Chapter 58: MIND

INTRODUCTION

In the tradition of the great books, the word “mind” is used less frequently than “reason,” “intellect,” “understanding,” or “soul.” There are still other words, like “intelligence,” “consciousness,” and even “spirit” or “psyche,” which often carry some part of the connotation of the word “mind.” Certain authors use “mind” as a synonym for one or another of these words, and give it the meaning which other writers express exclusively in terms of “reason” or “understanding.” Some discuss mind without reference to soul, some identify mind with soul or spirit, and some conceive mind as only a part of soul or spirit.

For the purpose of assembling in a single chapter references to all discussions which fall within the area of meaning common to all these terms, it was necessary to adopt some single covering word. Our choice of “mind” is partly the result of its present currency, partly the result of the fact that it is somewhat more neutral than the others and therefore less prejudicial to the conflicting theories which are juxtaposed in this chapter.

Words like “reason” or “intellect” usually imply a sharper distinction between the functions or faculties of sensation and thought than does the word “mind.” Imagination and memory, for example, are attributed to the understanding in the writings of Locke and Hume, whereas, in the analytical vocabulary of Aristotle and Aquinas, imagination and memory belong to sense, not to reason or intellect. Similarly, words like “soul” or “spirit” usually connote a substantial as well as an immaterial mode of being, whereas “mind” can have the meaning of a faculty or a power to be found in living organisms.

The adoption of the word “mind” is purely a matter of convenience. It begs no questions and decides no issues. The relations between what is here discussed and the matters considered in the chapters on SOUL, SENSE, MEMORY AND IMAGINATION, remain the same as they would be if “reason” or “intellect” were used in place of “mind.” Different formulations of these relationships are not affected by the words used, but by different theories of what the mind is, however it is named.

Before we consider the diverse conceptions of the human mind which are enumerated under the seven main divisions of the first section in the Outline of Topics, it may be useful to examine the elements of meaning more or less common to the connotation of all the words which “mind” here represents. Even here we must avoid begging the question whether mind is a peculiarly human possession. Other animals may have minds. Mind may be, as it is on one theory, a universal property of matter. According to another theory, there may be superhuman minds or intelligences, or a single absolute mind, a transcendent intelligence.

What, then, does the universe contain because there is mind in it, which would be lacking if everything else could remain the same with mind removed? The facts we are compelled to mention in answering this question should give us some indication of the elements of meaning common to “mind” and all its synonyms.

First is the fact of thought or thinking. If there were no evidence of thought in the world, mind would have little or no meaning. The recognition of this fact throughout the tradition accounts for the development of diverse theories of mind. None of the great writers denies the phenomenon of thought, however differently each may describe or explain it; none, therefore, is without some conception of mind.

It may be supposed that such words as “thought” or “thinking” cannot, because of their own ambiguity, help us to define the sphere of mind. But whatever the relation of thinking to sensing, thinking seems to involve more—for almost all observers—than a mere reception of impressions from without. This seems to be the opinion of those who make thinking a consequence of sensing, as well as of those who regard thought as independent of sense. For both, thinking goes beyond sensing, either as an elaboration of the materials of sense or as an apprehension of objects which are totally beyond the reach of the senses. To the extent that this insight is true, the elements or aspects of thought discussed in the chapters on IDEA, JUDGMENT, and REASONING have an obvious relevance to the various theories of mind discussed in this chapter.

The second fact which seems to be a root common to all conceptions of mind is that of knowledge or knowing. This may be questioned on the ground that if there were sensation without any form of thought, judgment, or reasoning, there would be at least a rudimentary form of knowledge—some degree of consciousness or awareness by one thing of another. Granting the point of this objection, it nevertheless seems to be true that the distinction between truth and falsity, and the difference between knowledge, error, and ignorance, or knowledge, belief, and opinion, do not apply to sensations in the total absence of thought. The chapter on KNOWLEDGE reports formulations of these distinctions or differences. Any understanding of knowledge which involves them seems to imply mind for the same reason that it implies thought.

There is a further implication of mind in the fact of self-knowledge. Sensing may be awareness of an object and to this extent it may be a kind of knowing, but it has never been observed that the senses can sense or be aware of themselves. Take, for example, definitions of sense, or theories of sensation and the objects of sense. Such definitions and theories must be regarded as works of reflective thought; they are not products of sensation.

Thought seems to be not only reflective, but reflexive, that is, able to consider itself, to define the nature of thinking and to develop theories of mind. This fact about thought—its reflexivity—also seems to be a common element in all the meanings of “mind.” It is sometimes referred to as “the reflexivity of the intellect” or as “the reflexive power of the understanding” or as “the ability of the understanding to reflect upon its own acts” or as “self-consciousness.” Whatever the phrasing, a world without self-consciousness or self-knowledge would be a world in which the traditional conception of mind would probably not have arisen.

The third fact is the fact of purpose or intention, of planning a course of action with foreknowledge of its goal, or working in any other way toward a desired and foreseen objective. As in the case of sensitivity, the phenomena of desire do not, without further qualification, indicate the realm of mind. According to the theory of natural desire, for example, the natural tendencies of even inanimate and insensitive things are expressions of desire. But it is not in that sense of desire that the fact of purpose or intention is here taken as evidence of mind.

It is rather on the level of the behavior of living things that purpose seems to require a factor over and above the senses, limited as they are to present appearances. It cannot be found in the passions which have the same limitation as the senses, for unless they are checked they tend toward immediate emotional discharge. That factor, called for by the direction of conduct to future ends, is either an element common to all meanings of “mind” or is at least an element associated with mind.

It is sometimes called the faculty of will—rational desire or the intellectual appetite. Sometimes it is treated as the act of willing which, along with thinking, is one of the two major activities of mind or understanding; and sometimes purposiveness is regarded as the very essence of mentality. Considerations relevant to this aspect of mind are discussed in the chapter on WILL.

These three or four facts—thought, knowledge or self-knowledge, and purpose—seem to be common to all theories of mind. More than that, they seem to be facts which require the development of the conception. They are, for the most part, not questioned in the tradition of the great books; but they are not always seen in the same light. They are not always related in the same way to one another and to other relevant considerations. From such differences in interpretation and analysis arise the various conflicting conceptions of the human mind.

The conflict of theories concerning what the human mind is, what structure it has, what parts belong to it or what whole it belongs to, does not comprise the entire range of controversy on the subject. Yet enough is common to all theories of mind to permit certain other questions to be formulated.

How does the human mind operate? How does it do whatever is its work, and with what intrinsic excellences or defects? What is the relation of mind to matter, to bodily organs, to material conditions? Is mind a common possession of men and animals, or is whatever might be called mind in animals distinctly different from the human mind? Are there minds or a mind in existence apart from man and the whole world of corporeal life?

Such questions constitute the major topics of this chapter. Other topics which appear here, such as the moral and political aspects of mind, are reserved for discussion in the many other chapters devoted to the great ideas of moral and political thought. Still others, like the problem of insanity—the loss or derangement of mind—are obviously relevant here even though the more general consideration of psychopathology belongs elsewhere, e.g., in the chapter on MEDICINE.

The intelligibility of the positions taken in the dispute of the issues which are here our major concern depends to some degree on the divergent conceptions of the human mind from which they stem. It seems necessary, therefore, to examine the seven notions of mind which appear in the great books. This will at least provide the general context for the reader’s further explorations, even if it is not possible to trace the implications each of these notions may have for the great controversial issues.

Seven is, of course, a fiction of analysis. There are, from one point of view, more—perhaps as many as there are, among the great authors, thinkers who have dwelt at length on the subject. From another point of view, there may be fewer than seven, for when the lines are drawn according to certain basic differences, several of these theories appear to be variants of a single doctrine.

“That in the soul which is called mind,” Aristotle writes, is “that whereby the soul thinks and judges.” For him, as for Plato, the human intellect or reason is a part or power of the soul of man, distinct from other parts or faculties, such as the senses and the imagination, desire and the passions. Though the human soul is distinguished from the souls of other living things by virtue of its having this part or power, and is therefore called by Aristotle a “rational soul,” these writers do not identify mind and soul. As soul is the principle of life and all vital activities, so mind is the subordinate principle of knowledge and the activities of thinking, deliberating, deciding.

Within the general framework of this theory, many differences exist between Plato and Aristotle and between them and others who share their views. These differences arise not only with respect to the soul of which the intellect is a part, but also with respect to the power or activity of the intellect itself. For example, the distinction which Aristotle initiates, between mind as an active and as a passive power, is more explicitly formulated by Aquinas in his theory of the active intellect and the intellect as potential.

The human intellect, Aquinas writes, “is in potentiality to things intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says. This is made clear from the fact that at first we are only in potentiality towards understanding, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is in a way to be passive.” But the forms of things, or what Aquinas calls their “intelligible species,” are not actually intelligible as they exist in material things. He therefore argues that in addition to the “power receptive of such species, which is called the possible intellect by reason of its being in potentiality to such species,” there must also be another intellectual power, which he calls the active or “agent” intellect.

Nothing, he says, can be “reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act” or already actual. “We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions. Such is the necessity for positing an agent intellect.”

The more explicit formulation which Aquinas gives of the distinction between the active and the possible intellects as distinct powers has further consequences for the analysis of three states of the passive or possible intellect distinguished by Aristotle. The intellectual power which is receptive of the intelligible species may either be in complete potentiality to them, as it is when it has not yet come to understand certain things. Or it may be described as in habitual possession of the intelligible species when it has previously acquired the understanding of certain things, but is not now actually engaged in understanding them. In the third place, the potential intellect may also be actual or in act whenever it is actually exercising its habit of understanding or is for the first time actually understanding something.

In this traditional theory of mind, many other distinctions are made in the sphere of mental activity, but none is thought to require a division of the mind into two distinct powers, or even to require the discrimination of several states of the same power. Just as Plato regards the intuition or direct apprehension of intelligible objects as an activity of the same intelligence which is able to reason discursively about the ideas it can contemplate, so Aristotle and Aquinas assign three different activities to the intellectual power which apprehends intelligible objects, not by intuition, but only as the result of the abstraction of forms from matter by the active intellect.

Once the possible intellect is actualized by the reception of the abstracted species, it can act in three ways. It can express in concepts the species which have been impressed upon it. This—the first act of the intellect—is conception. Its second and third acts—of judgment and of reasoning—consist in forming propositions out of concepts and in seeing how one proposition follows from others in inference or proof.

Unlike abstraction and conception, which Aquinas assigns to the active and the possible intellect respectively, conception, judgment, and reasoning do not, in his opinion, require distinct powers. Nor do the two kinds of thought or reasoning which Aquinas calls “speculative” and “practical.” The speculative and practical intellects, he maintains, “are not distinct powers,” for they differ only in their ends. The speculative intellect “directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the sole consideration of truth”; the practical intellect “directs what it apprehends to operation” or action. But to the nature of intellect as a power of apprehension, “it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not.”

Not all the foregoing distinctions are made, or made in the same way, by Plato, Aristotle and other authors like Plotinus, Augustine, or Aquinas, who stand together in regarding mind as only a part of the human soul. Lucretius belongs with them on this point, though he differs radically from them on the issue of mind and matter. Mind, for him, is only “the directing principle” of the soul, “the head so to speak, and reigns paramount in the whole body.” It is only the thinking or deciding part of the soul. But Plato, Aristotle, and their followers make a distinction in kind between sensations or images and universal ideas or abstract concepts. Sense and intellect are for them distinct faculties of knowing and have distinct objects of knowledge. For Lucretius, on the other hand, thinking is merely a reworking of the images received by the senses. In this one respect at least, Lucretius is more closely associated with the theory of mind to be found in Hobbes, Locke, and Hume.

In the consideration of mind, agreement on one point seems everywhere to be accompanied by disagreement on another. Locke does not agree with Lucretius or Hobbes about the materiality of mind; and though he agrees with Berkeley that mind is a spiritual entity, he does not agree with him, any more than he agrees with Hobbes and Hume, about the abstraction of general concepts from particular sense-impressions. Plato and Aristotle agree that the senses and the intellect or reason are quite distinct, but they do not agree about the relation of these faculties, especially not on the extent to which the mind can act independently of sense and imagination. Augustine seems to share Plato’s doctrine of reminiscence as an account of how the senses recall actively to mind ideas it has always somehow possessed. Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s doctrine of abstraction as the quite contrary account of the role the senses play in providing the materials on which the mind works to obtain ideas. But Augustine and Aquinas come together on another point in which they depart alike from Aristotle and Plato. They distinguish with precision between the intellect and will as separate faculties of the soul, whereas Plato and Aristotle treat thinking and willing (or knowing and loving) as merely diverse aspects of mental life.

The same situation prevails with respect to the other theories of mind which we must now consider in their own terms. Descartes, for example, resembles Plato and Augustine on the point on which we have seen that they together differ from Aristotle and Aquinas, namely, the relation of mind or reason to the senses or imagination. Yet he is also closer to Aristotle and Plato in a respect in which they together differ from Augustine and Aquinas, namely, in regarding thinking and willing as acts of the mind rather than as belonging to completely separate faculties.

These agreements and differences occur in the context of a basic opposition between Descartes and all the other writers so far mentioned. Unlike all of them, he identifies the human mind with the rational soul of man. In the dual nature of man, he says, “there are certain activities, which we call corporeal, e.g., magnitude, figure, motion, and all those that cannot be thought of apart from extension in space; and the substance in which they exist is called body… . Further, there are other activities, which we call thinking activities, e.g., understanding, willing, imagining, feeling, etc., which agree in falling under the description of thought, perception, or consciousness. The substance in which they reside we call a thinking thing or the mind, or any other name we care, provided only we do not confound it with corporeal substance, since thinking activities have no affinity with corporeal activities, and thought, which is the common nature in which the former agree, is totally different from extension, the common term for describing the latter.” Descartes denies that brutes possess thought, but “even though I were to grant,” he says, “that thought existed in them, it would in nowise follow that the human mind was not to be distinguished from the body, but on the contrary that in other animals also there was a mind distinct from their body.”

The two components of human nature are, according to Descartes, each of them substances—a res cogitans or a thinking substance and a res extensa or an extended substance. Descartes uses the phrases “rational soul” and “mind” interchangeably. Reason or intellect—the capacity to think—is not a power of the soul. Nor is thinking an act which the soul sometimes performs, sometimes does not. It is the very essence of the soul itself, even as extension is the essence of body. Just as bodies cannot exist without actually having three dimensions, so the mind cannot exist without thinking.

Though it is literally translated into English by “I think, therefore I am,” Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum can be rendered by “Thinking is; therefore, the mind is,” or by the strictly equivalent statement, “The mind exists; therefore, there is thinking.” It is precisely this equation of the mind’s existence with the activity of thought which Locke challenges. “We know certainly, by experience,” he writes, “that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has the power to think; but whether that substance perpetually thinks or not, we can be no farther assured than experience informs us. … I grant that the soul in a waking man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake: but whether sleeping, without dreaming, be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man’s consideration. … Methinks every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach that the soul is always thinking.”

What is striking about this disagreement is that Locke and Descartes agree in their conception of man as a union of two distinct substances—the union of a material substance or body with a spiritual substance, a mind or soul. It is not surprising, however, that Berkeley should hold the Cartesian view against Locke. Considering the flow of time in terms of the succession of ideas, Berkeley affirms it to be “a plain consequence that the soul always thinks.” To try to “abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation” is, he adds modestly, “no easy task.” He might have said it is impossible, for since he holds that bodies do not exist and that man consists of mind or spirit alone, he need not hesitate to assert that the mind cannot cease to think without ceasing to be. Neither he nor Descartes is, in James’ opinion, “free to take the appearances for what they seem to be, and to admit that the mind, as well as the body, may go to sleep.”

Despite these differences, Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley seem to agree on the range of activities within the sphere of mind. The mind is a thinking substance for Descartes, yet it also senses and imagines, suffers passions, and exercises acts of will. What Descartes says in terms of acts, Locke says in terms of powers. Mind has many distinct powers, among which Locke includes all the cognitive faculties (not only the powers of abstract thought and reasoning, but also those of sense and imagination), and such voluntary faculties as choosing and willing. Berkeley also includes the whole range of psychological phenomena—sensation, imagination, memory, the passions, reasoning, and choice.

Hume takes a similar view, though in his case one basic qualification must be added. He does not conceive the mind as a soul or a spirit or any other sort of substance. He even has some difficulty with the notion of its continuity or identity from moment to moment in the flow of experience. Yet, he says, “it cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other. … There are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those between will and understanding, the imagination and the passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature.” What the mind is or how it exists, we may not be able to say; but Hume thinks that “if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far.”

Descartes’ theory of mind seems to serve as a point of departure in another direction from that taken by Locke. Spinoza agrees that the mind is a thinking thing. He agrees that man consists of an individual body united with an individual mind. But he differs from Descartes on the meaning of substance. By its very nature, substance is infinite; and because it is infinite, there can be only one substance, which is God. Finite individual things, whether bodies or minds, do not exist as substances, but as modes of the divine attributes.

“The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and therefore,” Spinoza declares, “when we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing, we say nothing less than that God has this or that idea.” He includes love and desire, as well as perception and imagination, among the affections of the mind, even calling them “modes of thought.” He adds, however, that these do not exist apart from the idea of the thing loved or desired, “though the idea may exist although no other mode of thinking exist.”

Of the remaining three of the seven conceptions of mind here being considered, two bear certain resemblances to theories already mentioned.

Hegel’s view of the human mind as a phase or dialectical moment of the Absolute Mind or Spirit seems comparable to Spinoza’s conception of the human mind as a part of God’s infinite intellect. The Hegelian theory of mind, developed in such works as the Phenomenology of Mind and the Philosophy of Mind, is reflected in his Philosophy of History and in his Philosophy of Right. The expression of his view of mind appears, therefore, in the chapters on HISTORY and STATE, as well as here.

There seems to be similar justification for associating the views of William James with those of Locke and Hume. Willing to posit a soul “influenced in some mysterious way by the brain states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own,” James goes on to say that “the bare phenomenon, however, the immediately known thing which on the mental side is in apposition with the entire brain-process is the state of consciousness and not the soul itself.”

What the soul is and whether it exists belong to metaphysics. So far as psychological observation and analysis are concerned, the phenomena of mind are to be found in the stream of thought or consciousness. States of mind are states of consciousness. James uses the words “feeling” or “thought” to cover every type of mental operation, every state of mind, every form of consciousness, including sensations and emotions, desires and wishes, as well as conception and reasoning.

Locke and Hume distinguish powers of the mind according to different types of mental operation, James tends rather to analyze the mind in terms of its diverse states according to different types of mental content. But he also lays great stress on the dynamic interconnection of the various elements of consciousness in the continuous flow of the stream of thought.

Freud too presents an analysis of different types of mental content, and accompanies it by a theory of the different layers of mind—or psychic structure. He holds, for example, that “we have two kinds of unconscious—that which is latent but capable of becoming conscious, and that which is repressed and not capable of becoming conscious in the ordinary way. … That which is latent, and only unconscious in the descriptive and not in the dynamic sense, we call preconscious; the term unconscious we reserve for the dynamically unconscious repressed, so that we have three terms, conscious (Cs), preconscious (Pcs), and unconscious (Ucs).”

Like James, Freud is concerned with the dynamic interaction of various mental operations or contents. In addition, a further point of similarity exists between them. James says that “the pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are… the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality… No actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind.” Freud goes further in the same direction. By identifying “psychic energy in general” with what he calls “libido,” he implies that mind in its most primitive form has entirely the aspect of desire or seeking. It expresses itself in “two fundamentally different kinds of instincts, the sexual instincts in the widest sense of the word … and the aggressive instincts, whose aim is destruction.”

Finally, there is the theory in which mind is neither one of the faculties of the soul, nor itself a thinking substance; nor is it a soul or spirit with a diversity of powers. “All our knowledge,” Kant writes, “begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought.” These three faculties have distinct functions for Kant. The sensitive faculty is a faculty of intuition. The faculty of understanding is a faculty of judgment and scientific knowledge. The faculty of reason, when properly employed, performs a critical and regulative function in the realm of thought, but when employed beyond the province of its power leads thought into blind alleys or dialectical frustrations.

Mind is not one of these faculties, nor is it the being in which these faculties inhere. The notion of mind seems to have significance, for Kant, primarily in a collective sense. It represents the unity and order of the triad of cognitive faculties. The faculties of feeling and will—which Kant adds to these in his enumeration of “the higher faculties”—belong to the “transcendental ego,” but they do not fall within that part of the transcendental structure which is mind. Kant’s distinction between the speculative and the practical use of reason, and his distinction between the moral and the aesthetic judgment, involve different relationships between mind—or its triad of faculties—and these other faculties.

The foregoing survey of conceptions of the human mind gives some indication of the way in which other questions about mind are answered.

With regard to the relation of mind and matter, for example, the theories of Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and James seem to affirm a duality of substances, or of modes of substance, or at least of realms—the physical and the mental. They are confronted by the problem of the relation which obtains between the two—their independence or interaction.

“Mental and physical events,” writes James, “are, on all hands, admitted to present the strongest contrast in the entire field of being. The chasm which yawns between them is less easily bridged over by the mind than any interval we know. Why, then, not call it an absolute chasm,” he asks, “and say not only that the two worlds are different, but that they are independent?”

James thinks that to urge this theory of the complete independence of mind and body “is an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state of psychology.” He prefers the common-sense theory that each acts on the other somehow. But earlier writers who consider body and mind as distinct substances, find grave difficulties in the way of conceiving their interaction. “How our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do,” is, according to Locke, “obscure and inconceivable.” According to Hume, there is no “principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body.” He interprets one consequence of the union to be that “a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter. Were we empowered by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control planets in their orbit; this extensive authority,” Hume thinks, “would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension.”

Denying that bodies exist, Berkeley nevertheless argues that even if they did, they could exert no influence upon mind. “Though we give the materialists their external bodies,” he says, “they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible that it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident that the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition.”

Those who deny the existence of matter, like Berkeley, or the existence of anything immaterial, like Lucretius or Hobbes, are confronted by problems of their own. Berkeley must explain the mind’s perception of bodies or why the mind thinks of matter. Lucretius must explain perception, thought, and choice as functions of material particles in motion.

The reduction of mind to matter raises a question which leads in the opposite direction. Why may it not be supposed that thought and feeling are present in the universe wherever matter is—an atom of mind inseparably conjoined with every atom of matter, as in the “mind-stuff” or “mind-dust” theory which William James considers and criticizes? Still another formulation of the relation of mind to matter is found in the theory of Aristotle and Aquinas, according to whom the rational soul is “the substantial form of an organic body,” but the intellect—one of its powers—is not united to matter in any way. Mind is said to be immaterial in that understanding or thought does not require a bodily organ.

The angelic intellect, according to Aquinas, is a “cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter.” The human mind is not so completely divorced from matter, for, though man’s intellect “is not the act of an organ, yet it is a power of the soul, which is the form of the body.” Among all bodily forms, the human soul alone has the distinction of possessing “an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever.” But Aquinas also maintains that “the body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its organ of action, but on the part of the object”—the phantasm or image produced by the sensitive faculty. He conceives this dependence in the following manner. “For the intellect to understand actually … there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers” that are acts of bodily organs. “When the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy, or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from understanding actually even those things of which he had a previous knowledge.”

The problem of body and mind is discussed more fully in the chapter on MATTER. Other problems involved in the theory of mind similarly occur in other chapters as well as in this one, e.g., the problem of mind in animals and men (in the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN); the problem of the existence of minds superior to that of man (in the chapters on ANGEL and GOD); the problem of the origin of ideas in the human mind (in the chapters on IDEA and MEMORY AND IMAGINATION). It should be noted, however, that agreement or disagreement on the nature of the human mind does not always determine agreement or disagreement with respect to these other questions.

Sharing the view that the mind is a spiritual substance, Locke and Descartes do not agree about innate ideas or principles. Locke tends to agree with Aristotle when he says that the mind is a tabula rasa, “void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished?” he asks. “Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from Experience. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our own minds, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.”

But Locke does not accept Aristotle’s sharp distinction between the faculties of sense and reason, nor does he find it necessary to adopt Aristotle’s notion of an active intellect to explain how the mind abstracts general ideas from the particulars of sense-perception. So far as his theory attributes to mind the power of sense, Locke has more affinity with Berkeley and Hume than with Aristotle; yet on the question of abstract ideas or the distinction between men and brutes, he is as much opposed to them as they are to Aristotle.

These few observations may be taken as a sample of the many intricately crossing lines of thought which make the complex pattern of the traditional discussion of mind. With few exceptions, almost any other choice of authors and topics would provide similar examples. That fact, combined with the fact that almost every major topic in this chapter leads into the discussion of other great ideas, tends to make the chapter on MIND a kind of focal point for perspective on the whole world of thought. It is not surprising that this should be the case, for on any theory, mind is somehow the place of ideas or, as Aristotle says, “the form of forms.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. Diverse conceptions of the human mind * 1a. Mind as intellect or reason, a part or power of the soul or human nature, distinct from sense and imagination * (1) The difference between the acts of sensing and understanding, and the objects of sense and reason * (2) The cooperation of intellect and sense: the dependence of thought upon imagination and the direction of imagination by reason * (3) The functioning of intellect: the acts of understanding, judgment, and reasoning * (4) The distinction of the active and the possible intellect in power and function * 1b. Mind as identical with thinking substance * (1) The relation of the mind as thinking substance to sense and imagination * (2) Thinking and willing as the acts of the thinking substance * 1c. Mind as a particular mode of that attribute of God which is thought * (1) The origin of the human mind as a mode of thought * (2) The properties of the human mind as a mode of thought * 1d. Mind as soul or spirit, having the power to perform all cognitive and voluntary functions * (1) The origin of the mind’s simple ideas: sensation and reflection * (2) The activity of the understanding in relating ideas: the formation of complex ideas * 1e. Mind as a triad of cognitive faculties: understanding, judgment, reason * (1) The relation of understanding to sense or intuition: its application in the realm of nature; conformity to law * (2) The relation of judgment to pleasure and displeasure: its application in the realm of art; aesthetic finality * (3) The relation of reason to desire or will: its application in the realm of freedom; the summum bonum * 1f. Mind as intelligence or self-consciousness, knowing itself as universal: the unity of intellect and will * 1g. Mind as the totality of mental processes and as the principle of meaningful or purposive behavior * (1) The nature of the stream of thought, consciousness, or experience: the variety of mental operations * (2) The topography of mind * (3) The unity of attention and of consciousness: the selectivity of mind

2. The human mind in relation to matter or body * 2a. The immateriality of mind: mind as an immaterial principle, a spiritual substance, or as an incorporeal power functioning without a bodily organ * 2b. The potentiality of intellect or reason compared with the potentiality of matter or nature * 2c. The interaction of mind and body * (1) The physiological conditions of mental activity * (2) The influence of mental activity on bodily states * 2d. The parallelism of mind and body * 2e. The reduction of mind to matter: the atomic explanation of its processes, and of the difference between mind and soul, and between mind and body

3. Mind in animals and in men * 3a. Mind, reason, or understanding as a specific property of human nature: comparison of human reason with animal intelligence and instinct * 3b. Mentality as a common property of men and animals: the differences between human and animal intelligence in degree or quality * 3c. The evolution of mind or intelligence

4. The various states of the human mind * 4a. Individual differences in intelligence: degrees of capacity for understanding * 4b. The mentality of children * 4c. The states of the possible intellect: its potentiality, habits, and actuality * 4d. The condition of the mind prior to experience * (1) The mind as completely potential: the mind as a tabula rasa * (2) The innate endowment of the mind with ideas: instinctive determinations * (3) The transcendental or a priori forms and categories of the mind * 4e. The condition of the human mind when the soul is separate from the body * 4f. Supernatural states of the human intellect: the state of innocence; beatitude; the human intellect of Christ

5. The weakness and limits of the human mind * 5a. The fallibility of the human mind: the causes of error * 5b. The natural limits of the mind: the unknowable; objects which transcend its powers; reason’s critical determination of its own limits or boundaries * 5c. The elevation of the human mind by divine grace: faith and the supernatural gifts

6. The reflexivity of mind: the mind’s knowledge of itself and its acts

7. The nature and phases of consciousness: the realm of the unconscious * 7a. The nature of self-consciousness * 7b. The degrees or states of consciousness: waking, dreaming, sleeping * 7c. The conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious activities of mind

8. The pathology of mind: the loss or abeyance of reason * 8a. The distinction between sanity and madness: the criterion of lucidity or insight * 8b. The causes of mental pathology: organic and functional factors * 8c. The abnormality peculiar to mind: systematic delusion

9. Mind in the moral and political order * 9a. The distinction between the speculative and practical intellect or reason: the spheres of knowledge, belief, and action * 9b. The relation of reason to will, desire, and emotion * 9c. Reason as regulating human conduct: reason as the principle of virtue or duty * 9d. Reason as the principle of free will: rationality as the source of moral and political freedom * 9e. Reason as formative of human society: the authority of government and law * 9f. The life of reason, or the life of the mind, as man’s highest vocation: reason as the principle of all human work

10. The existence of mind apart from man * 10a. The indwelling reason in the order of nature * 10b. Nous or the intellectual principle: its relation to the One and to the world-soul * 10c. The realm of the pure intelligences: the angelic intellect * 10d. The unity and separate existence of the active or the possible intellect * 10e. Mind as an immediate infinite mode of God * 10f. Absolute mind: the moments of its manifestations * (1) The unfolding of mind or spirit in world history * (2) The concrete objectification of mind in the state * 10g. The divine intellect: its relation to the divine being and the divine will

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

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Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

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For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. Diverse conceptions of the human mind

• 1a. Mind as intellect or reason, a part or power of the soul or human nature, distinct from sense and imagination
  • 7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 350a-353d; BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII, 392c-393c; BK IX, 421a-c / Timaeus, 466a-467a / Theaetetus, 534d-535c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-248a9] 330b-d / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413b24-26] 643d-644a; CH 3 [414a14-20] 644d; [414b33-415a13] 645a-b; BK III, CH 3-8 659c-664d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1097b34-1098a7] 343b; BK IX, CH 4 [1166a10-28] 419b-c; CH 8 [1168b28-1169a12] 422b-d; CH 9 [1170a16-18] 423d-424a; BK X, CH 7 [1177b26-1178a8] 432c / Politics, BK VII, CH 15 [1334b8-28] 539b-d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [136-160] 31d-32a
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 6, 111a-b
  • 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4a / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 2-3 216b-217b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 11-36 74a-80d esp par 21 76c-d; BK XIII, par 12 113b-d / City of God, BK VII, CH 23, 256b-c; BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c; BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 8 626c-627a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 75, A 3, ANS 380c-381b; Q 76, A 3, CONTRARY 391a-393a; Q 78, A 1, ANS 407b-409a; Q 79 413d-427a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXV [61-84] 92a-b
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-115c esp 113c-114b; 248d-250a,c / Judgement, 551a-552c
• 1a(1) The difference between the acts of sensing and understanding, and the objects of sense and reason
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228a-230c; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 447b-d; 457b-458a / Theaetetus, 534d-536b / Sophist, 565a-569a esp 568a-569a / Philebus, 634b-635b
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 18 111b-c; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Topics, BK VI, CH 8 [144b18-26] 159d-160a / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188a26-189a9] 264b-c; BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-248a9] 330b-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a28-981b13] 499a-500a; CH 5 [986b25-987a1] 504d-505a; CH 6 [987a29-b18] 505b-d; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b5] 518a-b; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b35-1036a12] 559b-c; CH 15 563c-564c; BK VIII, CH 2 [1043a12-28] 567c-d; CH 3 [1043a28-33] 568b; BK X, CH 9 586a-c; BK XI, CH 7 [1064a4-9] 592b / Soul, BK II, CH 5 [417b17-28] 648b-c; BK III, CH 8 664b-d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [353-521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a; [722-756] 53d-54a
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 6, 110c-111c
  • 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4a / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 2, 107b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 23 153d-154b; TR VI, CH 1-2 189b-190b; TR VIII, CH 8, 195b-196a / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 2 216b-c
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 10 15b-d; BK IV, par 15-17 23a-c; BK VII, par 23 50b-c / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 3, ANS 52c-53b; Q 13, A 1, REP 3 62c-63c; Q 14, A 11 84c-85c; Q 18, A 2, ANS 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 55, A 2, REP 2 289d-290d; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS and REP 1 295d-297a; Q 75, A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 79, A 5, REP 2 418c-419b; A 6, REP 2 419b-420d; Q 84, A 1, ANS and REP 2 440d-442a; A 2, ANS and REP 1 442b-443c; A 6-8 447c-451b; Q 85, A 1, REP 3 451c-453c; A 2 453d-455b; Q 86, A 1 461c-462a; PART III, Q 1, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 29, A 6 748b-749a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, REP 3 896a-897d
• 1a(2) The cooperation of intellect and sense: the dependence of thought upon imagination and the direction of imagination by reason
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 126b-c / Phaedo, 228a-230c / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Theaetetus, 535a-536b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 18 111b-c; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b20-248a8] 330a-d / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a2-10] 632a; BK III, CH 7 [431a14]-CH 8 [432a13] 663d-664d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 6 [445b4-18] 683b-d / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [449b30-450a25] 690c-691a
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 75, A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; Q 79, A 4, REP 3 417a-418c; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 430c-431d; Q 84, A 2, CONTRARY and REP 1 442b-443c; A 3, ANS 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6-8 447c-451b; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; A 5, REP 2 457d-458d; A 7, ANS 459c-460b; Q 86, A 1, ANS and REP 2 461c-462a; A 4, REP 3 463d-464d; Q 88, A 1-2 469a-472c; Q 89, A 1, ANS and REP 1 473b-475a; A 5, ANS and REP 4 477a-478b; Q 91, A 3, REP 1-3 486b-487d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; A 4, REP 1,3 9a-10b; Q 51, A 1, ANS 12b-13c; Q 52, A 1, ANS 15d-18a; Q 56, A 5, ANS 33c-34b; PART III, Q 11, A 2 773a-d
• 1a(3) The functioning of intellect: the acts of understanding, judgment, and reasoning
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228a-230c / Republic, BK VII, 392a-394a / Theaetetus, 535a-536b; 537d-538a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [2a4-10] 6a / Interpretation, CH 1 [16a9-18] 25a-b / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 39a-d / Metaphysics, BK VI, CH 4 [1027b18-28] 550a,c; BK IX, CH 10 577c-578a,c / Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a25-33] 636d-637a; BK III, CH 6 662d-663c
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [353-521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 2, 107b-c
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XIII, par 37 120d-121a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31 651d-652b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 14, A 7, ANS 81d-82b; Q 46, A 2, REP 3 253a-255a; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d; A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 59, A 1, REP 1 306c-307b; Q 79, A 8-9 421c-423d; A 10, REP 2-3 423d-424d; Q 82, A 4, REP 1 434c-435c; QQ 84-89 440b-480c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a; Q 5, A 1, REP 1 636d-637c; Q 15, A 4, REP 1 683b-684a; Q 16, A 1, REP 3 684b-d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 1, REP 2 205b-206b; PART II-II, Q 1, A 2, REP 2-3 381a-c; Q 8, A 1, REP 2 417a-d; Q 180, A 6 613a-614d; PART III, Q 1, A 3 773d-774c; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS 1025c-1032b
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 56b; 59b-61d esp 59c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a
• 1a(4) The distinction of the active and the possible intellect in power and function
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 4-5 661b-662d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 54, A 1, REP 1 285a-d; A 4 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2, REP 2 289d-290d; Q 79, A 2-5 414d-419b; Q 84, A 4, ANS and REP 3 444d-446b; A 6 447c-449a; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; Q 87, A 1 465a-466c; Q 88, A 1, ANS and REP 2 469a-471c; Q 117, A 1 595d-597c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 4 9a-10b; A 5, REP 1-2 10b-d; Q 67, A 2, ANS 82c-83b; PART III, Q 9, A 1, ANS 763b-764c; A 3-4 765b-767b; Q 12, A 1, ANS and REP 3 776c-777b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 3, REP 11 1034b-1037c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 31, SCHOL 366d-367a
• 1b. Mind as identical with thinking substance
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a; PART V, 56a-b / Meditations, II 77d-81d; IV, 89b; VI, 98c-d / Objections and Replies, 114d-115a,c; DEF VI-VII 130c-d; PROP IV 133c; 135b-136b; 152b,d-156a; 207a; 208c-d; 209c; 224d-225d; 248b; 249d-250b; 261a-b; 276b-c
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH 1, SECT 9-25 123a-127d; CH XIX, SECT 4 176a-b
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; SECT 26-27 418a-b; SECT 98 432a; SECT 135-142 440a-441c passim
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 130b-131a; 221a-226a esp 221a-222b
• 1b(1) The relation of the mind as thinking substance to sense and imagination
  • 31 DESCARTES: Rules, VIII, 13a-b; 14b; XII, 18b-c; 20a-c; XIV 28a-33b passim / Discourse, PART I, 41d; PART IV, 53b; PART V, 59a-60c / Meditations, II 77d-81d; VI 96b-103d esp 96b-98c, 99d-101a / Objections and Replies, DEF I-II 130a-b; POSTULATE II 131a; 136d-137a; 137d; 207d-208a; 209c; 215b-c; 218c-d; 224d-225d; 229d-230c
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; SECT 138-139 440c-d
• 1b(2) Thinking and willing as the acts of the thinking substance
  • 31 DESCARTES: Rules, III 3b-5a; XI 17b-18b; XIV 28a-33b passim / Meditations, III 81d-89a esp 81d-82a; IV 89a-93a passim; VI, 101d-102a / Objections and Replies, DEF I-II 130a-b; 137d; 162b; 170d; 218c-d
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; SECT 26-28 418a-c; SECT 138-139 440c-d
• 1c. Mind as a particular mode of that attribute of God which is thought
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 14 359d-360a; PROP 25, COROL 365b; PROP 29-31 366b-367a; PART II, AXIOM 2 373d; PROP 1, SCHOL 374a; PROP 5 374c-d; PROP 10, COROL 376d; PROP 11-13 377b-378c; PROP 20 382d; PART III, PROP 1 396a-c; PROP 2, DEMONST 396c; PART V, PROP 40, SCHOL 462d
• 1c(1) The origin of the human mind as a mode of thought
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 14, COROL 2 360a; PROP 25, COROL 365b; PROP 29-31 366b-367a; PART II 373a-394d passim, esp PROP 1 373d-374a, PROP 5-6 374c-375a, PROP 10, COROL 376d, PROP 11-13 377b-378c
• 1c(2) The properties of the human mind as a mode of thought
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, DEF 3 373b; AXIOM 2-3 373d; PROP 11-13 377b-378c; PROP 17-19 380d-382c; PROP 40 387a-388b; PROP 48-49 391a-394d; PART III, PROP 1-2, DEMONST 396a-c; PROP 3 398b-c; PROP 9-14 399b-401a; PART V, PROP 23, SCHOL 458c-d
• 1d. Mind as soul or spirit, having the power to perform all cognitive and voluntary functions
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH 1, SECT 4 121d-122a; SECT 10 123b-d; CH VI 131b-c; CH IX 138b-141a passim, esp SECT 1 138b-c, SECT 15 141a; CH XI, SECT 1-CH XII, SECT 1 143d-147d; CH XIX 175b-176b; CH XXI, SECT 5-6 179c-180a; CH XXIII, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 18 209a; SECT 22 209d; SECT 28-32 211b-212d; BK IV, CH XIV 364b-365a
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; SECT 7 414b-c; SECT 26-28 418a-c; SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 135-142 440a-441c passim
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 194d-195a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 1a; 118b-119b; 221a-226a esp 221a-222b
• 1d(1) The origin of the mind’s simple ideas: sensation and reflection
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH 1, SECT 1-8 121a-123a; SECT 23-25 127b-d; CH II, SECT 2 128a-b; CH III, SECT 1 128d-129a; CH VII 131c-133b; CH XI, SECT 17-CH XII, SECT 1 147a-d; CH XII, SECT 8 148c-d; CH XVII, SECT 22 173d-174a; CH XVIII, SECT 6 174c-d; CH XX, SECT 1-2 176b-c; SECT 15 177d; CH XXI, SECT 4 178d-179c; SECT 75 200b-d; CH XXIII, SECT 1 204a-b; SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 29-30 211d-212b; SECT 32-37 212c-214b; CH XXV, SECT 9 216d; SECT 11 217a
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1, 413a
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 12-14 455d-456b
• 1d(2) The activity of the understanding in relating ideas: the formation of complex ideas
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH II, SECT 2 128a-b; CH VII, SECT 10 133a-b; CH XI, SECT 6-7 145a-b; CH XII, SECT 1-CH XIII, SECT 1 147b-149a; CH XIII, SECT 4-6 149b-d; SECT 27 154c-d; CH XVII, SECT 1 174a; SECT 6 174c-d; CH XXII, SECT 2 201a-b; SECT 9 202c-203a; CH XXIII, SECT 15 208c-d; CH XXX, SECT 3 238c-d; CH XXXII, SECT 12 245b-c; BK III, CH II, SECT 3 253c; CH V 263d-268a; CH VI, SECT 11 271b-d; SECT 26-51 274d-283a; CH XI, SECT 15 303b-c; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 5 324d
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1, 413a
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 13-14 455d-456b; SECT III, DIV 18 457c-d; SECT V, DIV 39, 466c-d; DIV 40, 467b
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 101b-102a esp 101d-102a
• 1e. Mind as a triad of cognitive faculties: understanding, judgment, reason
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16a; 34a-41c esp 38c-41c; 51d-52b; 59c-64a esp 60a-c; 89c-94b; 108a-113b esp 111d-113b; 115b-c; 119a-b; 129c-130c esp 130b-c; 166c-171a; 173b-174a; 187a-c; 193a-200c esp 193a-195a, 199b-c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 281c-282d / Practical Reason, 329a-d; 343a; 349b-350c / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 461a-462d, 464c-467a, 472c-d, 474b-475d; 542b-543c; 570b-572c; 604a-b
• 1e(1) The relation of understanding to sense or intuition: its application in the realm of nature; conformity to law
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 15b-c, 16a-c, 22a,c, 23a-24a, 30b-c, 31a-d, 34a-c, 37b-39c, 41c-42a, 45d-46a, 47c-48a, 48d-51d, 53b-55a, 58a-64a, 64d-65c, 94d-95d, 98c, 101b-107b; 109d-112d; 115b-c; 164a-171a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 275b; 281c-282d esp 282b-c / Practical Reason, 292a-293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 319c-320b; 329b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383c-d; 385a-c; 386d-387a,c / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 464c-465c, 474b-475d; 482d-483d; 492c-d; 542b-544c; 550a-551a,c; 562d-563b; 570c-572b; 609b-610a
• 1e(2) The relation of judgment to pleasure and displeasure: its application in the realm of art; aesthetic finality
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 101b-107b esp 102b-103a / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 467d-473a, 474b-475d; 480d-482b; 486d-491c; 493c-495a,c; 497a-501b; 542b-544c; 546d-548c; 558a-b; 559a-560c esp 560b-c; 562a-564c esp 562a-d; 567c-568c; 570b-572c; 577b; 584d-585a; 588c; 597b-599b
• 1e(3) The relation of reason to desire or will: its application in the realm of freedom; the summum bonum
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-171a esp 164a-165c; 234c-240b esp 236b-240b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265b; 271c-d; 275b; 279b; 281c-283b esp 282d-283b; 284d-285a / Practical Reason, 292a-293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 303b-304b; 307d-314d esp 314a-d; 315c; 319c-321b; 327d-329c; 337a-355d esp 337a-338c, 343b-d, 348d-355d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383c-d; 386b-387a,c; 388a-d; 390b / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 465a-c, 474b-475d; 483d-484b; 587a-588a; 594b-595c; 601d; 604d-606d esp 606a-d; 607c; 609b-610a
• 1f. Mind as intelligence or self-consciousness, knowing itself as universal: the unity of intellect and will
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4-9 12d-14d; par 13 15c-d; par 21 17a-c; par 27 18d; PART I, par 35 21a-b; par 66 29a-c; PART III, par 353-360 112b-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 4 116a-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160d-161a; 170b-d; PART III, 306b
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 235a-238a esp 236a-237b
• 1g. Mind as the totality of mental processes and as the principle of meaningful or purposive behavior
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 1a-9a esp 1a, 5a-b, 6b-7a; 51a-b; 121b-122b
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 383b / Unconscious, 428a-430c esp 428d-429b / General Introduction, 452a-c; 467c-468a
• 1g(1) The nature of the stream of thought, consciousness, or experience: the variety of mental operations
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 43a-44a; 51a-52a; 90b-93a esp 92b; 140b-184a esp 140b-141a, 145a, 146a-b, 157b-161a, 165a-167b; 300a-311a esp 300a-b, 307b-308a, 311a; 313a-314a; 315a-319a esp 317b-319a; 323a-327a esp 326a-b [fn 1]; 360a; 381b-385b; 396a-397a; 421a-427a esp 424b-426a; 452a-457a; 480a-b; 502a-505b; 561a; 664a-666b; 767a; 851a-862a esp 852b-853a
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 180c-181b; 337a-b; 348a-d; 351d-353b esp 352d; 363c-364b; 375a-385c esp 375b-376a, 377c-380d, 383b-c, 384a-385c / Unconscious, 442b-443d / General Introduction, 452a-c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b-648b / Ego and Id, 700a-701d / New Introductory Lectures, 835d-836a; 837d-838c
• 1g(2) The topography of mind
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 9a-15a esp 13a-14a; 17b-49b esp 43a-44a, 47b-49b
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351b-353b; 382a-c / Unconscious, 430d-432c / Ego and Id, 701d-703a / New Introductory Lectures, 836c-d; 839b-d
• 1g(3) The unity of attention and of consciousness: the selectivity of mind
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 91a; 184a-187b; 260a-286a esp 260a-262a, 264b-265a, 270b-272b; 388a; 445a-446a; 606b-610b esp 608a-609a; 692a-693b; 773a-774a; 830a; 862b-863b [fn 2]
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 375b-c / Unconscious, 438c-d / Ego and Id, 698d-699b [fn 1] 2. The human mind in relation to matter or body
• 2a. The immateriality of mind: mind as an immaterial principle, a spiritual substance, or as an incorporeal power functioning without a bodily organ
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-126c / Phaedo, 223b-225c; 231c-232b / Timaeus, 452d-453b; 466a-b
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 4 [408b18-29] 638c; CH 5 [411b13-18] 641c-d; BK II, CH 2 [413b24-29] 643d-644a; BK III, CH 4 [429a10-b23] 661b-662a; CH 5 662c-d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 3 [736b25-30] 277c
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 2, 107b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 8, 195b-196a; 197c-198b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 2, 43c-d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 5, 268c-d; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q 75, A 2 379c-380c; A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; A 6 383c-384c; Q 79, A 1, REP 4 414a-d; A 2, REP 2 414d-416a; A 3, REP 3 416a-417a; A 4, REP 4-5 417a-418c; A 5, REP 1-2 418c-419b; A 6, REP 1-2 419b-420d; Q 83, A 1, REP 5 436d-438a; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c; Q 87, A 3, REP 3 467b-468a; Q 89, A 1, ANS 473b-475a; PART III, Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 35, A 5, ANS 775d-777a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 4 9a-10b; Q 53, A 1, ANS and REP 2-3 19d-21a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXV [61-84] 92a-b
  • 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 494a-b
  • 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 20a-b / Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a; 53b; PART V, 59a-60c / Meditations, II, 77d-81d; VI 96b-103d esp 98c-99a, 99d, 101d-102a / Objections and Replies, 114d-115a,c; 119d-120a; DEF VI-VII 130c-d; DEF X 130d; PROP IV 133c; 135d-136b; 152b,d-156d; 207d-208a; 209c; 224d-225d; 231a-232d; 261a-b; 276b-c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PREF 451a-452c
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15-22 208c-209d; SECT 28-32 211b-212d esp SECT 32 212c-d; CH XXVII, SECT 12-14 223a-224b passim; SECT 27 227d-228a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 6 313c-315b
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 26 418a; SECT 137 440b-c; SECT 141 441a-b
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186a-b
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 48 24b-c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 130a; 221a-223a
• 2b. The potentiality of intellect or reason compared with the potentiality of matter or nature
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-248a9] 330b-d / Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 2 [1046a37-b24] 571c-d; CH 5 573a-c / Soul, BK III, CH 5 662c-d; CH 11 [434a16-22] 667a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7, A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 31d-32c; Q 14, A 2, REP 3 76d-77d; A 8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 19, A 1, ANS 108d-109c; Q 50, A 2, REP 2-4 270a-272a; Q 55, A 1 289a-d; A 2, ANS 289d-290d; Q 58, A 1, ANS 300c-301a; Q 75, A 5, REP 1-2 382a-383b; Q 79, A 2 414d-416a; A 6, ANS 419b-420d; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 2 442b-443c; A 3, REP 1-2 443d-444d; Q 85, A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; Q 87, A 1, ANS 465a-466c; Q 91, A 3, REP 2 486b-487d; PART III, Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 22, A 1, ANS and REP 1 720d-721c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 4, REP 1-2 9a-10b; Q 55, A 1, ANS and REP 5 26b-27a; PART III, Q 9, A 3, ANS and REP 3 765b-766b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 10 1025c-1032b
  • 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 494a-b
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 153a
• 2c. The interaction of mind and body
  • 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 452d-453b; 474b-476b
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [94-829] 31b-40c
  • 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 5-7 2d-4a
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b esp 48d-49c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 60b-c; PART VI, 61a / Meditations, VI, 99d / Objections and Replies, 207d-208a; 209c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PREF 451a-452c
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 28 322a-c
  • 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b-232a
  • 42 KANT: Judgement, 538d-539a
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 281a-282c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-4a; 8a-52b esp 8a-9a, 14b-15a, 19a-b, 47b-49b, 51b-52a; 82b; 84a-94b esp 89b-93a; 116a-119b; 139a-140b; 208a-b; 222b-223a; 259a; 288a-289b; 311a; 450a-451b; 694a; 742b-755a; 758a-759a; 827b-835a esp 829b-830a
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a / Narcissism, 402d-404b passim / Instincts, 412b-414c esp 413d-414a / General Introduction, 451c-452a; 605b-606a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639a-640d; 646b-651a / Ego and Id, 700a-703a passim, esp 702d-703a / New Introductory Lectures, 829a-c
• 2c(1) The physiological conditions of mental activity
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b20-248a9] 330a-d / Soul, BK II, CH 9 [421a19-26] 652d / Dreams 702a-706d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 10 [686a22-29] 218b-c
  • 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 155d-160d esp 159a-c
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [722-776] 53d-54b
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 2 259b,d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 7, ANS 449b-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q 85, A 7, ANS 459c-460b
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b
  • 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-20d / Objections and Replies, 207d-208a; 208d-209a; 209c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 14 380c; PROP 16-17 380d-381d; PROP 26 384a-b; PART V, PREF 451a-452c passim; PROP 39 462a-c
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 23 127b; CH XIX, SECT 1, 175b; CH XXVII, SECT 27 227d-228a; CH XXXIII, SECT 6 249a-b; BK IV, CH III, SECT 28 322a-c
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20 416b-417a; SECT 50 422c
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 288c-d; 299c; 595d-596a
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 9a-73b; 152a-153a; 157a-b; 166b-167a; 367a-373a esp 370a-b; 380a-b; 381b-383b; 387b-388a; 413b-420b; 427b-430b; 453a; 455b-456a; 497a-501b; 506a-507a; 520a-521a; 533a-538b; 690a-691b; 758a-759a; 829b; 865a
  • 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of Dreams, 351b-352c; 378a-b; 382a-c / Unconscious, 431d / General Introduction, 586c-d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639b-d; 646b-648a
• 2c(2) The influence of mental activity on bodily states
  • 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474d-475b
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701a13]-CH 8 [702a22] 237a-c; CH 11 239a-d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [136-176] 31d-32b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 117, A 3, REP 3 598c-599b
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 36c-40d; 234c-235a; 332d-333c; 532a-b
  • 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 296d / Circulation of the Blood, 321d-322a; 322c-d
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 5, 179c; BK IV, CH III, SECT 28 322a-c; CH X, SECT 19 354a-c
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 51-52 472b-473c; DIV 57-58, 475c-476b
  • 42 KANT: Judgement, 538d-539a; 560b
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 350c-d
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 141d-142a; 142d; BK V, 213c-d; BK VI, 247d-248a; BK IX, 350d-354a passim, esp 351d-352a, 353b-d; BK XIII, 567d-568c esp 568b; BK XV, 617a-b; 618a-b
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 3a-b; 64a-67a; 132a-134b; 694a-699a; 767a-794a esp 767b-768a, 787a-794a; 827b-835a esp 828a-830a; 841a-848a passim, esp 842a-b, 847b-848a
  • 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 1b-6b esp 4c-5a / Hysteria, 25a-59d esp 25a-27a, 30a-d, 35b-c, 37d-38a, 56b-58c; 82d-83c / Narcissism, 403a-c / Repression, 426b-c / General Introduction, 572a-b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718a-719d; 728c-729a / New Introductory Lectures, 852a-b
• 2d. The parallelism of mind and body
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 2 355a; PROP 14, COROL 2 360a; PROP 25, COROL 365b; PART II, PROP 1-2 373d-374a; PROP 5-7 374c-375c; PROP 11-13 377b-378c; PROP 15-28 380c-384c; PART III, PROP 2 396c-398b; PROP 10-14 399c-401a; PART V, PROP 1 452d
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 84a-90b esp 84b-85b, 88a-90a; 96a-b; 116a-119b esp 119b
• 2e. The reduction of mind to matter: the atomic explanation of its processes, and of the difference between mind and soul, and between mind and body
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 241d-242b / Sophist, 567a-568a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 2-5 633a-641d passim, esp CH 2 [403b31-404a30] 633a-c, [405a7-13] 634b
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [251-293] 18b-d; [865-990] 26a-27c; BK III [94-829] 31b-40c; BK IV [722-817] 53d-54d; [877-961] 55d-56d
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 5, 68b / Third Ennead, TR I, CH 2, 78d; CH 3 79b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, 195b-196c
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 2 442b-443c; A 6, ANS 447c-449a
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 52c; PART II, 162c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 224d-226d; 261a-b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 6 313c-315b; CH X, SECT 5 350a-b; SECT 10 351b-352a; SECT 17 353b-c
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 93 431b; SECT 137 440b-c; SECT 141 441a-b
  • 42 KANT: Judgement, 599d-600d
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95a-107b esp 95b-98a; 115a-118b esp 117a-118b
  • 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 829a-b 3. Mind in animals and in men
• 3a. Mind, reason, or understanding as a specific property of human nature: comparison of human reason with animal intelligence and instinct
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-444] 44c
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b; [683-684] 137a
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-213] 260a-b / Trojan Women [665-672] 275d
  • 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44a-c / Timaeus, 452c-454a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK V, CH 3 [132a17-22] 183a / Physics, BK II, CH 8 [199a20-23] 276c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a28-b27] 499a-b / Soul, BK II, CH 3 [414b17-20] 644d; [415a7-12] 645b; BK III, CH 3 [427b7-14] 659d-660a; [428a20-24] 660c; CH 10 [433a8-13] 665d / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453a5-14] 695b
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [488b20-27] 9d; BK VIII, CH 1 [588a18-b4] 114b,d / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [641b5-8] 164b-c / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 23 [731a24-b8] 271c-d; BK II, CH 6 [744a27-31] 285c / Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1097b23-1098a7] 343a-b; CH 13 [1102b3-1103a3] 347d-348c; BK III, CH 2 [1111b6-12] 357b-c; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a17-26] 387d; BK VII, CH 3 [1147a25-b5] 397c-d; BK IX, CH 9 [1170a16-18] 423d-424a; BK X, CH 7 [1177b26-1178a8] 432c; CH 8 [1178b23-32] 433c / Politics, BK I, CH 5 [1254b20-25] 448b; BK VII, CH 13 [1332b39-b10] 537a-b; CH 15 [1334b12-28] 539c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a1-3] 594d
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3 108b-c; CH 6 110c-112b; CH 9 114c-116b; BK II, CH 8, 146a-147a; BK III, CH 7, 183c-184a; BK IV, CH 7, 233a-b
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 16 262d-263a,c; BK V, SECT 16 271c-d; BK VI, SECT 23 276b; BK VIII, SECT 7 286a; SECT 41 288d; BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d
  • 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7-13, 4a-6b esp CH 10, 5a / Third Ennead, TR III, CH 4 94c-95c; TR IV, CH 2 97d-98a / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 10, 213d-214a / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 4-6 323c-325a
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 11 74a-b; BK XIII, par 37 120d-121a / City of God, BK V, CH 11 216c-d; BK VII, CH 23, 256b-c; BK VIII, CH 6, 269a; BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a; BK XXIX, CH 24, 610c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 8 626c-627a; CH 22, 629b-c
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 18, A 2, REP 1 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 30, A 2, REP 3 168a-169b; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c-396a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 4-6 411d-413d; Q 79, A 5, REP 3 418c-419b; A 6, REP 1 419b-420d; A 8, REP 3 421c-422b; A 10, REP 2 423d-424d; Q 83, A 1, ANS 436d-438a; Q 84, A 2, REP 1 442b-443c; Q 86, A 4, REP 3 463d-464d; Q 91, A 3, REP 1-2 486b-487d; Q 96, A 1, REP 4 510b-511b; A 2, ANS 511b-d; Q 115, A 4, ANS 589d-590c; Q 118, A 2, ANS and REP 2 601c-603b; PART I-II, PROLOGUE 609a,c; Q 1, A 1, ANS 609b-610b; Q 10, A 3, ANS 664d-665c; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2, REP 3 673c-674c; Q 17, A 2 687d-688b
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 2 8b-9a; Q 110, A 4, REP 3 350d-351d; PART III SUPPL, Q 79, A 1, ANS 951b-953b
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI [40-57] 46c; PURGATORY, XXV [52-84] 91d-92b; PARADISE, V [19-24] 112b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d; 59b-c; PART II, 100a-c
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 119b-d; 184a-c
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT IV, SC IV [32-39] 59a
  • 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 428a; 454a
  • 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 35, 163d-164a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 41b,d; PART IV, 51d-52a; PART V, 56a-b; 59a-60c / Meditations, II, 71b-d; 77d-81d / Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 209b; 226a-d; 276c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 57, SCHOL 441b
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [379-411] 240b-241a; BK IX [549-566] 259b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 339-348 233a-234a; 365 236a; 397 240b / Vacuum, 357a-358a
  • 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VI, SECT 56-58 36d-37b; CH XIV, SECT 163-164 63a-c / Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 1 93a-b; BK II, CH XI, SECT 4-11 144d-146a esp SECT 10-11 145d-146a; CH XXVII, SECT 12 223a-b; BK III, CH VI, SECT 26-27 274d-276a; SECT 29 276b-d; CH X, SECT 17 295d-296b; CH XI, SECT 20 304c-d; BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 1 371c-d
  • 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 151b-152a; 159b-160a
  • 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1d-2b
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336b-c; 337d-338a; 341d; 349b-c / Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 409d-410a
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 199c-200c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256d-257a; 264d-265a; 281c-282c / Practical Reason, 316c-317a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372a-b / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d / Judgement, 479a-c; 584d-585c; 587a-588a; 602b,d [fn 1]
  • 43 MILL: Liberty, 294d-295b
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 21 17a-c; PART III, par 262-264 83d-84a; ADDITIONS, 4 116a-d; 121 136c-d; 157 142b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c; 168b-d; 178a-b; 186a; 198a; PART I, 258a; PART III, 304d-305b
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287a-c; 319b-c; 331b-332a
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a-b; 678b-686b esp 686a-b; 691a-b
  • 54 FREUD: Unconscious, 429c-d
• 3b. Mentality as a common property of men and animals: the differences between human and animal intelligence in degree or quality
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [588a18-b4] 114b,d; BK IX, CH 7 [612b18-32] 138b-c / Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 10 [686a22-687a23] 218b-d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [1028-1090] 74c-75b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52b; 53a-b; 53d; 54a; 63a; 64a-c; 79c; PART II, 100a-c; PART IV, 267b
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215a-232c esp 216c-219a, 231d-232c
  • 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 35, 163d-164a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 209b; 226a-d
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [369-397] 240a-b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVII, SECT 8 221a-222a; BK III, CH VI, SECT 12 271d-272b esp 272b; SECT 22 273d-274a; BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 12, 370c-371a
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IX 487b-488c
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a
  • 42 KANT: Judgement, 602b,d [fn 1]
  • 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-449c passim; 469c-d
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287a-303d esp 287a-c, 294c; 319b-d; 591d-592a
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 5a-6b; 13a-15a passim; 47b-51a passim, esp 49b-50a; 85a-b; 676b-677a; 678b-686b; 690b; 691a-b; 704a-706b; 873a
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 385b-c
• 3c. The evolution of mind or intelligence
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-342c; 348d-349c
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 281a-c; 286c-288d; 299b-c; 320a-330a,c esp 320a-321b, 328b-d; 349b-d; 566b-567b; 591d-592a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 41b; 51a-52b; 95b-98a; 800b; 851a-861a esp 851a-b, 857b-858a, 859a-860a; 878a; 890a-897b esp 897a-b
  • 54 FREUD: Instincts, 413a-d / General Introduction, 591d-592b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 647a-648a / Ego and Id, 707b-708b esp 708a-b 4. The various states of the human mind
• 4a. Individual differences in intelligence: degrees of capacity for understanding
  • 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK VIII [165-185] 223d-224a
  • 5 ARISTOPHANES: Frogs [1482-1499] 581d-582a
  • 7 PLATO: Republic, BK V, 358a-360c; BK VI, 373c-375b; 383c-d; BK VII, 401b-c / Theaetetus, 513a-d; 528a; 540c-541a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d esp 810c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 34 [89b10-15] 122c / Topics, BK VIII, CH 14 [163b8-16] 222a
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 10 [686a22-29] 218b-c / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 21 [1404a15-19] 654b; CH 22 [1405a7-9] 655b / Poetics, CH 22 [1459a5-7] 694d
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 6, 182a-b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 31 26c-27a; BK XIII, par 47, 123d-124a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 89, A 1, ANS 473b-475a; Q 117, A 1, ANS 595d-597c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 10, A 4, REP 1 771b-772a
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-61a; 66c-67a; 67d-68c; 84c-d; PART II, 154a-b
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 60a-c; 65a; 71d-72b; 150c-151a; 240a-c; 319c-320a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 41b,d
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 13, SCHOL 378a-c; PART V, PROP 38-39 461d-462c
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1-2 171a-172b; 7 173a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH X, SECT 8 142d-143a; CH XI, SECT 2 144a-c
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IX, DIV 84, 488b,d [fn 1]
  • 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 235b-236a; 269b-270a; 271b-273a
  • 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 7d-8a
  • 42 KANT: Judgement, 525c-532a esp 526a-d, 528c-530c; 586a-587a
  • 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 79, 234b-d
  • 43 MILL: Liberty, 297c-299a / Representative Government, 385b-d
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 20c; 283c
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 166 59d-60a; ADDITIONS, 107 134a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 166b-168a
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [522-613] 15a-17a
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 266c; 566a-567b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 263c-d; BK XV, 639a-b
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 14b-15a; 274a-275a; 315a-b; 345b; 381a; 431b-432a esp 432b-433b [fn 1]; 678b; 686b-690a; 691b-693a passim
  • 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 787d-788b [fn 3]
• 4b. The mentality of children
  • 7 PLATO: Laches, 35d / Apology, 200c-d / Gorgias, 261a-c / Republic, BK II, 320c-321d esp 321d; BK IV, 353b-c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 1 [184a21-b14] 259b; BK VII, CH 3 [247b13-248a6] 330c-d / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [450a26-b9] 691a-b
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [588a18-b1] 114b,d / Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 10 [686a22-29] 218b-c / Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b29-1095a12] 340a-b; BK III, CH 12 [1119a34-b19] 366a,c; BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-19] 391b; BK X, CH 3 [1174a1-4] 428b
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [445-450] 35d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 7-13 2c-4c / City of God, BK XXI, CH 16 573b-574a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 85, A 3, ANS 455b-457a
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60b
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 72b-73c
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II [163-173] 115b
  • 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VI, SECT 54-63 36c-38c passim / Human Understanding, BK I, CH I 95b,d-103d esp SECT 15-16 98d-99c; CH II, SECT 22 111a-b; BK II, CH I, SECT 1-8 121a-123a esp SECT 6-8 122b-123a; SECT 21-22 126d-127a; CH IX, SECT 5-7 138d-139b; CH XI, SECT 8-9 145b-c; CH XXXIII, SECT 7-10 249b-d
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 14 408d-409a
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 33, 463c-d
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 559d
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 270a; 413b [fn 2]; 456b-457a; 684b-685a
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 241b-c; 363b-364b; 379d-380b / Narcissism, 400a / General Introduction, 526d-527b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 768b-c
• 4c. The states of the possible intellect: its potentiality, habits, and actuality
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-248a9] 330b-d / Soul, BK II, CH 1 [412a6-12] 642a; [412b22-28] 642b; CH 5 [417b21-418a6] 647d-648d; BK III, CH 4 [429b5-430a2] 661d-662b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A 1, ANS 108d-109c; Q 34, A 1, REP 2 185b-187b; Q 79, A 4, REP 2 417a-418c; A 6-7 419b-421c; A 10, ANS 423d-424d; A 12, ANS 425c-426b; Q 84, A 7, REP 1 449b-450b; Q 86, A 2, ANS and REP 2 462a-463a; Q 87, A 1-3 465a-468a
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 31, SCHOL 366d-367a
• 4d. The condition of the mind prior to experience
• 4d(1) The mind as completely potential: the mind as a tabula rasa
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429b23-430a2] 662a-b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 79, A 2, ANS 414d-416a; Q 84, A 3 443d-444d; A 6 447c-449a; Q 89, A 1, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, A 1, ANS 595d-597c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 9, A 1, ANS 763b-764c
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 327 231a-b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK I 95b,d-121a,c esp CH I, SECT 1 95b,d-96a, SECT 15 98d-99a, SECT 23 101b-102a, CH II, SECT 22 111a-b, CH III, SECT 23 119b-120a; BK II, CH I 121a-127d esp SECT 2 121b-c, SECT 6 122b-c, SECT 9 123a, SECT 17 125c-d, SECT 20-25 126d-127d; CH IX, SECT 6 139a; CH XI, SECT 16-17 147a-b
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT II 455b-457b
  • 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-235a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 852b-861a esp 852b, 859b-860b
• 4d(2) The innate endowment of the mind with ideas: instinctive determinations
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124a-126c esp 126a-c / Meno, 179d-183a; 188d-189a / Phaedo, 228a-230d
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 97a-d; BK II, CH 19 [99b20-33] 136a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b30-993a11] 511a-c
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 22, 127c-d; BK II, CH 11, 150a-c
  • 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR II, CH 4, 8b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 25, 155b; TR IV, CH 5 160d-161b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 2, 216b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 10 73d-74a; par 16-19 75b-76b; par 26-38 78a-81a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 9 627a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 3 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 89, A 1, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, A 1, ANS 595d-597c
  • 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-335a esp 334c-d
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 1b-c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Rules, IV, 5c-d; 6d; VIII, 13c-d / Discourse, PART IV, 53b; PART V, 54c / Meditations, III, 83b; VI, 96d-97a / Objections and Replies, 120c-d; 140c; 215b-c; 224b,d
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP 23, SCHOL 458c-d
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK I 95b,d-121a,c esp CH I, SECT 1 95b,d-96a, SECT 15 98d-99a, SECT 23 101b-102a, CH III, SECT 21 118b-119a; BK II, CH I, SECT 9-25 123a-127d esp SECT 9 123a, SECT 17 125c-d, SECT 20-24 126d-127c; CH IX, SECT 6 139a; CH XI, SECT 16-17 147a-b
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 17, 457b,d [fn 1]
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 58c-59b; 113c-118a / Practical Reason, 352c-353a / Judgement, 551a-552c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 767b
  • 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 512b-513b; 526d; 532b; 599a-b / Group Psychology, 688d-689b / Ego and Id, 707c-708b esp 708b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721a
• 4d(3) The transcendental or a priori forms and categories of the mind
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 14a-15c, 22a,c, 23a-24a, 25b-c, 27c, 28d-29d, 32a-c, 34a-c, 37b-39c, 41c-45b, 48d-51d, 52c-55a, 56d-59b, 61a-62c, 65d-66d, 94b-95a, 99a-101b; 146a; 186d-187a; 192a-b / Practical Reason, 307d-308b; 349b-350c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 628b-631a; 851a-852a; 859a-882a esp 859b-861b, 865b, 867a-868a, 879b; 886b-889a esp 889a
• 4e. The condition of the human mind when the soul is separate from the body
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124a-126c / Phaedo, 223a-225c; 246d-247b / Republic, BK X, 440d-441a,c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 5 [430a20-25] 662d
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 21 265b-c
  • 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [724-751] 230b-231a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR I, CH 18 151b-c; TR III, CH 25-TR IV, CH 5 154d-161b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XXII, CH 30, 618a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 77, A 8 406b-407a; Q 89 473a-480c
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXV [1-108] 91b-92c esp [79-84] 92b
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP 21 458a; PROP 23 458b-d; PROP 40 462c-d
  • 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 233d
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 192d-193c
• 4f. Supernatural states of the human intellect: the state of innocence; beatitude; the human intellect of Christ
  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:17-20; 3:4-7,22 / Exodus, 33:11-23 / Ezekiel, 1; 10
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:8 / John, 14:19-21 / I Corinthians, 13:12 / II Corinthians, 12:1-4 / I John, 3:2
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IX, par 25 68c / City of God, BK X, CH 2 299d-300a; CH 28 316b-d; BK XXII, CH 29 614b-616d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; Q 86, A 2, REP 1 462a-463a; Q 94 501c-506a; Q 101 522c-523d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 5, A 4 739a-740b; Q 6, A 2 741c-742a; QQ 9-12 763b-779d; PART III SUPPL, Q 92 1025b-1037c
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, V [1-12] 112a-b; VII [64-84] 115d-116a; XIII [31-111] 125d-126c; XIV [1-66] 126d-127c; XV [37-84] 128d-129b; XXI [82-102] 139a-b; XXXIII [139]-XXXIII [145] 156a-157d 5. The weakness and limits of the human mind
• 5a. The fallibility of the human mind: the causes of error
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a / Republic, BK VII, 388a-389d / Theaetetus, 536c-544a / Sophist, 557b-558d esp 558b
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 21 87d-89b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 16-18 109b-111c / Sophistical Refutations, CH 1 [165a13-18] 227c / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1009a15-1010a14] 528c-529d; CH 6 [1011a3-13] 530d; CH 7 [1012a18-22] 532a; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b18-1052a4] 577d-578a,c; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b12-24] 590d-591a / Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a6-18] 648d-649a; BK III, CH 3 [427b6-15] 659d-660a; [428a5-429a2] 660b-661a; CH 6 [430a26-b5] 662d-663a; [430b26-30] 663b-c; CH 10 [433a21-28] 665d-666a / Dreams, CH 2 [460b3-b27] 704b-d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 24 [1408a20-25] 659b
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [353-521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XI, CH 2, 323c; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 9 627a; CH 12 627c-d; BK III, CH 28 668a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17, A 1, ANS and REP 2 100d-101d; A 3 102d-103c; Q 84, A 8 450b-451b; Q 85, A 1, REP 1 451c-453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478b; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 53, A 1, ANS 19d-21a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XIII [88-142] 126b-d
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a; 58d-60a
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 14c-15a; 271a-276a esp 273b-274a; 287b-292d; 497c-d; 500b-d; 517d-518b
  • 26 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT V, SC II [106-114] 136a
  • 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On Animal Generation, 333b-c
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 11a-15a passim; 27a-c; 38d-39a; 51c-d; 60a-61c esp 61b-c; 90b-d / Novum Organum, BK I 107a-136a,c passim, esp APH 38-68 109c-116a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Rules, II, 3a; VIII, 13a-b; XII, 22c-23b / Meditations, I-II 75a-81d esp II, 80a, 80d-81a; III, 83a; IV 89a-93a; VI, 100a-103d / Objections and Replies, 141a; 142c; 215b-216c; 229d-230d
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17, SCHOL 381b-d; PROP 24-31 383c-385c; PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 41 388a-c; PROP 44, COROL 1, SCHOL 389c-390a; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a; PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [179-197] 236a-b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 82-88 186b-189b; 365-366 236a; 394-395 240b / Geometrical Demonstration, 440b-441b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 3 144c-d; CH XXI, SECT 60-70 194a-197b passim; CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXIII 248b-251d esp SECT 18 251a-c; BK III, CH IX, SECT 21 290c-291a; CH X, SECT 16 295d; CH XI, SECT 4 300c; BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 9-13 377d-378c; CH XX 388d-394c
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1-4 405a-d
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6, 453c; SECT V, DIV 45 469c; SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c
  • 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 194a; 234b-236b
  • 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1d
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-b; 108a-d; 109b-c; 129c-173a esp 133c-d; 193a-b; 200c-209d; 229b-c; 233d-234b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b; 283d-284d
  • 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1, 29d; NUMBER 37, 118c
  • 43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim; 293d
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 122b-125b; 241a-b; 361a-b; 460a-469a esp 462b-464a, 468b-469a; 508a-520a esp 508a; 610b-625a passim, esp 618b-621a, 625a
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 148d-149a; 210c-d; 337a-c; 379b-d / General Introduction, 453b-476a,c passim; 602b-c / War and Death, 760d-761a / New Introductory Lectures, 819b-c
• 5b. The natural limits of the mind: the unknowable; objects which transcend its powers; reason’s critical determination of its own limits or boundaries
  • OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33:12-23 / Job, 9:21; 11:7-9; 26:14; 28:12-21; 36:26; 37:14-23; 38:1-42:6 / Psalms, 139:1-6—(D) 138:1-6 / Proverbs, 20:24; 25:3; 27:1 / Ecclesiastes, 3:11; 6:11-12; 8:7,16-17; 9:11-12; 11:2-6—(D) 3:11; 6:11-7:1; 8:7,16-17; 9:11-12; 11:2-6 / Isaiah, 55:8-9
  • APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:9-18—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 9:9-19 / Ecclesiasticus, 1:1-3; 18:4-7; 24:27-29—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1:1-2; 18:4-6; 24:37-39
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Mark, 13:31-37 / John, 1:18 / Acts, 1:6-7 / Romans, 11:33-34 / I Corinthians, 2:16 / I Timothy, 6:14-16 / James, 4:13-15
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-95] 2a-b
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1419-1421] 155c
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Helen [1137-1150] 309a
  • 7 PLATO: Parmenides, 489d-491a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 4 [196b5-7] 272c; [196b5-7] 273a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b28-983a11] 501a-b; BK II, CH 1 [993a30-b11] 511b,d; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b20-645a4] 168c-d / Ethics, BK X, CH 7 [1177b29-1178a2] 432c
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 1 1a-b; BK VI, par 6-8 36c-37c / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c; BK X, CH 31 319b-d; BK XII, CH 7 346c-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1 3b-4a; Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 12, A 4 53b-54c; A 11-12 59d-61c; Q 29, A 1, REP 1 162a-163b; Q 32, A 1 175d-178a; Q 46 250a-255d; Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a-418c; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; A 7-8 449b-451b; Q 85, A 8 460b-461b; Q 86 461b-464d; Q 88 468d-473a; Q 94, A 1-2 501d-504a; Q 117, A 2, ANS and REP 1 597c-598c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 68, A 2 89c-90c; Q 91, A 4 210c-211c; Q 93, A 2 216c-217b; Q 109, A 1 338b-339c; Q 112, A 5 359c-360c; PART II-II, Q 2, A 3 392d-393c; Q 8, A 1 417a-d; Q 9, A 1 423c-424b
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96] 10b-c; PURGATORY, III [22-45] 56a-b; X [121-129] 68c-d; PARADISE, II [46-148] 108b-109b passim; IV [28-48] 111a; XIX [40-90] 135c-136a; XXI [82-102] 139a-b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a; 52c; 54a-c; 78d-79a; PART II, 163a
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 209a-c; 212a-215a; 238c-239c; 267c-268a; 271b-273b; 291b-294b; 497b-502c passim, esp 501d-502c
  • 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 273c-d / On Animal Generation, 389b; 492c
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 17b-c; 41b-d; 54b-c; 96d-97b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 1-2 107a-b; APH 9-10 107d; APH 21 108b-c; APH 37 109b-c; APH 48 110d-111a; BK II, APH 15 149a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 43c / Meditations, I 75a-77c passim; III, 86d-87a; IV 89a-93a; VI 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, 112a-c; 123d-126b; 168d-169a; 215d-216c; 259a-b
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, AXIOM 5 373d; PROP 24-31 383c-385c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [544-576] 187a-b; BK VI [296-301] 202b; BK VII [109-130] 219b-220a; BK VIII [114-130] 234b-235a / Samson Agonistes [293-314] 346a-b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72 181a-184b; 184-241 205a-217b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO 93a-95d; BK II, CH I, SECT 5 122a-b; SECT 24 127b-c; CH III, SECT 3 128b-c; CH VII, SECT 10 133a-b; CH X, SECT 9 143a-c; CH XIV, SECT 26 160c-d; CH XV, SECT 11 165a-b; CH XXII, SECT 9 202c-203a; CH XXIII, SECT 12-13 207a-208b passim; SECT 36 213c-d; BK III, CH II, SECT 2 254d-255a; CH VI, SECT 9 270d-271a; CH XI, SECT 23 305a-b; BK IV, CH III 313a-323d; CH VI, SECT 4-16 331d-336d passim; CH X, SECT 19 354a-c; CH XII, SECT 9-13 360d-362d passim; CH XIV, SECT 1-2 364b-c; CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a; CH XVIII, SECT 7 383b
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1-3 405a-c; SECT 81 428c-d; SECT 101 432c-d
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 2 451b-c; DIV 6-10 453b-455b passim; SECT II, DIV 13-16 455d-457a; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; DIV 29 461a-d; SECT V, DIV 36, 464d-465a; SECT VII, DIV 57, 475b-c; DIV 60 477a-c; SECT VIII, DIV 62, 478c; DIV 71-72 482c-483c; DIV 81 487a; SECT XI, DIV 110 501a-b; SECT XII 503c-509d passim, esp DIV 130 508c-d
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308c-d
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason 1a-250a,c esp 1a-13d, 15c-16c, 19a, 20a, 25b-26b, 27b-28b, 29d-33d, 53b-54b, 93c-99a, 101b-107b, 129c-130a, 133a-134d, 146a-149d, 153a-c, 157d, 175b [fn 1], 196b-197c, 200c-209d, 215d-216c, 217d-218a, 219a-227a, 229b-c, 230c-235a, 247a-b, 248d-250a,c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b; 281c-282d; 283d-287d / Practical Reason, 296a-d; 307d-308b; 309b; 310d-314d; 331a-332d; 335c-337c esp 337a-c; 354d-355d / Judgement, 461a-c; 465a-c; 497a-498b; 547b-d; 551a-552c; 564a-c; 570b-572b; 574b-577a; 579a; 581a-b; 584c-d; 599d-600d; 603a-604b
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 126b; 129a
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [354-376] 11a-b; [558-565] 15b; [602-655] 16b-17b; [1064-1067] 26b; [1765-1784] 42b; [1810-1815] 43a; PART II [4917-4922] 122a; [11,433-452] 278a-b
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 244b-245b; 272b-276b esp 276a-b; 366a-b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 50b-c; BK V, 196a-197c; EPILOGUE II, 693d-694d
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 120d-121c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 223b-224a; 262a-269a; 388a; 400a-b; 822b
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 383b-c / Unconscious, 430b-c
• 5c. The elevation of the human mind by divine grace: faith and the supernatural gifts
  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 15; 17:1-19:23; 22:9-18; 26:1-6; 46:1-4 / Exodus, 19; 24 esp 24:12-18; 31:1-11; 33:11-23 / Numbers, 12 / Joshua, 3:7-8; 5:13-6:5—(D) Josue, 3:7-8; 5:13-6:5 / Judges, 6:11-24 / I Kings, 3:5-15; 4:29-34; 9:1-9; 19—(D) III Kings, 3:5-15; 4:29-34; 9:1-9; 19 / I Chronicles, 17—(D) I Paralipomenon, 17 / Isaiah, 6 / Ezekiel, 1; 10 / Daniel, 1; 7-12
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 17:1-9 / Luke, 2:25-35 / John, 1:1-18 / Acts, 2:1-21; 9:1-8; 10:44-47 / I Corinthians, 2:6-16; 14 / II Corinthians, 12:1-9 / Revelation—(D) Apocalypse
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 1 1a-b; BK VI, par 6-8 36c-37c; BK IX, par 23-25 68a-c; BK X, par 65 87d-88a / City of God, BK X, CH 2-3 299d-301a; BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b; BK XX, CH 29, 614b-d / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 37, 674c-d; BK IV, CH 15-16 685c-686c
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1 3b-4a; Q 2, A 2, REP 1 11d-12c; Q 12 50b-62b; Q 32, A 1 175d-178a; Q 79, A 4, ANS and REP 1 417a-418c; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d; Q 105, A 3 540c-541b
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, QQ 68-69 87c-101c; Q 109, A 1 338b-339c; PART II-II, QQ 8-9 416d-426c; Q 45 598c-603c
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, V [34-45] 108a; XIV [34-66] 127b-c; XIX [40-66] 135c-d
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 209a-c; 212a-d; 238c-239c; 267c-268a; 292a-294b esp 294a-b
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17b-c; 19b-c; 39d-40a; 41b-d; 54b-c; 55b-c; 95d-97b
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 125b-126a; 168d-169a
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [552-587] 331a-332a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 202 211a; 430-435 245a-251a; 881 345b
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 190d-191a
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 394a-b; 395a-b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 50b-c; BK V, 196a-198b; BK XI, 525c-d
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 13c-d; BK VII, 189a-191a,c esp 191a,c 6. The reflexivity of mind: the mind’s knowledge of itself and its acts
• 7 PLATO: Charmides, 8b-9d
• 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 [1074b35-1075a4] 605c / Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429b5-9] 661d; [429b25-430a9] 662b-c; CH 6 [430b21-26] 663b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [452a23-28] 694d-695a
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK IX, CH 9 [1170a28-b1] 424a
• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 1, 105a-b; CH 17 122d-124a; CH 20, 126c-d
• 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK XI, SECT 1 302a-b
• 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR IX, CH 3, 137c-d / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 1-6 215d-219b
• 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XI, CH 26 336d-337b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 2, REP 1-3 76d-77d; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 28, A 4, REP 2 160c-161d; Q 56, A 1, ANS 292a-d; Q 85, A 2, ANS and REP 1 453d-455b; Q 86, A 1, REP 3 461c-462a; Q 87 464d-468d; Q 88, A 2, REP 3 471c-472c; Q 89, A 2, ANS 475a-d; PART I-II, Q 17, A 6 690b-d
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [49-60] 80b-c
• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a / Meditations, II 77d-81d esp 77d-79a; VI, 96d-97a / Objections and Replies, 162b; 207b; 209d-210b; 276b-c
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 21, SCHOL 383a; PROP 23 383b-c; PROP 27-29 384b-385a
• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO 93a-95d; BK II, CH I, SECT 1-8 121a-123a; SECT 10 123b-d; SECT 24 127b-c; CH VI 131b-c; CH IX, SECT 1-2 138b-c; CH XI, SECT 14, 146d; CH XIV, SECT 4 155d-156a; CH XIX 175b-176b; CH XXI, SECT 30 185a-c; CH XXIII, SECT 1 204a-b; SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 32 212c-d
• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 7-9 453c-455a passim
• 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349b-c
• 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150c
• 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15d-16c; 31a-32c; 49c-51d; 55a-56c; 99a-101b; 120c-129c esp 121a-123b, 126a-128b; 200c-204c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 271a-c; 281c-282d / Practical Reason, 292a-c; 307d-310c; 337a-b / Judgement, 600c-d
• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 138 48c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-161a; 165a-b; PART I, 257d-258a; PART I, 259a-b; PART III, 306a-b
• 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 341c
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 121a-b; 122b-126a; 177a-178a; 191a-b; 196a-197a; 222b-224a; 685a-686a
• 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 180b-181b; 383b-c / Narcissism, 408c-409a / Unconscious, 429c-430c 7. The nature and phases of consciousness: the realm of the unconscious
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 43a-44a; 90b-93a esp 92b; 98a-115a esp 107b-114b; 146a-167a esp 154a-155b, 157b-161a, 165a-167a
• 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 197d-198a; 367b-c; 382a-385c esp 384a-385c / Unconscious 428a-443d esp 428b-429b, 430d-431d, 436b-437a, 438c-d, 439d, 442b-443a / General Introduction, 452a-c; 531d-532c esp 532b; 566c-567b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b-647c / Ego and Id, 697b-702c esp 697b-698d, 700a-701d / War and Death, 760a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 769a-770c / New Introductory Lectures, 834d-838c esp 836b-837d
• 7a. The nature of self-consciousness
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a / Meditations, II, 77d-79a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVII, SECT 9-26 222a-227d passim; BK IV, CH IX, SECT 2-3 349a-c
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 121a-123b / Practical Reason, 292d [fn 1]
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 137-140, 48a-50a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-161a; 165a-b
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 297a-c
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 688a-689b
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 147a-149a; 188a-197a esp 191a-197a; 204b-259b esp 205a-206a, 213a-240a; 471b-472b; 685a-686a
  • 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 767d-768d
• 7b. The degrees or states of consciousness: waking, dreaming, sleeping
  • 7 PLATO: Republic, BK V, 370d-371b; BK IX, 416a-c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b13-248a6] 330c-d / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a / Soul, BK II, CH 1 [412b22-28] 642b / Sleep, CH 1 [454a1-6] 696b-c; [454b23-27] 697b; CH 2 [455a3-13] 698a-b; [456a26-29] 699a; CH 3 [456b9-17] 699c / Dreams, CH 1 702a-703a; CH 3 [460b28-461a8] 704d-705a; [461a31-b11] 705c; [462a15-31] 706b-d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [749-776] 54a-b; [907-1036] 56a-57c
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 8, CONTRARY and REP 2 450b-451b; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50d-51d
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 176c-180b; 290b-c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51c; 53c-54b / Meditations, I, 75d-76b; VI, 103b-d / Objections and Replies, 162b
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49, SCHOL, 393b-c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [28-128] 176a-178a esp [100-109] 177b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH 1, SECT 10-19 123b-126c; CH XIX 175b-176b
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 220c-221a
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 19a-20a; 115b-117a; 149a-150a; 313a-b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 147c-148c; BK XI, 481a-482b; 524c-527a; BK XIII, 583d; BK XIV, 601c-602d
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 337a-346a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 98a-103b; 107a-114b esp 108b-109b; 130a-139a esp 130a-132a, 137a-139a; 154a-b; 261a-262a; 643b [fn 1]; 836a-850a passim, esp 839b-840b
  • 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 137a-176d passim, esp 149c-153c, 157a-164d, 169b-174d; 229d-230a; 234b-235c; 314c-320c esp 315b, 319c-320b; 332a-340a esp 336d-340a; 352d-357c esp 353d-354a, 357a; 358d-359d; 366d-370a esp 367c-d; 373a-377b / Narcissism, 408d-409a / General Introduction, 477d-483d esp 478b-d; 485a-486a; 518c-519c esp 519b; 535a-c; 537a-539b esp 538d-539a; 617b-c / Ego and Id, 703b / New Introductory Lectures, 811d-812c
• 7c. The conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious activities of mind
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 8b-9a; 74b-78b; 107a-114b; 295b-298a; 774a; 849a-b
  • 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 5b-c / Hysteria, 110b-c / Interpretation of Dreams, 348a-c; 352d-353b; 367b-d; 369a-370d; 377c-385c passim, esp 382a-383c, 384a-385c / Repression, 422a-425b / Unconscious, 430d-443d esp 433b-c, 436b-437c, 438b-439b / General Introduction, 452a-c; 453b-476a,c passim, esp 455b, 473b-475a; 484a-491b esp 485a-486a, 489d; 499b-504d esp 502d-504d; 512b-c; 531d-532c; 537a-539b esp 537b-c, 538d-539b; 558d-568a esp 558d-561b, 566a-567d; 586b-d / Ego and Id, 697d-701d; 703a-c / New Introductory Lectures, 835a-839b esp 835c-836d 8. The pathology of mind: the loss or abeyance of reason
• 5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe [1021-1064] 80a-c
• 5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [282-345] 145d-146b
• 5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [847-1297] 347b-351a / Heracles Mad [815-1145] 371d-374d / Orestes [1-423] 394a-398b
• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 5 399a-d passim
• 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VII [323-405] 245a-247b
• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP 1 590d-591c; PART I-II, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 24, A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP 1 742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d; Q 48, A 3-4 824c-826a,c
• 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 74, A 5, REP 1 131d-132b
• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXX [1-33] 44c-d
• 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT IV, SC V 59c-62a; ACT V, SC II [236-255] 70b-c / King Lear, ACT II, SC IV [274-289] 261c-d; ACT III, SC IV 264a-266b; ACT IV, SC IV [1-20] 272b-c; SC VI [80-294] 274b-276c; SC VII [14-82] 276d-277c / Macbeth, ACT V, SC I 306b-307a; SC III [37-46] 308a
• 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, I, 75d
• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 44, SCHOL 437d-438a
• 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 148b-150a; 306a-307a
• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 513d-515a; 524c-527a
• 53 JAMES: Psychology, 241b-258b; 818b-819a
• 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86a-d; 90a-b / Interpretation of Dreams, 174d-176d; 364c-d / War and Death, 760b / New Introductory Lectures, 830d-831a
• 8a. The distinction between sanity and madness: the criterion of lucidity or insight
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 96b-98a
  • 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159a-b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 67b; 67d; 68b-c; 69a
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 166a-167a; 235b-c
  • 26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night’s Dream, ACT V, SC I [1-27] 370d-371a
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC II [171-221] 42b-d; ACT III, SC IV [137-144] 56a; ACT IV, SC V [1-75] 59c-60b; [154-200] 61b-d / King Lear, ACT IV, SC VII [14-82] 276d-277c
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 13 146b-c; CH XXXIII, SECT 3-4 248c-d
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 11, 455b-c
  • 43 MILL: Liberty, 299d-300b [fn 1]
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13c-14a; 111d; 354c-355a
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick esp 122b-123b, 135a-138a
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 525c
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 337a-348d passim; BK XII, 356d-359c; 364d-365d
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 137a; 241b-244a esp 244a; 749a-750b esp 750b; 799a-806b esp 799a-800a, 806a-b
  • 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86c / Interpretation of Dreams, 364c-d / Narcissism, 399b-d / Unconscious, 433b-c; 440a-442b / New Introductory Lectures, 812a-b
• 8b. The causes of mental pathology: organic and functional factors
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 86b; BK VI, 199c-d; 201b-c
  • 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [9b34-10a10] 15a / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b13-248a6] 330c-d / Soul, BK III, CH 3 [429a4-8] 661b / Dreams, CH 2 [460b32-a16] 704b-c
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 7 [653a1-7] 178d-179a
  • 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease 154a-160d esp 155d-156a, 159a-b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP 1 590d-591c; PART I-II, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP 1 742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d; Q 48, A 3-4 824c-826a,c
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 68b-71b
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT II, SC IV [106-113] 259c
  • 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-50b
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 155d-156a
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 598a-b
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 127a-b; 355a; 356b-c
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 135a-136b
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 299c; 318b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XV, 616a-617a
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 4c-d; BK II, 21d-22b; BK III, 62d-63b; BK XI, 337a-348d passim; BK XII, 376a-d
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 3a; 25b-26b; 32a-37b passim; 40b-41a; 258a-b; 533a-538b
  • 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 81c-87a; 97b-106c / Interpretation of Dreams, 176a-d; 380d-382a esp 381d-382a / General Introduction, 451d-452a; 547b-549d; 616d-623b passim; 627a-b / Group Psychology, 690c-691c / Ego and Id, 716d-717a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 774c-d / New Introductory Lectures, 812a; 866c-867a; 872b-d
• 8c. The abnormality peculiar to mind: systematic delusion
  • 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote esp PART I, 1a-3b, 50b-52d, PART II, 205a-209d
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 13 146b-c
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13c-14a
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 232b-236a
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK X, 391d-394d; BK XI, 510b-d; 515a-517a; 525c
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 337a-346a passim
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 242a-244b; 527b-528b [fn 3]; 818b-819a
  • 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86a-d; 102a-106c / Narcissism, 408a-d / General Introduction, 547b-550c; 620c-622a esp 620c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 774c-d 9. Mind in the moral and political order
• 9a. The distinction between the speculative and practical intellect or reason: the spheres of knowledge, belief, and action
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 [993b20-23] 512a / Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a22-30] 636d-637a; BK III, CH 7 663c-664b; CH 9 [432b26-433a6] 665c
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701a6-39] 236b-d / Ethics, BK VI 387a-394d passim, esp CH 1 [1139a3]-CH 2 [1139b13] 387b-388b, CH 5 389a-c, CH 7 390a-d, CH 8 [1142a11-19] 391b / Politics, BK VII, CH 14 [1333a16-29] 538a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 79, A 11-12 424d-426b; Q 86, A 1, REP 2 461c-462a; PART I-II, Q 3, A 5 626b-627a; Q 9, A 1, REP 2 657d-658d; Q 38, A 4, REP 2-3 788d-789b
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART II-II, Q 8, A 3 418c-419a; Q 9, A 3 425b-d; Q 45, A 3 600c-601a; PART III, Q 13, A 1, REP 3 780a-781b
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16d-17a; 18a-b; 42a-c; 55b-d; 65d-66a; 86b-c / Novum Organum, BK II, APH 4 137d-138b
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 126a-b; 243c-d
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 265-290 221b-225a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 5-6 94b-95a; BK IV, CH XI, SECT 8 356b-d; CH XIV 364b-365a
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 2 405b
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 34, 464b; SECT XII, DIV 126-128 507a-508a
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-191a; 240b-243c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-255d; 260d-261b; 264b-d; 271a-c; 283d-287d / Practical Reason, 291a-297c; 300d [fn 1]; 307d-314d esp 310d-311d; 319c-321b; 329a-337a,c esp 329a-330c; 343a-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 463a-467a, 474b-475d; 523d-524a; 596c-598b; 599d-607c
  • 43 MILL: Representative Government, 346c-347a
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6a-7a; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d; 4 116a-d / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 360d-361a; 362d
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1224-1237] 30b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 15a-b; 47b-c; BK IX, 361d-365c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 655a-661a passim, esp 656b; 729a-730a; 865b
• 9b. The relation of reason to will, desire, and emotion
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [658-660] 120c
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus [373-430] 228b-d
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120a-c; 128a-129d / Phaedo, 224a-226c; 230d-234c / Gorgias, 275b-280d / Republic, BK IV, 346a-355a; BK IX, 425c-427b / Timaeus, 466a-467b
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK V, CH 1 [129a10-16] 179a / Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 5 573a-c; CH 7 [1049a5-12] 574c-d / Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a34-b4] 637a; BK III, CH 10 665d-666d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 236b-237b / Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1102b13-1103a10] 348a-d; BK II, CH 6 [1106b8-1107a6] 352a-c; BK III, CH 12 [1119a35-b19] 366a,c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; BK IX, CH 4 [1166a10-28] 419b-c; CH 8 [1168b28-1169a12] 422b-d / Politics, BK VII, CH 14 [1333a17-29] 538a; CH 15 [1334b8-28] 539b-d
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 4 108d-110a; BK II, CH 18 161a-162b; CH 23 170a-172d
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 15-17 23a-c; BK VIII, par 19-24 58b-60a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 16, A 1, ANS 94b-95c; A 4 97a-c; Q 57, A 4, REP 3 298a-299a; Q 59, A 2 307c-308b; Q 79, A 1, REP 2 414a-d; A 2, REP 2 414d-416a; A 11, REP 1 424d-425b; Q 80, A 2 428a-d; Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; QQ 82-83 431d-440b; Q 93, A 6-8 496b-500c; PART I-II, Q 6, A 2 646a-c; Q 9, A 1 657d-658d; Q 10, A 1, REP 3 662d-663d; Q 11, A 2 667b-d; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 673c-674c; Q 15, A 1, REP 3 681b-d; A 2 682a-c; Q 16, A 1, REP 3 684b-d; A 2 684d-685b; Q 17 686b,d-693d; Q 19, A 3-6 704c-708a; Q 26, A 1, ANS 734a-d; Q 28, A 1, ANS 740b-741a; A 2, ANS and REP 2 741a-742a; Q 30, A 1 749a-d; A 3 750d-751c; Q 31, A 3 754a-d; Q 46, A 4, REP 1,3 815b-d; Q 48, A 3, REP 1,3 824c-825b
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 5, ANS and REP 3 10b-d; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; A 5, REP 1 33c-34b; Q 60, A 1, ANS 49d-50c; Q 72, A 2, REP 1,4 112b-113a; Q 74, A 5-10 131d-137c; Q 77, A 1-3 145a-148b; Q 90, A 1, ANS and REP 1 205b-206b; PART II-II, Q 45, A 2, ANS 599d-600c; PART III, Q 18, A 2 811d-812b
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI [46-57] 46c; PURGATORY, XVIII [19-75] 80a-c
  • 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 82 99a
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 64a-c; PART II, 141a-b; CONCLUSION, 279a-c
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 184b-d; 200d-205b; 232b-238d passim; 273d-276a; 432a-d; 486b-495a
  • 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT I, SC II [13-20] 408b-c
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II [51-68] 114a-b; [163-182] 115b-c; ACT III, SC I [74-81] 121a / Othello, ACT I, SC III [322-337] 212b-c / Sonnets, CXLVI 608d
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c; 55b-d; 66c-67b; 78a-b
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 50b
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 48, SCHOL 391b-c; PART IV, PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; APPENDIX, II 447b; PART V, PREF 451a-452c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [521-594] 243b-245a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 412-413 242a; 423 243b / Geometrical Demonstration, 440b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXII, SECT 69 196d-197a; BK IV, CH XX, SECT 12 392c
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a; 343d-345c / Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c; BK II, 400a-c
  • 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256b; 264d-265a; 271c-d; 279b; 282d-283b; 284d-285a / Practical Reason, 303b-304b; 314a-d; 315b-c; 341c-342a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386d / Judgement, 483d-484b; 586a-587a
  • 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 15, 65b-c
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 24 17d-18a; par 29 19a-b; PART I, par 71 31b-c; ADDITIONS, 4 116a-d / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 350b-c
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [354-807] 11a-21a; [1064-1117] 26b-28a; [3217-3250] 79a-b; PART II [11,404-510] 277b-280a
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK III, 50c-62a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 796a-b; 816a-819a esp 817b
  • 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 110c / Interpretation of Dreams, 353a-b / General Introduction, 590a-593b passim, esp 592d-593a / Ego and Id, 702c-d; 704a-c; 706d-707c; 715a-716c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-722c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773c; 800d-801a / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-839b esp 838a-c; 843d-846a esp 845b
• 9c. Reason as regulating human conduct: reason as the principle of virtue or duty
  • 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 59c-64a / Phaedrus, 120b-c; 128a-129c esp 129b-c / Republic, BK IV, 346a-355a / Laws, BK I, 643c-d; 650b; BK III, 669b-670c; BK IV, 681b-682c; BK XII, 792c-d
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 5 [410b10-16] 640c
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1097b23-1098a18] 343a-c; CH 13 [1102b13-1103a10] 348a-d; BK II, CH 6 [1106b14-1107a9] 351c-352c esp [1106b35-1107a3] 352c; BK III, CH 12 [1119a35-b19] 366a,c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; CH 5 389a-c; BK IX, CH 4 [1166a10-28] 419b-c; CH 8 [1168b28-1169a12] 422b-d; BK X, CH 7 [1177a11-18] 431d; [1177b26-1178a8] 432c; CH 8 [1178a16-24] 432d-433a / Politics, BK VII, CH 13 [1332b39-b10] 537a-b; CH 14 [1333a17-29] 538a; CH 15 [1334b8-28] 539b-d
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 18 161a-162b; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 26, 212d-213a,c; BK IV, CH 5, 228a-229a; CH 8 235b-237d
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK II, SECT 15-17 259a-d, BK III, SECT 3 260b, SECT 6 261a-c, SECT 8-9 261d, SECT 12 262b-c, SECT 16 262d-263a,c, BK IV, SECT 4 264a, SECT 12 264c, BK V, SECT 9 270b-c, SECT 26 272c, BK VI, SECT 16 275b-d, SECT 32 277a-b, SECT 40 277d, BK VII, SECT 14-16 280d, SECT 33 282a, SECT 55 283b-c, BK VIII, SECT 7 286a, SECT 39-41 288c-d, SECT 48 289c, SECT 54 290b, BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d, BK X, SECT 8 297d-298a, SECT 33 300c-301a, BK XI, SECT 1 302a-b, BK XII, SECT 2-3 307b-d
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 50b-c / Solon, 66b-d / Pericles, 121a-122a / Timoleon, 197c-198a / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c esp 646b-647b / Dion, 798b-d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 4, 512a; CH 14 520a-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 21, A 2, REP 1 125c-d; Q 95, A 2 507c-508a; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 3-4 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 24, A 1 727b-d; Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, A 3, ANS 31a-32b; A 4 32b-33c; Q 63, A 1 63a-64a; Q 74, A 5-10 131d-137c; Q 90, A 1, REP 3 205b-206b; PART III, Q 5, A 4 739a-740b; Q 15, A 4 790d-791c; A 6, REP 2 792c-793c
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY 53a-105d esp XVI [90]-XVIII [75] 75d-80c
  • 22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a / Parson’s Tale, par 12, 503b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 91b-92d
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 21d-22a; 117d-118c; 184b-d; 488b-489c
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC I [68-79] 49c-d / Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II [33-50] 113d-114a / Othello, ACT I, SC III [322-337] 212b-c
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26a-27c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 14-17 428a-d; PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 23-24 430c-d; PROP 26-28 431a-c; PROP 59 442b-d; PROP 61 443a-b; PROP 63 443d-444a; APPENDIX, IV 447b-c; PART V, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 1-20 452d-458a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 146 200b; 252-253 219b-220a; 347 233b-234a
  • 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH II-III 25d-29d passim; CH VI, SECT 57-63 36d-38c / Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 46-54 189d-192c; SECT 69 196d-197a
  • 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 159b-160a; 165a-b; 173b
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-d; 236d-237a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals 253a-287d esp 255a, 256d-257d, 260a-261d, 265c-266d, 269c, 272a-b, 274a-277b, 279c-d, 283d-287b / Practical Reason, 297a-314d esp 307d-314d; 321b-329a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 373d; 378d-379a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d; 388b-c; 390b,d-391c; 392b-393a / Judgement, 571c-572a; 586a-587a; 596c-597d; 605d-606b [fn 2]
  • 43 MILL: Liberty, 276b-d
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-171c; 189a-b; PART II, 280b-281b; PART III, 312d-313a; PART IV, 353c-d
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 304a-305a; 310c-312c esp 310d, 311d-312a; 592b-593b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 646b-c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 13b-15a; 202a-b; 807a-808a; 816a-819a esp 817b, 819a
  • 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 625a-d / Ego and Id, 702c-d / New Introductory Lectures, 840a
• 9d. Reason as the principle of free will: rationality as the source of moral and political freedom
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 230d-234c / Republic, BK I, 347d-348d; BK IX, 425c-427b / Theaetetus, 528c-531a / Laws, BK IX, 754a-b
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 1-2 355b,d-358a; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 2 140c-141c; BK III, CH 5 180d-181d; BK IV, CH 1 213a-223d
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 2 257a; SECT 5-10 257b-258a; SECT 16-17 259a-d; BK VI, SECT 32 277a-b; SECT 40-46 277d-278d; BK VII, SECT 68-69 284c-d; BK XII, SECT 2 307b
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR I, CH 10 82b / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 2-3 343c-344b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 59, A 3, ANS and REP 1 308b-309a; Q 83, A 1 436d-438a; A 3 438d-439c; PART I-II, Q 13, A 2, ANS 673c-674c; A 6, ANS 676c-677b; Q 17, A 1 esp REP 2 686d-687c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3 8b-9a; Q 77, A 8, REP 3 151c-152a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [52-84] 77b-d; XVIII [40-75] 80b-c
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC II [61-79] 49c-d
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 65-73 444b-447a; PART V, PROP 42 463b-d
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK IX [335-375] 254b-255b; BK XII [79-90] 321a / *Areopagit