Chapter 77: REASONING

INTRODUCTION

IN the tradition of western thought, certain verbal expressions have become shorthand for the fundamental ideas in the discussion of which they happen to be so often repeated. This may be due to the influence of the textbooks used in the schools, which copy one from another and hand down an easily recited jargon from generation to generation. In most cases the great books themselves are probably the original source, though they have usually suffered over-simplification or distortion when their insights are thus transmitted.

“Featherless biped” and “rational animal” are, for example, stock phrases to illustrate the idea that a definition consists of genus and differentia—the class to which man, in this instance, belongs and the attribute which differentiates him from other members of this class. Statements such as “the whole is greater than the part” or “two plus two equals four” similarly serve to represent axioms or at least statements which, whether or not they can be proved, are usually accepted as true without proof. In the field of reasoning, the familiar verbal landmark is “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” Even those who have never heard of syllogisms, or who are thoroughly innocent of the age-old controversies about the theory of the syllogism and the difference between deduction and induction, might offer this sequence of statements if, pressed to say what reasoning is, they tried to answer by giving an example.

The example, shopworn though it is and far from being the perfect paradigm, does convey certain insights into the nature of reasoning which are generally undisputed.

The word “therefore,” which connects the third statement with the first two, signifies a relationship which is sometimes described in terms of cause and effect, as by Aristotle, and sometimes in terms of antecedent and consequent, as by Hobbes. The premises (i.e., the statements which precede the “therefore”) cause the conclusion, it is said. We know that Socrates is mortal because we know that Socrates is a man and that all men are mortal. The premises are the cause in the sense of the reason why the conclusion may be regarded as true. The conclusion is also said to follow from the premises, or the premises are said to imply or yield the conclusion. If the premises are true, then the truth of the conclusion can be inferred or proved. The relationship between the premises and the conclusion seems to be the same whether the act of reasoning is called “proof” or “inference.” The distinction in meaning between these two words seems to be one of direction. We speak of “proving” a conclusion when we look toward the premises as the foundation for its truth; we speak of “inferring” a conclusion when we look toward it as something which can be drawn from the premises.

The words “if” and “then” indicate that reasoning is a motion of the mind from one statement to another. Sometimes the inference is immediate, as when we argue that if all men are mortal, then some mortals are men. Here only two propositions are involved, one of which is simply the converse of the other. Those who deny that immediate inference is truly inference (because a proposition and its converse are merely two ways of stating the same fact), insist that, implicitly or explicitly, reasoning always involves at least three statements. In any case, a single statement like “Socrates is a man,” or even a pair of statements connected by “and” rather than “if-then”—e.g., “Socrates is a man and Socrates is mortal”—does not express what is commonly recognized as reasoning. The motion of reasoning does, however, appear in this sequence of statements, “If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal,” even though it omits a statement that may be necessary to the validity of the reasoning, namely, “All men are mortal.”

Thus, the familiar grammatical distinctions of word (or phrase), sentence, and paragraph do not seem to provide a perfect parallel for the distinctions which the logicians make between terms, propositions, and syllogisms. But this much is clear. Just as a single word or phrase, like “man” or “rational animal,” can never express a proposition, but only a term, so a simple sentence expresses only a proposition, and never a syllogism; and a compound sentence, one made up of a number of sentences, expresses a syllogism only if its verbal construction somehow indicates that they form a sequence in which one follows from the others, or if they are related in such a way that the truth of one is caused by the truth of the others.

The chapter on IDEA (and perhaps also the chapter on DEFINITION) deals with that content or act of the mind—whether a percept or a concept, an image or an abstraction—which is verbally expressed in words or phrases and of which the term is the logical representative. The chapter on JUDGMENT (and perhaps also the chapter on PRINCIPLE) deals with the mental act or content that requires a sentence for its expression and is logically represented by the proposition. Here we are concerned with mental activity which involves not only two or more ideas, but also two or more judgments so connected that the mind passes from one to another.

Whether the logical structure that Aristotle calls a “syllogism” represents all forms of the mental activity called reasoning, is one of the great traditional issues. Hume suggests, for example, that animals reason without making use of syllogisms; and Descartes and Locke seem to hold that the highest forms of thinking, such as occur in mathematics or philosophy, cannot be reduced to syllogisms, except perhaps by a tour de force.

We face a different sort of problem when we compare reasoning with other acts of the mind—with conception (or the having of ideas) and with judgment (or the connecting of ideas with one another in the manner which mediaeval writers call “composition and division”). No one denies that reasoning is thinking, nor does anyone deny that there are forms of thinking which are not reasoning, since conceiving and judging are generally regarded as kinds of thinking or modes of thought. Reasoning is merely that mode of thought which is a process—the going step by step from one statement to another.

The problem which arises from the comparison of reasoning with other modes of thought turns on the question whether the mind can learn anything without having to think rationally. Can certain things be known by insight or instinct, by induction or intuition, rather than by reasoning? Are there truths which cannot be known by reasoning at all, but only by some other mode of thought? These questions in turn raise the problem of the priority or superiority of such modes of thought as do not consist in reasoning. The theory discussed in the chapter on INDUCTION—that induction is prior to reasoning because intuitive generalization from experience must provide the starting-points for demonstration—indicates one solution of the problem. Our present concern, however, goes beyond the issue concerning induction and deduction to the most general contrast between the intuitive and the rational.

For Plotinus any form of thinking—not merely reasoning—signifies a deficiency or weakness. In the scale of intellectual beings man occupies the lowest rank because he reasons. But even the pure intelligences, which know intuitively, rank below the One, because even the simplest act of thought involves some duality of subject and object. The One, according to Plotinus, transcends thought even as it transcends being. “The super-essential,” he says, “is the supra-cogitative.” The One “has no need for intellection, being always self-sufficing.”

Other writers do not go as far as this. Christian theologians do, however, contrast the human mind with the angelic intellect and the mind of God by saying that the latter are supra-rational, i.e., above the need to reason. They do not, like Plotinus, hold that the transcendent being transcends thought itself—certainly not insofar as they discuss the divine ideas. But the kind of thinking which is not an instantaneous act of vision or an immediate intuition involves the mind in a process of thought, somehow akin to change or motion; and this, the theologians hold, cannot take place in any immutable being—the angels or God.

The human intellect, according to Aquinas, gradually comes to know the truth “by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation… by advancing from one thing known to another. But if from the knowledge of a known principle [men] were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no place for discursiveness in the human intellect. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them.”

That, says Aquinas, is why the angels “are called intellectual beings” and men “are called rational.” Recourse to reasoning on the part of men betrays “the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the fullness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first grasping of principles they would at once comprehend all that they implied, by perceiving at once whatever could be reasoned out of them.”

The type of intuitive apprehension which the angels enjoy is even more perfectly exemplified in God’s knowledge. “In the divine knowledge,” according to Aquinas, “there is no discursiveness”—no succession, neither the turning from one thought to another, nor the advance from the known to the unknown by reasoning from principles to conclusion. The divine knowledge, Aquinas explains, is a single all-embracing act of vision, in which “God sees all things in one thing alone, which is Himself,” and therefore “sees all things together and not successively.” Apart from participation in the vision of God through supernatural light, all human thinking on the natural plane is discursive. Even the conception and the judgment are discursive in the sense that the one involves an act of abstraction or definition and the other involves a composition or division of concepts.

But though it is always discursive, human thinking is not, according to Aquinas, always involved in the motion of reasoning, that is, the transition from one thought to another. “Reasoning,” he says, “is compared to understanding”—i.e., the act of judgment by which we affirm or deny a single proposition—“as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession.”

Descartes uses the word “intuition” to name the way in which we know certain truths immediately and with certitude. He distinguishes “intuition from deduction by the fact that into the conception of the latter there enters a certain movement or succession, into that of the former there does not. … The first principles are given by intuition alone, while, on the contrary, the remote conclusions are furnished only by deduction.” But while deduction, which Descartes says he understands to be “all necessary inference from other facts that are known with certainty,” supplements intuition, it is never at any stage of the reasoning process independent of intuition.

Not only does intuition, according to Descartes, supply the first principles or ultimate premises of reasoning, but it also certifies each step in the process. He asks us to “consider this consequence: 2 and 2 amount to the same as 3 and 1. Now we need to see intuitively not only that 2 and 2 make 4, and that likewise 3 and 1 make 4, but further that the third of the above statements is a necessary conclusion from these two.”

If in addition to knowing the premises by intuition, the drawing of a conclusion from them is, as Descartes says, itself “effected by intuition”—if the act of inference rests on the intuition that the conclusion follows logically from the premises—in what way does deduction or reasoning supplement intuition? To this question, Descartes replies that though the mind “has a clear vision of each step in the process,” it cannot comprehend in one intuition all the connections involved in a long chain of reasoning. Only by taking the steps one after another can we “know that the last link in a long chain is connected with the first, even though we do not take in by means of one and the same act of vision all the intermediate links on which that connection depends, but only remember that we have taken them successively under review.”

Like Descartes, Locke contrasts intuition and reasoning, or intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. “Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this,” says Locke, “we may call intuitive knowledge. … When the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison … to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain by the intervention of other ideas … to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call reasoning.”

Again like Descartes, Locke asks, “What need is there of reason?” It is necessary, he thinks, “both for the enlargement of our knowledge and regulating our assent … Sense and intuition reach but very little of the way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas; and in those cases where we are fain to substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for true without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their probability.” But though reasoning enlarges our knowledge beyond what can be known intuitively, reasoning produces certain knowledge, according to Locke, only if “every step in reasoning … has intuitive certainty. … To make anything a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last, in the account) is found.”

On this view of reasoning, nothing can be known demonstratively or by proof unless some things can be known intuitively, i.e., without inference or proof. Locke and Descartes seem to agree with Aquinas and Aristotle that demonstration depends upon indemonstrable truths, whether these are called axioms, immediate propositions, first principles, or self-evident maxims. Locke and Descartes, on the one hand, stress the point that in reasoning the logical connection between premises and conclusion is also indemonstrable and must be intuitively perceived. Aquinas and Aristotle, on the other, repeatedly observe that the truth of the conclusion is implicitly contained in the truth of the premises, so that the advance which reasoning appears to make from the known to the unknown consists in coming to know actually what is already potentially known. Nevertheless they, unlike Descartes and Locke, maintain that reasoning extends knowledge, even though it may not be the method of initial discovery.

A somewhat contrary view seems to be taken by Hume. If the objects under consideration are matters of fact rather than the relations between our own ideas, the kind of reasoning which goes from premises to conclusion avails not at all. The beliefs we hold about such matters, according to Hume, result from mental operations which are “a species of natural instinct … which no reasoning or process of thought is able either to produce or to prevent.” What he calls “experimental reasoning” or “reasoning concerning matters of fact” is founded, he says, “on a species of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events which we have observed to result from similar causes.”

Not only men, but also animals reason in this way. But Hume thinks “it is impossible that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning by which he concludes that like events must follow like objects. … The experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties.”

The foregoing considerations indicate how diverse theories of the role of reasoning arise from diverse theories of the nature and kinds of knowledge in animals, men, angels, and God. According as various distinctions are made between human knowledge and opinion, or between the way in which different objects can be known, or between speculative and practical interests, so, too, different formulations are given of the nature of reasoning.

Aristotle’s distinction, for example, between scientific and dialectical or rhetorical reasoning turns upon his understanding of the difference between the objects of certain knowledge and the objects of probable opinion. This difference, he says, makes it “equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.”

Hume’s distinction between a priori and a posteriori reasoning—i.e., between reasoning from principles and reasoning from experience—depends upon his understanding of what matters must be submitted to experience and of the manner in which experience generates belief. The distinction which Aquinas makes between demonstrations propter quid and demonstrations quia—i.e., between proving what something is from its causes and proving that it is from its effects—depends upon his understanding of the difference between essence and existence as objects of rational knowledge.

To take an example in the opposite vein, Locke’s theory that the same type of demonstration is possible in both mathematics and the moral sciences, seems to rest upon his view that all knowledge consists in the comparison of ideas. In contrast to this, other theories, which hold that the mode of reasoning differs in different disciplines (especially in mathematics and morals, or in metaphysics and the natural sciences), seem to arise from the contrary view that, in these different fields of inquiry, the objects and conditions of knowledge are different.

Sometimes a distinction in the modes of reasoning is based upon the same considerations, but the distinction itself is expressed by different writers in different terms. The role of causes in reasoning appears to underlie Aquinas’ distinction between a priori and a posteriori reasoning, or reasoning from cause to effect as opposed to reasoning from effect to cause. “Demonstration can be made in two ways,” he writes; “one is through the cause and is called a priori, and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration a posteriori; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us.” Descartes appears to make a parallel distinction, though he makes it in different terms. “The method of proof is twofold,” he says, “one being analytic, the other synthetic. Analysis shows the true way by which a thing was methodically discovered, as it were effect from cause. … Synthesis employs an opposite procedure, one in which the search goes as it were from effect to cause.” For both mathematical and metaphysical reasoning, Descartes prefers the analytic to the synthetic method.

According to Newton, the method of analysis, in natural science as well as mathematics, consists in going from effects to causes, while the method of synthesis goes from causes to effects. Newton relates the difference between analysis and synthesis to the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning. This way of distinguishing between inductive and deductive reasoning, in terms of going from effects to causes or from causes to effects, would also seem to be related to the distinction Aquinas makes between demonstration quia (i.e., reasoning which proves only that something exists) and demonstration propter quid (i.e., reasoning which proves what something is—its nature or properties). The proof that God exists is, according to Aquinas, a demonstration quia; it is also a posteriori reasoning or reasoning from effect to cause. But he would not call it “inductive.” In one passage at least, he seems to regard induction as the method whereby we can come to some knowledge of what God is. “From natural things,” he writes, “one does not come by a demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but by the induction of reason one may know something above nature, since the natural bears a certain resemblance to the supernatural.”

This sense of the word ‘induction,’ however, is like that in which Aristotle opposes induction to reasoning, not like that in which he distinguishes between inductive and deductive reasoning according to the order of terms in the inductive and deductive syllogism. In the ordinary deductive syllogism, the middle term establishes the connection between the two extreme terms (for example, ‘being a man’ establishes the connection between ‘Socrates’ and ‘being mortal’). But “the syllogism which springs out of induction,” according to Aristotle, establishes “a relation between one extreme and the middle by means of the other extreme, e.g., if B is the middle term between A and C, it consists in proving through C that A belongs to B.” Starting from C (particular cases of long-lived animals, such as man, horse, mule), we can argue inductively from the fact that these long-lived animals are bileless, to the general connection between B (being bileless) and A (being long-lived). Such reasoning is valid, Aristotle adds, only if we can treat C “as made up of all the particulars; for induction proceeds through an enumeration of all the cases.”

Different theories of definition also affect the place which is assigned to definition in reasoning. Hobbes, for example, regards reasoning as a kind of calculation with names, which wholly depends upon the determination of their meanings. The operations of addition and subtraction when done with words rather than with numbers are, he thinks, equivalent to “conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part.” It is “nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon.” Aristotle, with the theory that definitions state the essential natures of things, not just the meanings of words, holds that a definition may be “the conclusion of a demonstration giving essential nature,” as well as “an indemonstrable statement of essential nature.” In the latter case, the definition functions as a principle in demonstration.

According to William James, reasoning, like definition, is “a selective activity of the mind” which serves an individual’s interest or purpose. “My thinking,” he says, “is first, last, and always for the sake of my doing. … Reasoning is always for a subjective interest, to attain some particular conclusion, or to gratify some special curiosity.” It makes no difference whether the interest is practical or the curiosity speculative. The process of reasoning will be the same, though the element which provides a solution to the problem in any emergency will be called a “reason’ if the emergency be theoretical, a “means’ if it be practical.”

Those writers who, like Aristotle and Aquinas, regard the speculative and the practical as distinct though related orders of thought and knowledge, seem to think that practical reasoning has its own syllogistic form. Practical deliberations for them are different from theoretic demonstrations. The conclusion of theoretic reasoning is an assertion that something is either true or false, whereas the conclusion of practical deliberation is a judgment that something is good or evil, and therefore should either be done or avoided. According to Aristotle, practical reasoning of the sort which ends in a decision that leads to action, takes the form of a syllogism which has one universal and one particular premise. The major premise is a general rule of conduct, the minor premise a particular perception of fact. In the example Aristotle gives of the practical syllogism, the major premise is the rule that everything sweet ought to be tasted, and the minor premise is the perception that this particular thing is sweet. These two premises lead to the practical conclusion that this particular thing ought to be tasted.

Not all practical reasoning, however, is concerned with reaching decisions or prompting action in particular cases. The rules of conduct which decisions and actions apply may themselves be the products of practical reasoning. The process by which general rules are derived from even more general principles—the precepts of law or morality—involves, according to Aquinas, a form of thinking distinctly different from the theoretic or speculative sort. He points out in his Treatise on Law that we are able to formulate certain practical rules only by making particular determinations of universal principles, not by drawing deductions from them. “Something may be derived from the natural law in two ways,” he writes: “first, as a conclusion from premises; secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like that by which, in the speculative sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles; while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details.” Of these two ways of thinking in the field of law, it would appear that it is only the second type which is peculiar to the practical as opposed to the speculative order.

The discussion of reasoning in relation to knowledge, opinion, and action, or in relation to different disciplines and sciences, usually presupposes a theory of the form which reasoning takes regardless of its subject matter or use. This fact is most explicitly attested by the order of three great books concerned with reasoning. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics deals with the theory of demonstration in the sciences. His Topics deals with the theory of probable argument or reasoning in the sphere of opinion. Both are preceded by his Prior Analytics which treats of the syllogism in terms of its purely formal structure and its various forms. In the later tradition, the distinction between the problems of the Prior and the Posterior Analytics comes to be represented by the separation between what are called “formal” and “material” logic.

The formal analysis of reasoning centers on the problem of its cogency. Quite apart from any consideration of the truth of its premises or conclusions, reasoning is true or false according as it is valid or invalid on purely logical grounds. From premises which are in fact false, a conclusion, which may be either true or false, can be truly inferred if the structure of the reasoning is formally valid—that is, if the form of the premises stands in a certain logically prescribed relation to the form of the conclusion. The logical problem, then, is to prescribe the formal relationships among propositions which permit valid inference from certain propositions to others, without regard to the content of the propositions or their truth in fact.

Defining a syllogism as “discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so,” Aristotle says, “I call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make plain what necessarily follows; a syllogism is imperfect, if it needs either one or more propositions which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down, but have not been expressly stated as premises.” Using the letters S and P to symbolize the subject and predicate of the conclusion, and the letter M to symbolize the middle term, the term which appears in the premises but not in the conclusion, Aristotle states the form of a perfect syllogism in the following manner: “All M is P, all S is M; therefore all S is P.”

The first of these propositions, the one which contains the predicate of the conclusion, is called the major premise; the second, the one which contains the subject of the conclusion, the minor premise; the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term, the predicate the major term. Aristotle classifies syllogisms into three figures, or formal types, according to the position of the middle term, either as subject of the major premise and predicate of the minor in the first figure, or as predicate in both or as subject in both in the second and third figures respectively. Then according to whether the premises are universal propositions or particular (‘All M is P’ or ‘Some S is M’), and each is either affirmative or negative (‘All M is P’ or ‘Some S is not M’), he further distinguishes within each figure a number of valid moods, or formally correct patterns of inference.

For example, in no figure can a valid mood be constructed with two particular or two negative premises. No conclusion can be drawn from the two particular statements that some poisons are liquids and that some liquids are indispensable to life; nor can any conclusion be drawn from the two negative statements that no triangles are parallelograms and no rhomboids are parallelograms. In the first figure, the minor premise can be particular and must be affirmative, the major can be negative and must be universal. In this figure the following combinations of premises—“some figures are not rectangular” with “all rectangular figures are parallelograms,” or “all prime numbers are odd” with “some odd numbers are squares”—yield no conclusions. In the second figure, one premise must be negative. Here it is impossible to draw a valid conclusion from two affirmative premises. Nothing follows from the two affirmative statements that all fish swim and all whales swim. In the third figure, only a particular conclusion can be drawn from a pair of premises both of which are universal. From the proposition that no men are wise and the proposition that all men are mortal, we can conclude only that some mortals are not wise.

From these examples it will be seen that Aristotle’s rules of the syllogism are rules concerning the quantity and quality of the premises required in each figure to permit a valid inference; and as in the third figure these rules permit only a particular conclusion to be drawn, so for all figures they determine the character of the conclusion which can be drawn from premises of a certain quantity and quality. If one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative. If one premise is particular, the conclusion must be particular.

There seems to be one universal principle of the syllogism which underlies all these specific rules for the valid moods in different figures. “When one thing is predicated of another,” Aristotle says, “all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject.” The negative aspect of this principle is immediately obvious. What cannot be predicated of a predicate, cannot be predicated of its subject. In the tradition of formal logic, this principle is sometimes stated in terms of the relation of classes rather than in terms of subjects and predicates: if one class is included in a second, and that second class is included in a third, the first is included in the third; and if one class excludes another, the classes which it includes are also excluded from that other.

The principle of the syllogism is traditionally called the dictum de omni et nullo. The dictum de omni, which Kant in his Introduction to Logic calls “the supreme principle of affirmative syllogisms,” is thus expressed by him: “Whatever is universally affirmed of a concept is also affirmed of everything contained under it.” The dictum de nullo, according to Kant, states that “whatever is universally denied of a concept is also denied of everything that is contained under it.” Kant appears to think that both these rules follow from even more general principles: that “an attribute of an attribute is an attribute of the thing itself” and that “whatever is inconsistent with the attribute of a thing is inconsistent with the thing itself.”

James also attempts to make a more general formulation of the dictum de omni et nullo. This law of thought, he says, is “only the result of the function of comparison in the mind which has come by some lucky variation to apprehend a series of more than two terms at once.” As James states what he calls the “principle of mediate comparison,” it appears to be broader than the principle of the syllogism. It applies to any series of related terms—to the relation of equal and unequal quantities in mathematics, as well as to the relation of subjects and predicates in the logic of predication or classes.

James’ principle of mediate comparison itself depends on what in mathematical logic and the logic of relations is called the “transitivity” of relations. The relation of larger than, for example, is transitive; for if one thing is larger than a second, and the second is larger than a third, it follows that the first is larger than the third. As stated in mathematical logic, the principle of the syllogism is merely a special case of transitivity as it appears in the relation of implication; for if P implies Q, and Q implies R, then P implies R.

James recognizes this when he writes that “the principle of mediate predication or subsumption is only the axiom of skipped intermediaries applied to a series of successive predications. It expresses the fact that any earlier term in the series stands to any later term, in the same relation in which it stands to any intermediate term; in other words, that whatever has an attribute has all the attributes of that attribute; or more briefly still, that whatever is of a kind is of that kind’s kind.” Along with “the axiom of mediate equality, ‘equals of equals are equal,’” the rule of mediate predication or subsumption is, according to James, a special case of the law that “skipping intermediary terms leaves relations the same. This AXIOM OF SKIPPED INTERMEDIARIES or Of TRANSFERRED RELATIONS … seems to be on the whole the broadest and deepest law of man’s thought.”

James’s attempt to state a law of thought or principle of reasoning which relegates all the rules of the syllogism to the status of a special case represents one type of attack on the syllogism. Whether, for instance, the sample of reasoning which Descartes asks us to consider—that if 2 and 2 make 4, and 3 and 1 make 4, then 2 and 2 amount to the same as 3 and 1—can be reduced to the syllogistic form of subject and predicate, or must be formulated under a more general principle of “transferred relations,” illustrates the basic issue here between subject-predicate logic and relational or mathematical logic. Other aspects of that issue are discussed in the chapters on LOGIC, JUDGMENT, and RELATION.

Another type of criticism of the traditional theory of the syllogism accepts the syllogism as the form of all reasoning, but objects, as Kant does, to what he calls “the mistaken subtlety” of the classification of syllogisms according to figures and moods. But Kant does not deny all distinctions among syllogisms. On the contrary, he says that syllogisms are “threefold, like all judgements, differing from each other in the manner in which they express the relation of knowledge in the understanding, namely, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive.” Whether the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms are distinct types of reasoning, or only special cases which it would be a mistaken subtlety to treat as having principles of their own, is a problem considered in the chapter on HYPOTHESIS.

Of all criticisms, the most severe is that which either rejects the syllogism entirely as of no use in reasoning, or regards the deductive syllogism as useful only in argumentation or debate, not in the process of inquiry or discovery, where inductive reasoning alone is fruitful or instructive. From the conclusion of a syllogism, according to Mill, one learns nothing more than one already knew in the premises; whereas in inductive reasoning, Mill, like Bacon, thinks that the mind goes beyond anything contained in the premises and genuinely discovers a new truth.

It seems to be Descartes’ opinion that “the syllogistic forms are of no aid in perceiving the truth about objects.” Locke makes the same point more extensively. Admitting that “all right reasoning may be reduced to [Aristotle’s] forms of syllogism,” he denies that they are “the best way of reasoning for the leading of those into truth who are willing to find it and desire to make the best use of their reason for the attainment of knowledge. … The rules of syllogism,” he writes, “serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid, is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing to any rules of common logic. A man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically; so that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then a man has little or no need of it. … Syllogism, at best, is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge we have, without making any addition to it.”

It may be that the critics of the syllogism attribute to its exponents claims they do not make. Aristotle, for example, seems to present the syllogism as a method of expounding arguments rather than of discovering them, and of testing the validity of reasoning rather than of learning the truth about things. “All instruction given or received by way of argument,” he writes, “proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the species of instruction. The mathematical sciences, and all other speculative disciplines, are acquired in this way, and so are the two forms of dialectical reasoning, syllogistic and inductive; for each of these latter makes use of old knowledge to impart new, the syllogism assuming an audience that accepts its premises, induction exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. Definitions or descriptions of reasoning: the process of thought 1a. Human reasoning compared with the reasoning of animals 1b. Discursive reasoning contrasted with immediate intuition 1c. The role of sense, memory, and imagination in reasoning: perceptual inference, rational reminiscence, the collation of images

2. The rules of reasoning: the theory of the syllogism 2a. The structure of a syllogism: its figures and moods (1) The number of premises and the number of terms: the middle term in reasoning (2) Affirmation, negation, and the distribution of the middle term: the quantity and the quality of the premises 2b. The kinds of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, modal 2c. The connection of syllogisms: sorites, pro-syllogisms and epi-syllogisms

3. The truth and cogency of reasoning 3a. Formal and material truth: logical validity distinguished from factual truth 3b. Lack of cogency in reasoning: invalid syllogisms; formal fallacies 3c. Lack of truth in reasoning: sophistical arguments; material fallacies 3d. Necessity and contingency in reasoning: logical necessity; certainty and probability

4. The types of reasoning, inference, or argument 4a. Immediate inference: its relation to mediated inference or reasoning 4b. The direction and uses of reasoning: the distinction between proof and inference, and between demonstration and discovery 4c. Inductive and deductive reasoning 4d. Direct and indirect argumentation: proof by reductio ad absurdum; argument from the impossible or ideal case 4e. Refutation: disproof 4f. Reasoning by analogy: arguments from similarity

5. Reasoning in relation to knowledge, opinion, and action 5a. The fact and the reasoned fact: mere belief distinguished from belief on rational grounds 5b. Scientific reasoning: the theory of demonstration (1) The indemonstrable as a basis for demonstration (2) Definitions used as means in reasoning: definitions as the ends of reasoning (3) A priori and a posteriori reasoning: from causes or from effects; from principles or from experience; analysis and synthesis (4) The role of causes in demonstration and scientific reasoning (5) Demonstration in relation to essence and existence: demonstrations propter quid and quia 5c. Dialectical reasoning: the opposition of rational arguments 5d. Rhetorical reasoning: the rational grounds of persuasion 5e. Practical reasoning (1) The form of the practical syllogism (2) Deduction and determination in legal thought (3) Deliberation: the choice of alternative means; decision

6. The character of reasoning in the various disciplines 6a. Proof in metaphysics and theology 6b. Demonstration in mathematics: analysis and synthesis 6c. Inductive and deductive inference in the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences 6d. Induction and demonstration in the moral sciences

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. Definitions or descriptions of reasoning: the process of thought

• 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 244c-245c / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Theaetetus, 537d-538a / Sophist, 570a-577b / Statesman, 594d-595d / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24b18-22] 39c / Topics, BK I, CH 1 143a-d / Sophistical Refutations, CH 1 [165a1-3] 227b; CH 2 227d-228a
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
• 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 12, 164b
• 18 AUGUSTINE: On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31 651d-652b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 7 81d-82b; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d; A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 79, AA 8-9 421c-423d; A 10, REP 2-3 423d-424d; Q 84, A 3, REP 3 443d-444d; Q 85, A 5, ANS 457d-458d
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 2, A 1 391a-392a; Q 8, A 1, REP 2 417a-d; PART II-II, Q 1, A 3 773d-774c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56d-57a; 58a-c; 60a
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-335c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, 1a-40a,c passim, esp V-VII 7d-12a, X-XII 15d-25a, XIV, 28b-29a, 32d / Objections and Replies, 137a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II, SECT 2-13 309d-312b; CH XV, SECT 1 365a-c; CH XVII 371c-380d passim, esp SECT 2 371d-372b
• 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 337d-342c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 15d-16c; 20a; 34c-35b; 108a-209d esp 109d-112d, 115d-116a, 118a-c, 119a-b, 129c-130c, 158a-159d, 173b-174a, 185b-c, 187a-c, 193d-194b, 199a-c; 224a-227a / Critique of Judgement, 551a-552c; 570b-572c
• 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1a
• 49 DARWIN: The Descent of Man, 292b-293d; 299b-300a
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 146a-187a esp 161a-176a, 179b-184a, 186a; 360a-362b; 381b-385b; 664a-693b esp 666b-668a, 672b-678b, 690a-b
• 54 FREUD: The Interpretation of Dreams, 337a; 363b-364b esp 364a-b; 367b-c; 377c-379c esp 379a-c; 384c-385c / The Unconscious, 442d-443a / The Ego and the Id, 700a-701d esp 701d

1a. Human reasoning compared with the reasoning of animals

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a25-27] 499b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 3 [414b17-20] 644d; [415a7-12] 645b / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453a5-14] 695b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [488b20-27] 9d / Nicomachean Ethics, BK VI, CH 7 [1141a22-28] 390a-b; BK VII, CH 3 [1147b2-5] 397d / Politics, BK VII, CH 13 [1332b3-5] 537a-b
• 10 GALEN: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12, 173a-c
• 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK V, SECT 16 271c-d; BK VI, SECT 23 276b; BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c-396a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 5 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 86, A 4, REP 3 463d-464d; Q 96, A 1, REP 4 510b-511b; PART I-II, Q 13, A 2, REP 3 673c-674c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 2 8b-9a
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52b; 53a-b; 53d-54a; 57d; 59b-c; 63a; 64a-c; 79b-c; PART II, 100a-c; PART IV, 267b
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215a-223b passim, esp 220b-223b
• 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 35, 163d
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART V, 59a-60c / Objections and Replies, 156c-d
• 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VII [449-549] 227a-229a; BK VIII [369-451] 240a-242a; BK IX [549-566] 259b
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 339-344 233a-b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 11 145d-146a; CH XXVII, SECT 8 221a-222a; BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 1 371c-d
• 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 11 407b-408a
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IX 487b-488c
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 151b-152a; 159b-160a
• 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 337d-338a; 341d-342a / The Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 199c-200c / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372a-b / Critique of Judgement, 602b,d [fn 1]
• 49 DARWIN: The Descent of Man, 292b-297c esp 292b-294c; 400a-c
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 665a-666b; 676b-677a esp 677a; 679a-686b esp 679a-683a, 686a-b; 873a

1b. Discursive reasoning contrasted with immediate intuition

• 7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 6 [1048a18-34] 574a-c; CH 9 [1051b22-34] 577b-c; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b14-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 605a-d
• 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR I, CH 18 151b-c; TR IV, CH 1 159a-d; CH 12, 164b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 216c-217b; TR V, CH 1-2 228b-229d passim; CH 7 231d-232b; TR VI 235b-237d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IX, PAR 23-25 68a-c; BK XII, PAR 16 102d-103a / The City of God, BK IX, CH 22 296d-297a; BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; CH 7 326a-c; CH 21 333a-d; CH 29 339a-b; BK XVI, CH 6 426c-427a; BK XXII, CH 29, 614b-d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 7 81d-82b; Q 34, A 1, REP 2 185b-187b; Q 46, A 2, REP 3 253a-255a; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d; A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 79, A 8, ANS and REP 3 421c-422b; Q 85, A 5, ANS 457d-458d; PART I-II, Q 14, A 1, REP 2 677b-678a; Q 15, A 4, REP 1 683b-684a
• 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [43-45] 108a
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 17b-c / Novum Organum, BK II, APH 15 149a
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, III, 4a-d; XI 17b-18b; XII, 23b-c / Objections and Replies, 123a-b
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PART V, PROP 28 459b
• 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [469-505] 185b-186a
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1-5 171a-173a; 277-288 222b-224b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH III, SECT 23 119b-120a; BK IV, CH I, SECT 2, 309b; CH IX, SECT 2-3 349a-c; CH XVII, SECT 14-17 378c-379c
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 33a-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 320c-321b; 337a-c; 350c-351b / Critique of Judgement, 572d-574b; 579a

1c. The role of sense, memory, and imagination in reasoning: perceptual inference, rational reminiscence, the collation of images

• 7 PLATO: Meno, 179d-183a; 188d-189a / Phaedo, 224a-225c; 228a-230a / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a2-16] 632a-b; BK III, CH 7 [431b14-19] 663d-664b / On Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [436b17-437a17] 673d-674a / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453a5-15] 695b
• 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [353-521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a
• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 10 73d-74a; PAR 16-19 75b-76b; PAR 26-38 78a-81a / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 4-5 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52b-54c; 60a-b; PART IV, 267b
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-335c esp 334c-d
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 18b-c; 20b-d; XIV 28a-33b / Discourse on the Method, PART I, 41d / Objections and Replies, 229d-230c
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 13 146b-c
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b
• 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 341d-342a
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 34a-c; 54b-64a; 111d-112a / Critique of Practical Reason, 352c-353a
• 49 DARWIN: The Descent of Man, 292d-293d
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 381b-385b; 525a-526b; 664a-666b esp 664b-665b; 667b-674a; 676a-686b esp 677a-678b

2. The rules of reasoning: the theory of the syllogism

• 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 244c-245c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 3 [1b10-16] 5c-d / Prior Analytics 39a-93a,c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 14 108d-109a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356b13-17] 596a
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31-34 651d-653b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-58a; 58d-60b
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 56c-58b esp 57b-58b; 59c-60a; 96d-97a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14 107d-108a; APH 104-106 128a-c; BK II, APH 27-32 157b-161b esp APH 32 161a-b
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind 1a-40a,c passim, esp V-VII 7d-12a, X-XI 15d-25a, XIV, 28b-29a, 32d / Discourse on the Method 41a-67a,c esp PART I, 41d-42b, PART II, 45b-c, 46c-48b, PART III, 50b-51a, PART IV, 52a
• 33 PASCAL: On the Geometrical Spirit, 430b-434a; 442a-443b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 4-8 372c-377d
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a
• 41 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 299b
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 59c-108a,c; 110d-112d esp 110d-111c; 115d-119a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-b / Critique of Judgement, 600d-603d esp 601d-602b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 667b-668a; 868b-873a esp 869b-870a, 871a, 872b-873a; 878b-879a

2a. The structure of a syllogism: its figures and moods

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1-26 39a-60b
• 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 22b-c
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 59c-60a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 4, 373c-375a; SECT 8 377b-d
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 110d-112d esp 110d-111c; 118a-c

2a(1) The number of premises and the number of terms: the middle term in reasoning

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 4 [25b32-39] 40d; CH 25 58d-59d; CH 32 65a-d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 3 [1014a35-b3] 534c
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 59c-60a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 4, 374d-375a; SECT 8, 377c-d
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 110d-112d esp 110d-111c, 112a; 118a-c
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 667b-668a; 672b

2a(2) Affirmation, negation, and the distribution of the middle term: the quantity and the quality of the premises

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 4-7 40d-45b; CH 24 58b-d; CH 26 59d-60b; CH 33 65d-66a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 14 108d-109a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 86, A 1, REP 2 461c-462a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 8, 377b-c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 39c-41c esp 39d-40c

2b. The kinds of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, modal

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 23 57b-58b; CH 27-29 60b-63d; CH 44 68d-69b
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 110d-111e esp 111b; 175c-d

2c. The connection of syllogisms: sorites, pro-syllogisms and epi-syllogisms

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 25 [42b1-26] 59c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 25 [86a33-b20] 118a-c
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 4 373a-374d; SECT 15, 379a-b
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 111d-112d; 115d-119a
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 872b-873a

3. The truth and cogency of reasoning

3a. Formal and material truth: logical validity distinguished from factual truth

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 2-4 72d-77a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 12 [77b16-34] 106d-107a / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a5-12] 259d; CH 3 [186a4-9] 260d-261a
• 10 GALEN: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 14, 178c-d
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31-34 651d-653b
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 57d-58a; 59c-60c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14 107d-108a
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, X, 16d-17a / Objections and Replies, 126b-127c
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 13 146b-c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 36a-37d esp 36b-37b; 180c-182b; 193a-b
• 44 BOSWELL: Life of Samuel Johnson, 134c-d
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 683d-684a
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 872b; 879b-885a esp 880b-882a

3b. Lack of cogency in reasoning: invalid syllogisms; formal fallacies

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 16-21 85c-89b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 12 [77b16-34] 106d-107a / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a5-12] 259d; CH 3 [186a4-9] 260d-261a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 24 649d-651d
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31-34 651d-653b
• 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 23b-c
• 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 126b-127c
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 368b-369a
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 109b-c; 133d
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 108a-b; 227b-228a; 236b [fn 1]; 526b [fn 1]

3c. Lack of truth in reasoning: sophistical arguments; material fallacies

• 7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedo, 237b-238a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 34-35 66b-d; BK II, CH 18 87a-b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 16-17 109b-111b / Topics, BK I, CH 1 [100b23-101a18] 143b-d; BK VIII, CH 10 [160b23-39] 218b-c; CH 12-13 220c-221d / On Sophistical Refutations 227a-253d / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a5-12] 259d; CH 3 [186a4-9] 260d-261a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 24 649d-651d
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
• 18 AUGUSTINE: On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31 651d-652b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-60c
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 60a-61d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 38-69 109c-116b
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, X, 16d-17a / Objections and Replies, 126b-127c
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 367a-368b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 10, 123c; CH XI, SECT 13 146b-c; BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 19-21 379d-380a
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 75, 484c; SECT XII, DIV 132 509a-d
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 36d-37d; 109b-c; 120c-121c; 133d

3d. Necessity and contingency in reasoning: logical necessity; certainty and probability

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24b18-26] 39c; CH 8-22 45b-57b; CH 30 [46a3-10] 63d; BK II, CH 25 91a-b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [72a25-b4] 98d-99a; CH 6 [75a12-28] 103a-b / Topics, BK I, CH 1 [100a25-b23] 143a-b; BK II, CH 6 [112a16-23] 157b-c; BK VIII, CH 12 [162a35-b2] 220c / Physics, BK II, CH 9 [200a15-29] 277c-d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 5 [1015b6-8] 535d-536a; BK VII, CH 15 [1039b31-1040a8] 563d-564a; BK XII, CH 8 [1074a14-16] 604c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b12-27] 339d-340a; CH 7 [1098a25-b7] 343d-344a; BK VI, CH 3 388b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a3-18] 594b; CH 2 [1357a14-30] 596d-597a; BK II, CH 25 [1402b13-1403a17] 652b-653a
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7, 112d-113d; CH 26, 131b
• 16 COPERNICUS: On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 7, ANS and REP 2 56a-57b; Q 19, A 8, REP 3 116a-d; Q 44, A 1, REP 2 238b-239a; Q 47, A 1, REP 3 256a-257b; Q 82, A 2, ANS 432d-433c; PART I-II, Q 13, A 5, ANS 675c-676b; A 6, REP 1-2 676c-677b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART II-II, Q 4, A 8 409a-d; PART III, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 65c-d; 71c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II 2a-3b; XII, 23b / Discourse on the Method, PART II, 46c-48b / Meditations on First Philosophy, I, 76c
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 368b-369a
• 34 HUYGENS: Treatise on Light, PREF, 551b-552a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XV, SECT 1-3 365a-d esp SECT 1 365a-c; CH XVI 366d-371c passim; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT 15-17 378d-379c
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20-21 458a-c; SECT VI 469d-470d esp 469d [fn 1]; SECT X, DIV 87-88 489b-490b
• 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 348a,c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 14d; 17d-18a; 194b-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-d
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 878a-884b

4. The types of reasoning, inference, or argument

4a. Immediate inference: its relation to mediated inference or reasoning

• 7 PLATO: Euthyphro, 196d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 7 [17b23-37] 27b-c; CH 10 [20a16-37] 30d-31b / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 2-3 39d-40c; BK II, CH 8-10 79b-81b; CH 22 [67b26-68a24] 89b-d
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 17d-18a; 109d-111c esp 109d-110a, 110d-111c

4b. The direction and uses of reasoning: the distinction between proof and inference, and between demonstration and discovery

• 7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 3 [72b25-33] 99c / Topics, BK I, CH 2 143d-144a / On Sophistical Refutations, CH 2 227d-228a; CH 10-11 234d-237c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095a30-b13] 340c-d
• 11 ARCHIMEDES: The Method, 569b-570a
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 267a-b
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 56c-58b; 59c-d; 96d-97a / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; BK I 107a-136a,c esp APH 11-26 107d-108d, APH 29-30 109a, APH 69 116a-b, APH 103-106 127d-128c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II, 2c-3a; X, 16d-17a; XIV, 28b-c / Discourse on the Method, PART II, 46c-48b
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1 171a-172a; 40 177b-178a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH VII, SECT 11, 340c-341a; CH XVII, SECT 2-3 371d-372b; SECT 6-7 376c-377b
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 15d-16c; 110d-111c; 119a-b; 193a-200c esp 193d-194b, 199a-c / Critique of Practical Reason, 294a-b / Critique of Judgement, 570b-572b; 572d-574b; 600d-603d esp 603b-c
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 381b-385b esp 382a, 384a-385b; 672b-673b

4c. Inductive and deductive reasoning

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 23 90a-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [71a1-11] 97a; CH 3 [72b25-33] 99c; CH 18 111b-c; BK II, CH 7 [92a34-b1] 126b / Topics, BK I, CH 12 148d; CH 18 [108b7-12] 152d; BK VIII, CH 14 [164a11-16] 222d
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095a30-b8] 340c; CH 7 [1098a35-b3] 343d; BK VI, CH 3 388b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356a36-1358a35] 596a-598b; BK II, CH 20-22 640d-645a
• 28 GALILEO: Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 252a-b
• 28 HARVEY: The Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals, 280c
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 42a-c; 57b-58b; 61d; 96d-97a / Novum Organum, BK I 107a-136a,c esp APH 11-26 107d-108d, APH 69 116a-b, APH 103-106 127d-128c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, III, 2d-3a; III, 4c-d; VII 10b-12a; XI 17b-18b; XII, 23b-24c / Discourse on the Method, PART VI, 61d-62c / Objections and Replies, 167c-d
• 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULE IV 271b / Optics, BK III, 543a-b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XII, SECT 6-13 360a-362d
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 9 454c-455a; SECT III, DIV 19, 458a; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT VIII, DIV 65, 479b-c; SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d passim
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 45b-46a; 195d-197b
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim; 475b,d [fn 1] passim
• 45 FARADAY: Experimental Researches in Electricity, 659a
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 690b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 674a-675b esp 675b

4d. Direct and indirect argumentation: proof by reductio ad absurdum; argument from the impossible or ideal case

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 23 57b-58b; CH 29 62d-63d; BK II, CH 11-14 81b-84b; CH 17 86b-87a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 26 118d-119b / Topics, BK VIII, CH 2 [157b34-158a2] 214b-c / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 [1006a12-29] 525b-c; BK XI, CH 5 [1061b34-1062a12] 590a-b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VII, CH 2 [1146a22-30] 396b
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 368b
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 227a-228a

4e. Refutation: disproof

• 7 PLATO: Sophist, 558b-d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 20 87c-d; CH 26 91b-d / On Sophistical Refutations, CH 4-11 228b-237c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VII, CH 1 [1145b1-7] 395b / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 22 [1396b20]-CH 26 [1403b34] 644d-653a,c esp CH 25 [1402a29]-CH 26 [1403b34] 651d-653a,c
• 10 GALEN: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 14, 177a-179d
• 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 208a-c
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 368b

4f. Reasoning by analogy: arguments from similarity

• 7 PLATO: Republic, BK II, 316a-b; BK IV, 350a-b; BK VI-VII, 383d-391b
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 24 90c-91a / Topics, BK I, CH 18 [108b6-19] 152d-153a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357b25-1358a2] 597c-d; BK II, CH 20 [1393a22-1394a8] 640d-641d
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, REP 2 938a-939d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60c; 67c
• 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 34 109b; BK II, APH 27, 158a-b
• 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 370b-371a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 2 144a-c; BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a
• 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 105-106 433b-d
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XI, DIV 113 502a-d; DIV 115 503b-c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Judgement, 547b-548c; 600d-603d esp 601d-602a, 602b [fn 1]
• 49 DARWIN: The Origin of Species, 26a; 241b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 295a-b; 677a-678a; 686b-690a esp 688a-689a
• 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 801b-c / New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 819a

5. Reasoning in relation to knowledge, opinion, and action

5a. The fact and the reasoned fact: mere belief distinguished from belief on rational grounds

• 7 PLATO: Meno, 188b-189a / Republic, BK V, 370d-373c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 6 [75a12-37] 103a-c; CH 13 107c-108c; BK II, CH 1-2 122b,d-123c / On the Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413a11-19] 643a-b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095a30-b13] 340c-d; CH 7 [1098a35-b4] 343d; BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; CH 11 392c-393b
• 11 ARCHIMEDES: The Method, 569b-570a; PROP 1, 572b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XVI, 35a-b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 25 210c-d
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-463d passim, esp DIV 28-33 460d-463d; SECT V 463d-469c passim, esp DIV 38 466b-c, DIV 45 469c
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 165a-b
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 228c-d; 240b-243c / Critique of Judgement, 601d-607c
• 43 MILL: On Liberty, 283c-288c passim / Utilitarianism, 445d-446b
• 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-160b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 689b-690a

5b. Scientific reasoning: the theory of demonstration

• 7 PLATO: Meno 174a-190a,c / Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a / Parmenides 486a-511d esp 491a-c / Philebus, 610d-613a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 30 63d-64b / Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c / Metaphysics, BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-13] 547b; BK VII, CH 15 [1039b20-1040a8] 563c-564a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; CH 6 389d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-c; 60a-b; 60d; 65c-d; PART IV, 267a-c
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-337a,c
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 42a-c; 56c-59c; 61d / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; BK I 107a-136a,c esp APH 11-26 107d-108d, APH 69 116a-b, APH 103-106 127d-128c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, I-XII 1a-27d / Discourse on the Method, PART VI 60d-67a,c
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 365b-366a; 368b-369a / On the Geometrical Spirit, 430b-434a; 442a-443b
• 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULES 270a-271b / Optics, BK III, 543a-b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH XI, SECT 16 303c-d; BK IV, CH I, SECT 9, 308d-309b; CH II, SECT 2-13 309d-312b; CH IV, SECT 7 325b; CH VII, SECT 11, 340c-341a; CH XII, SECT 6-13 360a-362d; CH XV, SECT 1 365a-c; CH XVII 371c-380d passim, esp SECT 2-4 371d-376c, SECT 15 378d-379b
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20 458a-b; DIV 30, 462a; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 190c-191a; 194b-c; 211c-218d esp 217c-d / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 264d / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Critique of Judgement, 463a-467a; 542c-543a; 603b-c
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-d
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 674a-675b; 677b; 862a-865a

5b(1) The indemonstrable as a basis for demonstration

• 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 112a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24a21-b16] 39a-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 3 99b-100a; CH 7 [75a38-b7] 103c; CH 11 105d-106b; CH 19-23 111c-116a; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK II, CH 1 [193a1-9] 269b / On the Heavens, BK I, CH 5 [271b1-13] 362c-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b24-993a1] 511a-b; BK III, CH 2 [996b26-997a14] 515b-d; BK IV, CH 4 [1006a4-12] 525a-b; CH 6 [1011a3-14] 530d; BK XI, CH 6 [1063b7-12] 591d; BK XIII, CH 4 [1078a28-31] 610b-c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a22-30] 636d-637a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742b17-35] 283d-284a / Nicomachean Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; CH 6 389d; CH 11 392c-393b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A 3, REP 1-2 102d-103c; Q 36, A 3, REP 4 194c-195d; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; Q 112, A 5, ANS 359c-360c
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-334d esp 334a
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 39c-d; 97a
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II 2a-3b / Discourse on the Method, PART II, 46c-47a / Meditations on First Philosophy, I, 76c / Objections and Replies, 123a-b; 224b,d
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II, SECT 1, 309d; SECT 7-8 310d-311a; CH I, SECT 4 313b-c; CH XV, SECT 1 365a-c; SECT 3 365d; CH XVII, SECT 15 378d-379b
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 217c-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 307d-310c esp 309b / Critique of Judgement, 542d-543a
• 43 THE FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 446d-447a; 461c-462a; 475b,d [fn 1]
• 44 BOSWELL: Life of Samuel Johnson, 82b
• 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 3 116a

5b(2) Definitions used as means in reasoning: definitions as the end of reasoning

• 7 PLATO: Sophist, 551a-552c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 43 68d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [72a19-24] 98d; CH 8 [75b21-32] 104a; CH 10 [76b35-77a4] 105c-d; CH 22 [82b36-83a1] 113b; CH 33 [89a17-b5] 121d-122a,c; BK II, CH 3-10 123c-128d / Topics, BK VII, CH 5 [154a23-b13] 209d-210a; [155a17-23] 210d; BK VIII, CH 3 214d-215d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b30-993a1] 511b; BK III, CH 2 [996b18-21] 515b; BK IV, CH 4 [1005b35-1007a20] 525a-527a; CH 7 [1012a18-24] 532a-b; CH 8 [1012b5-8] 532c; BK XI, CH 5 590a-d; BK XIII, CH 4 [1078b23-30] 610b-c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b16-403a2] 631d-632a; CH 3 [407a22-30] 636d-637a; CH 5 [409b31-410a18] 639b-c; BK II, CH 2 [413a11-19] 643a-b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b4-642b5] 161d-165d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 2 10d-11d; A 2, REP 2 11d-12c; Q 3, A 5, ANS 17c-18b; Q 17, A 3, REP 1-2 102d-103c; Q 85, A 6 458d-459c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-60c; 65d
• 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 128c-129a
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1 171a-172a / On the Geometrical Spirit, 430b-434b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH XI, SECT 15-17 303b-304a esp SECT 16 303c-d; BK IV, CH VIII, SECT 20, 319b
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT VIII, DIV 74 484a-c; SECT XII, DIV 131 508d-509a
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 179d-182b; 211c-218d / Critique of Practical Reason, 293c-294b
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 690b
• 54 FREUD: Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 412a-b

5b(3) A priori and a posteriori reasoning: from causes or from effects; from principles or from experience; analysis and synthesis

• 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 242b-243c
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 3 [72b25-33] 99c / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 3 [1029a33-b12] 552a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b29-1095a12] 340a-b; CH 4 [1095a30-b13] 340c-d; BK III, CH 3 [1112b20-24] 358d; BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-19] 391b / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a17-24] 445b
• 10 GALEN: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 14, 177a-178d esp 177c, 178c-d; BK III, CH 1-2, 199c-d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 14, A 5 680a-c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-b; PART IV, 267a-b
• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-335c
• 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 104-106 128a-c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, I, 2d-3a; IV-V 5a-8a / Objections and Replies, 128a-129a
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 368b-369a
• 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 543a-b
• 34 HUYGENS: Treatise on Light, PREF, 551b-552a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 10, 123c; BK IV, CH XII, SECT 6-13 360a-362d
• 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 21 417a
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30, 462a; SECT V, DIV 34-38, 464a-466c; SECT XI 497b-503c passim, esp DIV 105 498d-499a; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d passim
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 14a-20c; 34a-36a; 110d-111c; 115d-120c; 129a; 135a-173a esp 158a-160b, 172c-173a; 174a; 179c-182b; 190c-191a; 192a-b; 193d-200c; 211c-218d / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-254d esp 253d-254a; 262a-287d esp 263a-264d, 268b-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 294a-b; 307d-308b; 309b-d; 329d-330c / The Science of Right, 405b-d / Critique of Judgement, 600d-603d esp 603a-b
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-446b
• 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d-183c
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 91a-94b esp 94b; 673a-674b; 872a-873a
• 54 FREUD: On Narcissism, 400d

5b(4) The role of causes in demonstration and scientific reasoning

• 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455a-b; 465d-466a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c esp BK II, CH 11-18 128d-136a / Physics, BK II, CH 7 275b-d / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 [996b18-26] 514d-515b; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-13] 547b; BK VII, CH 17 [1041a10-b11] 565b-d; BK VIII, CH 4 [1044a33-b20] 569a-b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b7-642a5] 161d-165d esp [639b34-640a9] 162b, [640b5-12] 163a, [642a14-21] 165b / Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098a25]-CH 8 [1098b35] 343d-344b
• 16 COPERNICUS: On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 11d-12c; Q 14, A 7 81d-82b; A 11, ANS 84c-85c; Q 19, A 5, ANS and REP 2 112d-113c; Q 44, A 1, REP 1 238b-239a; Q 57, A 2, ANS 295d-297a; PART I-II, Q 14, A 5 680a-c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 55, A 4 28c-29d; PART III, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-b; PART IV, 267a-b
• 28 GALILEO: Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 202d-203a; FOURTH DAY, 252a-b
• 28 HARVEY: The Circulation of the Blood, 319c / On Animal Generation, 335c-336c; 393b-c; 425a
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 45a-46a; 46c-47c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a; APH 99 127b-c
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 52a-d; PART VI, 61d-62c; 66a-b / Meditations on First Philosophy, III 81d-89a esp 84b-85a, 87c-88c; IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 108b-112a; 120c-122c; AXIOM V 131d-132a; 212c; 215a-b
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 2, 4 355d; PROP 8, SCHOL 2 356d-357d esp 357b-d; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, 395a-d; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423c; APPENDIX, I 447a
• 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULE I-II 270a; GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 371b-372a / Optics, BK III, 541b-542a; 543a-b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XII, SECT 9 360d-361b; CH XVI, SECT 2 371d-372b
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 60, 477a; SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XII, DIV 132, 509b-c
• 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 348a,c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 46d-47c; 164a-171a; 183b [fn 1] / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 285c-286a / Critique of Practical Reason, 310d-311d; 339a / Critique of Judgement, 574a-b; 578a-d
• 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 9b-10b
• 45 FOURIER: Analytical Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-184a
• 49 DARWIN: The Origin of Species, 217d-218a; 239b-240d
• 50 MARX: Capital, 10b-11b esp 11b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 89b-90a; 668a-671a esp 670a-b; 745b; 824b-825a; 884b-886a
• 54 FREUD: A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 454b-c; 483d-484a

5b(5) Demonstration in relation to essence and existence: demonstrations propter quid and quia

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 [996b12-21] 515a-b; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-18] 547b,d
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 2 11d-12c; Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; A 5, ANS 17c-18b; Q 46, A 2, ANS 253a-255a
• 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, I [34-45] 56b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a; 79d-80b
• 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, I, 76c; III 81d-89a; VI 96b-103d / Objections and Replies, 110b-c; 216d-218b; 261a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVII, SECT 20, 173a; CH XXXI, SECT 6 240d-241d esp 241a-b; SECT 11 242d-243a; BK III, CH XI, SECT 15-17 303b-304a esp SECT 16 303c-d; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 8 325b-c; CH XII, SECT 6-9 360a-361b esp SECT 9 360d-361b
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30 461d-462b; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 85d-88a; 95a-d; 179c-182b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 667b

5c. Dialectical reasoning: the opposition of rational arguments

• 7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedrus, 134b-c / Phaedo, 242b-243c / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Parmenides, 491a-511d / Theaetetus, 525d-526b / Sophist, 558b-d / Statesman, 594d-595d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24a21-b16] 39a-c; CH 30 [46a3-10] 63d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 6 [75a21-28] 103b; CH 11 [77a25-35] 106b / Topics 143a-223a,c / On Sophistical Refutations, CH 2 227d-228a; CH 8 234b-d; CH 11 236a-237c / On the Heavens, BK I, CH 10 [279b4-12] 370d / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1004b18-27] 523d; BK XI, CH 3 [1061b8-12] 589d; BK XIII, CH 4 [1078b18-28] 610b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a28-39] 594c-d
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 8 113d-114c; BK II, CH 12, 151d-152a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 83, A 1, ANS 436d-438a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
• 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 101b-106a
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 47d-48d
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART I, 43d
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 9 369b-c
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT X, DIV 86-91 488d-491c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-b; 36d-37d; 108a-d; 120c-173a esp 129c-130b, 133c; 174b-177b; 187a-192d; 200c-209d; 219a-220b; 229b-c; 231c-232a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b; 283d-284d / Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 302a-d; 331c-337a,c; 340a-342d; 348d-349a / The Science of Right, 407a-408b / Critique of Judgement, 540a-546d; 562a-578a esp 562d-564c, 575b-578a; 584c-d
• 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 135 47b-d
• 54 FREUD: A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 545d

5d. Rhetorical reasoning: the rational grounds of persuasion

• 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 50d-52d; 57a-c / Phaedrus 115a-141a,c esp 129d-141a,c / Meno, 176d-177a / Gorgias 252a-294d / Timaeus, 457c / Sophist, 558a-561a
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 27 92a-93a,c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [71a1-10] 97a / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1009a16-22] 528c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b23-27] 339d-340a / Rhetoric, BK I 593a-622d esp CH 1 [1355a4-b22] 594b-595a; BK II, CH 18-26 639a-653a,c; BK III, CH 15 669d-670c; CH 17-19 672a-675a,c
• 10 GALEN: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 16, 180c-181a
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 5 110b-c; CH 8 113d-114c
• 18 AUGUSTINE: On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 36-37 653d-654b; BK IV, CH 4 676d-677a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 83, A 1, ANS 436d-438a; PART I-II, Q 7, A 1, REP 1 651d-652c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 67c; PART II, 127d; 128d
• 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 446d-450a; 453c-454d
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 58c-59a; 66c-67c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, X, 16d-17a
• 33 PASCAL: On the Geometrical Spirit, 440b-442a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 34 299d-300a
• 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 227a-228a
• 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 261c-d; 320c-321b
• 42 KANT: Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 376c-d
• 43 THE FEDERALIST: NUMBER 14, 62a-d
• 43 MILL: On Liberty, 284b-c
• 44 BOSWELL: Life of Samuel Johnson, 209a
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VIII, 243b; EPILOGUE I, 672a-b

5e. Practical reasoning

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH 1-4 162a-166b / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 7 [1032a25-b22] 555b-d / On the Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a22-23] 636d; BK III, CH 9 [432b26-433a5] 665c
• 9 ARISTOTLE: On the Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701a5-39] 236b-d / Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b12-27] 339d-340a; CH 4 [1095a30-b13] 340c-d; CH 7 [1098a20-b8] 343c-344a; BK II, CH 7 [1107a27-32] 352d-353a; BK X, CH 1 [1172a34-b7] 426b-c
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 2 177c-178d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a-54a; 60b-61a; 66c-68a; 78a-d
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 57d-58b; 81d-82a
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART III, 48b-50b
• 33 PASCAL: The Provincial Letters, 27a-80b; 90a-127a
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 60a-c; 149d-150a; 190c-191a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-255d; 260d-261b; 264b-265b; 266b-d; 271a-c; 277d-279d; 283d-287d esp 283d-284d / Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-297c; 298a-300a; 300d [fn 1]; 306d-307a; 307d-321b esp 307d-309b, 309d-310b; 329a-337a,c esp 329b-d; 338c-343d; 349b-350c / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372b-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-d; 388d; 390b,d-391a; 393a / The Science of Right, 398c-399c; 416b-417a / Critique of Judgement, 461a-467a esp 463a-467a; 596c-598b
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-d; 456a-457b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 186a; 381b-385b esp 382a

5e(1) The form of the practical syllogism

• 8 ARISTOTLE: On the Soul, BK III, CH 11 [434a16-22] 667a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: On the Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701a5-39] 236b-d / Nicomachean Ethics, BK VI, CH 9 391c-392b esp [1142a20-26] 392a; BK VII, CH 3 [1146b24-1147b19] 396d-398a passim
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 86, A 1, REP 2 461c-462a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 76, A 1, ANS 141a-c; Q 77, A 2, REP 4 145d-147c

5e(2) Deduction and determination in legal thought

• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK V, CH 7 382c-383a; CH 10 385c-386b / Politics, BK III, CH 11 [1282b1-6] 480b-c; CH 15 [1286a10-37] 484b-d; CH 16 [1287a23-28] 485d; [1287b15-25] 486a-b
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 2 227c-228c; A 4 229b-230c
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-87b; 91a-96b esp 95c-96b; PART II, 130c-136b esp 130c; 164a,c; PART III, 165a
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b
• 38 MONTESQUIEU: The Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3a; 3c; BK XXVI, 214b,d
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 149d-150a
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-446b; 456a-457b; 475b,d [fn 1]
• 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 214 71a-c; PAR 216 71d-72a; PAR 222 73b-c; PAR 225-229 73d-75b esp PAR 227 74b-d; ADDITIONS, 134 138b-c; 140 139b-c

5e(3) Deliberation: the choice of alternative means; decision

• 5 EURIPIDES: The Phoenician Maidens [528-593] 382c-383a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK III, CH 1 [1110a28-35] 356a; CH 2-3 357b-359a; BK VI, CH 1-2 387a-388b; CH 5 389a-c passim; CH 7 [1141b8-21] 390c-d; CH 8-9 390d-392b; CH 12 [1144a6-37] 393d-394a
• 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 12 264c
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A 5, ANS 112d-113c; A 7, ANS 114d-115d; Q 82, A 2, REP 3 432d-433c; Q 83, A 1, ANS 436d-438a; PART I-II, QQ 13-15 672d-684a; Q 44, A 2 808b-d
• 22 CHAUCER: The Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a esp PAR 9-36 403a-417b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a; 64a-65c; 77a
• 26 SHAKESPEARE: The Merchant of Venice, ACT II, SC VII [1-75] 416a-417a; SC IX [19-72] 417d-418b; ACT III, SC II [73-139] 420d-421b
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 81d-95b
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART III, 48b-50b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 48 190c-d; SECT 53 191d-192b; SECT 57 193b-c; SECT 60-73 194a-199c passim
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 60a-c; 169c-170a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b; 266b-267d; 268b / Critique of Practical Reason, 327d-329a / The Science of Right, 398a-399c / Critique of Judgement, 586a-b; 588b [fn 2]; 595a-d
• 43 MILL: On Liberty, 276b-277a; 294d-295b / Utilitarianism, 456a-457b
• 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 122 44a
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 794a-798b esp 794a, 796a-b

6. The character of reasoning in the various disciplines

6a. Proof in metaphysics and theology

• 7 PLATO: Parmenides 486a-511d esp 491a-c / Sophist, 570a-d / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1004a25-31] 523b-c; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-18] 547b,d; BK IX, CH 6 [1048a25-b9] 573c-574a; BK XI, CH 3 [1061a10-18] 589b; CH 7 [1064a1-9] 592b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1 3a-10c; Q 2, A 2 11d-12c; Q 32, A 1, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 2, A 10 399b-400b; PART III SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, REP 2 938a-939d
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a; 79d-80a; PART II, 163a-b; PART III, 165b
• 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 122b-c
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 95d-101c
• 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, 69a-71a,c / Objections and Replies, 119d; 128a-129a
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 11, SCHOL 358d-359b
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 355b-356b
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 2 451b-c; DIV 4 451d-452c
• 40 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 308c-d
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 85d-88a; 179c-182b; 190a-200c; 211c-218d esp 215d-216d / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 264d / Critique of Practical Reason, 293c-294b; 351b-352c / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Critique of Judgement, 600d-603d

6b. Demonstration in mathematics: analysis and synthesis

• 7 PLATO: Meno, 180b-183c / Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII, 392a-395c; 397c-d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 41 [49b32-37] 68c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [71a11-16] 97a-b; CH 10 104d-105d esp [76b39-77a2] 105d; CH 12 106c-107c; CH 18 111b-c; BK II, CH 9 [93b21-25] 128a-b / Topics, BK V, CH 4 [132a32-34] 183b; BK VI, CH 4 [141b3-22] 194d-195a; BK VII, CH 3 [153a6-11] 208a-b; BK VIII, CH 1 [157a1-3] 213a / Physics, BK II, CH 9 [200a15-29] 277c-d / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 4 [302b27-31] 394a / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 [996a21-36] 514d-515a; [996b18-21] 515b; BK VII, CH 10 [1036a2-8] 559b-c; BK IX, CH 9 [1051a22-34] 577b-c; BK XI, CH 3 [1061a29-b3] 589c; CH 4 589d-590a; CH 7 [1063b36-1064a9] 592b; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077b1-10] 608d-609a; CH 3 609a-610a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742b23-35] 283d-284a / Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b19-27] 339d-340a; BK III, CH 3 [1112b20-24] 358d; BK VII, CH 8 [1151a15-19] 402a
• 11 ARCHIMEDES: The Method, 569b-570a; PROP 1, 572b
• 11 APOLLONIUS: On Conic Sections, BK II, PROP 44-47 710b-713a; PROP 49-51 714b-726a
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 58a-c; 59c
• 28 GILBERT: On the Loadstone, PREF, 1b-c
• 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind 1a-40a,c passim, esp II, 3a, IV, 7c, VII 8a-10a, XIV, 30d-33b, XVI-XXI 33d-40a,c / Discourse on the Method, PART I, 43b-c; PART II, 46c-47c; PART IV, 52d-53a / Meditations on First Philosophy, 73a; I, 76c; V, 93a-d / Objections and Replies, 128a-129a / Geometry 295a-353b esp BK I, 295a-298b, BK II, 304a-b, BK III, 353a
• 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1-5 171a-173a / New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 365b-366a / On the Geometrical Spirit, 430a-434a; 442a-443b
• 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1a-b / Optics, BK III, 543a-b
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH XVI, SECT 4 166a-b; BK IV, CH I, SECT 9, 308d-309b; CH II, SECT 9-10 311b-c; CH III, SECT 18-20 317d-319c passim; CH XII, SECT 1-8 358c-360c passim, esp SECT 7 360b-c; SECT 14-15 362d-363b; CH XVII, SECT 11 378b
• 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 12 408a-b; SECT 15-16 409a-d
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20 458a-b; SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT XII, DIV 131 508d-509a
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 17d-18d; 46a-b; 68a-69c; 211c-218d esp 215d-217a / Critique of Practical Reason, 295b-d; 330d-331a / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 376c-d / The Science of Right, 399a-b / Critique of Judgement, 551a-553c
• 43 THE FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-d
• 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2b
• 45 FOURIER: Analytical Theory of Heat, 173a-b
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-d; EPILOGUE II, 695b-c
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 874a-878a passim

6c. Inductive and deductive inference in the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 7-9 275b-278a,c / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 5 379b-c; BK III, CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411e-d / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 3 [995a15-17] 513d
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK III, CH 10 [760b29-32] 301d-302a
• 10 HIPPOCRATES: On Ancient Medicine, PAR 1-8 1a-3b
• 10 GALEN: On the Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 1-2 199a-200a esp 199c-d
• 16 COPERNICUS: On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1, REP 2 3b-4a; Q 32, A 1, REP 2 175d-178a
• 28 GALILEO: Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 207d-208c; FOURTH DAY, 252a-b
• 28 HARVEY: The Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals, 267b,d-268a; 280c; 285c-d; 295d-296a / On Animal Generation, 332a-335c; 336b-d; 383d
• 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 16a; 34b; 42a-c; 56c-59c; 96d-97a / Novum Organum 105a-195d esp PREF 105a-106d, BK I, APH 11-26 107d-108d, APH 69 116a-b, APH 103-106 127d-128c, BK II, APH 1-9 137a-140c, APH 36 164a-168d, APH 52 194c-195d
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART VI 60d-67a,c esp 61d-62c / Objections and Replies, 215a-b
• 33 PASCAL: New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum, 365b-371a
• 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULES 270a-271b; GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 371b-372a / Optics, BK III, 541b-542a; 543a-b
• 34 HUYGENS: Treatise on Light, PREF, 551b-552a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 10 123b-d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 25-29 321a-323a passim; CH VI, SECT 13 335c-d; CH XII, SECT 9-13 360d-362d
• 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 107, 434a
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 9 454c-455a; SECT III, DIV 19, 458a; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c; DIV 60, 477a; SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c
• 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 165a-b
• 42 KANT: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b / Critique of Judgement, 578d-582c esp 579b-c
• 45 FARADAY: Experimental Researches in Electricity, 659a; 774d-775a
• 49 DARWIN: The Origin of Species, 42a; 239c
• 50 MARX: Capital, 6a-c
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-d
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 91a-94b esp 94b; 126a-127a passim; 295a-b; 324b; 385a-b; 674a-675b esp 675b; 677b; 862a-865a; 882a-884b passim
• 54 FREUD: On Narcissism, 400d-401b / Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 412a-b / A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 483d-485a esp 484c-485a; 502d-503d; 545c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661c-662a / New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 879c

6d. Induction and demonstration in the moral sciences

• 9 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b12-27] 339d-340a; CH 4 [1095a30-b13] 340c-d; CH 7 [1098a25-b7] 343d-344a; BK VII, CH 1 [1145b1-7] 395b; BK X, CH 1 [1172a34-b7] 426b-c / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a17-24] 445b
• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-b; PART II, 130c-136b; 153c-154a; 164a,c; PART III, 165a
• 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 1 103d-104a; SECT 4 104d-105a; BK III, CH XI, SECT 15-17 303b-304a esp SECT 16 303c-d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 18-20 317d-319c; CH IV, SECT 7 325b; CH XII, SECT 8 360c
• 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 1-5 451a-453b passim; DIV 9, 454d-455a; SECT V, DIV 36, 465a-d [fn 1]; SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d passim, esp DIV 132, 509c-d
• 38 MONTESQUIEU: The Spirit of Laws, XXIIIb-c
• 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 169b [fn 1] / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254b; 265c-266d / Critique of Practical Reason, 293c-294b; 304d-305a; 306d-307a; 307d-309b; 309d-310b; 317b-318b; 320c-321b; 330d-331a / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372b-d; 376c-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 390b; 393a / The Science of Right, 397a-b; 398c-399c; 413d-414a; 416b-417a / Critique of Judgement, 593a-d
• 43 THE FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER 85, 257d-258d
• 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim; 461c-463d passim; 475b,d [fn 1]
• 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 214 71a-c; PAR 222 73b-c; PAR 225-229 73d-75b esp PAR 227 74b-d; ADDITIONS, 134 138b-c; 140 139b-c
• 50 MARX: Capital, 6a-c
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 683d-684a; 690b
• 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 886b-888a esp 887a-888a, 888b [fn 1]