Chapter 63: ONE AND MANY

INTRODUCTION

In Pragmatism and in his unfinished last work, Some Problems of Philosophy, William James uses the problem of the one and the many as one of the crucial tests of the philosophical mind. In his famous table of doctrines or “isms” he aligns monism with rationalism and idealism in the column headed “tender-minded,” and in the other column, headed “tough-minded,” he places their opposites—pluralism, empiricism, and materialism. But as his own theories show, “isms” like monism and pluralism tend to over-simplify the issues.

Whoever emphasizes the oneness of the world, for example, may also acknowledge its manyness and recognize that it is somehow a pluriverse as well as a universe. Some, like Bradley, may qualify this view by regarding the unity as ultimate reality, the plurality as appearance or illusion. Whoever finds the multiplicity of things the primary fact may, nevertheless, find some unity in the order and connection of things. Some, like James himself, may insist that the connection is a loose concatenation of relatively independent parts of reality, rather than an interpenetration of each part with every other in the solid whole which James calls the “block universe.”

There may be another oversimplification in James’ consideration of the problem of the one and the many. He seems to be concerned largely, if not exclusively, with the alternatives of the block and the concatenated universe as conceptions of the structure of reality. But, as some of the great books of antiquity make evident, that is only one of the problems of the one and the many. Perhaps it should be said, not that there are many problems of the one and the many, but that there is one problem having many aspects or applications, for in every statement of the problem there is at least this singleness of theme; that the one and the many are opposed, that the one is not a many and the many not a one. Yet even that does not seem to be quite accurate for, as Socrates tells Protarchus in the Philebus, it may also be said that the one is a many and the many a one. These are “wonderful propositions,” he says, wonderful because “whoever affirms either is very open to attack.”

At this early moment in the recorded tradition of western thought, the dialogues of Plato, so thorough in their exploration of the problems of the one and many, make no claim to having discovered or invented them. They were ancient even then. They seem to hang in the very atmosphere of thought, usually befogging those who try to see the truth about anything else without first clearing away their obscurities.

Socrates refers to “the common and acknowledged paradoxes of the one and the many… that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought.” These aside, some genuine perplexities remain. Protarchus asks Socrates to instruct him about “those other marvels connected with this subject which,” as Socrates seems to have implied, “have not yet become common and acknowledged.”

Socrates begins by calling his attention, not to the unity of this man or this ox, but to the sense in which it is said that “man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one.” It is necessary to ask, he says, first, whether such unities exist; then, such unities being always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, how each is itself alone, is not only one but this one; finally, how these unities can be conceived as dispersed and multiplied in the world of things which come to be and pass away. This last question seems to be the most difficult because it asks about the coming of the same and one as it becomes in the one and many.

Protarchus is impatient to begin clearing up these problems. Willing to undertake what he calls “this great and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at issue,” Socrates is also anxious to let Protarchus and the other youths know the intellectual perils which lie ahead for novices who enter upon this inquiry. “The one and many,” he tells them, “become identified by thought… They run about together, in and out of every word which is uttered… This union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is… an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old.”

That is why, he explains:

any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy, he leaves no stone, or rather no thought, unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbors, whether they are older or younger or of his own age—that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog; and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found.

Whether it is full of exasperating subtleties or is a treasure of true wisdom, the discussion of the one and the many—in itself and in relation to being and becoming, the intelligible and the sensible, the definite and the infinite, the same and other, universals and particulars, wholes and parts, the simple and the complex, the indivisible and the continuous—is a discussion which seems unavoidable to the ancients. In the dialogues of Plato and in Aristotle’s treatises, especially his Metaphysics, the one and the many are connected with the basic terms of philosophical thought.

For Plato, the distinction between the one and the many enters into the analysis of almost any object—such as pleasure or virtue or knowledge. Anything, viewed under the aspect of its being or its becoming, its definite sameness or its indefinite otherness and variety, must be discussed both as a one and as a many. The motion of Plato’s dialectic may be from the one to the many or from the many to the one; or it may be on the level of the many as an intermediate stage through which analysis must go in proceeding from the infinite to the one. Those who pass at once from unity to infinity, says Socrates, do not recognize “the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.”

For Aristotle, first philosophy or metaphysics, concerned as it is with “being qua being and the attributes which belong to anything qua being,” also investigates unity. Unity is the first property of being. The meanings of one or unity are as various as the meanings of ‘to be.’ If there is a difference between essential and accidental being, there is a parallel difference between essential and accidental unity. If natural and artificial things differ in substance or being, so too must they differ in unity. “Being and unity are the same,” Aristotle says, “and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as are principle and cause.” Unity is nothing apart from being, and nothing can be without being one in some sense of unity which is determined by the way in which the thing exists. Aristotle’s analysis of any subject matter, proceeding as it does by reference to contraries, always appeals to the one and the many. “All contraries,” he says, “are reducible to being and non-being and to unity and plurality, as for instance, rest belongs to unity and movement to plurality… And everything else is evidently reducible to unity and plurality…. For all things are either contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are the principles of all contrariety.”

The problems in whose analysis one and many seem to be involved recur in every period of western thought. The question, for example, whether there is an irreducible duality in the relation of knower and known, or whether, in the act of knowledge, knower and known are one, is discussed by Hobbes and William James as well as Plotinus and Aristotle. The question whether the state—which is a multitude somehow united for a common life—has, or should have, the same degree of unity as the family, is discussed by Locke and Hegel as well as Plato and Aristotle.

The earlier controversy over the indivisibility of sovereignty becomes at a later stage the central issue of federal union, to which e pluribus unum is the solution offered by the Federalists. Questions concerning the simple and the complex, or wholes and parts, as objects of knowledge, or questions concerning the unity and divisibility of time, space, or matter, engage the attention of inquirers and analysts no less in modern than in ancient times.

But there are certain problems which are treated with unusual speculative vigor by the ancients alone. Unlike the problems just mentioned, which deal with applications of the contrast between unity and multiplicity, these are questions about the One itself—what it is, whether it exists, whether it is identical with Being, whether it is itself a substance or the substance of all things.

The sustained inquiry into such matters in antiquity seems to testify to the extraordinary power exerted upon ancient thought by Parmenides of Elea. The person called ‘the Eleatic Stranger’ represents his theories in such dialogues of Plato as the Sophist and the Statesman. Parmenides, or his disciple Zeno, is probably the source of many of the paradoxes and riddles which Socrates, in the Philebus, dismisses as no longer worthy of serious attention. One whole dialogue, named Parmenides because of his part in the discussion, exhibits the Eleatic demonstration that ‘all is one.’ It abounds in the subtleties of the various arguments which try to defend the reality of the many or try to reduce that position to absurdity.

Questioned by Socrates concerning his paradoxes, Zeno says that his writings “were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the one.” When he addresses himself to the partisans of the many, Zeno says that he returns “their attack with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one.”

Aristotle also deals with the Eleatic arguments. In the Physics, he says first that inquiring about whether being is one, cannot contribute to the study of nature. He then adds that such inquiry anyway would be “like arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of argument… or like refuting a merely contentious argument.” This description, he says, “applies to the arguments both of Melissus and Parmenides: their premises are false and their conclusions do not follow… Accept one ridiculous proposition and the rest follows—a simple enough proceeding.” Aristotle’s treatment of Parmenides and Zeno in the Metaphysics seems to be no more sympathetic, though it tacitly admits the relevance of the Eleatic speculations to the study of being, if not to the study of change and the principles of nature. Nevertheless, many of the questions concerning the one and the many which both Plato and Aristotle deem worthy of discussion appear to have some connection with the perplexities propounded by Parmenides and his school.

Those who do not deny either the unity of being or its multiplicity tend to make the primary fact about reality either its oneness or its manyness. This may seem at first to be of slight significance, but if the two views of the world which result from this difference are examined, it may be found that the disagreement on this single point changes the perspective on everything else. The philosophers who magnify either the one or the many behold universes more radically dissimilar than the same object looked at from opposite ends of a telescope. But that is not all. Almost every other fundamental conception—of God and man, of the mind and knowledge, of matter and motion, of cause and necessity—seems also to be altered.

Spinoza, for example, criticizes those who attribute to finite things, of which there are necessarily many, the properties which belong to the infinite being, of which there can be only one. This man, this stone, or any comparable individual thing, is not a substance, having the power to exist in and of itself; it consists merely “of certain modifications of the attributes of God,” the one infinite substance in which everything else “both is and is conceived.” According to Spinoza, those who suppose that the finite many are substances “have not observed a proper order of philosophic study.”

They begin with the objects of sense which have the least reality and come last to the divine nature, the infinite one, which “ought to be studied first because it is first in the order of knowledge and in the order of things… Hence it has come to pass,” Spinoza continues, “that there was nothing of which men thought less than the divine nature while they have been studying natural objects, and when they afterwards applied themselves to think about God, there was nothing of which they could think less than those prior fictions upon which they had built their knowledge of natural things, for these fictions could in no way help to the knowledge of the divine nature.”

Starting with the definition of substance as that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself, and with the definition of God as absolutely infinite being, “that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes,” Spinoza undertakes to prove that there cannot be two or more substances having the same nature or attributes, that substance is necessarily infinite, and hence that it is impossible for more than one substance to exist. Since he regards it as axiomatic that “everything which is, is either in itself or in another,” it follows for Spinoza that if anything at all exists, God (or substance) must necessarily exist—as that which alone exists in itself and as that in which everything else has its finite being as a mode or affection of the attributes of God.

Certain other consequences seem to follow. The one infinite substance is indivisible: it is not a whole made up of parts which can have independent existence, as the parts of a quantitative whole seem able to exist when the quantity is divided. Furthermore, God, according to Spinoza, “is the immanent, and not the transitive, cause of all things.” God causes them not as one thing acting on another when both are independent in existence, but rather as the being in which all things are. God is not present in the world, as other theologians seem to think, in the manner in which a cause exists in an effect that depends upon it. Rather the whole world is in God as an effect which can in no way be separated from the existence of the cause, any more than an aspect can be separated from that of which it is an aspect.

For Spinoza, the unity and totality of being can be called “nature,” as well as “infinite substance” or “God.” His distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata, discussed in the chapter on NATURE, seems to permit him to distinguish between the infinite or eternal and the finite or temporal—the one and the many—without implying a real separation between God and the world. Since God is immanent in the world, and since God not only exists necessarily but also acts from the necessity of His own nature, it follows (as is indicated in the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY) that every finite and temporal aspect of nature is necessarily determined. Nothing is contingent. Nothing could be otherwise than it is.

This examination of a doctrine in which the primacy of the one absorbs as well as subordinates the many, serves to exemplify the point that making the one primary is more than a matter of emphasis. It also shows that almost every fundamental question is affected. It presents a picture of what William James appears to mean when he speaks of the block universe, though he himself usually seems to have in mind Hegel’s Absolute rather than Spinoza’s God.

Aristotle advances a contrary doctrine. Like Spinoza he uses the term ‘substance.’ Like Spinoza he defines substance as that which exists in itself, not as an accident (a quality, for example) which exists in another, e.g., the redness in the rose. But for him substance is not necessarily infinite, nor is it indivisible. A rose or a man is a substance. Every physical thing which has a natural unity is a substance.

Each is a finite whole, or rather each is a whole in a number of different senses. Insofar as it has essential unity, it is a whole composed of matter and form which, according to Aristotle, are represented in the formulation of a definition by the genus and the differentia. Insofar as it is composed of matter, it also has the unity of a quantitative whole in virtue of which it moves as one thing or uniquely occupies a place. Since quantitative unity involves continuity, and continuity entails divisibility, a substance remains one only so long as it is not divided into its quantitative parts, just as it remains one essentially only so long as its matter and form are not separated.

A substance is individual not because it is absolutely indivisible—as for Lucretius the atom is because it is simple rather than composite. Its individuality rather consists, first, in its being divided from other substances in such a way that it can perish without necessarily destroying them, or they can perish without destroying it; and, second, in the fact that, though divisible into parts, it is one whole when these parts remain undivided. Yet as one substance it has more unity than a mere collection of things.

The difference between a man and a machine, according to Aristotle’s differentiation between the unity of natural substances and of artificial things, is that a man is not composed of substances (though the parts of a living organism may come to exist as substances when it is decomposed or they are separated from it), whereas a machine, made up of separate pieces of metal, is nothing but a number of individual substances arranged in a certain way. The unity of man does not appear to be the same, therefore, when soul and body are conceived by Descartes as two substances and by Aristotle not as distinct substances but as form and matter which through their union constitute a single substance.

Unity, in short, belongs essentially to the individual natural substance. Because each individual substance is necessarily a one among a many, Aristotle, unlike Spinoza, cannot affirm the unity of substance without also affirming a plurality of substances. Not itself a substance, but only an aggregation of substances, the world is primarily a many rather than a one. The unity it possesses derives from the order and connection of the substances which are its component parts; and that in turn largely derives from the way in which distinct substances causally interact.

Since, according to Aristotle, causality includes contingency and chance, the causal interdependence of substances, with respect to their generation and their motions, does not lock them together into a solid block. To use James’ imagery again, a vast plurality of individual substances, causally yet also contingently related, constitutes a loosely-knit world, a concatenated universe.

The relation of the world as a whole to God does give it greater unity, if the supposition of a plurality of finite individual substances remains the fundamental feature of the world God creates. The Christian doctrine of creation may attribute to the world a greater unity than that possessed by any work of human art, in proportion as the infinitely greater wisdom of the divine plan orders the separate things of nature with an infinitely greater perfection than man can achieve in putting things together or in ordering them to his purpose. But if, according to the theologian, God in creating the world creates not one substance, but many substances, forming a single whole through the pattern of their connection with one another, then in a sense the world has less unity than each of its component substances.

For Aquinas, one kind of substance may have greater unity than another. The immaterial has more than the material; and God more than any finite substance, since each of these is composed of matter and form, or essence and accidents, or at least of essence and existence, whereas the infinite being of God is absolutely simple. The divine nature is without matter, without accidents: its attributes are identical with its essence, and its essence with its existence.

This cardinal point about the divine nature is crucial to the conception of God, and of the world’s relation to God. In the formation of Christian theology, God’s absolute simplicity seems to exclude all but one resolution of the issue concerning the Trinity. According to the position Augustine takes in criticizing the Arian heresy, the position which is expressed in the Nicene Creed, God is not a trinity of substances, but a trinity of persons—aspects of, or relations within, one substance. The plurality of things which constitutes the world puts the world entirely outside the divine substance. Immanent only as a cause, the simple being of God transcends the complex whole of the created world.

This transcendence seems, furthermore, to imply for theologians like Augustine and Aquinas a fundamental duality in the realm of existence. God and the world are two, not one. Infinite being is absolutely prior to and independent of finite beings. The one can exist without the many. Though the many are said to participate in being, when they do exist, they do not enter into the being of the one, or share it in any way. The being they have is not only separate from the being of God, but even their mode of being is only analogical to the divine being.

The doctrine that each thing has its own being, and that, as Aquinas says, “being is common to all things only in an analogical sense,” seems to put diversity above unity in the structure of reality, and to leave the ultimate plurality of this world unaffected either by the fact that it was created as one or by the fact of its relation to a transcendent One.

In the tradition of the great books, the problem of the one and the many is often stated without using the notion of substance as the pivotal term.

It appears in Plato’s consideration of being and becoming. It is sometimes present in his treatment of the relation between intelligible forms and sensible things—between the universal ideas and the particulars which resemble them through some manner of imitation or participation. It even runs through the discussion of the realm of ideas itself; for the idea of the one is one idea among many, and yet each of the many ideas is in some way one.

The problem of the one and the many appears in Hume’s consideration of the absolute distinctness of each unit of experience from every other, accompanied as it is by his skepticism concerning our ability to discover any connections which might tie these units together into a real unity. It appears in Kant’s theory of the transcendental unity of apperception, which reduces the sensory manifold to a unity of order; and in Hegel’s theory of the one Absolute Idea which contains within itself all the variety that becomes manifest as the Idea unfolds in the processes of nature or history.

The substitution of one set of terms for another does not seem to alter the fundamental issue. Nor does it enable the mind to escape taking sides with those who give primacy to the one or to the many, except perhaps by trying to balance them as correlatives. Among the great books, however, the Enneads of Plotinus develops a theory of the One which, putting it above being and beyond knowing, seems to transfigure all the traditional terms of analysis.

The One of Parmenides is, after all, Being; and this identification of Being with One raises a question of the reality of the many. But, according to Plotinus, “there exists a Principle which transcends Being; this is The One, whose nature we have sought to establish so far as such matters lend themselves to proof. Upon The One follows immediately the Principle, which is at once Being and the Intellectual-Principle. Third comes the Principle, Soul.” These are what Plotinus calls the three hypostases. He finds some analogy for his trinity in a doctrine he ascribes to Plato’s Parmenides, in which he finds a threefold distinction “between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.”

The One, according to Plotinus, not only transcends being; it also transcends intelligence. Knowing or thinking requires an object. The relation of knower and known entails a duality which would fracture the utter simplicity of The One. Even the complete reflexivity of The One knowing only itself is excluded. The super-essential is for Plotinus also the supra-cogitative. “What stands above Being stands above intellection,” he says; “it is no weakness in it not to know itself, since as pure unity it contains nothing which it needs to explore.” Multiplicity begins with the effort of the Intellectual-Principle to know the Transcendent. “It knows the Transcendent in its very essence but, with all its efforts to grasp that prior as pure unity, it goes forth amassing successive impressions, so that, to it, the object becomes multiple… The Intellectual-Principle is established in multiplicity.”

What is the All of which The One is not all, since the Intellectual-Principle and the Soul also belong to it? Plotinus answers that “The One is all things and no one of them. The source of all things is not all things… It is precisely because there is nothing within the One that all things are from it.” Everything else in the totality of which the Transcendent is the source emanates from it.

“Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing,” Plotinus declares, “The One is perfect and, in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced the new: this product has turned again to its begetter and has filled and has become its contemplator and so an Intellectual-Principle… It is simultaneously Intellectual-Principle and Being; and, attaining resemblance in virtue of this vision, it repeats the act of the One in pouring forth a vast power. This second outflow is a Form or Idea representing the Divine Intellect as the Divine Intellect represented its own prior, The One. This active power sprung from essences (from the Intellectual-Principle considered as Being) is Soul. Soul arises as the idea and act of the motionless Intellectual-Principle…. It takes fullness by looking toward its source; but it generates its image by adopting another, a downward, movement. This image of Soul is Sense and Nature, the vegetal principle.”

Nothing, writes Plotinus, “is completely severed from its prior. Thus the human Soul appears to reach as far down as to the vegetal order.” In these successive emanations “all that is not One is conserved by virtue of the One, and from the One derives its characteristic nature.” Everything except the One is a one-many. “If it had not attained such unity as is consistent with being made up of multiplicity, we could not affirm its existence.” The Transcendent alone is “a really existent One, wholly and truly One, while its sequent, poured down in some way from the One, is all, a total which has participation in unity and whose every member is similarly all and one.”

If reason cannot fully grasp the Transcendent One, that may be because discursive reason is itself a thing of multiplicity. The unity of an all-embracing vision may be required to apprehend the ineffable unity of the Transcendent. But the mysteriousness of unity is not confined to the Transcendent One. It confronts the mathematician as well as the philosopher. It challenges Nicomachus and Euclid as well as Plotinus.

“Unity,” writes Nicomachus, “occupying the place and character of a point, will be the beginning of intervals and numbers, but is not itself an interval or a number.” What, then, is unity or a unit in itself? Euclid answers with this definition: “A unit is that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called one.” Unity is not only the measure of existence, but also of numbers; for, according to Euclid, “a number is a multitude composed of units.” In mathematics no less than in metaphysics or in theology the relation of unity to number seems to be the heart of the problem of the one and the many.

“Number,” according to Locke, “applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts; everything that either does exist, or can be imagined.” Unity or one is, in his view, not only the simplest of all our ideas, but the most omnipresent. “Every object our senses are employed about; every idea in our understandings; every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is… in its agreement to all other things, the most universal idea we have.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The transcendental one: the Absolute; the unity of being, of nature, of the universe * 1a. The relation of the one and the many: emanation of the many from the one * 1b. The unity or duality of God and the world: the immanence and transcendence of God * 1c. The one and the many in relation to the universal and the particular: the abstract and the concrete universal 2. The modes of unity: comparison of numerical, essential, and divine unity * 2a. Numerical unity or identity: the number one * 2b. The unity of the indivisible or the simple: the individual thing, the point, the atom, the quality * 2c. The complex unity of a whole composed of parts: the distinction between the indivisible and the undivided 3. Kinds of wholes or complex unities * 3a. Quantitative wholes: oneness in matter or motion * (1) The continuity of a quantitative whole * (2) The unity and divisibility of a motion * (3) The unity and divisibility of matter * (4) The unity and divisibility of time and space * 3b. Natural or essential wholes: the oneness of a being or a nature * (1) The distinction between essential and accidental unity * (2) The comparison of the unity of natural things with man-made compositions or aggregations: artificial wholes * (3) The unity of a substance and of substantial form * (4) The unity of man as composite of body and soul, matter and spirit, extension and thought * (5) The unity of the human person or the self: the order of man’s powers; the split personality 4. Unity in the realm of mind: unity in thought or knowledge * 4a. The unity of mind or intellect, the cognitive faculties, or consciousness * 4b. The unity of sense-experience: the unity of attention; the transcendental unity of apperception * 4c. Unity in thinking or understanding: the unity of complex ideas and definitions; the unity of the term, the judgment, and the syllogism * 4d. The unity of science: the unity of particular sciences * 4e. The one and the many, or the simple and the complex, as objects of knowledge: the order of learning with respect to wholes and parts * 4f. The unity of knower and known, or of subject and object 5. Unity in moral and political matters * 5a. The unity of virtue and the many virtues * 5b. The unity of the last end: the plurality of intermediate ends or means * 5c. The unity of subjective will and objective morality in the ethical realm * 5d. The unity of the family and the unity of the state: the limits of political or social unification * 5e. The unity of sovereignty: its divisibility or indivisibility; the problem of federal union 6. Unity in the supernatural order * 6a. The unity and simplicity of God * 6b. The unity of the Trinity * 6c. The unity of the Incarnation

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The transcendental one: the Absolute; the unity of being, of nature, of the universe

7 PLATO: Parmenides, 491d-511d / Theaetetus, 532c-533a / Sophist, 566a-567a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK IV, CH 1 [121a14-19] 169a; [121b4-8] 169c; CH 6 [127b26-40] 176d-177a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 7 [169a21-24] 232d; [169b33-36] 233a; CH 10 [170b18-25] 235a / Physics, BK I, CH 2-3 259b-262a; CH 8 [191a23-b13] 267a-c; BK III, CH 6 [207a7-31] 285b-d / Heavens, BK I, CH 8-9 367b-370d / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 1 409a-410c; CH 8 [325a4-15] 423c-424a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [983b7-984b8] 501d-502c; CH 5 [986b8-987a2] 504c-505a; CH 6 505b-506b; CH 7 [988a34-b5] 506c; CH 8 [988b23-989a18] 506d-507b; BK III, CH 1 [996a4-9] 514c; CH 3 [998b14-28] 517b-c; CH 4 [1001a4-b25] 519d-520c; BK IV, CH 2 [1003b23-1005a1] 522d-524a; CH 4 [1007a19-1008a3] 527a-b; BK V, CH 4 [1014b27-35] 535a-b; BK VII, CH 4 [1030a7-14] 553b; CH 11 [1036b26-1037a20] 559d-560b; CH 16 [1040b16-27] 564d; BK VIII, CH 6 [1045a36-b7] 570b-c; BK X, CH 2 580b-d; BK XI, CH 2 [1060a36-b19] 588c-d; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a18-22] 598a; CH 4 [1070a31-b8] 599d-600a; CH 8 [1074a31-39] 604d; CH 10 [1075b12-24] 605d-606a; BK XIV, CH 1 [1087b34-1088a4] 620a-b / Soul, BK II, CH 1 [412b6-9] 642c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1023-1104] 28a-29a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 14 120d-121c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 3 257a-b; BK IV, SECT 29 266a; SECT 40 267a-b; BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b; SECT 30 273a; BK VI, SECT 36-45 277c-278c; BK VII, SECT 9 280b-c; SECT 19 281a; BK IX, SECT 8-9 292b-d; BK X, SECT 6-7 297a-c; BK XII, SECT 30 310a-b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [724-729] 230b 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR II, CH 13 46c-47b; TR IX, CH 1 65d-66a / Third Ennead, TR VIII 129a-136a; TR IX, CH 3 138a,c / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 6-7 211a-212c; TR II, CH 1 214c-215a; TR III, CH 11-17 222b-226c; TR V, CH 4-13 230b-235b; TR VI, CH 2-6 235d-237d / Sixth Ennead, TR II, CH 8-12 272d-276a; TR IV, CH 7-8 300b-301c; CH 11 302c-d; TR V 305c-310d; TR IX 353d-360d passim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 3, REP 1 29c-30b; Q 11 46d-50b passim, esp A 1 46d-47d; Q 30, A 3 169b-170c; Q 39, A 8 210a-213a; Q 44, A 1, ANS 238b-239a; Q 47, A 3 258c-259a; Q 93, A 9, ANS 500c-501c; Q 103, A 3, ANS 530a-c; PART I-II, Q 10, A 1, REP 3 662d-663d; Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 4, A 1, REP 4 730d-731d; Q 17, A 2, ANS 808d-809d; Q 19, A 1, REP 4 816a-818b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 172b; PART IV, 269d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I 355a-372d esp PROP 2-8 355d-357d, PROP 10, SCHOL 358a-b, PROP 12 359b-c, PROP 13, COROL and SCHOL 359d, PROP 14, COROL 1 360a, PROP 15 360a-361d, PROP 16, COROL 1-3 362a, PROP 18 363c, PROP 25, SCHOL and COROL 365b, PROP 28 365c-366a, PROP 33, SCHOL 1-PROP 34 367c-369a; PART III, 395a-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 7 132d; CH XIII, SECT 26 154b-c; CH XVI, SECT 1 165c-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 13 415c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 43d-44a; 44c-45b / Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 564c-565d esp 565c-d; 580c-d

1a. The relation of the one and the many: emanation of the many from the one

7 PLATO: Republic, BK V, 370d-373c; BK VII, 392b-394b / Parmenides 486a-511d / Sophist, 561d-574c esp 564d-574c / Statesman, 594d-595a / Philebus, 610d-613a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 8 [191a24-b12] 267a-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 505b-506b; CH 7 [988a34-b5] 506c; BK V, CH 6 [1016b18-25] 537b; [1017a3-7] 537c; BK X, CH 1 [1052a1-1053a8] 578d-580a; CH 6 583d-584c; BK XIV, CH 1-2 619b,d-622c 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VII, CH 2 26c-d / Second Ennead, TR II, CH 11 46b-c; CH 18 49c-50a; TR IX, CH 8 70a-d / Third Ennead, TR II, CH 16 90c-91c; TR III, CH 1 93b-c; TR VII, CH 11 126a-d; TR VIII 129a-136a passim; TR IX, CH 3 137b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR II 139c-141c; TR III, CH 2-5 142a-144c; TR IV, CH 1 159b-d; CH 10-12 163a-164d; CH 30-45 174b-183a; TR VIII, CH 3-TR IX, CH 5 202a-207a,c / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 4-9 209d-213c; TR II, CH 1 214c-215a; TR III, CH 10-12 221b-223c; TR IV 226d-228b; TR VII 238a-239b; TR VIII, CH 7 242d-243c / Sixth Ennead, TR II, CH 1-8 268d-273c; CH 20-22 278d-280d; TR IV, CH 4 299a-d; TR V 305c-310d; TR VI, CH 7 313d-314a; TR VII, CH 4-17 323c-331a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QQ 3-11 14a-50b passim; Q 14, A 6, ANS 80a-81c; Q 16, A 6 98b-d; QQ 30-31 167a-175c; QQ 44-45 238a-250a; Q 47 256a-259a; Q 77, A 6, REP 1 404c-405c; Q 85, A 8, ANS 460b-461b; QQ 103-105 528a-545b esp Q 103, AA 3-4 530a-531b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I 355a-372d esp DEF 3,5 355b, AXIOM 1-2 355c-d, PROP 1-8 355d-357d, PROP 11-16 358b-362a, PROP 18 363c, PROP 21-25 364a-365b, PROP 29 366b-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 43d-44a; 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 74b-76c; 107b-c; 173b-177b; 197b-198a / Judgement, 564c-565d esp 565c-d; 580c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b; PART III, 306a

1b. The unity or duality of God and the world: the immanence and transcendence of God

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 10 [1075b12-16] 605d 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 [699b11]-CH 4 [700a5] 234a-235a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 14 120d-121c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 1 256b,d; BK VII, SECT 9 280b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 2-3 1b-2a; BK III, PAR 10 15b-d; PAR 18 18b; BK IV, PAR 26 25c-d; PAR 31 26c-27a; BK VI, PAR 4 36a-b; BK VII, PAR 1-7 43b-45d; PAR 16-23 48c-50c esp PAR 21 49d-50a; BK X, PAR 8-10 73b-74a; BK XI, PAR 7 100d-101a; PAR 21 103d-104a / City of God, BK IV, CH 12-13 195d-196b; BK VII, CH 6 248a; CH 30 261b-d; BK X, CH 14 307c-308a; BK XII, CH 17 353a-354a; CH 25 358b-359a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 12 627c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 1 14b-15b; A 8 19d-20c; Q 4, A 3 22b-23b; Q 6, A 4 30b-d; Q 8 34c-38c; Q 16, A 6 98b-d; Q 18, A 4 107d-108c; Q 44, AA 1-2 238b-240a; Q 51, A 3, REP 3 277a-278c; Q 52, A 2 279b-280a; Q 61, A 3, REP 2 316a-d; Q 90, A 1 480d-481d; QQ 103-105 528a-545b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 26, A 2, REP 3 511a-d; PART III SUPPL, Q 84, A 2, REP 1 984c-985d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [94-123] 107b-c; II [112-148] 109a-b; XIII [52-66] 126a; XIX [40-66] 135c-d; XXVIII 148d-150b; XXIX [127-145] 151c-d; XXXIII [76-145] 157a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 162b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 54d-56a / Objections and Replies, 110b-112a; 123c-d; 158b-159a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I 355a-372d esp DEF 3-5 355b, AXIOM 1-2 355c-d, PROP 2-8 355d-357d, PROP 10, SCHOL 358a-b, PROP 13, COROL-PROP 18 359d-363c, PROP 22-23 364d-365a, PROP 25, COROL and SCHOL 365b, PROP 28-31 365c-367a, PROP 33-34 367b-369a; PART II, PROP 1-11 373d-377c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [469-505] 185b-186a; BK XI [334-346] 306b 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 370a-371a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 18 152a-c; CH XV, SECT 2-4 162c-163b; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11-12 271b-272b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 149-150 442d-443b; SECT 155 444b-c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 56 475a-b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 192c-d / Practical Reason, 342c; 351b-352c / Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 564c-565d esp 565c-d; 566c-d; 580c-d; 592a-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-157b; 176b-c; PART I, 220c-221a; 224a-b; 227d-228c; 237d-238a; 245d-246c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 115b-117a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 216d-218b; BK XIV, 608a-b; BK XV, 631a-c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 153b-d

1c. The one and the many in relation to the universal and the particular: the abstract and the concrete universal

7 PLATO: Laches, 32a-33a / Meno, 174d-175d / Euthyphro, 193a-c / Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a; BK VII, 392a-394a / Parmenides, 486d-489a / Theaetetus, 514b-515d / Sophist, 559a-c / Philebus, 610d-613a 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [1a20-b9] 5b-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d-106a; CH 24 [85a31-b3] 116c; [85b15-21] 117a / Heavens, BK I, CH 9 [277b26-278a9] 369a-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 505b-506b; CH 7 [988a34-b5] 506c; BK III, CH 4 [1001a18-b6] 520a-b; BK V, CH 3 [1014b3-13] 534d; CH 6 [1016b17-1017a3] 537b-c; CH 25 [1023b17-19] 545b-c; CH 25 [1023b22]-CH 26 [1023b32] 545c; BK VII, CH 10 [1034b35-1036a25] 558b-559d; CH 15 563c-564c; BK X, CH 1 578b,d-580a esp [1052a28-37] 578d; CH 2 580b-d; BK XII, CH 8 [1074a32-39] 604d; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IX, CH 5 206d-207a,c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 3 15c-16a; Q 11, A 3, ANS 49a-c; Q 13, A 9, ANS and REP 2 71b-72c; Q 14, A 6, ANS 80a-81c; Q 30, A 3, ANS and REP 1 169b-170c; A 4 170c-171b; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 77, A 1, REP 1 399c-401b; Q 79, A 5, REP 2 418c-419b; Q 93, A 9, ANS 500c-501c; PART I-II, Q 10, A 1, REP 3 662d-663d; Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS 710a-711c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-333b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1 387b-388a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 9 145b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 6 244b-c; BK III, CH I, SECT 3 251d-252a; CH III, SECT 1-9 254d-256c passim; CH VI, SECT 1 268b-c; SECT 32-33 277c-278c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 7-19 406a-410c passim, esp SECT 12-16 408a-409d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 125, 507b [fn 1] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 197b-198a; 211c-213a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 5-7 13a-14c; PAR 24 17d-18a; PART III, PAR 156-157 57d; PAR 165 59d; PAR 185-186 64b-d; PAR 353-360 112b-114a,c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158a-159a; 176b-177b; PART I, 237d-238a; PART III, 306a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 308a-311a passim

2. The modes of unity: comparison of numerical, essential, and divine unity

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185b5-186a4] 260b-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 5 [986b8-987a1] 504c-505a; BK V, CH 6 536a-537c; BK X, CH 1 578b,d-580a / Soul, BK II, CH 1 [412a8-9] 642c; CH 4 [415b22-28] 645c-d 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IX, CH 2 205c-206a; CH 5 206d-207a,c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 11 46d-50b esp A 4 49d-50b; Q 30, A 1, REP 2,4 167a-168a; A 2, REP 5 168a-169b; Q 93, A 1, REP 3 492a-d; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2 709d-723a esp A 9 719d-720c; Q 17 806d-809d 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 224d-225d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, DEF 7 373c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 215b-216a

2a. Numerical unity or identity: the number one

7 PLATO: Republic, BK VII, 392b-394b / Theaetetus, 535b-c; 537a-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4a10-19] 8b-9a / Topics, BK I, CH 18 [108b23-32] 153a,c; BK VI, CH 4 [141b6-8] 194d / Physics, BK IV, CH 14 [223b12-224a14] 303c-304a,c; BK VII, CH 1 [242a31-b4] 326c-d / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [1001a25-b25] 520a-c; BK V, CH 6 [1016b18-1017a1] 537b-c; CH 9 [1018a4-9] 538d; CH 13 [1020a8-9] 541b; BK X, CH 1 578b,d-580a; CH 3 [1054a30-35] 581a; CH 6 [1056b33-1057a16] 584b-c; BK XII, CH 7 [1072a33-34] 602b; CH 8 [1074a31-39] 604d; BK XIII, CH 6-9 611d-618c; BK XIV, CH 1 [1087b34-1088a14] 620a-b 11 EUCLID: Elements, BK VII, DEFINITIONS, 1 127a 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 814c; 821d; BK II, 832b; 838c-d; 839d-840a 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IX, CH 2 205c-206a; CH 5 206d-207a,c / Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 4 230b-d / Sixth Ennead, TR II, CH 9-11 273c-275d; TR VI 310d-321b esp CH 5 312c-313b, CH 11-16 315d-319d; TR IX, CH 1-2 353d-355a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 5, ANS and REP 2 17c-18b; Q 7, A 4, ANS 33d-34c; Q 10, A 6 45c-46d; Q 11, A 1, REP 1-2 46d-47d; A 2, ANS 47d-48d; A 3, REP 2 49a-c; A 4, REP 2 49d-50b; Q 30, A 1, REP 4 167a-168a; A 2, REP 5 168a-169b; A 3 169b-170c; Q 85, A 8, REP 2 460b-461b; PART I-II, Q 10, A 1, REP 3 662d-663d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 3, REP 1 713a-714c; A 9, REP 1 719d-720c; Q 17 806d-809d; PART III SUPPL, Q 79 951b-956b 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 146c-147a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XIV, 31b-c; 32a-b / Geometry, BK I, 296a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 12-15 359b-361d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 512 262a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 4-5 113b-c; BK II, CH XXVII 218d-228c passim; BK IV, CH I, SECT 4 307b-c; CH III, SECT 8 315b-c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 12-13 415b-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-101b

2b. The unity of the indivisible or the simple: the individual thing, the point, the atom, the quality

7 PLATO: Republic, BK VII, 392b-394b / Parmenides, 506d-507b / Theaetetus, 545b-547b / Sophist, 566a-d / Philebus, 611b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [1a3-9] 5c / Topics, BK I, CH 18 [108b23-32] 153a,c / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185b17-19] 260c; BK III, CH 7 [207b31-208a10] 285d-286a; BK IV, CH 10 [218a3-30] 297d-298b / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a15-317a17] 411d-413a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992a18-24] 510b-c; BK III, CH 4 [1001b7-19] 520b-c; BK V, CH 3 [1014b3-13] 534d; CH 5 [1015b9-16] 536a; CH 6 [1016a24-31] 537b; BK XI, CH 12 [1069a13-16] 598c; BK XII, CH 7 [1072a33-34] 602b / Soul, BK III, CH 2 [427a10-14] 659b-c; CH 6 [430b6-22] 663a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [1174b9-14] 428d-429a 11 EUCLID: Elements, BK I, DEFINITIONS, 1 1a 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK II, 832b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [483-634] 7a-8d 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 2 142b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 3, REP 1 29c-30b; Q 8, A 2, REP 2 35c-36b; Q 10, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3,5 40d-41d; Q 11, A 1, ANS 46d-47d; A 2, REP 4 47d-48d; AA 3-4 49a-50b; Q 29, A 4, ANS and REP 3 165c-167a; Q 30, A 1, REP 3 167a-168a; Q 40, A 2, REP 1 214b-215b; Q 42, A 2, REP 4 225d-227a; Q 50, A 2 270a-272a; Q 52, A 2 279b-280a; Q 53, A 1, REP 1 280d-282a; A 2, ANS 282a-283b; Q 76, A 8 397d-399b; Q 85, A 8, ANS and REP 2 460b-461b; PART I-II, Q 13, A 4, REP 2 675a-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 54, A 4 25b-d; PART III SUPPL, Q 83, A 2, REP 5 976c-978c; A 3, REP 4 978c-980d 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 20d-21b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 12-15 359b-361d; PART II, DEF 7 373c 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 541b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH II, SECT 1 127d-128a; CH XV, SECT 9 164b-d; CH XVI, SECT 1 165c-d; BK III, CH IV, SECT 15-16 263a-c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 7 406a-b; SECT 99 432b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 120c-129c esp 121a-124d, 126a-128b; 130b-133c esp 131c; 137a-140c esp 137d-138d [antithesis]; 152a-d; 158a-159d; 161d-163a; 211c-213a

2c. The complex unity of a whole composed of parts: the distinction between the indivisible and the undivided

7 PLATO: Parmenides, 495c-497c; 505c-506b / Theaetetus, 545b-547b / Sophist, 566a-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, CH 13 [150a1]-CH 14 [151a32] 204c-206a / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185b11-17] 260b-c; BK III, CH 6 [206b33-207a31] 285b-d; BK IV, CH 3 [210b25-28] 289b-c / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 536a-537c; CH 26 545c-d; BK X, CH 1 578b,d-580a; CH 3 [1054a20-23] 581a / Soul, BK III, CH 6 [430b6-22] 663a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [1174a13-b14] 428b-429a / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a18-24] 445b; CH 2 [1253a19-25] 446c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [599-634] 8b-d 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR II, CH 2 142a-143b; TR IX, CH 5 206d-207a,c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 3, REP 1 29c-30b; Q 11, A 1, ANS and REP 2 46d-47d; A 2, REP 2 47d-48d; Q 30, A 1, REP 4 167a-168a; Q 39, A 3, ANS 204c-205c; Q 85, A 3, REP 2 455b-457a; A 8, ANS 460b-461b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 2, REP 2 953b-955c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 145b-146c; 150d-151c 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK I, RULE II 270b-271a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXII, SECT 4 201c-d; CH XXIV 214b-d; BK III, CH V, SECT 10-11 266b-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 12-13 415b-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 168 145c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 104a-106b

3. Kinds of wholes or complex unities

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 536a-537c; CH 25-26 545b-d; BK X, CH 1 578b,d-580a 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 2-3 142a-143d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3 14a-20c; Q 8, A 2, REP 3 35c-36b; Q 11, A 1, REP 2 46d-47d; A 2, REP 2 47d-48d; Q 76, A 8, ANS 397d-399b; Q 77, A 1, REP 1 399c-401b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS 710a-711c; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 3, ANS and REP 1 955c-956b 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 224d-225d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 161d-163a

3a. Quantitative wholes: oneness in matter or motion

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [4b20-5a37] 9a-d / Physics, BK IV, CH 5 [212b29-33] 292b; BK VII, CH 1 [242a23-243a3] 327a-b / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 6 420b-421d; CH 10 426c-428d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 [1015b37-1016a16] 536b-c; [1016b7-18] 537a-b; CH 13 541b-c; CH 25 [1023b13-18] 545b; CH 26 [1023b32-1024a10] 545c-d; BK X, CH 1 [1052a18-28] 578b,d; BK XI, CH 9 [1066a27-34] 594d; CH 12 [1069a5-12] 598a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [1174a13-b14] 428b-429a 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 1 139d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 2, REP 3 35c-36b; Q 11, A 2, REP 2 47d-48d; Q 119, A 1, ANS 604c-607b 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 114d-115a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-361d; PART II, DEF 7 373c; LEMMA 5-7 379d-380b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 129c-159d esp 130b-133c, 137a-140c, 152a-d; 161d-163a

3a(1) The continuity of a quantitative whole

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5a1-14] 9b-c / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185b5-17] 260b-c; BK III, CH 6-7 284b-286c; BK IV, CH 4 [211a29-b4] 290c; CH 5 [212a3-6] 291d; BK V, CH 3 307b-308b; BK VI, CH 1-2 312b,d-315d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 4 [1014b20-27] 535a; CH 6 [1015b36-1016a17] 536b-c; CH 13 [1020a8-14] 541b; CH 26 [1023b32-36] 545c-d; BK X, CH 1 [1052a18-25] 578b; BK XI, CH 12 [1069a5-11] 598a,c / Soul, BK III, CH 2 [427a10-14] 659b-c; CH 6 662d-663c 11 EUCLID: Elements, BK X, PROP 1 191b-192a 11 ARCHIMEDES: Spirals, 484b / Quadrature of the Parabola, 527a-b 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811d-812a 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 1 139d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, ANS 14b-15b; Q 7, A 3, REP 3-4 32c-33c; A 4, ANS 33d-34c; Q 11, A 2, REP 2 47d-48d; Q 30, A 3, ANS 169b-170c; Q 58, A 2, ANS 301b-d; Q 67, A 2, ANS 350b-351a; Q 76, A 8, ANS 397d-399b; Q 85, A 8, ANS 460b-461b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 3, REP 3 713a-714c; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 3, ANS and REP 1 955c-956b 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 139c-153a passim 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-361d 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK I, LEMMA I 25a; LEMMA III, SCHOL, 31a-32a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 69c-72c; 161d-163a

3a(2) The unity and divisibility of a motion

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 11 [219a10-13] 298d-299a; BK V, CH 4 308b-310a; BK VI 312b,d-325d; BK VII, CH 1 [242a31-b4] 326c-d; BK VIII, CH 7 [261b28]-CH 8 [265a12] 347c-352a / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 [1016b5-7] 536c; CH 13 [1020a25-33] 541c; BK X, CH 1 [1052a18-21] 578b; BK XII, CH 6 [1071b8-11] 601b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 4 [1174a13-b14] 428b-429a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 8-9 123b-125d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7, A 3, REP 4 32c-33c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 201a-202a 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 6 139b-c; APH 41 173d-174b 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 434a-439b passim 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK I, LEMMA II, SCHOL, 31b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 26b-27a; 74b-76c; 130b-133c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-d

3a(3) The unity and divisibility of matter

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 456a-457b 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK III, CH 6-7 284b-286c; BK VI, CH 4 316d-318a / Heavens, BK IV, CH 6 [313b6-22] 405a,c / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [315b25-317a17] 411b-413a; CH 8 [325a23-326a28] 423d-425d; CH 9 [327a1]-CH 10 [328b25] 426a-428d / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 13 [1039a2-11] 562d; CH 16 [1040b5-16] 564c; BK X, CH 1 [1053a21-24] 579d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 6 [445b4-446a20] 683b-684c; CH 7 [449a21-30] 688d-689a 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [483-634] 7a-8d 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 7 52c / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 1 139d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, ANS 14b-15b; Q 7, A 3, REP 3-4 32c-33c; A 4, ANS 33d-34c; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 47, A 3, REP 2-3 258c-259a; Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 119, A 1, ANS 604c-607b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS 710a-711c; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 1, REP 3 951b-953b 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 139c-153a passim, esp 147d-148b 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 8 140b 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 112b 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 541b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVII, SECT 12 170d; CH XXIII, SECT 31 212b-c; CH XXIX, SECT 16 237b-d; BK IV, CH X, SECT 10 351d-352a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 47 421c-422a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 100c-d; 131c; 137a-140c; 152a-d; 161d-163a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103d 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d-855a,c

3a(4) The unity and divisibility of time and space

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 450c-451a; 456a-457b 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [5a6-29] 9b-c / Physics, BK IV, CH 11 [219a10-13] 298d-299a; BK VI 312b,d-325d passim / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 10 [337a22-34] 439b-c / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 13 [1020a25-34] 541c / Soul, BK III, CH 6 [430b6-19] 663a-b 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 8-13 123b-129a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, PAR 17-41 93b-99b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7, A 3, REP 4 32c-33c; A 4, REP 1 33d-34c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 201a-202a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52d-53a / Objections and Replies, 213b-c 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 434a-439b passim 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIII, SECT 13-14 151b-d; CH XV, SECT 9 164b-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 98 432a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 24a-26b; 130b-133c; 160b-163a; 186d-187a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 398a-399b; 420a-b; 547a-548b; 631a

3b. Natural or essential wholes: the oneness of a being or a nature

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 536a-537c; BK X, CH 1 578b,d-580a 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK II, CH 6 189a-190b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 2, REP 3 35c-36b; Q 11, A 1, REP 2 46d-47d; A 4, REP 3 49d-50b; Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 85, A 8, ANS 460b-461b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 152d-155d; 224d-225d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, SECT 1-10 268b-271b passim, esp SECT 4 268d-269b; BK IV, CH VI, SECT 11 334b-335b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1 413a-b; SECT 12 415b-c; SECT 99 432b

3b(1) The distinction between essential and accidental unity

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 10 [93b36-38] 128b-c / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 536a-537c; CH 27 545d-546a; BK VII, CH 4-6 552b-555a; CH 12 561b-562a 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK VII, CH 8 [1328a21-24] 532c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 10, A 6, ANS 45c-46d; Q 11, A 1, REP 2 46d-47d; Q 76, A 8, ANS 397d-399b; Q 118, A 3, ANS 603b-604b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c; Q 28, A 1, REP 2 740b-741a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS 710a-711c; A 6 716b-718b; Q 3, A 1, REP 2 723b-724a; Q 17, A 2, ANS 808d-809d; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 1, ANS and REP 4 951b-953b; A 2, REP 1-2,4 953b-955c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, SECT 1-10 268b-271b passim, esp SECT 4 268d-269b

3b(2) The comparison of the unity of natural things with man-made compositions or aggregations: artificial wholes

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 [1015b35-1016a9] 536b-c; CH 26 [1023b32-36] 545c-d; BK VIII, CH 3 [1043b19-24] 568a-b; BK X, CH 1 [1052a18-25] 578b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS 710a-711c; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 2, REP 4 953b-955c 42 KANT: Judgement, 557a-558b

3b(3) The unity of a substance and of substantial form

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 3 [186a14-19] 261c-d; BK IV, CH 2 [209b1-210a10] 288b-d / Heavens, BK I, CH 9 [277b26-278a9] 369a-d; BK IV, CH 4 [312a12-17] 403d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 6 [1016b1-11] 537a; CH 25 [1023b19-23] 545b-c; BK VII, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK VIII, CH 6 569d-570d; BK IX, CH 1 [1046a28-29] 571b; BK X, CH 1 [1052a28-34] 578d; BK XII, CH 10 [1075b34-37] 606d; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077a20-23] 608c / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b1-403a2] 631c-632a; CH 5 [410b10-16] 640c; BK II, CH 5 [411b23]-BK II, CH 2 [414a28] 641b-644c 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c; BK II, CH 6 189a-190b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, AA 2-3 15c-16d; Q 7, A 1, ANS 31a-d; A 2, ANS 31d-32c; Q 11, A 1, REP 1-2 46d-47d; A 4, REP 2-3 49d-50b; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 29, A 2, REP 5 163b-164b; Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 70, A 3 365b-367a; Q 76, AA 3-4 391a-394c; A 8, ANS 397d-399b; Q 85, A 4, ANS and REP 2 457a-d; Q 119, A 1, ANS 604c-607b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 4, ANS 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c; Q 3, A 7, REP 1 728a-729a; Q 17 806d-809d; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 1, ANS and REP 4 951b-953b; A 2, REP 1-2,4 953b-955c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 152d-155d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 3 355b; PROP 5-10 356b-358b; PROP 12-15 359b-361d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 1-6 204a-205c; SECT 37 213d-214b; CH XXVII, SECT 2-7 219b-221a; BK III, CH VI, SECT 1-10 268b-271b passim, esp SECT 4 268d-269b, SECT 10 271b; SECT 21 273c-d; SECT 42 280b-c; SECT 49 282c; BK IV, CH VI, SECT 11 334b-335b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 63a; 63d-64a; 74b-76c; 81b-83b; 91d-93b; 95a-d; 131c-d; 137a-140c; 162b-163a / Judgement, 556d-558a; 559b-d; 565b-d; 575c-576a

3b(4) The unity of man as composite of body and soul, matter and spirit, extension and thought

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-d / Phaedo, 231b-234c / Republic, BK III, 338a-339a / Timaeus, 453b-c / Laws, BK V, 686d-687c 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 10 [1035b13-32] 559a-b; BK VIII, CH 3 [1043a29-b4] 567d; CH 6 569d-570d; BK XII, CH 10 [1075b34-37] 606d / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a2-b9] 632a-d; CH 5 [410b10-16] 640c; [411b5-18] 641c-d; BK II, CH 1-2 642a-644c 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 5 [1254a33-b7] 448a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [94-176] 31b-32b; [370-395] 34d-35a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3 108b-c; BK IV, CH 11 240d-242d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 21 265b-c; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; BK IX, SECT 8 292b; BK XII, SECT 30 310a-b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I 1a-6b / Second Ennead, TR I, CH 5 37c / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 19-23 151d-154b; TR VII, CH 1 191c-d; CH 8 197c-198b / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 4-8 323c-325c 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK V, CH 11 216c; BK IX, CH 8-17 289d-295c passim; BK X, CH 29 316d-318b; BK XIII, CH 16 367a-d; CH 19 369c-370c; BK XIV, CH 2-3 377a-378d; CH 5 379c-380b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 1, REP 2 34d-35c; A 2, REP 1-2 35c-36b; Q 75, A 2, REP 1-2 379c-380c; A 4 381b-382a; Q 76 385c-399b; Q 118-Q 119, A 1 600a-607b; PART I-II, Q 4, A 5, REP 2 632c-634b; Q 17, A 4, ANS and REP 3 688d-689c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c; A 5 715a-716b; A 6, ANS and REP 2 716b-718b; Q 3, A 7, REP 1 728a-729a; Q 17, A 2, ANS and REP 4 808d-809d; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, AA 1-2 951b-955c; Q 80, AA 1-2 956c-958b; QQ 82-85 968a-992a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXV [34-78] 91d-92a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 294c-295a; 311a-b; 432b-d; 540a-543a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-49c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a; PART V, 60b-c / Meditations, II 77d-81d; VI, 98c-99a; 99d-100a / Objections and Replies, 119d-120a; DEF VI-VII 130c-d; DEF X 130d; PROP IV 133c; 135d-136b; 152d-155d; 170b-c; 207d-208a; 209c; 224d-225d; 231a-232d; 248b; 276b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 11-13 377b-378c; PART III, PROP 2 396c-398b; PART V, PREF 451a-452c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 512 262a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 4-5 113b-c; BK II, CH XXVII, SECT 6-8 220c-222a esp SECT 8, 221d-222a; SECT 15 224b-c; SECT 21 225d-226a; SECT 27-29 227d-228c; BK IV, CH III, SECT 6 313c-315b passim 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 52 472c-473c 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b-230a; 270b; 277a-b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 198a-c 42 KANT: Judgement, 557c-558b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 47-48 24a-c; ADDITIONS, 2 115d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 1a-4a esp 2b-3a, 4a; 84a-93b esp 88a-90b; 116a-119b esp 118b-119b; 130a; 139a-140a; 208a-b; 222b-223a 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a

3b(5) The unity of the human person or the self: the order of man’s powers; the split personality

NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 6:12-14; 7-8; 13:13-14 7 PLATO: Symposium, 165d-166b / Gorgias, 270d-271b / Republic, BK IV, 346a-355a esp 350b-355a / Timaeus, 453b-454a; 474b-d; 476a-b 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 6-11 662d-667a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3-4 108b-110a; CH 12 118d-120b; BK III, CH 24 203c-210a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK I, SECT 1 253a; BK V, SECT 36 273d; BK VII, SECT 13 280c; SECT 55 283b-c; BK VIII, SECT 1 285a-b; BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 18 166d-167b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VIII, PAR 10-11 55c-56b; PAR 19-24 58b-60a; BK X, PAR 39 81b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 77 399b-407a; Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; QQ 93-101 492a-523d; PART I-II, Q 13, A 1 672d-673c; Q 16, A 1 684b-d; Q 17, A 4 688d-689c; Q 36, A 3 782b-783a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 77, A 2 145d-147c; QQ 81-83 162d-174b; PART II-II, Q 29 530b-533a; PART III, Q 2, A 1, REP 2 710a-711c; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 711d-712d; Q 6 740b-745b; Q 17, A 2, ANS and REP 4 808d-809d; Q 19, A 1, REP 4 816a-818b; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 1 893d-895d; Q 79, A 2 953b-955c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV [1-18] 57c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 105c-107a; 159a-162c; 273b-276a; 300d-301c; 326b-327b; 381b-c; 388c-389c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 72b 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV 89a-93a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 11-12 123d-124c; SECT 19 126a-c; CH XXVII 218d-228c passim, esp SECT 9-26 222a-227d 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 120c-129c esp 121a-124d, 126a-128b; 200c-204c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 368d-369a / Judgement, 584d-585c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1064-1117] 26b-28a; [3217-3250] 79a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XII, 554b-555c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 1a-b; 130a-139a passim, esp 134b-137b; 147a-149a; 154a-155b; 188a-259b esp 192a-b, 205a-206a, 213a-219a, 222a-b, 225a-258a 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 6a-9b / Hysteria, 28d-29b; 81d-83c esp 82a / Unconscious, 430a-b / General Introduction, 589c-593b esp 590a-c; 615b-616c; 633d-635c esp 634b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640c-d / Group Psychology, 689d-690c / Ego and Id, 699a-c; 701d-707c esp 701d-703a, 704d; 711b; 712b-716b esp 712b-c, 715c-716a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721d-722d esp 722c; 747a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 767d-768d / New Introductory Lectures, 830a-840a esp 830d-832a, 836d-839b; 843d-845b esp 845b

4. Unity in the realm of mind: unity in thought or knowledge

4a. The unity of mind or intellect, the cognitive faculties, or consciousness

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a3-22] 636b-d; BK III, CH 1-5 656b,d-662d; CH 7 [431a20-b1] 663d-664a; CH 8 [432a2-14] 664c-d 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 143b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 76, A 2 388c-391a; Q 79, AA 4-5 417a-419b; Q 88, A 1, ANS 469a-471c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 4, ANS 9a-10b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 55a-56c; 99a-101b; 110d-112a; 119a-b; 120c-129c esp 121a-124d, 126a-128b; 185b-c; 193a-200c esp 193d-194b, 194d-195a, 199a-c; 200c-204c / Practical Reason, 329a-d / Judgement, 463a-475d; 570b-572b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 321-322 106c-107a; PAR 343 110d-111a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 175c-177b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 1a-b; 154a-157b esp 156a; 159b-161a esp 160a-161a

4b. The unity of sense-experience: the unity of attention; the transcendental unity of apperception

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 534d-535b 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b36-100b14] 136b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980b25-981a1] 499b / Soul, BK II, CH 11 654b-656a; BK III, CH 1 [425a14-b10] 657b-d; CH 2 [426b7-427a15] 658d-659c; CH 7 [431a20-b1] 663d-664a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 7 685c-689a,c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 143b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 3, REP 2 4c-5a; Q 78, AA 3-4 410a-413d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 77, A 1, ANS 145a-d; PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, REP 4 971a-972d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, IV [1-18] 57c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 99 432b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 48d-59b esp 49c-51d 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 244b-245a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 232b-238b esp 232b-234b, 237a-238a; 261a-269a; 315b-318b passim, esp 318a-b; 469a-471a; 502b-503b; 570a-572b esp 572a

4c. Unity in thinking or understanding: the unity of complex ideas and definitions; the unity of the term, the judgment, and the syllogism

7 PLATO: Laches, 32a-33a / Meno, 174a-179b / Theaetetus, 514b-515d; 534d-536a; 545b-547b / Sophist, 559a-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [2a19-33] 6b-c; [3b6-9] 7b-d / Interpretation, CH 5 26b-c; CH 8 27d-28a; CH 11 31c-32c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 23 [84b31-85a1] 115d-116a; BK II, CH 6 [92a28-33] 126b; CH 10 [93b36-38] 128b-c; CH 13 [97b6-25] 133a-b / Topics, BK I, CH 18 [108b17-37] 152b-d; BK IV, CH 3 [123a27-29] 171d; CH 6 [127b5-6] 177a; BK VI, CH 2 [139b19-32] 192c-d; CH 4 [141b26-32] 194c-d; CH 5 [142b30-143a12] 196b-c; CH 10 [148b23]-CH 11 [149a38] 202b-203d; CH 13 [150a1]-CH 14 [151a31] 204c-206a; BK VII, CH 3 [153a6-22] 208a-b; [154a3-11] 209b; CH 4 [154a15-18] 209c / Sophistical Refutations, CH 7 [169b3-6] 233b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 7 [1012a22-24] 532b; BK V, CH 3 [1014a35-b3] 534c; BK VII, CH 4-6 552b-555a; CH 10-12 558a-562a; CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK VIII, CH 2 [1043a12-28] 567c-d; CH 3 [1043b28-33] 568b; CH 6 569d-570d; BK X, CH 1 [1052a28-37] 578d / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402b1-9] 631c-d; BK II, CH 3 [414b20-32] 644d-645a; BK III, CH 6 662d-663c; CH 8 [432a9-10] 664c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 3 166a-167d esp [643b10-35] 167a-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 58, A 2 301b-d; Q 85, A 4 457a-d; A 8 460b-461b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59c-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XII, SECT 1 147b-d; SECT 5-8 148a-d passim; CH XVI, SECT 1 165c-d; CH XXII, SECT 4 201c-d; CH XXIV 214b-d; BK III, CH V 263d-268a passim, esp SECT 4 264b, SECT 10-11 266b-d; CH VI, SECT 28-33 276a-278c passim, esp SECT 32, 278a-b; CH XI, SECT 18 304a-b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1 413a-b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 43d-44a; 44c-45b; 45d-46a; 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 107b-c; 110d-112a; 133c; 193a-200c esp 195b-d, 197b-198a; 234c / Practical Reason, 329a-d / Judgement, 550a-551a,c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 220c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 178a-184a esp 178b-179a, 180a; 213b-214a; 820b-821a

4d. The unity of science: the unity of particular sciences

7 PLATO: Charmides, 10b-11a / Symposium, 167a-d / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK VII, 397c-398a 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 7 103c-d; CH 9 104b-d; CH 11 [77a26-35] 106b; CH 28 119c; CH 32 120c-121b / Topics, BK I, CH 3 [110a16-28] 155c / Sophistical Refutations, CH 9 [170a20-b3] 234b-c / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 1 [995b4-26] 513d-514b; CH 2 [996b18-997a34] 514d-516a; BK IV, CH 1-3 522a-525a; BK VI, CH 1 547b,d-548c; BK XI, CH 1-4 587a-590a; CH 7-8 592b-593d 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR IX, CH 2 137a / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 2 143a; TR IX, CH 5 206d-207a,c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 3 4c-5a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 6, REP 3 40a-41a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 71c-d; 72a-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 13a-c; 15d-16b; 44c-45a; 48d-49b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I 1a-2a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 193a-200c esp 197b-198a / Judgement, 560d-561a; 578a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 197b; BK VI, 248d-249a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 1a-4a passim 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874a

4e. The one and the many, or the simple and the complex, as objects of knowledge: the order of learning with respect to wholes and parts

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 126a-c; 134b-c / Symposium, 167a-d / Meno, 174a-183a / Phaedo, 231b-232b / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK V, 368c-373c; BK VII, 392b-394b / Timaeus, 465d / Parmenides 486a-511d / Theaetetus, 534d-536a; 537a-c; 545b-547b / Sophist, 569d-570a / Statesman, 594d-595a / Philebus, 609b-613c 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Topics, BK V, CH 5 [135a20-b6] 186d-187a / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [999a24-29] 518a; BK V, CH 6 [1016b18-25] 537b; BK VII, CH 17 [1041a6-11] 565a-d; BK X, CH 1 [1052a1-1053a8] 578d-580a; CH 3 [1054a20-29] 581a; BK XI, CH 10 594d-596a / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402a15-403a2] 631d-632a; BK III, CH 1 [425a14-b10] 657b-d; CH 6 662d-663c / Sense and the Sensible, CH 7 685c-689a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b12-19] 161b-d / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a18-24] 445b 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 1 159a-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, REP 1 16a-d; Q 10, A 1, REP 1 40d-41d; Q 11, A 2, REP 4 47d-48d; A 3, REP 2 49a-c; Q 12, AA 8-10 57b-59d; Q 14, AA 5-6 79a-81c; A 10, REP 1 83d-84c; Q 30, A 1, REP 4 167a-168a; A 3, REP 3 169b-170c; Q 39, A 8 210a-213a; Q 58, A 2 301b-d; Q 85, AA 3-4 455b-457d; A 8 460b-461b; PART I-II, Q 10, A 1, REP 3 662d-663d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 44c-45a / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; BK I, APH 19-36 108b-109b; BK II, APH 3-5 137c-139a; APH 17 149b-d; APH 27 157b-158d; APH 30 159c-d; APH 35 162a-164a; APH 37 168d-169c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, VIII, 14b-c; IX 14d-15d; XII 18b-25a esp 20d-24c / Discourse, PART II, 46c-48b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH III, SECT 7 255c-256a; CH VI, SECT 32 277c-278b; BK IV, CH VI, SECT 11 334b-335b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 99 432b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 9 454c-455a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 49c-51d esp 51c-d; 110d-111c; 193d-200c / Practical Reason, 294a-b / Judgement, 572a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 197b; BK VI, 248d-249a; BK XII, 555b-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 315a-319a esp 317b-318b; 327a-331b; 360a; 397a; 406b; 452b-453b [fn 1]; 456b-457a; 503b-504a; 547a-548b; 551b-552a

4f. The unity of knower and known, or of subject and object

7 PLATO: Seventh Letter, 809c-810d esp 810c 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-9] 25a / Topics, BK I, CH 18 [108a17-37] 152b-d / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b18-24] 602d-603a; CH 9 [1074b35-1075a11] 605c-d / Soul, BK I, CH 5 [409b18-411a7] 639c-641a; BK II, CH 5 [416b32-417a2] 647b; [417a17-21] 647d; [418a2-6] 648c-d; BK III, CH 2 [425b17-426a8] 657d-658d; CH 3 [427a16-b6] 659c-d; CH 4 661b-662c; CH 5 [430a14-16] 662c; [430a20-22] 662d; CH 7 [431a1-8] 663c; CH 7 [431b13]-CH 8 [432a2] 664b-c / Sense and the Sensible, CH 6 [446b13-27] 685a-b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [450a25-451a19] 691a-692b 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR IX, CH 1 136a-d / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 10 221b-222a; TR VI, CH 1 235b-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 17 75c-d; PAR 19 76a-b; PAR 22-24 76d-77c; PAR 27-28 78b-d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6 269b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 2 76d-77d; A 6, REP 1,3 80a-81c; A 9, REP 2 83b-d; Q 27, A 1, REP 2 153b-154b; Q 85, A 8, REP 3 460b-461b; Q 117, A 1 595d-597c; PART I-II, Q 28, A 1, REP 3 740b-741a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 52c-53a; 88b-91d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 31 19c-20a; PART III, PAR 146-147 55c-56a; PAR 343 110d-111a; PAR 360 113d-114a,c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-161a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 231a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 142a-143b; 147a-b; 176a-178a; 232b-238b esp 232b-233a, 234a-235a, 236a-237b; 307a; 309a-311a passim, esp 311a; 852a

5. Unity in moral and political matters

5a. The unity of virtue and the many virtues

7 PLATO: Laches, 32a-37b / Protagoras, 48a-50d; 58a-64d / Meno 174a-190a,c esp 174a-175d / Statesman, 605d-607a / Laws, BK XII, 795c-797b 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK V, CH 1 [128b34-39] 178d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129b12]-CH 2 [1130a29] 377a-378b; BK VI, CH 13 394b-d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VIII, SECT 39 288c; BK XI, SECT 10 303b-c 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR II, CH 7 9c-10a; TR III, CH 6 11d-12b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 60, A 1 49d-50c; Q 61, AA 3-4 56b-58b; Q 65 70a-75a; Q 68, A 5 92c-93c; Q 73, A 1 119c-120c; PART II-II, Q 23, AA 4-8 485d-489c; Q 184, A 1 629a-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 80a-81a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 20 175a 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 377d 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 469a-b

5b. The unity of the last end: the plurality of intermediate ends or means

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 10 [433a5-13] 666b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 1-2 339a-d; CH 4 [1095a13-29] 340b-c; CH 6 [1096b11-28] 341b-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 14 189d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK V, SECT 16 271c-d; BK VI, SECT 42 278a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR IV, CH 4-16 14a-19b / Sixth Ennead, TR IX, CH 6-11 357a-360d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 4 266d-267c; CH 8-9 270a-271a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 35 634c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, AA 5-8 613a-615c; Q 12, A 3, REP 1 670d-671b; Q 13, A 3, REP 2 674c-675a; Q 16, A 3, CONTRARY and REP 3 685b-686a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, QQ 2-4 390d-409d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 234c-240b esp 235a-b, 236d-237a, 238c-239a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 257c-d; 266c-267d; 271d-279d esp 273d-277b; 286c-287d / Practical Reason, 307a-d; 317a-b; 327d-329a; 337a-355d / Judgement, 588b [fn 2]; 591b-592c esp 592a-c; 594c-597d 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a; 461c-463d

5c. The unity of subjective will and objective morality in the ethical realm

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 8 14c; PAR 33 20b-d; PART II, PAR 141 54b-d; PART III, PAR 155 57c; PAR 183 64a; PAR 185 64b-d; PAR 229 75b; PAR 258 80b-81c; PAR 260-261 82a-83d; PAR 270 84d-89c; PAR 353-360 112b-114a,c esp PAR 360 113d-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 100-101 133a-b; 118 136a-b

5d. The unity of the family and the unity of the state: the limits of political or social unification

7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 343c-344a; BK V, 356b-365d / Statesman, 605d-608d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 1 [1155a22-28] 406d; BK IX, CH 6 420c-421a / Politics, BK I, CH 1-2 445a-446d; BK II, CH 1-6 455b,d-461d esp CH 2 455d-456c; BK VII, CH 4 530a-d; CH 8 532c-533a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK II, CH 21 161b-c; BK XII, CH 21 357a-b; BK XVII, CH 14 464d; BK XIX, CH 14-17 520a-523a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 81, A 1, ANS 163a-164d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 99a-101a; 109c-d; 111a-b; 121a; 152c-d; 155b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 871 344b 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 78-80 42b-43a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3b-c; BK X, 64a; 64d-65b; BK XX, 140a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 367a-369a passim / Social Contract, BK I, 392b-393b; BK II, 419c-d; BK IV, 425a-427a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 18a 42 KANT: Science of Right, 455c-456a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1-2, 30d-32a; NUMBER 14 60a-62d passim, esp 61b-c 43 MILL: Representative Government, 352b-353a; 417c-433b passim / Utilitarianism, 460a-461c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 56a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 158-159 58a; PAR 173 61a-b; PAR 181 63c-d; PAR 270 84d-89c; PAR 276 92b; ADDITIONS, 117 135d-136a; 161 143a-b; 168 145c-d; 178 147d-148a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-178a; PART I, 211a-212c; 222a-c; 236a-c; PART III, 302d-303a; PART IV, 363c-d 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 421a-d esp 421c-d; 427c-428b 54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 677b-678b; 684d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 785c-788d; 791b-c; 799a-800a

5e. The unity of sovereignty: its divisibility or indivisibility; the problem of federal union

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 97c-98a,c; PART II, 100c-105c; 150b; 151a-152a; PART III, 198a-199a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3b; BK IX, 58b,d-60a 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 392b-393b; BK II, 395a-396a; BK III, 406b,d-410a; 420d; 422a-c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 577b-c 42 KANT: Science of Right, 437c-d; 439a-441d; 452c-d; 455c-456a / Judgement, 586a-587a 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: 11a-20a,c passim, esp ARTICLE VI [583-590] 16d, AMENDMENTS, X 18a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1-14 29a-62d passim; NUMBER 15, 63d-64a; 65c-d; NUMBER 18-20 71a-78b passim; NUMBER 32, 105d-107b; NUMBER 39, 126b-128b; NUMBER 42, 138c; NUMBER 44, 146d-147c; NUMBER 82 242b-244a 43 MILL: Representative Government, 428b-433b passim 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 276-278 92b-93a; PAR 281 95b-d; PAR 321-322 106c-107a / Philosophy of History, PART II, 278; PART IV, 342b-d; 355c-d

6. Unity in the supernatural order

6a. The unity and simplicity of God

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:1-6 / Deuteronomy, 4:39; 5:6-10; 6:4; 32:29 / I Kings, 8:23,60—(D) III Kings, 8:23,60 / Psalms, 18:31—(D) Psalms, 17:32 / Isaiah, 37:16,20; 43:10-15; 44:6,8; 45:5-6,18,21-22; 48:12—(D) Isaias, 37:16,20; 43:10-15; 44:6,8; 45:5-6,18,21-22; 48:12 / Jeremiah, 10:6—(D) Jeremias, 10:6 / Hosea, 13:4—(D) Osee, 13:4 / Zechariah, 14:9—(D) Zacharias, 14:9 / Malachi, 2:10—(D) Malachias, 2:10 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 12:13—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 12:13 / II Maccabees, 1:24-25—(D) OT, II Machabees, 1:24-25 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 23:9; 28 / Mark, 12:29-34 / John, 17:3 / I Corinthians, 8:1-6; 12:1-13 / Ephesians, 4:1-6 / I Timothy, 2:1-6 / James, 2:19 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VIII, CH 10 353b-355d / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1073a4-11] 603a-b; CH 8 [1074a32-39] 604d; CH 9 [1075a5-11] 605c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 14 [1154b20-31] 406c 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR IX 353d-360d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 10 3b-c; PAR 12 4a; BK IV, PAR 24 25b-c; PAR 29 26b; BK VII, PAR 2 43c-44a; PAR 16-23 48c-50c esp PAR 21 49d-50a; BK XII, PAR 4 111c / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6 268d-269c; CH 11 272c; BK XI, CH 10 327d-328d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 5 625d-626a; CH 32 633c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3 14a-20c; Q 4, A 2, REP 1-2 21b-22b; A 3 22b-23b; Q 6, A 3 29c-30b; Q 7, A 2 31d-32c; Q 8, A 2, REP 2-3 35c-36b; A 4 37c-38c; Q 11 46d-50b; Q 13, A 1, REP 2-3 62c-63c; A 4 65c-66b; A 11 73c-74b; Q 14, A 1, REP 2 75d-76c; A 4 78b-79a; Q 26, A 1, REP 1 150b-c; Q 27, A 1, REP 2 153b-154b; Q 30, A 1, REP 3-4 167a-168a; A 3 169b-170c; Q 40, A 1, REP 1 213b-214b; Q 44, A 1, ANS 238b-239a; Q 47, A 1 256a-257b; Q 50, A 2, REP 3 270a-272a; A 3, REP 2 272a-273b; Q 54, A 1, ANS 285a-d; A 3, REP 2 286c-287b; Q 55, A 1, ANS and REP 3 289a-d; A 3, ANS 291a-d; Q 57, A 1, ANS 295a-d; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3 442b-443c; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; PART I-II, Q 18, A 1, ANS 694a-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 4, ANS 5a-6a; Q 50, A 6, ANS 11a-12a; Q 73, A 1, REP 3 119c-120c; PART III, Q 2, A 2, ANS and REP 1 711d-712d; Q 3, A 2, REP 3 724a-c; A 3 724c-725b; Q 6, A 5, REP 2 744a-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XIII [52-66] 126a; XXIV [115-154] 143d-144b; XXXI [127-145] 151c-d; XXXIII [76-145] 157a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 151d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d / Meditations, III 81d-89a esp 88a-b / Objections and Replies, 122b-c; 232b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I 355a-372d esp DEF 1 355a, DEF 3,6 355b, AXIOM 2 355c-d, PROP 1-8 355d-357d, PROP 13-15 359c-361d, PROP 16, COROL 1,3 362a, PROP 17, COROL 2 362b, PROP 18 363c, PROP 20 363d-364a, PROP 29, SCHOL 366b-c; PART II, PROP 4 374c; PROP 7, SCHOL 375b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 15 116c-d; BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 35 213b-c; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11 271b-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307b-c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 229c-230b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 176b-c; 192c-d; 205a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 224a-b; 227d-228a; PART III, 306a-c; PART IV, 322a-c

6b. The unity of the Trinity

NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1:1-5 / I John, 5:7 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XIII, PAR 12 113b-d; PAR 32 119a-b / City of God, BK X, CH 23-24 312c-313a; BK XI, CH 10 327d-328d; CH 24-28 335c-338d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 5 625d-626a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 11, A 4, CONTRARY 49d-50b; QQ 27-31 153a-175c; Q 39, A 8 210a-213a; Q 42 224a-230a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 3, REP 1 713a-714c; Q 3, A 3 724c-725b; Q 17, A 1, REP 5 807a-808d; A 2, REP 3 808d-809d; PART III SUPPL, Q 95, A 3, ANS 1045b-1046d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XIV [28-33] 127b; XXIV [115-154] 143d-144b; XXXIII [76-145] 157a-d 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK V, STANZA 267 155a / Second Nun’s Tale [15,798-809] 467a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 207b; 207d-208c; PART IV, 259d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 100c-d 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 232b 32 MILTON: Christ’s Nativity [1-14] 1a-b / Paradise Lost, BK V [600-615] 188b; BK XI [469-551] 329b-331a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307a-313d esp 307b-c, 310b-312a; 605a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 303d-304a; 306a-c

6c. The unity of the Incarnation

NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1:9-14; 10:30,38; 14:10-11 / Philippians, 2:5-7 / Colossians, 2:9 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IX, CH 14-17 293a-295c; BK X, CH 29 316d-318b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 13 627d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, QQ 1-26 701b,d-846d esp Q 2 709d-723a, Q 17 806d-809d; PART III SUPPL, Q 95, A 3, ANS 1045b-1046d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXXI [76-126] 101c-102a; PARADISE, II [31-45] 108a; VII [25-33] 115c; XXXIII [76-145] 157a-d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 512 262a; 765 322a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308a-b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 134a-138a esp 136b-d, 137c-d; 140a-b; 145b-d; 150c-151c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 306b-307b

CROSS-REFERENCES

• For: Other discussions of the problem of the one and the many in relation to the order of being, nature, or reality, see BEING 2-2a; GOD 5d-5e; NATURE 1b; OPPOSITION 2b, 2c; RELATION 3; WORLD 3a-3b.
• For: Problems closely related to that of the one and the many, see RELATION 1d; SAME AND OTHER 2b, 2c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 1.
• For: The dialectical significance of the problem of the one and the many, see DIALECTIC 3a, 3d; OPPOSITION 2b.
• For: Other discussions of numerical unity or identity, or the unity of the individual or the indivisible, see ELEMENT 5a-5b; INFINITY 4b; MATHEMATICS 2c; QUANTITY 2, 6a; SAME AND OTHER 1a-1b.
• For: Discussions relevant to the unity and divisibility of matter, motion, time, and space, see CHANGE 5b; ELEMENT 5b; INFINITY 4b; QUANTITY 2; SPACE 3a; TIME 1.
• For: The problem of essential and accidental unity, see SAME AND OTHER 3a.
• For: The problem of the unity of substantial form, see FORM 2c(3).
• For: The problem of the unity of man, or of unity in the human personality, see MAN 3a, 5a; OPPOSITION 4-4b, 4d; SOUL 4a.
• For: Considerations of unity in the faculties or operations of thought or knowledge, see DEFINITION 1d; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); MIND 1a(3); SAME AND OTHER 4c; SENSE 3c(5).
• For: The one and the many, or the simple and the complex, as objects of knowledge and in relation to the order of learning, see IDEA 5d; KNOWLEDGE 5b.
• For: The unity and diversity of knower and known, see KNOWLEDGE 1; SAME AND OTHER 4a.
• For: The controversy over the unity of virtue and the plurality of virtues, see COURAGE 4; PRUDENCE 3b; TEMPERANCE 1a; VIRTUE AND VICE 1b, 3b.
• For: Other discussions of the order of means and ends, see GOOD AND EVIL 5c; PRINCIPLE 4a; RELATION 5a(2).
• For: Unity as an aesthetic or an artistic principle, see ART 7b; BEAUTY 1c; POETRY 8a(1).
• For: Matters bearing on the unity of the family and the state, and relevant to the process and limits of social unification, see CITIZEN 8; FAMILY 2a; GOVERNMENT 1b; STATE 1b, 10a-10f; WAR AND PEACE 11a, 11d.
• For: Considerations germane to the divisibility or indivisibility of sovereignty, see GOVERNMENT 1g, 5d; STATE 9d.
• For: Other discussions of the uniqueness and simplicity of God, and of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, see GOD 4b, 9a-9b; MAN 11c; RELATION 2.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• AQUINAS. On the Trinity of Boethius, Q 4
• DANTE. On World-Government or De Monarchia, BK I, CH 14-15
• DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 60-65
• HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind
• —. Science of Logic, VOL I, BK I, SECT 1, CH 3(B); BK II, SECT 1, CH 3(A)
• W. JAMES. Memories and Studies, CH 8
• —. Pragmatism, LECT IV
• —. A Pluralistic Universe
• —. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 7-8

II.

• SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Physicists, BK I (Concerning Whole and Part)
• PROCLUS. The Elements of Theology, (a, #)
• ERIGENA. De Divisione Naturae
• ALBO. The Book of Principles (Sefer ha-Ikkarim), BK II, CH 8, 10-13
• G. PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA. Of Being and Unity
• BRUNO. De la causa, principio, e uno
• SUÁREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, III-VI, XV (10), XXX (10), XXXIV, XLIV (11), XLVI (1), XLVII (11, 14-15, 17)
• —. On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputationes Metaphysicae, VII)
• JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica, PART II, Q 27; Philosophia Naturalis, PART III, Q 9
• LEIBNIZ. Monadology, PAR 1-9, 56-90
• SCHELLING. Von der Weltseele
• SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL I, BK IV (56)
• FECHNER. Über die physikalische und philosophische Atomenlehre
• LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6
• —. Outlines of Metaphysic, DIV I, esp CH 3, 5; DIV II
• C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL VI, PAR 373-383
• BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, Terminal Essays, IV-V
• —. Appearance and Reality
• ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES I (4, 9-10); Supplementary Essay
• B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 16-17
• H. ADAMS. Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres
• MEYERSON. Identity and Reality
• BLOOD. Pluriverse
• MCTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, BK II
• BROAD. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, CH 1
• WHITEHEAD. Science and the Modern World, CH 10