Chapter 78: RELATION

INTRODUCTION

LIKE quantity and quality, relation is generally recognized as a basic term or category. But its meaning, like theirs, cannot be defined. Relation is, perhaps, the prototype of an indefinable notion. As Bertrand Russell points out, it seems to be impossible to make any statement of what relation is without using the notion of relation in doing so.

Any term which is essentially relative seems also to be incapable of definition. Its meaning cannot be stated without referring to its correlative; and since the meaning of the latter reciprocally involves the former as its correlative, each member of a pair of correlative terms draws upon the other for its meaning. A part is a part of a whole; a whole, a whole of parts. Similarly, the meaning of parent involves the notion of child and the meaning of child the notion of parent.

Plato applies this maddening fact about correlative terms to all comparatives which presuppose the correlation of more and less. “Comparatives such as the hotter and the colder,” he writes, “are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.” They cannot be measured or defined. Terms like ‘much’ and ‘little,’ ‘great’ and ‘small’ look like quantities, but, according to Aristotle, they are “not quantities, but relatives, for things are not great or small absolutely; they are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison.”

Concerning quantities and qualities, the ancients ask how they exist. The alternatives seem to be either that they exist in and of themselves, or that they exist as the attributes of substances such as stones and trees. But with regard to relations, the question seems to be whether they exist rather than how they exist.

The supposition that a relation cannot exist apart from the terms it relates may be thought to imply that the relation does exist when the terms it relates exist. The ancients, however, do not appear to regard the relation as something having a reality distinguishable from the reality of the correlative terms. It seems to be significant that both Plato and Aristotle discuss relative terms, rather than relations as such. For the most part, they signify relations by using a pair of words which name things standing in a certain relation to one another.

Thus in the Categories, Aristotle refers to ‘double’ and ‘half,’ ‘master’ and ‘slave,’ ‘greater’ and ‘less,’ or ‘knowledge’ and ‘object known’ as examples of correlative terms. “All relatives,” he says, “have a correlative.” Sometimes it is necessary to find the precise word, or even to invent the right word, for in order to indicate that a given term is relative, its correlative must be appropriately named. “Concubine,” says Locke, “is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife; but in languages where this, and like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relations which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist but together.”

When “reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist,” Aristotle suggests that it may be the result of our failure to use words carefully. If we wish to use the term ‘rudder’ as relative, we cannot call its correlative a ‘boat,’ for “there are boats which have no rudders.” Since there is no existing word, it would be “more accurate,” Aristotle thinks, “if we coined some word like ‘ruddered’ to name the correlative of ‘rudder.’” Similarly, in the case of ‘slave’ as a relative term, its correlative is not ‘man’ understood in any sense, but only man understood as ‘master.’

The things which are designated by a pair of reciprocally relative terms must, according to Aristotle, coexist. One man cannot be called a master unless another man exists who can be called his slave; something cannot be called larger unless something coexistent with it can be called smaller. Aristotle considers possible exceptions to this principle of the simultaneity or coexistence of correlatives; as, for example, in the case of knowledge and the knowable. It seems possible, he thinks, for the knowable to exist before anyone has actual knowledge of it. But the exception may be due to an improper naming of the correlatives. If the correlative of knowledge is the known rather than the knowable, then knowledge and its object may be said to be necessarily coexistent, for nothing comes to be an object actually known, except simultaneously with someone’s coming actually to know it.

THE COEXISTENCE OF things which are correlative to one another still leaves a question concerning the existence of the relation between them. When conceived as an attribute, a quality or a quantity can be said to exist in the thing it somehow modifies. In the language of Aristotle, such accidents inhere in substances, and accordingly have reality as long as the substances in which they inhere exist. But a relation does not seem to inhere in a substance. It cannot be the attribute of a single thing. It somehow lies between two things, inhering in neither, for if it belonged to either one alone it could have some reality if that one existed and the other did not. The question, therefore, is whether relations really exist at all, or are only in the mind of him who compares things or considers them relative to one another.

“A sign that the relative is least of all a substance and a real thing,” writes Aristotle, “is the fact that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or movement; as in respect of quantity there is increase and diminution, in respect of quality alteration, in respect of place locomotion, in respect of substance simple generation and destruction. In respect to relation there is no proper change; for, without changing, a thing will be now greater and now less or equal, if that with which it is compared has changed in quantity.”

Plotinus also questions the reality of relations. “Has relation—for example, that of right and left, double and half—any actuality? … What can be the meaning of correlatives apart from our conception of their juxtaposition? ‘Greater’ may refer to very different magnitudes; ‘different’ to all sorts of objects. The comparison is ours; it does not lie in the things themselves.” In the case of certain space and time relations he maintains that “right and left are in our conception, nothing of them in the things themselves. Before and after are merely two things; the relation is again of our making.”

Yet Plotinus seems unwilling to say that “we do not mean anything by relation, but are victims of words,” or that “none of the relations mentioned can exist.” Recognizing what he calls “the elusive character of relation,” he is willing to affirm the reality of relations “when the actuality of the relationships is derived from no other source than relation itself.” He thinks that one quantity may be the double of another, “quite apart from our speech or thought.” The fact that one quantity is the double of another is an additional fact about the two quantities over and above all their other properties. “In all the conditions in which we assert relation,” Plotinus declares, “the mutual relation exists over and above the objects; we perceive it as already existent; our knowledge is directed upon a thing, there to be known—a clear testimony to the reality of relation.”

The problem thus seems to become one of distinguishing between relations which have independent reality and those which exist only in the mind. “Some have said that relation is not a reality but only an idea. But this,” Aquinas declares, “is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual order and relation.” Not all relations are real, however. “Relations which result in the things understood from the operation of the intellect alone are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two understood things.” For example, “the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation,” for “reason, by apprehending one thing twice, regards it as two; and thus it apprehends a certain relation of a thing to itself … The same is true of those relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.”

Aquinas offers, in contrast, “other relations which are realities with regard to both extremes; as when a relation exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both. This is clear of all relations consequent upon quantity, great and small, double and half, and the like; for there is quantity in both extremes.”

This distinction between real and logical relations seems to be qualified by the intermediate case of a relation which is partly logical and partly real; for, according to Aquinas, “sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme, it is only an idea. This happens whenever the two extremes are not of one order … Since God is outside the whole order of creation and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are related to Him.”

In the Charmides, Socrates raises some doubts about the admissibility of reflexive relations, or the relations of things to themselves. Others have questioned the partly real and partly logical relation, according to which one thing is related to another but the second is not related to the first. But the more important issues, in the tradition of western thought, seem to be whether there are both real and logical relations, i.e., relations both in nature and in the mind, and whether, in either case, relations enter into the very nature of the things related or are merely external, so that the character of a thing is unaffected by the relations in which it stands.

AS INDICATED IN THE chapters on JUDGMENT, REASONING, and LOGIC, relation tends to displace predication in certain typically modern theories of the proposition and of inference. What is currently called “relational logic” is set against “subject-predicate logic.” Relations themselves, without regard to the character of the terms related, become the primary object of logical analysis. It is said, for example, that the proposition ‘John hit James’ has the form ‘aRb’ or ‘R(a,b),’ and that the proposition ‘John went to school with James’ has the form ‘R(a,b,c).’ The first is a dyadic relation, the second a triadic relation.

Relations are classified not only with respect to the number of the terms they relate, but also with respect to such formal properties as symmetry, transitivity, reflexivity. The relation of parent and child, for example, is asymmetrical. It cannot be said, if A is the parent of B, that B is also the parent of A; whereas the relation of brotherhood is symmetrical. Statements of symmetrical relationship are convertible. If we say that A is the brother of B, we can also say that B is the brother of A.

The type of relationship remains the same regardless of the character of the terms. Unequal quantities are asymmetrically related, equal quantities symmetrically; ‘to-the-right-of’ is an asymmetrical spatial relation, ‘next-to’ is symmetrical; in time, ‘simultaneous-with’ is symmetrical and ‘prior-to’ asymmetrical. The distinction between transitive and intransitive relations similarly holds for all kinds of terms. The relation of father to son or of ‘standing-next-to’ in space is intransitive, for if A is the father of B, and B the father of C, A is not the father of C; whereas the spatial relation of ‘standing-to-the-right-of’ is transitive, for if A is to the right of B, and B to the right of C, then A is to the right of C.

The modern analysis of propositions as relational structures which differ in type according to the character of the relations, not the character of the terms, has an antecedent in Locke’s analysis of judgments as acts of comparison which look to the relation between ideas rather than to the ideas themselves. Both analyses lead to a theory of inference which is based on the convertibility of symmetrical relations and on the transitivity of certain relationships and the intransitivity of others. As indicated in the chapter on REASONING, the factor of transitivity appears in William James’ discussion of the “principle of mediate comparison.” He states this in the formula “‘more than the more is more than the less.” Then he explains that “such a formula would cover all possible cases; as, earlier than early is earlier than late, worse than bad is worse than good, east of east is east of west; etc., etc., ad libitum. Symbolically, we might write it as a < b < c < d… and say that any number of intermediaries may be expunged without obliging us to alter anything in what remains written.”

James thus formulates what he regards as the most fundamental law of thought. For series of “homogeneously related terms,” the law is that “skipping intermediary terms leaves the relations the same.” The factor of transitivity enters the picture when James distinguishes between relations which are and relations which are not transferable. “All skipping of intermediaries and transfer of relations occurs within homogeneous series,” he writes. “But not all homogeneous series allow of intermediaries being skipped. It depends on which series they are, on what relations they contain. Let it not be said that it is a mere matter of verbal association, due to the fact that language sometimes permits us to transfer the name of a relation over skipped intermediaries, and sometimes does not; as where we call men ‘progenitors’ of their remote as well as of their immediate posterity, but refuse to call them ‘fathers’ thereof. There are relations which are intrinsically transferable, whilst others are not. The relation of condition, e.g., is intrinsically transferable. What conditions a condition conditions what it conditions—‘cause of cause is cause of effect.’ The relations of negation and frustration, on the other hand, are not transferable: what frustrates a frustration does not frustrate what it frustrates. No changes in terminology would annul the intimate difference between these two cases.”

THE FOREGOING PASSAGES from James reflect the general tenor of the theory of the calculus of relations. He himself does not systematically expound it. Its elaboration is to be found in the writings of Boole, Couturat, and De Morgan, of Jevons, Pierce, Bradley, Royce, Russell and Whitehead (whose works are cited in the Additional Readings). Is this relational logic more general than the subject-predicate logic that is traditionally called “Aristotelian,” or is the reverse the case?

The modern answer insists upon the greater generality of relational logic. Royce, for example, defining “subsumption” as a non-symmetrical, transitive relation which obtains between two classes when one includes the other, declares that “the entire traditional ‘theory of the syllogism’ can be expressed as a sort of comment upon, and relatively simple application of, the transitivity of the subsumption relation.” According to Royce, William James’ axiom of skipped intermediaries represents a step in the right direction, but it fails to achieve complete generality.

Russell disposes of the traditional theory of the proposition in the same fashion that Royce disposes of the traditional theory of the syllogism. Traditional logic, he writes, “believed that there was only one form of simple proposition (i.e., of proposition not stating a relation between two or more other propositions), namely, the form which ascribes a predicate to a subject.” It is, therefore, “unable to admit the reality of relations; all relations, it maintains, must be reduced to properties of the apparently related terms.” Russell insists, on the contrary, that “propositions stating that two things have a certain relation have a different form from subject-predicate propositions.” This can be most easily seen, he thinks, in the case of asymmetrical relations. The proposition which states that A and B are related by the symmetrical relation of equality, can be interpreted to mean that A and B both possess a common property. “But when we come to asymmetrical relations, such as before and after, greater and less, etc., the attempt to reduce them to properties becomes,” in Russell’s opinion, “obviously impossible.” The relational theory of the proposition, therefore, includes the subject-predicate theory as a special case.

A defense of the subject-predicate logic would not make the counterclaim that relational logic can be treated as a special case. Rather it would insist that the two logics are radically different in principle—that the one belongs to a philosophy of nature and a metaphysics, in which substance is the primary concept; whereas the other belongs to the empirical sciences and to modern mathematics, in which the concept of relation supplants substance. Whichever side of the controversy is taken, the undeniable difference between a relational and a subject-predicate logic represents one of the great differences between modern and ancient thought.

It is not only in logic that the modern emphasis seems to be upon relations rather than upon things related—on relations denuded of their terms rather than on terms treated as correlatives. The same tendency appears in modern mathematics, in algebra, in the calculus, and especially in the theory of equations and functions, of sets and series. It also appears in modern physics where, according to Cassirer, the great conceptual revolution consists in displacing substance by function, and the causal interaction of substances by functional relationships and systems of order. Such substitutions obviously parallel the shift in logic—from the consideration of terms related as subjects and predicates, to the consideration of relations without regard to differences in the terms related.

In the tradition of the great books, this conceptual revolution seems to be announced by the treatment which Hume and Kant accord to the notion of substance. Hume appears to conceive of experience as a series of events related, as he says, by “only three principles of connexion … namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.” These relations make up the fabric of experience. So long as it consisted in such connections, our experience would be the same whether or not there were enduring things or substances.

“Nature has established connexions among particular ideas,” Hume writes, so that “no sooner does one idea occur to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative.” All our knowledge of matters of fact depends upon the association of ideas, or the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation among the elements of experience. All other knowledge has for its object those relations between ideas which do not connect them causally or place them in a spatial or temporal order. In either case, relations of all sorts, rather than things and their properties (or substances and their attributes), seem to be the prime constituents of nature and of knowledge.

Kant presents a fourfold classification of judgments according to their quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Under the head of relation, he distinguishes the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive according to the following criteria: “a. Relation of the predicate to the subject. b. Relation of the cause to its effect. c. Relation of subdivided knowledge, and of the collected members of the subdivision to each other.” These are, he writes, “all the relations of thought in judgements.”

Pointing out that he borrows the term from Aristotle, Kant calls the pure concepts of the understanding “categories” and constructs a table of categories which runs parallel to his table of judgments; because, as he explains, “the same function which imparts unity to various representations in one judgement imparts unity likewise to the mere synthesis of various representations in one intuition, which in a general way may be called the pure concept of understanding.” Kant’s categories, in contrast to Aristotle’s, afford a striking example of the shift from substance to relation.

Where for Aristotle substance is the primary category and all other categories signify the accidents of substance, among which relation seems to have least reality in the nature of things, Kant makes relation one of the four major groups of categories, and under relation places subsistence and inherence (or substance and accident) along with causality and dependence (or cause and effect) and community (or reciprocity between the active and the passive). It is not substance, but the relation of substance and accident, which is for Kant a transcendental category.

THE ISSUE CONCERNING substance and relation takes another form in the problem whether relations exist in the very nature of things, as belonging to their essence, or only exist as connections between things. In the latter alternative, there is still the question whether relations between things are externally affixed to them or are internally inherent in them and affect the natures of the things related.

According to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, there are real relations in God, each really distinct from the others, yet each identical with the divine essence. These relations are the persons of the Trinity—the relations Aquinas calls “paternity, filiation, spiration and procession,” the relation of the Father and the Son, and of the Holy Spirit to them both. “Relation in God,” he writes, “is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence is subsistent. Therefore, as the Godhead is God, so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore, a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting.”

Since the three persons of the Trinity are of the same essence, the principle of their real distinction must be found elsewhere. Denying that “there can be discerned between them a real distinction in respect of the divine essence,” Descartes does not reject the possibility of a distinction “in respect of their relation to one another.” Aquinas considers “two principles of difference among the divine persons… origin and relation,” but thinks it is “better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished by relations rather than by origin”; for, among other reasons, “when a relation is an accident, it presupposes the distinction of subjects; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about, distinction.”

It would seem to follow that, except in God, relations are not subsistent. In Aristotle’s theory of corporeal substances, for example, the matter and the form which constitute a physical thing are united, not related. Though matter and form are conceived as really distinct principles in the composition of a composite substance—as essence and existence are also sometimes said to be really distinct principles in the being of all things except God—their real distinction does not imply that they are subsistent, as are the persons of the Trinity, nor that they are relations, or in relation to one another. If real as opposed to logical relations occur only between things which somehow really subsist, then those principles which must be united in order for a thing to subsist cannot be really related to one another.

With a somewhat different analysis, Locke seems to exclude relations from the constitution of what he calls “the complex idea of substance.” All complex ideas, according to Locke, “are either modes, substances, or relations.” The complex idea of substance is a “collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we …. find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.”

The various simple ideas of qualities which, together with the indistinct notion of a supporting substratum, constitute the complex idea of a particular substance, are, in Locke’s theory, compounded, not related. Relation is itself a complex idea, consisting in “the consideration and comparing of one idea with another.” The ideas related may be either simple or complex, but the relations are between ideas, not in them—certainly not in simple ideas, nor in complex ideas of modes and substances, which are combinations, not relations, of simple ideas.

The exception is, of course, a complex idea of relation, which involves several distinct ideas and, in addition, the idea of a relation between them which, Locke says, “it gets from their comparison one with another. … Since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together … any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation”; but, Locke adds, “there must always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then ground or occasion for their comparison.”

Locke’s theory of relations not only seems to exclude them from the interior constitution of substances, but also seems to make them entirely extrinsic to the natures of the things related. “Ideas of relation,” Locke says, “may be the same in men who have far different ideas of the things that are related or that are thus compared.” The relation is unaffected by the things it relates, as they in turn are unaffected by it, for they are “not contained in the real existence of things, but [are] something extraneous and super-induced.”

Berkeley and Hume also seem to agree that relations are entirely external. “Relations are distinct from the ideas or things related,” writes Berkeley, “inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former.” To Hume, “all events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we can never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.” So far as our understanding goes, nothing in the nature of one event necessarily leads the mind to the consideration of another, as it would if the event could not be understood by us except as intrinsically related or connected with that other.

In the tradition of western thought, the issue concerning the internality or externality of relations has profound implications for man’s conception of the order of nature or the structure of the world. The difference, discussed in the chapter on CHANGE, between what William James calls the “block” and the “concatenated” universe presupposes not only different views of causality, but also different positions with respect to the internality or externality of relations, as is indicated by James’ criticism of Hegel and Bradley.

The relation of part and whole, and of one part to another in the structure of an organic whole, seems to be the prime example of internal relationship. Each part is thought to be constituted, both in its being and nature, by the being and nature of the whole to which it belongs and by the other parts which comprise that whole. This may be seen in Spinoza’s theory of God or Nature as the one and only substance, in and through which everything else both is and is conceived. All things are locked together in a system of internal relationships—the finite parts with one another through the infinite whole which determines each to be what it is, in itself and in relation to all others.

RELATION SEEMS TO BE the principle of order. At least it can be said that the various conceptions of order which appear in the great books involve the idea of relation and of different kinds of relationship.

The order of the universe or of nature, for example, seems to be differently conceived according as things are causally related to one another, related as lower and higher species in a hierarchy of grades of being, or as the parts of one all-embracing whole. In each case, it makes a difference, as we have already observed, whether the relations involved are thought to be real or logical, and internal or external to the things related.

Relation similarly enters into conceptions of psychological, political, and moral order—the order of the parts of the soul, the order of classes or functions in the state, the order of goods, of means and ends, of duties, of loves. Just as the status of each thing in nature is affected by whether the universe is conceived as a whole of internally related parts or as a set of externally related wholes, so the status of the individual in society is affected by whether the state is conceived as an organic whole or merely as a political order formed by the free association of individuals.

The consideration of the various types of order occurs in other chapters, such as NATURE, WORLD, SOUL, STATE, GOOD AND EVIL, and BEAUTY. Particular types of relationship are also discussed in chapters concerned with the terms between which such relationships hold—the relation of cause and effect in the chapter on CAUSE; spatial and temporal relationships in the chapters on SPACE and TIME; the relation of species and genus in the chapters on EVOLUTION and IDEA; relations of equality and inequality in the chapter on QUANTITY; and relations of similarity and dissimilarity in the chapter on QUALITY.

This last type of relationship, more broadly conceived as including not merely likeness in quality, but the sameness or similitude of things in every sort of respect, is the main consideration of the chapter on SAME AND OTHER. The theory of analogy is discussed there also, for though it is concerned with relation—a proportion being a ratio of ratios—the specific relationship by which relations are themselves related in analogies or proportions seems to be one of similitude (either identity or similarity).

Finally, the idea of relation seems to be involved in the contrast between the absolute and the relative. Things are said to be considered absolutely when they are considered in themselves, and relatively when they are considered with reference to something else. By extension of these meanings, relativism tends to assert that with regard to most things, if not all, what they are depends on the point of view, i.e., their relation to man, to this group of men, or even to this man. Absolutism goes to the opposite extreme of saying that things are what they are independently of man’s view of them. The opposition of these two tendencies creates familiar issues concerning the true, the good, and the beautiful, which are discussed in the chapters devoted to those subjects.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

The general theory of relation 1a. The nature and being of relations: the distinction between real and logical or ideal relations 1b. The effect of relations on the nature and being of things: internal and external relations 1c. The coexistence of correlatives 1d. Relational unity or identity of relation: the notion and use of analogy or proportionality
Order and relation in God: the divine processions and the relations constituting the Trinity of persons
The relation of God to the world: divine immanence and transcendence
Relation in the order of thought or knowledge 4a. The definability or indefinability of relative terms 4b. The proposition or judgment as a statement of relation: relation in reasoning 4c. The transcendental categories of relation 4d. Relations as objects of knowledge: ideas of relation 4e. The relations between ideas 4f. The types of relationship underlying the association of ideas in thought, memory, and dreams
Order as a system of relationships or related things 5a. The nature and types of order: inclusion and exclusion; succession and coexistence; priority, posteriority, and simultaneity (1) The order of the causes or of cause and effect (2) The order of goods or of means and ends: the order of loves (3) The order of quantities: the types of proportion (4) The order of kinds: hierarchy; species and genus 5b. The order of the universe or of nature: the hierarchy of beings 5c. Order as a principle of beauty
The absolute and the relative modes of consideration 6a. Absolute and relative with respect to space, time, motion 6b. Absolute and relative with respect to truth 6c. Absolute and relative with respect to goodness or beauty

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The general theory of relation

1a. The nature and being of relations: the distinction between real and logical or ideal relations

7 PLATO: Charmides, 8d-9d / Cratylus, 86d / Phaedo, 242c-245d / Republic, BK V, 372d-373b / Timaeus, 448b-449a / Parmenides, 489a-c / Sophist, 570a-574c / Statesman, 594a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7, 11a-13d / Physics, BK III, CH 1 [200b29-32] 278b; BK V, CH 2 [225b11-13] 305d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [990b9-17] 508d; BK V, CH 15, 542a-543a; BK XIV, CH 1 [1088a15-34] 620b-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096a17-29] 341b-c
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 6-9, 254d-257a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 2, REP 1, 28d-29c; Q 13, A 7, 68d-70d; Q 28, AA 1-2, 157c-160a; A 4, ANS and REP 1,3-4, 160c-161d; Q 40, A 2, REP 4, 214b-215b; Q 42, A 1, REP 4, 224b-225d; Q 45, A 3, REP 1-3, 244a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 1, ANS, 1b-2b; PART III, Q 2, A 7, REP 2, 718b-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, VI, 8c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXV, 214d-217a; CH XXX, SECT 4, 238d-239a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 11, 415a; SECT 89, 430c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-45b esp 42c, 43d-44c; 61a-64a esp 62d-63c; 72c-85d esp 72c-74b; 99a-108a,c / Practical Reason, 339a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156b-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 157b-159b esp 158b-159b; 458a-459b; 549a-550b; 863b [fn 2]; 865b-866a; 873a-b; 879b-886a passim, esp 880b-882a, 884b-885a; 889a-890a

1b. The effect of relations on the nature and being of things: internal and external relations

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 521d-522b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [8a12-24] 13a-d / Physics, BK V, CH 2 [225b11-13] 305d / Metaphysics, BK XI, CH 12 [1068a10-16] 596d-597a; BK XIV, CH 1 [1088a15-34] 620b-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 7, 68d-70d; Q 28, AA 1-2, 157c-160a; Q 30, A 1, REP 3, 167a-168a; Q 40, A 2, REP 3-4, 214b-215b; Q 44, A 1, REP 1, 238b-239a; Q 45, A 3, 244a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 7, REP 2, 718b-d; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 2, REP 2, 953b-955c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 5, 355d; PROP 2-3, 355d-356a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXV, SECT 4-5, 215c-d; BK IV, CH VI, SECT 11, 334b-335b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-101b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 74, 31d / Philosophy of History, PART I, 220c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 142a-b; 458a-459b; 550b-551b [fn 2]; 640b [fn 1]; 644b-645a; 660a-b; 669a

1c. The coexistence of correlatives

7 PLATO: Charmides, 8d-9d / Gorgias, 267c-268a / Republic, BK IV, 351b-352b / Theaetetus, 520a-b; 521b-522b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6b26-8a12] 11b-13a; CH 10 [11b23-33] 17a / Topics, BK V, CH 6 [135b17-26] 187b-c; BK VI, CH 4 [142a22-33] 195c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 19 [1392a3-4] 640a
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 4, 169a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 7, 255d-256a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 7, REP 6, 68d-70d; Q 40, A 2, REP 4, 214b-215b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXV, SECT 2, 215b-c; SECT 5, 215d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 83b-84d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 72, 31c; PAR 74, 31d

1d. Relational unity or identity of relation: the notion and use of analogy or proportionality

7 PLATO: Gorgias, 267c-268a / Timaeus, 448b-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 10 [76a36-b2] 105a; BK II, CH 14 [98a20-23] 134a; CH 17 [99a1-16] 135a-b / Topics, BK I, CH 17 [108a6-14] 152b; BK IV, CH 4 [124a15-20] 172d; BK V, CH 7 [136b33-137a20] 189a-c; CH 8 [138a23-27] 191b-c / Physics, BK I, CH 7 [191a8-12] 266d; BK VII, CH 4 [249a22-24] 332b / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 6 [333a27-34] 434a / Meteorology, BK IV, CH 9 [387b1-6] 491c / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 [1016b32-1017a3] 537c; CH 9 [1018a12-13] 538d; BK VII, CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c; BK IX, CH 1 [1046a4-8] 570d-571a; CH 6 [1048a31-b8] 573d-574a; BK XII, CH 4-5, 599d-601a passim / Soul, BK III, CH 7 [431a20-b1] 663d-664a; CH 8 [431b20-432a2] 664b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [486b15-487b] 7b-d; BK VIII, CH 1 [588a18-b3] 114b,d / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 4, 167d-168c; CH 5 [645b1-33] 169b-d / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715b17-26] 255d; BK III, CH 10 [760b9-17] 301b / Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096b27-29] 342a; BK V, CH 3-5, 378c-381d passim; BK VIII, CH 7 [1158b29-33] 410d / Politics, BK V, CH 1 [1301b29-36] 503a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357b25-1358a2] 597c-d; BK II, CH 20 [1393a22-1394a8] 640d-641d; BK III, CH 4, 657b-d; CH 10, 662c-663d; CH 11 [1412b33-1413a13] 665c-d / Poetics, CH 21 [1457b6-33] 693a-c
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK V, 81a-98b esp DEFINITIONS, 3-6, 81a; BK VII, DEFINITIONS, 20, 127b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK II, 841c-d
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1078b-1080a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 4, A 3, 22b-23b; Q 5, A 6, REP 3, 27c-28b; Q 12, A 1, REP 4, 50c-51c; Q 13, AA 5-6, 66b-68c; A 10, 72c-73c; Q 14, A 3, REP 2, 77d-78b; Q 16, A 6, ANS, 98b-d; Q 33, A 3, ANS, 182c-183c; Q 44, A 3, ANS, 240b-241a; Q 54, A 3, ANS and REP 2, 286c-287b; Q 66, A 2, ANS, 345d-347b; Q 93, A 1, REP 3, 492a-d; PART I-II, Q 20, A 3, REP 3, 713c-714c; Q 27, A 3, REP 2, 738c-739c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 1, REP 1, 54d-55c; PART III, Q 60, A 1, ANS, 847b-848a; PART III SUPPL, Q 69, A 1, REP 2, 885c-886c; Q 92, A 1, REP 6, 1025c-1032b
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 12d-13b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336b-d; 449a-b; 469d-470d
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 27, 157b-158d
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 158b-161d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 1, 228c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IX, DIV 82, 487b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-74b / Judgement, 601d-603a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 212d-213c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 688a-689b passim

2. Order and relation in God: the divine processions and the relations constituting the Trinity of persons

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK X, CH 24, 312d-313c; BK XI, CH 10, 327d-328d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, 14a-20c; Q 11, AA 3-4, 49a-50b; Q 28, 157c-161d; Q 29, A 4, 165c-167a; QQ 30-40, 167a-217c passim; Q 41, A 5, 222b-223b; Q 42, 224a-230a
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXIV [127-147] 144a; XXXIII [76-145] 157a-d
22 CHAUCER: Second Nun’s Tale [15,794-809] 467a-b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 97c; PART III, 207b; 207d-208c; PART IV, 259d
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, V, 93a-96a / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE V, 131b-c; 159b-161d; 217d-218b; 232b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 1, 355a; DEF 3-6, 355b; DEF 8, EXPL, 355c; PROP 7, 356c; PROP 10-11, 358a-359b; PROP 15, DEMONST, 360a; PROP 17, SCHOL, 362c-363c; PROP 20, 363d-364a; PROP 23, 364d-365a; PROP 29, SCHOL, 366b-c; PROP 32, COROL 2, 367b; PROP 33, SCHOL 2, 367d-369a
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK III [56-415] 136b-144b esp [315-341] 142a-b, [383-389] 143b-144a; BK V [600-615] 188b; BK XII [469-551] 329b-331a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307b; 310b-313b esp 310b-311d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 422a-c; 521c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 306a-c

3. The relation of God to the world: divine immanence and transcendence

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 2-3, 1b-2a; BK III, PAR 10, 15b-d; BK IV, PAR 26, 25c-d; PAR 31, 26c-27a; BK VI, PAR 4, 36a-b; BK VII, PAR 1-2, 43b-44a; PAR 7, 45a-d; PAR 17, 49a; PAR 21, 49d-50a; BK X, PAR 8-10, 73b-74a; BK XII, PAR 7, 100d-101a; PAR 21, 103d-104a / City of God, BK VII, CH 6, 248a; CH 30, 261b-d; BK XII, CH 2, 343c-d; CH 17, 353a-354a; CH 25, 358b-359a; BK XIX, CH 13, 519a-520a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 12, 627c-d; CH 32, 633c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 8, 19d-20c; Q 6, A 2, REP 1, 28d-29c; Q 8, 34c-38c; Q 13, A 7, 68d-70d; Q 18, A 4, 107d-108c; Q 26, A 1, REP 3, 157c-158d; A 4, ANS, 160c-161d; Q 44, A 1, REP 1, 238b-239a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2, 242d-244a; A 3, 244a-d; Q 51, A 3, REP 3, 277a-278a; Q 52, A 2, ANS, 279b-280a; Q 61, A 3, REP 2, 316a-d; Q 103, A 2, CONTRARY and ANS, 529a-530a; Q 104, AA 1-2, 534c-537b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 8, REP 2, 692a-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 28, A 2, REP 3, 511a-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, II [112-148] 109a-b; XIII [52-66] 126a; XIX [40-66] 135c-d; XXVII, 148d-150b; XXIX [127-145] 151c-d; XXXIII [76-93] 157a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 428c-d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d / Meditations, III, 87b-88c / Objections and Replies, 110b-112a; 158b-159a; 213b-d; 214a-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, 355a-372d esp DEF 3-6, 355b, AXIOM 1-2, 355c, PROP 2-8, 355d-357d, PROP 10, SCHOL, 358a-b, PROP 17, SCHOL, 362c-363c, PROP 24-30, 365a-366d, PROP 33, SCHOL 1-2, 367c-369a; PART II, PROP 1-11, 373d-377c
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XI [334-346] 306b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 370a-371a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIII, SECT 18, 152a-c; CH XV, SECT 12, 165b-c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 149-150, 442d-443b; SECT 155, 444b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 56, 475a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 192c-d / Practical Reason, 334b-335b / Judgement, 566c-d; 580c-d; 592a-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 220c-221a; 224a-b; 246c-247a; PART III, 306a-c; PART IV, 322a-c; 349b-350a

4. Relation in the order of thought or knowledge

4a. The definability or indefinability of relative terms

7 PLATO: Philebus, 615c-616c
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6b36-7b14] 11a-12b; [8a12-24] 13a-d / Topics, BK IV, CH 1 [120b36-121a6] 168d; CH 4 [124b15-34] 173c-d; [125a14-b14] 174a-c; BK VI, CH 4 [142a22-33] 195c-d; CH 5 [142b30-143a12] 196b-c; CH 6 [145a12-b20] 198d-199b; CH 8, 200b-201a; CH 9 [147a23-32] 201b; CH 12 [149b4-23] 203d-204a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 13, 238d-239a; CH 31, 250c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 44, A 1, REP 1, 238b-239a

4b. The proposition or judgment as a statement of relation: relation in reasoning

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH I, SECT 1-7, 307a-308a esp SECT 7, 307d-308a; CH XII, SECT 6-8, 360a-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20, 458a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 39c-41c esp 40c-d; 51d-52b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 174b-176a; 213b-214a esp 214b [fn 1]; 302b-304b; 638b; 640b [fn 1]; 869a-874a passim, esp 870b-871a; 878a-879b; 889a

4c. The transcendental categories of relation

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-45b esp 42c, 43d-44c; 61a-64a esp 62d-63c

4d. Relations as objects of knowledge: ideas of relation

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 242c-245d / Republic, BK VII, 392b-393b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7, 11a-13d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [990b9-17] 508d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 7, 68d-70d; Q 28, A 1, ANS and REP 4, 157c-158d; A 4, REP 2-3, 160c-161d; Q 44, A 1, REP 1, 238b-239a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 4-5, 144d-145a; CH XII, SECT 1, 147b-d; SECT 3, 147d-148a; SECT 7, 148c; CH XXI, SECT 5, 179c-d; CH XXV-XXVIII, 214d-233d passim, esp CH XXV, 214d-217a; CH XXX, SECT 4, 238d-239a; BK IV, CH II, 313a-323d passim; CH IV, SECT 1, 323d-324a; SECT 7, 325b; SECT 18, 328d-329a; CH VI, SECT 13, 335c-d; SECT 16, 336d; CH VII, SECT 1-7, 337a-338c esp SECT 2, 337a; CH XI, SECT 13-14, 357d-358c; CH XII, SECT 6-8, 360a-c; CH XVII, SECT 8, 377c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20, 458a-b; SECT XII, DIV 131, 508d-509a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 24a-33d esp 31d-32c; 61a-64a esp 62d-63c; 99a-101b; 119a-120c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 157b-161a esp 158b-159b, 160a-162b [fn 1]; 167b; 301b-304b passim, esp 302b-303b; 319b-327a esp 319b-320a, 323a, 324b-326a; 386a; 411a-413a; 457a-459b esp 459b [fn 3]; 549a-552a esp 549b-550b
54 FREUD: Unconscious, 442d / Ego and Id, 700d-701a

4e. The relations between ideas

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 4-5, 144d-145a; CH XXI, SECT 5, 179c-d; BK IV, CH II, 313a-323d passim; CH IV, SECT 1, 323d-324a; SECT 7, 325b; SECT 18, 328d-329a; CH VI, SECT 13, 335d; SECT 16, 336d; CH VII, SECT 1-7, 337a-338c esp SECT 2, 337a; CH XI, SECT 13-14, 357d-358c esp SECT 13, 358a; CH XII, SECT 6-8, 360a-c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 89, 430c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20, 458a-b; DIV 30, 462a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-45b esp 42c, 43d-44c; 61a-64a esp 62d-63c; 99a-108a,c; 119b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 167b-176a esp 168a, 174b-176a; 300b-301b [fn 1]; 319b-320a; 867a-879b esp 868b-869a, 874a, 878a-879b; 889a-b

4f. The types of relationship underlying the association of ideas in thought, memory, and dreams

8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [452a7-452b6] 692d-694b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 18, 381d-382b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXIII, 248b-251d esp SECT 5-18, 248d-251c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT III, 457c-458a; SECT V, DIV 41-45, 467d-469c
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 194a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 51c-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 360a-364a esp 360a-361a; 367a-370b esp 369a-370a; 378a-387b esp 378a, 387a-b; 677a-678b passim
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 74a-75a; 76c-d / Interpretation of Dreams, 265a-272c passim; 348a-349c esp 348d-349a; 352a-c / General Introduction, 486b-489c passim, esp 487d-488a

5. Order as a system of relationships or related things

5a. The nature and types of order: inclusion and exclusion; succession and coexistence; priority, posteriority, and simultaneity

7 PLATO: Statesman, 594a-595a / Philebus, 615c-617d
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7b15-23] 12b-c; CH 12-13, 19d-20d / Interpretation, CH 13 [23a18-26] 35b-c / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24b26-31] 39d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a5] 98b-c; CH 27, 119b; BK II, CH 12, 129d-131b; CH 16 [98b35-99a24] 134b-c / Topics, BK II, CH 4 [111b24-31] 156d-157a; BK VI, CH 4, 194c-196a passim; CH 6 [145b21-33] 199b-c / Physics, BK VII, CH 1 [242a16-243a2] 326b-327b / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 3 [999a6-14] 517d; BK V, CH 2 [1014a20-25] 534b-c; CH 11, 539c-540a; BK IX, CH 8, 575b-577a; BK XI, CH 1, 598a-c; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077a14-b14] 608b-609a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [646a25-b10] 170b-c / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742b16-743a1] 283b-284a / Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096a17-23] 341b-c / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a17-24] 445b; CH 5 [1254a29-33] 447d-448a; BK III, CH 1 [1275a35-b2] 472b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 813a-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, PAR 40, 109b-110a / City of God, BK XIX, CH 13, 519b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, ANS, 14b-15b; A 6, ANS and REP 2, 18c-19a; Q 12, A 10, 59a-d; Q 16, A 4, 97a-c; Q 45, A 3, REP 3, 244a-d; Q 66, A 4, REP 4, 348d-349d; Q 94, A 3, ANS, 504a-505a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 2, ANS, 2b-4a; Q 50, A 2, REP 3, 7c-8a; Q 110, A 4, REP 4, 350d-351d
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390c; 445c; 447a-b
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 1, 355d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIV, SECT 1-12, 155b-157c passim, esp SECT 3-4, 155c-156a, SECT 6, 156b-c, SECT 12, 157b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 41-43, 467d-468d
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK II, 399c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-85d esp 72c-74b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 691a-693d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 319b-322a passim, esp 319b; 346a-b; 399a-b; 547a-549a esp 547b [fn 1], 548b-549a; 571b-573a; 631b
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 779c

5a(1) The order of the causes or of cause and effect

7 PLATO: Lysis, 24b / Phaedrus, 124b-c / Euthyphro, 195c-d / Gorgias, 267c-268a / Timaeus, 455a-b; 465d-466a / Theaetetus, 521d-522b / Philebus, 617b-c / Laws, BK X, 762b-763b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 12 [14b10-22] 20b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a6] 98b-c; BK II, CH 12, 129d-131b; CH 16-18, 134b-136a / Physics, BK II, CH 6 [198a5-13] 275a; CH 8-9, 275d-278a,c; BK III, CH 2 [202a2-12] 279c; BK VII, CH 1-2, 326a-329a; BK VIII, 334a-355d / Heavens, BK I, CH 7 [275b1-12] 366a-d; [275b18-29] 366d-367a / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 7, 421d-423b / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 [993b23]-CH 2 [994b31] 512a-513b; BK V, CH 2, 533b-534c; BK XI, CH 8 [1065a2-4] 593d; BK XII, CH 3 [1070a21-24] 599c; CH 4 [1070a22-35] 600b; CH 5 [1071a35-36] 601a; CH 6-8, 601b-605a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b11-642a24] 161d-165b esp [639b11-31] 161d-162a; BK II, CH 1 [646a25-b10] 170b-c / Motion of Animals, CH 5, 235c-d / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742b16-17] 283b-d / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 23 [1400a28-35] 649a-b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 4, 169a
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 854b; 959a-960a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 2, 322b-323a
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XII, CH 24-25, 358a-359a; BK XXII, CH 2, 587b-588a; CH 24, 609b-610a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3, 12c-14a; Q 3, A 1, ANS, 14b-15b; A 2, ANS, 15c-16a; A 4, ANS, 16d-17c; A 6, ANS, 18c-19a; A 7, ANS, 19a-c; A 8, ANS and REP 1-2, 19d-20c; Q 4, A 2, ANS, 21b-22b; A 3, ANS and REP 4, 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP 1, 24b-25a; A 4, ANS, 25d-26c; Q 8, A 1, 34d-35c; Q 13, A 5, REP 1, 66b-67d; Q 14, A 4, ANS and REP 3, 81d-82b; A 11, ANS, 84c-85c; Q 18, A 3, ANS, 106b-107c; Q 19, A 4, ANS, 111c-112c; A 5, REP 2-3, 112d-113c; A 6, ANS and REP 3, 113c-114d; Q 22, A 2, REP 2, 128d-130d; Q 23, A 5, ANS, 135d-137d; Q 36, A 3, REP 4, 194c-195d; Q 41, A 2, ANS and REP 1,3, 218c-219d; Q 42, A 2, ANS, 225d-227a; Q 44, A 2, 239b-240a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2, 242d-244a; A 3, 244a-d; A 5, ANS, 245c-247a; Q 46, A 1, REP 6, 250a-252d; Q 52, A 3, ANS, 280a-d; Q 63, A 8, REP 1, 332c-333b; Q 65, A 3, ANS, 341c-342b; Q 75, A 1, REP 1, 378b-379c; Q 82, A 3, REP 1, 433c-434c; A 4, ANS, 434c-435c; Q 87, A 2, REP 3, 466c-467b; Q 88, A 3, REP 2, 472c-473a; Q 90, A 3, 482c-483a; Q 103, A 6, 532b-533a; Q 104, A 1, ANS, 534c-536c; A 2, 536c-537b; Q 105, A 1, REP 3, 538d-539c; A 5, ANS and REP 3, 542a-543b; Q 112, A 1, ANS, 571d-573a; Q 114, A 3, ANS, 583b-d; Q 115, AA 1-2, 585d-588c; Q 118, A 2, REP 3, 601c-603b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2, ANS, 610b-611b; Q 46, A 1, ANS, 813b-814a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 66, A 6, REP 3, 80c-81b; Q 112, A 1, REP 1-3, 356c-357b; PART II-II, Q 1, A 7, REP 3, 385c-387a; PART III, Q 6, A 5, ANS, 744a-d; Q 7, A 1, REP 3, 745d-746c; A 7, REP 1, 750a-d; Q 18, A 1, REP 2, 810a-811c; Q 19, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 816a-818b; Q 62, A 1, 858c-859d; A 5, ANS, 862b-863a; Q 64, A 5, 874a-d; A 8, REP 1, 876c-877c; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 3, ANS, 897d-900d; Q 74, A 3, REP 2, 927c-928d; Q 76, A 1, REP 1, 939d-941a; A 2, 941b-942b; Q 80, A 1, REP 1, 956c-957c
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [112-148] 109a-b
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus, PAR 37, 417b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78c-d; 79d-80a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 135c-136b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 390c-d; 416b-c; 426a-429b; 442c-443c; 445c; 447a-b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d / Meditations, III, 81d-89a esp 84b-85a, 87b-88c / Objections and Replies, 110a-112a esp 111d-112a; 120c-123a; DEF III-IV, 130b; AXIOM I-V, 131d-132a; AXIOM VIII, 132b; PROP II, 132c; 158b-161d passim; 212a; 213b-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 1, 355a; AXIOM 3-5, 355d; PROP 3, 356a; PROP 21-29, 364a-366c; PROP 33, 367b-369a; PROP 36, 369b; APPENDIX, 369b-372d; PART II, LEMMA 3, 378d-379a; PROP 48, DEMONST, 391a; PART III, DEF 2-3, 395d-396a; PROP 1-3, 396a-398c; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423c
33 PASCAL: Pensées, 505, 261a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 1-4, 178b-179c; CH XXII, SECT 11, 203c-d; CH XXVI, SECT 1-2, 217a-d
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33, 417d-419a passim
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 18-SECT VIII, DIV 74, 457c-484c passim, esp SECT VII, DIV 60, 477a-c; SECT XI, 497b-503c esp DIV 105, 498d-499a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 63b; 67d-68b [fn 1]; 76c-83b esp 81c-d; 95a-d; 140b,d-145c; 177b-179b; 187c-188c; 214b,d [fn1] / Practical Reason, 311d-314d; 334b-337a,c; 339a-b / Judgement, 577c-578a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 9b-10d / Descent of Man, 285b-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK X, 405a-b; EPILOGUE II, 675a-696d
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 588c-589a

5a(2) The order of goods or of means and ends: the order of loves

OLD TESTAMENT: I Kings, 3:5-14—(D) III Kings, 5-14
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13:44-46 / Philippians, 3:7-16
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 6c-8a
7 PLATO: Lysis, 23a-c / Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Symposium, 165b-167d / Meno, 183b-184c / Gorgias, 262a-264b / Republic, BK II, 310c-d; BK VII, 401b; BK IX, 421a-427b / Timaeus, 465d-466a / Philebus, 635b-639a,c / Laws, BK I, 643c-644a; BK II, 656d-658c; BK III, 674b; BK V, 687c-688c; 689c-690c; 694d-695a; BK IX, 751c
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 22 [68a25-b8] 89d-90a / Topics, BK III, CH 1-4, 162a-166b / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 2 [1013a32-b3] 533c; [1013b25-28] 533d-534a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 1-2, 339a-d; CH 4 [1095a13-29] 340b-c; CH 5 [1095b13]-CH 7 [1097b22] 340d-343a; BK III, CH 8, 354a-d; BK VII, CH 11-14, 403c-406a,c; BK X, CH 6-7, 430d-432c / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a1-6] 445a; BK III, CH 12, 480c-481b; BK VII, CH 1 [1323a22-b21] 527a-c; CH 13 [1331b24-38] 536b-c; [1332a8-27] 536d-537a; CH 14 [1333a17-37] 538a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 7, 604c-607d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 19, 163a-c; BK III, CH 14, 189d
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK V, SECT 16, 271c-d
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 74c-75c / Pericles, 122a
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR IV, 12b-19b esp CH 2-7, 12d-16a, CH 14-16, 18a-19b / Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 15, 74d-75b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, PAR 10-14, 11a-12b / City of God, BK VIII, CH 8-9, 270a-271a; BK XI, CH 16, 331a-c; BK XII, CH 8, 346d-347b; BK XV, CH 22, 416a-c; BK XIX, CH 1-3, 507a-511a; CH 11-17, 516d-523a; CH 20, 523d-524a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 3-5, 625b-626a; CH 22, 629b-630a; CH 31-33, 633b-634b; CH 35, 634c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, ANS, 14b-15b; A 2, ANS, 15c-16a; Q 5, A 6, 27c-28b; Q 6, A 2, 28d-29c; PART I-II, QQ 1-5, 609a-643d; Q 20, AA 1-4, 712a-715b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 2, ANS, 2b-4a; Q 114, A 4, REP 1, 373a-d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [82]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; PARADISE, XXVI [1-69] 145d-146c
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus, 401a-432a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62a; PART II, 155b-c; PART III, 237d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71a-72c; 73d-74a; 75d-76a; 91d-92b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 369b-372d; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-424a; APPENDIX, V, 447c
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 94a-97a / Pensées, 505, 261a-b; 793, 326b-327a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 52-53, 191d-192b; SECT 55-56, 192c-193b; SECT 62, 194c-d; SECT 72, 198a-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 235a-b; 238c-239a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-b; 257c-d; 266a-267d; 268b; 271d-279d / Practical Reason, 316a-317d; 327d-329a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 377d / Judgement, 478a-479d esp 478a-b; 557d [fn 2]; 584d-587a; 588b [fn 2]; 592a; 594b-595d esp 595a-d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 23, 85a-87a passim, esp 85b-c; NUMBER 41, 132b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b; 448a-450a; 461c-463c
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 378a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 61, 27b-c; PART II, PAR 122, 44a; PART III, PAR 294, 98b-d; ADDITIONS, 38, 122c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168a-d; PART II, 267a-b; PART III, 307b-308a; PART IV, 348b-c; 365b-c
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 213b-214b
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 164b-165a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 14b-15a; 199b-204b esp 202a-203a

5a(3) The order of quantities: the types of proportion

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 4, 330d-333a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 [1016b18-31] 537b; CH 13, 541b-c; CH 15, 542a-543a; BK X, CH 1 [1052b15-1053a9] 579a-580a; CH 5, 583a-c; CH 6 [1056b33-1057a16] 584b-c; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077b24-30] 608c; CH 6-9, 611d-618c passim
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 3-5, 378c-381d passim / Politics, BK V, CH 1 [1301a29-35] 503a
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK V, 81a-98b; BK VI, PROP 23, 117a-b; BK VII, DEFINITIONS, 20, 127b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I-II, 821d-831d; BK II, 841c-848d
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1078b-1079a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 7, ANS, 68d-70d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART II, 47c / Geometry, 295a-353b esp BK I, 295a-298b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK I, LEMMA II, SCHOL, 31b-32a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 407b-408b passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 73c-d / Judgement, 497a-498b
50 MARX: Capital, 19d-25d passim, esp 19d-20b, 25a-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 551a-b

5a(4) The order of kinds: hierarchy; species and genus

7 PLATO: Statesman, 582d-583c; 594a-595a
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [2b26-35] 6c-7b; CH 13 [14b32-15a12] 20c-d / Topics, BK IV, CH 2 [123a13-19] 171c; BK VI, CH 4 [141b15-34] 195a-b; CH 5, 196b-d / Physics, BK IV, CH 3 [210a17-19] 289a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 25, 545b-c; BK VII, CH 10-11, 558a-561a; BK VIII, CH 6, 569d-570d; BK X, CH 8-9, 585b-586c
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [588a4-17] 114d-115a / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 2-4, 165d-168c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 813a-b
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR II, CH 2, 142a-143b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 5, ANS, 17c-18b; A 6, REP 2, 18c-19a; Q 13, A 7, ANS, 68d-70d; Q 15, A 3, REP 4, 93b-94a; Q 28, A 1, ANS, 157c-158d; Q 29, A 2, REP 4, 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4, ANS, 170c-171b; Q 47, A 2, ANS, 257b-258c; Q 50, A 2, REP 1, 270a-272a; A 4, 273b-274b; Q 66, A 2, REP 2, 345d-347b; Q 75, A 7, 384d-385c; Q 76, A 3, ANS and REP 4, 391a-393a; Q 77, A 1, REP 1, 399c-401b; A 4, REP 1, 403a-d; Q 85, A 3, ANS, 455b-457a; A 4, ANS, 457a-d; Q 88, A 2, REP 4, 471c-472c; PART I-II, Q 18, A 7, REP 3, 698c-699c; Q 23, A 1, ANS, 723c-724c; Q 35, A 4, ANS, 774d-775d; A 8, ANS and REP 3, 779c-780c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 54, A 1, REP 1, 22d-23d; Q 61, A 1, REP 1, 54d-55c; Q 72, A 7, ANS, 117a-118a; PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS, 710a-711c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH III, SECT 6-9, 255c-256c; CH VI, SECT 32, 277c-278b; SECT 36-41, 279a-280b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 193a-200c esp 196b-198d
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 30d-31b; 64a; 207a-208a; 210b-211b; 238b-c; 241d-242a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 870b-871a

5b. The order of the universe or of nature: the hierarchy of beings

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 11:20—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 11:21
5 EURIPIDES: Phoenician Maidens [528-548] 382c-d
5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [685-703] 551b-c
7 PLATO: Symposium, 155d-157a / Gorgias, 284a-285a / Timaeus, 446d-477a,c / Philebus, 618b-619d
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 13 [23a18-26] 35b-c / Physics, BK II, CH 8-9, 275d-278a,c; BK VIII, CH 1 [252a5-23] 335d-336a / Heavens, BK I, CH 2, 359d-360d; BK II, CH 9-10, 382b-383a; CH 12, 383b-384c; BK III, CH 2 [300b16-301a20] 392a-c / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 3-5, 430c-433d; CH 9-11, 436d-441a,c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [984b8-22] 502d; CH 6, 505b-506b; CH 7 [988a34-b5] 506c; CH 9, 508c-511c; BK VIII, CH 3 [1043b33-1044a11] 568b-c; BK XI, CH 8 [1065b2-4] 593d; BK XII, CH 6-8, 601b-605a; CH 10 [1075a12-24] 605d-606a; BK XIV, CH 3 [1090b14-21] 623b / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413a20-b4] 643b-c; BK III, CH 11 [433b32-434a9] 666d
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1, 114b,d-115b / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [641b13-29] 164c-d; CH 5 [644b22-645a26] 168c-169a; BK IV, CH 5 [681a12-14] 211d; CH 10 [686b23-35] 218b-c / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 1 [731b24-33] 272a-b / Politics, BK I, CH 5 [1254a24-35] 447d-448a; BK VII, CH 4 [1326a29-35] 530b-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [418-448] 6b-c; BK II [167-183] 17a-b; [294-307] 18d-19a; [569-580] 22b; [865-930] 26a-d; [1023-1174] 28a-30a,c; BK V [146-234] 63a-64a; [783-836] 71b-72a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 8, 146a-b; BK IV, CH 7, 234b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 9, 257d; BK IV, SECT 3-4, 263b-264a; SECT 40, 267a-b; SECT 45-46, 267b-c; BK V, SECT 8, 269d-270b; SECT 16, 271c-d; SECT 30, 273a; BK VI, SECT 1, 274a; SECT 9, 274b; SECT 11, 274c; SECT 36, 277c; SECT 38, 277c-d; SECT 40-44, 277d-278c; BK VII, SECT 11, 280c; SECT 75, 285c; BK VIII, SECT 26-27, 287c; BK IX, SECT 9, 292b-d; BK X, SECT 6, 297a-b; BK XI, SECT 18, 304b-c
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1023b-1080b
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR I, CH 7, 44c-45a; CH 13, 46c-47b; CH 18, 49c-50a / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 10, 163a-c; TR IX, 205a-207a,c / Fifth Ennead, TR II, 214c-215c; TR IX, CH 12-14, 251a-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, PAR 16-23, 48c-50c / City of God, BK XI, CH 22, 333d-334c; BK XII, CH 2-5, 343c-345b; BK XIX, CH 11-17, 516d-523a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3, 12c-14a; Q 3, A 1, ANS, 14b-15b; A 2, ANS, 15c-16a; Q 5, A 5, ANS, 26c-27c; Q 11, A 3, ANS, 49a-c; Q 13, A 7, ANS, 68d-70d; Q 18, A 3, ANS, 106b-107c; Q 19, A 5, REP 2, 112d-113c; A 8, 116a-d; Q 21, A 1, REP 3, 124b-125b; Q 23, A 5, REP 3, 135d-137d; A 7, ANS, 138d-140a; Q 42, A 1, REP 1-2, 224b-225d; A 3, 227a-d; Q 47, 256a-259a; Q 48, A 1, REP 5, 259b-260c; A 2, ANS and REP 3, 260c-261b; Q 50, A 1, ANS and REP 1, 269b-270a; A 2, REP 1, 270a-272a; A 4, 273b-274b; Q 57, A 1, ANS, 295a-d; Q 61, AA 3-4, 316a-317c; QQ 65-74, 339a-377a,c; Q 75, A 1, REP 1, 378b-379c; A 7, 384d-385c; Q 76, A 1, ANS, 385d-388c; A 3, ANS, 391a-393a; A 6, REP 1-2, 396a-d; Q 77, A 2, 401b-d; A 4, REP 1, 403a-d; Q 88, A 2, REP 4, 471c-472c; QQ 103-119, 528a-608d; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 1, 612a-613a; A 8, 615a-c; Q 2, A 5, REP 2-3, 618d-619c; Q 22, A 2, REP 1, 721c-722c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 52, A 1, ANS, 15d-18a; PART II-II, Q 2, A 3, ANS and REP 1, 392d-393c; Q 23, A 3, REP 3, 485a-d; Q 26, A 1, REP 2, 510c-511a; PART III SUPPL, Q 91, 1016a-1025b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [103-142] 107b-d; II [46-148] 108b-109b; X [1-27] 120b-c; XIII [52-87] 126a-b; XXVII [97-120] 148b-c; XXVIII, 148d-150b; XXIX [13-36] 150b-c
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK III, STANZA 1-7, 54b-55b; STANZA 250-253, 87a-b / Knight’s Tale [2987-3016] 209a-b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a
26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC III [62-71] 573b
27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT I, SC III [75-139] 108d-109c
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 400d-401a; 426b-429b passim, esp 426d-427a, 428a-c; 470a
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 17, 149b-d; APH 27, 157b-158d; APH 29-30, 159b-d; APH 48, 179d-188b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 54c-56a / Meditations, IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 139b-c; 215a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 29, 366b-c; PROP 33, 367b-369a; APPENDIX, 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 6-7, 374d-375c; PART III, 395a-d; PROP 2, 396c-398b; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-424a; PROP 2, 425a; PROP 4, 425b-d
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [397-505] 184a-186a; BK VII [1-178] 232a-236a; [314-356] 239a-240a; BK IX [99-113] 249b
33 PASCAL: Pensées, 119-121, 195a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, 269a-372a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH IX, SECT 12, 140c; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11-12, 271b-272b; BK IV, CH III, SECT 27, 321d-322a; CH VI, SECT 11, 334b-335b; CH XVI, SECT 12, 370c-371a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 29-33, 418c-419a passim; SECT 146-153, 442a-444a passim
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 44, 468d-469c; SECT VIII, DIV 79-80, 486b-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1a-2b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 93c-99a; 133a-c; 187c-189a; 199c-200c; 220a-b; 237b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256d-257a; 264d-265a / Practical Reason, 292a-d; 301d-302d; 307d-314d / Judgement, 467a-470c esp 467d-468c; 578d-580a esp 579b-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 168, 145c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160b-162a; PART I, 220c; PART IV, 361a-b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 55b-62a; 63d-64d; 96b-98a,c esp 96b-c; 179b-180d; 228c-229a,c; 238b-239a; 241b-c; 243b-d / Descent of Man, 340d-341d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b-98a; 314a; 571b-572a; 641a-643a; 862b-863b [fn 2]; 873a-b; 882a-886a; 889a-890a
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 779c

5c. Order as a principle of beauty

7 PLATO: Republic, BK III, 333b-334b; BK IV, 342b-c / Timaeus, 474d-475a / Statesman, 594a-c / Philebus, 637d
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b10-19] 329c-330a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [984b8-22] 502d; BK XIII, CH 3 [1078a39-b5] 610a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [645a4-26] 168d-169a / Politics, BK V, CH 9 [1309b23-30] 512a; BK VII, CH 4 [1326a29-35] 530b-c / Poetics, CH 7, 685b-c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 814a; 826d-827a
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 868b
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VI, CH 1, 21c-d / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 22, 332d-333b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, PAR 20, 24b-c / City of God, BK II, CH 21, 161b-c; BK XVII, CH 14, 464d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4, REP 1, 25d-26c; Q 96, A 3, REP 3, 512a-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 2, REP 1, 2b-4a; Q 54, A 1, ANS, 22d-23d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XII, SECT 5, 148a-b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345d-346a
42 KANT: Judgement, 488a-489a; 544c-545b; 557c-558b
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 301d-302a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 755a; 865b

6. The absolute and the relative modes of consideration

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 242c-244b
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5b11-29] 10a-b / Topics, BK II, CH 11 [115b3-35] 161c-162a,c; BK V, CH 1, 178b,d-179b; BK VI, CH 4 [141b3-142a16] 194d-195c; CH 8 [146b36-147a11] 200d-201a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 5 [166b37-167a20] 229d-230a; CH 8 [170a12-19] 234a; CH 25, 248b-249b / Physics, BK I, CH 1 [184a16-21] 259a / Heavens, BK III, CH 5 [303b13-304a7] 394d-395b / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 11, 539c-540a; BK X, CH 6, 583d-584c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 1, REP 1, 23c-24a; Q 7, A 2, 31d-32c; Q 11, A 1, REP 2, 46d-47d; A 2, REP 1,3-4, 47d-48d; Q 13, A 2, 63c-64d; A 11, REP 2, 73c-74b; Q 30, A 1, REP 2-4, 167a-168a; Q 70, A 3, REP 2, 365b-367a; Q 93, A 3, ANS, 493d-494c; PART I-II, Q 2, A 5, REP 2, 618d-619c; Q 6, A 6, ANS and REP 2, 649a-650a; Q 17, A 4, 688d-689c; Q 22, A 1, ANS, 720d-721c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 1, REP 2, 6a-7b; Q 52, A 1, ANS, 15d-18a; Q 105, A 4, REP 1,4, 318b-321a; PART III, Q 17, A 1, REP 7, 807a-808d; A 2, ANS, 808d-809d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, VI, 8a-9a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 3,6, 355b; AXIOM 2,4-5, 355d; PROP 10, 358a-b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 12, 415b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 130b-133c; 202b-203c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 227b

6a. Absolute and relative with respect to space, time, motion

7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 350d-351b
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 2 [209b31-36] 288b / Heavens, BK I, CH 3 [269b18-30] 360d-361a; BK IV, CH 4, 402c-403d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [387-390] 49b
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, BK I, 514b-515a; 519a; BK II, 557a-b
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1015a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, PAR 18-27, 93c-95c
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 36, 165c-166b
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL, 8b-13a; COROL V-VI, 19a-b; BK I, PROP 57-61, 111b-114b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIII, SECT 7-10, 149d-150d; SECT 27, 154c; CH XV, SECT 5-8, 163b-164b; CH XXVI, SECT 3-5, 217d-218c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 97-98, 431d-432a; SECT 110-117, 434b-436a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 47b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 408a-411a esp 409a-b; 511b-512a; 565a-b; 612a-624b esp 613a-b; 783a-785a

6b. Absolute and relative with respect to truth

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 86b-d / Timaeus, 447c-d / Theaetetus, 517b-532a
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5-6, 528c-531c; BK VII, CH 3 [1029b1-11] 552a; BK X, CH 1 [1053a31-b3] 580a; CH 6 [1057a7-11] 584b; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b12-1063a14] 590d-592a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095a30-b12] 340c-d / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 24 [1402a3-28] 651b-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 20, 164c-166c
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 18, 523a-b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 10d-11d; Q 16, A 1, REP 2, 94b-95c; Q 85, A 2, ANS, 453d-455b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 57d-58a; 65c; PART IV, 267b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 209c-212a; 240c-246a; 251d-253c; 259c-261c; 271b-272d; 318a-319b; 439c-440a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 13a-c; 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 67, 115d-116a
31 DESCARTES: Rules, I-II, 1a-3b; VI, 8a-10a / Discourse, PART II, 46b-c
33 PASCAL: Pensées, 385, 238b-239a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 88b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 129c-130a; 194b-c; 218d-222b; 224a-227a; 240b-243c / Practical Reason, 292d-293b; 311d-313d
43 MILL: Liberty, 275a-283c passim
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 427a-b; 428b-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 245c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 639a-646a
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 880b; 881d-882b

6c. Absolute and relative with respect to goodness or beauty

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 86d / Symposium, 167a-d / Phaedo, 242c-243a / Gorgias, 261a-c / Republic, BK IV, 350d-352b; BK VI, 383d-386c / Theaetetus, 528b-c; 531a-532a / Philebus, 630c-631d; 636a-639a,c
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 22 [68a25-b8] 89d-90a / Topics, BK III, CH 1-4, 162a-166b / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 3 [1029b34-1030a11] 552a
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 6 [700b33-36] 236b / Ethics, BK I, CH 1-2, 339a-d; CH 4 [1095a13-29] 340b-c; CH 6 [1096a11]-CH 7 [1097b34] 341b-342d; BK II, CH 8, 354a-d; BK III, CH 4, 359a-c; BK V, CH 3-5, 378c-381d; CH 7, 382c-383a; BK VII, CH 12 [1152b25-33] 403d-404a; BK X, CH 5 [1175b24-1176a29] 430b-d / Politics, BK I, CH 6 [1255a32-37] 449a; BK VII, CH 1 [1323a22-b21] 527a-c; CH 13 [1332a8-27] 536d-537a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 7, 604c-607d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1141-1170] 59a-b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 20, 265a-b
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 11, 287b-c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 13, 16c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 10, 661d-662a; CH 14, 663c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 1, REP 1, 23c-24a; A 2, REP 3, 24b-25a; A 6, 27c-28b; Q 11, A 2, REP 1, 47d-48d; Q 26, A 3, REP 1, 151a-c; Q 65, A 1, REP 2-3, 339b-340b; Q 70, A 3, REP 2, 365b-367a; PART I-II, Q 1, A 7, ANS, 614c-615a; QQ 2-4, 615c-636c passim; Q 7, A 2, REP 1, 652d-653c; Q 18, AA 1-4, 694a-696d; Q 23, AA 1-2, 723c-725c; Q 27, A 1, REP 1-2, 737b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 92, A 1, ANS, 213c-214c; Q 94, A 4, 223d-224d; Q 97, A 1, REP 3, 236a-d; Q 114, A 10, ANS, 377c-378a,c; PART II-II, Q 29, A 2, REP 3, 531a-d; A 3, REP 1, 531d-532c; Q 182, A 1, ANS, 620b-621d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61d-62a; 65a; 73b-c; 75a; 96a-b; PART II, 140b; PART IV, 272c
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK IV, 273d-274a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 46b-47c; 93b-c; 115b-119d; 124c-125a; 146b-c; 209c-212a; 230b-d; 281a-284c
26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT V, SC I [89-109] 431d
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC II [254-257] 43b / Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II [1-96] 113c-114c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 70b-74a; 75d-76a
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 46b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 371b-372d; PART IV, PREF, 423c-424a
33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 29b-44a / Pensées, 383-385, 238b-239a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90a-d; BK I, CH III, SECT 8-12, 105d-107d; SECT 21, 111a; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 55-56, 192c-193b; CH XXVIII, SECT 10-12, 230b-231c esp SECT 10, 230b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 362a-d
42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259c-d; 270d-271a; 271c-272b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 377c-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-388a / Science of Right, 397b-398a / Judgement, 471b-473a; 476a-495a,c; 513b-516b; 516d-517c; 524d-525a; 540b-542a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 471b-476a,c
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 197a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 70, 31a; ADDITIONS, 45, 123c-d / Philosophy of History, PART III, 280b-281b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 302b-304a
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95a / Descent of Man, 302a; 314c-315d esp 315d; 462d-463a; 569c; 577b-d
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 428b-d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 15d-16a; BK XI, 514c-d; BK XII, 542d; BK XIV, 611a-c; EPILOGUE I, 645a-646c; 647b-649c passim
54 FREUD: War and Death, 757d-759c esp 759a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 792b-c

CROSS-REFERENCES

For the conception of identity as a logical rather than a real relation, see SAME AND OTHER 1, 2d; and for the conception of the relation between creatures and God as partly real and partly logical, see GOD 5e; ONE AND MANY 1b; WORLD 3b.
For another consideration of correlative terms, see OPPOSITION 1a.
For the theory of proportionality or analogical similitude, see SAME AND OTHER 3b; and for the applications of analogy and proportion in metaphysics and mathematics, see IDEA 4b(4); MATHEMATICS 4c; QUANTITY 1b; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d, 5f.
For other discussions of indefinable terms, see DEFINITION 1c; PRINCIPLE 2a(3).
For the issues raised by a relational theory of judgment and reasoning, see IDEA 5b; JUDGMENT 5c, 6d, 7c; REASONING 2.
For discussions relevant to the conception of the categories as the transcendental concepts of the understanding, see FORM 1c; JUDGMENT 8c–8d; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); MIND 4d(3); PRINCIPLE 2b(3).
For the consideration of the relations between ideas as objects of knowledge, see IDEA 1a; KNOWLEDGE 6a(3).
For other discussions of the association of ideas, see IDEA 5e; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 2c.
For another discussion of the prior, the posterior, and the simultaneous, see TIME 5d.
For the order of causes, see CAUSE 1b.
For the order of goods, or of means and ends, see GOOD AND EVIL 5b-5c.
For the relation of quantities and the relation of qualities, see QUALITY 4c; QUANTITY 1b; SAME AND OTHER 3c-3d.
For the order of kinds, see ANIMAL 2a; EVOLUTION 1b; IDEA 4b(3); OPPOSITION 1c(2); SAME AND OTHER 3a(1)—3a(3); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5b.
For order in the soul, in the state, and in the universe or nature, see MAN 5-5a; NATURE 3a–3b; ONE AND MANY 3b(5); SOUL 2b; STATE 5a-5c, 6a-6b; WORLD 1a–1c, 6a-6c.
For the doctrine of the Trinity as concerned with order and relation in God, see GOD 9a.
For the absolute and the relative in space, time, and motion, see CHANGE 7c(3); SPACE 2a; TIME 1.
For the absolute and the relative in truth, goodness, and beauty, see BEAUTY 5; CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 9a-9b; GOOD AND EVIL 6d; OPINION 3c, 6a; PRINCIPLE 5; TRUTH 7-7b; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7a–7c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

HUME. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK I, PART I, SECT V
KANT. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, DIV III
HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL I, BK II, SECT II, CH 3; SECT III, CH 1, 3
J. S. MILL. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, CH 4-7
W. JAMES. Essays in Radical Empiricism
- The Meaning of Truth, CH 11, 13
- Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 9

II.

PETRUS HISPANICUS. Summulae Logicales (Logical Treatises)
DUNS SCOTUS. Tractatus de Primo Principio (A Tract Concerning the First Principle), CH 1-2
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, X (1), XXVIII (3), XXXII (2), XXXIX, XLVII, XLVIII (1-4), L (4), LIII–LIV
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica, PART II, Q 17
LEIBNIZ. Philosophical Works, CH 12 (A New System of the Interaction of Substances), 13 (Reply of M. Foucher Concerning the Interaction of Substances)
- New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH 25, 28, 30
DE MORGAN. Formal Logic, CH 3-5
BOOLE. An Investigation of the Laws of Thought
JEVONS. Pure Logic, CH 1-2, 4
LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK II, CH 3
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL III, PAR 45-149, 214-251; VOL VI, PAR 318-324, 386-392
BRADLEY. Appearance and Reality, BK I, CH 3; BK II, CH 26
- Collected Essays, VOL II (31)
COUTURAT. The Algebra of Logic
WOODWORTH. Psychological Issues, CH 5-6
CASSIRER. Substance and Function, PART I; PART II, CH 7-8; SUP II-III
WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Principia Mathematica, PART I, SECT C, D; PART II, SECT B, C, D, E; PART IV-V
ROYCE. The Principles of Logic
B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 9, 24-31
- The Problems of Philosophy, CH 9
- Our Knowledge of the External World, V
- Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, CH 4-6
W. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART I, CH 12-13
MOORE. Philosophical Studies, CH 9
WHITEHEAD. Science and the Modern World, CH 10
TARSKI. Introduction to Logic, V
BLANSHARD. The Nature of Thought, CH 31-32