, “but within me, in the inner retreat of my mind, the Truth, which is neither Hebrew nor Greek, nor Latin nor Barbarian, would tell me, without lips or tongue or sounded syllables: ‘He speaks truth.’ ”
For Augustine, God is the warranty of the inner voice which plainly signifies the truth. For Spinoza, the truth of an idea depends upon its relation to God. Because “a true idea in us is that which in God is adequate, in so far as He is manifested by the nature of the human mind,” it follows, according to Spinoza, that “he who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt the truth of the thing”; for “he who knows a thing truly must at the same time have an adequate idea or a true knowledge of his knowledge, that is to say (as is self-evident) he must be certain.”
It is impossible, Spinoza maintains, to have a true idea without at the same time knowing that it is true. To the question, “How can a man know that he has an idea which agrees with that of which it is the idea?” he replies that “he knows it simply because he has an idea which agrees with that of which it is the idea, that is to say, because truth is its own standard.” For what can be clearer, Spinoza asks, “or more certain than a true idea as the standard of truth? Just as light reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the standard of itself and of the false.”
Spinoza defines an adequate idea as one which, “in so far as it is considered in itself, without reference to the object, has all the properties or internal signs of a true idea.” He explains, moreover, that by “internal” he means to exclude even “the agreement of the idea with its object.” This, he thinks, meets the objection that “if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea only in so far as it is said to agree with that of which it is the idea, the true idea [would have] no reality or perfection above the false idea (since they are distinguished by an external sign alone), and consequently the man who has true ideas will have no greater reality or perfection than he who has false ideas only.”
Although Descartes and Locke also employ an intrinsic criterion of truth—not the adequacy, but the clarity and distinctness, of ideas—they do not seem to mean, as Spinoza does, that a single idea, in and of itself, can be true or false. Like Aristotle before them or Kant later, they regard a simple idea or concept as, strictly speaking, incapable of being either true or false.
“Truth and falsity,” writes Locke, “belong … only to propositions”—to affirmations or denials which involve at least two ideas; or, as Kant says, “truth and error… are only to be found in a judgement,” which explains why “the senses do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all.”
Nevertheless, for Locke the clarity and distinctness of the ideas which enter into the formation of propositions enable the mind to judge intuitively and certainly of their truth. When ideas are clear and distinct, “the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves. … Such kind of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together by bare intuition … and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of.”
The problem of the criterion of truth is sometimes closely connected with the problem of the causes of error. Descartes seems to pass by natural steps from one to the other. Having decided that “the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true,” he reminds himself that there may be “some difficulty in ascertaining which are those that we distinctly conceive.” The mystery of error looms large for Descartes because it seems to him that the human intellect, being created by God, must have a kind of natural infallibility, the infallibility of an instrument designed by God for knowing the truth, not for ignorance or error.
“If we did not know,” Descartes reflects, “that all that is in us of reality and truth proceeds from a perfect and infinite being, however clear and distinct were our ideas, we should not have any reason to assure ourselves that they had the perfection of being true.” But once we have “recognized that there is a God … and also recognized that all things depend upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver,” we can infer that whatever we “perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true.”
What, then, is the source of our errors? “I answer,” writes Descartes, “that they depend on a combination of two causes, to wit, on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me, and on the power of choice or free will.” Each perfect in its own sphere, neither the will nor the understanding by itself causes us to fall into error. “Since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for understanding, there is no doubt,” Descartes declares, “that all that I understand, I understand as I ought, and it is not possible that I err in this.”
The trouble lies in the relation of the will to the intellect. “Since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand.” It is not God’s fault, says Descartes, if, in the exercise of my freedom, I do not “withhold my assent from certain things as to which He has not placed a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding.” But as long as “I so restrain my will within the limits of knowledge that it forms no judgment except on matters which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived.”
There are other accounts of error, less elaborate than Descartes’, which are similar to the extent that they place the cause in some combination of human faculties rather than in their simple and separate operation. Socrates explains to Theaetetus that false opinions arise when the senses and the mind do not cooperate properly. Aristotle suggests that it is the imagination which frequently misleads the mind. Looking at the problem from the point of view of the theologian, Aquinas holds that Adam, in his state of innocence before the fall, could not be deceived. “While the soul remained subject to God,” he writes, “the lower powers in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action.” But man born in sin can be deceived, not because the intellect itself ever fails, but as a result of the wayward influence “of some lower power, such as the imagination or the like.”
Lucretius, for whom sense, not mind, is infallible, attributes error to the fault of reason, which misinterprets the veridical impressions of the senses. “What surer test can we have than the senses,” he asks, “whereby to note truth and falsehood?” He explains that the mind, not the senses, is responsible for illusions and hallucinations. “Do not then fasten upon the eyes this frailty of the mind.”
Other writers, like Descartes, take the opposite view, that the senses are much less trustworthy than the intellect. Still others, like Montaigne, seem to find that error and fallacy, rather than any sort of infallibility, are quite natural to all human faculties, and beset sense and reason alike. “Man,” says Pascal, is “full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without grace. Nothing shows him the truth. Everything deceives him. Those two sources of truth, reason and the senses, besides being both wanting in sincerity, deceive each other in turn.”
Considering the extremes to which men have gone in their appraisal of human prowess or frailty, Locke’s moderate statement of the matter is worth pondering. “Notwithstanding the great noise made in the world about errors and opinions,” he writes, “I must do mankind that right, as to say, there are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the truth; but, indeed, because concerning these doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all. … And though one cannot say that there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are, yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually assent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.”
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
1. The nature of truth * 1a. The signs or criteria of truth: methods of verification * 1b. The relation between truth and being or reality * 1c. The relation of truth, goodness, and beauty
2. The modes of truth and falsity * 2a. The distinction between truth and falsity in the mind and in things: logical and ontological truth * 2b. The distinction between truth of statement and truth of signification: the distinction between real and verbal truth * 2c. The distinction between theoretical and practical truth: conformity to existence and conformity to right desire * 2d. The comparison of human and divine truth: finite truths and the infinite truth * 2e. The distinction between truth and probability: its relation to the distinction between knowledge and opinion
3. Truth and error in relation to human knowing and learning * 3a. Truth in the apprehensions of the sensitive faculty * (1) The truth of sensations: judgments of perception * (2) Truth in the memory and imagination * 3b. Truth in the acts of the mind * (1) The truth of ideas: concepts and definitions * (2) The truth of propositions: the special problem of judgments about future contingencies * (3) Truth in reasoning: the truth of premises in relation to the truth of conclusions; logical validity and truth about reality * 3c. The principle of contradiction as the foundation of truth in judgment and in reasoning * 3d. The nature and causes of error * (1) The infallibility of the senses and the mind: the respects in which they are incapable of error * (2) The nature and sources of error in human perception and thought: the distinction between error and ignorance * (3) Rules for the correction or prevention of error in thought
4. Comparison of the various disciplines with respect to truth * 4a. Truth in science and religion: the truth of reason and the truth of faith * 4b. Truth in science and poetry: the truth of fact and the truth of fiction * 4c. Truth in metaphysics, mathematics, and the empirical sciences: the truth of principles, hypotheses, and conclusions in the several speculative disciplines * 4d. Truth and probability in rhetoric and dialectic
5. The eternal verities and the mutability of truth
6. The accumulation or accretion of truth, and the correction of error, in the progress of human learning
7. The skeptical denial of truth * 7a. The impossibility of knowing the truth: the restriction of all human judgments to degrees of probability; the denial of axioms and of the possibility of demonstration * 7b. The defense of truth against the skeptic
8. The moral and political aspect of truth * 8a. Prevarication and perjury: the injustice of lying or bearing false witness * 8b. The expediency of the political lie * 8c. Truth in relation to love and friendship: the pleasant and the unpleasant truth * 8d. Civil liberty as a condition for discovering the truth: freedom of thought and discussion * 8e. The love of truth and the duty to seek it: the moral distinction between the sophist and the philosopher; martyrdom to the truth
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.
Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
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1. The nature of truth
7 Plato: Euthydemus, 71c-72a / Cratylus, 85a-89b
8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 5 [4b21-b31] 8c-9a / Interpretation, CH 1 [16a9-18] 25a-b; CH 4 [17a1-4] 26b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 7 [1011b25-29] 531c; [1012b1-17] 531d-532a; BK VI, CH 4 [1027b17-22] 550a; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b34-1052a5] 577c-d
17 Plotinus: Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 5, 218b
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK VII, par 21 49d-50a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 12, ANS and REP 3 74c-75b; Q 16 94b-100d esp A 1, ANS 94b-95c, A 2, ANS 95c-96b; Q 17, A 4 103c-104b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b
31 Descartes: Meditations, III, 83a; IV 89a-93a passim / Objections and Replies, 229c-d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 6 355d; PART II, DEF 4 373b; PROP 32 385c; PROP 43, SCHOL 388d-389b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, SECT 1-3 243c-244a; SECT 19 247a-b; BK IV, CH V 329a-331b esp SECT 2 329a, SECT 9 330d-331a
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 36a-37b; 77b-d; 94a; 193a-b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 23 17d; PART III, par 280 94d-95a
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 879c
1a. The signs or criteria of truth: methods of verification
7 Plato: Euthydemus, 71c-74a / Gorgias, 266b / Republic, BK IX, 421a-422b / Timaeus, 447a-d / Sophist, 556c-559a
8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 32 [47a4-9] 65a / Heavens, BK I, CH 3 [270b1-13] 361c-d; BK III, CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b15-403a2] 631d-632a
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK III, CH 4 [666b7-10] 193d / Motion of Animals, CH 1 [698a10-15] 233a / Generation of Animals, BK III, CH 10 [760b27-35] 301d-302a / Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098a35]-CH 8 [1098b12] 343d-344a; BK II, CH 7 [1107a27-32] 352d-353a; BK X, CH 1 [1172b34-1173a7] 426b; CH 8 [1179a17-22] 433d-434a / Politics, BK VII, CH 1 [1323a33-37] 527b
10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 1, 1b
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 13, 173d
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [690-700] 9c; BK IV [469-499] 50b-d
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 17-20 75c-76c; BK XI, par 5 90b-c / City of God, BK XI, CH 2 323a-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 32, A 1, REP 2 175d-178a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; PART III, 165a; CONCLUSION, 282c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 260c-261c; 285c-288a; 292c-d
28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 200a-b
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268d; 286b-c; 295d-296a / Circulation of the Blood, 322d-323d; 324c-d / On Animal Generation, 331b-332a; 357b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 43d-44c; 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14-17 107d-108a; APH 50 111b; APH 70 116b-117a; APH 73 117d-118a; APH 81 120b-c; APH 106 128c; BK II 137a-195d passim
31 Descartes: Rules, II 2a-3b / Discourse, PART I, 43d-44b; PART II, 47a-48a; PART IV 51b-54b; PART VI, 61d-62c; 65d-66b / Meditations, 72b,d; 73d-74a; I-II 75a-81d; III, 82a-d; 85b-86d; IV 89a-93a passim; V, 93a-94a; 95d-96a; VI, 99a-c / Objections and Replies, 123d-125b; POSTULATE VII 131c; 153a-c; 157b-158a; 168b-c; 206c-207a; 210b-c; 226d; 237b-238b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 6 355d; PART II, DEF 4 373b; PROP 32-34 385c-d; PROP 38-43 386c-389b; PART IV, PROP 1 424c-425a; PART V, PROP 4, SCHOL 453b-d
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 365b-366a / Geometrical Demonstration, 435b-436b
34 Newton: Principles, BK III, RULE IV 271b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 2-3 93b-94a; BK II, CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; BK III, CH XI, SECT 24 305b-d; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 1-12 323d-326d esp SECT 3-4 324b-c; CH XII, SECT 13 362c-d
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 129 438d-439a
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT X, DIV 86-91 488d-491c
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 13b
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 348a,c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 36b-37b; 64d-65c; 77b-d; 85b-87c esp 86b-87c; 91d-93b; 114d-115a; 146a-149d esp 146d; 153a-c; 157d; 193a-b; 211c-218d; 231b-c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 20, 78a-b
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 446d-447a; 461c-d; 463c-d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 129a
45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1b-c
45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 467a-b; 774d-775a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2b; PART II, par 227 74b-d / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 350a-b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 684a
53 James: Psychology, 141a-142a; 176a-b; 456a; 636a-660b esp 636a-b, 638b-640a, 643a, 645a-b, 646b-648b, 654a-655a; 863a; 864a-865a; 881a-b
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 819d-820a; 879c
1b. The relation between truth and being or reality
7 Plato: Euthydemus, 71c-74a / Cratylus, 85a-89b / Phaedrus, 124c-126c / Republic, BK V, 368c-373c; BK VI, 383d-388a esp 387a; BK IX, 423b-424a / Timaeus, 447a-d / Parmenides, 507c-509a / Theaetetus, 534d-536a; 537a-c / Sophist, 561d-577b / Philebus, 625a
8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 12 [14b10-21] 20b / Interpretation, CH 3 [16b19-26] 25d-26a; CH 9 [18b1-4] 28b-c / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 36 [48b40-49a9] 66d; BK II, CH 2 [53b11-26] 72d-73a / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 [993b19-31] 512a-b; BK V, CH 7 [1017a31-34] 538a; BK VI, CH 4 550a,c; BK IX, CH 10 577c-578a,c
17 Plotinus: Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 5, 218b
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, par 10 15b-d; BK V, par 5 28b-c; BK VII, par 16-23 48c-50c / City of God, BK XI, CH 10, 328c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 34 634b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1, REP 2 3b-4a; Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 14, A 8, REP 3 82c-83b; Q 16, A 1, REP 3 94b-95c; A 3 96b-d; A 8, REP 2 99d-100d; Q 18, A 4, REP 3 107d-108c; Q 44, A 1, ANS 238b-239a; Q 87, A 3, REP 1 467b-468a; Q 119, A 1, ANS 604c-607b; PART I-II, Q 2, A 3, ANS 617b-618a; Q 3, A 7, ANS 628a-d; Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-722c; Q 29, A 5, ANS 747c-748b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [124-126] 112a; XXXIII [49-54] 156d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b
31 Descartes: Meditations, I, 76c / Objections and Replies, 226d-227a; 229c-d; 261a
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 6 355d; PART II, DEF 4 373b; PROP 7 375a-c; PROP 10, SCHOL 376d-377a; PROP 24-34 383c-385d; PROP 43, SCHOL 388d-389b; PROP 44, DEMONST 389b-c; COROL 2, DEMONST 390a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH V, SECT 7-8 330b-d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 36a-37b esp 36b-c; 91d-93b; 102c-103a; 114d-115a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 360 113d-114a,c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-157b; PART I, 237d-238a; PART IV, 349b-350b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 217c
53 James: Psychology, 636a; 638a-643a esp 641a-643a; 852a; 880b-882a
1c. The relation of truth, goodness, and beauty
7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124c-129d / Symposium, 167a-d / Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a / Theaetetus, 525c-526a / Sophist, 556c-559a; 561b-d / Philebus, 630d-631d; 637c-638a / Laws, BK II, 654a-662a
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 1 [1013a20-24] 533b; BK XII, CH 7 [1072a25-b4] 602b-c / Soul, BK III, CH 7 663c-664b esp [431b13-19] 663d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK II, CH 2, 141a; BK IV, CH 11, 241a-b
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 20 265a-b
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR III, CH 1-2 10a-d; TR VI, CH 3-9 22b-26a esp CH 4, 23a / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 31-33 336d-338b
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK VII, par 23 50b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4, REP 1 25d-26c; Q 16, A 1, ANS 94b-95c; A 3, ANS 96b-d; A 4 97a-c; Q 17, A 4, REP 2 103c-104b; Q 54, A 2, ANS 285d-286c; Q 79, A 11, REP 2 424d-425b; Q 82, A 3, REP 1 433c-434c; A 4, REP 1 434c-435c; PART I-II, Q 3, A 5, REP 2 626b-627a; Q 9, A 1, ANS and REP 2-3 657d-658d; Q 19, Art 1 703b-d; A 3, REP 1 704c-705a; Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-722c; Q 27, A 1, REP 3 737b-d; A 2, ANS 737d-738c; Q 29, A 5 747c-748b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 26c-27a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 20 319b-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 132, 46b / Philosophy of History, PART III, 278a-c; PART IV, 346d-347a
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 153b-d
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 880b
2. The modes of truth and falsity
2a. The distinction between truth and falsity in the mind and in things: logical and ontological truth
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 29 [1024b18-26] 546c-d
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 16, A 1 94b-95c; A 7, REP 4 99a-d; Q 17, A 1 100d-101d; Q 21, A 2, ANS 125c-d
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 126b-127c
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, SECT 2 243d; BK IV, CH V, SECT 11 331b
2b. The distinction between truth of statement and truth of signification: the distinction between real and verbal truth
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 [1006a12-29] 525b-c; BK XI, CH 5 [1062a5-19] 590b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 16, A 8, REP 3 99d-100d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, SECT 4-25 244a-248a passim, esp SECT 5 244a-b; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 1-12 323d-326d passim, esp SECT 1 323d-324a; SECT 18 328d-329a; CH V, SECT 6-8, 330b-d
53 James: Psychology, 880b-882a
2c. The distinction between theoretical and practical truth: conformity to existence and conformity to right desire
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 [993b19-31] 512a-b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 339d-340b; CH 7 [1098a25-35] 343d; BK II, CH 2 [1103b26-1104a9] 349b-c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; BK X, CH 1 [1172b34-1173a8] 426b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 85, A 6, REP 1 458d-459c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78b-c
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 126a-b; 206c-207a; 237b-c
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH V, SECT 11 331b
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114d-115a; 190c-191a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253b-c; 264b-d; 271a-c; 283d-287d esp 283d-284d / Practical Reason, 291a-297c; 310a-b; 319c-321b; 329a-337a,c esp 329b-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-d / Judgement, 596c-598b
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 461c-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2d-3b / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 360d-361a
53 James: Psychology, 643a-645b; 655a-659a; 865b; 886a-888a
2d. The comparison of human and divine truth: finite truths and the infinite truth
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 34:6 / Numbers, 23:19 / Psalms, 31:5; 86:15; 96:13; 100:5; 117:2; 119:142,160; 146:6—(D) Psalms, 30:6; 85:15; 95:13; 99:5; 116:2; 118:142,160; 145:6-7 / Proverbs, 30:5-6
NEW TESTAMENT: John, 3:33; 7:14-18; 8:12-59; 14:6,16-17; 15:26; 16:13-14; 17:17; 18:37-38 / Romans, 1:18-25; 2:2,8-9,20 / I Corinthians, 1:17-2:16 / II Corinthians, 13:8 / Ephesians, 4:21-24 / II Thessalonians, 2:10-14 / I Timothy, 2:3-4; 3:15 / II Timothy, 2:25-26 / Hebrews, 6:18; 10:26 / James, 5:19-20 / I John, 1:5-10; 2:4,21-22; 3:18-19; 5:5-12 esp 5:6 / II John, 2-4 / III John, 3-4,8
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, par 10 15b-d; BK V, par 5 28b-c; BK XI, par 5 90b-c / City of God, BK XI, CH 10, 328c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 9-10 627a-b; CH 34 634b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 3 10d-11d; Q 16, AA 5-8 97c-100d; Q 21, A 2, ANS 125c-d; Q 106, A 1, REP 3 545d-546d; Q 107, AA 2-3 550b-551c; PART I-II, Q 3, A 7, ANS 628a-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93, A 2, ANS 216c-217b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [19-148] 108a-109b passim; IV [115]-V [12] 111d-112b; XIX [22-66] 135b-d; XXI [73-105] 139a-b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 80b-82b; 208d-209c; 213c-d; 267c-268a; 272d-273b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 32-34 385c-d
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK VII [109-130] 219b-220a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 308a-b; PART IV, 349b-350a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 216d-218b esp 217c-d
53 James: Psychology, 671b [fn 1]
2e. The distinction between truth and probability: its relation to the distinction between knowledge and opinion
7 Plato: Republic, BK V, 370d-373c esp 373b-c; BK VI, 386d-388a / Timaeus, 447b-d / Theaetetus, 517b-d; 527b-d; 531b-532a / Philebus, 633a-635b
8 Aristotle: Interpretation, CH 9 28a-29d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 97d-99a; CH 6 102b-103c; CH 8 104a-b; CH 30 119d; CH 33 121b-122a,c / Topics, BK I, CH 1 [100a25-b26] 143a-b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4-6 525a-531c; BK VII, CH 15 [1039b31-1040a8] 563d-564a; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b13-18] 577d; BK XI, CH 6 590d-592b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b11-28] 339d-340a; CH 7 [1098a25-35] 343d; BK II, CH 2 [1104a1-9] 349b-c; BK VI, CH 9 [1142b5-15] 391d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a4-18] 594b; CH 2 [1357a23-b21] 596d-597c; BK II, CH 25 [1402b13-1403a17] 652b-653a
16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 7, ANS 56a-57b; Q 16, A 8 99d-100d; Q 32, A 1, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 79, A 9, REP 3-4 422b-423d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 2, REP 3 36a-37b; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 60c-61a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 271b-273b
31 Descartes: Rules, II 2a-3b; III, 3d-4a / Discourse, PART I, 43d; 44a-b; PART IV, 51b-d / Meditations, I-II, 75a-78b; V, 95b-96a / Objections and Replies, 124b-125b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 35, DEMONST 385d-386a; PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PROP 41-44 388c-390a; PROP 49, SCHOL, 391d-392a
32 Milton: Areopagitica, 406a-b
33 Pascal: Pensées, 184-241 205a-217b passim, esp 233-241 213b-217b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 29 322c-323a; CH IV, SECT 6-8 325a-c; SECT 18 328d-329a; CH VI 331b-336d esp SECT 13 335c-d, SECT 16 336d; CH XV 365a-366c; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT 14-17 378c-379c; CH XIX, SECT 1 384c-d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 108a; 228c-d; 240b-243c / Judgement, 600d-604b esp 601d, 603a-b, 603d-604b
43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-293b passim
45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 391b-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 132, 46b-c; par 140 49b-54a; PART III, par 268 84c-d; ADDITIONS, 91 131a-d
54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661c-662a
3. Truth and error in relation to human knowing and learning
3a. Truth in the apprehensions of the sensitive faculty
3a(1) The truth of sensations: judgments of perception
7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-b / Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII, 392b-393b; BK X, 431b-c / Theaetetus, 538d-541a / Sophist, 575d-577b esp 577a-b / Philebus, 622d-626a
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1010b1-29] 530a-c; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b33-1063a9] 591a-b / Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a6-18] 648d-649a; BK III, CH 3 [427b6-15] 659d-660a; [428a11-18] 660b; CH 6 [430b26-30] 663b-c / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442b4-9] 680a-b
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 2 [648a15-20] 173a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [693-700] 9c; BK IV [379-521] 49a-51a
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A 2 102a-d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 285c-286a
28 Harvey: Circulation of the Blood, 320b / On Animal Generation, 333c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 51c-d; 58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 16 108a; APH 41 109c-d; APH 50 111b / New Atlantis, 213d
31 Descartes: Rules, VII, 13a-b; XII, 18c; 22c-23a / Discourse, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, I 75a-77c; III, 83d-84a; VI, 101d-103d / Objections and Replies, 124d; POSTULATE I 130d; 206c-207a; 229d-230d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 24-28 383c-384c; PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 41 388a-c
33 Pascal: Pensées, 9 173b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 14-16 245c-246b; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 4 324c; CH XI, SECT 3 355a-b; SECT 11 357b-c
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1 405a-b; SECT 14-15 415c-416a; SECT 40 420b; SECT 86-88 429c-430b
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 117-123 504a-506a
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 108a-109c esp 108a-d
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 461c-d
53 James: Psychology, 460a-471a esp 468b-469a; 475a-478b; 508a-520a esp 508a, 519b; 521a-522a; 565a-b; 593a-626a esp 593a-595a, 601a-602a, 606b-625a; 648b [fn 1]; 780a-785a; 851b-852a
54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 148d-149a; 337a-c / Unconscious, 430b-c
3a(2) Truth in the memory and imagination
7 Plato: Theaetetus, 538d-541a / Philebus, 623d-624c
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1010b1-12] 530a-b; BK V, CH 29 [1024b17-27] 546c-d / Soul, BK III, CH 3 [428a11-18] 660b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [451a8-12] 692a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A 2, REP 2 102a-d; Q 54, A 5, ANS 288a-d
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote esp PART I, 1d-2b, 4b-c, 18d-22a, 44b, 50b-52d
31 Descartes: Rules, XII, 22c-23a / Discourse, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, I, 75c-77c
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17, SCHOL 381b-d; PROP 35, SCHOL 386a-b; PROP 40, SCHOL 1-PROP 41 387b-388c; PROP 44, COROL 1 and SCHOL 389c-390a
33 Pascal: Pensées, 82-88 186b-189b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XI, SECT 11 357b-c
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 11, 455b-c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 88c-d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 173b-174a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VII, 294b-295a
53 James: Psychology, 240a-241b; 480a-484a esp 483b; 498a-499a; 527a-538b; 662a-663a [fn 1]
54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 341b-343c esp 342d-343b / General Introduction, 597b-599b / Ego and Id, 700c; 701d
3b. Truth in the acts of the mind
7 Plato: Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a / Theaetetus, 536c-544a
8 Aristotle: Soul, BK III, CH 6 662d-663c; CH 10 [433a21-28] 665d-666a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VI, CH 2 [1139a27-30] 387d-388a; CH 3 [1139b14-18] 388b
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 19 76a-b / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 9 627a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 16, AA 1-2 94b-96b; Q 17, A 3 102d-103c; Q 58, A 5 303c-304c; Q 85, A 6 458d-459c; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a; Q 106, A 1, ANS 545d-546d; Q 107, A 2, ANS 550b-551a; PART I-II, Q 17, A 6, ANS 690b-d
31 Descartes: Rules, VIII, 13a-b; XII, 18c; 22c-23c / Meditations, III, 82a-86d esp 85c; IV 89a-93a esp 90b-91b / Objections and Replies, 123d-125b; 141a; 229d-230d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 44, DEMONST 389b-c; COROL 2, DEMONST 390a; PROP 48 391a-c; PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 36b-37d; 108a-109c; 110d-112d; 115d-119a esp 118a-c; 174b-d; 193a-b; 233d-234b
53 James: Psychology, 867a-868b
3b(1) The truth of ideas: concepts and definitions
7 Plato: Cratylus 85a-114a,c passim, esp 85a-89a, 104b-114a,c / Republic, BK II, 323c-324c; BK VI, 386d-388a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 4 [2a4-10] 6a / Interpretation, CH 1 [16a9-18] 25a-b / Topics, BK VI, CH 1 [139a24-b2] 192a-b; BK VI, CH 4-BK VII, CH 5 194c-211a,c passim / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 29 [1024b27-38] 546d-547a; BK VI, CH 4 [1027b27-28] 550a; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b18-33] 577d-578a / Soul, BK III, CH 6 [430a26-b5] 662d-663a; [430b26-30] 663b-c
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 19 76a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 35 653b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 2 10d-11d; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 17, A 3 102d-103c; Q 58, A 5 303c-304c; Q 85, A 1, REP 1 451c-453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 94, A 4, ANS 505a-506a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d
28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 200a-b
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 333b-d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 57d-58b
31 Descartes: Rules, XII, 21d-22a / Meditations, III, 82a-86d esp 83a, 85c; IV, 90b-c / Objections and Replies, DEF III 130b; AXIOM IV-V 131d-132a; 156d-158a
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 6 355d; PROP 8, SCHOL 2, 357b-d; PART II, DEF 4 373b; PROP 32-43 385c-389b
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 373a-b / Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-431b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX-XXXII 238a-248b passim, esp CH XXXII 243c-248b; BK III, CH VI, SECT 43-47 280c-282b passim
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 36b-c; 77b-d; 85b-87c esp 86b-87c; 91d-93b; 179d-182b; 193a-c; 215d-217a; 233d-234b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367d-368a / Judgement, 570b-572d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 1-2 9a-10a
53 James: Psychology, 299a-302a esp 299b, 302b [fn 1]; 305a-312a esp 307a-308a; 669a-671a esp 671b [fn 1]
3b(2) The truth of propositions: the special problem of judgments about future contingencies
7 Plato: Euthydemus, 71c-74a / Cratylus, 85a-86b; 109a-b / Sophist, 561d-577b esp 575a-577b
8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 4 [2a4-10] 6a; CH 5 [4a10-19] 8b-9a / Interpretation, CH 1 [16a9-18] 25a-b; CH 4-14 26a-36d passim, esp CH 4 [17a1-4] 26b, CH 7 26d-27d, CH 9 28a-29d, CH 14 35c-36d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 7 [1011b25-29] 531c; [1012b1-17] 531d-532a; CH 8 [1012b29-1013a22] 532b-d; BK VI, CH 4 550a,c; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b34-1052a18] 577c-d / Soul, BK III, CH 3 [427b16-25] 660a; CH 6 [430a26-b5] 662d-663a; [430b26-31] 663b-c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 7 [1107a27-32] 352d-353a; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a21-31] 387d-388a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 13, A 12, ANS and REP 3 74c-75b; Q 14, A 13 esp REP 3 86d-88c; A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; AA 7-8 99a-100d; Q 17, AA 3-4 102d-104b; Q 57, A 3 297b-298a; Q 58, A 4, REP 2 302d-303c; Q 85, A 1, REP 1 451c-453c; A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; A 6 458d-459c; Q 86, A 4 463d-464d; Q 94, A 4, ANS and REP 5 505a-506a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 147-154 107b-108b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 57c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 54c-55a; 57d-58b
31 Descartes: Rules, XII, 22c-23b / Discourse, PART IV, 52a / Meditations, III, 83a; 85c; IV, 90b-91b / Objections and Replies, 123d-125c; DEF IX 130d; 156d-157c; 215d-216c; 229d-230d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49, SCHOL, 392a-394a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXI, SECT 1-3 243c-244a; SECT 19-26 247a-248b: BK III, CH VII, SECT 1 283a-b; BK IV, CH V 329a-331b; CH VI, SECT 3 331c-d; SECT 16 336d
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 21 458b-c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 99a-100a; 108a-d; 193a-c
53 James: Psychology, 638b; 640b; 671a-672a; 884b-885a; 889b-890a
3b(3) Truth in reasoning: the truth of premises in relation to the truth of conclusions; logical validity and truth about reality
7 Plato: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c esp 67b-68d, 71b-72c / Phaedo, 236c-238a
8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 2-4 72d-77a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b16-26] 98a-b; [72a6-9] 98c; [72a14-19] 98c-d; CH 10 104d-105d; CH 12 [77b16-34] 106d-107a / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a5-12] 259d; CH 3 [186a4-9] 260d-261a; BK VIII, CH 1 [252a19-b7] 335d-336b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b11-28] 339d-340a; CH 8 [1098b9-12] 344a; BK VI, CH 9 [1142b8-15] 391d; [1142b22-26] 392a; BK VII, CH 2 [1146b23-30] 396b / Poetics, CH 24 [1460a19-25] 696b-c
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 14, 178c-d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31-34 651d-653b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 3, REP 3 443d-444d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-59a; 65c-d; PART IV, 267b-c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 57b-58a; 59c-60b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14 107d-108a
31 Descartes: Rules, III, 4a-d; X, 16d-17a; XII, 23b / Objections and Replies, 126b-127c
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, DEMONST 387a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 13 146b-c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 36a-37d; 64d-65c; 109b-c; 110d-111c; 180c-182b; 193a-b; 211c-218d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 134c-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 683d-684a
53 James: Psychology, 295a-b; 526b [fn 1]; 867a-882a esp 869a-870a, 871b-872b, 878b-880b
3c. The principle of contradiction as the foundation of truth in judgment and in reasoning
7 Plato: Protagoras, 53a / Euthydemus, 72d-73b / Republic, BK IV, 350d-351b / Theaetetus, 527a-528a / Sophist, 558b-d
8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 10 [13b1-35] 19a-c / Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 17 86b-87a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 11 105d-106b / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 [996b26-30] 515b; BK IV, CH 3-6 524b-531c; CH 8 [1012b29-1013a22] 532b-d; BK XI, CH 5-6 590a-592b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 58, A 4, REP 2 302d-303c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 59c-60a
31 Descartes: Meditations, III, 82b-d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49, SCHOL, 393c-d
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 16 99b-c; SECT 19-20 100b-d; CH III, SECT 3 113a-b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 1 309b-d; CH VII, SECT 4 337b-338b; SECT 8-11 338d-342d passim
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 17d-18d; 36b-37b; 64d-65c; 97a-b; 174b-d
53 James: Psychology, 639a-641a
3d. The nature and causes of error
3d(1) The infallibility of the senses and the mind: the respects in which they are incapable of error
7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-c / Theaetetus, 539a-540a
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1010b15-29] 530b-c; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b25-33] 578a / Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a6-18] 648d-649a; BK III, CH 3 [427b6-15] 659d-660a; [428b5-429a2] 660b-661a; CH 6 [430a26-b5] 662d-663a; [430b26-30] 663b-c; CH 10 [433a21-28] 665d-666a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442b4-9] 680a-b
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [693-700] 9c; BK IV [379-521] 49a-51a
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, AA 2-3 102a-103c; Q 85, A 1, REP 1 451c-453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56d
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 16 108a
31 Descartes: Rules, XII, 22c-23b / Meditations, II, 77d-78b; III, 83a; IV 89a-93a / Objections and Replies, 124b-d; 215b-216c; 229d-230d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 43-47 388c-391a; PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d passim
33 Pascal: Pensées, 9 173b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 3 144c-d; CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 14-17 245c-246c
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 40 420b; SECT 88 430a-b
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 52, 473a
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 108a-d; 193a-b; 233d-234b
53 James: Psychology, 125a-126a; 361a-b
3d(2) The nature and sources of error in human perception and thought: the distinction between error and ignorance
7 Plato: Meno, 180b-182a esp 181d-182a / Phaedo, 224a-225a / Republic, BK II, 323c-324c; BK III, 339b-340a / Theaetetus, 520c-522b; 536c-544a / Sophist, 557b-558d; 575d-577b / Philebus, 622d-626a
8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 34-35 66b-d; BK II, CH 16-21 85c-89b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 5 101b-102b; CH 12 [77b16-34] 106d-107a; CH 16-18 109b-111c / Topics, BK I, CH 1 [101a5-17] 143c-d; BK V, CH 3 [131b19-36] 182b-c; BK VI, CH 9 [148a2-9] 202a; BK VIII, CH 12-13 220c-221d / Sophistical Refutations 227a-253d / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a5-12] 259d / Heavens, BK I, CH 5 [271b1-18] 362c-d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1009a15-1010b14] 528c-529d; CH 6 [1011b3-13] 530d; CH 7 [1012a18-22] 532a; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b18-1052a4] 577d-578a,c; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b12-24] 590d-591a / Soul, BK III, CH 1 [425a30-b5] 657c; CH 3 [427a16-b6] 659c-d; CH 6 [430a26-b5] 662d-663a; CH 10 [433a21-28] 665d-666a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442b4-9] 680a-b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [451a8-12] 692a / Dreams 702a-706d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK III, CH 1 [1110b17-1111a20] 356b-357a; CH 4 359a-c; BK VI, CH 9 391c-392b / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 7 [1408a20-25] 659b
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [379-521] 49a-51a; [1141-1191] 59a-d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
14 Plutarch: Marcus Brutus, 816d-817c
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XI, CH 2, 323c; BK XIX, CH 6 514b-515a; CH 18 523a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 9 627a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17 100d-104b; Q 84, A 8 450b-451b; Q 85, A 1, REP 1 451c-453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478b; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a; PART I-II, Q 5, A 8, REP 3 642d-643d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 53, A 1 19d-21a; Q 72, A 5, ANS 115a-116b; Q 88, A 1, ANS 193a-194b; PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XIII [112-120] 126c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 51b-52b; 56b-d; 57c-d; 58d-60a; 78a-79b; PART II, 139c; PART III, 172b-d; PART IV, 258b-d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 269d-294b esp 270c-276a, 285c-292d; 497c-d; 517d-518b
27 Shakespeare: Sonnets, CXLVIII 608d-609a
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, BK V, 105c
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On Animal Generation, 333b-d; 335a-c; 364a-365a esp 365a; 411c-d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 13c-15a; 16a; 43d-44c; 51b-d; 60b-61c esp 61b-c; 66c-d; 98c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 12 107d; APH 14-17 107d-108a; APH 20 108b; APH 30 109a; APH 38-70 109c-117a; APH 78-92 119b-125d; APH 104-106 128a-c / New Atlantis, 213d
31 Descartes: Rules, II, 2d-3a; XII, 22c-23b / Meditations, I-II 75a-81d passim; III, 83a; IV 89a-93a esp 91b; VI, 100a-103d / Objections and Replies, 123d-126a; 141a; 142c; 215b-216c; 229d-230d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17, SCHOL 381b-d; PROP 33 385c-d; PROP 35 385d-386b; PROP 40-41 387a-388c; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a; PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d passim; PART IV, PROP 1 424c-425a
33 Pascal: Pensées, 82-88 186b-189b / Geometrical Demonstration, 441a-b
34 Newton: Optics, BK I, 384b-385b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 58-70 193d-197b; CH XXXII, SECT 19 247a-b; CH XXXIII 248b-251d esp SECT 18 251a-c; BK III, CH IX, SECT 21-23 290c-291c; CH X 291d-300a passim, esp SECT 9 293d-294a, SECT 16 295d, SECT 34 299d-300a; CH XI, SECT 1-7 300a-301c; BK IV, CH V, SECT 9 330d-331a; CH VI, SECT 16 336d; CH VII, SECT 12-20 342d-344d passim; CH XVII, SECT 12-13 378b-c; CH XX 388d-394c
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, INTRO 405a-412a,c passim, esp SECT 1-4 405a-d, SECT 17-25 409d-412a,c; SECT 86-88 429c-430b
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6-7, 453c-454a; SECT V, DIV 45 469c; SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 109b-c; 133c-134d; 193a-b; 200c-209d; 219a-220b; 224a-227a esp 224a-c, 226b-d; 229b-c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b / Practical Reason, 294c-295d; 302a-d; 348d-349a / Judgement, 575b-c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1, 29d-30a; NUMBER 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER 38, 122a-b
43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-293b passim
44 Boswell: Johnson, 106d; 126b
48 Melville: Moby Dick, 313a-b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XII, 585b
53 James: Psychology, 240a-241b; 264b-268a; 460a-469a esp 462b-464a, 468b-469a; 506a-520a passim, esp 508a; 533a-538b; 610b-625a passim, esp 618b-621a, 625a
54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 148d-149a; 210c-d; 337a-d; 353d-355b esp 354c-355a; 379b-d / General Introduction, 472a-c / Ego and Id, 700c; 701d / War and Death, 760d-761a / New Introductory Lectures, 819b-c
3d(3) Rules for the correction or prevention of error in thought
7 Plato: Sophist, 557b-558d / Statesman, 582d-584a / Philebus, 610d-613a
8 Aristotle: Topics 143a-223a,c / Sophistical Refutations 227a-253d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-60c
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On Animal Generation, 331b-332a; 333b-d; 335a-c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 11a-17b esp 13a-c, 14c-15a, 16b-c; 33d-34b; 43d-44c; 47d-49b; 51b-d; 60a-61d; 64a-66a esp 64d-65a / Novum Organum 105a-195d esp BK I, APH 11-26 107d-108d, APH 39-69 109c-116b, APH 103-106 127d-128c, APH 124 133c-d / New Atlantis, 213d
31 Descartes: Rules, II-XII 2a-25a / Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART II, 47a-48a, PART IV, 51b-52a, PART VI, 64d / Meditations, I 75a-77c; VI, 103a-d / Objections and Replies, 206a-c
32 Milton: Areopagitica, 389b-390a
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 365b-366a / Geometrical Demonstration, 430a-434a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK III, CH XI 300a-306d
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, INTRO 405a-412a,c passim, esp SECT 1-4 405a-d, SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 7 453c-454a; DIV 10, 455b; SECT XII, DIV 116, 503d-504a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 299b
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 5a-13d; 101b-d; 129c-130a; 209b-211c; 218d-227a; 248d-250a,c esp 250a,c / Practical Reason, 293c-294b esp 293d [fn 3]; 335b-c; 336d-337a,c / Judgement, 575b-c; 600d-603d
43 Mill: Liberty, 276b-277a; 283a-288c passim
45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 774d-775a
4. Comparison of the various disciplines with respect to truth
4a. Truth in science and religion: the truth of reason and the truth of faith
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, AA 1-2 3b-4c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 109, A 1 338b-339c; PART II-II, Q 1, A 1 380b-381a; AA 3-5 381d-384b; Q 2, AA 3-4 392d-394b; A 10 399b-400b; Q 4, A 1 402a-403d; A 8 409a-d
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, I [16-45] 56a-b; PARADISE, II [25-148] 108a-109b passim
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 83b; PART IV, 274c-d; CONCLUSION, 282c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 80b-82b; 208c-209c; 212a-215a; 238c-239d; 267c-268a; 272d-273b; 291b-294b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 33c-d; 55b-d; 95d-101c
31 Descartes: Discourse, PART I, 43c / Objections and Replies, 125c-126a; 284d
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XII [552-587] 331a-332a
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 147b-148b; 163a-166a / Pensées, 434 248a-250a; 846 339a-b; 857-858 342a; 862-865 342b-343b / Vacuum, 355b-356b; 365b-366a / Geometrical Demonstration, 440a-b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH VII, SECT 11, 340b-c; CH XVII, SECT 23-24 380b-d; CH XVIII 380d-384b passim, esp SECT 2 381a-b, SECT 8-9 383b-d; CH XIX, SECT 4 385b
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 102 497b-d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 333d-334a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 190c-d
42 Kant: Judgement, 601d-607c esp 601d-602a, 603a-b, 604d-606d
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 455a-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 360 113d-114a,c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-160b; PART IV, 349b-350b
48 Melville: Moby Dick, 276a-b; 360b-361a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 196a-197c; EPILOGUE II, 695d-696d
53 James: Psychology, 864a
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 874a-881c esp 874d-875a, 878b-880d, 881c
4b. Truth in science and poetry: the truth of fact and the truth of fiction
6 Herodotus: History, BK II, 71a-73b esp 72a-b; BK IV, 127a-b
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 354b
7 Plato: Protagoras, 52d-57c / Gorgias, 281d-282a / Republic, BK II, 320d-324c; BK X, 427c-431b / Sophist, 561b-d; 577d-579d / Laws, BK II, 660b-662a
9 Aristotle: Poetics, CH 25 696d-698c
14 Plutarch: Cimon, 390b-d
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XVI [106-136] 23c-d; XXV [34-48] 36d; XXVIII [112-126] 42c-d
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK II, STANZA 147-149 40b-41a / Prologue [715-746] 171b-172a / Miller’s Prologue [3167-3186] 212a-b / Prologue to Melibeus 400b-401a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 67b-c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 41b-42a; 199a-200d; 258c-259a
26 Shakespeare: A Midsummer-Night’s Dream, ACT V, SC I [1-27] 370d-371a
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT III, SC II [18-42] 49a-b
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268a-b
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 183d-193a esp 184b-d, 186b-d; PART II, 212a-215b esp 213b-c, 214c-d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 38d-39b
31 Descartes: Discourse, PART I, 43a-b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49b-50c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 186c-d; 345c; 471c-d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 40d-41a; 337c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 173b-174a
44 Boswell: Johnson, 98d-99a; 282c-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 285d-286a
47 Goethe: Faust, PART II [7428-7433] 181b-182a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK III, 134a-c; BK IX, 366d-367b; BK X, 405b-406c
53 James: Psychology, 641a-643a
54 Freud: Group Psychology, 692c-693a
4c. Truth in metaphysics, mathematics, and the empirical sciences: the truth of principles, hypotheses, and conclusions in the several speculative disciplines
7 Plato: Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a; BK VII, 391b-398c / Timaeus, 447b-d / Philebus, 633a-635a
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 32 120c-121b / Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 9 [1051a22-34] 577b-c; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077b11]-CH 3 [1078b31] 609a-d
9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742b18-35] 283d-284a / Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b23-28] 339d-340a; CH 7 [1098a25-35] 343d
16 Ptolemy: Almagest, BK XIII, 429a-b
16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a
16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 888b-890a
17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR III 10a-12b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 59b-c; PART IV, 269b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 48b-49a
31 Descartes: Rules, II, 2d-3b / Discourse, PART II, 47b-48a; PART VI, 66a-b / Meditations, I, 76c / Objections and Replies, 218b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-39 386b-387a
34 Newton: Optics, BK III, 543a-b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II, SECT 9-30 315c-323c passim
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 348a,c
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 17d-19a; 194b-c; 217a-c; 245c-248d / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264d / Practical Reason, 311d-313d; 330d-331a; 351b-352c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c / Science of Right, 398c-399c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a
43 Mill: Liberty, 283d-284b / Utilitarianism, 445b-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d
49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 239c / Descent of Man, 590a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 690a-b
53 James: Psychology, 862a-866a esp 863a-865a, 866a; 870a-878a; 882a-886a esp 883a, 884a-b
54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661c-662b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 722a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 873a-875b
4d. Truth and probability in rhetoric and dialectic
5 Euripides: Phoenician Maidens [469-472] 382a
5 Aristophanes: Clouds [889-901] 499b-c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 425c-d
7 Plato: Protagoras, 39d-42c / Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedrus, 131b-141a,c / Apology, 200a-c / Gorgias 252a-294d esp 258b-d / Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a / Sophist, 578d-579d / Philebus, 634b-635a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
8 Aristotle: Topics, BK I, CH 1 [100a18-b31] 143a-c; CH 2 [101a34-b4] 144a / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1004b15-27] 523d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b18-28] 339d-340a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a4-40] 594b-d; CH 2 [1356b36-1357b21] 596a-597c; BK II, CH 23 [1397b12-27] 645d-646a; [1400b5-14] 648d; CH 25 [1402b13-1403a17] 652b-653a; BK III, CH 7 [1408a20-23] 659b
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK IV, par 2 19d; BK V, par 10 29b-d / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 36 653d; BK IV, CH 5 677a-d; CH 12 683d-684c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 67c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 12a-c
31 Descartes: Rules, X, 16d-17a / Discourse, PART VI, 63c-d
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK II [108-118] 113b / Areopagitica, 382a-383a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 34 299d-300a
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 108a-109d
43 Mill: Liberty, 292b-293b
5. The eternal verities and the mutability of truth
OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 100:5; 117:2; 119:160; 146:6—(D) Psalms, 99:5; 116:2; 118:160; 145:6-7 / Proverbs, 8:22-30
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:24-26—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 7:24-26 / Ecclesiasticus, 24:9—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 24:14
NEW TESTAMENT: II John, 2
7 Plato: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 125a-b / Meno, 184d / Theaetetus, 528b-c
8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 5 [4b10-12] 8b-9a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 8 104a-b / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 [993b19-31] 512a-b; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b33-1052a12] 578a,c
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, par 6 2b-c; par 9 3a-b; BK XI, par 9-41 91c-92b / City of God, BK VIII, CH 7 269c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 8-10 626c-627b; BK II, CH 38 654b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 3, REP 3 42c-43b; Q 14, A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 16, AA 7-8 99a-100d; Q 84, A 1, REP 3 440d-442a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93, A 2 216c-217b; PART II-II, Q 1, A 1, CONTRARY 380b-381a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART IV, 267b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 27d-28c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 56 112a
31 Descartes: Meditations, V, 93b-94c / Objections and Replies, 216d-217b; 229c-d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, DEF 8 355c; PROP 8, SCHOL 2 356d-357d; PROP 17, SCHOL, 363a-b; PROP 19, SCHOL 363d; PROP 20, COROL 1 364a
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 358b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH I, SECT 9 308c-309b; CH III, SECT 31 323c-d; CH XI, SECT 14 358b-c
43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-293b passim
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1d-2a; 6a-7c; PART III, par 270, 85c; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-157b; 176b-c; PART IV, 349b-350a
47 Goethe: Faust, PRELUDE [73-74] 3a
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 428b-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 216d-218b esp 217c
53 James: Psychology, 879b-882a; 889a-890a
6. The accumulation or accretion of truth, and the correction of error, in the progress of human learning
8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 [183b16-184b8] 253a-d / Heavens, BK I, CH 10 [279b4-12] 370d; BK IV, CH 1 [307b28-308a8] 399a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [983b33-984a6] 501c-d; CH 7 506b-d; CH 10 511c-d; BK II, CH 1 511b,d-512b; BK III, CH 1 [995a23-b4] 513b,d; BK XII, CH 10 [1075b25-1076a4] 606a-d; BK XIII, CH 1 [1076a8-17] 607a / Soul, BK I CH 2 [403b20-23] 633a
9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK II, CH 3 [513a7-14] 36c-d / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [642a25-30] 165b-c / Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096a11-16] 341b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a34-39] 594d
10 Hippocrates: Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 1 26a-c
10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 14, 178d-179a; CH 16 180c-182b; BK II, CH 8, 192a-b; CH 9, 199a,c; BK III, CH 10 207b-d
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 49c
16 Ptolemy: Almagest, BK I, 6b
16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 846a-850a / Harmonies of the World, 1009b-1010a
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK VII, par 13-15 47c-48c / City of God, BK VIII, CH 5 267d-268d; CH 10-11 271a-272c / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 40 655b-656a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d; PART II-II, Q 1, A 7 385c-387a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; PART II, 114d-115a; 164a,c; PART IV, 267c-269b passim; CONCLUSION, 282b-d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 271a-c; 276b-278a
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT II, SC III [119-128] 367b
28 Gilbert: Loadstone, PREF, 2b-d
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-269a; 274a-b; 279d-280c; 293b-d / Circulation of the Blood, 306a-c / On Animal Generation, 331a-332a; 336d-337a,c; 364a-365a; 377a-c; 433c; 457b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 14c-15d; 16c; 32a; 47d-48d; 64a-b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 56 112a; APH 84 121b-d; APH 92-115 125b-130d passim
31 Descartes: Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART I, 42b-44c, PART II, 46c-48a, PART III, 49d-50b, PART VI 60d-67a,c
32 Milton: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 384b-389a, 398a-b, 404a-b
33 Pascal: Vacuum, 357a-358a
35 Locke: Human Understanding, 85a-c; 89a-b
36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 118a-119a
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 224b-225a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330a-d; 346d-347a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 23d-24a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 274a-d; 298a-300b
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 1d-2b [fn 2]; 5d-6c; 220b-221b; 248d-250a,c / Practical Reason, 336d-337a,c / Judgement, 513d-514b
43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-293b passim, esp 280a-c, 288d-290a
44 Boswell: Johnson, 129a; 222a
45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 332a-b; 391b-c
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 590a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 196a-b; BK IX, 342b-343a
53 James: Psychology, 37b; 125b-126a
54 Freud: Psycho-Analytic Therapy, 125d-126a / General Introduction, 550d-551a / New Introductory Lectures, 880d-881c
7. The skeptical denial of truth
7a. The impossibility of knowing the truth: the restriction of all human judgments to degrees of probability; the denial of axioms and of the possibility of demonstration
7 Plato: Euthydemus, 72d-73a / Cratylus, 86a-d; 107d-109a / Phaedo, 236c-238a / Theaetetus, 517b-532c passim, esp 517b-c, 522b, 525a-526c, 531b-532a
8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 3 [72b5-33] 99b-c / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 3-8 524b-532d; BK X, CH 1 [1053a31-b3] 580a; CH 6 [1057a7-11] 584b; BK XI, CH 5-6 590a-592b
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [469-477] 50b
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK II, CH 20 164c-166c
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK V, par 19 32b-c / City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 16, A 1, REP 2 94b-95c; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 80b-82b; 208a-294b esp 240c-246a, 257d-264a, 270a-279c, 285c-294b; 308c-d; 318a-319b; 439c-440a; 497d-502c; 517b-519a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 67 115d-116a
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 272a-273a
33 Pascal: Pensées, 72 181a-184b esp 182b; 381-385 238b-239a
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1-2 405a-b; SECT 86-88 429c-430b; SECT 101-102 432c-433a
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT IV, DIV 28-SECT V, DIV 38 460d-466c esp SECT V, DIV 34 463d-464b; SECT VII, DIV 60 477a-c; SECT XII 503c-509d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 129c-130a; 218d-222b; 224a-227a / Practical Reason, 294c-295d; 311d-313d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2b-c; 3b-5c; 7a; PART I, par 44 23c; PART III, par 270, 86b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 159b-c
47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [354-429] 11a-12b; [656-675] 17b-18a; [1064-1067] 26b; [1908-1945] 45b-46a
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 427a-b; 428b-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 194b-195a
53 James: Psychology, 884b-886a
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 881d-882a
7b. The defense of truth against the skeptic
7 Plato: Cratylus, 86b-d; 113c-114a,c / Meno, 179b-183b esp 179d-180b, 182c-183b / Theaetetus, 517b-532c esp 527b-528c
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4-8 525a-532d; BK XI, CH 6 590d-592b
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK II, CH 20 164c-166c
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 3 10d-11d; Q 16, A 1, REP 2 94b-95c; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 13a-c; 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 67 115d-116a
31 Descartes: Meditations, V, 95d-96a / Objections and Replies, 206c-207a; 272a-273a
33 Pascal: Pensées, 378 238a; 912-922 349b-351b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 4-7 94a-95c esp SECT 7 95a-c
35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, PREF, 404a; INTRO, SECT 1-5 405a-d; SECT 40 420b; SECT 85-91 429c-431a; SECT 101-102 432c-433a; SECT 133 439c-440a
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 8-9, 454b-455a; SECT XII, DIV 126-128 507a-508a
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 129c-130a; 200c; 218d-222b; 224a-227a / Practical Reason, 294c-295d; 311d-313d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 121c-d; 126b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 3b-5c; 7a; PART III, par 272, 90a
53 James: Psychology, 671a-672a
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 881d-882b
8. The moral and political aspect of truth
8a. Prevarication and perjury: the injustice of lying or bearing false witness
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:8-10; 27; 39:7-20 / Exodus, 20:16; 23:1,7 / Leviticus, 6:2-7; 19:11-12 / Deuteronomy, 5:20; 19:15-21 / II Chronicles, 18—(D) II Paralipomenon, 18 / Job, 8:11-18; 27:3-4,8-10 / Psalms, 5:6; 15:1-2; 24:3-4; 31:18; 34:11-13; 43:1; 50:16-21; 52:1-5; 55:23; 101:7; 119:29-30; 120:1-3—(D) Psalms, 5:7; 14:1-3; 23:3-4; 30:19; 33:12-14; 42:1; 49:16-21; 51:1-7; 54:24; 100:7; 118:29-30; 119:1-3 / Proverbs, 3:3; 6:16-19; 8:7-9; 10:18; 11:1,9; 12:17-22; 13:5; 14:5,25; 17:4,7; 19:5,9,22; 20:17,23; 21:6,28; 24:24,26; 25:18; 26:18-28; 30:5-9 / Isaiah, 9:13-17; 28:14-18; 59 passim—(D) Isaias, 9:13-17; 28:14-18; 59 passim / Jeremiah, 5:1-5; 9:1-9; 14:10-16; 23:16-40—(D) Jeremias, 5:1-5; 9:1-9; 14:10-16; 23:16-40 / Nahum, 3:1 / Zechariah, 8:16-19—(D) Zacharias, 8:16-19 / Malachi, 2:1-9; 3:5-18—(D) Malachias, 2:1-9; 3:5-18
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:11—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 1:11 / Ecclesiasticus, 1:28-30; 4:25; 7:12-13; 15:8; 19:26-28; 20:18,24-26; 25:2; 27:9; 34:4; 41:17; 51:1-3—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1:37-40; 4:30; 7:13-14; 15:8; 19:23-26; 20:20,26-28; 25:3-4; 27:10; 34:4; 41:21; 51:1-5 / Susanna—(D) OT, Daniel, 13
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:33-37; 19:17-18; 26:55-75; 28:11-15 / Mark, 14:48-72 / Luke, 3:14; 22:54-62 / John, 8:44; 18:15-27 / Acts, 5:1-10; 6:11-15 / Romans, 9:1 / I Corinthians, 4:2 / Ephesians, 4:14-15,25 / Colossians, 3:8-10 / I Timothy, 2:7; 4:1-3 / Titus, 2:3 / James, 3:14-17 / I Peter, 2:1 / Revelation, 21:6-8,27; 22:13-15—(D) Apocalypse, 21:6-8,27; 22:13-15
5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [216-462] 101a-103c / Trachiniae [335-496] 173a-174c / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-134] 182d-183c, [895-962] 190a-d
5 Euripides: Phoenician Maidens [861-961] 385d-386d
6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 105c-d; BK VI, 201d-202c; BK VII, 217d
7 Plato: Euthyphro, 192a-193b / Apology, 208c-210d esp 209a-b / Laws, BK XI, 783c-784b
8 Aristotle: Physics, BK VIII, CH 1 [251a28-b1] 334d-335a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 29 [1025a1-12] 547a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK IV, CH 7 374b-375a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 14 [1375a8-13] 619c; CH 15 [1377a8-b12] 621d-622d
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IX, SECT 1, 291a-b
18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 36 634d-635b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 21, A 2, REP 2 125c-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 100, A 5, ANS and REP 5 255a-257c; A 6, ANS 257c-258c
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XI [16-66] 15b-d; XVI [1-33] 23d-24a; XXIII [58-148] 33c-34c esp [142-144] 34c; XXIX [37]-XXX [148] 43c-46a; PARADISE, XXXI [82-126] 151a-c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 101c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 16a-17c; 314d-316a; 323c-324b; 381d-382b; 383b-384b
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK IV [114-125] 155a
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 67b-69a; 117b-127a
35 Locke: Toleration, 14a
36 Swift: Gulliver, PART IV, 146b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 40b-41a; 66c-d; 130d-131a; 295b; 318d-319a; 382b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 215b-216a; 296b-c
42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 260a-c; 267d-268a; 269a-c; 272c-d / Science of Right, 432c-433c
43 Mill: Liberty, 280d-281c / Utilitarianism, 455c-456a
44 Boswell: Johnson, 2d-3a; 99a; 124a; 157c-d; 372c-373a; 377b; 542a-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 140 49b-54a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK III, 134a-c; BK VIII, 304c-305a; BK IX, 366d-367b; BK X, 441a-b
8b. The expediency of the political lie
4 Homer: Iliad, BK XIV [301-360] 101b-d / Odyssey, BK XIII [250-310] 257d-258b
5 Sophocles: Trachiniae [335-496] 173a-174c / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-134] 182d-183c
6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 105c-d; BK VI, 186b-c; BK VIII, 264a-c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 427b-c
7 Plato: Republic, BK II, 323c-324a; BK III, 326b-c; 340b-341a / Laws, BK II, 658a-c
13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK II [1-246] 124a-131a
14 Plutarch: Alcibiades, 160b-161b / Lysander, 357a-b; 365a-366a
15 Tacitus: Histories, BK III, 256a-b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVI-XXVII 38a-41b
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XVIII 25a-26a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 11b-13c; 16a-17c; 306a-d; 314d-316a; 381a-388c; 487d-488a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XII, 94c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 48a
43 Mill: Liberty, 277b-278a / Utilitarianism, 455c-456a
44 Boswell: Johnson, 212a-d
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 315a-b
54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 197c-d / War and Death, 757b
8c. Truth in relation to love and friendship: the pleasant and the unpleasant truth
OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 11:9-13
NEW TESTAMENT: I Corinthians, 13:6 / Galatians, 4:16 / Ephesians, 4:15,25 / I John, 3:18-19
5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c / Trachiniae [335-496] 173a-174c / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [895-962] 190a-d
5 Euripides: Phoenician Maidens [861-961] 385d-386d
7 Plato: Symposium, 161b-d / Apology, 201d-203c / Phaedo, 234c-235a / Republic, BK I, 297b-c; BK V, 356d-357b; BK X, 427c / Philebus, 622d-631d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096a11-16] 341b; BK IV, CH 3 [1124b26-30] 371d; CH 7 374b-375a
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK IV, CH 1 213a-223d passim
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK VI, SECT 21 276a
14 Plutarch: Cimon, 390b-d
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 26b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 38, A 4 788d-789b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 100, A 5, REP 5 255a-257c
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XI [16-66] 15b-d passim; XVII 25b-26d; XXIII [58-148] 33c-34c; XXVI-XXVIII 38a-41b; XXIX [37]-XXX [148] 43c-46a; PARADISE, XVII [103-142] 133b-c
22 Chaucer: Nun’s Priest’s Tale [4288-452] 457b-460b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 307a; 320c-321a; 323c-324b; 522b-d
26 Shakespeare: 2nd Henry IV, ACT I, SC I [60-135] 468d-469c
27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, ACT III, SC II [165-212] 121d-122b / Antony and Cleopatra, ACT I, SC II [99-115] 313b-c / Timon of Athens 393a-420d esp ACT I, SC II [220-234] 399c-d, ACT IV, SC III [197-218] 413a / Sonnets, CXXXVII-CLII 607a-609c
28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 331c-332a
31 Descartes: Rules, I, 1d
33 Pascal: Pensées, 100-101 191a-192b / Geometrical Demonstration, 440a-b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, 87a-b
44 Boswell: Johnson, 94b; 106d; 299b-d; 393c; 402a-c; 542a-c
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 315b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 247d-248a; BK VIII, 310c-d; 319c-d; 333b-334c
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 20a-b
54 Freud: General Introduction, 453a
8d. Civil liberty as a condition for discovering the truth: freedom of thought and discussion
5 Sophocles: Antigone [499-511] 135b-c; [683-739] 137a-c
6 Herodotus: History, BK VII, 216d-217a
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 397b-c; BK III, 427a-c
7 Plato: Apology, 200a-210b passim / Statesman, 601c-602c
15 Tacitus: Histories, BK I, 189a-b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 102d-103a
31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 283c-d
32 Milton: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 383b-384a, 392a-393a, 401b-402a, 404a-b, 409b-410a
35 Locke: Toleration 1a-22d esp 4a, 9a-10a, 15c / Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 20 319b-c
35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 102 497b-d; DIV 114 503a-b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XIX, 146c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 669a-671b passim
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 300a-b; 523a
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 220b-221b; 223a-c
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS, I 17a
43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-293b passim; 293d; 297b-298b
44 Boswell: Johnson, 221d-224a; 300c-301a; 512c-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 314-315 104b-c
54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 879b-880b
8e. The love of truth and the duty to seek it: the moral distinction between the sophist and the philosopher; martyrdom to the truth
OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 15:1-2; 25:4-5; 43:3; 51:6; 119:30—(D) Psalms, 14:1-3; 24:4-5; 42:3; 50:8; 118:30 / Proverbs, 23:23
APOCRYPHA: II Maccabees, 6:18-7:42—(D) OT, II Machabees, 6:18-7:42
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 28:19-20 / Mark, 16:14-20 / Luke, 24:46-48 / John, 8:31-32; 14:6; 16:13; 18:37 / Acts, 6:8-7:60—(D) Acts, 6:8-7:59 / II Corinthians, 13:7-8 / Ephesians, 6:14 / James, 3:13-18 / I Peter, 2:1-2
6 Herodotus: History, BK VII, 239a-c; 242c-d
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 397b-c
7 Plato: Lysis, 22b-c / Protagoras, 54c-55a / Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedrus, 124c-127c / Meno, 179d-180b; 182c-183b / Euthyphro, 198d-199a,c / Apology 200a-212a,c esp 201d-203a, 206b-d, 207d-208a, 210a-b / Phaedo, 223b-225a; 234c-235a; 251b-d / Gorgias, 271a-b / Republic, BK II, 319c-320c; 323c-324a; BK V, 370b-373c; BK VI, 377a-379c; BK X, 427c / Theaetetus, 518d-519a; 524b; 525a; 528c-531a / Sophist 551a-579d esp 571b-c / Philebus, 610c-d / Seventh Letter, 808c-809a
8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1004b17-27] 523d
9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b21-645a25] 168c-169a / Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096a11-16] 341b; BK IV, CH 7 [1127a33-b8] 374c-d; BK VII, CH 2 [1146b23-27] 396b
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 2, 107d-108b; CH 8 113d-114c; CH 9, 115c-116a; BK II, CH 6, 144d-145b; CH 17, 160a-161a; CH 22, 169d-170a; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 10, 186b-187a; CH 15, 190c-d; CH 21-22, 193d-198b; CH 24, 207d-210a; BK IV, CH 1 213a-223d passim, esp 215c-217b, 220b-223d; CH 5, 228a-b; CH 8 235b-237d
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK I, SECT 14 254b-c; BK III, SECT 6 261a-c; SECT 12 262b-c; BK V, SECT 9 270b-c; BK VI, SECT 12 274c; SECT 21 276a
16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1009b-1010b
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, par 1 1a-b; BK III, par 6-10 14b-15d; BK V, par 12-13 30a-c; par 23-25 33c-34c; BK VI, par 7-8 36d-37c; BK VII, par 24 50d-51a; BK VIII, par 29-30 60d-61c; BK X, par 33-34 79d-80c / City of God, BK VIII, CH 27 284d-285d
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 82, A 3, REP 1 433c-434c; PART I-II, Q 29, A 5 747c-748b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 100, A 5, REP 5 255a-257c; PART III SUPPL, Q 96, A 6, REP 10 1058a-1061b; A 7 1061b-1062a; A 11, ANS 1063d-1064d
22 Chaucer: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b / Second Nun’s Tale 463b-471b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 446d-450a
28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268a-d / Circulation of the Blood, 313a-b / On Animal Generation, 331c-332a; 457b
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 71 117a-c
31 Descartes: Rules, VII, 13d-14a / Discourse, PART I, 41d-42a; PART III, 51b
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK VI [29-43] 197a; BK XII [552-573] 331a-b
33 Pascal: Pensées, 261 221a; 582-583 276b; 864 343b
35 Locke: Human Understanding, 87a-b; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 74, 199c-d; BK III, CH X, SECT 34, 300a; BK IV, CH XIX, SECT 1 384c-d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK II, 395d-396a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 217a-220d esp 219c-220d; 327d-328b
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 499c; 526c-d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 187c-188b; 221c-222b / Practical Reason, 299d; 335b-c; 337c-338b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b [fn 1] / Judgement, 551d-552a
43 Mill: Liberty, 278c-283c
44 Boswell: Johnson, 4b-c; 151b-c; 221d-224a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1d-2a; 4b-5c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-160b; PART II, 276a-d; 279d-281a; PART III, 308b-c
47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [586-593] 16a-b
48 Melville: Moby Dick, 35b-36a; 78a-b
54 Freud: Psycho-Analytic Therapy, 125d-127a,c esp 127a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 874d-875a
CROSS-REFERENCES
- For other discussions bearing on the nature of truth and its relation to being, goodness, and beauty, see BEAUTY 1b; BEING 4-4b; GOOD AND EVIL 1c; KNOWLEDGE 1, 4a; OPINION 3a.
- For other discussions of the signs or criteria of truth and of methods of verification, see EXPERIENCE 4b; HYPOTHESIS 4d; IDEA 6c-6e; SENSE 5c.
- For the significance of the distinction between theoretic and practical truth, see JUDGMENT 2; KNOWLEDGE 6e(1); PHILOSOPHY 2a; PRUDENCE 2a; SCIENCE 3a; WISDOM 1b.
- For discussions of what is involved in the comparison of human and divine truth, see GOD 5f; INFINITY 7d; KNOWLEDGE 7a; WISDOM 1d.
- For matters surrounding the distinction between truth and probability, and the related distinction between knowledge and opinion, see JUDGMENT 9; KNOWLEDGE 6d(1)-6d(3); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4a; OPINION 3-3b.
- For the consideration of truth and falsity in the apprehensions of the sensitive faculty, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 2c(4), 5c; PRINCIPLE 2b(1); SENSE 4d-4d(2).
- For the consideration of truth and falsity in the acts of the mind, see DEFINITION 1c; IDEA 6f; JUDGMENT 10; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4c; PRINCIPLE 2b(2); REASONING 3a-3c; TIME 6f.
- For other discussions of the principle of contradiction as the principle of truth in judgment and reasoning, see LOGIC 1a; OPPOSITION 1d(1); PRINCIPLE 3a(3).
- For the theory of error, its nature and causes, and the respects in which the human mind is fallible or infallible, see KNOWLEDGE 4a; MIND 5a; SENSE 4d, 4d(2); and for the suggestion of various methods of saving the mind from error, see KNOWLEDGE 5d-5e; LANGUAGE 6; LOGIC 4; MIND 5b; REASONING 3b-3c; SIGN AND SYMBOL 4c.
- For discussions relevant to the contrast between truth in one discipline and truth in another, see DIALECTIC 5; HISTORY 3a; MATHEMATICS 1c; OPINION 4a; POETRY 8a(2); RHETORIC 5a; THEOLOGY 4b.
- For the eternity or immutability of truth, and for the change or growth of truth in the tradition of human learning, see CHANGE 15a; ETERNITY 4c; KNOWLEDGE 10; PROGRESS 6c.
- For various expressions of skepticism and of the answers to the skeptic, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 9b; KNOWLEDGE 5c-5d; OPINION 3c; PRINCIPLE 5; RELATION 6b; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7a.
- For another consideration of truth as a source of moral or spiritual freedom, see LIBERTY 3b; and for freedom of thought and discussion as a condition of discovering the truth, see KNOWLEDGE 9b; LIBERTY 2a-2b; OPINION 5b; PROGRESS 6f.
- For the love of truth and its pursuit as the distinguishing marks of the philosopher, see LOVE 1d; PHILOSOPHY 6a; WISDOM 3.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I.
- Augustine. Concerning the Teacher
- ———. On Free Will, BK II
- Aquinas. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, Q 1
- F. Bacon. “Of Truth,” in Essays
- Descartes. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 1-5, 29-38, 42-44, 48-50, 70-76
- Hobbes. Concerning Body, PART I, CH 5
- Spinoza. Correspondence, II
- ———. Of the Improvement of the Understanding
- Kant. Introduction to Logic, VII
- Hegel. Science of Logic, VOL I, SECT III, CH 2 (A)
- W. James. Pragmatism, LECT VI-VII
- ———. The Meaning of Truth
II.
- Cicero. Academics
- Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians, BK I (Does a Criterion of Truth Exist?, Concerning the Criterion, Concerning Truth); BK II, CH 1
- Anselm of Canterbury. Dialogue on Truth
- Grosseteste. On Truth
- R. Bacon. Opus Majus, PART I
- Duns Scotus. Oxford Commentary, BK I, DIST 3, Q 4
- Albo. The Book of Principles (Sefer ha-Ikkarim), BK I, CH 27
- Nicholas of Cusa. De Docta Ignorantia, BK I, CH 3
- Suárez. Disputationes Metaphysicae, III, VIII-IX, X (1), XXX (12)
- Campanella. The Defense of Galileo
- Herbert of Cherbury. De Veritate (Of Truth)
- Corneille. Polyeucte
- Molière. Tartuffe
- Malebranche. De la recherche de la vérité, BK I, CH 3-9, 15-17; BK III (II), CH 9-11
- ———. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, I-II
- Leibniz. Philosophical Works, CH 3 (Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas)
- ———. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH 29, 32; BK IV, CH 5, 20
- ———. Monadology, par 33-37
- Voltaire. “Falsity,” “Truth,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
- ———. The Ignorant Philosopher, CH 33
- T. Reid. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, VI, CH 5-6, 8
- W. Hamilton. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL II (27-31)
- Emerson. “Truth,” in English Traits
- Whewell. On the Philosophy of Discovery, CH 29
- Lotze. Microcosmos, BK VIII, CH 1
- ———. Logic, BK III, CH 5
- Clifford. “The Ethics of Belief,” in VOL II, Lectures and Essays
- Bosanquet. Logic, VOL II, CH 9-10
- C. S. Peirce. Collected Papers, VOL V, par 358-410, 464-496, 538-604
- Frazer. The Golden Bough, PART VII, CH 13
- Royce. The World and the Individual, SERIES I (6)
- Dewey. “The Intellectual Criterion for Truth,” “A Short Catechism Concerning Truth,” in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy
- Joachim. The Nature of Truth
- Bradley. The Principles of Logic, BK III, PART II, CH 3-4; Terminal Essays, VIII
- ———. Appearance and Reality, BK II, CH 16, 24
- ———. Essays on Truth and Reality, CH 4-5, 7-9, 11
- Péguy. Basic Verities (The Search for Truth)
- Bergson. The Creative Mind, CH 1, 8
- McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, CH 44-45
- Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Croce. “On Telling the Truth,” in The Conduct of Life
- Whitehead. Religion in the Making, CH 4
- ———. Adventures of Ideas, CH 16, 18
- Santayana. Scepticism and Animal Faith, CH 25
- ———. The Realm of Truth
- Blanshard. The Nature of Thought, CH 25-27
- Cassirer. The Myth of the State, PART I (4), III (18)
- B. Russell. Philosophical Essays, CH 5-7
- ———. The Problems of Philosophy, CH 12-13
- ———. The Analysis of Mind, LECT 13
- ———. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, CH 16-17, 21-23
- ———. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART II, CH 8-11