Chapter 84: SENSE

INTRODUCTION

The nature of sensation seems at first to be as obvious as its existence. In the tradition of the great books there may be controversy concerning the existence of sense in plants as well as in animals, and there may be controversy over the existence in man of faculties higher than sense. But no one disputes that men and other animals are endowed with a power of sense.

The extent of this power may be questioned, but not the fact that animals and men, when awake, experience sensations or perceive through their senses. Sleep, according to Aristotle, can occur only in those living things which have the power of sense-perception. “If there be an animal not endowed with sense-perception, it is impossible that this should either sleep or wake, since both these are affections of the activity of the primary faculty of sense-perception.”

The existence of the sensible—of an external something which causes sensation and can be sensed—also seems to escape denial or dispute. The existence of a purely intelligible reality—of a world of immaterial things incapable of being sensed—is subject to debate in all periods of Western thought. The sensible world is sometimes regarded as the only reality; sometimes it is regarded as mere seeming, or appearance, in comparison with the reality of purely intelligible being. Men may also differ on the question whether things possess sensible qualities when they are not being sensed. But with few exceptions, notably Berkeley and Hume, the existence of a sensible world of material things is not denied or seriously doubted.

The controversies and issues indicated above are, for the most part, discussed elsewhere. The chapter on ANIMAL considers the sensitivity of plants. There also, as well as in the chapters on MAN, IDEA, and MIND, is considered the distinction between the senses and the higher faculties of reason or intellect. The chapter on MEMORY AND IMAGINATION deals with these two functions in their relation to sense and sense-perception; and the contrast between sensible and intelligible reality is discussed in the chapters on BEING, FORM, IDEA, and MATTER. Some of these topics necessarily recur here, especially as they bear on what for this chapter are the primary problems—the nature of sensation, the analysis of the power of sense, and the character of the knowledge which is afforded by the senses.

As we have already observed, no difficulty seems to arise at first concerning the nature of sensation. It is supposed by many inquirers, early and late in the tradition, that matter is sensitive as well as sensible. Animals have sense-organs which react to physical stimulation. Bodies either act directly upon the sense-organs, as in the case of touch and taste; or, as in the case of vision, hearing, and smell, they exert their influence through an intervening medium, yet in a manner which seems to be no less the action and reaction of bodies.

Those who distinguish between living organisms and inanimate bodies tend to regard sensitivity as a property of living matter, but it does not follow for all who make this distinction that other than material factors are needed to explain sensation. On the contrary, some writers seem to think that the motions of matter account for sensation as readily as the laws of mechanics account for all the sensible changes we are able to perceive.

Lucretius, for example, holds that living things consist of body and soul, and that the soul (or mind) differs from the body only in the size, the fineness of texture, and the mobility of the material particles which compose it. It is, he says, “by the common motions of the two”—body and soul—that “sensation is kindled and fanned throughout our flesh.” Sensation occurs when the particles of body and soul together are set in motion by the impact of external bodies upon the organs of sense. “When the pupil of the eye receives in itself a certain kind of blow, it is said to perceive white color, and another again when it perceives black.” Similarly, “every kind of sound and voice is heard when they have found their way into the ears and struck upon the sense with their body; for that voice, too, and sound are bodily you must grant, since they can strike on the senses.”

Either the external body itself, as in touch, strikes the sense and sets up those bodily motions in the animal which are sensation; or, according to Lucretius, minute replicas or images—composed of atoms, as all things are—fly off from the surface of distant bodies and enter through the pores of our sense-organs to awaken in us vision, hearing, or smell. In either case, sensation is a bodily reaction; and, for Lucretius, imagination and memory, even thought, are consequent motions in the atoms of the mind—further bodily reverberations, as it were, of sensation.

“The cause of sense,” writes Hobbes, “is the external body or object, which presses the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in taste and touch, or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continues inwards to the brain and heart, causes there a resistance or counter-pressure, or endeavor of the heart, to deliver itself; which endeavor, because outward, seems to be some matter without. And this seeming or fancy is that which men call sense.”

The object seems to be colored or hot or sweet when it causes certain sensations in us which are projected outward upon it, in response or counter-action to the inward motions it sets up. But, says Hobbes, these sensible qualities are, in the object, nothing but “so many several motions of the matter by which it presses our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they anything else but diverse motions (for motion produces nothing but motion).”

The foregoing theory, reducing sensation to bodily motion, seems to draw its cogency from the fact that only bodies are sensible, that sense-organs are bodily parts, and that sense-organs must be activated by some sort of physical contact for sensations to occur. Some writers, like Descartes, accept the theory for animals, but reject it for men; or they distinguish, in the case of men, between thought and sensation. They regard sensation, with its subsidiary functions of memory and imagination, as reducible to corporeal motions, but refuse to grant that external sense-impressions or interior fancy can produce knowledge without the activity of an immaterial soul.

To animals, Descartes declares, “we can ascribe . . . no knowledge at all, but only fancy of a purely corporeal kind.” In contrast, “that power by which we are said to know things is purely spiritual, and not less distinct from every part of the body than blood from bone, or hand from eye.” In men as well as animals, the external senses, “in so far as they are part of the body . . . perceive in virtue of passivity alone, just in the way that wax receives an impression from a seal.” Fancy or imagination is also “a genuine part of the body”; and “memory, at least that which is corporeal and similar to that of the brutes, is in no respect distinct from imagination.”

These corporeal faculties are, according to Descartes, of use to the understanding or the mind only when it “proposes to examine something that can be referred to the body”; but if it “deal with matters in which there is nothing corporeal or similar to the corporeal, it cannot be helped by those faculties.” Hence, for Descartes, the “mind can act independently of the brain; for certainly the brain can be of no use in pure thought; its only use is for imagining and perceiving.”

For others, like William James, the distinction between sensation and thought, so far as their relation to matter is concerned, seems quite untenable. He objects to those who look upon sensational consciousness as “something quasi-material, hardly cognitive, which one need not much wonder about,” while they regard rational consciousness as “quite the reverse, and the mystery of it [as] unspeakable.” We can correlate consciousness with the brain’s workings only in an empirical fashion, James thinks, and we ought to confess that “no glimmer of explanation of it is yet in sight. That brains should give rise to a knowing consciousness at all, this is the one mystery which returns, no matter of what sort the consciousness or of what sort the knowledge may be. Sensations, aware of mere qualities, involve the mystery as much as thoughts, aware of complex systems, involve it.”

Still others, like Plotinus and Aristotle, think that the mystery of conscious matter is not essentially different from the mystery of living matter, for if there is anything mysterious about nutrition and growth, or sensation and imagination, it consists in the same thing—the union of material and immaterial principles, of body and soul.

“If the soul were a corporeal entity,” Plotinus writes, “there could be no sense-perception, no mental act, no knowledge. … If the sentient be a material entity (as we are invited to believe), sensation could only be of the order of seal-impressions struck by a ring on wax.” Perception is not a passively received impression. It is, according to Plotinus, an act of awareness “determined by the nature and character of the living being in which it occurs. … In any perception we attain by sight, the object is grasped there where it lies in the direct line of vision. … The mind looks outward; this is ample proof that it has taken and takes no inner imprint, and does not see in virtue of some mark made upon it, like that of the ring on the wax; it need not look outward at all if, even as it looked, it already held the image of the object, seeing by virtue of an impression made upon itself.”

According to Aristotle, “two characteristic marks have above all others been recognized as distinguishing that which has soul in it from that which has not—self-movement and sensation.” By self-movement he appears to mean such things as the nutrition and growth which is found in plants, as well as the additional animal faculty of local motion. Both self-movement and sensation require soul as well as body. “Nothing grows or decays naturally,” he writes, “except what feeds itself, and nothing feeds itself except what has a share of soul in it.” So, too, “nothing except what has soul in it is capable of sensation.” But “the exercise of sense-perception does not belong to soul or body exclusively.” Sensation “is not an affection of the soul” by itself, nor has a soulless body “the potentiality of perception.”

But, Aristotle asks, are all affections of the soul “affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself? … If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g., anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems to be the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination, or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.”

Aquinas tries to answer the question Aristotle asks, with a threefold distinction which places sensation and imagination midway between the vegetative functions and rational thought. The power of thought, or “the intellectual power,” Aquinas says, “does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing.”

At the other extreme from this “operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ,” are those “operations of the soul … performed by a corporeal organ and by virtue of a corporeal quality.” Because it is a kind of self-movement, digestion requires soul as well as body, but it is a corporeal action in the way in which, according to Aquinas, it involves “the action of heat.” Between these extremes, Aquinas places sensation and imagination, operations “performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality.”

He explains this further by means of a distinction between natural and spiritual immutation—physical and psychic change. “Natural immutation takes place by the form of the thing which causes the immutation being received, according to its natural existence, into the thing in which the immutation is effected, as heat is received into the heated thing.” Vegetative activities, while remaining psychic in the sense of occurring only in living or besouled matter, involve only natural immutations in the vital organs involved.

In contrast, “spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the thing causing the immutation being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing in which the immutation is effected, as the form of color is received into the eye, which does not thereby become colored.” Though some sensations may require a natural immutation of the sense-organ, as hot and cold do, all sensations necessarily involve a spiritual immutation, which enables the sense-organ to perform its proper act of knowing, as the eye knows color without becoming colored. “Otherwise,” Aquinas says, “if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense’s action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.”

These diverse views of the nature of sensation seem to be paralleled by diverse views of the sensitive faculty. That the function of the senses is somehow to apprehend or know does not seem to be disputed. But whether the senses—including memory and imagination—are the only faculty of knowing is an issue to which the great books seem to give a variety of answers.

The opposite answers appear to be correlated, not only with conflicting positions in respect to body and soul, but also with opposing theories of the distinction between men and other animals. Those who hold that the motions of matter are adequate to explain the phenomena of knowing and thinking, tend to make sense-perception the primary function of the mind and to treat not only memory and imagination, but also reasoning or thought as subsequent activities of the same general faculty which receives impressions from external sources in the first instance. Since other animals possess senses and give evidence that perception in them has consequences for memory and imagination, those who hold this view also tend to attribute thought to animals and to regard man as differing from them only in degree.

Those who take the contrary view that knowing involves an immaterial principle or cause—a soul as well as a body—tend to distinguish the various functions of sense from the activities of thought—such as conception, judgment, and reasoning. They also take the position that man, while sharing sense-perception, memory, and imagination with other animals, alone possesses the higher faculty. The difference between men and brutes is thus conceived as one of kind, not of degree, when the difference between the senses and the reason in man is also conceived as a difference in kind. A functional relationship between sensation and thought is not thereby denied, but a distinct faculty is affirmed to be necessary for going beyond the apprehension of particulars to knowledge of the universal, or for rising above the imagination to abstract thought.

The distinction between sense and reason as faculties of knowing is sometimes stated in terms of a difference in their objects—the particular versus the universal, becoming versus being, the material versus the immaterial. Sometimes it is stated in terms of the difference between a corporeal power requiring a bodily organ and a spiritual power which belongs exclusively to the soul. Sometimes it is stated in terms of the contrast between sense as intuitive and reason as discursive, the one beholding its objects immediately, the other forming concepts, judgments, or conclusions about objects which are either beheld by the senses or cannot be intuitively apprehended at all.

The exceptions to the foregoing summary are almost as numerous as the exemplifications of the points mentioned. Nothing less than this intricate pattern of agreements and differences will serve, however, to represent the complexity of the discussion and the way in which diverse theories of sense imply different views of nature and man, of mind and knowledge. The situation can be illustrated by taking certain doctrines which seem to be opposite on most points, and then considering other theories which seem to agree, on this point or that, with both extremes.

We have already observed the opposition between Hobbes and Aquinas with regard to matter and spirit in relation to the activity of the senses. Hobbes, like Lucretius, not only treats all mental phenomena as manifestations of bodily motion, but also reduces thought to the train or sequence of images. Images are in turn reducible to the sensations from which they derive. “As we have no imagination,” Hobbes writes, “whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses.” Using the word “thoughts” to stand for the images derived from sense, Hobbes goes on to say that “besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.”

Only man’s use of words makes the difference in the exercise of the imagination “that we generally call understanding,” and which, according to Hobbes, “is common to man and beast.” Similarly, it is only the fact that common names have general significance which gives human discourse the appearance of abstract thought, for Hobbes denies abstract ideas. Thoughts or images are no less particular than sensations, “there being nothing in the world universal but names.”

Berkeley and Hume seem to agree with Hobbes that man has no abstract ideas or universal concepts; that all the operations of thought are merely elaborations of the original impressions of sense; and that no special power, but only the use of language, distinguishes men from other animals.

Berkeley uses the word “idea” to stand for sense-impressions—“ideas actually imprinted on the senses”—and for whatever is “perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind.” To these two he adds a third: “ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination, either compounding or dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.” The only difference between the first and the third is that “the ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination.” But our ideas of sense and imagination do not cover all the objects of which we can think. He admits, therefore, the possibility of our having notions, whereby we understand the meaning of a word like “spirit” or “soul” which refers to a substance of which we can form no idea.

Hume divides “all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas.” The other he calls “impressions,” meaning thereby “all our more lively perceptions.” Impressions are the source of all other ideas, the creative power of the mind consisting in “no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses” and every simple idea being “copied from a similar impression.”

Yet, though Berkeley and Hume seem to agree with Hobbes in reducing all thought to primary sense-perceptions and derived memories or imaginations, Hume does not attempt to explain thought by the motions of matter. Berkeley differs even more radically. He denies that matter or bodies exist, and so he regards sense-perception, like all the rest of thought, as purely spiritual. The soul passively receives its original impressions directly from God and actively forms the ideas it is able to derive from these impressions.

Nor do all those who somehow conceive man as composed of both body and soul agree upon the function of sense in relation to the rest of thought. Locke, for example, uses “understanding” to cover all sorts of mental activity. Mental activity begins with the passive reception of the simple ideas of sense—the impressions produced in us when “the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs”—and the simple ideas of reflection which arise from an awareness of our own mental operations. But mental activity also includes the formation of complex ideas by the compounding of simple ones, and even the act whereby we form abstract ideas, in doing which man, in Locke’s opinion, is distinguished from brutes.

All these activities require soul as well as body. All are somehow nothing more than a reworking of the original sensations passively received. In this last respect, Locke’s view accords with that of Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, though he differs from them with respect to abstract ideas and in his theory of body and soul. On the very point which he holds in common with Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, Locke seems to disagree with Descartes.

Thinking, for Descartes, is the activity of a purely spiritual substance—the rational soul—peculiar to the dual nature of man; whereas sensation and imagination, common to men and brutes, are purely corporeal functions. In man, the soul or thinking substance may form certain of its ideas, those relative to bodies, under the influence of sense or fancy; but with regard to other ideas, such as those we have of geometrical figures, Descartes says he cannot admit that they “have at any time entered our minds through the senses.” He objects to the use of the word “idea” for images, or what he calls “pictures in the corporeal imagination, i.e., in some part of the brain.” He criticizes those who “never raise their minds above the things of sense,” so accustomed are they “to consider nothing except by imagining it,” with the result that whatever “is not capable of being imagined appears to them not to be intelligible at all.”

Against the maxim which Locke, no less than Hobbes or Berkeley, would approve—that “there is nothing in the understanding which has not first of all been in the senses”—Descartes offers the ideas of God and of the soul as plainly contrary examples, ideas clearly in the mind which have no origin in sensation or fancy. “Those who desire to make use of their imagination to understand these ideas,” he adds, “act in the same way as if, to hear sounds or smell odors, they should wish to make use of their eyes.”

In making a sharp distinction between the faculties of sense and understanding or reason, Descartes seems to share the position of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant. Yet for Descartes as for Plato, the intellect in its own sphere of objects is like the senses in theirs, since each is able to behold its proper objects intuitively; whereas for Kant as for Aristotle, sense alone is a faculty of intuition. The ideas by which we apprehend intelligible objects, according to Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza, are not derived from sensations or images. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other hand, the intellect abstracts all its ideas, or universal concepts, from the particulars of sense.

In this respect Aristotle and Aquinas seem to be in agreement with Locke, even though that agreement must be qualified by the observation that Locke sees no need for a special faculty to obtain abstract ideas. On the other hand, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes all seem to agree in holding that understanding is as immaterial as its objects. Unlike sense, which requires bodily organs, rational thought is, according to them, an activity peculiar either to the soul itself or to a power of the soul which is not embodied in an organ, as the power of vision is embodied in the eye or the powers of memory and imagination are embodied in the brain.

William James denies this. He holds the view that all forms of consciousness are somehow functions of the brain. Yet he also insists that percept and concept are radically distinct forms of consciousness. To this extent, James makes as sharp a separation as the authors above mentioned between the sensory and the rational phases of thought. He places sensation, perception, memory and imagination on one side, and conception, judgment, and reasoning on the other. But this is for him not a distinction of faculties or powers, but only of different functions which one and the same mind is able to perform.

Certain points or problems in the traditional discussion of sense are unaffected by the basic issues just considered. For example, most writers tend to make some distinction between the special exterior senses, such as vision and hearing, touch and taste, and the several interior senses, which Aquinas enumerates as the common sense, memory, imagination, and the estimative or cogitative powers. Yet not all who consider memory and imagination as activities consequent upon sense-perception call them “interior senses.” Not all recognize a distinct estimative or cogitative power even when they recognize a kind of thinking about particulars done by animals and men with sensory materials. Nor do all who discuss discrimination or comparison, and the collation or combining of the impressions received from the special senses, attribute these functions to the special faculty which Aristotle first calls “the common sense.”

Frequently the same analytical point is made in different ways. As indicated in the chapter on QUALITY, the distinction which Aristotle and Aquinas make between proper and common sensibles, according as the quality, such as color and odor, belongs to a single sense, or, like shape and motion, can be perceived by two or more senses, seems to parallel the distinction between what Locke calls “secondary” and “primary” qualities. But where Locke and others treat the so-called “secondary qualities” as entirely subjective, occurring only in the experience of the sentient organism and having no reality in the sensible thing, Aristotle takes a contrary view.

When it is not actually seen or smelled, the sensible thing, according to Aristotle, is potentially colorful or odoriferous; just as when it is not actually seeing or smelling, the sense of vision or smell is also in a state of potentiality with respect to these qualities. But when the sensible thing is actually sensed, then, Aristotle says, “the actuality of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty is one actuality.” The thing is actually colored when it is actually seen, though it is only potentially colored when it is merely able to be so seen. “Earlier students of nature,” he writes, “were mistaken in their view that without sight there was no white or black, without taste no savor. This statement of theirs is partly true, partly false: ‘sense’ and ‘the sensible object’ are ambiguous terms, i.e., they may denote either potentialities or actualities. The statement is true of the latter, false of the former.”

Another example of the same analytical point (which is made differently by different writers) concerns the distinction between sensation and perception. According to William James, “perception involves sensation as a portion of itself, and sensation in turn never takes place in adult life without perception also being there.” The difference between them is that the function of sensation is “that of mere acquaintance with a fact,” whereas “perception’s function . . . is knowledge about a fact, and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication.” Hearing a sound is having a sensation, but perception occurs when, as James points out, we “hear a sound, and say ‘a horse-car.’”

But James does not agree that, when perception is so described, it is, as other psychologists have suggested, a species of reasoning. “If, every time a present sign suggests an absent reality to our mind, we make an inference, and if every time we make an inference we reason; then,” James admits, “perception is indubitably reasoning. Only one sees no room in it for any unconscious part.” No inference is consciously made in perception; and James thinks that “to call perception unconscious reasoning is either a useless metaphor, or a positively misleading confusion between two different things.” In his opinion, “perception differs from sensation [simply] by the consciousness of further facts associated with the object of sensation.” For him, “perception and reasoning are coordinate varieties of that deeper sort of process known psychologically as the association of ideas.”

What James treats as the object of sensation, Aristotle refers to as a quality sensed by one or more of the special senses, either a proper or a common sensible. What James treats as the object of perception, Aristotle calls an “accidental object of sense,” because it is strictly not sensible at all by any of the exterior senses, singly or in combination. When we call “the white object we see” the son of Diares or a man, we have an example of an accidental sensible or an object incidentally perceived, because “‘being the son of Diares’ is incidental to the directly visible white patch” we see with our eyes.

This distinction between sensation and perception seems to have a bearing on the problem of the fallibility of the senses. Again the same point seems to be differently made. Aristotle, for example, holds that whereas each of the senses is normally infallible in the apprehension of its proper object or appropriate quality, error is possible in the perception of the complex thing which is not strictly an object of the special senses. “While the perception that there is white before us cannot be false,” he writes, “the perception that what is white is this or that may be false.”

Lucretius likewise insists that the senses themselves are never deceived, but that all the errors attributed to the senses are the result of a false inference or judgment which reason makes on the basis of the evidence presented by the senses. That also seems to be the opinion of Descartes, who thinks that “no direct experience can ever deceive the understanding if it restricts its attention accurately to the object presented to it. … Thus if a man suffering from jaundice persuades himself that the things he sees are yellow, this thought of his will be composite, consisting partly of what his imagination presents to him, and partly of what he assumes on his own account, namely, that the color looks yellow, not owing to the defect in his eye, but because the things he sees really are yellow. … We can go wrong only when the things we believe are in some way compounded by ourselves.” Descartes holds that “no falsity can reside” in sensations themselves, but only in those judgments which, on the basis of sensations, we are “accustomed to pass about things external to us.”

The most fundamental judgment which men make on the basis of sensation is that an external world exists—a reality not of our own making. Descartes argues from the evidence of the senses to the independent existence of a world of bodies. Though Berkeley argues, on the contrary, that bodies do not exist except as objects of perception, he attributes the sense-impressions, over which we seem to have no control, to the action of an external cause—to God, who uses them as signs for instructing us.

Locke defines sensitive knowledge as that which informs us of “the existence of things actually present to our senses.” We may know our own existence intuitively, and God’s existence demonstratively, but “the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation.” And though, he adds, “the notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us … be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of our reason . . . yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge.”

Against such views, the most fundamental skepticism goes further than doubting the veracity of the senses because of the illusions and hallucinations they cause us to suffer. “By what arguments,” Hume asks, “can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects . . . and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself or from the suggestion of some visible or unknown spirit?”

“It is a question of fact,” he adds, “whether the perception of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them. How shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be, entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature of sense * 1a. The power of sense as distinct from the power of understanding or reason * 1b. Sense and intellect in relation to becoming and being, particulars and universals * 1c. The distinction between perception or intuition and judgment or reasoning: the transcendental forms of intuition * 1d. Sense-perception as a primary function of the mind or understanding: sensations as received impressions; the distinction between sensation and reflection, ideas and notions, percepts and concepts

2. Sensitivity in relation to the grades of life * 2a. The differentiation of animals from plants in terms of sensitivity * 2b. The degrees of sensitivity in the animal kingdom: the genetic order of the several senses * 2c. Comparisons of human and animal sensitivity

3. The analysis of the power of sense: its organs and activities * 3a. The anatomy and physiology of the senses: the special sense-organs, nerves, brain * 3b. The distinction between the exterior and interior senses * (1) Enumeration of the exterior senses: their relation and order * (2) Enumeration of the interior senses: their dependence on the exterior senses * 3c. The activity of the exterior senses * (1) The functions of the exterior senses: the nature and origin of sensations * (2) The attributes of sensation: intensity, extensity, affective tone; the psychophysical law * (3) The classification of sensations or sense-qualities: proper and common sensibles; primary and secondary qualities * (4) The distinction between sensation and perception: the accidental sensible; complex ideas of substance * (5) Sensation and attention: pre-perception and apperception; the transcendental unity of apperception * 3d. The activity of the interior senses * (1) The functions of the common sense: discrimination, comparison, association, collation or perception * (2) Memory and imagination as interior powers of sense * (3) The estimative or cogitative power: instinctive recognition of the harmful and beneficial * 3e. The relation of sense to emotion, will, and movement: the conception of a sensitive appetite

4. The character of sensitive knowledge * 4a. Comparison of sensitive with other forms of knowledge * 4b. The object of sense-perception: the evident particular fact; judgments of perception and judgments of experience * 4c. The relation of sense and the sensible: the subjectivity or objectivity of sense-qualities * 4d. The limit, accuracy, and reliability of sensitive knowledge: the fallibility of the senses * (1) The erroneous interpretation of sense-data: the problem of judgments based on sensation * (2) Error in sense-perception: illusions and hallucinations

5. The contribution of the senses to scientific or philosophical knowledge * 5a. Sensation as the source or occasion of ideas: the role of memory or reminiscence; the construction of complex ideas; the abstraction of universal concepts * 5b. Sense-experience as the origin of inductions * 5c. The dependence of understanding or reason upon sense for knowledge of particulars: verification by appeal to the senses

6. The role of sense in the perception of beauty: the beautiful and the pleasing to sense; sensible and intelligible beauty

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) I Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The nature of sense

1a. The power of sense as distinct from the power of understanding or reason

7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII, 392c-393c / Theaetetus, 534d-536a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [999b1-4] 518b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 647b-648d; BK III, CH 4 [429a29-b4] 661c-d; CH 8 664b-d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK IX, CH 9 [1170a16-18] 423d-424a 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4a / Fourth Ennead, TR VI, CH 1-2 189b-190b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 2-3 216b-217b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 12-20 74b-76c / City of God, BK VII, CH 23, 256b-c; BK VIII, CH 6, 269b; BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 3 52c-53b; Q 14, A 2, ANS and REP 1 76d-77d; Q 75, A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c-381b; Q 78, A 1 407b-409a; AA 3-4 410a-413d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3 8b-9a; Q 56, A 5 33c-34b; PART III, SUPPL, Q 70, A 2 896a-897d 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, VII, 13a; XII 18b-25a / Meditations, VI, 98d-99c / Objections and Replies, 218c-d; 229d-230c 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 14a-c; 23a-24a; 37b-39c; 98c; 101d-102a; 112d-113b; 115b-c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c / The Critique of Judgement, 570c-571c 53 James: Psychology, 158b-159a; 450a-451b; 469a-b; 628b-631a

1b. Sense and intellect in relation to becoming and being, particulars and universals

7 Plato: Phaedrus, 126b-d / Symposium, 167a-d / Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231b-232b / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 447b-d; 457b-458a / Theaetetus, 534d-536a / Sophist, 565a-569a esp 568a-569a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a6] 98b-c; CH 18 111b-c; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 19 [100a6-11] 136d / Topics, BK II, CH 7 [113a23-32] 158d; BK VI, CH 4 [141b2-14] 194d-195a; BK VIII, CH 1 [156a4-6] 211d-212a / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [189a5-8] 264b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980b28-981a13] 499a-500a; CH 6 [987a29-b18] 505b-d; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b4] 518a-b; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b34-1036a12] 559b-c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 [417b17-28] 648b-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-31] 391b-c; BK VII, CH 3 [1147a25-b6] 397c-d 11 Nicomachus: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 811c-d 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR VI, CH 1-2 189b-190b / Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 1 228b-229c; TR IX, CH 5 248a-249a / Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 27-28 266c-267c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK VII, par 23 50b-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 11 84c-85c; Q 18, A 2, ANS 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 2 295d-297a; Q 75, A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 86, A 1, ANS and REP 4 461c-462a; A 3 463b-d; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b-749a 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-333b 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII 18b-25a; XIV 28a-33b passim / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, II, 79a-81d esp 81d; VI, 96b-d / Objections and Replies, 130a-b; 136d-137a; 218c-d; 219b-c; 229d-230c 38 Rousseau: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 341d-342a 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445d-446a 53 James: Psychology, 307a-311a esp 309a, 311b-312b [fn 1]

1c. The distinction between perception or intuition and judgment or reasoning: the transcendental forms of intuition

42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-41c esp 23a-24a, 34a-c, 38c-41c; 42a; 45d-46a; 47c-48a; 53b-54b; 58a-64a esp 61a-64a; 66a-d; 98c; 109d-110a; 112d-113b; 115b-c; 199b-c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-c / Critique of Practical Reason, 307d-308b; 329b-c / The Critique of Judgement, 461a-475d esp 461a-462d, 464c-467a, 474b-475d; 482d-483d; 492c-d; 570b-572c 53 James: Psychology, 629a-631a

1d. Sense-perception as a primary function of the mind or understanding: sensations as received impressions; the distinction between sensation and reflection, ideas and notions, percepts and concepts

12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK III [231-251] 33a-b; BK IV [26-41] 44b-d; [722-817] 53d-54d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 52b-c; 54a; PART IV, 258b-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 14-18 380c-382b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15 98d-99a; BK II, CH I-II 121a-128c esp CH I, SECT 1-8 121a-123a, SECT 20-25 126d-127d; CH II, SECT 1, 128d; CH VIII, SECT 1 133b-c; SECT 8 134b-c; CH IX 138b-141a passim, esp SECT 1 138b-c, SECT 15 141a; CH XI, SECT 17-CH XII, SECT 1, 147a-b; CH XIX, SECT 1, 175b; CH XX, SECT 1 176b-c; CH XXI, SECT 4 178d-179c; SECT 74-75, 200a-d; CH XXII, SECT 2, 201a; CH XXIII, SECT 1 204a-b; SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 29 211d-212a; SECT 32 212c-d; BK III, CH IV, SECT 11 261d-262b; CH V, SECT 2 263d-264a; BK IV, CH II, SECT 11 311c-312a; CH IV, SECT 4 324c 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1 413a-b; SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim; SECT 36 419c-d; SECT 135-142 440a-441c passim, esp SECT 139-140 440d-441a, SECT 142, 441c 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II 455b-457b passim 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 115b-c 53 James: Psychology, 144a-145a; 160a; 313b-314a; 452a-457a esp 453a-454a, 455a-456a; 472b-473a; 593a 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 352d

2. Sensitivity in relation to the grades of life

2a. The differentiation of animals from plants in terms of sensitivity

7 Plato: Timaeus, 469d-470a 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK I, CH 5 [410b16-411a2] 640d-641a; BK II, CH 2 [413b31-4] 643c; CH 3 [414a28-33] 644c; [414b32-415a3] 645a-b; CH 12 [424a32-b4] 656b-c / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [436a8-12] 673c / On Sleep and Sleeplessness, CH 1 [454a12-18] 696c-d; [454b23-455a2] 697b-c / On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death, On Breathing, CH 1 [467b23-25] 714b 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [588b4-589a1] 114d-115b / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 10 [655b33-656a4] 182a; BK IV, CH 10 [686b23-687a1] 218b-c / Gait of Animals, CH 4 [705b26-a13] 244a-b / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 23 [731a24-b8] 271c-d; BK II, CH 1 [732a12-14] 272c; CH 3 [736a25-b14] 276d-277b; CH 4 [740b25]-CH 5 [741a30] 281d-282b; BK III, CH 7 [757b14-30] 298c-d; BK V, CH 1 [778b30-779a4] 321a-b / Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1097b33-1098a2] 343b 10 Galen: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 1 167a-b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK VIII, SECT 7 286a; BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d 18 Augustine: City of God, BK VII, CH 23, 256b-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A 2, ANS and REP 1 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 69, A 2, REP 1 361c-362c; Q 78, A 1, ANS 407b-409a 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 368a-b; 369d-370b; 372b; 397c-398c; 457c-d 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 11-15 140b-141a 49 Darwin: The Origin of Species, 114b-115c esp 115a-b 53 James: Psychology, 8a 54 Freud: The Unconscious, 429c-d

2b. The degrees of sensitivity in the animal kingdom: the genetic order of the several senses

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413a4-10] 643c; [414a1-3] 644a; BK III, CH 11 [433b31-434a4] 666d; CH 12-13 667a-668d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [436b12-437a17] 673c-674a 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK I, CH 3 [489a17-19] 10b; CH 9 [491b26-34] 13c; CH 11 [492a27-30] 14a-b; BK II, CH 12 [504a19-23] 26c; CH 13 [505a32-34] 27d-28a; BK IV, CH 7 [532a5-7] 58d; CH 8 59d-62a; BK V, CH 16 [548b10-15] 75b-c; BK VIII, CH 1 [588b17-31] 115a-b / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 8 [653b22-29] 179b; CH 10-17 181d-188a,c passim; BK III, CH 4 [667a9-14] 195b; BK IV, CH 5 [681a14-17] 212b; CH 11 [690a17-691a28] 222d-223c / Gait of Animals, CH 4 [705a9-13] 244b / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 23 [731a24-b8] 271c-d; BK V, CH 1 [778b20]-CH 2 [781b29] 321a-324a 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [633-721] 52c-53d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a-411d 31 Descartes: Discourse on the Method, PART V, 59a-c 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 11-15 140b-141a 49 Darwin: The Descent of Man, 261c-262a; 366c; 397d-398a; 402b-c; 406c; 432c-434c passim; 447b-448a passim; 456b-d; 474a-b; 480a-482b passim; 529a-b; 553d-554b; 568d-569b; 595b-596a 53 James: Psychology, 27a-42b passim, esp 40a, 41b

2c. Comparisons of human and animal sensitivity

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK II, CH 9 [421a6-16] 652c; [421a19-26] 652d; [421b8-422a6] 653a-c / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [436b17-437a17] 673d-674a; CH 4 [440b28-441a3] 678b-c; CH 5 [443b17-445a31] 681c-683b 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK I, CH 15 [494b17-19] 16d / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 16 [660a13]-CH 17 [660a23] 187a / Generation of Animals, BK V, CH 2 [781b17-23] 323d-324a / Ethics, BK III, CH 10 [1118a17-b7] 364d-365a 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [706-721] 53c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 91, A 3, REP 1,3 486b-487d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 2, REP 2 711d-712d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 286a-287b; 290c-291b 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 40, 173c-d 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 229d-230c 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 12-15 140c-141a 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1d-2a 38 Rousseau: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 337d-338a 42 Kant: The Critique of Judgement, 479b 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 25 121a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 244a-245b 49 Darwin: The Descent of Man, 259d-260a; 261c-262a; 301c-302b; 366c; 568d-570a 53 James: Psychology, 19b-42b passim, esp 41a-b

3. The analysis of the power of sense: its organs and activities

3a. The anatomy and physiology of the senses: the special sense-organs, nerves, brain

7 Plato: Timaeus, 454b-455a 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK II, CH 1 [412b18-24] 642d; CH 8 [420a2-19] 651b-c; CH 9 [421a19-26] 652d; [421b8-422a6] 653a-c; CH 10 [422a1-b9] 654a; CH 11 [422b17-424a9] 654b-655d; BK II, CH 12 [424b24]-BK III, CH 1 [425a13] 656a-657a; BK III, CH 2 [426b8-17] 658d; CH 13 [435a11-b3] 668a-b / Sense and the Sensible, CH 2-5 674a-683b passim / On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death, On Breathing, CH 3 [468b28]-CH 4 [469b6] 715b-716a 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK I, CH 4 [489a24-27] 10c; CH 15 [494b11-16] 16d; BK II, CH 10 25b-c; CH 12 [504a19-23] 26c; CH 13 [505a32-34] 27d-28a; BK IV, CH 1 [524b33-a5] 50a; CH 7 [532a5-10] 58d-59a; CH 8 59d-62a / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 1 [647a1-34] 171a-c; CH 8 [653b19-29] 179b; CH 10-17 181d-188a,c esp CH 10 [656a14]-CH 12 [657a24] 182b-183d, CH 16-17 185d-188a,c; BK III, CH 4 [666a10-b1] 193d-194b; CH 5 [667b22-32] 196a; BK IV, CH 5 [678b2-18] 208b-c; [681b15-682a9] 212b-d; CH 11 [690a18-691a28] 222d-223c / Motion of Animals, CH 9 [702b22-25] 238b / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [743b25-744a18] 285a-b; BK V, CH 1 [779a27]-CH 2 [781b29] 321c-324a 10 Hippocrates: On the Sacred Disease, 159c-160a 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK III [136-160] 31d-32a; [231-251] 33a-b; [359-369] 34d; [406-416] 35b-c; BK IV [237-253] 47b-c; [324-352] 48c-d; [615-629] 52b-c 16 Kepler: Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, BK IV, 855a 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 23 153d-154b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 76, A 5, ANS and REP 2 394c-396a; Q 77, A 5, REP 3 403d-404c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 50b-51b; PART III, 172c; PART IV, 258b-c 28 Harvey: On the Circulation of the Blood, 326b / On the Generation of Animals, 455c; 456b-458a esp 457a-d; 494b 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 27, 157b-d 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-20d / Objections and Replies, 209c 34 Newton: Optics, BK I, 384b-385b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH III, SECT 1 128d-129a; CH VIII, SECT 12 135a; CH XXIX, SECT 3 234b-c 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 270a-271b 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK XIV, 102b,d-103b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 244a-245b 49 Darwin: The Origin of Species, 85d-87c; 90b-c / The Descent of Man, 259c-261c; 397d-398a; 595d-596a 53 James: Psychology, 8a-52b esp 27a-42b; 151a-b; 453a; 456b-457a; 497a-501b esp 500a-501b; 533a-538b passim, esp 533a-534a, 536a, 538a-b; 546b-547b [fn 1]; 562b-563a esp 562b-563b [fn 1]; 575b-584a; 768b; 787a 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 351b-352b; 367b-c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 647a-648a

3b. The distinction between the exterior and interior senses

8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b36-100a3] 136b-c / On the Soul, BK III, CH 2 657d-659c; CH 3 [428a5-16] 660b; CH 7 [431a14-b2] 663d-664a / On Sleep and Sleeplessness, CH 2 [455a3-b13] 697c-698b 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 29 157b-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, REP 3 430c-431d; PART I-II, Q 35, A 2, REP 2 773b-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50a-c; 52b-c; PART IV, 258b-c 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 457b 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-20a 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 24a-b; 26b-29d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 386d-387a,c 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c; 384c-385b

3b(1) Enumeration of the exterior senses: their relation and order

8 Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 2 [329b10-17] 429c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 7-11 649b-656a; BK III, CH 1-2 656b,d-659c / Sense and the Sensible 673a-689a,c 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK IV, CH 8 59d-62a / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 10 [656b24]-CH 11 [657a18] 182c-183c 10 Hippocrates: On the Sacred Disease, 159d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK II [434-443] 20c; [680-687] 23c-d; BK IV [478-499] 50b-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A 3 410a-411d; Q 91, A 3, REP 1 486b-487d; PART I-II, Q 31, A 6 756d-757c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, SUPPL, Q 82, A 4 972d-974c; Q 91, A 4, REP 1 1022d-1023d 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 457b-c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH III, SECT 3-CH IV, SECT 1 128b-129a; CH IX, SECT 8-9, 139c-140a 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1 413a-b; SECT 42-44 420c-421a 53 James: Psychology, 62a-63a; 569b-570a; 650b-651a

3b(2) Enumeration of the interior senses: their dependence on the exterior senses

8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b36-100a6] 136b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a22-24] 499a / On the Soul, BK III, CH 3 [428b10-429a9] 660d-661b; CH 11 [433b31-434a9] 666d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 690a-692b 9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, CH 8 [702a19-20] 237c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370a28-31] 613c 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 29 157b-d; TR IV, CH 8, 161d-162b; TR VI 189b-191c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 12-15 74b-75b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 4 411d-413d; Q 84, A 7, REP 2 449b-450b; Q 111, A 3, REP 1 570b-571b 21 Dante: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [13-18] 78c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50a-c; 52b-c; 54b-c; PART IV, 262a-c 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 334c-d 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-20d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17-18 380d-382b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH III, SECT 21 118b-119a; BK II, CH II, SECT 2-3 128a-c; CH X 141b-143d esp SECT 7 142c-d; CH XI, SECT 1-7 143d-145b; CH XII, SECT 1, 147b-c 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 13 455d-456b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 54b-55a 53 James: Psychology, 13a; 391a; 480a 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-c

3c. The activity of the exterior senses

3c(1) The functions of the exterior senses: the nature and origin of sensations

7 Plato: Meno, 177b-d / Republic, BK VI, 385c-386c / Timaeus, 453b-454a; 454c-455a; 463d-465d / Theaetetus, 518b-522b; 533b-534b / Philebus, 621a-c 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 8 [9a28-b8] 14b-c / Topics, BK I, CH 14 [105b4-9] 149b; BK IV, CH 5 [125b15-18] 174d / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 8 [324b26-32] 423b; [326a11-21] 425c-d / Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 6 [1048a18-34] 574a-c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 647b-648d; BK III, CH 7 [431a1-8] 663c / Sense and the Sensible 673a-689a,c passim 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 1 [647a7-19] 171a-b; CH 10 [656b26-657a13] 183a-c; BK IV, CH 11 [690b26-691a13] 222d-223b / Generation of Animals, BK V, CH 1 [780a13]-CH 2 [781b29] 322d-324a / Ethics, BK II, CH 1 [1103a26-31] 348d; BK X, CH 4 [1174b15-1175a3] 429a-b 10 Hippocrates: On the Sacred Disease, 159d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK II [398-477] 20a-21a; [865-990] 26a-27c; BK III [231-257] 33a-b; [323-416] 34b-35c; BK IV [26-268] 44b-47d; [522-776] 51a-54b 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR I, CH 6-7 3c-4a / Second Ennead, TR VI 64c-65e / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 23 153d-154b; CH 25-26, 155c; TR IV, CH 23-25 169c-171b; TR V, CH 1-TR VI, CH 2 183a-190b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 1, ANS 75d-76c; A 2, REP 1 76d-77d; Q 75, A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c-381b; Q 77, A 5, REP 3 403d-404c; Q 78, A 3 410a-411d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, SUPPL, Q 70, AA 1-2 893d-897d; Q 82, AA 3-4 971a-974c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 62b; PART III, 172b; PART IV, 258b-c 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 456c-457d passim, esp 457c-d 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 45, 176a-b 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a / Objections and Replies, 163b; 228c-229c; 229d-230c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, AXIOM 4 373d; PROP 11-16 377b-380d esp POSTULATE 3 380b 34 Newton: Optics, BK I, 428a-b; 434a-435a; 442a-443a; BK III, 518b-519b; 522a 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 3 121c-d; SECT 23 127b; CH III, SECT 1 128d-129a; CH VIII, SECT 4 133d; SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim, esp SECT 11-13 134d-135b, SECT 21 136c-d; CH IX, SECT 1-4 138b-d; CH XIX, SECT 1, 175b; CH XXIII, SECT 11-13 206d-208b; CH XXIX, SECT 3 234b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; BK III, CH IV, SECT 10 261b-d; CH V, SECT 2 263d-264a; BK IV, CH II, SECT 11-13 311c-312b; CH III, SECT 28 322a-c; CH IV, SECT 4 324c 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20 416b-417a; SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim; SECT 36 419c-d; SECT 44, 421a; SECT 56-57 423c-424a; SECT 90 430c-d; SECT 146-149 442a-d 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK XIV, 102b,d-103b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 115b-c / The Critique of Judgement, 477b-d; 518a 44 Boswell: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 202a 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 14a 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 25 121a 50 Marx: Capital, 31c-d 53 James: Psychology, 98b-103b; 108a-b; 149b-151b esp 151a-b; 184b-185a; 193b-194a; 422a; 452a-457a esp 456b-457a; 470b-471a; 472b-479a; 520a-521a; 547a-627a esp 549a, 550a-b, 553b-554b, 562a-563a, 584b-589b, 593a, 595b-597b [fn 2], 596a-608b, 611b, 613b-616b; 856b-858a passim 54 Freud: Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 412c-413a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 647c-648a / The Ego and the Id, 701b-d

3c(2) The attributes of sensation: intensity, extensity, affective tone; the psycho-physical law

8 Aristotle: Topics, BK I, CH 15 [106a22-36] 150a-b; [107a27-37] 152a / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b20-247a19] 330a-b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 8 [420a27-b4] 651c-d; CH 9 [421a6-16] 652c; BK III, CH 2 [426a27-b8] 658c-d; CH 13 [435a4-19] 668c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [1174b15-1175a3] 429a-b 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK II [398-477] 20a-21a; [963-972] 27b; BK IV [324-331] 48c; [524-548] 51a-b; [615-721] 52b-53d 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, TR VI, CH 1, 65a / Fifth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 11, 245c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 31, AA 5-6 755c-757c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 62b-c 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II, SECT 11-13 311c-312b 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 33 419a; SECT 36 419c-d 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 11-12 455b-d 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK XIV, 103a-c 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 69c-72c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c / The Critique of Judgement, 477b-478a 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 450a 49 Darwin: The Descent of Man, 569a-b 53 James: Psychology, 275b-276b; 319b-321a; 348a-359a; 498a-501b passim; 526b-527a; 533a-b; 540a-547a; 552a-554b; 563a-566a; 651a-b; 829b-830a 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c; 384c-d / On Narcissism, 403d-404a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639b-d; 648b-649c passim / The Ego and the Id, 701a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773a

3c(3) The classification of sensations or sense-qualities: proper and common sensibles; primary and secondary qualities

7 Plato: Timaeus, 462c-463d; 464b-465d 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 8 [9a28-b8] 14b-c / On Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 1-3 428b,d-431a / On the Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a6-19] 648d-649a; CH 9 [421a27-b2] 652d; CH 10 [422a10]-CH 11 [422b33] 654b-c; BK III, CH 1 [425a14-29] 657b-c; [425b4-10] 657c-d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [437a3-10] 673d-674a; CH 3-5 676a-683b; CH 6 [445b4-446a20] 683b-684c 10 Galen: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 6, 169c-d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK II [398-521] 20a-21c; [730-864] 24b-26a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 3 esp REP 2 410a-411d; A 4, REP 1-2 411d-413d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, SUPPL, Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d; PART III, 172b 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-c / Objections and Replies, 163b; 228c-229c; 231a-b 34 Newton: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULE 1 270b-271a / Optics, BK I, 428a-b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH II, SECT 1 128d-129a; CH V 131b; CH VI, SECT 1 131c; CH VIII, SECT 7-26 134b-138b; CH IX, SECT 8-9, 139c-140a; CH XXI, SECT 3 178d; SECT 75 200b-d; CH XXIII, SECT 7-13 205d-208b; SECT 37, 214a-b; CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; BK III, CH IV, SECT 16 263b-c; BK IV, CH III, SECT 11-14 315d-316d; SECT 28 322a-c 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 9-15 414d-416a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 73 427b-c; SECT 102 432d-433a 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 122 505c-d 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 15b-c; 29d-33d esp 30d-31a, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn 1] 53 James: Psychology, 185a-b; 502b-503b; 569b-570a; 572a-b; 627a-b; 650b-651a

3c(4) The distinction between sensation and perception: the accidental sensible; complex ideas of substance

8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK XIII, CH 10 [1087a18-21] 619c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a20-26] 649a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [437a3-17] 673d-674a; CH 6 [446b18-27] 685a-b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, SUPPL, Q 92, A 2, ANS 1032b-1034b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 8-10 139b-140b; CH XXIII, SECT 1 204a-b 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1 413a-b; SECT 42-44 420c-421a; SECT 148 442b-d 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 115b-c 53 James: Psychology, 452a-453a; 502a-505b; 526b-527a

3c(5) Sensation and attention: pre-perception and apperception; the transcendental unity of apperception

8 Aristotle: Sense and the Sensible, CH 7 685c-689a,c 21 Dante: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV [1-18] 57c 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 14a-15c, 23a-33d, 41c-42b, 48d-59b, 66d-93c 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 244a-245a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XIV, 605c-d 53 James: Psychology, 184b-185a; 232b-235a; 262a-291a esp 262b-268a, 275b-276b, 282a-288a; 295b-297a; 328a-329a; 469a-b; 522b-525a; 562a-b; 620b-621a

3d. The activity of the interior senses

3d(1) The functions of the common sense: discrimination, comparison, association, collation or perception

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK III, CH 1 [425a14-b10] 657b-d; CH 2 [426b8-427a14] 658d-659c / On Sleep and Sleeplessness, CH 2 [455a3-b13] 697c-698b 10 Hippocrates: On the Sacred Disease, 159c-d 16 Kepler: Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, BK IV, 855a 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 143b-c; TR VII, CH 6-7 194b-195b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 1-2 411d-413d; Q 87, A 3, REP 3 467b-468a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 52a-b 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 457b-458a esp 457b-c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19c-d 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 1-7 143d-145b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 14a; 51c-d; 54b-64a / The Critique of Judgement, 493c-d; 528c-529b 53 James: Psychology, 185a-b; 313b-341a esp 313b-319a, 322b-326a, 336a-340a; 344b-346a; 360a-399b esp 378a-380a, 396a-397a, 399a-b; 411a-420b esp 414a-416b [fn 1], 415a-418a; 502b-504b; 506a-507a; 525a-526b; 547a-552a esp 547a-b, 551b-552a; 561a-575a esp 561a, 570a-573a; 584a-589b esp 584a-b; 867a-868b 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c; 384c-385c

3d(2) Memory and imagination as interior powers of sense

7 Plato: Theaetetus, 523d-524a / Philebus, 621a-b 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b20-100a9] 136a-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a28-b24] 499a / On Memory and Reminiscence 690a-695d 9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701b13]-CH 8 [702a21] 237a-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370a28-31] 613c 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 28-32 156d-159a; TR VI 189b-191c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 12-17 74b-75d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 55, A 2, REP 2 289d-290d; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 3 411d-413d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50a-52b esp 50a-d; PART IV, 258b-c; 262a-c 30 Bacon: The Advancement of Learning, 55b-c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19d; 20b-d / Objections and Replies, 208d-209a; 218c; 219b-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17-18 380d-382b; PART III, POSTULATE 2 396a 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH X, SECT 1-2 141b-c; SECT 7 142c-d 38 Rousseau: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 341d-342a 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 54b-64a / The Critique of Judgement, 493c-d 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of History, PART I, 219d-220a 53 James: Psychology, 13a-15a esp 13a; 145a; 421b-431b passim, esp 424b-425a; 480a-501b esp 480a-b, 497a-501b 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-d

3d(3) The estimative or cogitative power: instinctive recognition of the harmful and beneficial

6 Herodotus: The History, BK II, 63b-c 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 12 [596b20-28] 122d; BK IX, CH 5-6 136d-138b passim 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 20 167d-168b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c-396a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 4-5 411d-413d; Q 81, A 2, REP 2 429c-430c; A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 83, A 1, ANS 436d-438a; Q 96, A 1, ANS and REP 4 510b-511b; PART I-II, Q 29, A 6, ANS 748b-749a 22 Chaucer: The Canterbury Tales, Nun’s Priest’s Tale [15279-287] 457b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 286d-287b 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 456d-457a 31 Descartes: Meditations, VI, 100a-d 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 3 104b-d; BK II, CH X, SECT 3 141c-d; CH XI, SECT 5 144d-145a; SECT 11 145d-146a 38 Rousseau: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 337d-338a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 144a 49 Darwin: The Origin of Species, 121a; 122c / The Descent of Man, 287d-288a; 290c-291a; 292b-c 53 James: Psychology, 13a; 708a-709a; 720b-725a passim; 729b 54 Freud: A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 607d-609c esp 607d-608c; 612c-614a esp 613d-614a; 623b-c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640d-641a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-721c esp 720c-d; 737b-d; 751a-752b / New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 845a-846a

3e. The relation of sense to emotion, will, and movement: the conception of a sensitive appetite

7 Plato: Phaedrus, 128a-129c / Republic, BK IV, 350b-353d esp 352c-d; BK IX, 421a-b / Timaeus, 466a-467b / Laws, BK VI, 712b 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b20-247a19] 330a-b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413b17-24] 643d; CH 3 [414b28-a16] 644c-d / On Dreams, CH 2 [460b34-b29] 704b-d 9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, CH 6 [700b4]-CH 8 [702a22] 235d-237c / Ethics, BK III, CH 10 [1118a1-b7] 364c-365a; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a16-21] 387d; BK VII, CH 3 [1147a25-b6] 397c-d; CH 4 [1148a4-22] 398b-c; CH 6 [1149a23-b3] 399d-400a 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [877-891] 55d 12 Epictetus: The Discourses, BK II, CH 23, 170a-171a 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 28 156d-157b; TR IV, CH 20 167d-168b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, par 1-2 9a-b; par 10 11a-b; BK III, par 1 13b-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 1, REP 2 28b-d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 78, A 1 407b-409a; Q 81 428d-431d; Q 82, A 2, REP 3 432d-433c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, REP 2 619d-620d; Q 17, A 7 690d-692a; QQ 22-48 720b,d-826a,c passim, esp Q 22, A 3 722d-723b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, AA 4-5 32b-34b 21 Dante: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [85-102] 77d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-d; 62b-c; 64a-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 288a-290b 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT III, SC IV [65-81] 55b-c 30 Bacon: The Advancement of Learning, 55b-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, PROP 9 399b-c 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 164b-c; 235c-d / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 259a-c; 265b,d [fn 1]; 270c-d; 284d-285a / Critique of Practical Reason, 298d-300a; 341c-342a / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386d / The Critique of Judgement, 477b-c; 586a-b 53 James: Psychology, 13a-15a; 51a-b; 521a-522a; 694a-699a; 738a-759a esp 743a-745b, 754b-755b, 757b-759a; 767b-794a esp 768a-771a, 790a-794a; 808b-810b; 812a-813a; 827b-835a esp 827b-828a, 830b-831b 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 351c-353b esp 351d-352a; 363c-364b / Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 412c-413d; 419a-420c esp 420a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 648b-c / The Ego and the Id, 701b

4. The character of sensitive knowledge

7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Theaetetus, 517b-536a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a20-b24] 499a; [981b10-13] 499d-500a; BK IV, CH 5 [1009b1-17] 528d-529a; [1010b1-1011a2] 530a-c; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b34-1063a9] 591a-b 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR I, CH 3-7 1d-4a / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 26, 155c; TR IV, CH 20 167d-168b; CH 23-25 169c-171b; TR V 183a-189b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 10-11 73d-74b; BK XII, par 5 100a-b / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 27 650a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 14, A 6, REP 1 80a-81c; Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a-411d; A 4, ANS and REP 4-6 411d-413d 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-333c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-20a / Meditations, VI 96b-103d / Objections and Replies, 136d-137a; 163b; 229d-230d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 11-16 377b-380d 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 29 211d-212a; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14 312b-d; CH III, SECT 2-5 313a-c; SECT 21 319c; CH XI 354c-358c 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 18, 416b; SECT 135-145 440a-442a passim 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 30b-31a esp 30b-c; 34a-b; 54b-55a; 58a-59b 53 James: Psychology, 157b-168a esp 158b-161a, 167b; 453a-479a esp 453a-454a, 456b-459b, 469a-b

4a. Comparison of sensitive with other forms of knowledge

7 Plato: Symposium, 167a-d / Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI-VIII, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 447b-d / Theaetetus, 534d-536a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c / Topics, BK II, CH 8 [114a17-26] 159d-160a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a20-b24] 499a / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 647b-648d 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 23 [731a30-b5] 271c-d / Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095a30-b12] 340c-d; BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-31] 391b-c 17 Plotinus: Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 1-3 228b-230a / Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 18, 291a-b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, par 10 15b-d; BK XII, par 5 100a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 13, A 7, ANS 68d-70d; Q 14, A 6, REP 1 80a-81c; Q 54, A 2, ANS 285d-286c; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 4-6 411d-413d; Q 85, A 2, REP 3 453d-455b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49d 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-333c 31 Descartes: Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, III, 83d-84a; VI 96b-103d / Objections and Replies, 136d-137a; 218c-d; 229d-230d 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 5 252b-c; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14 312b-d; CH III, SECT 2-5 313a-c; SECT 21 319c; CH XI, SECT 13 357d-358a 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1 405a-b; SECT 18 416b-c; SECT 27 418a-b; SECT 135-142 440a-441c 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 41, 468a-b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 14a-c; 22a,c; 23a-24a; 34a-c; 45d-46a; 199a-c / The Critique of Judgement, 528c-d; 542b-543c; 570b-572b esp 571c-572a 53 James: Psychology, 144a-145a; 167b; 311b-312b [fn 1]; 450a-451b; 453a-459b esp 453a-b, 456a

4b. The object of sense-perception: the evident particular fact; judgments of perception and judgments of experience

7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 447b-c; 457d / Theaetetus, 517b-536a / Sophist, 568b 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b20-100b5] 136a-d / Topics, BK II, CH 8 [114a18-26] 159d-160a / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [981b10-13] 499d-500a; BK IV, CH 5 [1009b1-17] 528d-529a; [1010b1-1011a2] 530a-c; BK XI, CH 7 [1064a4-9] 592b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 [417b18-28] 648b-c; BK III, CH 11 [434a16-22] 667a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098a34-b8] 343d-344a; BK VI, CH 8 [1142a23-31] 391b-c 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4a / Fourth Ennead, TR VI, CH 1-2 189b-190b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, par 10 15b-d; BK IV, par 15-17 23a-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 14, A 11, ANS and REP 1-2 84c-85c; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 17, A 2 102a-d; Q 18, A 2, ANS 105c-106b; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 59, A 1, REP 1 306c-307b; Q 75, A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 77, A 5, REP 3 403d-404c; Q 79, A 6, ANS 419b-420d; Q 85, A 1, ANS 451c-453c; A 6, ANS 458d-459c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; PART III, 172b 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-333c 31 Descartes: Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, II, 80c-81d; VI 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, 229d-230d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 11-16 377b-380d 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 8-10 139b-140b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14 312b-d; CH III, SECT 2 313a; SECT 5 313c; SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 21 319c; CH XI 354c-358c esp SECT 13 357d-358a 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 18 416b-c 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 16a-17d; 108a-d; 115b-c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445d-446a 53 James: Psychology, 150b-151b; 184b-185b; 363b-364a; 453a-457a; 472b-479a; 502a-504a; 506a-507a; 564a-b; 569b-570a; 606b-610b esp 608b-609a; 867a-868b esp 868a-b 54 Freud: The Unconscious, 430c / The Ego and the Id, 702d-703a

4c. The relation of sense and the sensible: the subjectivity or objectivity of sense-qualities

7 Plato: Theaetetus, 517b-520b 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 7 [7b35-8a12] 12d-13a / Physics, BK VII, CH 2 [244b1-245a12] 328b-d; CH 3 329a-330d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1010b30-1011a2] 530c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 647b-648d; CH 11 [423b27]-CH 12 [424a24] 655c-656a; BK III, CH 2 657d-659c; CH 4 [429a10-29] 661b-c; CH 8 664b-d / Sense and the Sensible 673a-689a,c / On Dreams, CH 2 [459a23-460b32] 703a-704b 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 2 [648b15-18] 173a / Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [1174b15-1175a3] 429a-b 10 Galen: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 167d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK II [730-864] 24b-26a; [1002-1022] 27d-28a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 2, ANS 76d-77d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 57b; 59d; PART III, 172b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 285b-292d passim 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-c / Meditations, VI, 100a / Objections and Replies, 162d-165a; 228c-229c; 231a-b 34 Newton: Optics, BK I, 428a-b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII 133b-138b passim; CH XXI, SECT 3 178d; SECT 75 200b-d; CH XXIII, SECT 7-13 205d-208b; SECT 37, 214a-b; CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 14-16 245c-246b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 11-14 311c-312d; CH III, SECT 6, 314b; SECT 11-14 315d-316d; SECT 28 322a-c; CH IV, SECT 4 324c; CH XI, SECT 4-9 355b-357a 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1-91 413a-431a esp SECT 3 413c-d, SECT 8-15 414c-416a, SECT 48-49 422a-b, SECT 56-57 423c-424a, SECT 73 427b-c, SECT 76-78 427d-428b, SECT 86-91 429c-431a; SECT 102 432d-433a 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 117-123 504a-506a 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 29d-33d esp 30d-31a, 31d-32a, 32d-33b [fn 1]; 88b-89c; 101b-102a; 115b-c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c 50 Marx: Capital, 31c-d 53 James: Psychology, 98b-105a; 127b-128a; 150a-151a; 176b-177a; 459a-479a esp 459a-b, 471b-473a, 479a; 851b-852a; 860a-b

4d. The limit, accuracy, and reliability of sensitive knowledge: the fallibility of the senses

7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI-VIII, 386d-398c / Theaetetus, 534d-535c / Statesman, 594d-595c 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c / Topics, BK V, CH 3 [131b19-36] 182b-c / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 3 [318b19-24] 415c / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1010a15-29] 530b-c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a6-18] 648d-649a; BK III, CH 3 [427b6-14] 659d-660a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442a4-9] 680a-b 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 23 [731a30-b5] 271c-d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK I [693-700] 9c; BK IV [324-521] 48c-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, TR VIII 64c-65c / Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 1 228b-229c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A 2 102a-d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c 21 Dante: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, II [46-57] 108b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 285c-292d 28 Harvey: On the Circulation of the Blood, 320b; 322d-323d; 324c-d / On the Generation of Animals, 332a-333c 30 Bacon: The Advancement of Learning, 51c-d; 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 10 107d; APH 14-17 107d-108a; APH 41 109c-d; APH 50 111b; BK II, APH 6 139b-c; APH 39-40 169d-173d; APH 44, 175d 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, VII, 13a-b; XII, 18c; 22c-23a / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, I 75a-77c; III, 83d-84a; VI 96b-103d esp 103a-d / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE I 130d; 206c-207a; 229d-230d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 16, COROL 2 380d; PROP 24-28 383c-384c; PROP 29, COROL 384d-385a; PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 41 388a-c 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK V [544-576] 187a-b; BK VIII [114-130] 234b-235a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 9 173b; 83 188b-189a 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 11-13 206d-208b; CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 14-16 245c-246b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14 312b-d; CH IV, SECT 4 324c; CH XI, SECT 3-9 355a-357a 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1 405a-b; SECT 14-15 415c-416a; SECT 27 418a-b; SECT 40 420b; SECT 86-88 429c-430b; SECT 101 432c-d; SECT 135-142 440a-441c passim 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 29 461a-d; SECT XII, DIV 117-123 504a-506a 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 27b-33d esp 29d-30c; 108a-d esp 108d [fn 1] / Critique of Practical Reason, 337a-c / The Critique of Judgement, 603b-d 49 Darwin: The Origin of Species, 96c 53 James: Psychology, 125a-126a; 400a-405a; 460a-471a esp 469a-b; 508a; 544a-545b; 589b-625a esp 589b-590a, 593a-595a, 606b-610b, 625a 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 383b-c

4d(1) The erroneous interpretation of sense-data: the problem of judgments based on sensation

7 Plato: Republic, BK X, 431c-d / Theaetetus, 538d-541a 8 Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 3 [318b19-31] 415c-d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 5 [1009b1-17] 528d-529a; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b34-1063a9] 591a-b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a14-18] 648d-649a; BK III, CH 1 [425a30-b3] 657c; CH 3 [428b18-24] 661a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442a4-9] 680a-b 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [324-468] 48c-50b; [1149-1170] 59a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A 2 102a-d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 50b-52d 30 Bacon: The Advancement of Learning, 58b 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 22c-23a / Meditations, III, 83d-84a / Objections and Replies, 229d-230d 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX, SECT 19-26 247a-248b 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 117, 504b-c 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 108a-d 44 Boswell: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 13c-d 53 James: Psychology, 111a; 460a-469a esp 462b-463b, 468b-469a; 508a; 568b-570a; 589b-595a esp 589b-590a, 593a-595a; 617a-625a esp 618b-620a

4d(2) Error in sense-perception: illusions and hallucinations

7 Plato: Theaetetus, 520c-522b 8 Aristotle: On Dreams 702a-706d 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 2 [648b15-18] 173a 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [324-336] 48c; [722-748] 53d-54a 14 Plutarch: The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, Marcus Brutus, 816d-817c 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, TR VIII 64c-65c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A 2, ANS 102a-d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c; Q 111, A 4, ANS 571b-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50d-52b; PART III, 172b-d; 174b; 189d-190a; PART IV, 249d; 258b-d; 261a 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 50b-52d 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 50 111b / New Atlantis, 213d 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 22c-23a / Meditations, I, 75c-d; VI, 101d-102d 34 Newton: Optics, BK I, 384b-385b; 434a-435a; 443a 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIX, SECT 3 234b-c 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 14, 415d 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b 44 Boswell: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 13c-d 53 James: Psychology, 132a-139a; 248b-249b; 264b-269a; 462b-469a esp 462b-465a, 468a-469a; 475a-477b; 508a-520a esp 508a; 521a-522a; 527a-538b; 545a-b; 565a-b; 601a-606a; 610b-625a; 662a-663a [fn 1]; 747b [fn 3]; 780a-785a; 786a-787b [fn 1]; 842b-847b 54 Freud: The Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 3a-d / Hysteria, 31b-38d passim, esp 31b-d, 36b-d; 102a-106c esp 104d-105d / The Interpretation of Dreams, 148d-149a; 149d-150d; 337a-d; 353d-356b esp 354c-355b, 356a-b / A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 472a-c / The Ego and the Id, 700c

5. The contribution of the senses to scientific or philosophical knowledge

7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228a-230c / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 455b-c / Theaetetus, 534d-536b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 30 [46a18-28] 64a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 13 [78b31-79a16] 108b-c; CH 18 111b-c; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b; CH 8 [191b24-34] 267a-b / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 7 [306a6-18] 397b-c / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a20-982a1] 499a-500b; BK XI, CH 7 [1064a4-9] 592b / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b11-403a2] 631d-632a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [436b13-17] 673c-674a 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK III, CH 4 [666a7-10] 193d / Generation of Animals, BK III, CH 10 [760b28-32] 301d-302a / Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [1104a14-15] 349c 10 Hippocrates: On Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 1a-3b / Aphorisms, SECT I, par 1 131a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 9, ANS 8d-9c; Q 84, AA 6-8 447c-451b; Q 87, A 1, ANS 465a-466c; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478b; Q 91, A 3, REP 1-3 486b-487d; Q 96, A 1, REP 3 510b-511b; PART I-II, Q 3, A 3, ANS 624b-625a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; PART II-II, Q 9, A 4 766b-767b; Q 12, A 3, REP 2 778b-779a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 54b-c; 60a-b; PART II, 129a; PART IV, 267a-b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 260c-261c; 285c-288a; 291b-292d 28 Gilbert: On the Loadstone, PREF, 1a-b; BK I, 6a-7a; BK II, 27b-c 28 Galileo: Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131a-138b passim 28 Harvey: On the Motion of the Heart and Blood, 267b,d-268d; 280c / On the Circulation of the Blood, 322d-323d; 324c-d / On the Generation of Animals, 331b-335c; 411c-d 30 Bacon: The Advancement of Learning, 5b-c; 16a; 34b; 44c; 50c-51d; 57b-d / Novum Organum 105a-195d esp BK I, APH 64 114b, APH 95-103 126b-128a, BK II, APH 38-43 169c-175c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, I, 2d-3a; VII, 10c-12a; XII, 22c-23a; 24a-b; XIV, 28d-33b / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b; PART VI, 61d-62c / Meditations, I, 75b-76c; VI, 97a-103d / Objections and Replies, 128d-129a; 215b-c; 217c-d; 229d-230d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b 34 Newton: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULE III-IV 270b-271b / Optics, BK III, 543a-b 34 Huygens: Treatise on Light, CH I, 553a 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 24 127b-c; CH XXIII, SECT 3 204c-d; SECT 6-7 205b-206a; SECT 28-29 211b-212a; SECT 32-37 212c-214b; BK III, CH XI, SECT 21-23 304d-305b; BK IV, CH III, SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 16 317a-c; SECT 25-29 321a-323a passim; CH VI, SECT 13 335c-d; CH XII, SECT 9-13 360d-362d; CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 30 418c; SECT 58-59 424a-b; SECT 104 433a-b; SECT 107 433d-434a 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20-SECT V, DIV 38 458a-466c passim; SECT VII, DIV 48, 471b-c; DIV 60 477a-c; SECT VIII, DIV 65, 479b-c; SECT XII, DIV 111-113 501b-502d esp DIV 112 501c-502a 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 5a-13d; 14a-c; 15c-16c; 31b-d; 46a-b; 58a-b; 66d-67b; 68a-69c; 85a-b; 86d-87b; 94b-95a; 211c-218d / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-254d esp 253a-c, 254b-c; 263b-c; 273a-b / Critique of Practical Reason, 295b-d; 312c-d; 329d-330c; 331a-332d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445b-447a passim; 475b,d [fn 1] 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1c-2b; 6d-7a,c; PART III, 87b-c 45 Faraday: Experimental Researches in Electricity, 774d 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3, 10a-11a / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-190b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 684a 53 James: Psychology, 385a-b; 647b-648b; 677b; 851a-884b esp 860b-861a, 862a-865a, 867a, 884b 54 Freud: On Narcissism, 400d-401a / Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 412a-b / A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 545b-d / The Ego and the Id, 701d / New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 815a; 879c

5a. Sensation as the source or occasion of ideas: the role of memory or reminiscence; the construction of complex ideas; the abstraction of universal concepts

7 Plato: Phaedo, 228a-230d / Republic, BK VII, 392b-393b / Timaeus, 455a-c / Theaetetus, 538d-541a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a20-981a13] 499a-c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a2-15] 632a-b; BK III, CH 7 [431a14]-CH 8 [432a14] 663d-664d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [449b30-450a25] 690c-691a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 55, A 2, REP 2 289d-290d; Q 75, A 2, REP 3 379c-380c; A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; Q 79, AA 3-5 416a-419b; Q 84, A 2, REP 1 442b-443c; A 6 447c-449a; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, REP 2 619d-620d; Q 29, A 6, ANS 748b-749a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 12, A 2, ANS 777b-778b 21 Dante: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a; 52b-c; 54a-c; PART IV, 262a-b 28 Gilbert: On the Loadstone, BK V, 105c 28 Harvey: On the Circulation of the Blood, 305a / On the Generation of Animals, 332a-335c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, VII, 13a; 14b; XII, 18b-c / Discourse on the Method, PART I, 47c-d; PART IV, 53b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15 98d-99a; BK II, CH I-II 121a-129b esp CH I, SECT 1-8 121a-123a, SECT 20-25 126d-127d, CH II, SECT 2 128a-b; CH VII, SECT 10 133a-b; CH IX, SECT 15 141a; CH XI, SECT 4-9 144d-145c; CH XI, SECT 15-CH XII, SECT 2 146d-147d; CH XII, SECT 8 148c-d; CH XIII, SECT 2 149a; SECT 4-6 149b-d; SECT 27 154c-d; CH XIV, SECT 27 160d-161a; SECT 30-31 161c-162a; CH XVI, SECT 1-2 165c-d; SECT 5 166b-c; CH XVII, SECT 3 168b; SECT 5 168d-169a; CH XVIII, SECT 22-CH XIX, SECT 1 173d-174a; CH XIX, SECT 6 174c-d; CH XXII, SECT 2 201a-b; SECT 9 202c-203a; CH XXIII, SECT 1 204a-b; SECT 3 204c-d; SECT 9 206b-c; SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 29 211d-212a; SECT 32-37 212c-214b; CH XXV, SECT 9 216d; SECT 11 217a; CH XXX, SECT 3 238c-d; CH XXXII, SECT 6-8 244b-d; SECT 12 245b-c; BK III, CH I, SECT 5 252b-c; CH II, SECT 3 253c; CH III, SECT 6-9 255c-256c; CH IV, SECT 12-14 262b-263a; CH VI, SECT 9 270d-271a; SECT 28-47 276a-282b esp SECT 46-47 281d-282b; CH XI, SECT 21-23 304d-305b; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 11-12 326b-d 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 6-16 405d-409d passim; SECT 1 413a-b 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II 455b-457b esp DIV 13-14 455d-456b; SECT VII, DIV 49 471c-d 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 45b-46a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 281c-282c 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1c-2a 53 James: Psychology, 171b-175a; 302b; 327a-331b; 405b-407a; 455a-b; 480a-484a; 540a-635a esp 547a-550b, 551b-552a, 561a-b, 584a-b, 593a-595a, 626a-628a, 630b-631a, 632b-635a; 787a 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 353d-354a; 367c / The Unconscious, 442b-443d / The Ego and the Id, 700a-701d

5b. Sense-experience as the origin of inductions

8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 30 [46a18-28] 64a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 18 111b-c; BK II, CH 2 [90a24-30] 123b-c; CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK I, CH 8 [191b24-34] 267a-b / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 499a-500b / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b11-403a2] 631d-632a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098a34-b8] 343d-344a; BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-31] 391b-c; CH 11 [1143a25-b5] 392d-393a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 1, ANS 12b-13c 28 Harvey: On the Motion of the Heart and Blood, 273c-d / On the Circulation of the Blood, 322d-323d; 324c-d / On the Generation of Animals, 332a-335c esp 334c-d; 473a 30 Bacon: The Advancement of Learning, 16a; 34b; 43d-44c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 11-17 107d-108a; APH 19 108b; APH 22 108c; BK II, APH 38-43 169c-175c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, VII, 10c-12a; XIV, 28a-b / Discourse on the Method, PART VI, 61d-62c / Objections and Replies, 167c-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1-2 387b-388b 34 Newton: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULE III-IV 270b-271b 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 107 433d-434a 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 19, 458a 38 Rousseau: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 341c-342b 45 Faraday: Experimental Researches in Electricity, 659a 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of History, PART IV, 361a-b 53 James: Psychology, 862a-865a 54 Freud: Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 412a

5c. The dependence of understanding or reason upon sense for knowledge of particulars: verification by appeal to the senses

7 Plato: Republic, BK IX, 421a-422b 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK I, CH 8 [191b24-34] 267a-b; BK VIII, CH 3 [247b1-7] 330b / On the Heavens, BK I, CH 3 [270b1-13] 361c-d; BK III, CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b11-403a2] 631d-632a; BK III, CH 8 [432a2-9] 664c 9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, CH 1 [698a10-15] 233a / Generation of Animals, BK III, CH 10 [760b28-32] 301d-302a / Ethics, BK III, CH 7 [1107a27-32] 352d-353a; CH 9 [1109b20-23] 355c; BK X, CH 1 [1172a34-b9] 426b; CH 8 [1179a17-22] 433d-434a / Politics, BK VII, CH 1 [1323a33-b7] 527b 10 Galen: On the Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 2, 199d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK I [418-448] 6b-c; [690-704] 9c; BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK VIII, CH 7 269c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 11 84c-85c; Q 32, A 1, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 84, AA 7-8 449b-451b; Q 86, A 1 461c-462a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 85d; PART III, 165a; PART IV, 249b-250a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 260c-261c; 285c-286a; 287b; 291b-292d 28 Galileo: Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 200a-b 28 Harvey: On the Motion of the Heart and Blood, 268d; 273c; 286b-c; 295d-296a / On the Circulation of the Blood, 322d-323d; 324c-d / On the Generation of Animals, 331b-335c; 357b 30 Bacon: The Advancement of Learning, 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 50 111b; APH 70 116b-117a; BK II 137a-195d passim 31 Descartes: Discourse on the Method, PART VI, 61d-62c; 66a-b / Meditations, I 75a-77c / Objections and Replies, 229d-230d 34 Newton: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULE III-IV 270b-271b 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IV, SECT 6 131a; BK IV, CH XII, SECT 13 362c-d 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT X, DIV 86 488d-489b; SECT XI, DIV 110 501a-b; SECT XII, DIV 132 509a-d 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 85d-93c; 114d-115a; 146a-149d; 153a-c; 231b-c / Critique of Practical Reason, 337a-c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 461c-d; 463c-d 44 Boswell: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 129a 45 Faraday: Experimental Researches in Electricity, 774d-775a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 684a 53 James: Psychology, 307a; 456a; 647b-648b esp 648b [fn 1]; 655a; 863a-865a; 881a-b 54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 819d-820a; 879c

6. The role of sense in the perception of beauty: the beautiful and the pleasing to sense; sensible and intelligible beauty

7 Plato: Symposium, 167a-d / Republic, BK V, 370d-373c; BK VI, 385c-386c / Theaetetus, 513a-b; 535c 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [645a4-26] 168d-169a / Ethics, BK III, CH 10 [1118a1-b7] 364c-365a; BK X, CH 4 [1174b15-1175a3] 429a-b; CH 5 429d-430d / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 [1405b17-20] 656a / Poetics, CH 7 [1450b34-1451a6] 685b-c 12 Epictetus: The Discourses, BK IV, CH 11 240d-242d 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR VI 21a-26a / Fifth Ennead, TR VIII 239b-246c / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 30-34 336b-338d 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 38 81a / City of God, BK VII, CH 7 269c-d; BK XXII, CH 19, 605b / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 4 625b-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4, REP 1 25d-26c; Q 91, A 3, REP 3 486b-487d; PART I-II, Q 27, A 1, REP 3 737b-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 180, A 2, REP 3 608c-609c; PART III, SUPPL, Q 82, A 1, REP 5 968a-970c; Q 91, AA 3-4 1020d-1023d 21 Dante: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXX [19-36] 152a 27 Shakespeare: Sonnets, LIV 594c; LXIX 596d; XCII-XCV 600b-d 28 Galileo: Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 175a-176c 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 381d-382a 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23d [fn 1] / The Critique of Judgement, 476a-479d; 482b-483d; 492b-495a,c; 501b-502d; 506a-511a esp 508b-c; 537a-539d 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of History, PART I, 220b-c; PART II, 266a-267a; PART III, 304a; PART IV, 346d-347a 47 Goethe: Faust, PART II [11288-303] 274b-275a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 307b-308b 49 Darwin: The Origin of Species, 95a-d esp 95d / The Descent of Man, 301c-302a; 451b; 568d-569b; 577b; 595d-596a 52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK III, 53c-54b 53 James: Psychology, 157a; 755a-758a esp 755b 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 775b-c

CROSS-REFERENCES

• For: Discussions relevant to the controversy over the distinction between sense and reason or intellect, and the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, see BEING 7c, 8a-8b; EXPERIENCE 4a; IDEA 1b-1c, 2c-2g; KNOWLEDGE 6a(1), 6a(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1a, 5b, 6c(1), 6d; MIND 1a, 1d, 1g; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4d; and for the related issue concerning the difference between animal and human faculties, see ANIMAL 1c(2); EVOLUTION 7b(3); MAN 1a-1c; SOUL 2c(2)—2c(3).
• For: The intuitive character of sense-perception as contrasted with the discursive nature of judgment and reasoning, see INDUCTION 1a; KNOWLEDGE 6b(4), 6c(1); PRINCIPLE 2b(1); REASONING 1b; and for the theory of space and time as transcendental forms of intuition, see FORM 1c; MATHEMATICS 1c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); MIND 1e(1), 4d(3); SPACE 4a; TIME 6c.
• For: The differentiation of plant, animal, and human life with respect to sensitivity, see ANIMAL 1a(1), 1b, 1c(1); LIFE AND DEATH 3a-3b; MAN 4b; SOUL 2c(1)−2c(2).
• For: The discussion of the nervous system, see ANIMAL 5.
• For: The theory of memory and imagination as interior powers of sense and as dependent on the exterior senses, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1a, 1c; and for another consideration of the estimative power, see HABIT 3b.
• For: The pleasantness and unpleasantness of sensations, see PLEASURE AND PAIN 4b, 4e; and for the variation of sense-qualities in degree or intensity, see QUALITY 3c; SAME AND OTHER 3c.
• For: The distinction between proper and common sensibles, or between primary and secondary qualities, see QUALITY 2b; and for the issue concerning the objectivity or subjectivity of these qualities, see QUALITY 6c.
• For: The distinction between sensation and perception, and the problem of our sensitive knowledge of substances as opposed to qualities, see BEING 8c; IDEA 2f; KNOWLEDGE 6b(1); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1d; PRINCIPLE 2a(1); and for the doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception, see MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); ONE AND MANY 4b.
• For: The relation of sense to emotion and will, and for the distinction between the sensitive and the rational appetite, see DESIRE 3b(1); EMOTION 1; GOOD AND EVIL 4a; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1d; WILL 2b(2).
• For: The comparison of sensitive with other forms of knowledge, see KNOWLEDGE 6b(1)-6b(3); and for the problem of truth and falsity in sensation and sense-perception, see MEMORY AND IMAGATION 2e(4), 5c; PRINCIPLE 2b(1); TRUTH 3a(1)−3a(2).
• For: The contribution of sense to thought, and for the role of sense in theories of reminiscence, induction, and abstraction, see EXPERIENCE 3b, 4b; IDEA 2b, 2f-2g; INDUCTION 2; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3a, 3c, 6c-6d; MIND 1a(2); REASONING 1c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c.
• For: The role of sense in the perception of beauty, see BEAUTY 4-5; PLEASURE AND PAIN 4c(1).

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

Augustine. Answer to Skeptics Aquinas. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Anima, A 13 Descartes. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 45-46, 48, 66-70; PART II, 3; PART IV, 189-198 Hobbes. Concerning Body, PART IV, CH 25, 29 Berkeley. An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision —. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK I, PART III, SECT V-VII Kant. De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation) Hegel. The Phenomenology of Mind, I-II W. James. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 4-6

II.

Theophrastus. On the Senses Epicurus. Letter to Herodotus Cicero. Academics Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism Albertus Magnus. De Sensu et Sensato R. Bacon. Opus Majus, PART V John of St. Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART IV, QQ 4-8 Malebranche. De la recherche de la vérité, BK I, CH 5-9, 10 (2, 4-6), 12-15, 17-20 —. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, IV-V Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH 2-9 —. Monadology, par 10-18 Condillac. Treatise on the Sensations Voltaire. “Sensation,” in A Philosophical Dictionary T. Reid. An Inquiry into the Human Mind —. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, II Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, VOL II, SUP, CH 1-4 Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, VOL I, pp 417-548; VOL II, pp 90-152 J. Mill. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, CH 1 W. Hamilton. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL II (21-28) Bain. The Senses and the Intellect Fechner. Elemente der Psychophysik Whewell. On the Philosophy of Discovery, CH 19-21 Helmholtz. Treatise on Physiological Optics —. On the Sensation of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music —. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, VI Herschel. Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects, IX E. Hartmann. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (B) VI Lotze. Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 Galton. Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (Sensitivity, Sequence of Test Weights, Whistles for Audibility of Shrill Notes, Appendices C, D, E) Mach. The Analysis of Sensations Bradley. Appearance and Reality, BK I, CH 1, 5 Bergson. Matter and Memory, CH 4 Wundt. Principles of Physiological Psychology, PART II —. Outlines of Psychology, (6, 8-11) Woodworth. Psychological Issues, CH 5 McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, CH 35 Moore. Philosophical Studies, CH 2, 5, 7 Broad. Perception, Physics, and Reality, CH 4 —. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, CH 4 —. Scientific Thought, PART II Parsons. An Introduction to the Theory of Perception B. Russell. Our Knowledge of the External World, III-IV —. Mysticism and Logic, CH 8 —. The Analysis of Mind, LECT VII-VIII —. The Analysis of Matter, CH 15-26 Adrian. The Basis of Sensation Köhler. Gestalt Psychology, CH 5 Whitehead. Process and Reality, PART II Koffka. Principles of Gestalt-Psychology Lovejoy. The Revolt Against Dualism Straus. Vom Sinn der Sinne Powys. In Defence of Sensuality Blanshard. The Nature of Thought, CH 1-6 Dewey. “Appearing and Appearance,” “A Naturalistic Theory of Sense Perception,” “Perception and Organic Action,” in Philosophy and Civilization Price. Perception Boring. The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness, CH 2-8 Hartshorne. The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation