Chapter 85: SIGN AND SYMBOL

INTRODUCTION

A SIGN points to something. A symbol stands for or takes the place of another thing. Sign and symbol are sometimes differentiated according to whether emphasis is placed on that which is signified or pointed out, or on that which functions as a surrogate or substitute.

Yet “sign” and “symbol” are often used interchangeably. We call the notations of music or mathematics either “signs” or “symbols.” Words, too, are traditionally spoken of as signs or symbols. Words and other conventional notations for expressing meaning both point to and stand for something else. It is only in certain cases that one of these two functions seems to predominate, as the road marker points out the direction to take, and paper money takes the place of the precious metal whose value it represents.

On what is common to signs and symbols of all sorts there seems to be no disagreement throughout the tradition of western thought. From Augustine’s statement that “a sign is a thing which, over and above the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into mind as a consequence of itself,” to Freud’s analysis of the symbolism of dreams, of symptoms, and symptomatic acts, the great books consider sign or symbol as one term in a relation, the relation being one of meaning or, as Freud says, of “significance, intention, tendency.” The fundamental problems traditionally discussed concern the nature of meaning itself, and the modes of signification which vary with the kinds of things that function as signs and the kinds of things they signify.

WITH RESPECT TO THINGS which function symbolically, the primary distinction seems to be that between natural and conventional signs. Augustine at first suggests a threefold division. Some things are simply things, and not signs at all. Some (for example, “the ram which Abraham offered up instead of his son”) are not only things, but “also signs of other things.” And some things, such as words, “are never employed except as signs.” Augustine adds that words are not merely signs. “Every sign,” he writes, “is also a thing, for what is not a thing is nothing at all.”

The distinction between natural and conventional signs falls within this threefold division. “Natural signs,” Augustine says, “are those which, apart from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of something else, as, for example, smoke when it indicates fire. For it is not from any intention of making it a sign that it is so, but through attention to experience we come to know that fire is beneath, even when nothing but smoke can be seen. And the footprint of an animal passing by belongs to this class of signs.”

Augustine seems to find natural signs in things that are related as cause and effect. Berkeley, on the other hand, tends to substitute the relation of sign and thing signified for the relation of cause and effect. “The fire which I see,” he writes, “is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching, but the mark that forewarns me. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof.”

Every natural thing or event thus tends to become the sign of something else, so that the whole of nature constitutes a vast symbolism or language by which God informs us of his plan. Aristotle tends, in the opposite direction, to limit natural signs to those things which, according to our knowledge and experience, permit a necessary or probable inference to something else. The fact that a woman is giving milk he regards as an infallible sign that she has lately borne a child; the fact that a man is breathing fast is merely a probable and refutable sign that he has a fever.

In any case, signs are generally acknowledged to be natural if they satisfy Augustine’s criterion that they were not intentionally devised by men for the purpose of signifying. “Conventional signs, on the other hand,” he writes, “are those which living beings mutually exchange for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their thoughts.” Of conventional signs, Augustine goes on to say, words hold the chief place, because everything which can be expressed by gestures, or by such non-verbal symbols as flags or bugle calls, can also be expressed in words, whereas many thoughts which words readily express do not lend themselves easily to other modes of expression.

Except for the hypothesis (discussed in the chapter on LANGUAGE) of a natural form of speech common to all men and consisting of words perfectly adapted to the objects they name, it is never proposed that words are anything but conventional signs. As Aristotle says, “nothing is by nature a noun or a name—it is only so when it becomes a symbol.” The audible sound or the visible mark becomes a symbol only by human institution or convention.

Yet not all the audible sounds which men and other animals make to express their feelings or desires are, in Aristotle’s opinion, to be regarded as words. “Inarticulate sounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these constitutes a noun.” Nor are such cries, whereby one animal calls another or communicates fear or anger, strictly conventional signs; for, as Augustine points out, they are instinctive modes of expression, and so are natural rather than conventional. They are not voluntarily instituted.

IN TERMS OF THE ancient distinction between the conventional and the natural—that which changes from time to time and place to place and that which is everywhere and always the same—no one would question the conventionality of words and of all other non-verbal symbols which are peculiar to one people, one culture, or one epoch. That words are conventional signs raises the central problem concerning their meaning or significance. Utterly dissimilar words in different languages can have the same meaning, and identical sounds or marks in different languages can mean quite different things. Since the sounds or marks which constitute spoken and written words do not possess meaning naturally, from what source do such conventional signs get the meanings they have?

The usual answer, given by Aristotle, Locke, and others, is that words get their meanings from the ideas, thoughts, or feelings which men use them to express. “Spoken words,” writes Aristotle, “are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men do not have the same writing, so all men do not have the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images.”

In addition to being able to make articulate sounds, it was necessary for man, Locke says, to “be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others.” Thus words came to be used by men “as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use then of words is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.”

Locke goes further. Not only does the immediate signification of words lie in the ideas they stand for, but in his view words “can be signs of nothing else.” Yet he also considers the fact that men, because they “would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things as they really are… often suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things.” Locke thinks, nevertheless, that “obscurity and confusion” enter into the signification of words “whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds.”

But though the meaning of a word may come from the idea it signifies, the word which is thus made meaningful seems, in the common usage of mankind, to serve as the name or designation of some real thing. It refers to something other than ideas or concepts in the human mind. Locke himself talks of “the application of names to things,” and in his consideration of the distinction between proper and common names is concerned to point out that, though they differ in meaning (i.e., differ in the type of idea they signify), both refer to the same sort of reality—individual existences. Aristotle and other writers who distinguish between things in the order of nature and the concepts we form of them, tend to take both views of the significance of words. Words signify the real things which they name as well as the ideas whose meanings they express. If we waive for the moment the possibility that some words may signify only ideas, whereas others signify both ideas and things, two questions may be asked. Are there any words which signify things alone? What is the relation between the idea and the thing a word signifies, when a word signifies them both; that is, when a word has both sorts of significance, how are they related to one another?

Aquinas answers the second question by saying that since “words are the signs of ideas, and ideas the similitudes of things, it is evident that words function in the signification of things through the conceptions of the intellect.” Ideas may be the immediate or proximate object which words signify, but through them words ultimately signify the real things which are themselves the objects of ideas. According to this theory, an idea may be both the object signified by a word and the medium through which that word also signifies the thing of which we have the idea. Aquinas seems to think that ideas are always required as the medium whereby words signify things. “We can give a name to anything,” he says, “only insofar as we can understand it.” Accordingly, it is impossible for words to signify things directly, i.e., without the mediation of ideas.

THIS POSITION HAS A number of consequences for the theory of signs and raises a number of issues. Augustine’s statement that “every sign is also a thing” has a different meaning when it is said of the sensible things which also happen to be signs and of the things of the mind—concepts or ideas—which cannot be without being signs. The understanding of this difference helps to explain the relation between verbal signs and the mental signs through which they signify or from which they get their meanings.

Whereas words are in the first instance meaningless marks and sounds which get meaning when men use them to express their thoughts or feelings, ideas and images are at once meaningful, however they arise in the mind. They are natural signs in the sense that it seems to be their very nature to signify. They do not get meaning. They do not even have meaning, in the way in which smoke as a natural sign of fire has a meaning which is distinct from, though a consequence of, its nature as smoke. An idea is a meaning, an intention of the mind, as it is sometimes called, a reference to an object thought about. The idea of fire is the meaning the word “fire” has when it designates the natural phenomenon which that word is conventionally used to name; and as Aristotle suggests, the conventional signs of different languages [e.g., “fire” and “feuer”]—have the same meaning because the idea of fire is the same, and the natural phenomenon experienced and thought about is the same, for men of diverse tongues.

That ideas or mental images are themselves meanings or intentions—the symbols of things thought about—seems to be recognized in different ways by many writers in the tradition of the great books. In the Cratylus, Socrates suggests that signs should be like the things they signify. Some conventional signs, he thinks, are better than others in this respect. He implies that all words are inferior to mental images, which, by their very nature, imitate or resemble their objects.

The act of memory, according to Aristotle, requires a memory image which is “something like an impression or picture” of the thing remembered. If the memory image, through its resemblance to something once experienced, did not function as the sign of that absent thing, memory would not be memory, for, Aristotle argues, it would consist in beholding the memory image itself, which is present, rather than the absent thing it stands for.

Aquinas, perhaps, is the writer most explicit in his treatment of images and ideas as in their very nature meanings or intentions of the mind. His calling them “mental words” seems to indicate that in his view they, like physical and sensible words, are signs; but the added qualification of “mental” also implies their difference. “The vocal sound which has no signification,” he writes, “cannot be called a word; wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact that it signifies the interior concept of the mind. It follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word.” The mental word or concept suffices “when the mind turns to the actual consideration of what it knows habitually,” for then, he adds, “a person speaks to himself.” But unlike angels, who can make their concepts known to one another immediately, men require the medium of external speech. They must use sensible physical signs to communicate their thoughts.

Without referring to ideas as mental words, Locke does appear to identify ideas with meanings and to regard them as signs. The definition of a word, he says, is an attempt to make known “the meaning or idea it stands for.” Denying that the general and the universal belong to the real existence of things, he holds that they “concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general… when used for signs of general ideas… and ideas are general when they set up as the representatives of many particular things; but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which, in their signification, are general.”

The basic issue to which Locke is addressing himself is discussed in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR. Locke’s solution seems to involve the affirmation of abstract ideas, which are general or universal in their significance and through which common names come to have a different sort of meaning from the meaning of proper names. “Ideas become general by separating them from the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.” Common nouns like “man” or “cat” become general in their significance, according to Locke, “by being made the signs of general ideas.”

To the question of what kind of signification it is that general words have, Locke replies: “As it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper names; so, on the other side, it is as evident, they do not signify a plurality; for man and men would then signify the same…. That, then, which general words signify,” Locke declares, “is a sort of things, and each of them does that by being sign of an abstract idea in the mind.”

It seems to follow, therefore, that those who, like Hobbes and Berkeley, deny the existence of abstract ideas or universal concepts, must offer a different explanation of the meaning of common nouns or general names. “There being nothing in the world universal but names,” Hobbes writes, a name is universal when it “is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accident; and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, a universal recalls any one of those many.”

On similar grounds, Berkeley criticizes Locke’s theory of how words acquire general significance. His own theory is that words become general “by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind.” And, in another place, he says that “an idea which, considered in itself, is particular becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.” He does not himself explain how we come by the notion of “the same sort,” or how one particular idea can represent the sort to which other particular ideas belong. But he rejects Locke’s explanation because it involves ideas which are not only general, but also abstract.

The attempt to account for the meaning of general names is, in Berkeley’s view, the cause of Locke’s acceptance of abstract ideas. “If there had been no such thing as speech or universal signs,” he writes, “there never [would have] been any thought of abstraction.” Not only do men mistakenly suppose that “every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines [them] to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name”; but they also suppose that “it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth,” Berkeley concludes, “there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name.” Where Locke would say that a common name gets its general meaning by signifying one idea which itself has general significance, Berkeley reiterates that a general name gets its meaning from “a great number of particular ideas,” all of which it signifies indifferently.

THE RELATION OF WORDS to ideas raises still other problems in the theory of signs, problems which have peculiar interest in the tradition of the liberal arts. One of these problems has already been mentioned. It is the question whether some words signify ideas alone, in contrast to words which signify ideas and, through them, things. This suggests the parallel problem of words which signify words, in contrast to words which are the names of things.

In his little tract Concerning the Teacher, Augustine points out that some words, such as “noun” and “adjective,” signify kinds of words, just as other words, such as “man” and “stone,” signify kinds of things. Furthermore, in the sentence “man is a noun,” the word “man” signifies itself as the object referred to; whereas in the sentence “man is an animal,” the word “man” signifies a living organism of a certain sort. The same word, therefore, may signify both itself and some thing other than itself.

These differences which Augustine observes in the signification of words come to be formulated in the traditional distinction between the first and second imposition of words. A word is used in the first imposition when it is used to signify things which are not words, as, for example, the word “man” when it refers to a human being. A word is used in the second imposition when it is applied to words rather than things, as, for example, the word “noun” said of “man,” or the word “man” when it is used to refer to itself in the sentence “man is a noun.”

A parallel distinction is that between words used in the first and the second intention. When the word “man” is used to signify a living organism of a certain sort, it is used in the first intention because it signifies a reality, not an idea. A word is said to be used in the second intention when it signifies an idea rather than a thing. For example, in the sentence, “man is a species,” the word “species” signifies a logical classification and so is in the second intention; and the word “man” is also in the second intention because it refers to the idea which is denominated a species.

In some cases, an idea may not signify things at all, but only other ideas, such as the logical notions of genus and species. Words like “genus” and “species,” unlike the words “man” and “stone,” can therefore be used only in the second intention. The idea man is called a “first intention of the mind” because its primary function is to signify the living thing. Only secondarily does it signify itself as an object able to be considered. The idea species, on the other hand, is called a “second intention” because its sole function is to signify ideas which stand to other ideas in a certain relation.

Hobbes concisely summarizes most of these points when he points out that some words “are the names of the things conceived,” whereas “others are the names of the imaginations themselves, that is to say, of those ideas or mental images we have of all the things we see and remember. And others again are names of names… as ‘universal,’ ‘plural,’ ‘singular,’ are the names of names.” The names which we apply to particular species and genera, such as “man” and “animal,” Aquinas says, “signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of these common natures, which are signified by the terms genus or species.”

ANOTHER TRADITIONAL distinction in the modes of signification is that between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. A name is said to be an intrinsic denomination when it is applied to a thing in order to signify its nature or its inherent properties and attributes, as, for example, when we call a thing “animal” or “rational,” “white” or “square.” A name is said to be an extrinsic denomination when it is applied to a thing only in order to signify some relation in which that thing stands to something else, as, for example, when we call sunshine “healthy” because it helps to produce healthy organisms or when we apply the names of animals, such as “pig” or “fox,” to men because we think the men bear certain resemblances to these animals. The same word can be used in different connections both as an intrinsic and as an extrinsic denomination. “Healthy” means an inherent quality when it is applied to living organisms, and a causal relation to organic health when it is applied to sunshine; “pig” means a certain kind of animal when it is applied to the four-footed mammal, and only a resemblance to this animal in certain characteristics when it is applied to men.

This double use of the same word exemplifies what is traditionally called “equivocal speech” or the equivocal use of a name. Some writers tend to identify equivocation with ambiguity, on the ground that both involve a multiplicity of meanings for the same word. Others seem to think that a word is used ambiguously only if its user is indefinite as to which of its several meanings he intends to express; but they hold that a word can be used equivocally without ambiguity if its user makes plain that he is employing it now in this sense, now in that.

Aristotle says that two things are named equivocally “when though they have the same name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each”; and “on the other hand, things are said to be named univocally which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.” When we call a man and a pig an “animal,” we are using that word univocally because we are using it with the same definition or meaning in both cases; but when we call a pig and a man a “pig,” we are using that word equivocally because we are using it with different meanings, signifying having the nature of a pig in one instance and being like a pig in certain respects in the other.

Aristotle distinguishes several types of equivocation, of which we have already noted two. The use of the word “healthy” to describe an animal and sunshine is that type of equivocation in which the same word is used to name an inherent attribute and also a cause of that attribute; in other instances of the same type, it might be used to name the nature or attribute and the effect rather than the cause. Speaking of a man and a pig as a “pig” represents the metaphorical type of equivocation, in which the same word is used to name the nature of a thing and something else of a different nature which has only a likeness to that nature.

Metaphors, in turn, can be divided into types. Some are based on a direct similitude between two things in some accidental respect, e.g., the man who is like a pig in manner of eating. Some, Aristotle says, are based on analogies or proportions, as, for example, when we call a king the “father of his people.” Here the metaphor is based on the similarity of the relationship of a king to his subjects and of a father to his children. The name “father” is used metaphorically when it is transferred from one term in this proportion to the term which stands in an analogous position.

A third kind of metaphor, according to Aristotle, consists in the use of the same word now in a more generic, now in a more specific sense, or with broader and narrower meanings. Of this he gives an example in the Ethics when he discusses general and special justice, using the word “justice” narrowly to signify one of the special virtues and broadly to mean all the virtues considered in their social aspect. There is a sense of the word “justice,” he writes, in which it signifies “not part of virtue but virtue entire”; “this form of justice is complete virtue, though not absolutely, but only in relation to our neighbor.” The word “injustice” is also used in a correspondingly wide sense. But there is “another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the wide sense.” This “particular injustice,” Aristotle says, “shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition falls within the same genus.” As Aristotle treats this type of equivocation in the Rhetoric and the Poetics, it includes three possibilities: the transfer of the name of a genus to one of its species, the transfer of the name of a species to its genus, and the transfer of the name of one species to another in the same genus.

It may be questioned whether this type of equivocation is properly classified as metaphorical, on Aristotle’s own definition of metaphor as “giving a thing a name that belongs to something else.” In the type of equivocation exemplified by the use of the word “justice,” now with a generic and now a specific meaning, the name does not seem to belong to the genus any more than it does to the species, or conversely. In contrast, when the name “father” is given to a king in relation to his people, the usage is metaphorical, because the name “father” belongs to something else, i.e., the man who is a progenitor.

The same point can be made in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. When “justice” is used as the name for the whole of virtue (regarded socially) and also for one particular virtue, the word is an intrinsic denomination in both instances. In all other types of equivocation, the equivocal word is used once as an intrinsic and once as an extrinsic denomination; for example, as applied to the animal, the word “pig” is an intrinsic denomination, but it is an extrinsic denomination when it is applied to a man in order to signify a certain resemblance to the animal to which the name belongs. The same is true in the case of the word “healthy” as said of an animal and of sunshine.

In all these cases of equivocation, the two meanings of the same word are not totally distinct. On the contrary, the two senses have something in common. One of the meanings seems to be derived from the other; one appears to be secondary (usually the one involved in the extrinsic denomination) and the other primary. What is traditionally called “equivocation by chance,” in contrast to equivocation by intention, is the extreme case in which the same word is used in two utterly distinct senses, having no common element of meaning at all; e.g., the word “pen” used for a writing instrument and an enclosure for animals. Equivocation by intention, in which the different meanings of a word have something in common, thus appears to be intermediate between equivocation by chance (in which the meanings share no common element) and univocal usage (in which the meaning is exactly the same each time the word is used).

In the Physics, Aristotle seems to discover still another type of equivocation. “A pen, a wine, and the highest note in a scale are not commensurable,” he writes. “We cannot say whether any one of them is sharper than any other… because it is only equivocally that the same term ‘sharp’ is applied to them.” This does not seem to be equivocation by chance, for the word “sharp” seems to have some common meaning as applied to the three objects which affect the diverse senses of touch, taste, and hearing; nor is it like all other cases of equivocation by intention, in that no one of these three meanings of “sharp” seems to be primary and the others derived from it. Furthermore, in all three meanings, the word “sharp” is used as an intrinsic denomination.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle also considers the special pattern of meaning which words like “being” or “one” have when they are applied to such heterogeneous things as substances, quantities, qualities, etc. He refers to these words as ambiguous or equivocal, comparing them with the word “healthy” as said of an animal, and of other things which either cause health or are effects of health. It may be questioned, however, whether “being” is equivocal in the same way that “healthy” is, since it always carries the significance of an intrinsic, never of an extrinsic denomination. “Being” as said of heterogeneous things seems to be more like “sharp” said of diverse sensible qualities—having a meaning which remains somehow the same while it is diversified in each case according to the diversity of the objects to which it applies.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS of the univocal and the equivocal sign, along with the treatment of ambiguity and intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, indicate the extent and manner in which the great books anticipate the kind of analysis which in our time has come to be called “semantics.” The chapter on LANGUAGE gives further evidence of the fact that many of the points and distinctions made in contemporary semantics have a long history in the tradition of the liberal arts. Furthermore, as the chapter on LANGUAGE indicates, contemporary semantics cannot even claim novelty for its great interest in freeing men from the tyranny of words or in serving as a critical instrument to cut through the “vicious abstractions” of metaphysics. Hobbes and Locke frequently dismiss theories not on the ground that they are false, but rather because they think that the statement of them consists in so many meaningless words.

In the tradition of the great books, the analysis of words and their modes of signification seems to be motivated by other interests as well as these. The distinction between the univocal and the equivocal sign, for example, is considered in its bearing on the logical problems of definition and demonstration as well as for the sake of proposing remedies to safeguard discourse against ambiguity. It is also brought to bear upon the theological problem of the meaning of the names men apply to God and on the way in which they interpret the words of Sacred Scripture.

The problem of the names of God is discussed in the chapter on SAME AND OTHER in terms of the kind of likeness which can obtain between an infinite being and finite creatures. As there appears, Aquinas takes the position that God and creatures are neither the same in any respect, nor are they in all respects so diverse as to be utterly incomparable. Though an infinite and a finite being are in his view incommensurable, yet they can also have some sort of similitude—not an unqualified sameness, but the kind of similarity which can be described as an intrinsically diversified sameness.

Aquinas holds, therefore, that no names can be applied to God and creatures univocally, for “no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures.” Nor, he goes on, “are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense,” for it would follow then that “from creatures nothing at all could be known or demonstrated about God,” which supposition Aquinas denies. Between these two extremes of the simply univocal and the purely equivocal, he finds a middle ground in a type of signification which he calls “analogical.” The meaning of an analogical name, he says, “is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same; yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals.”

What he means by “pure equivocation” seems to be what earlier writers call “equivocation by chance,” and what he means by the “analogical” seems to correspond to what they call “equivocation by intention.” “Univocal names have absolutely the same meaning,” he writes, “while equivocal names have absolutely diverse meanings; whereas in analogicals, a name taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same name taken in other significations; as, for instance, ‘being’ which is applied to substance is placed in the definition of ‘being’ as applied to accident; and ‘healthy’ applied to animal is placed in the definition of ‘healthy’ as applied to urine and medicine.”

But, as we have seen, there are many types of equivocation by intention—the attributive, based on cause and effect, as exemplified by the word “healthy”; that involving broader and narrower meanings, exemplified by the word “justice”; metaphors, of the sort exemplified by calling a man “pig,” and of the sort based on analogies, when we speak of a king as the “father” of his people; and, finally, the very special type of equivocation found in “sharp” applied to a tone, a taste, and a touch.

If Aquinas places the kind of signification he calls “analogical” in the general area of equivocation by intention, it may be asked whether the various names of God are all analogical in the same way. The answer seems to be negative, for he distinguishes those names which have only a metaphorical sense when said of God, such as “angry” or “jealous”; and he denies the opinion of those who say that God is called “good” only in an attributive sense, i.e., signifying him to be the cause of the goodness found in creatures. On the contrary, he thinks that words like “good” and “wise,” and especially the name “being,” are to be interpreted as intrinsic denominations when applied to both God and creatures.

For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, that would appear to make the pattern of meaning exhibited by the word “sharp” the model for the significance of “being” rather than that found in the merely attributive equivocation of the word “healthy”—whether “being” is said of substance and accidents, or of God and creatures. The point seems to be unaffected by the fact that Aquinas calls this type of signification “analogical,” whereas Aristotle always refers to “being” as equivocal. Aristotle never treats any type of equivocation as analogical except the metaphor which results from transferring the name of one term in a proportion to another term standing in the same or a similar relationship.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN literal and figurative or metaphorical speech seems to be of prime importance in the theologian’s rules for interpreting the word of God. As indicated in the chapter on RELIGION, Augustine insists that the language of Holy Writ must be read in many senses. Aquinas distinguishes a basic literal sense from three modes of spiritual meaning. That signification “whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal and presupposes it.” The spiritual sense Aquinas divides into the allegorical, the moral, and the analogical.

To grasp the various spiritual meanings, the reader must understand that in Holy Scripture “divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.” As in the symbolism of the sacraments, physical things serve as the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace, so also “in Holy Scripture spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things.”

A theologian like Aquinas thus justifies metaphors not only in Scripture, but also in sacred doctrine or theology, as “both necessary and useful,” whereas in his view the poet’s employment of them is solely for the sake of pleasure. Philosophers and scientists, on the other hand, often take the opposite view—that metaphors have a place only in poetry and should be avoided in the exposition of knowledge.

In the writing of poetry, “the command of metaphor,” says Aristotle, “is the mark of genius,” but all his rules for the construction of scientific definitions and demonstrations require the avoidance of metaphors, as of all other forms of equivocation. So, too, Hobbes inveighs against metaphors and figures of speech, giving as one of the main causes of absurdity in science “the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper; for though it be lawful to say (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither or thither, the Proverb says this or that (whereas ways cannot go, nor Proverbs speak); yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.”

Darwin looks forward to the day when “the terms used by naturalists, of affinity, relationship, community of type, paternity, morphology, adaptive characters, rudimentary and aborted organs, and so forth, will cease to be metaphorical and will have a plain significance.” Freud, on the other hand, aware of how pervasive symbolism is in all the works of man, normal and neurotic, dreaming and awake, seems to be reconciled to the inevitability of metaphors in scientific discourse. The difficulty we meet with in picturing certain psychological processes, he writes, “comes from our being obliged to operate with scientific terms, i.e., with the metaphorical expressions peculiar to psychology. Otherwise we should not be able to describe the corresponding processes at all, nor in fact even to have remarked them. The shortcomings of our description would disappear if for the psychological terms we could substitute physiological or chemical ones. These, too, only constitute a metaphorical language, but one familiar to us for a much longer time and perhaps also simpler.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The theory of signs 1a. The distinction between natural and conventional signs 1b. The intentions of the mind: ideas and images as natural signs 1c. The things of nature functioning symbolically: the book of nature 1d. The conventional notations of human language: man’s need for words 1e. The invention of non-verbal symbols: money, titles, seals, ceremonies, courtesies 1f. Natural signs as the source of meaning in conventional signs: thought as the medium through which words signify things

2. The modes of signification 2a. The first and second imposition of words: names signifying things and names signifying names 2b. The first and second intention of names: words signifying things and words signifying ideas 2c. Intrinsic and extrinsic denominations: the naming of things according to their natures or by reference to their relations 2d. Proper and common names 2e. Abstract and concrete names

3. The patterns of meaning in human discourse 3a. Verbal ambiguity: indefiniteness or multiplicity of meaning 3b. The distinction between univocal and equivocal speech 3c. The types of equivocation (1) The same word used literally and figuratively: metaphors derived from analogies or proportions and from other kinds of similitude (2) The same word used with varying degrees of generality and specificity: the broad and narrow meaning of a word (3) The same word used to signify an attribute and its cause or effect 3d. The significance of names predicated of heterogeneous things: the analogical as intermediate between the univocal and the equivocal

4. The determination of meaning in science and philosophy 4a. The relation between univocal meaning and definition 4b. The dependence of demonstration on univocal terms: formal fallacies due to equivocation 4c. The nature and utility of semantic analysis: the rectification of ambiguity; the clarification and precision of meanings 4d. The use of metaphors and myths in science and philosophy 4e. The use of signs in reasoning: necessary and probable signs; the interpretation of symptoms in medicine

5. Symbolism in theology and religion 5a. Natural things as signs of divinity 5b. Supernatural signs: omens, portents, visitations, dreams, miracles 5c. The symbolism of the sacraments and of sacramental or ritualistic acts 5d. The symbolism of numbers in theology 5e. The interpretation of the word of God 5f. The names of God: the use of words to signify the divine nature

6. Symbolism in psychological analysis 6a. The symbolism of dreams: their latent and manifest content 6b. The symbolism of apparently normal acts: forgetting, verbal slips, errors 6c. The symbolism of anxieties, obsessions, and other neurotic manifestations

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp.” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The theory of signs

1a. The distinction between natural and conventional signs

• OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:19-20; 11:1-9
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49a-c
• 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 85a-114a,c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-9] 25a
• 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK II, 832a
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 2, 624d-625a; BK II, CH 1-2, 636b,d-637c
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 34, A 1, ANS 185b-187b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 60, A 4, REP 1 849c-850b
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 62c-63a
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 59c-60b
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341a-b
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 252c-d; PART II, 269c-d

1b. The intentions of the mind: ideas and images as natural signs

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-9] 25a / Soul, BK III, CH 8, 664b-d / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [450b25-451a19] 691a-692b
• 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR II, CH 3, 8a
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 13, 627d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 1, ANS 62c-63c; A 4, 65c-66b; Q 14, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 75d-76c; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3, 76d-77d; Q 27, A 1, ANS 153b-154b; A 2, ANS and REP 2, 154c-155b; A 3, ANS 155c-156a; A 4, ANS and REP 2, 156b-d; Q 34, A 1, 185b-187b; Q 37, A 1, ANS 197c-199a; Q 107, A 1, 549b-550b; PART I-II, Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-722c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93, A 1, REP 2, 215b,d-216c
• 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 81d-89a passim / Objections and Replies, DEF III-IV, 130b; AXIOM VI, 132a; PROP II, 132c
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, DEF 3, 373b; PROP 5, 374c-d
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX, SECT 2, 238b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 8, 244d; SECT 14-16, 245c-246b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14, 312b-d; CH XXI, SECT 4, 395a,c
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 15, 415d-416a; SECT 43-44, 420d-421a; SECT 65-66, 425d-426a; SECT 145-154, 441d-444b passim, esp. SECT 148, 442b-d
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 161a-176a esp. 164a-165b, 166a-b, 168b-169a, 175a-176a; 299a-311a esp. 300a-301a, 307a-308a, 310b-311a; 313a; 411a; 478a-b; 502a-503a; 553b-558b esp. 555a-b, 558b-561b [fn 2]; 573b-574a; 606b-610b esp. 608a-609a; 620b-621a; 664b-665b

1c. The things of nature functioning symbolically: the book of nature

• 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c-45a
• 5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [708-715] 551d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 27, 92a-93a,c
• 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 853b-856b / Harmonies of the World, 1080b-1085b passim
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 2, 624d-625a; BK II, CH 1, 636b,d-637a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 10, 9c-10c; Q 57, A 4, ANS and REP 3, 298a-299a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12, A 3, REP 2, 778b-779a; Q 60, A 2, ANS and REP 1, 848a-d; A 4, REP 1, 849c-850b
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXV [1-21] 34d
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 212a-c
• 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT V, SC VI [44-79] 103c-104a / Richard III, ACT II, SC IV [7-17] 334c-d / 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [12-49] 450a-c / 2nd Henry IV, ACT I, SC I [60-103] 468d-469b
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT I, SC II [112-166] 249a-c
• 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 381a-b
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 173, 203b-204a
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 43-44, 420d-421a; SECT 65-66, 425d-426a; SECT 108-109, 434a-b; SECT 146-154, 442a-444b passim, esp. SECT 148, 442b-d
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART III, 111a-b
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 203a-c; PART I, 235d-236c; 252c-d; PART II, 263d-265c
• 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [4679-4727] 116b-117b
• 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 1a-3a; 115b-122b esp. 120a-b; 135a-137a; 138b-145a; 204a-205a; 231a; 236a-238a; 331a-332a

1d. The conventional notations of human language: man’s need for words

• OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:19-20; 11:1-9
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49a-c; BK V, 171a-b
• 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 107c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 138c-139b / Philebus, 612d-613a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-8] 25a / Soul, BK II, CH 8 [420b16-22] 652a
• 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [1028-1090] 74c-75b
• 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK XI, 103c-d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 19, 76a-b; BK XIII, PAR 34, 119d-120b / City of God, BK X, CH 13, 307b / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 1-4, 636b,d-638a; CH 24, 648d-649a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 107, A 1, REP 1-3, 549b-550b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 60, A 6, ANS 851b-852b
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXVI [124-138] 147a-b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54c-56a
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 300c
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 62d-63a
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 59c-60b
• 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-431b
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVI, SECT 5-7, 166b-167b; CH XVIII, SECT 7, 174d-175a; CH XXII, SECT 5-7, 201d-202b; CH XXIII, SECT 36, 213c-d; CH XXVIII, SECT 2, 228c-229a; BK III, CH I, SECT 1-CH II, SECT 2, 251b,d-253c; CH II, SECT 8-CH III, SECT 5, 254b-255c; CH V, SECT 8, 265c-266a; CH VI, SECT 43-51, 280c-283a; CH X, SECT 24, 298b; SECT 27, 298c-d; SECT 31, 299a; CH XI, SECT 5, 300d; BK IV, CH V, SECT 10, 331a; CH XXI, SECT 4, 395a,c
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 121, 436d-437b
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART III, 111a-b
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 339d-342c; 349d-350a
• 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 675d [n 83]; 756a [n 43]
• 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1a-c
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 78, 32d-33a / Philosophy of History, PART I, 218a-c
• 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 298d-299b; 329a-b; 592a
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 650b; 683b-685a
• 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 516b-c

1e. The invention of non-verbal symbols: money, titles, seals, ceremonies, courtesies

• 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK I [84-109] 10d-11a; BK XVIII [478-613] 135a-136d
• 5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [375-675] 31b-34b / Agamemnon [905-957] 61c-62b
• 5 EURIPIDES: Hecuba [299-331] 355b-c / Phoenician Maidens [1098-1140] 387d-388a
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK IV, 146d-147a; BK V, 174b; BK VII, 264c; BK IX, 306b-c
• 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 395c-d; BK V, 485b-c
• 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 104d-105a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 5 [1133a5-29] 380d-381c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 5 [1361a27-32] 601d-602a
• 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 6, 242c-d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 1, 636b,d-637a; CH 3, 637c-d; CH 25, 649b-d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 2, AA 1-2, 615d-617b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 62, A 1, ANS 858c-859d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 73c-75d
• 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 11d-14b; BK II, 101b-106a
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215b-216b
• 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT III, SC I [160-177] 337b; ACT IV, SC I [181-211] 343b-c / King John, ACT IV, SC I [1-34] 394b-d / Merchant of Venice, ACT II, SC VII [48-60] 416d; SC IX [20-52] 417d-418a; ACT III, SC II [73-107] 420d-421a / 1st Henry IV, ACT V, SC IV [77-101] 465a-b / 2nd Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [4-31] 482d-483a; ACT IV, SC V [21-47] 494c-d / Henry V, ACT IV, SC I [250-301] 554a-c
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT IV, SC V [175-186] 61c; ACT V, SC I [241-266] 66d-67a / Timon of Athens, ACT I, SC I [15-18] 397a; ACT IV, SC III [23-44] 410d-411a / Winter’s Tale, ACT IV, SC IV [73-108] 508c-509a
• 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH V, SECT 37, 33a-b; SECT 46-51, 35a-36a; CH XVI, SECT 184, 68b-d
• 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 310c
• 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XVIII, 128b-c; BK XX, 174b-175a
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341a-b
• 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 10b-12c; BK II, 123b-d
• 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 154d-155a; 240c-244c
• 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 75b-d; 178b; 307b; 317b-319b; 322a; 389b-390a
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 462c
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 58, 27a; PAR 64, 28c-d; PAR 78, 32d-33a; PART II, PAR 164, 59a-d; PAR 217, 72b-c; ADDITIONS, 37, 122c; 40, 122d-123b; 49, 124b-c; 106, 134a
• 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 138b-139b; 385b
• 50 MARX: Capital, 40c-41a; 41d-44a; 44d-45c; 58a-60a
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 198b-203a; 206b-c; 212a-c; 230b; 232a-233b; BK VI, 244b-c; 248b-249a; BK IX, 355b-c; BK X, 423d-424a; 424c-d
• 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 36b-c; BK VI, 147c-d; BK VII, 171a-c
• 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 4a-b / General Introduction, 510c; 555a / New Introductory Lectures, 815c-d

1f. Natural signs as the source of meaning in conventional signs: thought as the medium through which words signify things

• 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 104d-114a,c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-8] 25a / Soul, BK II, CH 8 [420b29-421a1] 652b / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [437a11-17] 674a
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 3, 637c-d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 1, ANS 62c-63c; A 4, ANS and REP 1, 65c-66b; A 10, REP 5, 72c-73c; Q 27, A 1, ANS 153b-154b; Q 85, A 2, REP 3, 453d-455b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93, A 1, REP 2, 215b,d-216c; PART III, Q 60, AA 6-8, 851b-854d passim
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 59c-60b
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 9, 145b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 8, 244d; BK III, CH II, SECT 5, 253d-254a; CH III, SECT 13, 257c-258a; CH IV, SECT 2, 260b; CH V, SECT 12, 266d-267a; CH XI, SECT 24, 305b-d
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 18-19, 410a-c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 18b

2. The modes of signification

2a. The first and second imposition of words: names signifying things and names signifying names

• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57b; PART IV, 270a-b

2b. The first and second intention of names: words signifying things and words signifying ideas

• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 29, A 1, REP 3, 162a-163b; A 2, ANS 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4, ANS 170c-171b; Q 85, A 2, REP 2, 453d-455b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a; PART IV, 270a-b
• 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 79c; BK III, 150a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH II, 252d-254c passim; CH III, SECT 11, 257a-b; CH IV, SECT 2, 260b; CH V, SECT 12, 266d-267a; SECT 14, 267b-c; CH VI, SECT 19, 273b; SECT 48-50, 282b-d; CH XI, SECT 10, 302b; SECT 24, 305b-d
• 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 4b-c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 127b-128a

2c. Intrinsic and extrinsic denominations: the naming of things according to their natures or by reference to their relations

• OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:19-20
• 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 85a-114a,c / Theaetetus, 520b
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 1 [1a13-16] 5b / Topics, BK I, CH 15 [106b1-9] 149d; [106b29-107a2] 150d-151a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, AA 2-3, 63c-65c; A 5, ANS 66b-67d; A 6, ANS and REP 2-3, 67d-68c; AA 7-8, 68d-71b; A 10, 72c-73c; A 11, REP 3, 73c-74b; Q 29, A 1, REP 3, 162a-163b; A 4, 165c-167a; Q 34, A 3, 188b-189a; Q 40, A 2, ANS 214b-215b
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXV, 214d-217a passim; BK III, CH I, SECT 5, 252b-c; CH VI, 268b-283a passim
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 15, 409a-b

2d. Proper and common names

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [2a11-18] 6a-b / Interpretation, CH 7 [17a37-40] 26d / Sophistical Refutations, CH 22 [178b38-179a10] 246c / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 10 [1035b28-32] 559b; CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c; CH 15 [1040a8-13] 564a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 1, REP 3, 62c-63c; A 9, 71b-72c; A 11, 73c-74b; Q 30, A 4, 170c-171b; Q 33, AA 2-3, 181c-183c; Q 34, AA 1-2, 185b-188a; Q 108, A 5, ANS and REP 1, 555d-558b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS 424b-425a
• 22 CHAUCER: Second Nun’s Prologue [15,553-587] 462b-463a
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15, 98d-99a; BK II, CH XI, SECT 9, 145b-c; BK III, CH I, SECT 3, 251d-252a; CH III, SECT 1-9, 254d-256c; SECT 11-12, 257a-c; CH VI, SECT 42, 280b-c
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 11-12, 407b-408b; SECT 15, 409a-b; SECT 18-19, 410a-c; SECT 122, 437b-c
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 125, 507b [fn 1]
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 217b-221a; 351a-353b
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342b
• 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 4b-c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 310a-311a; 447b-448a

2e. Abstract and concrete names

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 34, 66b-c
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, REP 1, 16a-d; Q 13, A 1, REP 2, 62c-63c; A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 31, A 1, REP 5, 171c-172b; Q 32, A 2, 178a-179b; Q 39, AA 4-6, 205c-209a; Q 40, A 2, ANS 214b-215b; Q 54, A 1, REP 2, 285a-d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c; 57a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, 284b-285a
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 305a-308b; 689a
• 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 516b-c

3. The patterns of meaning in human discourse

3a. Verbal ambiguity: indefiniteness or multiplicity of meaning

• 5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights [960-1089] 482a-483c / Wasps [471-507] 513a-c / Birds [959-991] 554c-555a; [1372-1409] 559b-c / Frogs [923-935] 575a-b / Plutus [1-55] 629a-d
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 11b-d; 21b-22a
• 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 65a-84a,c / Cratylus, 107d-109a / Phaedrus, 132c-133a; 138c-141a,c / Republic, BK I, 297b-300b / Critias, 478c-d / Theaetetus, 520b / Sophist, 552b-c / Philebus, 609d-610a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 15, 149d-152a; CH 18 [108a18-36] 152b-d; BK II, CH 3, 154d-155d; BK VIII, CH 3 [158a8-24] 215b; CH 7, 217c-d / Sophistical Refutations, CH 1 [165a5-13] 227b-c; CH 33 [182b13-31] 251d / Heavens, BK I, CH 11 [280a1-7] 371d-372a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b1-9] 510b; BK IV, CH 4 [1006a29-b18] 525c-d; BK VII, CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c; BK VIII, CH 3 [1043b29-34] 567d / Soul, BK III, CH 2 [425b26-426a26] 658a-c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 2 [648a37]-CH 3 [649b22] 172d-174b / Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129a18-31] 376b-d / Politics, BK II, CH 3, 456c-457a; BK III, CH 3 [1276a8-24] 473a / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 [1404b38-39] 655b; CH 5, 657d-658c
• 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 168c
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 6, 638a-d; CH 10, 640d-641a; BK IV, 657a-674d
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 60, A 3, REP 1, 848d-849c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b; 57d-58a; 60c; PART II, 100b; 127a; 135c; 157c; PART III, 172a
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 253c-254a; 284d-285a; 517b-519a
• 26 SHAKESPEARE: Taming of the Shrew, ACT I, SC II [1-44] 205b-c / Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT I, SC I [70-158] 230a-d / Romeo and Juliet, ACT II, SC IV [38-140] 297d-298d / Richard II, ACT I, SC I [69-99] 328b-d / Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC I [1-36] 568b,d
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT V, SC I [127-149] 65d-66a
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 43, 109d-110a; APH 59-60, 112b-113a
• 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, II, 80d-81a / Objections and Replies, 208c-d
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 47, SCHOL, 390c-391a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH IV, SECT 5, 131a; CH XIII, SECT 11, 150d-151a; SECT 18, 152a-c; SECT 28, 155a-b; CH XXIX, SECT 6-12, 234d-236c; BK III, CH VI, SECT 28, 276a-b; SECT 30-31, 276d-277c; SECT 47-51, 282a-283a; CH VIII, SECT 4-6, 283c-284b; CH IX, 285a-291c; CH X, SECT 5, 292d-293a; SECT 22, 297c-298a; CH XI, SECT 3-7, 300b-301c; SECT 9, 301d-302a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 19, 318b-319a; CH VIII, SECT 11, 348b-c
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 143, 441c-d
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 48, 470d-471c; SECT VIII, DIV 62-63, 478b-d
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 154a
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b; 307b-308b
• 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 38d-39a; 264b
• 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XII, 89c-d
• 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-c / Practical Reason, 294b-c; 315d-316a / Science of Right, 400d
• 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 120a-b
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 447b-d
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 218a-c
• 50 MARX: Capital, 104d [fn 4]
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 549b-550a
• 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 277d-278a / General Introduction, 517c-518b; 540c-541b

3b. The distinction between univocal and equivocal speech

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 1 [1a1-12] 5a / Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-8] 25a / Topics, BK VI, CH 10 [148a23-b4] 202b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [990b33-991a8] 509a-b; BK XI, CH 3 [1060b31-36] 589a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 10, REP 1, 9c-10c; Q 13, A 5, 66b-67d; A 10, 72c-73c; Q 29, A 4, ANS and REP 4, 165c-167a
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 17, SCHOL, 362c-363c
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH IV, SECT 5, 131a; CH XXIX, SECT 9, 235c-d; BK III, CH IX, SECT 15-16, 288d-289c; CH X, SECT 5, 292d-293a; CH XI, SECT 3-7, 300b-301c; BK IV, CH VII, SECT 15, 343d-344a; CH VIII, SECT 11, 348b-c
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 62-63, 478b-d
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 307b-308b
• 42 KANT: Science of Right, 400d
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 875b-876a

3c. The types of equivocation

3c(1) The same word used literally and figuratively: metaphors derived from analogies or proportions and from other kinds of similitude

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 1 [1a1-6] 5a / Topics, BK VI, CH 2 [139b33-140a6] 192d-193a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 11 [1138a5-14] 387a,c / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 [1404b27-1405a3] 655a-d; CH 3 [1406b5]-CH 4 [1407a16] 657a-d; CH 6 [1408a2-9] 659a; CH 10-11, 662c-666b / Poetics, CH 21 [1457b1-33] 693a-c; CH 25 [1461a8-20] 697c-d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, PAR 24, 34a-b; BK VI, PAR 6, 36c-d / City of God, BK XVII, CH 3, 450c-451c; BK XX, CH 21, 549d / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 10, 640d-641a; BK III, CH 1, 657b; CH 5-37, 659d-674d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, AA 9-10, 8d-10c; Q 3, A 1, REP 1-5, 14b-15b; A 2, REP 1-2, 15c-16a; A 3, REP 1, 16a-d; Q 13, A 2, ANS and REP 1, 63c-64d; A 3, 64d-65c; A 6, ANS and REP 2, 67d-68c; A 10, CONTRARY, 72c-73c; Q 34, A 1, ANS and REP 1,4, 185b-187b; Q 67, A 1, 349d-350b; A 2, REP 3, 350b-351a; Q 68, A 4, ANS 358b-359b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 100, A 2, REP 2, 252b-253a; PART III, Q 8, A 1, REP 2, 756d-757c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b; 59d; 61c; PART III, 176d-177d; 181d; 193d-195d
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 422c-423c
• 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267a-b
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 65b-c
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH I, SECT 5, 252b-c
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 144, 441d
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART III, 114b-115b
• 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 775d [n 173]
• 42 KANT: Judgement, 547b-548c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 380a-381a; 689a-b
• 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 510b-c; 512d-513a

3c(2) The same word used with varying degrees of generality and specificity: the broad and narrow meaning of a word

• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 1-2, 376a-378c / Poetics, CH 21 [1457b7-16] 693b
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 34-35, 670c-672d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 27, A 2, ANS 154c-155b; Q 67, A 1, 349d-350b; A 2, REP 3, 350b-351a; Q 68, A 4, 358b-359b; Q 115, A 2, ANS 587c-588c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 1, 1b-2b; PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS and REP 2, 424b-425a; Q 186, A 1, ANS 650c-651d
• 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK II, 123b-d
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 447b-d
• 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 509d

3c(3) The same word used to signify an attribute and its cause or effect

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 15 [106b1-9] 149d; [106b33-107a8] 150d-151a; BK V, CH 2 [129b30-130a1] 180a / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1003a33-b11] 522b; BK VII, CH 4 [1030a31-b3] 553a-b; BK XI, CH 3 [1060b36-1061a7] 589a-b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 5, ANS 66b-67d; A 6, ANS and REP 3, 67d-68c; A 10, ANS 72c-73c; Q 16, A 6, ANS 98b-d; PART I-II, Q 20, A 3, REP 3, 713c-714c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 60, A 1, ANS 847b-848a

3d. The significance of names predicated of heterogeneous things: the analogical as intermediate between the univocal and the equivocal

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 3 [16b19-26] 25d-26a / Topics, BK I, CH 15, 149d-152a passim / Sophistical Refutations, CH 7 [169a22-25] 232d / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a20]-CH 3 [187a10] 260a-262a; BK VII, CH 4 [248b7-249a24] 331b-332b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b18-24] 511a; BK III, CH 3 [998b22-27] 517c; BK IV, CH 2 [1003a23-34] 522d; BK V, CH 6-7, 536a-538b; CH 9, 538c-539a; BK VII, CH 1, 550b,d-551a; BK X, CH 1 [1052a1-15] 578d-579a; CH 2, 580b-d; BK XI, CH 2 [1060a36-b10] 588c; BK XII, CH 4-5, 599d-601a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096b17-29] 341b-c
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 1, 16d-17c; A 6, REP 1, 18c-19a; Q 4, A 3, ANS 22b-23b; Q 13, AA 5-6, 66b-68c; A 10, 72c-73c; Q 29, A 4, REP 4, 165c-167a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 1, REP 1, 54d-55c
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 18, 152a-c
• 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 181b-182b

4. The determination of meaning in science and philosophy

4a. The relation between univocal meaning and definition

• 7 PLATO: Sophist, 552b-c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [3b32-4a9] 7c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 13 [97a37-39] 133c / Topics, BK IV, CH 3 [123a27-29] 171d; CH 6 [127b5-6] 177a; BK VI, CH 2, 192c-193b; CH 10 [148a22-b22] 202b-203a; BK VII, CH 4 [154a14-18] 209c; BK VIII, CH 3 [158b8-159a2] 215b-c / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b1-8] 631c-d
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 2-3, 165d-167d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 1, ANS 62c-63c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; PART IV, 269b-c
• 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-434a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH XI, SECT 12, 302d
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 18, 410a-c
• 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 120a-b
• 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 347a-c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 121b-122a

4b. The dependence of demonstration on univocal terms: formal fallacies due to equivocation

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 34, 66b-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a / Topics, BK VIII, CH 3 [158b8-17] 215b / Sophistical Refutations, CH 4 [165b24-166b21] 228b-229c; CH 24 [179b38-180a7] 247d-248a / Heavens, BK I, CH 11 [280a1-7] 371d-372a / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 [1006a33-b12] 525c-d
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 24 [1401a13-23] 650b
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7, 112b-113d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 10, REP 1, 9c-10c; Q 13, A 5, ANS 66b-67d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a; PART III, 172a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH IX, SECT 15-16, 288d-289c; CH X, SECT 22, 297c-298a; CH XI, SECT 7-26, 301a-306d passim
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 62-63, 478b-d
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 307b-308b

4c. The nature and utility of semantic analysis: the rectification of ambiguity; the clarification and precision of meanings

• 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 52d-57a / Euthydemus, 68c-d / Cratylus, 107c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 120a-b
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 1 [1a13-16] 5b; CH 7 [6b26-7b14] 11b-12b; CH 8 [10a26-b31] 15b-c / Topics, BK I, CH 15, 149d-152a; CH 18 [108a18-36] 152b-d; BK II, CH 3, 154d-155d; BK V, CH 4 [133a15-134a4] 184d-185b; BK VI, CH 10 [148a23-b22] 202b-203a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 19-23, 243d-247a / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [245a9-246a4] 329a-b / Heavens, BK I, CH 11, 371d-372d; CH 12 [281b2-15] 373a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b18-24] 511a; BK IV, CH 4 [1006a33-b4] 525c-d; BK V, 533a-547d; BK IX, CH 7 [1049a19-b1] 574d-575a / Soul, BK II, CH 4 [416a20-25] 647a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129a18-31] 376b-d
• 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 1, 167a-b
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 17, 122d-123c
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, 657a-674d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QQ 27-43, 153a-237a,c passim; PART I-II, Q 22, A 1, ANS 720d-721c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 1, 1b-2b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54c-58a; 58d-60a; 60c; PART II, 157c-d; PART IV, 269b-272b; 273a-b; 274a-b
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c; 63a-b
• 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 1a-14a / Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-434a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH I, SECT 6, 252c-d; CH V, SECT 16, 267d-268a; CH VI, SECT 28, 276a-b; CH IX, SECT 3, 285b-c; SECT 15-16, 288d-289c; CH XI, 300a-306d passim, esp. SECT 7, 301a-c
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 122, 437b-c
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 62-63, 478b-d; DIV 74, 484a-c
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 418a-419b
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK II, 419b-c
• 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 115b-c / Practical Reason, 294b-c; 339b-d / Judgement, 546d-547d
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 465c-469b passim
• 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 81b-82c
• 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1a-c; 4a-5d; 7c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 121b-122b

4d. The use of metaphors and myths in science and philosophy

• 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Phaedrus, 124a-129d; 138c-139a / Symposium, 157b-159b / Phaedo, 246d-250a / Gorgias, 260a-262a; 292b-294d / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-391b; BK X, 437c-441a,c / Timaeus, 444c-446b; 477a,c / Critias, 478b-d / Theaetetus, 542a-544a / Sophist, 565a-b / Statesman, 586d-589c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 13 [97b38-39] 133c / Topics, BK VIII, CH 3 [158b8-17] 215b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 [1404b27-1405a20] 655a-656a; CH 3 [1406b5]-CH 4 [1407a16] 657a-d; CH 10-11, 662c-666b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 9, 8d-9c; Q 13, A 3, 64d-65c; A 6, ANS and REP 2, 67d-68c; A 9, ANS and REP 1, 71b-72c; A 10, 72c-73c; Q 34, A 1, ANS and REP 1,4, 185b-187b; Q 67, A 1, 349d-350b; A 2, REP 3, 350b-351a; Q 68, A 4, ANS 358b-359b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 60, A 5, REP 1, 850b-851b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a; 61c; 67c
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 422c-423c
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336d-337a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH I, SECT 5, 252b-c
• 42 KANT: Judgement, 575b-c
• 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 758a-759c; 777d-778c
• 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 40c-d; 242b
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 153b; 686b-687b
• 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 510b-d passim; 566d-567b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 662a-b

4e. The use of signs in reasoning: necessary and probable signs; the interpretation of symptoms in medicine

• 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 59b-c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 27, 92a-93a,c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 6 [75a28-35] 103b-c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK IV, CH 10 [537b14-20] 64b; BK VII, CH 12 [588a9-12] 114c; BK VIII, CH 18 [601b6-8] 127c; CH 21 [603a20-24] 129c; CH 23 [604a18]-CH 24 [604b20] 130a-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357a23-b24] 596d-597c; BK II, CH 24 [1401b8-14] 650d; CH 25 [1402b13-1403a17] 652b-653a
• 10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics, 19a-26a,c esp. PAR 1, 19a-b, PAR 25, 26a,c / Regimen in Acute Diseases, APPENDIX, PAR 9-14, 38b-40d / Epidemics, BK I, SECT I, PAR 5, 46c-d; SECT III, PAR 1, 49c-d; BK III, SECT III, PAR 16, 59b-c / Injuries of the Head, PAR 5, 65a / Articulations, PAR 10, 94d-95a; PAR 26, 99a-b; PAR 30, 100a; PAR 51, 109a-b; PAR 54, 111a; PAR 57, 111d-112b; PAR 59, 113b / Instruments of Reduction, PAR 4-24, 122d-126c passim / Aphorisms, SECT I, PAR 12, 131d; SECT II, 132b-134a passim; SECT IV, PAR 17-SECT V, PAR 15, 135d-138b; SECT V, PAR 30-SECT VII, PAR 86, 138d-144a,c passim
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 57, A 4, ANS 298a-299a
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53d
• 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 197a
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 372b-373b; 531d-532b
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49b-50b; 77d-78d
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART III, 112b-113a; 114b
• 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 145b-146a
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 324b
• 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 1b-2b / Hysteria, 31b-d; 38d-40a; 50b-c; 54b-55d; 56b-c; 60c-62c passim; 87a-90d esp. 87b-d / Psycho-Analytic Therapy, 124b / General Introduction, 550d-557a esp. 556a-b; 593b-c; 605b-607b passim

5. Symbolism in theology and religion

5a. Natural things as signs of divinity

• OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 9:8-17 / Job, 12:7-9; 37-41 / Psalms, 8; 19:1-4; 75:1; 104; 135:6-7; 147:7-9—(D) Psalms, 8; 18:1-5; 74:2; 103; 134:6-7; 146:7-9
• APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 13:1-5—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 13:1-5 / Ecclesiasticus, 42:15-43:33—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 42:15-43:37 / II Maccabees, 7:28—(D) OT, II Machabees, 7:28
• NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:26-30 / Luke, 12:24-28 / Romans, 1:18-20
• 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 438d-439a
• 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [589-660] 22c-23b; BK V [110-145] 62c-63a
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 16-17, 121d-124a; BK III, CH 1, 177a-c
• 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK XII, SECT 28, 310a
• 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 853b-854a; 860a / Harmonies of the World, 1009b-1010a; 1049b-1050a; 1061a; 1080b-1085b passim
• 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XI, CH 24-28, 335c-338d; BK XVI, CH 26, 438c-439a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 10, ANS and REP 1, 9c-10c; Q 3, A 1, REP 1-5, 14b-15b; Q 12, A 3, REP 2-3, 52c-53b; Q 13, A 2, 63c-64d; A 4, ANS 65c-66b; Q 27, A 1, ANS 153b-154b; Q 34, 185a-189a; Q 47, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 256a-257b; Q 65, A 1, REP 3, 339b-340b; Q 103, A 1, ANS 528b-529a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12, A 3, REP 2, 778b-779a; Q 60, A 2, ANS and REP 1, 848a-d; A 5, REP 1, 850b-851b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 2, 1032b-1034b
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXVIII [1-78] 148d-149c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a; 81a-c
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 212a-c
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 421d; 490d-494a esp. 491a-b, 492c-493a
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 38a; 41b-d / New Atlantis, 203a-b
• 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VII [114-130] 234b-235a; BK IX [780-794] 264b; [990-1004] 269a; BK XI [181-207] 303a-b
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 643-646, 290b-291b; 652-657, 292a-293a; 670, 295a-b; 675, 296b-297a; 693-736, 301b-317b
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 32, 418d-419a; SECT 146-154, 442a-444b passim, esp. SECT 148, 442b-d
• 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 186c-d
• 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81d; 346d-347a
• 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 187a-190a
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 228a-c; 235d-236c; 252a-255b; PART II, 263d-265c; 266a-267a; 268b-271c
• 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 248d-249a

5b. Supernatural signs: omens, portents, visitations, dreams, miracles

• OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:1-16 esp. 4:14-15; 9:8-17; 28:10-22; 37:1-11; 40-41 / Exodus, 3:1-4:9; 7-17 passim; 31:18; 32:15-16; 40:34-38—(D) Exodus, 3:1-4:9; 7-17 passim; 31:18; 32:15-16; 40:32-36 / Numbers, 9:15-23; 11-12; 16-17; 20:1-13; 22; 26:9-11 / Deuteronomy, 4:9-14,32-39; 5:22-27; 6:20-25; 7:17-23; 10:20-11:9; 13:1-5; 28:1-29:9 / Joshua, 3-4; 5:13-6:20; 10:12-14—(D) Josue, 3-4; 5:13-6:20; 10:12-14 / Judges, 6:11-24,36-40; 7:13-15; 13 / I Samuel, 10:1-16; 12:12-20; 28—(D) I Kings, 10:1-16; 12:12-20; 28 / I Kings, 13:4-6; 17; 18:16-39 esp. 18:30-39; 19—(D) III Kings, 13:4-6; 17; 18:16-39 esp. 18:30-39; 19 / II Kings, 1-6 passim; 13:20-21; 20:1-11—(D) IV Kings, 1-6 passim; 13:20-21; 20:1-11 / II Chronicles, 32:9-22 esp. 32:21-22—(D) II Paralipomenon, 32:9-22 esp. 32:21-22 / Job, 4:13-21; 38:1-42:8 / Psalms, 105 esp. 105:16-41; 135:8-12—(D) Psalms, 104 esp. 104:16-41; 134:8-12 / Isaiah, 6; 7:10-16; 38:1-8—(D) Isaias, 6; 7:10-16; 38:1-8 / Jeremiah, 32:16-24—(D) Jeremias, 32:16-24 / Ezekiel passim, esp. 1-3, 11:22-24, 40:1-48:35—(D) Ezechiel passim, esp. 1-3, 11:22-24, 40:1-48:35 / Daniel, 2-12 passim—(D) Daniel, 2:1-3:23 passim; 3:91-12:13 passim / Hosea, 1-3—(D) Osee, 1-3 / Amos, 7-8 / Jonah—(D) Jonas / Zechariah, 1-6—(D) Zacharias, 1-6
• APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, 10-11—(D) OT, Esther, 10:4-11:12 / Bel and Dragon, 30-42—(D) OT, Daniel, 14:30-42 / II Maccabees, 1:18-22; 15:11-17—(D) OT, II Machabees, 1:18-22; 15:11-17
• NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew passim, esp. 1:20-21, 2:2-13, 2:19-23, 8:1-17, 8:23-9:8, 9:18-34, 10:1, 12:22-29, 12:38-40, 14:13-33, 15:22-16:4, 17:1-8, 17:14-20, 20:29-34 / Mark passim, esp. 1:23-2:12, 5:1-43, 7:24-8:26, 9:1-9, 9:16-29, 10:46-52, 16:16-18 / Luke passim, esp. 1:5-66, 4:33-5:26, 7:1-23, 8:22-56, 9:28-43, 11:16, 11:29, 14:1-6, 17:11-19, 18:35-43 / John passim, esp. 1:43-2:11, 2:18, 2:22, 3:14-18, 4:46-54, 5:36, 6:30, 9:1-41, 11:1-48, 12:27-30, 12:37-40, 20:1-9 / Acts passim, esp. 2:1-24, 3:2-11, 5:15-24, 7:55-56, 8:6-8, 8:13, 9:3-8, 9:33-42, 10:1-48, 13:9-12, 14:7-10, 18:9-11, 19:11-20, 20:9-12, 28:3-10 / I Corinthians, 1:22-24 / Hebrews, 2:3-4 / Revelation—(D) Apocalypse
• 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK I [33-100] 3b-4b; BK II [1-83] 10a-d; [301-332] 13a-b; BK VIII [167-183] 52d-53a; [245-252] 53c-d; BK XII [195-250] 84a-d / Odyssey, BK II [146-207] 189c-190b; BK IV [787-841] 207a-d; BK XVII [541-550] 282d; BK XIX [509-581] 294c-295a,c; BK XX [91-121] 297a-b; [240-246] 298c; [345-357] 299d; BK XXIV [520-548] 322c-d
• 5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [176-230] 17a-c / Seven Against Thebes [24-29] 27b / Prometheus Bound [484-499] 45a; [645-668] 46d-47a / Agamemnon [104-159] 53a-d / Choephoroe [514-552] 75a-c
• 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [976-986] 108b / Oedipus at Colonus [1447-1666] 127b-129b / Antigone [988-1097] 139c-140c / Electra [404-515] 159b-160a
• 5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [42-60] 411c-d; [1234-1283] 422b-c
• 5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [708-722] 551d-552a
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 4d; 8a-b; 12b-d; 17a-b; 18b; 20d-21a; 38a-b; 39c-40a; BK II, 60d-61b; 79a-c; 83b-c; 86c-87a; BK III, 90d-91a; 95d; 116a-b; BK IV, 124d-125a; 126d-127a; 135b-c; 138a-b; 150b-d; 154c-d; 155b-c; BK V, 170c-d; 176c-d; 183d-184a; BK VI, 190c-d; 200d-201a; 204b-c; 208b; BK VII, 219a-c; 238d-239a; BK VIII, 266b-d; 267a; 270c-271a; 283d; BK IX, 289d-290a; 302c; 309d-310a; 313d-314a
• 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 66a / Apology, 207b-c; 211a-b / Timaeus, 467a-c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prophesying, 707a-709a,c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VI, CH 11 [518b32-36] 43a; CH 20 [522b13-19] 47a-b
• 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [1161-1240] 76b-77b; BK VI [43-79] 80d-81b; [379-422] 85b-d
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 17, 123c-124a; BK III, CH 1, 177a-b
• 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [387-401] 113b-114a; BK II [162-233] 128b-130b; [679-704] 143b-144a; BK III [90-101] 149b-150a; [135-191] 150b-152b; [388-393] 157b-158a; [523-547] 161b-162a; BK VI [190-211] 216a-b; BK VII [59-80] 237b-238a; BK VIII [26-89] 259b-261b; [520-540] 273a-b; BK XII [244-265] 360b-361a
• 14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 52b-c / Poplicola, 82a-b / Timoleon, 198c-d / Pelopidas, 239d-240c / Aristides, 268a-d / Sulla, 371d-372c / Lucullus, 404d-405a; 405c / Agesilaus, 483a-b / Alexander, 568a-b / Demosthenes, 698b-699a / Dion, 781d-782a / Marcus Brutus, 818a-b; 822b
• 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 9a-b; BK II, 26c; 27b; BK IV, 79b; BK VI, 95d-96a; BK XI, 105c; BK XII, 112d-113a; 119b; 124b; BK XIV, 149b-c; BK XV, 168d-169a / Histories, BK I, 206a; 212d-213a; BK II, 228a-b; 235a-c; BK III, 256d; BK IV, 293a-294a
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 19-20, 18b-19a / City of God, BK X, CH 8, 303a-d; CH 12-13, 306d-307c; CH 16-18, 308b-310d; BK XI, CH 2, 323b; BK XXII, CH 8-10, 591d-599b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 51, A 2, REP 1, 276b-277a; Q 104, A 4, ANS 538a-c; Q 105, A 7, 544a-d; Q 106, A 3, ANS and REP 2, 547c-548b; Q 110, A 4, 567c-568b
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IX [13-69] 66a-c; XIX [1-63] 81c-82a; XXVII [91-108] 95c
• 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK V, STANZA 52-55, 127a-b; STANZA 177-186, 143b-144b; STANZA 207-219, 147a-149a; STANZA 245, 152a
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 51b-52a; 80b-d; 81d-82b; PART II, 160b; PART III, 165d-167a; 177a-c; 183b-187a; 188a-191a
• 26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC III [1-71] 572c-573b; ACT IV, SC III [275-289] 591c; ACT V, SC I [71-89] 592d
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC I [64-125] 30b-31a / Macbeth, ACT II, SC IV [1-20] 294a-b / Cymbeline, ACT V, SC IV [91-122] 482a-b
• 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 381a-b
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 8c; 19b; 41b-c; 54c-d; 55b-d / New Atlantis, 202c-203c
• 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK I [594-599] 106b; BK V [28-128] 176a-178a; BK XI [193-366] 303b-307a / Areopagitica, 389a-b
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 803-856, 328b-341b passim
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 13, 371a-b; CH XIX, SECT 15, 388a-c
• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 63, 425b-c
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT X, DIV 92-101, 491c-497b esp. DIV 98-101, 495d-497b
• 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 180b-c; 189b-190d; 206b-d; 294a-296b; 445d-446b; 465d-467a; 547a-b; 571a; 605b-d; 614b-c
• 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 232a-c; 398b-399b
• 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 126b-c
• 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [430-513] 12b-14b
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 377b-379a; BK XII, 561b-562a
• 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 11a-b; BK V, 129c-135a
• 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 138a-c / General Introduction, 477b-c

5c. The symbolism of the sacraments and of sacramental or ritualistic acts

• OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 17:9-14 / Exodus, 12:1-13:16; 20:8-11; 24:5-8; 31:13-17 / Leviticus passim, esp. 16, 23 / Numbers, 15:37-41; 16:37-40 / Deuteronomy, 5:12-15; 6:5-9; 11:18-21; 16:1-17 / Joshua, 4:1-9—(D) Josue, 4:1-9 / Esther, 9:20-32 / Ezekiel, 20:12,20—(D) Ezechiel, 20:12,20
• APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, 16:20-22—(D) OT, Esther, 16:20-22 / II Maccabees, 1:18-22—(D) OT, II Machabees, 1:18-22
• NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 26:26-28 / Mark, 14:22-24 / Luke, 22:19-20 / John, 3:3-7; 6:30-59 / Acts, 2:38-39; 22:16 / Romans, 6:3-4 / I Corinthians, 10:16-17; 11:23-27
• 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK X, CH 5-6, 301b-302d; CH 19-20, 310d-311c; BK XVI, CH 26, 438c-439a; BK XXI, CH 20, 575c-d; CH 25, 579d-581a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 3, 637c-d; BK III, CH 5-9, 659d-661c; BK IV, CH 21, 690d-691b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 92, A 3, ANS 490c-491b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, QQ 101-103, 265d-304a; PART III, QQ 60-65, 847a-884a,c
• 22 CHAUCER: Parson’s Tale, PAR 1-22, 495a-510b esp. PAR 22, 510b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 177d-178a; 180c-d; 206c-207a; 211c-212a; PART IV, 249b-250c; 263d-264a
• 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [436-445] 328b-329a
• 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 71b-80b; 128b-137b / Pensées, 862, 343a; 870, 344a-b; 923, 351b
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 41, 468a-b; DIV 43, 468c
• 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 82a; 294b-d
• 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 83d; 334b
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART IV, 331d-332c; 338a-d
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 198b-203a; BK VI, 244b-c; 248b-249a
• 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 512a

5d. The symbolism of numbers in theology

• OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:8-11
• APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 11:20—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 11:21
• NEW TESTAMENT: Revelation—(D) Apocalypse
• 14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 56d-57a
• 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 853b-854a / Harmonies of the World, 1049b-1050a; 1077b
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, PAR 16, 17c / City of God, BK XI, CH 30-31, 339c-340b; BK XII, CH 18, 354b-d; BK XV, CH 20, 414d-415b; BK XX, CH 7, 535b-536d; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 16, 644d-645d; BK III, CH 35, 672a-d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 5, REP 1, 26c-27c; Q 74, A 3, REP 3, 375a-377a,c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 96, A 4, 1054b-1055c
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 259a-b
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 248b-c; BK IX, 377c-378c
• 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 511c

5e. The interpretation of the word of God

• OLD TESTAMENT: Daniel, 2:47; 5:5-28
• NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 12:1-12; 13; 15:10-20; 18:23-35; 19:3-9; 20:1-16; 21:28-45; 22:1-14,31-32; 25:1-30 / Mark, 2:23-28; 4:1-34; 10:2-9; 12:1-12,18-27 / Luke, 6:1-5,39-49; 8:4-18; 12:16-21,36-48; 14:7-11,15-33; 15-16; 18:1-8; 19:11-27; 20:9-19,37-38 / John, 5:38-39,46-47; 10:1-14,33-36 / Acts, 7; 13:16-36 / Romans, 4; 9-11 passim; 12:19-20; 14:10-13; 15:1-4 / Galatians, 3-4 passim / I Peter, 1:10-16; 2:5-8 / II Peter, 1:19-21
• 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [645-668] 46d-47a
• 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [463-512] 103c-d; [1432-1445] 112b-c
• 5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights [40-222] 470c-472c; [960-1089] 482a-483c / Peace [1043-1126] 537d-539a / Birds [959-991] 554c-555a / Lysistrata [762-780] 593a-b / Plutus [1-55] 629a-d
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 11b-c; 21b-22a; BK VI, 199d-201a; BK IX, 295d-296c
• 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 392a-b; 401a-b
• 7 PLATO: Apology, 201d-203a
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 9, 15a-b; BK V, PAR 24, 34a-b; BK VI, PAR 6, 36c-d; BK XII, PAR 32-36, 107a-108c; BK XII, PAR 41-BK XIII, PAR 53, 110a-125a,c / City of God, BK XI, CH 30-32, 339c-340d; BK XIII, CH 21, 371a-c; BK XV, CH 2-3, 398c-399c; CH 25-27, 419a-421d; BK XVI, CH 2, 422b-423d; CH 6, 426c-427a; CH 37, 444b-445a; BK XVII, CH 3, 450c-451c; BK XVIII, CH 42-44, 496d-498c; BK XX, 530a-560a,c esp. CH 21, 549d, CH 28-29, 556c-557c / Christian Doctrine, BK I-III, 624a-674d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, AA 9-10, 8d-10c; Q 3, A 1, REP 1-5, 14b-15b; Q 29, A 3, REP 1, 164c-165c; Q 51, A 2, REP 1, 276b-277a; QQ 65-74, 339a-377a,c passim, esp. Q 68, A 1, ANS 354a-355c, A 2, ANS 355d-357a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, AA 9-10, 388d-390d; PART III, Q 60, A 4, ANS 849c-850b; A 5, REP 1, 850b-851b
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 70c-71a; PART II, 160b-c; PART III, 165a-188a; 191b-199a; 215b-216b; 246c; PART IV, 247a-258b; 259a-260c
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: Cymbeline, ACT V, SC V [426-485] 488b-d
• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 17b-20a; 98a-100b
• 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b; 163a-164b / Pensées, 570-588, 273b-277b; 642-692, 290b-301a; 775, 323b-324a
• 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 21c-22d / Human Understanding, BK III, CH IX, SECT 9, 286d-287b; SECT 23, 291b-c; CH X, SECT 12, 294b-c
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 256a-258a
• 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 329d-330a
• 42 KANT: Judgement, 547b-d
• 43 MILL: Liberty, 290a-b
• 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1220-1237] 30a-b
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 377c-378c
• 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 129c-135a; BK VI, 150d-153d

5f. The names of God: the use of words to signify the divine nature

• OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 3:13-14; 6:2-3; 15:3; 20:7; 34:5-7,14 / Leviticus, 19:12; 21:6; 22:32 / Deuteronomy, 5:11; 28:58-59 / II Samuel, 22:2-3; 23:3—(D) II Kings, 22:2-3; 23:3 / Psalms, 8 esp. 8:9; 68:4; 83:15-18; 135:13—(D) Psalms, 8 esp. 8:10; 67:5; 82:16-19; 134:13 / Isaiah, 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; 47:4; 48:2; 51:15; 54:5; 63:16—(D) Isaias, 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; 47:4; 48:2; 51:15; 54:5; 63:16 / Jeremiah, 10:16; 16:21; 23:6; 31:35; 32:18; 33:2; 50:34; 51:19—(D) Jeremias, 10:16; 16:21; 23:6; 31:35; 32:18; 33:2; 50:34; 51:19 / Daniel, 7:9,13 / Amos, 4:13; 5:8; 9:6
• APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 14:20-21—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 14:20-21
• NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:9 / Luke, 11:2 / Revelation, 1:8; 21:6; 22:13—(D) Apocalypse, 1:8; 21:6; 22:13
• 5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [160-183] 53d-54a
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49d-50a; 60a-d; 80a-c; BK IV, 134a
• 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 91c-d; 93d-97d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 6, 626a-b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 2, 15c-16a; A 3, REP 1, 16a-d; A 6, REP 1, 18c-19a; Q 4, A 1, REP 5, 20d-21b; A 3, ANS 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP 1, 24b-25a; Q 13, 62b-75b; Q 14, A 1, REP 1-2, 75d-76c; PART II-II, Q 14, A 1, REP 2, 677b-678a; Q 47, A 1, REP 1, 819c-820b
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a; XXVI [124-138] 147a-b; XXX [34-99] 152a-d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54b; 78d-79a; 79d-80b passim; PART II, 162a-163b; PART III, 172d-173a; 183d-184a
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 238d-239b
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 443c
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 17, SCHOL, 362c-363c
• 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 370a-371a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 18, 152a-c
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 435b
• 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 176a-b
• 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b esp. [3455-3457] 84b
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 248d

6. Symbolism in psychological analysis

• 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 9b-14a esp. 9d, 10d-11a, 12c-d, 13c-d / Psycho-Analytic Therapy, 123d-124a / Interpretation of Dreams, 279b-291c / General Introduction, 504d-513d esp. 508c-513b; 526d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 778b,d [fn 2] / New Introductory Lectures, 815a-816b; 848c-849b

6a. The symbolism of dreams: their latent and manifest content

• 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK XIX [509-581] 294c-295a,c
• 5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [176-230] 17a-c / Choephoroe [523-552] 75b-c
• 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [977-982] 108b
• 5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [42-66] 411c-d
• 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 25b-d; 28c-29a; 47a-c; BK II, 78d; BK VII, 218b-220b esp. 219a-c
• 7 PLATO: Crito, 213b-d / Phaedo, 221d-222a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prophesying, 707a-709a,c esp. CH 2 [464b7-18] 709c
• 14 PLUTARCH: Pyrrhus, 329c-d / Cimon, 398d-399b / Eumenes, 473a-b / Alexander, 548d-549a / Demosthenes, 702c-703b / Demetrius, 727b-d
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IX [13-69] 66a-c; XIX [1-63] 81c-82a; XXVII [91-108] 95c
• 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK V, STANZA 52-55, 127a-b; STANZA 177-186, 143b-144b; STANZA 207-219, 147a-149a; STANZA 245, 152a / Nun’s Priest’s Tale [14,898-15,162] 451a-455b
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 533d-534a
• 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT III, SC II [17-55] 36c-37a / Richard III, ACT I, SC IV [1-74] 114d-115b / Romeo and Juliet, ACT I, SC IV [95-103] 291a-c / A Midsummer-Night’s Dream, ACT III, SC II [145-156] 360b-c / Julius Caesar, ACT II, SC II [58-107] 578d-579b
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT V, SC I, 306b-307a / Cymbeline, ACT V, SC IV [30-150] 481c-482c; SC V [426-485] 488b-d
• 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [28-128] 176a-178a esp. [100-109] 177b
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II, 263d-265c
• 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 19a-20a
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 86a; BK VI, 249a-250a; BK XI, 481a-482a; BK XII, 561b-562a; BK XIV, 608a-b; EPILOGUE 1, 673d-674a,c
• 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 11a-13a esp. 11d-12c / Interpretation of Dreams, 173a-174d; 178a-205c esp. 178a-179c, 189b-190a, 194b-d, 197b-198d, 204c-d; 230b-231c; 252c-340a esp. 252c-253a, 264c-272c, 282a-285b, 332a-333b, 339b-340a; 356d-373a passim / General Introduction, 476a-478b; 489c-494d esp. 492d-493c; 504d-526c esp. 504d-506c, 518d-519d; 539c-544d esp. 539c-540a, 541b / New Introductory Lectures, 808d-817a esp. 809b, 810b-d, 812d, 813d-814b

6b. The symbolism of apparently normal acts: forgetting, verbal slips, errors

• 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 13a-c / General Introduction, 453b-476a,c esp. 467d-468a; 546b-547a / New Introductory Lectures, 852a-b

6c. The symbolism of anxieties, obsessions, and other neurotic manifestations

• 5 EURIPIDES: Orestes [1-423] 394a-398b esp. [255-259] 396c, [385-400] 397c-398a
• 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [978-1023] 42d-43b
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT V, SC I, 306b-307a
• 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 1b-5a esp. 3a, 4a; 8b-9a / Hysteria, 25a-26a; 31b-38d; 43b-49b esp. 46c-d; 54b-59d esp. 58b-c; 83a; 83d-85d esp. 84b; 116b-118a,c / Interpretation of Dreams, 200a-d; 370b-c / Repression, 425c-427a,c / Unconscious, 440b-442b / General Introduction, 550d-557a; 558d-562c esp. 559d-560a, 562b-c; 568a-569c; 571d-572c; 593b-594c; 596d-597b; 609c-615b esp. 612c-d, 615a-b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718a-747b esp. 719b-c, 720a, 721a, 721c, 723c, 724a-727c, 729a-b, 731d-732d, 742a-c / New Introductory Lectures, 841a-843c esp. 841b-d; 848b-849b; 852a-b

CROSS-REFERENCES

• For: The theory of language, and for the distinction between the natural and the conventional in language, see LANGUAGE 1-3c.
• The conception of ideas as intentions of the mind, see IDEA 6a.
• The treatment of things or events in nature as signs or symbols, see LANGUAGE 10; MEDICINE 3c.
• Another discussion of the distinction between first and second intentions, see IDEA 3a.
• Other discussions bearing on the distinction between proper and common names and between abstract and concrete names, see IDEA 4b(1)-4b(2); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2c, 5a.
• The problems of verbal ambiguity, and for the distinction between univocal and equivocal speech, see IDEA 4b(4); LANGUAGE 5-5b.
• Discussions relevant to the theory of analogical names, or to the problem of how names can signify what is common to heterogeneous things, see BEING 1; IDEA 4b(4); RELATION 1d; SAME AND OTHER 3a(3)-3b, 4c.
• The relation of the univocal and the equivocal to definition and demonstration, see DEFINITION 3; LANGUAGE 1a, 7; REASONING 3b; and for other logical considerations in the use of language, see LANGUAGE 6-7; LOGIC 3a.
• Other discussions of the language of poetry, and of problems of style in the exposition of knowledge, see LANGUAGE 9; POETRY 8b; RHETORIC 2c.
• The role of signs in divination and prophecy, see LANGUAGE 10; PROPHECY 3b-3c.
• The general theory of the sacraments, see GOD 9e; RELIGION 2c.
• The problem of the names of God and the problem of the interpretation of Sacred Scripture, see GOD 6a; LANGUAGE 12; THEOLOGY 4b.
• Other discussions of the symbolism of dreams, see LANGUAGE 10; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8d(1)-8e; and for the theory of the neuroses and neurotic behavior relevant to the interpretation of psychological signs, see DESIRE 4a-4d; EMOTION 3a-3c(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 2e(2); OPPOSITION 4c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

1. AUGUSTINE. Concerning the Teacher
2. ———. The Harmony of the Gospels
3. AQUINAS. Summa Contra Gentiles, BK I, CH 22-25
4. AQUINAS. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, Q 4
5. DANTE. Convivio (The Banquet), SECOND TREATISE, CH 1, 14-16
6. ———. Epistle to Can Grande della Scala
7. HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART I, CH 2
8. J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK I
9. FREUD. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, CH 8-12
10. ———. A Review of “The Antithetical Sense of Primal Words”
11. ———. A Connection Between a Symbol and a Symptom

II.

1. PTOLEMY. On Methods of Inference
2. QUINTILIAN. Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory), BK VII, CH 9
3. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Logicians, BK II, CH 2
4. MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART I, CH 1-30, 37-45, 61-64
5. BONAVENTURA. Breviloquium, PROLOGUE
6. ———. Itinerarium Mentis in Deum (The Itinerary of the Mind to God)
7. DUNS SCOTUS. Opus Oxoniense, BK IV
8. OCKHAM. Studies and Selections, Logic, CH 11-12
9. THOMAS OF ERFURT. Grammatica Speculativa
10. NICHOLAS OF CUSA. De Docta Ignorantia, BK I, CH 12
11. CAJETAN. De Nominum Analogia
12. SUÁREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXVIII (3), XXXII (13), XXXII (2), XXXIX (3)
13. BOEHME. The Signature of All Things
14. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica, PART II, QQ 1-3; PART II, QQ 21-22
15. ARNAULD. Logic or the Art of Thinking, PART I, CH 1, 15
16. LEIBNIZ. Characteristica
17. ———. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK III
18. CONDILLAC. Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, PART I
19. J. HARRIS. Hermes, or A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Universal Grammar
20. VOLTAIRE. “Allegories,” “Figure in Theology,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
21. T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, I, CH 1; VI, CH 5
22. CREUZER. Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Volker
23. EMERSON. Nature
24. VENN. Symbolic Logic
25. C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL II, PAR 219-444; VOL V, PAR 388-410
26. FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART I, CH 3, 8-21; PART II, CH 5-6; PART III, CH 8; PART IV, BK I, CH 4; PART V, CH 1-9
27. BRÉAL. Semantics
28. ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES I (7); Supplementary Essay (2)
29. J. C. WILSON. Statement and Inference, PART II (18)
30. WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Principia Mathematica, CH 1
31. WELBY-GREGORY. What Is Meaning?
32. ———. Significs and Language
33. W. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART I, CH 6-8; PART II, CH 3
34. WITTGENSTEIN. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
35. OGDEN and RICHARDS. The Meaning of Meaning
36. SANTAYANA. Scepticism and Animal Faith, CH 18
37. EATON. Symbolism and Truth
38. EDDINGTON. The Nature of the Physical World, CH 12
39. WHITEHEAD. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, CH 1
40. ———. Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effects
41. ———. Process and Reality, PART II, CH 8
42. PENIDO. Le rôle de l’analogie en théologie dogmatique
43. RICHARDS. Mencius on the Mind
44. BUCHANAN. The Doctrine of Signatures, CH 1-2, 5-6
45. DEWEY. Essays in Experimental Logic, IV
46. ———. Experience and Nature, CH 5
47. ———. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 18
48. B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 4-8, 27
49. ———. The Analysis of Mind, LECT 10
50. ———. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, CH 1-6, 13-15, 22
51. MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, CH 2
52. ———. Ransoming the Time, CH 9
53. M. R. COHEN. A Preface to Logic, II-IV
54. CASSIRER. Language and Myth
55. ———. An Essay on Man
56. ———. The Myth of the State, PART I (1-3)
57. AYER. Thinking and Meaning
58. CARNAP. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics
59. ———. Introduction to Semantics
60. ———. Meaning and Necessity
61. DEWEY and BENTLEY. Knowing and the Known