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Chapter 57: METAPHYSICS

INTRODUCTION

IN this chapter, as in MATHEMATICS, we must distinguish controversies about the science we are considering from controversies in it. But here the situation is complicated by many ambiguities. In the tradition of Western thought, the name of science has never been denied to mathematics, no matter how its subject matter has been defined or what conception of science has prevailed. But controversies about metaphysics often begin, in modern times at least, by questioning our right to use the word “science” when we speak of metaphysical inquiry or speculation. The challenge usually implies that metaphysics cannot be regarded as a body of valid knowledge because the peculiar objects it has chosen to investigate are not susceptible to scientific inquiry.

If experimentation were the sine qua non of scientific knowledge, it would follow, of course, that a discipline which could not perform experiments or even less rigorous types of empirical research could not be called a science. But by that standard mathematics would also be ruled out. It does not seem to be the case, however, that mathematics and metaphysics stand or fall together.

Hume, for example, admits the one and excludes the other. If we are persuaded of his principles concerning science, what havoc, he says, must we make when we run over our libraries.

“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”

Nor does Kant make experimentation or empirical research indispensable to valid and certain knowledge. On the contrary, pure, as opposed to empirical, physics is for him like mathematics in having the superior status of a priori knowledge. They are both sciences in the highest sense of the term because they consist of valid synthetic judgments a priori. Kant, therefore, does not exclude metaphysics from the ranks of science because he thinks that “metaphysic, according to its proper aim, consists merely of synthetic propositions a priori.” Not the method of metaphysics, nor the form of its propositions, but the character of its objects seems to be the cause of its frustration, reducing it to what Kant calls an “illusory dialectic” rather than a valid science.

It might be supposed that those who take the opposite view—that metaphysics is a science, even, perhaps, the highest of the sciences—would agree in defining its objects or the scope of its inquiry. This does not seem to be the case, any more than it seems to be true that all those who criticize metaphysics conceive its subject matter in the same way.

Following what he takes to be the traditional conception of metaphysics in the medieval schools, which appears to him to be continued in the writings of Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff, Kant says that “metaphysic has for the proper object of its inquiries only three grand ideas: God, Freedom, and Immortality.” This also seems to be at least part of what Hume has in mind when he refers to “school metaphysics” and associates it with “divinity,” by which he means theology, natural or sacred. Yet we find William James saying that “Hume is at bottom as much of a metaphysician as Thomas Aquinas,” because he is engaged in speculations concerning the relation or lack of relation, the identity or lack of identity, in the discrete elements of immediate experience. Here the question seems to be not about God, freedom, and immortality, but about the existence of enduring substances underlying all perceptible qualities, or about a fixed order of reality behind the sequence of phenomena in experience. According to James, “the whole question of interaction and influence between things is a metaphysical question, and cannot be discussed at all by those who are unwilling to go into matters thoroughly.”

In the Preface to his Principles of Psychology, James declares his plan to limit his own inquiries to what can beknown by the empirical methods of the natural sciences. Psychology like physics must assume certain data. The discussion of these assumptions, he says, “is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book…. The data assumed by psychology, just like those assumed by physics and the other natural sciences, must sometime be overhauled. The effort to overhaul them clearly and thoroughly is metaphysics; but metaphysics can only perform her task well when distinctly conscious of its great extent.” The implication seems to be not that metaphysics is impossible but rather that metaphysics, as James conceives it, does not yet exist in any mature or satisfactory development. “Only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task,” he writes, can hope to be successful. “That will perhaps be centuries hence.”

WE CANNOT FULLY explore the issue concerning the objects of metaphysics without observing that other names are used in the tradition of the great books to designate the discipline which, rightly or wrongly, claims to be the highest human science. The Greeks initiated the conception of a discipline which should be preeminent because it deals with first principles and highest causes. It not only searches for wisdom about the ultimate realities; it also lays the foundations for all other sciences. But the Greeks do not have one name for this discipline, nor is “metaphysics” even among the various names they use.

Aristotle, whose Metaphysics is the first great book to have this word in its title, never uses the word to refer to the science which he is trying to define and establish. In the opening chapters, he speaks of it under the name of wisdom, for “all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of all things.” There are other theoretical sciences, such as physics and mathematics, which investigate causes or deal with principles, but they do not reach to the highest causes or first principles, nor do they take all things in their most universal aspect as the object of their inquiry.

Though “physics also is a kind of Wisdom,” says Aristotle, “it is not the first kind”; and elsewhere he says that “both physics and mathematics must be classed as parts of Wisdom.” Physics deals only with material things in motion; and “the mathematician investigates abstractions”—objects which, except as abstracted, cannot exist apart from matter and motion. “If there is something which is eternal and immovable and separated from matter, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to physics nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both.” It is that science which is the highest part of wisdom.

Aristotle gives two names to the supreme form of human wisdom or the highest of the theoretical sciences. He denominates it both from the position it occupies in relation to all other disciplines and also in terms of the kind of substance which it alone investigates. If there is “no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science (i.e., physics) will be the first science, but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy.” But this highest science also deserves to be called “theology” as well as “first philosophy.” There are, Aristotle says, “three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort,” i.e., the eternal, immutable, immaterial.

THERE IS STILL another name for the highest speculative discipline in the Greek conception of the order of the sciences. “Dialectic” is the name which Plato gives to the search for first principles and for the knowledge of the most intelligible realities. As appears in the chapter on DIALECTIC, Aristotle contrasts the dialectician and the philosopher as respectively concerned with opinion and knowledge, but Plato regards the dialectician as preeminently the philosopher. Not only does dialectic belong to the realm of knowledge rather than opinion, but in the realm of knowledge, mathematics occupies the lower, dialectic the upper part. The mathematical sciences build upon hypotheses which they do not and cannot establish. Dialectic uses hypotheses only “as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and… by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.”

Despite all the relevant differences between Plato and Aristotle concerning being and becoming, reason and sense, the intelligible and the sensible, it seems possible to compare the knowledge which Plato calls “dialectic” with what Aristotle calls “first philosophy” or “theology.”

Both, for example, proceed from first principles and establish the foundations of the inferior sciences. On its downward path, dialectic, according to Plato, brings the light of reason to bear on the understanding of the hypotheses which are the principles of mathematics. Though Aristotle thinks that mathematics rests on axioms or self-evident truths, he also says that “it must be the business of first philosophy to examine the principles of mathematics” because the mathematician only uses them in a special application without investigating their general truth. Furthermore, the question concerning how the objects of mathematics exist is a question for the first philosopher, not the mathematician.

In the Sophist, Plato, to illustrate the difference between the sophist and the dialectician or philosopher, develops an analysis of such terms as being and non-being, true and false, same and other, one and many, rest and motion. These, it seems, are the fundamental concepts in the philosopher’s knowledge of the ultimate reality. But these are also the fundamental concepts in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the medieval period when “metaphysics” generally replaces “dialectic” as the name for the first philosophy, the so-called transcendental terms—such as being, essence, other, one, true, good—are treated as the basic metaphysical concepts; and what is characteristic of them as abstractions helps to characterize the nature of metaphysics as a science.

The word “metaphysics” comes into use as a result of the title supposedly given by the Alexandrian librarians to the work in which Aristotle treats the problems of the first philosophy. The word is short for “the books which come after the books on physics.” Plotinus uses the word and connects it with the Platonic meaning of “dialectic.” In the training of the metaphysician he says, dialectic is the ultimate study.

Dialectic, according to Plotinus, “is the method, or discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things—what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its kind and whether its being is real-being, and how many beings there are, and how many non-beings to be distinguished from beings.” But we must not think of dialectic, Plotinus declares, “as the mere tool of the metaphysician.” It goes beyond metaphysics as vision or contemplative wisdom goes beyond discursive reasoning and demonstration. “It leaves to another science all that coil of premises and conclusions called the art of reasoning.”

THE QUESTION which Plotinus raises—whether there is a higher science or form of knowledge than metaphysics—is naturally considered by the great Christian theologians. In part their answer resembles that of Plotinus; in part it differs. Where Plotinus speaks of dialectic as “the most precious part of philosophy” because it transcends reasoning and argument and reaches the sort of immediate apprehension of reality which cannot be expressed in words, theologians recognize the supremacy of mystical knowledge—a foretaste in this life of what the vision of God will be like in the life to come. But, unlike Plotinus, they do not think such knowledge, here or hereafter, is natural wisdom. Rather it is supernatural knowledge, the divine gift to man of a contemplative wisdom to which his nature cannot attain by its own unaided powers.

The subordination of metaphysical science to knowledge which is both supernatural and non-scientific (i.e., neither discursive nor analytical nor demonstrative) is considered in the chapters on THEOLOGY and WISDOM. Another subordination of metaphysics, considered there also, must be mentioned here as well. That is the subordination of metaphysics to theology. Both metaphysics and theology may be conceived as sciences which are engaged in reasoning and argument and in trying to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But one is merely a human science working with the principles of reason, whereas the other is what Aquinas calls “sacred doctrine,” in order to signify that its principles are articles of religious faith.

In the hierarchy of human sciences, metaphysics remains supreme—the first philosophy. It suffers only by comparison with theology insofar as the latter rests upon divine revelation and, since it enjoys the certainty of faith, escapes the insecurity of reason. Though metaphysics and theology differ in their principles and somewhat in their methods, they do not differ entirely in their subject matter. Both, for example, may treat of God and of the existence of immaterial and imperishable beings. Aquinas, therefore, must face the objection that there is no need for any knowledge in addition to metaphysics because “everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science—even God Himself, in that part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, by Aristotle.” To this he replies by giving two reasons for sacred theology.

It is necessary, he says, “for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.” Furthermore, he continues, there is no reason “why those things which may be learnt from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence the theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is a part of philosophy.”

These two kinds of theology are traditionally distinguished as natural and sacred. When Francis Bacon divides the sciences “into theology and philosophy,” he adds that “in the former we do not include natural theology.” Natural theology is the divine part of philosophy, yet it is clearly distinct from sacred theology or what Bacon calls “inspired divinity.”

This distinction, in whatever language it is made, raises two problems. The first concerns the relation of natural to sacred theology, especially with regard to the scope of natural theology and the precise nature of its independence of sacred doctrine. On this question there seems to be considerable difference between such writers as Augustine and Aquinas, or Bacon and Descartes. As already noted, the various issues involved are reserved for discussion in the chapter on THEOLOGY. The second problem is directly pertinent to metaphysics alone. The question is whether metaphysics and natural theology are identical in subject matter or scope, or whether natural theology is only a part of metaphysics.

Aristotle seems to answer this question when he suggests that “first philosophy” and “theology” are interchangeable designations for the highest branch of speculative knowledge. To the extent that he declares this science to be an inquiry concerning the existence and nature of immaterial and imperishable substances, his definition of the object of metaphysics would seem to justify the title of theology.

Descartes, who also separates metaphysics from physics by reference to the immateriality and materiality of the substances which are their objects, even more explicitly seems to give the whole of metaphysics a theological character. In the Preface to his Meditations on the First Philosophy, he says that he is concerned to treat of “God and the human soul”; for, as he explains to the professors of Sacred Theology of the Sorbonne, “I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than theological argument.”

Though he adds the freedom of the human will to the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, Kant’s definition of the objects of metaphysical speculation similarly makes metaphysics an inquiry into things which lie outside the realm of physics and associates it with the traditional subject matter of theology, at least in the sense that here reason tries to prove propositions which are the main tenets of religious faith. In his Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant remarks that when reason “finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience,” it “falls into confusion and contradictions…. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.”

IF NOTHING IMMATERIAL exists, if there are no beings apart from the changing things of sense-experience, or if, although such things exist, they cannot be known by reason proceeding in the manner of speculative science, does it follow that metaphysics must also be denied existence, at least as a speculative science? The answer seems to be clear. If the declared objects of a science do not exist, or if those objects are unknowable by the methods which that science proposes to follow, then it seems difficult to defend its claims to be a valid science against those who challenge them. The controversy over the validity of metaphysics would thus appear to turn on the truth or falsity of the two “ifs” just mentioned.

But the matter cannot be so resolved if natural theology does not exhaust the whole of metaphysics; that is, if metaphysics considers objects other than the immaterial, and if it inquires into their nature rather than their existence. Aristotle’s definition of the subject matter of the first philosophy seems to contain an alternative conception of metaphysics, one which may be quite consistent with the conception of it as theology, but which, however, gives it problems to solve in the realm of physical things.

“There is a science,” Aristotle writes, “which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to being in virtue of its own nature.” This definition of the first philosophy seems to differentiate it from mathematics and physics as sharply as the other definition in terms of immaterial and imperishable substances. The other sciences, according to Aristotle, do not treat of “being qua being universally.” The properties of anything which is “in so far as it has being, and the contraries in it qua being, it is the business of no other science to investigate; for to physics one would assign the study of things not qua being, but rather qua sharing in movement”; and mathematics is concerned with the attributes of things insofar as they are “quantitative and continuous.” These sciences “mark off some particular kind of being, some genus, and inquire into this, but not being simply, nor qua being…. Similarly, these sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.”

Only the first philosophy “does not inquire about particular subjects in so far as each has some attribute or other, but speculates about being, in so far as each particular thing is.” Its subject matter, then, includes all existing things as existing, and involves not only the question how anything which exists exists (i.e., the properties of being), but also the question whether certain things, whose existence can be questioned, do in fact exist. Whatever truths hold good for all things qua being—such as the principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be in the same respect at the same time—belong to the first philosophy, even though, as in this case Aristotle points out, the law of contradiction may also belong to logic as the principle of demonstration.

THIS BROADER CONCEPTION of the first philosophy explains, as its restriction to natural theology could not explain, why the central books in Aristotle’s Metaphysics treat of sensible, physical substances; their nature as substances; the distinction between substance and accident, form and matter, potentiality and actuality, as principles of the composite nature of changing substances; and the properties of such existences in virtue of their having being, e.g., their unity and divisibility, their sameness and otherness.

Aristotle does not inquire whether such substances exist. He seems to take their existence as unquestionable, for he frequently refers to physical things as “the readily recognized substances.” But in addition to the question “how sensible substances exist,” there are such questions as “whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances,… and whether there is a substance capable of separate existence, apart from sensible substances, and if so why and how.” These latter questions lead to the concluding books of the Metaphysics which inquire into the existence of the non-sensible, the immaterial, the immutable. If Aristotle’s theology begins here, then theology is only a part—the crowning part, perhaps—of a larger science whose object is not a special realm of being, but all of being.

Hobbes and Bacon go further than Aristotle in the direction of opposing the identification of metaphysics with theology. Where Aristotle seems to admit theological subject matter as a part of the first philosophy, they exclude it entirely.

Hobbes does not use the word “metaphysics” in his own classification of the sciences; he employs it only as a term of derogation to refer to scholastic doctrines which he repudiates. His own classification makes philosophia prima that branch of natural philosophy which is prior to the mathematical and mechanical sciences. The latter deal with determinate quantity and motion. The antecedent science deals with “quantity and motion indeterminate.” These “being the principles or first foundation of philosophy,” the science which deals with them “is called Philosophia Prima.”

Bacon distinguishes between first philosophy and metaphysics and between metaphysics and natural theology. First philosophy, he says, is “the common parent of sciences.” It is concerned with “axioms, not peculiar to any science, but common to a number of them” and also with “the adventitious or transcendental condition of things, such as little, much, like, different, possible, impossible, entity, nonentity, etc.” Natural theology, which is the divine part of philosophy because it inquires about “God, unity, goodness, angels, and spirits,” is separate from the rest of natural philosophy.

“But to assign the proper office of metaphysics, as contra-distinguished from primary philosophy and natural theology,” Bacon writes, “we must note that as physics regards the things which are wholly immersed in matter and movable, so metaphysics regards what is more abstracted and fixed; that physics supposes only existence, motion, and natural necessity, whilst metaphysics supposes also mind and idea…. As we have divided natural philosophy into the investigation of causes and the production of effects, and referred the investigation of causes to theory, which we again divide into physical and metaphysical, it is necessary that the real difference of these two be drawn from the nature of the causes they inquire into.” Physics, according to Bacon, inquires into efficient and material causes; metaphysics, into formal and final causes; and as mechanics is the practical application of physical theory, so what Bacon calls “magic” is the practical doctrine that corresponds to the metaphysical theory of forms.

AGREEMENT OR disagreement concerning the subject matter and problems of that which claims to be the highest human science, however named, does not seem to be uniformly accompanied by agreement or disagreement concerning the status and development of the discipline in question.

There seems to be some similarity, for example, between Plato’s dialectic as an inquiry into forms and Bacon’s notion of metaphysics as concerned with formal causes—a similarity which Bacon himself observes. But where Plato seems to think that dialectic exists, to be taught and learned, Bacon’s judgment is that this part of metaphysics, if not the part dealing with final causes, has not yet been developed because the right method has not been employed.

Again, Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics as concerned with the primary axioms, the universal principles applicable to all existence, and the transcendental properties of being, seems to bear some resemblance to Bacon’s primary philosophy. But Bacon writes as if Aristotle’s Metaphysics had not been written, or at least as if it had not succeeded, as Aristotle might have supposed it had, in establishing the science which Bacon finds for the most part in a defective or undeveloped condition.

If we turn to natural theology, either as a part of metaphysics (with Aristotle), or as separate from metaphysics (with Bacon), or as identical with metaphysics (with Descartes), we find the same situation. Aside from some verbal and some real differences concerning the objects of the inquiry, Aristotle, Bacon, and Descartes think that the existence of beings apart from the sensible world of matter and change can be demonstrated and that something can be known of their nature—whether they are called immaterial substances, spirits, and intelligences, or God, angels, and souls.

With some alterations in language and thought, Plato and Plotinus, Augustine and Aquinas, Spinoza and Locke can be added to this company. They are theologians in that sense of “theology” which implies a rational knowledge—without religious faith, and either by intuition or demonstration—of beings which really exist, yet are not sensible or material or mutable or finite. Spinoza, for example, does not use the word “metaphysics,” but he holds that “the human mind possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.” Although Locke’s use of the word “metaphysics” is derogatory, and though the purpose of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is to prevent human inquiries from extending beyond man’s capacities, he attributes greater certainty to our knowledge of God and the soul than to our knowledge of bodies, and finds no greater difficulty in our speculations about spirits than about particles of matter.

“Experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies,” Locke writes, “we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as well as the other…. But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection; and so is it of all our other ideas of substances, even of God himself.”

As we have already seen, Hume and Kant deny metaphysics (so far as it is identified with what is traditionally natural theology) the status of a valid theoretical science. For them it is incapable of taking its place beside physics and mathematics. Hume, in addition, denies validity to metaphysical speculation concerning causes and substances in the natural order. Unlike Hume, who simply removes metaphysical problems from the realm of questions worth thinking about, Kant does not reject the problems but rather offers alternative methods of stating and solving them. He hopes thereby to accomplish a reformation rather than an abolition of metaphysical inquiry.

The existence of God, freedom, and immortality must be affirmed, Kant thinks, in the order of practical, not speculative reason. They are indispensable “conditions of the necessary object of our will… that is to say, conditions of the practical use of pure reason.” Yet, he adds, “we cannot affirm that we know and understand, I will not say the actuality, but even the possibility, of them.”

Furthermore, by redefining metaphysics to mean “any system of knowledge a priori that consists of pure conceptions,” Kant not only gives his fundamental treatises in morals and ethics a metaphysical character, but sees the possibility of a genuine metaphysic emerging from the Critique of Pure Reason. Once “the dogmatism of metaphysic” has been removed, “that is, the presumption that it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysic without a previous criticism of pure reason… it may not be too difficult to leave a bequest to posterity in the shape of a systematical metaphysic, carried out according to the critique of pure reason.”

Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and especially what he calls “the architectonic of pure reason,” is in a sense that metaphysic already begun. In subject matter, if not in its method or conclusions, it resembles the traditional inquiry concerning the universal principles and transcendental properties of being. The objects of natural theology are, of course, excluded as being beyond the power of reason to know in a speculative manner.

Metaphysics as a possible science is for Kant “nothing more than the inventory of all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged…. Such a system of pure speculative reason,” he says in his original preface to the Critique, “I hope to be able to publish under the title of Metaphysic of Nature.” And in the last pages of the Critique, wherein he criticizes all speculative efforts in the sphere of natural theology, Kant reaffirms “the speculative and the practical use of pure reason” to constitute “a Metaphysic of Nature and a Metaphysic of Ethics.” The former, he says, is “what is commonly called Metaphysic in the more limited sense.” Both together “form properly that department of knowledge which may be termed, in the truest sense of the word, philosophy. The path which it pursues is that of science, which, when it has once been discovered, is never lost, and never misleads.”

CONTROVERSIES ABOUT metaphysics can be distinguished from metaphysical controversies—that is, disputes within the field of metaphysical thought. We have confined our attention to the former throughout this chapter. But it may not be possible to judge, much less to resolve, the issues about the scope, methods, and validity of metaphysics without engaging in, or at least facing, issues which are themselves metaphysical.

The only way to escape this would be to suppose that psychology (as an analysis of the powers of the mind) or epistemology (as a theory of the criteria of valid knowledge) could determine in advance of any examination of metaphysical discussion whether the matters to be discussed fall within the range of questions concerning which the human mind has the power to find and validate answers. But if this supposition is untenable in itself, or if it is untenable because psychology and epistemology, when they are treated as the first philosophy, themselves presuppose a metaphysics or conceal their metaphysical presuppositions, then no alternative remains but to judge metaphysics directly by its fruits.

In that case, the issues surveyed in this chapter require an examination of the metaphysical discussions to be found in such chapters as GOD, ANGEL, IDEA, SOUL, IMMORTALITY, WILL (which are relevant particularly to the problems of natural theology); and (as relevant to other parts or problems of metaphysics) such chapters as BEING, CAUSE, FORM, MATTER, ONE AND MANY, RELATION, SAME AND OTHER.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

  1. Conceptions of the highest human science: dialectic, first philosophy, metaphysics, natural theology, transcendental philosophy

  2. The analysis of the highest human science: the character of dialectical, metaphysical, or transcendental knowledge

    • 2a. The distinctive objects or problems of the supreme science
    • 2b. The nature of the concepts, abstractions, or principles of the highest science
    • 2c. The method of metaphysics: the distinction between empirical and transcendental methods
    • 2d. The distinction between a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals: the difference between the speculative treatment and the practical resolution of the metaphysical problems of God, freedom, and immortality

  3. Metaphysics in relation to other disciplines

    • 3a. The relation of metaphysics to theology
    • 3b. The relation of metaphysics to mathematics, physics or natural philosophy, psychology, and the empirical sciences
    • 3c. The relation of metaphysics to logic and dialectic

  4. The criticism and reformation of metaphysics

    • 4a. The dismissal or satirization of metaphysics as dogmatism or sophistry
    • 4b. Reconstructions of metaphysics: critical philosophy as a propaedeutic to metaphysics

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as Part, Bk, Ch, Sect) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. Conceptions of the highest human science: dialectic, first philosophy, metaphysics, natural theology, transcendental philosophy

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-13d / Symposium, 167a-d / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 476a-b / Parmenides, 486a-511d esp 491a-d / Sophist, 561d-574c esp 571a-c / Statesman, 585c / Philebus, 611d-612b; 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a33-b2] 268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [194b9-15] 271a; CH 7 [198a22-31] 275b-c / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 1 [298b13-24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1-2 499a-501c; BK II, CH 1 511b,d-512b; BK III, CH 1 [995a23-b27] 513b,d-514b; CH 2 [996b18-997a34] 514d-516a; BK IV, CH 1-3 522a-525a; BK VI, CH 1 547b,d-548c; BK XI, CH 1-4 587a-590a; CH 7 592b-593a / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403b10-17] 632d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 7 390a-d 11 NICOMACHUS: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-813a 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, PREF, 5a-b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III 10a-12b 18 AUGUSTINE: The City of God, BK VIII, CH 1-12 264b,d-273a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1 3b-4a; A 8, ANS 7c-8d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 2 36a-37b; PART II-II, Q 45, A 1, ANS 598d-599d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 72a-d; PART IV, 269b-272b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 15d; 40a-48d esp 40a-41b, 43a-c, 44c-45a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 9 140b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART IV 51b-54b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a; PART V, PROP 25-42 458d-463d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I 451a-455b passim 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 19a; 115d-117d; 120b [fn 1]; 172d-174a; 243c-250a,c esp 246a-248d / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253b-d; 264b-d esp 264d / Prefaces to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-388d esp 388a-c; 390b,d-391a / Critique of Judgement, 551a-552c; 603d-607c esp 606d-607c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 197b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 95a 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 874a

2. The analysis of the highest human science: the character of dialectical, metaphysical, or transcendental knowledge

2a. The distinctive objects or problems of the supreme science

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-13d / Republic, BK V, 368c-373c; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c esp BK VII, 396d-398c / Timaeus, 476a-b / Sophist, 564d-574c / Philebus, 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a33-b2] 268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [194b9-15] 271a; CH 7 [198a22-31] 275b-c / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 1 [298b13-24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK I-IV 499a-532d; BK VI, CH 1-BK VII, CH 1 547b,d-551a; BK XI, CH 1-8 587a-593d; BK XII, CH 1 598a-c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403b10-17] 632d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 7 390a-d 11 NICOMACHUS: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-813a 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, PREF, 5a-b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III, CH 4-6 11a-12b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 2, ANS 24b-25a; Q 11, A 2, REP 4 47d-48d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-272b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 42c-46a; 60b-c / Novum Organum, BK II, APH 9 140b-c 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, 69a-71a,c; I-II 75a-81d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART V, PROP 25-33 458d-460c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 132 509a-d 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 6c-d; 19a; 120b [fn 1]; 249a-b / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 351b-352c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c / Critique of Judgement, 603d-607c esp 606d-607c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 694c-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 89b-90a; 118b; 141a; 258b-259b esp 259b; 291a

2b. The nature of the concepts, abstractions, or principles of the highest science

7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Sophist, 564d-574c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK IV, CH 6 [127a26-40] 176d-177a / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1003a33-b19] 522b-c; BK V, CH 7 537c-538b; BK IX, CH 6 [1048a31-b8] 573c-574a; BK XI, CH 3 589a-d; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403b10-17] 632d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 8, ANS 7c-8d; Q 11, A 1 46d-47d; Q 13, A 5 66b-67d; Q 16, AA 3-4 96b-97c; Q 48, A 2, REP 2 260c-261b; Q 85, A 1, REP 2 451c-453c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 2 36a-37b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-272b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43a-46a esp 44c-45a; 60b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART IV 51b-54b passim / Objections and Replies, 128d-129a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 41 388a-c; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART V, PROP 25-26 458d-459a; PROP 28 459b 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 6 405d-406a; SECT 17 409d-410a 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 342b 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 6c-d; 215d-216d; 245c-249c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253b-c; 264d; 270c-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 330d-331a; 351b-352c / Prefaces to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c / Critique of Judgement, 467d-468b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 884b-886a

2c. The method of metaphysics: the distinction between empirical and transcendental methods

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134a-c; 139d-140b / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c esp BK VII, 396d-398c / Parmenides, 486a-511d esp 491a-d / Sophist, 551a-579d esp 552b-c, 553d-554a, 561b, 570c-571d / Statesman, 580a-608d esp 580d, 582d-583c, 586c-589c, 591a-d, 594d-596a / Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK II, CH 3 513c-d; BK IV, CH 2 [1004b25-31] 523b-c; CH 4 [1005b35-1006a28] 525a-c; CH 7 [1012a18-24] 532a-b; CH 8 [1012b5-8] 532c; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-18] 547b,d; BK IX, CH 6 [1048a25-b9] 573c-574a; BK XI, CH 5 [1061b34-1062a19] 590a-c; CH 7 [1063b36-1064a9] 592b / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402a10-22] 631b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 8, ANS 7c-8d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 44c-45a 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, IV 5a-7d / Discourse on the Method, PART II, 46c-47b; PART IV 51b-54b passim / Meditations on First Philosophy, 69a-71a,c passim; I-II 75a-81d / Objections and Replies, 119c; 126a-b; 128a-129c; POSTULATE I-II 130d-131a; POSTULATE VII 131c; 167a-c; 206c-207b; 237b-238b; 239a-240a; 242c-244c; 245b-246a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PROP 44, COROL 2 and DEMONST 390a; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART V, PROP 25-26 458d-459a; PROP 28 459b; PROP 29, SCHOL 459c-d; PROP 31 459d-460b 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 132 509a-d 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 19a; 121a-d; 249c-250a,c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 263d-264d esp 264d; 277d-279d / Critique of Practical Reason, 298d-332d; 349b-351a / Prefaces to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 95a

2d. The distinction between a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals: the difference between the speculative treatment and the practical resolution of the metaphysical problems of God, freedom, and immortality

42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 5a-d; 15c-16c; 33a-d; 120b [fn 1]; 124d-128a; 143a-145c; 152a-153c; 164a-171a esp 169c-170a, 170c-171a; 177b-192d esp 177b-179c; 200c-209d; 218d-223d; 234c-240b esp 239a-c; 241d-242c; 246a-250a,c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 263d-264d; 277d-287d esp 277d-279d, 283d-285a / Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-293c esp 292a-293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 307d-314d; 331a-337a,c; 340a-342d; 344a-349b esp 344a-c, 348b-349b; 351b-352c; 353a-354d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-388d esp 386d-387a,c, 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Critique of Judgement, 568c-570a; 588a-613a,c passim, esp 607c, 609b-610a

3. Metaphysics in relation to other disciplines

3a. The relation of metaphysics to theology

18 AUGUSTINE: The City of God, BK VIII, CH 1-12 264b,d-273a / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 40 655b-656a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1 3a-10c esp A 1 3b-4a, AA 4-6 5a-7a, A 8 7c-8d; Q 2, A 2 esp REP 1 11d-12c; Q 12, AA 12-13 60d-62b; Q 32, A 1 175d-178a; Q 39, AA 7-8 209a-213a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 2, AA 3-4 392d-394b; Q 45 598c-603c passim 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 83b; 84a; PART II, 163a-b; PART III, 165b; PART IV, 247d; 269b-271c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 155a-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c; 15d-16b; 19d-20a; 39d-40c; 41b-d; 44c-45a; 95d-101d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 65 114b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART I, 43c / Meditations on First Philosophy, 69a-71a,c / Objections and Replies, 125b-126b; 283d-284d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 543 266a 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 40 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 307b-310a passim, esp 308b-309a; 670b-c 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 119a-c; 177b-192d esp 190a-c; 238b-240b / Critique of Practical Reason, 346b-347a; 351b-352c / Critique of Judgement, 599d-600a; 600d-601c; 604d-606d esp 606a-d; 607d-609b 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-160b; PART IV, 308c-309d

3b. The relation of metaphysics to mathematics, physics or natural philosophy, psychology, and the empirical sciences

7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI-VII, 386d-398c / Philebus, 634b-635b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a33-b2] 268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [194b9-15] 271a; CH 7 [198a22-31] 275b-c / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 1 [298b13-24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 8 [989b29-990a8] 508a; CH 9 [992a24-b9] 510c-d; BK II, CH 3 [994b31]-BK III, CH 2 [997a34] 513c-516a; BK IV, CH 1-3 522a-525a; BK VI, CH 1 547b,d-548c; BK XI, CH 1 587a-588a; CH 3 [1061a29]-CH 4 [1061b34] 589c-590a; CH 7 592b-593a; BK XIII, CH 1 [1069a30-b2] 598b-c; CH 8 [1073b1-7] 603d / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403b10-17] 632d 11 NICOMACHUS: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 812b-813d 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III 10a-12b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 8, ANS 7c-8d; Q 85, A 1, REP 2 451c-453c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 2 36a-37b; PART II-II, Q 45, A 1, ANS 598d-599d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 72a-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 15d; 42c-44c / Novum Organum, BK II, APH 9 140b-c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 128d-129a 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 15c-16c; 17d-19a; 211c-218d esp 215d-216d; 243c-248d passim, esp 245c-246b / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 254b-c; 264b-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 292d-293b; 295b-d; 307d-310c; 311d-313d; 330d-332d esp 331a-332d; 351b-352c 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d-183c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 197b; EPILOGUE II, 694c-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 90a; 118b; 884b-886a esp 886a

3c. The relation of metaphysics to logic and dialectic

8 ARISTOTLE: On Sophistical Refutations, CH 11 [172a12-22] 237a / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 1 [995b4-10] 513d-514a; CH 2 [996b26-997a14] 515b-d; BK IV, CH 2 [1004b18-27] 523d; CH 3 524b-525a; BK XI, CH 1 [1059a23-26] 587a; CH 3-4 589a-590a esp CH 3 [1061a9-12] 589d; CH 8 [1064b23-29] 593a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 8, ANS 7c-8d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 72a-d; PART IV, 269b-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43d-46a; 57b-58b 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 341b-342b 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 36d-37d / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253b,c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b; 182d-183c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 671a-672a; 852a; 873a-874a; 881b-886a esp 881b-882a, 884b-886a; 890a

4. The criticism and reformation of metaphysics

4a. The dismissal or satirization of metaphysics as dogmatism or sophistry

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49d; 52a-b; 54b-c; 56b-d; 57c-d; 59a-60a; 71a-b; 80b; 84a; PART II, 163a-b; PART III, 183c-d; PART IV, 247d; 267a-272b; 274a-b; 276c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 240a-246a; 257d-264a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 40a-c; 57d-58b; 60a-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 62-65 113b-114c; APH 71 117a-c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 2 291d-292a; SECT 6-14 293a-295a; BK IV, CH VIII, SECT 9 347d-348a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 6 405d-406a; SECT 17 409d-410a; SECT 97 431d-432a; SECT 143 441c-d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6-7 453b-454a passim; SECT VIII, DIV 62, 478c; SECT XII, DIV 132, 509d 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 329b-336a; 421b-422b 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-336c 41 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 526c-527a 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 20b-c; 36a-37d; 109b-c; 120c-121c; 129c-130a; 133d; 157d; 187c-188b; 192a-b; 218d-222b esp 221c-222b; 229b-c / Critique of Practical Reason, 299d; 304d-305a; 335b-c / Critique of Judgement, 600d-601c; 607d-608c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1948-1963] 46a-b; [4343-4367] 107a-b; PART II [7843-7846] 191a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 115b-117a; 255a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 243b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, xiva; 90a; 227b; 235b; 702a-b

4b. Reconstructions of metaphysics: critical philosophy as a propaedeutic to metaphysics

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 269b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART II, 46c-48b: PART IV 51b-54b / Meditations on First Philosophy, 72b,d; I 75a-77c / Objections and Replies, 237b-238b passim; 267a-277a,c passim 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, 405a-412a,c passim, esp SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c; SECT 133 439c-440a 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 7-10 453c-455b; SECT XII, DIV 116, 503d-504a 42 KANT: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 15c-16d; 19a-22a,c; 101d-102b; 133c-134d; 146a-149d; 157d; 196b-197c; 218d-227a; 248d-250a,c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 270c-d; 273d-274a / Critique of Practical Reason, 292d-293b; 296a-d; 307a-d; 331a-332d / Critique of Judgement, 567c-568a

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

  • Statements in other contexts concerning the highest human science, see DIALECTIC 2a, 4; PHILOSOPHY 2b; SCIENCE 1a(2); THEOLOGY 3a; WISDOM 1a.
  • Discussions relevant to the objects, problems, and concepts of metaphysics or the highest human science, see BEING 2, 3, 4-4a, 7a-7b, 7c, 7d, 7e, 8a-8b; CAUSE 5a, 5d; GOD 2b-2c, 6b; GOOD AND EVIL 1a-1b; IDEA 1f; IMMORTALITY 2; KNOWLEDGE 6a(1), 6a(4); LIBERTY 4a; MIND 10f; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 1, 2a-2b; ONE AND MANY 1-1b; RELATION 3; SAME AND OTHER 1, 2c, 2e; SOUL 4b; TRUTH 1b-1c.
  • Considerations relevant to the nature of metaphysical concepts or abstractions, see BEING 1; DEFINITION 6a; IDEA 1d, 2g, 4b(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6d; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d.
  • The method or character of metaphysical thought, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); LOGIC 4d; PHILOSOPHY 3a-3b; REASONING 6a; TRUTH 4c.
  • The relation of metaphysics to theology, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(5); THEOLOGY 2, 3a, 4a; WISDOM 1a, 1c; and for the relation of metaphysics to mathematics and physics, see MATHEMATICS 1a; NATURE 4b; PHILOSOPHY 2b; PHYSICS 1a; SCIENCE 1a(2).
  • The problem of principles common to metaphysics and logic, see PRINCIPLE 1c; and for the statement of the law of contradiction, see OPPOSITION 2a.
  • Criticisms of metaphysics, and for the substitution of psychology or epistemology for metaphysics as the first philosophy, see DIALECTIC 2c, 3c, 6; KNOWLEDGE 5d-5e; MAN 2b(4); PHILOSOPHY 3d, 6b; SOUL 5a; THEOLOGY 5.
  • Considerations relevant to a metaphysic of morals, and for the solution therein of the problems of God, freedom, and immortality, see GOD 2d; IMMORTALITY 3a; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4b; PHILOSOPHY 2a; WILL 5b(4).

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

AQUINAS. On the Trinity of Boethius, QQ 5-6 HUME. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK I, PART IV, SECT III-IV KANT. De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation), SECT V —. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, PART I-III, 40-60; SCHOLIA —. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL I, BK I W. JAMES. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 2-3

II.

MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART I, CH 33-36 BONAVENTURA. Itinerarium Mentis in Deum (The Itinerary of the Mind to God) SUÁREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, esp I MALEBRANCHE. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion LEIBNIZ. Philosophical Works, CH 11 (On the Reform of Metaphysics and on the Notion of Substance) VOLTAIRE. “Metaphysics,” in A Philosophical Dictionary SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL II, SUP, CH 17 COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO LOTZE. Metaphysics, INTRO C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL VI, par 318-394 A. E. TAYLOR. Elements of Metaphysics BERGSON. The Creative Mind, CH 6 SANTAYANA. Dialogues in Limbo, CH 10 HEIDEGGER. Was ist Metaphysik? WHITEHEAD. Process and Reality, PART I, CH 1 (2); PART II, CH 9 (4) T. WHITTAKER. Prolegomena to a New Metaphysic MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, INTRO; CH 4 —. A Preface to Metaphysics, LECT I-III CARNAP. The Unity of Science —. Philosophy and Logical Syntax, I GILSON. The Unity of Philosophical Experience, CH 12 B. RUSSELL. Mysticism and Logic, CH V —. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, CH 25