Chapter 93: TIME

INTRODUCTION

“DEVOURING Time,” “wasteful Time,” “this bloody tyrant, Time”—Time is the predatory villain with whom not only the lover, but all men must contend. The sonnets of Shakespeare make war upon Time’s tyranny—to stay “Time’s scythe,” to preserve whatever of value can be kept from “the wastes of time,” and to prove that “Love’s not Time’s fool” entirely.

Yet, viewing the almost universal depredations of Time, the poet fears that love may not escape Time’s ruin.

When I have seen by Time’s fell hand defaced
The rich-proud cost of outworn buried age;
When sometime lofty towers I see down-razed,
And brass eternal slave to mortal rage;

When I have seen the hungry ocean gain
Advantage on the kingdom of the shore,
And the firm soil win of the watery main,
Increasing store with loss and loss with store;
When I have seen such interchange of state,
Or state itself confounded to decay;

Ruin hath taught me thus to ruminate,
That Time will come and take my love away.

This thought is as a death, which cannot choose
But weep to have that which it fears to lose.

The lover knows that he cannot save his love from change and her beauty from decay. Time is too much for him. But when the lover is also a poet he may hope to defeat Time, not by making his love last forever, but by making the memory of it immortal. “Do thy worst, old Time,” he can say, “despite thy wrong, My love shall in my verse ever live young.” Or again:

Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea,
But sad mortality o’er-sways their power,
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea,
Whose action is no stronger than a flower?

O, how shall summer’s honey breath hold out
Against the wreckful siege of battering days,
When rocks impregnable are not so stout,
Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?

O fearful meditation! where, alack,
Shall Time’s best jewel from Time’s chest lie hid?
Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?
Or who his spoil of beauty can forbid?

O, none, unless this miracle have might,
That in black ink my love may still shine bright.

But the poet may have the cast of a theologian rather than a lover. He may, as Milton does, stand not in awe or fear but in contempt of Time, willing to wait while Time runs out its race. Milton bids Time

… glut thyself with what thy womb devours,
Which is no more than what is false and vain,
And merely mortal dross;

So little is our loss,
So little is thy gain,
For when as each thing bad thou hast entomb’d,
And last of all thy greedy self consum’d,
Then long Eternity shall greet our bliss
With an individual kiss…

Then all this Earthly grossness quit,
Attir’d with Stars, we shall forever sit,
Triumphing over Death, and Chance, and thee,
O Time.

A philosopher like Marcus Aurelius neither defies nor despises time. He enjoins himself to accept the mutability of all things as fitting and “suitable to universal nature…. Dost thou not see,” he asks himself, “that for thyself also to change is just the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature?” To him it seems “no evil for things to undergo change”; nor is he oppressed by the image of Time as “a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away too.”

For man to resign himself to time’s passage, Pascal thinks, requires no special effort. “Our nature consists in motion,” he says; “complete rest is death.” Time fits our nature, not only because it “heals griefs and quarrels,” but because time’s perpetual flow washes away the desperate ennui men suffer when they feel themselves imprisoned in the present.

Just as we seek and multiply diversions as means to escape from ourselves, so, according to Pascal, when we are dissatisfied with the present, “we anticipate the future as too slow in coming… or we recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight…. For the present is generally painful to us…. Let each one examine his thoughts, and he will find them all occupied with the past and the future…. The past and present are our means; the future alone is our end. So we never live, but we hope to live; and, as we are always preparing to be happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.”

THESE ARE ONLY SOME of the conflicting attitudes toward time and mutability which express man’s desire for permanence, for the eternity of a now that stands still, or his restless weariness, his avidity for the novelties time holds in store. Wherever in the great books of poetry, philosophy, or history men reflect upon their loves and aspirations, their knowledge and their institutions, they face man’s temporality. It is not that man alone of earthly things has a time-ridden existence, but that his memory and imagination enable him to encompass time, and so save him from being merely rooted in it. Man not only reaches out to the past and future, but he also sometimes lifts himself above the whole of time by conceiving the eternal and the immutable.

Man’s apprehension of the past and future is discussed in the chapter on MEMORY AND IMAGINATION. The bent of his mind or his striving toward the unchanging, the everlasting, the eternal, is considered in the chapter on CHANGE. Here we are concerned with his examination of time itself.

Though the idea of time is traditionally linked with that of space, it seems to be much more difficult to grasp. In addition to provoking opposite emotions from the poets, it seems to engage the philosophers in a dispute about its intelligibility. This goes deeper than conflicting definitions or analyses, such as occur in the discussion of both space and time. Whereas time seems no less clear than space to some thinkers, to others it is irremediably obscure. Struggling to say what it is and how it exists, they are exasperated by its evanescence as an object of thought.

Aristotle indicates some initial difficulties in the consideration of time. It is not itself a movement, yet “neither does time exist without change…. Time is neither movement nor independent of movement.” Furthermore, according to Aristotle, time is a continuous quantity. “Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole.” But the very nature of a continuous quantity is to be divisible. The present moment, however—the ‘now’ which is ‘the link of time” and the dividing line between past and future—seems to be an indivisible instant.

If the present had an extended duration, Aristotle points out, it would have to include parts, some of which would be past and some future. Hence though the present seems to be a part of time, it is, unlike the rest of time, indivisible; and though it separates past and future, yet it must also somehow belong to both, for otherwise time would not be continuous. “The ‘now’ is an end and a beginning of time, not of the same time however, but the end of that which is past and the beginning of that which is to come.”

“If we conceive of some point of time which cannot be divided into even the minutest parts of moments,” Augustine writes, “that is the only point that can be called the present; and that point flees at such lightning speed from being future to being past, that it has no extent of duration at all.” Only past time and future time can be called long or short. Only they have duration. “But in what sense,” Augustine asks, “can that which does not exist be long or short? The past no longer is; the future is not yet.”

The past and future, it seems, have duration, or at least extent, but no existence. The present exists but does not endure. “What then is time? If no one asks me,” Augustine says, “I know; if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not know.” All the words with which we speak of time and times “are the plainest and commonest of words, yet again they are profoundly obscure and their meaning remains to be discovered.”

Augustine returns again and again to the point that “we measure time in its passing.” But, he says, “if you ask me how I know this, my answer is that I know it because we measure time, and we cannot measure what does not exist, and the past and future do not exist. But how do we measure time present, since it has no extent”; and “where does time come from, and by what way does it pass, and where does it go to, while we are measuring it? Where is it from?—obviously from the future. By what way does it pass?’—by the present. Where does it go?—into the past. In other words, it passes from that which does not exist, by way of that which lacks extension, into that which is no longer.”

The more he reflects on time and its measurement, the more Augustine is perplexed, the more he is forced to say, “I still do not know what time is.” He realizes that he has been “talking of time for a long time, and this long time would not be a long time unless time has passed. But how do I know this, since I do not know what time is?” It seems to him true that we measure time, and yet he must say, “I do not know what I am measuring.” It seems to him that “time is certainly extendedness—but,” he must add, “I do not know what it is extendedness of.”

Berkeley suggests that the difficulties in understanding time may be of our own making. “Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words…. But if time be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in the abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.

“For my own part,” Berkeley goes on to say, “whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my own mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all.”

TO THOSE WHO conceive time as a mathematical magnitude or as a physical dimension, there seems to be no difficulty about its definition or a precise statement of its properties. So considered, time appears to be no less intelligible than space, for when it is so considered it is being treated exactly like space—not as a property of things, not as relative to bodies or their motions, but as an extensive manifold capable of being occupied by things, and in which they exist and move.

As in what Einstein calls “the four-dimensional space-time continuum” (which comprises three space coordinates and one time coordinate) time is merely one dimension among others, so in Newton’s theory time and space are also given parallel treatment. “Times and spaces,” Newton writes, “are as it were, the places as well of themselves as of all other things. All things are placed in time as to order of succession; and in space as to order of situation.” Einstein criticizes Newtonian mechanics for its “habit of treating time as an independent continuum,” yet Newton no less than Einstein appears to conceive time and space alike as dimensions, even if he conceives them in separation from one another.

But if time and space are something to be occupied or filled, they can also be thought of as unoccupied or empty. The opposition, discussed in the chapter on SPACE, between those who think of space in itself as empty, and those who deny a void or vacuum, seems to be paralleled here by the issue concerning empty time—time apart from all change or motion, time in itself. Waiving for the moment the question whether such time exists or is only a mathematical abstraction, we can see that this time may be more susceptible to analysis than the time of ordinary experience, the time which, according to Lucretius, no one feels “by itself abstracted from the motion and calm rest of things.”

Newton explains that he does not define time, space, place, and motion, because they are “well known to all.” But he observes that men commonly “conceive these quantities under no other notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects.” He finds it necessary, therefore, to distinguish each of them “into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and common.”

By “absolute, true, and mathematical time,” Newton means that which “of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration.” In contrast, “relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time, such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.” In astronomy, Newton points out, absolute time “is distinguished from relative, by the equation or correction of the apparent time. For the natural days are truly unequal, though they are commonly considered as equal, and used for measures of time; astronomers correct this inequality that they may measure the celestial motions by a more accurate time.”

Newton seems to be saying that time measures motion and also that it is measured by it. If his distinction between absolute and relative time is ignored, his theory of time does not appear to be very different from that of Aristotle, who says, “not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement.” Insofar as movement or change involves a sequence in which one part comes after another, time measures it by numbering the befores and afters. But we also judge the length of the time according to the duration of the movement, and in this sense the movement measures time.

As both Aristotle and Augustine point out, time measures rest as well as motion, for, in Aristotle’s words, “all rest is in time…. Time is not motion, but the ‘number of motion’ and what is at rest can be in the number of motion. Not everything that is not in motion can be said to be ‘at rest’—but only that which can be moved, though it actually is not moved.”

But where Aristotle, in defining time as the measure of motion or rest, makes time an attribute of movement, Newton regards absolute time as the perfect measure of motion precisely because its nature is independent of all physical change. Only relative time depends on motion, and that is the time which is measured by motion, not the measure of it. Those “who confound real quantities with their relations and sensible measures,” Newton declares, “defile the purity of mathematical and philosophical truths.”

Distinguishing between duration and time, Locke expresses in another way the difference between Newton and Aristotle. Time for Locke is that portion of duration which consists of definite periods and is measured by the motion of bodies. “We must, therefore, carefully distinguish betwixt duration itself, and the measures we make use of to judge its length. Duration in itself is to be considered as going on in one constant, equal uniform course; but none of the measures which we make use of, can be known to do so.” It seems wrong to Locke to define time as the measure of motion when, on the contrary, it is motion—“the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world”—which measures time.

What Locke calls “duration” seems to be the same as Newton’s absolute time. It is in no way relative to the existence of bodies or motion. Just as space or, as he calls it, “expansion,” is not limited by matter, so duration is not limited by motion. As place is that portion of infinite space “which is possessed by and comprehended within the material world, and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion,” so time is “so much of infinite duration, as is measured by, and coexistent with, the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe.”

MANY ISSUES ARE RAISED by absolute time or infinite duration conceived as independent of all bodily motions. Einstein, for example, challenges the classical notion of simultaneity, according to which two events taking place a great distance from one another are said to occur at the same time, that is, at the same moment in the absolute flow of time.

“Before the advent of the theory of relativity,” he writes, “it had always been tacitly assumed in physics that the statement of time had an absolute significance, i.e., that it is independent of the state of motion of the body of reference.” But if the world of physical events is a four-dimensional manifold in which the time coordinate is always associated with the space coordinates for any reference-body under observation, then “every reference-body (coordinate system) has its own particular time”; and, Einstein adds, “unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event.”

There is also the issue of the emptiness of that part of absolute time or infinite duration which comes before or after the existence of the world, comparable to the issue concerning the void or empty space beyond the borders of the material universe. Those who regard time as relative to and inseparable from motion deny the possibility of such empty time.

For Plato, as for Christian theologians like Augustine and Aquinas, time itself is created with the creation of the heavenly bodies and their motions. As the story of the world’s becoming is told in the Timaeus, the maker “resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity; and this image we call time…. Time, then, and the heaven came into being at the same instant.”

Augustine undertakes to answer “those who agree that God is the Creator of the world, but have difficulties about the time of its creation.” He asserts that “there is no time before the world. For if eternity and time are rightly distinguished by this, that time does not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had not some creature been made, which by some motion could give birth to change…. I do not see,” Augustine continues, “how God can be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be said that prior to the world there was some creature by whose movement time could pass.” But the existence of a creature prior to creation is impossible. Hence Augustine concludes that “if in the world’s creation change and motion were created,” then “the world and time were simultaneously created.”

Though the existence of a creature prior to creation is impossible, it is not impossible, according to Aquinas, for the created world to be coeval with its Creator. While he rejects the opinion of those who assert that the world now exists without any dependence on God, and who deny that it was ever made by God, he entertains, as possible, the view that “the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation.” Those who hold this view, he explains, mean that “it was always made…. For just as, if a foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed.”

It does not necessarily follow, Aquinas admits, that “if God is the active cause of the world, He must be prior to the world in duration, because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change.” But Aquinas does not think that the question whether the world and time began with creation or has always co-existed with its Creator, can be resolved by reason. “The newness of the world,” he says, “is known only by revelation…. That the world did not always exist we hold by faith alone; it cannot be proved demonstratively.” In saying this, he is not unmindful of the fact that Aristotle advances arguments to show that there can be no beginning to either time or motion. “Since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment is a kind of middle point, uniting as it does in itself both… a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time…. But if this is true of time, it is evident that it must also be true of motion, time being an attribute of motion.”

With one exception, all his predecessors, according to Aristotle, are in agreement that time is uncreated. “In fact,” he says, “it is just this that enables Democritus to show that all things cannot have had a becoming…. Plato alone asserts the creation of time, saying that it had a becoming together with the universe.” But Aristotle’s own arguments for the eternity of time and motion do not seem to Aquinas to be “absolutely demonstrative, but only relatively so—viz., as against the arguments of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to be in some actually impossible ways.” As for the present moment, or the now of time, always requiring something which comes before as well as after, Aquinas admits that “time cannot be made except according to some now,” yet “not because there is time in the first now, but because from it time begins.”

The position of Aquinas, that arguments for the initiation or the endlessness of time are only dialectical, seems to be confirmed by Kant. In the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sets forth as one of the cosmological antinomies the opposed arguments for the beginning of the world and for a world without beginning. The reasoning on either side being equal in its appearance of cogency, neither conclusion, according to Kant, is genuinely demonstrated.

But those who, like Newton and Locke, separate absolute time or infinite duration from the existence of a world in motion, seem to be unaffected by arguments which concern only the time of the material world, the time that is relative to motion. For them, absolute or infinite time is eternity. It may be empty of motion, but it is filled with God’s everlasting being. “Though we make duration boundless, as certainly it is,” Locke writes, “we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one easily allows, fills eternity.” God is not eternity, says Newton, but He is eternal. “His duration reaches from eternity to eternity…. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and, by existing always and everywhere, He constitutes duration and space.”

The issue is again brought into focus by the denial that God’s eternity can be identified with infinite or absolute time. “Even supposing that the world always was,” Aquinas writes, it would not be eternal in the sense in which God is, “for the divine being is all being simultaneously without succession.” He distinguishes “the now that stands still” as the eternal present from the continually shifting now in the flow of time’s passing moments. For him God’s everlasting being does not endure through endless time, but rather exists unchanging in the eternal present. “As eternity is the proper measure of being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence,” Aquinas writes, “according as any being recedes from permanence in being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity and is subject to time.”

THE TWO MEANINGS OF eternity—infinite time and utter timelessness—are discussed in the chapter on ETERNITY. The distinction between time and eternity, which is considered both there and here, seems to be understood differently by those who contrast timelessness with temporality and by those who equate eternity with endless time. For the latter, the point of difference between eternity and time seems to be only one of infinite as opposed to limited duration. Yet, as we have just observed, writers like Newton and Locke also distinguish absolute or infinite time (which they tend to identify with eternity) from definite periods or limited spans of time, by making the one independent of, the other relative to and measured by, motion.

The question remains whether absolute time is real time or only a mathematical abstraction, whether it exists apart from perceived time—the experienced duration of observable motions or the elapsed time of events in succession.

Considering this question, Kant says that “those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without their being anything real) for the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real. If they adopt the second view of inherence, which is preferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers, and regard space and time as relations… abstracted from experience… they find themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of mathematical doctrine a priori in reference to real things.”

On Kant’s own view, the synthetic judgments of mathematics can have the apodictic certainty of a priori propositions only if space and time are themselves a priori forms of intuition. As the a priori form of space makes possible the pure science of geometry, according to Kant, so the a priori form of time makes possible the pure science of numbers, i.e., arithmetic. But whereas “space, as the pure form of external intuition is limited… to external phenomena alone,” time, as “the form of the internal sense,” is for Kant “the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever.”

Without sharing Kant’s theory of a priori forms of intuition, or of the foundations of pure mathematics, other writers appear to agree to some extent with his denial of independent reality to time. Aristotle raises the question “whether if soul did not exist, time would exist or not.” He thinks the question may be fairly asked because “if there cannot be someone to count, there cannot be anything that can be counted, so that evidently there cannot be number”—for number is the counted or the countable. “But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, there would not be time unless there were soul.” Yet Aristotle qualifies this somewhat by adding that “if movement can exist without soul, and the before and after are attributes of movement,” time may exist as “these qua numerable.”

Augustine takes a less qualified position. Asking what it is that time is the “extendedness of,” he answers: “Probably of the mind itself.” Insisting that neither future nor past time can be measured because neither exists, Augustine concludes that it is only passing time we can measure, and that we can measure it only in the mind. “It is in you, O my mind,” he says, “that I measure time…. What I measure is the impress produced in you by things as they pass and abiding in you when they have passed… I do not measure the things themselves whose passage produced the impress; it is the impress that I measure when I measure time.”

Yet William James, while giving a similar analysis of our experience of time, insists that time is objective as well as subjective. Time and space relations, he writes, “are impressed from without.” The time and space in which the objects of our thought exist, exist as independently of the mind as do those objects themselves. “The time- and space-relations between things do stamp copies within”; as, for example, when “things sequent in time impress their sequence on our memory.”

WILLIAM JAMES proposes a solution of the mystery of how time exists—at least how it exists in experience. So far as our experience goes, past and future can exist only in the present. But how can these extended parts of time exist in the present if the present is but a fleeting moment, without any extent of duration, “gone,” as James says, “in the instant of becoming”? His answer is in terms of something he calls “the specious present.”

Unlike the real present, the specious present is “no knife-edge but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end. It is only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the other is perceived.”

On the basis of some experimental evidence, James estimates that the specious present may vary in length “from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute.” It has “a vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringe; but its nucleus is probably the dozen seconds or less that have just elapsed.”

The irreversible flow of time—the succession of moments which constitute the motion of the future through the present into the past—occurs in the specious present, though not, according to James, without the accompaniment of observed or experienced change. “Awareness of change is… the condition on which our perception of time’s flow depends.” But that awareness must take place in the specious present “with its content perceived as having one part earlier and the other part later.” In consequence, James considers the specious present to be, not only “the original intuition of time,” but also “the original paragon prototype of all conceived times.”

THE PROBLEMS OF TIME, its own process and being as well as its relation to all other existence and change, its character as an aspect of experience and as an object of thought, seem to belong to many subject matters—to psychology and to experimental or mathematical physics, to the philosophy of nature, metaphysics, and theology.

For some thinkers—in our own time notably Bergson, Whitehead, and Dewey—the concept of time, of the burgeoning future, of the continuum of events, seems to determine a whole philosophical outlook. If it is not equally decisive throughout the tradition of the great books, it is at least of critical significance in speculations about the origin and end of the world, in the contrast between physical and spiritual modes of being, in the consideration of the processes of life, thought, and feeling, and in the analysis of more inclusive concepts, such as that of order.

The temporal relationships of succession and simultaneity, for example, may be the source from which we derive the notions of prior, posterior, and simultaneous, but they are traditionally viewed as exemplifying rather than exhausting these types of order. When Augustine deals with the perplexing theological question of the priority of eternity to time, he finds it necessary to distinguish “priority in eternity, priority in time, priority in choice, priority in origin.”

When Aristotle deals with metaphysical questions concerning the order of cause and effect, of potentiality and actuality, of essence and accident, he differentiates between temporal and logical priority, and between priority in thought and priority in nature. When Harvey tries to solve the familiar biological riddle (which came first, the chicken or the egg?), he also finds his solution in a distinction. “The fowl is prior by nature,” he writes, “but the egg is prior in time.”

Space and spatial relationships, no less than time and the temporal, figure in the general analysis of order or relatedness and have a bearing on other problems in physics and philosophy. But in addition to time’s having more significance than space for the theologian, time also has peculiar importance for one subject matter in which space is of much less concern, namely, history and the philosophy of history.

Besides the general view which the historian takes of time as the locus of history, or the medium in which the pattern of history unfolds, the writer of history usually employs certain conventional time divisions to mark the major phases or epochs of the story he has to tell. Clocks and calendars record or represent the passage of time in conventional units, but these conventions have some natural basis in astronomical time, solar or sidereal. In contrast, the distinction between historic and prehistoric time, or the division of history into such periods as ancient, mediaeval, and modern, seems to be purely a matter of social or cultural convention.

With Hegel, however, the division of the whole of history into three epochs, and of each epoch again into three periods, follows from the dialectical triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis which is the indwelling form of history’s development. The division of each of the three phases of world-history—the Oriental, the Graeco-Roman, and the German worlds—into a first, second, and third period produces in each case the same pattern of origin, conflict, and resolution. For the most part, Hegel does not identify these three periods with ancient, mediaeval, and modern times; yet in one case, that of the German world, he does refer to the second period as “the middle ages” and the third as “the modern time.”

Such words as “ancient” and “modern” have conventional significance for most historians. Furthermore, the meanings of modernity and antiquity are themselves subject to historical relativity. In the tradition of the great books, this appears most plainly in the references made to ancients and moderns by writers whom we today classify as ancient and mediaeval.

Thucydides, for example, begins his history with a description of what is for him the antiquity of Greece. Nicomachus opens his Introduction to Arithmetic with a remark about “the ancients, who under the leadership of Pythagoras first made science systematic, defined philosophy as the love of wisdom.” Mathematics, Aristotle says, “has come to be identical with philosophy for modern thinkers.”

In another place, Aristotle contrasts “the thinkers of the present day” with “the thinkers of old”; and in still another he speaks of “ancient and truly traditional theories.” Like Aristotle in the sphere of thought, so Tacitus in the sphere of politics frequently compares ancient and modern institutions or practices.

In the Middle Ages, Aquinas speaks of the “teachings of the early philosophers” and, as frequently as Aristotle, he refers to ancient and modern doctrines. In the Renaissance, Kepler treats as ancient a scientist who, in point of time, comes much later than those whom Aristotle and Aquinas call modern. Classifying three schools of astronomical thought, he distinguishes an ancient one, which had “Ptolemy as its coryphaeus,” from two modern ones, respectively headed by Copernicus and Tycho Brahe.

Such references, which have occurred in all three periods of the western tradition, suggest the probability that at some future date the whole tradition with which we are now acquainted will be referred to as the thought and culture of ancient times.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature of time: time as duration or as the measure of motion; time as a continuous quantity; absolute and relative time

2. The distinction between time and eternity: the eternity of endless time distinguished from the eternity of timelessness and immutability

2a. Aeviternity as intermediate between time and eternity
2b. Arguments concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of motion or the world
2c. The creation of time: the priority of eternity to time; the immutability of the world after the end of time

3. The mode of existence of time

3a. The parts of time: its division into past, present, and future
3b. The reality of the past and the future in relation to the existence of the present
3c. The extent of the present moment: instantaneity

4. The measurement of time: sun, stars, and clocks

5. Temporal relationships: time as a means of ordering

5a. Simultaneity or coexistence: the simultaneity of cause and effect, action and passion, knowledge and object known
5b. Succession or priority and posteriority: the temporal order of cause and effect, potentiality and actuality
5c. Succession and simultaneity in relation to the association of ideas
5d. Comparison of temporal with non-temporal simultaneity and succession: the prior in thought, by nature, or in origin

6. The knowledge of time and the experience of duration

6a. The perception of time by the interior senses: the difference between the experience and memory of time intervals
6b. Factors influencing the estimate of time elapsed: empty and filled time; illusions of time perception; the variability of experienced durations
6c. Time as a transcendental form of intuition: the a priori foundations of arithmetic; the issue concerning innate and acquired time perception
6d. The signifying of time: the distinction between noun and verb; the tenses of the verb
6e. Knowledge of the past: the storehouse of memory; the evidences of the past in physical traces or remnants
6f. Knowledge of the future: the truth of propositions about future contingents; the probability of predictions

7. The temporal course of the passions: emotional attitudes toward time and mutability

8. Historical time

8a. Prehistoric and historic time: the antiquity of man
8b. The epochs of history: myths of a golden age; the relativity of modernity

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The nature of time: time as duration or as the measure of motion; time as a continuous quantity; absolute and relative time

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451d

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5a6-14] 9b-c / Physics, BK IV, CH 10-14 297c-304a,c; BK VI 312b,d-325d passim / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 10 [337a22-34] 439b-c / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 13 [1020a25-33] 541c; BK XII, CH 6 [1071b6-12] 601b

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 8-13 123b-129a / Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 5, 254c-d; CH 16 260d-261c

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 17-40 93b-99a; BK XII, par 8, 101b / City of God, BK XI, CH 6 325c-d; BK XII, CH 15 351b-352d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7, A 3, REP 4 32c-33c; Q 10, A 1, ANS 40d-41d; A 4 43b-44b; A 6, ANS 45c-46d; Q 53, A 3 283b-284d; Q 57, A 3, REP 2 297b-298a; Q 63, A 5, ANS 329a-330c; A 6, REP 4 330c-331c; Q 66, A 4, REP 4 348d-349d; PART I-II, Q 31, A 2, ANS and REP 1 753c-754a

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 84, A 3 985d-989b

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 201a-202a

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 213b-c

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 8 355c; PROP 21 364a-c; PART II, DEF 5 373b-c; PROP 45, SCHOL 390b; PART III, PROP 8 399b; PART V, PROP 23 458b-d

33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 432b-435b

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b; 9b-10a; 12a-b; BK I, LEMMA II, SCHOL, 31b-32a

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV 155b-162a esp SECT 21-22, 159b-d; CH XV 162b-165c passim

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 97-98 431d-432a

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 124-125 506a-507a esp DIV 125, 506d

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 292a-293a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-33d esp 26d, 28a-b; 74b-76c

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 188c-189b; 206c

53 JAMES: Psychology, 399a-b; 407a

2. The distinction between time and eternity: the eternity of endless time distinguished from the eternity of timelessness and immutability

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 1:2; 18:10—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1:2; 18:8

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450b-451d

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 12 [221b19]-CH 13 [222b29] 301a-302c; BK VI, CH 2 [233a13-b16] 315a-c; CH 7 [237b23-238a19] 321a-c; CH 10 [241b11-20] 325d; BK VIII, CH 1-2 334a-337b; CH 6 344b-346b; CH 8 348b-352a / Heavens, BK I, CH 12 372d-375d esp [282a22-283a2] 373d-374c, [283b7-22] 375c-d; BK II, CH 3 [286a8-13] 377c / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 9 [335a33-b2] 436d-437a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 5 [1015b9-16] 536a; BK IX, CH 8 [1050b6-27] 576b-d; BK XI, CH 10 [1067a33-38] 596a; BK XII, CH 6 [1071b2-11] 601b; CH 7 [1072a18-23] 602a-b; [1073a3-11] 603a-b; BK XIV, CH 2 [1088b14-28] 620d-621a

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VI, SECT 15 275a-b; SECT 36 277c

16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1071b

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR V, CH 7 20a-c / Third Ennead, TR VII 119b-129a / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 7-8 161d-162d; CH 15-16 165c-166b

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VI, par 21 49d-50a; BK XI 89b-99b esp par 8-17 91b-93c, par 39-41 98c-99b; BK XII, par 13-20 102a-103d; par 40 109b-110a; BK XIII, par 44 122d / City of God, BK XI, CH 5-6 324d-325d; CH 21 333a-d; BK XII, CH 12-19 349b-355a

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, AA 1-5 40d-45c esp A 1, REP 5 40d-41d, A 2, REP 2 41d-42c, A 3, REP 2 42c-43b, A 4 43b-44b; Q 14, A 9, ANS 83b-d; A 13, ANS and REP 3 86d-88c; Q 42, A 2, REP 2-4 225d-227a; Q 46, A 2, REP 5 253a-255a; Q 79, A 8, REP 2 421c-422b

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XI [106-108] 69d; PARADISE, XXIX [10-45] 150b-c

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 271b

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 292d-294a

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 366d-367a

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 216d-217a

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 8 355c; PROP 20, COROL 1-2 364a; PART II, PROP 44, COROL 2 and DEMONST 390a; PART V, PROP 23 458b-d; PROP 29, DEMONST 459c; PROP 34, SCHOL 460d

32 MILTON: On Time 12a-b / Paradise Lost, BK VII [70-98] 218b-219a; BK XII [553-556] 331a

33 PASCAL: Pensées, 121 195a; 205-206 211a

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 26-27 160c-161a; SECT 30-31 161c-162a; CH XV, SECT 3-8 162d-164b; SECT 11-12 165a-c; CH XVII 167d-174a passim, esp SECT 5 168d-169a, SECT 10 170b-c, SECT 16 172a-b; CH XXIX, SECT 15 237a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26d; 130b-133c; 135a-137a,c; 152c; 160b-161d; 185a-b

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 190a-b; 206c

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VII, 295b-c

2a. Aeviternity as intermediate between time and eternity

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, par 9 101b-c; par 12-15 101d-102c; par 18-22 103b-104b / City of God, BK XII, CH 15 351b-352d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 2, REP 1-2 41d-42c; A 3, ANS 42c-43b; AA 5-6 44b-46d

2b. Arguments concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of motion or the world

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:1-2 / Nehemiah, 9:6—(D) II Esdras, 9:6 / Job, 38:4-13 / Psalms, 90:2; 95:4-5; 102:25-26; 104:5-6; 119:90-91; 136:5-9; 148:1-6—(D) Psalms, 89:2; 94:4-5; 101:26-27; 103:5-6; 118:90-91; 135:5-9; 148:1-6 / Proverbs, 3:19; 8:22-29 / Isaiah, 45:12,18; 48:13; 65:17-25—(D) Isaias, 45:12,18; 48:13; 65:17-25 / Jeremiah, 51:15—(D) Jeremias, 51:15

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:17-18—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 7:17-18 / Ecclesiasticus, 23:19-20; 24:9—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 23:28-29; 24:14 / II Maccabees, 7:23—(D) OT, II Machabees, 7:23

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13:24-30,36-43,49-50; 24:3-35 / Mark, 13:3-33 / Luke, 21:5-33 / John, 1:1-3 / Colossians, 1:16-17 / Hebrews, 1:10-12 / II Peter, 3:3-13 / Revelation, 10:5-6—(D) Apocalypse, 10:5-6

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-c / Timaeus, 447b-c; 450c-451a; 460c-d

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 11 [104b13-18] 148a-b / Physics, BK IV, CH 13 [222a29-b8] 302b; BK VI, CH 10 [241a27-b20] 325b-d; BK VIII, CH 1-2 334a-337b; CH 6 344b-346b; CH 8 348b-352a / Heavens, BK I, CH 2 [269b2-10] 360c-d; CH 3 [270a1-26] 361c-362a; CH 9 [279a12]-CH 12 [283b23] 370b-375d; BK II, CH 6 [288a23-25] 379d / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 10-11 437d-441a,c / Meteorology, BK I, CH 14 [352b16-353a27] 458b-459a,c; BK II, CH 3 [356b2-357a4] 462b-d / Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 8 [1050b20-28] 576c-d; BK XI, CH 6 [1063a13-16] 591b; CH 10 [1067a33-38] 596a; BK XII, CH 6-8 601b-605a esp CH 7 [1072a19-b14] 602a-d, [1073a5-11] 603b

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 4 [699b15-700a6] 234d-235a; CH 6 [700b29-701a7] 236a-b

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-264] 2d-4b; [483-634] 7a-8d; [951-1051] 12d-14a esp [988-1007] 13b; BK II [89-141] 16a-d; [294-307] 18d-19a; [569-580] 22b; [1048-1063] 28b-c; [1105-1174] 29a-30a,c; BK V [1-431] 61a-66d esp [55-70] 61d-62a, [235-246] 64a-b, [351-379] 65d-66a; BK VI [535-607] 87c-88b

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK V, SECT 13 271b; SECT 23 272b; BK VI, SECT 15 275a-b; BK IX, SECT 28 293d-294a; BK X, SECT 7 297b-c; SECT 27 299d

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK XIII, 429a-b

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 847b-848b; 888b-891a

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR I 35a-39d esp CH 1-5 35a-37c; TR IX, CH 7-8 69c-70d

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 21 49d-50a; BK XI 89b-99b esp par 12-17 92b-93c, par 40 98d-99a / City of God, BK XI, CH 4-6 324a-325d; BK XII, CH 10-20 348b-357a

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 2, REP 2 41d-42c; A 4, ANS 43b-44b; Q 14, A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 46 250a-255d esp A 1 250a-252d; Q 61, A 2 315c-316a; Q 66, A 4 348d-349d; Q 75, A 1, REP 1 378b-379c

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 77, A 2, ANS and REP 1 945a-946b; Q 91, A 2 1017c-1020c

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50a; PART II, 162b

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 224d

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 35, 163a; APH 48, 186b-d

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-c

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK I [6-10] 93b; BK V [577-599] 187b-188a; BK VII [70-97] 218b-219a

33 PASCAL: Pensées, 121 195a

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b; LAW I 14a / Optics, BK III, 540a-541b

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 26 160c-d; CH XXIX, SECT 15 237a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 20a; 26d; 130b-133c; 135a-137a,c; 152a-d; 160b-161d / Practical Reason, 334b-335c

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 693c-694a passim

53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a

2c. The creation of time: the priority of eternity to time; the immutability of the world after the end of time

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:17-18—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 7:17-18

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 1 119b-c; CH 6, 122c-d; CH 11, 126a; CH 13, 128c / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 15-16 165c-166b

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 21 49d-50a; BK XI, par 12-16 92b-93a; par 40 98d-99a; BK XII, par 40 109b-110a / City of God, BK XI, CH 4-6 324a-325d; BK XII, CH 12 349b-350a; CH 15-17 351b-354a; BK XXII, CH 30, 618a-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 1, REP 2 127d-128d; Q 46 250a-255d; Q 61, A 2 315c-316a; Q 66, A 3, REP 1 347b-348d; A 4 348d-349d

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 84, A 3, REP 5 985d-989b; Q 91, A 2 1017c-1020c

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXIX [10-45] 150b-c

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [577-594] 187b-188a; BK VII [70-108] 218b-219b

3. The mode of existence of time

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [1b25-26] 5d; CH 6 [5b6-7] 9b / Physics, BK IV, CH 10 [217b29-218a8] 297c-d; CH 14 [223a21-29] 303a

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [449-482] 6c-7a

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 11-13 126a-129a

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 12-40 92b-99a / City of God, BK XI, CH 6 325c-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 1, REP 5 40d-41d; AA 4-5 43b-45c

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 293d-294a

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 1-5 155b-156b

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 98 432a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-33d esp 28a-b

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 25 121a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 186d-190b

53 JAMES: Psychology, 398a-399b

3a. The parts of time: its division into past, present, and future

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a / Parmenides, 494c-495b; 502a

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5b26-29] 9c / Physics, BK IV, CH 11 [219b10-2] 298d-299b; CH 12 [220b5-8] 300b; [221a14-19] 300d-301a; CH 14 [222b30-223a15] 302d-303a

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 14 258d

17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 13 259d-260b

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 17-38 93b-98c

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 2, REP 4 41d-42c; A 4, ANS and REP 2 43b-44b; A 5, ANS 44b-45c

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 87c-d / Objections and Replies, AXIOM II 131d; 213b-c

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 9 164b-d

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-d; 131a

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-156d

53 JAMES: Psychology, 398a-399a passim; 413a

3b. The reality of the past and the future in relation to the existence of the present

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 10 [217b29-218a8] 297c-d; CH 12 [221b33-222a3] 301d; CH 14 [223a21-29] 303a

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 2 [1139b10-11] 388b

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 14 258d

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 17-38 93b-98c

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 4, ANS 43b-44b; A 5, ANS and REP 3 44b-45c; Q 25, A 4 147a-d

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 293d-294a

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 190a-b

53 JAMES: Psychology, 219b; 398a-b; 413a; 421a

3c. The extent of the present moment: instantaneity

7 PLATO: Parmenides, 505a-c

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 10 [218a4-29] 297d-298a; CH 11 [219b9-220a24] 299b-300a; CH 13 [222a10-23] 301d-302a; [222b1-14] 302b-c; BK VI, CH 3 [233b33-234a23] 315d-316b; BK VIII, CH 1 [251b16-28] 335b; CH 8 [263b26-264a1] 350c-d / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 5 [1002b5-8] 521b

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 17 93b-c; par 19-20 93d-94b

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 2, REP 2 35c-36b; Q 10, A 1, REP 5 40d-41d; Q 42, A 2, REP 4 225d-227a

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 293d-294a

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 10 157a; CH XV, SECT 9 164b-d

53 JAMES: Psychology, 398a-399a; 420a-b

4. The measurement of time: sun, stars, and clocks

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:3-5,14-18 / Psalms, 104:19-20; 136:8-9—(D) Psalms, 103:19-20; 135:8-9

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 43:1-10 esp 43:6-8—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 43:1-11 esp 43:6-9

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [454-461] 44c-d

5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [606-626] 496a-b

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49d-50a; 70c; 79c

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK V, 487d

7 PLATO: Republic, BK VII, 394d-396b / Timaeus, 450c-451d

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 12 [220b15-31] 300c-d; CH 14 [223b12-224a1] 303c-d / Metaphysics, BK X, CH 1 [1052b34-1053a12] 579b-c

9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK IV, CH 10 [777b16-24] 319d-320a

14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 58d-59a / Solon, 74a / Caesar, 599d-600a

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK II, 34b-38a; BK III, 77a-86b; 104b-107a

16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, BK I, 510b; BK II, 568a-576a; BK III, 646a-652b; 672a-674b

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 7-8 122d-124c; CH 11-13 126a-129a

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 18-21 93c-94b; par 27-38 95b-98c / City of God, BK XI, CH 6 325c-d; BK XII, CH 15, 351d-352a

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 6, ANS and REP 3-4 45c-46d; Q 67, A 4 352a-354a; Q 70, A 2, ANS and REP 3,5 364b-365a

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 91, A 2, REP 3 1017c-1020c

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, I [37-45] 1b-c; PURGATORY, II [1-9] 54c; XV [1-15] 75b-c; XXV [1-9] 91b-c; XXVIII [1-6] 94c; PARADISE, X [28-33] 120c; XXVII [106-120] 148b-c

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 267a-b

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 69b,d-70a

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 497b-c

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 148b-149c; 167a-168a; THIRD DAY, 208b-c

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 46 177c-179a

32 MILTON: Song on May Morning 15b / Comus [111-118] 35b-36a / Paradise Lost, BK III [555-587] 147b-148a; [726-732] 151a; BK V [166-170] 179a; BK VIII [66-69] 233b

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b; 9b-10a; 12a-b; BK III, PROP 20 291b-294b

34 HUYGENS: Light, CH I, 554b-557b

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 17-31 158a-162a passim; CH XV, SECT 5-10 163b-165a passim; CH XXVI, SECT 3 217d-218a

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 98 432a

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 169a

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229a

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 376a-b

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 219a-b; 251a-b

53 JAMES: Psychology, 400a; 407a-408a

5. Temporal relationships: time as a means of ordering

5a. Simultaneity or coexistence: the simultaneity of cause and effect, action and passion, knowledge and object known

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 519d-520b; 533b-c

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7b15-8a12] 12b-13a; CH 13 20b-d / Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 12 [95a10-23] 129d-130a; CH 16 [98a35-b24] 134b-c / Physics, BK IV, CH 10 [218a8-29] 297d-298a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 2 [1014a20-25] 534b-c; BK IX, CH 9 [1051a4-13] 577a; BK XII, CH 3 [1070a21-24] 599c

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 10 59a-d; Q 46, A 2, REP 1 253a-255a

34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 379a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-d; 32a-b; 83b-84d / Practical Reason, 312a-c; 339a-b

53 JAMES: Psychology, 862b-863b [fn 2]

5b. Succession or priority and posteriority: the temporal order of cause and effect, potentiality and actuality

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7b15-8a12] 12b-13a; CH 12 19d-20b / Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 12 129d-131b; CH 16 [98b16-24] 134c / Physics, BK III, CH 6 [198a5-13] 275a; BK IV, CH 14 [223a4-14] 302d-303a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 2 [1014a20-25] 534b-c; CH 11 [1018b15-19] 539c; BK VII, CH 3 [1029a5-6] 551c; BK IX, CH 8 [1049b18-1050a3] 575b-d; [1050a2-6] 576b; CH 9 577a-c; BK XII, CH 3 [1070a21-24] 599c; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077a14-19] 608b-c; [1077b24-30] 608c

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [646a25-b10] 170b-c / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742a16-b17] 283b-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, ANS 14b-15b; Q 46, A 2, REP 1 253a-255a; Q 85, A 3 455b-457a

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 2, REP 3 7c-8a

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 135c-136b

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390c; 445c; 447a-b

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 87c-d / Objections and Replies, 159c-d

34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I, 379a

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII 470d-478a esp DIV 60 477a-c

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-d; 32a-b; 63b; 67d-68b [fn 1]; 76c-83b; 95a-d; 214b,d [fn 1] / Practical Reason, 311d-314d; 331c-333a; 339a-b

53 JAMES: Psychology, 399a

5c. Succession and simultaneity in relation to the association of ideas

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 18, SCHOL 382a-b

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 9-10 139d-140b

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT III, DIV 19, 457d

53 JAMES: Psychology, 361b-364a esp 362b-363b; 367a-370b esp 367a, 369a-b; 559a-560a; 559b-561b [fn 2]; 852b-853a; 860b-861a

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 74a-b / Interpretation of Dreams, 352b-c

5d. Comparison of temporal with non-temporal simultaneity and succession: the prior in thought, by nature, or in origin

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 12-13 19d-20d / Interpretation, CH 13, [23a18-26] 35b-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a5] 98b-c; CH 27 119b / Topics, BK IV, CH 2 [123a13-19] 171c; BK VI, CH 4 194c-196a / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 3 [999a6-14] 517d; BK V, CH 11 539c-540a; BK IX, CH 8 575b-577a; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077a14-b14] 608b-609a

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [646a25-b10] 170b-c / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742a16-b18] 283b-d / Politics, BK III, CH 1 [1275a35-b2] 472b

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 813a-d

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 8 91b-c; par 11-12 92a-b; par 14 92c-d; BK XII, par 20 103c-d; par 40 109b-110a / City of God, BK X, CH 31 319b-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, ANS 14b-15b; A 6, ANS and REP 2 18c-19a; Q 16, A 4 97a-c; Q 45, A 3, REP 3 244a-d; Q 46, A 2, REP 1 253a-255a; Q 66, A 4, REP 4 348d-349d; Q 85, A 3, REP 1 455b-457a; Q 94, A 3; ANS 504a-505a

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 2, REP 3 7c-8a; Q 110, A 4, REP 4 350d-351d

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 135c-136b

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390c; 445c; 447a-b

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-b

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 1 355d

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 32-33 20a-d

6. The knowledge of time and the experience of duration

6a. The perception of time by the interior senses: the difference between the experience and memory of time intervals

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 11 [219a4-9] 298d; [219b23-31] 299c-d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 7 [448a20-b16] 687a-d / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [452b7-453a4] 694b-695a

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [459-463] 6d

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 8 161d-162d

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 12-40 92b-99a

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 2, REP 1 41d-42c; Q 79, A 6, ANS and REP 2 419b-420d

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 62, SCHOL 443c-d

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VI, SECT 9 133a; CH XIV, SECT 1-16 155b-158a

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 97-98 431d-432a

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 292a-293a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-29d; 74b-76c

53 JAMES: Psychology, 130a-b; 131b; 396a-420b esp 396a, 399a-400b, 405b-407a, 409a-b, 411b-418a, 420a-b

54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 648a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 837c; 838b

6b. Factors influencing the estimate of time elapsed: empty and filled time; illusions of time perception; the variability of experienced durations

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 77a-b

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 11 [218b21-219a1] 298c-d

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 36, 98a

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV [1-18] 57c

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT I, SC III [258-261] 326b / As You Like It, ACT III, SC II [319-351] 612c-d

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 4 155d-156a; SECT 7-12 156c-157c

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 292a-293a

53 JAMES: Psychology, 264b-268a esp 268b-269b [fn 2]; 400a-411a esp 408a-411a; 417a-420a esp 418a-420a

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 147d-148a; 164c; 335b-336d

6c. Time as a transcendental form of intuition: the a priori foundations of arithmetic; the issue concerning innate and acquired time perception

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 2-4 155b-156a; SECT 31 161d-162a

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-29d; 61a-62d; 68a-69c esp 68c-69a; 94b-95d; 100d-101b; 213d-215a / Practical Reason, 307d-308b; 313a-d

53 JAMES: Psychology, 420a-b; 852b-853a; 860b-861a

54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 648a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 837c

6d. The signifying of time: the distinction between noun and verb; the tenses of the verb

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a / Parmenides, 495a / Sophist, 575d-576b

8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 2 [16a19-20] 25b; CH 3 [16b6-19] 25d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 11, ANS 73c-74b; Q 14, A 15, REP 3 89b-90b

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 293d-294a

6e. Knowledge of the past: the storehouse of memory; the evidences of the past in physical traces or remnants

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 1a-2b

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-355a passim

7 PLATO: Laches, 36c / Critias, 479d / Theaetetus, 538d-544a

8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence 690a-695d esp CH 1 [449b3-29] 690a-c

9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 19 [1392b14-34] 640b-c

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [449-482] 6c-7a

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 38d-39a

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR VI, CH 3 190b-191c

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 12-36 74b-80d esp par 23-25 77a-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 79, A 6, ANS and REP 2 419b-420d

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12, A 1, REP 3 776c-777b

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c; 54a; 65b-c

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41c-d; 439c-440a; 483b-484b

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 61d-62c

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, DEF 6 424b; PART V, PROP 21 458a

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 12 165b-c; BK IV, CH XI, SECT 11 357b-c

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART III, 79a-80a

38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 428a

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 96b,d; 413b-d

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 337c

42 KANT: Judgement, 579d-580a; 583d-584c

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 151c

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-156d; 181b-182c; 190a-b; PART I, 237a-b; 239c-241a; 247b-c

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [570-585] 16a

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 13c-14a; 42a; 152a-180d passim, esp 153a-156a, 160d-162a, 165d-166a,c, 179b-180d; 217b-229a,c passim, esp 229c; 231d-233b; 238b-239a; 242c-243a / Descent of Man, 255a-265d esp 255a-b, 265a-d; 332b-335a esp 332b-c, 335a; 336c-337a; 348d-349d

50 MARX: Capital, 86c

53 JAMES: Psychology, 145a; 396a-397a; 421a-427a esp 424b-425b

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 4a-b / General Introduction, 526c-527c; 599a-b / War and Death, 760a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 769a-770c

6f. Knowledge of the future: the truth of propositions about future contingents; the probability of predictions

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [463-512] 103c-d

5 EURIPIDES: Medea [1415-1419] 224c / Alcestis [1159-1163] 247c / Helen [1688-1692] 314c / Andromache [1284-1288] 326c / Bacchantes [1388-1392] 352a,c

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 354c

7 PLATO: Laches, 36c / Theaetetus, 531a-532a

8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 9 28a-29d

9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 19 [1393a1-8] 640c

10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics, PART 1 19a-b / Epidemics, BK III, SECT II, par 16 59b-c

16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, par 23-25 94c-95a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 30 651c-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 13 86d-88c; Q 57, A 3 297b-298a; Q 86, A 4 463d-464d; Q 89, A 3, REP 3 475d-476c; A 7, REP 3 478d-479c

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12, A 1, REP 3 776c-777b

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XVII [13-45] 132b-c

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-d; 65b-c

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 30-31 385a-c; PART IV, DEF 6 424b; PROP 62, SCHOL 443c-d; PROP 66, DEMONST 444c

34 NEWTON: Principles, 1a-2a; BK III, RULE IV 271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a

34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 12 165b-c

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 44 420d-421a; SECT 105 433b-c

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV-VII 458a-478a passim, esp SECT IV, DIV 21 458b-c, SECT VI 469d-470d

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 277c

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 177a-b; 184a

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [8591-8603] 209b

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 366b

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 59d-60a; 243b-c

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 584d-585b; EPILOGUE II, 685a

53 JAMES: Psychology, 852b; 883a-884b

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 387a,c

7. The temporal course of the passions: emotional attitudes toward time and mutability

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [607-623] 120a; [1211-1248] 125b-c

5 EURIPIDES: Trojan Women [643-683] 275c-d

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 7b-8a; BK VII, 224d-225a

7 PLATO: Symposium, 154d-155a; 165b-166a / Republic, BK I, 295d-296c / Theaetetus, 528c-529a / Laws, BK VII, 717d-718d

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH 2 [117a26-34] 164a

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK III, CH 6 [669a18-20] 197c / Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b28-1095a12] 340a-b; CH 9 [1099b32-1100a9] 345b-c; BK IV, CH 9 [1128b15-21] 376a; BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-19] 391b; CH 11 [1143b6-14] 393a; BK VII, CH 3 [1147a18-24] 397b-c; CH 14 [1154b8-15] 406a; [1154b20-30] 406c; BK VIII, CH 3 [1156a22-b5] 407d-408a; CH 6 [1158a1-9] 409d / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 3 [1380b5-7] 626a; CH 12-14 636a-638a

10 HIPPOCRATES: Fractures, PART 1 74b,d-75a

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1105-1174] 29a-30a,c; BK III [912-977] 41d-42c; [1053-1094] 43c-44a,c; BK IV [1058-1072] 57d-58a; BK V [170-173] 63b

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 3 257a-b; SECT 12 258b-c; SECT 14 258d; SECT 17 259b-d; BK III, SECT 14 262c; BK IV, SECT 3 263b-264a; SECT 5 264b; SECT 32-33 266b-d; SECT 35-36 266d; SECT 42-43 267b; BK V, SECT 10 270c-d; BK VI, SECT 15 275a-b; BK VII, SECT 18 281a; SECT 35 282a; BK VIII, SECT 6 285d-286a; BK IX, SECT 19 293b; SECT 21 293b-c; BK X, SECT 7 297b-c; SECT 27 299d; BK XI, SECT 27 306b

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [441-462] 115a-b esp [462] 115b

14 PLUTARCH: Aemilius Paulus, 225b-c; 229a-c

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 4, 14c

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 10 21c-d; par 13 22c-d; BK VIII, par 18 57d-58a; par 25-26 60a-b; BK IX, par 32-34 70a-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 40, A 6 796c-797a

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96] 10b-c; XIV [94-120] 20c-d; XV [22-99] 21b-22a; XXVI [90-142] 39a-c; PURGATORY, XI [73-117] 69c-70a; XIV [91-126] 74c-75a; XXVIII [134-144] 97c; PARADISE, XV-XVI 128b-132a; XXVII [121-148] 148c-d

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK III, STANZA 122-124 70b / Wife of Bath’s Prologue [5583-6410] 256a-269b

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 63d; 79c-d; PART II, 150c; 154b-c; PART IV, 271d

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 6d-7a; 33b-36a; 292d-294b; 394a-395b; 403d-404b; 458b-c; 478c-479c; 540d-541c

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT I, SC III [258-261] 326b; ACT V, SC V [41-66] 350a-b / 1st Henry IV, ACT V, SC IV [77-86] 465a-b / 2nd Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [45-56] 483b / Henry V, ACT I, SC I [22-69] 533b-c / As You Like It, ACT III, SC II [319-351] 612c-d

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC II [68-73] 32b; ACT III, SC II [196-223] 51a-b; ACT IV, SC VII [111-124] 63c-d; ACT V, SC I [202-240] 66c-d / Troilus and Cressida, ACT III, SC III [145-174] 124a-b; ACT IV, SC IV [26-50] 128c; SC V [221-226] 132c / Othello, ACT III, SC III [376-387] 220d / Macbeth, ACT V, SC V [15-28] 308d-309a / Winter’s Tale, ACT IV, SC I 505c-d / Tempest, ACT IV, SC I [148-158] 543b / Sonnets, I-XIX 586a-589a; XXV 590a; XLIX 593d; LV 594c-d; LIX-LX 595b-c; LXIII-LXV 595d-596b; CXV-CXVI 603d-604a; CXXI 605a

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 15c-d

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 9-13 426d-428a; PROP 16-17 428b-d; PROP 62, SCHOL 443c-d; PROP 66 444c-d; PART V, PROP 7 454b-c

32 MILTON: On Time 12a-b / Sonnets, VII 63b / Paradise Lost, BK XI [527-543] 310b-311a

33 PASCAL: Pensées, 122-123 195a; 129-131 195b; 135 196a; 139-143 196b-200a; 164-172 202b-203b; 181 204b; 205-208 211a-b; 210 211b

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, SECT 13 250a-b

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 536a

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 35a-c; 401a-b

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 335c

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 339c

43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 449c-450a

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 102a-b; 254b-c; 350d-351b

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 178a-c; PART I, 258b

47 GOETHE: Faust, DEDICATION 1a-b; PART II [4613-4678] 115a-116b; [11,573-586] 281b-282a

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 302b

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 221b-d; BK VI, 262c; 267c; BK VII, 305b-d; BK IX, 356b-d; BK X, 394d; BK XI, 559d; BK XV, 639c

53 JAMES: Psychology, 324a; 433a; 711b; 759a-760b

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 16b-c; 17b-18a / Interpretation of Dreams, 379c-380a / General Introduction, 579b-581b / Ego and Id, 704d-706d / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 740b-c; 743a-744a / War and Death, 758a-d; 760a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 768b-770c / New Introductory Lectures, 837c

8. Historical time

8a. Prehistoric and historic time: the antiquity of man

5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [466-492] 548a-c

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49a-52a; BK IV, 124d-132b; BK V, 161b

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-354b

7 PLATO: Critias, 480a-d

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [783-1160] 71b-76b

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 413b-d

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 164b-c; 179d-182c; 188c; PART I, 209b; 235d-236a; PART II, 260b-262c

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 171b

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 13c; 153a-155b / Descent of Man, 336a-337a; 343a-c; 349a-d; 589a

54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 881a

8b. The epochs of history: myths of a golden age; the relativity of modernity

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 92b-d / Timaeus, 444a-446d / Critias 478a-485d passim / Statesman, 586c-589c / Laws, BK IV, 681b-d

8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 [183b16-184b8] 253a-d / Heavens, BK I, CH 3 [270b12-26] 361d-362a; CH 9 [279b23-33] 370c; BK II, CH 1 375b,d-376a; BK IV, CH 2 [308a29-32] 400b / Meteorology, BK II, CH 1 [354a27-32] 460b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992a29-34] 510c; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a25-29] 598b

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [640b5-7] 163a

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 12 4b-c / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 1, 26b-c

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK II, CH 8, 193c; CH 9, 196b; BK III, CH 10 207b-d

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811a

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [324-337] 65b-c

13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, IV 14a-15b / Georgics, I [118-146] 40a-41a / Aeneid, BK I [254-296] 110a-111a; BK VIII [306-336] 267a-268a

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 51b; 58c-d; BK IV, 72a-b; BK XI, 106b-d; BK XIV, 146b-147a; 151d / Histories, BK I, 232d-233a; BK II, 255b-c

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 7a

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 909a

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XIII, par 49-51 124a-d / City of God, BK X, CH 14 307c-308a; CH 25 313c-314c; BK XV-XVIII 397b,d-507a,c esp BK XV, CH 1-3 397b,d-399c, CH 21 415b-416a, BK XVI, CH 26 438c-439a, CH 37 444b-445a, BK XVII, CH 1-4 449a-455c, BK XVIII, CH 11 477c-d; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 75, A 1, ANS 378b-379c

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XIV [94-120] 20c-d; PURGATORY, XXII [130-154] 87d-88a; XXVI [91-114] 93d-94a; XXVIII [136-148] 97c; PARADISE, XVI [16-39] 130a-c

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK I, STANZA 4 22a

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 267c-d; CONCLUSION, 282d

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 81d-82b; BK III, 143b-d

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215b

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 27b-28a; PART II, 208a-c

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 78 119b-c

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XI [334]-BK XII [605] 306b-332a

33 PASCAL: Pensées, 655 292b; 699 302b / Vacuum, 357b-358a

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 107 499c-500b

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART III, 118a-119a

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 79b-c; 900a,c

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 180c-182c; 186c-d; 188c; PART I, 209b-c; 231b-232a; 241b-d; PART II, 259c-d; 274a-275a; 278a-b; 282d-284a,c; PART III, 286c-287a; PART IV, 315b-317d; 348a-b

50 MARX: Capital, 86d [fn 4]

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 265b

CROSS-REFERENCES

For other discussions of time as a quantity and its relation to motion, see CHANGE 5a; MECHANICS 1c; QUANTITY 5b; RELATION 6a; and for the measurement of time, see ASTRONOMY 7; QUANTITY 6c.

For discussions relevant to the distinction between time and eternity, and to the problem of the infinity of time and the eternity of the world, see ASTRONOMY 8c(1); CHANGE 13; ETERNITY 1-2; INFINITY 3c; WORLD 4a, 8.

For time in relation to theories of creation, see ETERNITY 1a; WORLD 4e(2).

For another treatment of the relations of succession and simultaneity, see RELATION 5a; and for the temporal aspects of such relations as that between cause and effect, potentiality and actuality, and the various acts of the mind, see BEING 7c(1); CAUSE 1b; EDUCATION 5d; IDEA 5d-5e; RELATION 4f.

For the analysis of memory and imagination as interior senses, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1; SENSE 3b, 3d(2).

For considerations relevant to the conception of time as a transcendental form of intuition and to the related problem of the foundations of arithmetic, see FORM 1c; MATHEMATICS 1c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); MIND 1e(1), 4d(3); SPACE 4a.

For the general theory of the parts of speech which involves the distinction between noun and verb, see LANGUAGE 4a.

For other considerations of our knowledge of the past and the future, see HISTORY 3a; KNOWLEDGE 5a(5); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4c; PROPHECY 1a-1b; TRUTH 3b(2).

For the influence of time on human development, see EXPERIENCE 6a; LIFE AND DEATH 6b-6c; MAN 6c; and for man’s attitude toward time and change, see CHANGE 12b; PROGRESS 5.

For other treatments of the problem of time and free will in relation to God’s foreknowledge and foreordination, see GOD 7b, 7f; HISTORY 5a; LIBERTY 5a-5b; WILL 7c.

For other discussions of historical time and the antiquity of man, see EVOLUTION 7c; HISTORY 4a(3), 4c; MAN 9c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

AUGUSTINE. On Music
AQUINAS. De Aeternitate Mundi
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART II, CH 7
SPINOZA. Cogita Metaphysica, PART I, CH 4; PART II, CH 1
HUME. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK I, PART II
KANT. De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation)
—. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, DIV I

II.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Physicists, BK II, CH 3
—. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, BK III, CH 1-20
PROCLUS. The Elements of Theology, (F)
MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART II, CH 13
CRESCAS. Or Adonai, PROPOSITION 15
SUÁREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XV (3), XXXIX, XL (9), L
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART I, Q 18
LEIBNIZ. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH 14-15
WHEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, VOL I, BK II, CH 7-10
HODGSON. Time and Space
LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK II, CH 3
FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART IV, BK II, CH 2
BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK I, CH 4; BK II, CH 18
BOSANQUET. Science and Philosophy, 7
ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES I
POINCARÉ. The Value of Science, PART I, CH 2
MEYERSON. Identity and Reality, CH 6
CASSIRER. Substance and Function, SUP V
ROSS. A Theory of Time and Space
WEYL. Space—Time—Matter
S. ALEXANDER. Space, Time, and Deity
PROUST. Remembrance of Things Past
WHITEHEAD. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, CH 6
—. The Concept of Nature, CH 3
EINSTEIN. Relativity: The Special and the General Theory
—. Sidelights on Relativity
MARITAIN. Theonas, Conversations of a Sage, VI
MCTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 33
BERGSON. Time and Free Will
—. Creative Evolution
—. Durée et simultanéité, à propos de la théorie d’Einstein, CH 1-5
MANN. The Magic Mountain
DEWEY. Experience and Nature, CH 1-3, 7, 9
G. N. LEWIS. The Anatomy of Science, ESSAY II
HEIDEGGER. Sein und Zeit
EDDINGTON. Space, Time, and Gravitation
—. The Nature of the Physical World, CH 3
MEAD. Philosophy of the Present
SANTAYANA. The Realm of Matter, CH 4
BORING. The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness, CH 5
WEISS. Reality, BK II, CH 6
B. RUSSELL. The Analysis of Matter, CH 28-29, 32, 36
—. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART III, CH 5; PART IV, CH 5, 7

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