Chapter 62: OLIGARCHY

INTRODUCTION

In the great books of political theory the word “oligarchy” is usually listed along with “monarchy” and “democracy” among the traditional names for the forms of government. According to the meaning of their Greek roots, “oligarchy” signifies the rule of the few as “monarchy” signifies the rule of one and “democracy” the rule of the people—or the many.

These verbal meanings are somewhat altered, however, when we consider the actual conflict between oligarchy and democracy in Greek political life. It involved an opposition, not simply between the few and the many, but between the wealthy and the working classes. The contest between these factions for political power dominated more than a century of Greek history around the Periclean age; and that fact justifies Aristotle’s remark that oligarchy and democracy are the two principal conflicting forms of government.

We would not so describe the political struggle of our time. We would not speak of oligarchy as one of the principal forms of government in the world today. Instead we tend to think in terms of the conflict between democracy and dictatorship or despotism. Even when we look to the background of present issues, it is the age-old struggle between absolute and constitutional government—or between monarchies and republics—which seems to supply the obvious historical parallels for the contemporary conflict between the principles of arbitrary and legal government. The traditional terms of political theory, with the exception of oligarchy, thus appear to have a certain liveliness in the consideration of current problems. But though it does not have such frequency in our speech or familiarity in our thought, oligarchy may be much more relevant to the real issues of our day than appears on the surface.

Certainly within the framework of constitutional government, oligarchical and democratic principles are the opposed sources of policy and legislation. In modern as in ancient republics the division of men into political parties tends to follow the lines of the division of men into economic factions. The ancient meanings of oligarchy and democracy, especially for those observers like Thucydides and Aristotle who see the rich and the poor as the major rivals for constitutional power, indicate the fusion of political and economic issues.

The difference between oligarchy and democracy, says Aristotle, is not well-defined by reference to the few and the many, unless it is understood that the few are also the rich and the many the poor. The issue is not whether the few are wiser than the many, or whether it is more efficient to have the government in the hands of the few rather than the many. Such issues have been debated in the history of political thought, but they are more appropriate to the alternatives of aristocracy and democracy than to the conflict between oligarchy and democracy.

The historic struggle between oligarchs and democrats—whether described as a struggle between rich and poor, nobility and bourgeoisie, landed gentry and agrarian peons, owners and workers, classes and masses—is a struggle over the political privileges of wealth, the rights of property, the protection of special interests. In the tradition of the great books, Marx and Engels may be the first to call this struggle “the class war,” but they are only the most recent in a long line of political and economic writers to recognize that the economic antagonism of rich and poor generates the basic political conflict in any state. “Any city, however small,” says Socrates, “is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich: these are at war with one another.”

Oligarchy is not always defined as the rule of the wealthy, nor is it always conceived as the opponent of democracy on constitutional questions. In the Statesman, for example, Plato first divides the forms of government into “monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many,” and then divides “the rule of the few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy.” Here aristocracy and oligarchy seem to be regarded as opposites, the one a government in which the few rule according to the laws, the other lawless government by the few. In both, the few are the wealthy; hence wealth is no more characteristic of oligarchy than of aristocracy.

Some political theorists make no reference to wealth at all in the discussion of oligarchy. Hobbes divides the forms of government according to whether the sovereign power is in the hands of one or more; and if in the hands of more than one, then whether it is held by some or all. He calls the several forms of government monarchy (one), aristocracy (some), and democracy (all). There are “other names of government in the histories and books of policy,” he adds, such as “tyranny and oligarchy. But they are not the names of other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they that are discontented under monarchy call it tyranny, and they that are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy.” Like Hobbes, both Locke and Rousseau use no criterion except numbers to distinguish the forms of government, Locke calling government by the few “oligarchy” and Rousseau calling it “aristocracy.”

Barely outlined in this way, the alternatives of monarchy, aristocracy or oligarchy, and democracy seem to raise issues only of expediency or efficiency rather than of justice. Whether oligarchy is intrinsically a good or bad form of government tends to become a question only when other factors are considered; when, for example, the distinction between aristocracy and oligarchy is made to turn on whether the few are men of virtue or men of property, or when, in the comparison of oligarchy with democracy, the emphasis is not upon numbers but on the principles of wealth and liberty.

Nevertheless, the numerical criterion does not seem to be totally irrelevant to the comparison. “Oligarchy and democracy,” Aristotle writes, “are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth and freedom.” Though the “real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth,” and though “wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy,” Aristotle does not seem to think we can neglect the political significance of what he calls the “accidental fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous.”

With regard to aristocracy and oligarchy, the chief question does not seem to be one of principle, but of fact. Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in the Politics define aristocracy as government by the few best men, or the most virtuous. They also place it next to what is for them the ideal government by the supremely wise man—the rule of the philosopher king, or what Aristotle calls “the divine sort of government.” In this context, oligarchy represents a perversion of aristocracy, as tyranny represents a corruption of monarchy.

Plato describes oligarchy as arising when “riches and rich men are honored in the State” and when the law “fixes a sum of money as the qualification for citizenship” and allows “no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government.” But according to Socrates, wealth does not qualify men to rule, as virtue and wisdom do. “Just think what would happen,” he says, “if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot.” To which Adeimantus agrees that in government, as in navigation, the probable result would be shipwreck.

The criticism of aristocracies as masked oligarchies is discussed in the chapter on ARISTOCRACY. The critical point seems to be that nothing except superior virtue or talent justifies a political inequality between the few and the many. The meaning of oligarchy is generalized in consequence to include any government in which the special privileges or powers held by the few cannot be justified, whether it is wealth or some other title to pre-eminence that is substituted for superiority in virtue or talent. When it is so understood, the word “oligarchical” tends to become like “tyrannical,” a term of reproach.

In describing different forms of democracy, Aristotle observes that their common principle is to give a share in the government to all who meet whatever minimum qualification is set by law. “The absolute exclusion of any class,” he says, “would be a step towards oligarchy.” To the same effect is Mill’s comment on the steps away from oligarchy accomplished by English constitutional reforms in the 19th century.

“In times not long gone by,” Mill writes, “the higher and richer classes were in complete possession of the government…. A vote given in opposition to those influences… was almost sure to be a good vote, for it was a vote against the monster evil, the over-ruling influence of oligarchy.” But now that the higher classes are no longer masters of the country, now that the franchise has been extended to the middle classes, a diminished form of oligarchy still remains. “The electors themselves are becoming the oligarchy”—in a population where many are still disenfranchised. “The present electors,” Mill continues, “and the bulk of those whom any probable Reform Bill would add to the number, are the middle class; and have as much a class interest, distinct from the working classes, as landlords or great manufacturers. Were the suffrage extended to all skilled laborers, even those would, or might, still have a class interest distinct from the unskilled.”

Oligarchy remains, according to Mill, so long as there is any unjustifiable discrimination among classes in the population. It is not in his view limited to discrimination based on the extremes of wealth and poverty, as he plainly indicates by his remarks on the special interests of different parts of the working class, or their relation as a whole to the lower middle classes. He makes this even plainer by what he has to say on political discrimination as between the sexes. Suppose the suffrage to be extended to all men, he writes, “suppose that what was formerly called by the misapplied name of universal suffrage, and now by the silly title of manhood suffrage, became the law; the voters would still have a class interest, as distinguished from women.”

The oligarchical defect in representative government which Mill is here criticizing seems to have little or no basis in economic class divisions. The exclusion of any class in the population from a voice in government renders that government oligarchical with respect to them. The excluded class may even be a minority. So conceived, oligarchy no longer means the rule of either the rich or the few.

When the meaning of oligarchy is generalized in this way, the discussion of oligarchy seems to presuppose the typically modern conception of democracy. As indicated in the chapter on DEMOCRACY, the distinguishing feature of the modern democratic constitution is universal suffrage. By this criterion, the conflict between the democrats and the oligarchs of the ancient world appears to be a conflict between two forms of the oligarchical constitution—one in which the wealthier few and one in which the poorer many have political rights, but in neither of which membership in the political community includes all normal adult human beings in the population.

Where ancient political theory could conceive of a mixed constitution—somehow combining oligarchical and democratic principles—the modern conception of democracy seems to make any compromise with oligarchy impossible. Certain modern writers, notably Mosca, Michels, and Pareto, seem to insist, on the contrary, that oligarchy is present in all forms of government, and is especially prevalent in representative democracies where the actual conduct of government—the effective power—is in the hands of a bureaucracy or an elite, whether popularly chosen or self-appointed. But the contradiction may be more verbal than real if on one side the word “oligarchy” means some degree of restriction in the franchise or citizenship, and, on the other, it applies to any situation in which the whole people are not directly active in all the affairs of government and, consequently, a small number of men administers the state. Understood in the latter sense, the oligarchical principle does not seem to be incompatible with representative democracy. Those who use the word in this sense merely call attention to an inevitable characteristic of representative government. A representative democracy may also have an aristocratic aspect when it follows the principle that the men best qualified by virtue or talent for public office should be chosen by the suffrage of all their fellow-citizens.

Fuller discussion of these aspects of oligarchy is found in the chapters on ARISTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY. Here we are primarily concerned with political issues which have their source in the opposition of economic classes in the state, primarily that extreme division of men into those who live by their labor and those who live on their property and the labor of others. It is in terms of this extreme division between men of leisure and working men that the conflict between oligarchy and democracy takes place in the ancient world.

At a time when citizenship meant a much more active and frequent participation in government than it does under the modern institutions of the ballot box and the representative assembly, the ancient defenders of oligarchy could argue that only men of wealth had the leisure requisite for citizenship. Oligarchy could be further defended on the ground that, in many of the Greek city-states, public officials were either not compensated at all or at least not substantially. Only men of sizeable property could afford to hold public office.

Aristotle weighs the arguments for and against oligarchy. On the point of leisure, for example, he holds that “nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure.” Yet “even if you must have regard to wealth in order to secure leisure,” it is “surely a bad thing,” he thinks, “that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue.”

Aristotle seems to regard democratic and oligarchical claims as complementary half-truths. “Both parties to the argument,” he says, “are speaking of a limited and partial justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute justice.” According to an adequate conception of political justice, it is as unjust to treat equals unequally as it is to treat unequals equally. The oligarch violates the first of these principles, the democrat the second. “Democracy arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely.”

Both forms of government have “a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution…. In oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, because… they are equals and have not an equal share; and in democracies, the notables revolt, because they are not equal, and yet have only an equal share.”

What can cure this situation in which perpetual revolution seems to be inevitable, as democracy succeeds oligarchy, or oligarchy democracy, in the government of the Greek cities? Aristotle describes many forms of oligarchy and democracy, but none seems to remove the cause of revolution. When, in an attempt to preserve their position, the wealthier families turn to the more extreme forms of oligarchical constitution, that tendency eventually leads to a kind of despotic government which Aristotle calls “dynasty,” or the lawless rule of powerful families.

To establish a stable government which shall be less subject to revolution in favor of a contrary principle of government, and which shall resist the tendency toward lawless rule, by either the masses or the powerful few, Aristotle proposes the mixed constitution, which shall combine the elements of both democratic and oligarchical justice. But this will not work in actual practice, he thinks, unless the middle class “is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes…. Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme…. These considerations will help us to understand why most governments are either democratical or oligarchical. The reason is that the middle class is seldom numerous in them, and whichever party, whether the rich or the common people, transgresses the mean and predominates, draws the constitution its own way, and thus arises either oligarchy or democracy.”

From the point of view which sees no justice in granting any special privileges to property, Aristotle’s position on oligarchy seems open to question. For one thing, in admitting a partial justice in the principle that those who are unequal in wealth should be treated unequally in the distribution of political power, Aristotle appears to affirm that the possessors of wealth deserve a special political status. For another thing, in his own formulation of an ideal polity, Aristotle advocates the exclusion of the working classes from citizenship. “The citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties.” All these classes of men are necessary for the existence of the state, but they are to be no part of it in the sense of political membership. “The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship,” though it will include as necessary “the slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and laborers who are the servants of the community.”

Some of the great speeches in Thucydides’ History, which deal with domestic issues as well as the issues of war and peace, eloquently argue the opposite side of the case. Debating with Hermocrates before the Syracusan assembly, Athenagoras answers those who say that “democracy is neither wise nor equitable, but that the holders of property are the best fitted to rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many, and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger, and not content with the largest part, takes and keeps the whole of the profit.”

In modern political thought, the discussion of oligarchy seems to occur on two levels. There is a controversy on the level of constitutional principles with regard to suffrage and representation and the qualifications for public office. Here the issues concern the justice of the fundamental laws of republican or popular government. There is also a consideration of the way in which men of property or corporate concentrations of wealth are able to exert influence upon the actual course of government. Here the problem becomes, not so much the justice of the constitution or of the laws, but the weight which wealth seems able to throw onto the scales of justice.

The great modern defense of the oligarchical constitution does not seem to be as plainly or forcefully made in any of the great books as in the speeches of Edmund Burke, especially those in opposition to the suffrage reform measures proposed by Charles James Fox, wherein Burke argues for the principle of virtual representation. It is unnecessary, he claims, for the franchise to be extended to the working classes if their economic betters—who also happen to be their superiors in talent and education—deliberate on what is for the common good of all.

The Federalists seem to take an opposite view. Reflecting on the system of British representation in their day, they observe that, for the eight millions of people in the kingdoms of England and Scotland, “the representatives… in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight.” But, they go on, “of this number one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons and one half by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons. It cannot be supposed,” they argue, “that the half thus elected and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add anything either to the security of the people against the government, or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.” Nevertheless, they do not condemn such an oligarchical system of representation as entirely inimical to the virtues of parliamentary government. “It is very certain,” they declare, “not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people.”

Some of the American constitutionalists may be influenced by Burke’s defense of oligarchy in terms of the virtues of an aristocracy, but they state their own position in terms which are more plainly oligarchical. They argue for poll tax clauses and property qualifications for public office on the ground that the country should be run by the people who own it. Furthermore, those who are not economically independent are not in a position to exercise political liberty. “Power over a man’s subsistence,” Hamilton declares, “amounts to power over his will.”

Facing the issue which had been raised on the floor of the constitutional convention, Madison remarks that “the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.” He proposes a representative—or what he calls a “republican”—system of government to avoid the excessive factionalism of the pure or direct democracies of Greek city-states.

“Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government,” Madison writes, “have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.” By a weighted system of representation, the power of sheer numbers may be counter-balanced by the power given to other factors, thus preventing the “accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority…. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it.”

In another paper, The Federalists answer the charge that the constitution is oligarchical, because “the House of Representatives… will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.” This objection, they say, while “leveled against a pretended oligarchy,” in principle “strikes at the very root of republican government.”

The method of election provided for by the Constitution aims “to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society…. Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune…. Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of the country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.”

Whether the American Constitution in its original formulation is an oligarchical document has long been a matter of dispute. Whether The Federalists favor devices for protecting the rights of property or repudiate oligarchical restrictions in favor of the rights of man has also been the subject of controversy. That this is so may indicate at least a certain ambiguity in their position. But on the question of the oligarchical influences on government—the political pressures exerted by propertied classes to serve their special interests—the opinion of the modern authors of the great books seems much clearer.

The most extreme statement of this opinion is, of course, to be found in the Communist Manifesto. There government, in fact the state itself, is regarded as an instrument which the economic oppressors wield against the oppressed. The final step in the bourgeois revolution, according to Marx and Engels, occurred when the bourgeoisie “conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway.” In the bourgeois state, legislation is nothing but the will of this one class made into a law for all. One aim of the communist revolution, beyond the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, is the withering away of that historic formation of the state in which “political power… is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another.”

Though much less radical in intention than Marx, Smith and Mill make statements which seem to be no less radical in their criticism of the oligarchical influences on modern parliamentary government. It has been said, Smith observes, that “we rarely hear… of combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labor above their actual rate…. Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labor even below this rate.” Furthermore, the parties to the conflict do not have equal access to legislative protection. “Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters.”

Almost a century later, Mill writes in a similar vein concerning “the persevering attempts so long made to keep down wages by law…. Does Parliament,” he asks, “ever for an instant look at any question with the eyes of a working man?… On the question of strikes, for instance, it is doubtful if there is so much as one among the leading members of either House who is not firmly convinced that the reason of the matter is unqualifiedly on the side of the masters, and that the men’s view of it is simply absurd.” The remedy for this inequity, according to Mill, is not communism, but constitutional reforms in the direction of universal suffrage which will no longer leave the working classes “excluded from all direct participation in the government.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

The oligarchical constitution: the principles and types of oligarchy
The relation of oligarchy to monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy
The instability of oligarchical government
- 3a. The revolutionary changes to which oligarchy is subject: the change to despotism or democracy
- 3b. The preservation of oligarchies against revolution
The defense of oligarchy: the political rights and privileges of property
The attack on oligarchy and on the political power of wealth
- 5a. The objection to property as a basis for privilege with regard to citizenship or public office
- 5b. The character of the oligarch: the man of property; the capitalist
- 5c. Economic status and power as a political instrument: oligarchy in relation to the class war
Historical observations of oligarchy: the rise and fall of oligarchies

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

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Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

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For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The oligarchical constitution: the principles and types of oligarchy

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107d-108b
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 353d; BK V, 502d; 503d-504b; BK VIII, 579d-581c
7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII, 405c-408a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 680a-b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 10 [1160b11-16] 412d / Politics, BK II, CH 6 [1265b5-24] 461c-d; CH 10 [1272b27-1273a10] 468c-469a; CH 11 [1273a2-7] 469c-470a; BK III, CH 6 [1278a9-14] 475d; CH 7-13 476c-483a; BK IV, CH 2-9 488b-494d passim, esp CH 3 [1290a13]-CH 4 [1290b20] 489b-d, CH 5 [1292a39-b10] 491d-492a, CH 6 [1293a11-34] 492d-493a; CH 12 [1296b17-34] 496d-497a; CH 14-16 498b-502a,c passim; BK V, CH 1 [1301a30-35] 502b; CH 12 [1316a39-b15] 519c; BK VI, CH 6-8 524b-526d / Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a-555c; CH 29 566b-d; CH 33-34 568b-569a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 [1365b32-1366a5] 608a-b
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK VI, 97b-c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH V, 8a-b; CH IX, 14c-15a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 104d-105a; PART IV, 273a-b
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH X, SECT 132 55a-b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 52c-d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 419b
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 165c-166c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73b
42 Kant: Science of Right, 450c
43 Federalist: NUMBER 57 176d-179b; NUMBER 77, 228d
43 Mill: Representative Government, 363b-364d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART II, 277c-d; PART III, 293c-294a

2. The relation of oligarchy to monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107c-108c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VI, 520a-d; BK VIII, 575d-576b; 577b-c; 579d-580c; 587a-b
7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII, 402b-d; 405c-406a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 680a-b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 3 [1131a24-29] 378d; BK VIII, CH 10 [1160b11-16] 412d; [1160b32-1161a3] 413a-b / Politics, BK II, CH 6 [1265b27-39] 461b; CH 10 [1272b27-1273a10] 468c-469a; CH 11 [1273a2-7] 469c-470a; BK III, CH 5 [1278a15-34] 475b-c; CH 6 [1278a9-14] 475d; CH 7-13 476c-483a; CH 15 [1286b9-21] 484d-485a; BK IV, CH 2-9 488b-494d passim, esp CH 3 [1290a13]-CH 4 [1290b20] 489b-d, CH 5 491d-492a, CH 6 [1293a11-34] 492d-493a; CH 11 [1295b35]-CH 12 [1297a12] 496a-497b; CH 14-16 498b-502a,c; BK V, CH 7 [1306b22-26] 508c-d; CH 8-9 509d-512d; CH 12 [1316a1-b28] 518d-519d; BK VI, CH 6-8 524b-526d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 608a-c
14 Plutarch: Lives, Lycurgus, 36a-37b; 47a-48a
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK VI, 97b-c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 104d-105a; PART IV, 273a-b
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH X, SECT 132 55a-b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 52c-d; BK XX, 151c-152a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 419b
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 165c-166c; BK V, 309c-310d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 450a-c
43 Federalist: NUMBER 57 176d-179b; NUMBER 58, 181b-c; NUMBER 60, 185a-187a passim; NUMBER 63, 194b-195b; NUMBER 77, 228d-229a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 363b-364d; 393c-395a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART II, 277c-d; PART III, 292d-293b

3. The instability of oligarchical government

3a. The revolutionary changes to which oligarchy is subject: the change to despotism or democracy

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 108b-c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 436d-438b; BK VIII, 568d-569a; 569c-585a esp 582a-c; 587a-590c
7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII, 408b-409a / Laws, BK IV, 680a-b / Seventh Letter, 801c
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 12 [1273b36-1274a22] 470c-d; BK III, CH 15 [1286b9-21] 484d-485a; BK IV, CH 5 [1292b11-22] 492a; CH 11 [1295b35-1296a21] 496a-b; BK V, CH 1 502a-503b passim, esp [1302a8-16] 503b; CH 3 [1302b25-28] 504a; [1303b4-7] 505a; CH 6 507b-508c; CH 12 [1316a1-28] 518d-519d / Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a-555c; CH 32-41 568a-572a
14 Plutarch: Lives, Solon, 68d-71c; 75c-76d / Themistocles, 96b-c / Camillus, 117c-121a,c / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Crassus, 444d-445d / Pompey, 521c-d / Caesar, 581d-582a / Phocion 604b,d-619d / Agis 648b,d-656d / Cleomenes, 657a-663c / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c / Cicero, 708a-b
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK VI, 97b-c / Histories, BK II, 224d-225a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 149a-b; 152c
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XVIII, SECT 201 71c
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 51d-52a; 52c-53a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 394a-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART II, 275b-276a; 278d-279b; PART III, 300a-301c
50 Marx: Capital, 377c-378d
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 421c-425b esp 423d-424b, 425b; 429b-c

3b. The preservation of oligarchies against revolution

6 Herodotus: History, BK VI, 202c-203b
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK IV, 463a-465c; BK V, 482d-483a; 502d-504b; BK VIII, 580b-c; 582a; 582d-583d; 587b-589d
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 11 [1273a17-26] 470b; BK IV, CH 12-13 496d-498b; BK V, CH 6 [1306a9-12] 507d-508a; CH 8-9 509d-512d; BK VI, CH 6-7 524b-525b
14 Plutarch: Lives, Lycurgus, 35c-d / Camillus, 117c-121a,c / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Agis 648b,d-656d / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c esp 680b-d / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 165b-166c; BK IV, 239c-240b
50 Marx: Capital, 305a [fn 2]
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 432b-d

4. The defense of oligarchy: the political rights and privileges of property

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107d-108a
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VIII, 575d-576b; 590a-b
7 Plato: Laws, BK V, 695a-c; BK VI, 699d-700b / Seventh Letter, 807a-b
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 6 [1265b26-1266a30] 461b-d; CH 11 [1273a22-24] 469d; BK III, CH 5 [1277b33-1278a25] 475a-c; CH 10 478d-479a; CH 12-13 480c-483a; BK IV, CH 8-9 493c-494d; CH 11-12 495b-497b; BK V, CH 1 502a-503b; BK VI, CH 3 521c-522a
14 Plutarch: Lives, Lycurgus, 34d-35d / Solon, 70d-71c / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Dion, 800c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 32b-d; 35d
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH V, 8a-b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 140d
35 Locke: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 87 44a-b; SECT 94 46a-c; CH IX 53c-54d; CH XI, SECT 137-140 56d-58a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 8b-c; 7b-c; BK V, 25a-c; 32b-c; BK VII, 45c-46a; BK XI, 71d-72b; BK XXVI, 221c-d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 354b-355b / Political Economy, 377c-d / Social Contract, BK III, 412b-c
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 309a-311c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81c-82a; 94d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 436d-437c
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: ART IV [17-36] 5b-c
43 Federalist: NUMBER 10, 50b-d; NUMBER 35, 113b-114c; NUMBER 54 170a-172b passim; NUMBER 57 176d-179b passim; NUMBER 60, 186a-c; NUMBER 63, 194d-195b; NUMBER 79, 233c
43 Mill: Representative Government, 366c-d; 383b-387d; 418d-419a
44 Boswell: Johnson, 251a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 45 23c-d; PART III, PAR 208 69c; PAR 305-307 102b-c; ADDITIONS, 181 148b-c / Philosophy of History, PART II, 275b-276a; 277c-d

5. The attack on oligarchy and on the political power of wealth

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 108b-c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VI, 519c-520d; BK VIII, 575d-576b
7 Plato: Republic, BK IV, 342d-344a; BK VIII, 405c-408a / Laws, BK IV, 680a-b; BK V, 695a-c; BK VIII, 733b-734a / Seventh Letter, 800b-d
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 10 [1272b27-1273a10] 468c-469a; BK III, CH 7 476c-477a passim; CH 13 [1283b27-33] 481d; BK IV, CH 11 [1295b2-1296a2] 495c-496c; CH 12 [1296b35-1297a13] 497a-b; BK V, CH 1 [1301a25-39] 502b-c; [1301b26-1302a8] 503a-b; CH 6 [1305b36-1306a21] 507b-c; CH 9 [1309b14-1310a13] 511d-512b / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 16 638b-c
14 Plutarch: Lives, Lycurgus, 34b-37c; 47a-48a / Coriolanus, 180b-d / Lysander, 361a-d / Agis 648b,d-656d / Cleomenes, 657a-663c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 140d
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT I, SC 1 [1-89] 351a-352b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 7c; BK V, 23a-25a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 353a-358c passim
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 501c-d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 441d-443b; 450c
43 Federalist: NUMBER 57 176d-179b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 293c-294a
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto 415a-434d esp 420c-422b, 424d-425a, 425d-428a

5a. The objection to property as a basis for privilege with regard to citizenship or public office

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VI, 520b-c; BK VIII, 576d
7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII, 405c-407a / Laws, BK IV, 682c
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 11 [1273a22-b7] 469d-470a; BK III, CH 9-12 477c-481b passim
14 Plutarch: Lives, Lycurgus, 36a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 412b-c; 421c-d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73b
42 Kant: Science of Right, 445a-c
43 Federalist: NUMBER 39, 125c-126b; NUMBER 52, 165b-c; NUMBER 57 176d-179b; NUMBER 60, 186c
43 Mill: Representative Government, 345c-346c; 369b-370a; 384a-387d; 394a-395a; 398a-d; 419a-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 310 103b-c / Philosophy of History, PART I, 263b-d; PART IV, 356d; 364a-c
50 Marx: Capital, 137b-141b esp 138b, 140a-b; 364a-368b esp 367c-368b
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-d; 425b-d; 428d-429c

5b. The character of the oligarch: the man of property; the capitalist

5 Euripides: Suppliants [229-245] 260b-c / Hecuba [1206-1232] 363b
5 Aristophanes: Wasps [653-724] 515c-516d / Plutus [144-197] 630d-631b
6 Herodotus: History, BK VII, 221c-222a
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VI, 512c-d; BK VIII, 587a-b
7 Plato: Republic, BK IV, 343a-b; BK VIII, 407a-408a / Laws, BK VIII, 733b-734a; BK IX, 751c-d
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1267b36-9] 463b; BK IV, CH 6 [1293a12-34] 492d-493a; BK VI, CH 7 [1321a35-b2] 525a / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 16 638b-c
14 Plutarch: Lives, Aemilius Paulus, 218a-d; 223c-224a / Marcus Cato, 287c-d / Aristides-Marcus Cato, 292b / Lysander, 361a-d / Lucullus, 419a-420b / Crassus, 439a-c / Agis 648b,d-656d
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 57b-58d; BK VI, 97b-c
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Hell, VII [1-96] 9c-10c
36 Swift: Gulliver, PART IV, 158a-b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 377d-378a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK III, 10a; BK VII, 45a-b; BK XX, 146b-c
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 109d-110d; BK II, 177c-d
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 497c-501b passim
43 Mill: Representative Government, 345c-346a
44 Boswell: Johnson, 194c-195a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 292d-293b
50 Marx: Capital, 72a-c; 112c; 292d-295d esp 292d-293c
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 420c-d

5c. Economic status and power as a political instrument: oligarchy in relation to the class war

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 13:18-24—(D) Ecclesiasticus, 13:24-30
5 Aristophanes: Plutus [122-226] 630c-631c
6 Herodotus: History, BK VI, 202c-203b
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 428c-d; 434c-438c; BK IV, 463a-465c; 467a-b; BK V, 482d-483a; 502d-504b; BK VIII, 575c-576c; 577b-d; 579c-583c; 587a-590c
7 Plato: Republic, BK IV, 342d; BK VIII, 405c-406b / Laws, BK IV, 682b-c; BK VIII, 733b-734a
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1266b24-1267a17] 462b-d; BK III, CH 10 [1281a11-29] 478d-479a; CH 15 [1286b8-22] 484d-485a; BK IV, CH 3 [1289b26-1290a13] 488d-489a; CH 4 [1290a30-b20] 489b-d; [1291b5-13] 490d; CH 6 [1293a12-34] 492d-493a; CH 11-12 495b-497b passim; BK V, CH 5-6 506b-508c; CH 7 [1307a5-39] 509a-c; CH 9 [1310a22-25] 512c; BK VI, CH 3 521c-522a / Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a-555c; CH 32-41 568a-572a
14 Plutarch: Lives, Solon, 68d-71c / Poplicola-Solon, 87a / Agis 648b,d-656d / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK VI, 97b / Histories, BK II, 224d-225a
26 Shakespeare: 2 Henry VI, ACT IV 56a-64d
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT I, SC 1 [1-167] 351a-353a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 77b-83c
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 352a-358c passim / Social Contract, BK IV, 429c-430a
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 28a-d; 53b-56a; 61c-d; 109d-110d; BK IV, 239c-240a; 287d-288c; BK V, 309a-311c; 346c-347d
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 127a-c; 144a-c
43 Federalist: NUMBER 10, 49c-51b; NUMBER 54, 171b-172a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 345b-346c passim; 366d-367a; 368b-370a passim; 393c-395a; 398a-d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 251a; 255d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART II, 263b-d; 275b-276a; PART III, 287d-288b; 295b-297a; 300a-301c; PART IV, 364a-c
50 Marx: Capital, 63b-c; 137b-143a passim, esp 138b-c, 140a-b; 241a-244b esp 243d-244a; 283d-285c; 317b-c; 364a-368b esp 367c-368b; 372c-383d esp 382c-383d
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto 415a-434d esp 415b-417a,c, 420b-c, 421c-422a, 425b-c, 428d-429c, 434a-d

6. Historical observations of oligarchy: the rise and fall of oligarchies

6 Herodotus: History, BK VI, 202c-203b; BK VII, 243b-c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 353d; BK III, 434c-438b; BK IV, 458d-459c; 463a-465c; BK V, 502d; 503d-504b; BK VI, 520a-d; BK VIII 564a-593a,c esp 568d-569a, 575c-576c, 577b-d, 579c-583c, 584b-585a, 585d-586b, 587a-590c
7 Plato: Seventh Letter, 800b-d
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 10 [1272b27-1273a10] 468c-469a; CH 11 [1273a3-30] 469c-d; [1273a17-26] 470b; BK III, CH 15 [1286b9-21] 484d-485a; BK V, CH 4 [1304a18-39] 505d-506a; CH 5-6 506b-508c; CH 12 [1316a1-b28] 518d-519d / Athenian Constitution, CH 2-6 553a-555c; CH 32-41 568a-572a passim
14 Plutarch: Lives, Lycurgus, 34b-37c; 47a-48a / Solon, 68d-71c; 75c-76d / Camillus 102b,d-121a,c passim, esp 117c-121a,c / Alcibiades, 166a-174d / Coriolanus, 176b-184c / Lysander 354b,d-368a,c / Phocion 604b,d-619d / Agis 648b,d-656d / Cleomenes, 657a-663c / Tiberius Gracchus, 674c-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK VI, 97b-c
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 51d-52a; BK XI, 77b-83c
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK IV, 429c-431a
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 165b-181a,c passim; BK IV, 239c-240b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 501c-d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73b; 81c-82a; 570d-572d; 574b-582b esp 576a-577b, 579c-581a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 346a-c; 353b; 363d-364d; 367a; 393c-395a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 244 77c / Philosophy of History, PART II, 275b-276a; 278d-279b; PART III, 293c-294a; 295d-297a; 300a-301c
50 Marx: Capital, 354a-377a esp 355d-359c, 368c-369a, 371c-372c
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 415b-416b; 419b,d-422c esp 420b-c; 429c-433d passim

CROSS-REFERENCES

For: The general discussion of constitutional government, see CONSTITUTION 1–3b; LAW 7a; MONARCHY 1a–1a(1).

For: Other considerations of the relation of oligarchy to aristocracy and democracy, see ARISTOCRACY 2d; DEMOCRACY 2b, 3a–3b; GOVERNMENT 2a, 2c; and for the theory of the mixed constitution as a compromise between democracy and oligarchy, see ARISTOCRACY 2b; CONSTITUTION 5b; DEMOCRACY 3a; GOVERNMENT 2b.

For: The tyrannical and despotic extremes to which oligarchy can go, see TYRANNY 2b.

For: The revolutions generated by oligarchy, see ARISTOCRACY 3; REVOLUTION 3c(2).

For: Other discussions of property rights, see DEMOCRACY 4a(2); JUSTICE 8a; LABOR 7b; WEALTH 7a.

For: The general issues of economic and political justice in the conflict between democracy and oligarchy concerning the qualifications for citizenship and the extension of the suffrage, see CITIZEN 2c–3; CONSTITUTION 5a; DEMOCRACY 4a(1); JUSTICE 9e; LABOR 7d, 7f; LIBERTY 2d; SLAVERY 5a–5b; WEALTH 9h.

For: Other discussions of capitalism, and of the class war, see DEMOCRACY 4a(2); LABOR 7c–7c(3); OPPOSITION 5b; REVOLUTION 4a, 5a–5c; WAR AND PEACE 2c; WEALTH 6a, 9h.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

Plutarch. “Of the Three Sorts of Government—Monarchy, Democracy and Oligarchy,” in Moralia
Dante. Convivio (The Banquet), FOURTH TREATISE, CH 10-14

II.

J. Adams. A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America
Burke. Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents
———. On the Reform of the Representation in the House of Commons
———. An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs
———. Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe
Mosca. The Ruling Class
Michels. Political Parties
B. Adams. The Theory of Social Revolutions
Beard. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
———. Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy
Pareto. The Mind and Society, VOL III, CH 11
T. Veblen. The Theory of Business Enterprise
———. The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts
Bryce. Modern Democracies, PART III, CH 74-75
Tawney. Equality
Brinton. The Anatomy of Revolution, CH II, VI
Burnham. The Machiavellians

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