Chapter 46: LAW

INTRODUCTION

THE notion of law is associated with a diversity of subject matters, and its meaning undergoes many variations as the discussion shifts from one context to another. The most radical difference separates the way in which natural scientists use the term law from the way in which it is used in the arts and in morals or politics.

We ordinarily think of law as a rule—a command or a prohibition—which should be obeyed and can be disobeyed. Both alternatives are usually present. Though the duty or obligation which a law creates is one of obedience, there would be no moral significance to discharging this duty if the law could not be violated. But the laws of nature which the scientist tries to discover do not have this characteristic. They are inviolable. The so-called law of gravitation, for example, or Newton’s three laws of motion, cannot be disobeyed. Scientists may disagree about the truth of any formulation of a natural law, but if the formulation is valid, then the general rule of behavior is supposed to obtain without exception; and if exceptions are found, they are not interpreted as instances of disobedience, but rather as cases to which the law does not apply.

The rules of an art may be violated, either unwittingly or intentionally. For example, grammatical errors can be made by those ignorant of the rules or by those who wish to disregard them. The so-called “law of contradiction” in the art of logic seems to be like the rules of grammar or of any other art. Men certainly contradict themselves in spite of the rule which places the penalty of error on those who make contradictory statements.

But according to another conception of the law of contradiction, which belongs to the science of metaphysics rather than to the art of logic, nothing can both be and not be at the same time in the same respect. This law of being, like the laws of motion, is regarded as inviolable by those who think it true. In this it has the aspect of a scientific or natural law. The law of contradiction, conceived as a rule of logic, may also be natural in the sense of not being man-made. In the opinion of certain philosophers, man does not invent either the metaphysical rule which all existences must observe or the logical rule which the human mind should always obey. He discovers both.

There still remains that other class of rules to which the word “law” is most commonly applied. These are rules of moral action or social conduct which, like rules of art, are essentially violable. “Laws, in their most general signification,” Montesquieu writes, “are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their laws.” But he points out that law operates differently in the realm of physical nature and in the realm of intelligent beings like man. The latter, he says, “does not conform to [its laws] so exactly as the physical world. This is because, on the one hand, particular intelligent beings are of a finite nature, and consequently liable to error; and on the other, their nature requires them to be free agents.” Hence, even the laws “of their own instituting, they frequently infringe.”

The profound division between laws of nature and laws of human conduct thus seems to involve two points: (1) the former may apply to all things, the latter are addressed to man alone; (2) the former, being inviolable, state the necessities of behavior, the latter, precisely because they are violable, imply freedom in those to whom they are addressed.

These two kinds of law have this much in common. Both the laws of nature discovered by the scientist and the rules of conduct instituted by the legislator are general rather than particular. Their generality has been made, in the tradition of jurisprudence, the basis for differentiating rules of law from particular decisions or decrees. On theological grounds, however, the two kinds of law can be said to have a more significant characteristic in common.

Aquinas conceives the laws of nature which the scientist discovers as laws implanted in the very nature of things at their creation by God. The laws which God implants in human nature do not differ in their eternal origin in the divine intellect and will, or in their manifestation of the divine government of the world. They differ only in that it is part of man’s nature to be free and therefore able to disobey even the rules of his own nature. Thus both sorts of law are directions of behavior. Only if the laws which science discovers are not attributed to God, will they seem to be merely descriptive rather than prescriptive.

In this chapter we shall be primarily concerned with law as a direction of human conduct or, as Kant would say, law in the sphere of freedom. But within the one meaning of law which concerns us here, there are still many important distinctions of type. The division of law into divine and human, natural and positive, private and public, moral and political—to name only some of the traditional distinctions—determines the outlines of the diverse philosophies of law which the great books contain, and underlies the great issues concerning the origin, the properties, and the authority of law.

Different writers use different criteria to set up their classification of the kinds of law. It is nevertheless possible to perceive certain parallels in analysis and classification. The opposite of natural law is sometimes called “human law,” “positive law,” or “written law,” sometimes “civil law” or “municipal law.” Sometimes, as with Kant, for whom the analysis of law derives from an analysis of rights, the differentiation between natural and positive right is also expressed in terms of innate and acquired right, public and private right.

Thus, for Kant, “natural right rests upon pure rational principles a priori; positive or statutory right is what proceeds from the will of a legislator. … Innate right is that right which belongs to everyone by nature, independent of all juridical acts of experience. Acquired right is that right which is founded upon such juridical acts.” From natural or innate right develops “the system of those laws which require no external promulgation” and which therefore belong to the sphere of private right. Positive or civil rights are the acquired rights of men living in a state of civil society under “the system of those laws which require public promulgation” and which therefore belong to the sphere of public right. The source of differentiation here seems threefold: whether the right is inherent in human nature or acquired from the state; whether men are viewed as living in a state of nature or as living in a civil society; whether the laws do or do not need to be publicly promulgated.

The distinction between the state of nature and the state of civil society is used by many other writers in differentiating between natural and positive (or civil) law, e.g., by Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau. They also recognize that the law which governs men living in a state of nature is natural in the sense of being instinctive, or a rule of conduct which man’s reason is innately competent to prescribe; whereas the civil law originates with specific acts of legislation by a political power, vested in a sovereign person, in a representative assembly, or in the whole body of the people.

Dividing all laws into two kinds—“laws of nature and laws of the land”—Hegel holds that “the laws of nature are simply what they are and are valid as they are.” In contrast, positive law is “valid in a particular state, and this legal authority is the guiding principle for the knowledge of right in this positive form, i.e., for the science of positive law.” Our manner of knowing their content further distinguishes between these two kinds of law. “To know the law of nature,” Hegel explains, “we must learn to know nature, since its laws are rigid, and it is only our ideas about them that can be false…. Knowledge of the laws of the land is in one way similar, but in another way not. These laws too we learn to know just as they exist… But the difference in the case of laws of the land is that they arouse the spirit of reflection, and their diversity at once draws attention to the fact that they are not absolute.”

This leads us to the heart of the distinction. The law of the land, or civil law, is “something posited; something originated by men.” It is positive law in the sense that it must be posited (i.e., officially instituted) in order to exist. The civil law is not something discovered by examining man’s nature. It is made, and must be externally promulgated so that those who are subject to it can learn its provisions. Anyone who will inquire can learn the natural law for himself; or he can be helped to discover it by a teacher who instructs him in this matter as he would instruct him in geometry, not as a lawyer informs clients concerning the prevailing laws of the state.

Aquinas both subtracts from and adds to this analysis of the difference between natural and positive law. On the one hand, he does not appeal to the condition of man in a state of nature as contrasted with civil society. On the other hand, he finds the chief difference between the natural and the positive law in their originating sources. The one is made by God, the other by man. “The natural law,” Aquinas writes, “is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law.” It is God’s eternal law with respect to man as that is received and exists in human nature. It exists in man as the first principle of his practical reason and includes all the precepts which can be discovered by reasoning therefrom.

Hence, for Aquinas as for Locke, the law of nature is not only the law of reason but the law of nature’s God. But Aquinas distinguishes between the law of nature generally, or the eternal law, and the natural law in man. The latter is a moral law, both in the sense that it is a law governing free acts, and also in the sense that it directs man with regard to good and evil in the sphere of his private life, not merely with regard to the political common good.

Natural and positive law are alike in the very respects in which they differ. Both share in the nature of law which, according to Aquinas, “is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.” Each has a maker, God or man; each proceeds in a certain way from the reason and will of its maker; each must be promulgated, though not in the same manner; and each is concerned with a common good—human happiness or the welfare of the state.

The further additions which Aquinas makes consist of distinctions with respect to divine and human law. With respect to the divine law he distinguishes between God’s eternal ordinances and His positive commandments. The eternal part of the divine law, as we have seen, is that which, at the moment of creation, “God imprints on the whole of nature” to instill in each created species “the principles of its proper actions.” “If man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculties,” Aquinas writes, “there would be no need for man to have any further direction besides the natural law and the human law which is derived from it.” But “man is ordained to the end of eternal happiness”; and since salvation is a supernatural end which exceeds man’s power to achieve without God’s help, “it was necessary that … man should be directed to this end by a law given by God.”

God gave such a body of law to man, not at creation, but at a certain moment in history. He did not implant it in his nature but promulgated it, in the manner appropriate to positive law, through verbal declaration—through His revealed word in the Old and the New Testaments, e.g., the Ten Commandments and the two precepts of charity.

The human law Aquinas divides “into the law of nations [or the ius gentium] and civil law.” The civil law is that which is instituted by a community for its own members. With regard to the ius gentium Aquinas follows the tradition of the Roman jurists. What he has in mind in using this term should, therefore, not be confused with what later writers, such as Grotius, treat as the ius inter gentes or international law. Yet applicable to both the law of nations and international law is the question whether such law belongs more properly to the sphere of natural or to the sphere of positive law.

International law concerns the relations between autonomous states which, as Hegel points out, are “in a state of nature in relation to one another,” since “the sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to others.” Laws cannot be applied to sovereign states with the coercive force of positive law. “It follows,” says Hegel, “that if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war.” His statement that international law “does not go beyond an ought-to-be” separates it from positive law. On similar grounds Aquinas separates the ius gentium from positive law. He recognizes, as will presently appear, that it does not result from legislative enactment. Furthermore, he points out that it is discovered by reason and derives its rules by way of deduction from natural law. The law of nations is, therefore, not positively instituted.

That the law of nations lacks some of the properties of civil law does not make it, for Aquinas, less essentially a body of law; but for Hegel it falls short of the essence of law, which consists in a determinate and universal rule of right posited by a sovereign will. The great legal positivists of the 19th century, such as Austin, go further and deny that anything is truly law except the positive enactments of a government which has the power to enforce its ordinances. The laws of nature are laws only in a metaphorical sense.

The Greeks also appear to regard law as primarily a creation of the state. Aristotle conceives political justice as “part natural, part legal—natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people’s thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent.” This tends to identify the legal aspect of justice with the conventional. The threefold division of law into civil law, law of nations, and natural law is not Greek but Roman in origin.

Yet the Greeks do not hold that all law is of human institution or merely a matter of local convention. The fundamental opposition between the divine law and the man-made law of the state occurs frequently in the Greek tragedies, and with particular force in the Antigone of Sophocles. In burying her brother, Antigone violates the king’s edict, but, in her view, not to have done so would have been to violate the “unwritten statutes of heaven” which, she declares, are “not of today or yesterday, but from all time, and no man knows when they were first put forth. Not through dread of any human pride,” she says, “could I answer to the gods for breaking these.”

Aristotle cites this passage from Sophocles when, in his Rhetoric, he advises the forensic orator (or trial lawyer) “to appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice,” if “the written law tells against our case.” Under such circumstances, he thinks it is wise to “urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws often do change.” Under the opposite circumstances, that is, when “the written law supports our case,” he prescribes an opposite course—to cite the laws of the state and to urge that they be upheld.

Though Aristotle here speaks of “the law of nature,” he seems to have in mind the notion of “a universal law,” or a body of law that is common to all peoples. For the most part, he speaks of natural justice rather than natural law. Whether or not the two notions are equivalent, his principle of natural justice stands in the same relation to political enactments as, for later writers, the natural law stands to the positive law. Plato’s conception of law as “a disposition of reason” which orders things according to their natures, even more explicitly recognizes that law neither depends upon nor derives its authority from the power of the state. The phrase “natural law” may be infrequent in the Greek books, but its meaning is not unrepresented in Greek thought.

Other distinctions in kinds of law—written and unwritten, statutory and customary, constitutional law and the various particular bodies of law, such as the law of contracts, of crimes, or of torts—are for the most part subdivisions of positive law. The one exception, perhaps, is the unwritten law, which, when not identified with customary law, stands for the natural law or the law of reason. With respect to these parts of law, the chief problems concern constitutions and customs. The difference between a constitution as law and all other laws obtaining in a state is considered in the chapter on CONSTITUTION; and the legal force of custom, both in itself and also in relation to legislative enactments, is discussed in the chapter on CUSTOM.

Here our major concern is with positive law as a whole, with its properties and defects, but above all with its relation to natural law. Some of the properties of positive law are agreed upon even by those who sharply disagree concerning its relation to natural law.

It is generally agreed, for example, that a rule of positive law cannot be made by any man, but only by him who exercises the legislative authority and has the power to enforce the rule. Agreement also prevails concerning the mutability of positive law, though not all would go as far as Montaigne in holding that “there is nothing more subject to perpetual agitation than the laws.” Yet it is generally recognized that the content of positive law continually undergoes change with the nullification or amendment of old rules and the addition of new ones, and that positive regulations on any particular matter may vary from state to state.

No less common is the understanding of the indispensability of courts and judges. “Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation,” Hamilton writes. Though rules of law, in distinction from decrees, are formulated to cover an indefinite number of like cases, the cases to which they must be applied by the judicial process are far from uniform. Courts and judges have the task of deciding whether the facts of the particular case bring that case under the specific provisions of the law. This is the field of judicial discretion and the battleground of litigants and lawyers.

The propensities of men of law, on the bench and at the bar, to protract and complicate the procedures of a trial, to multiply and divide the issues, to separate themselves from laymen by a heavy curtain of language, have been satirically noted in the great diatribes against the legal profession, from Aristophanes to Chaucer, Rabelais, Montaigne, and Swift.

Rabelais, for example, has Pantagruel undertake to arbitrate in the litigation between “Lord Kissbreech, plaintiff of one side, and… Lord Suckfist, defendant of the other, whose controversy was so high and difficult in law that the court of parliament could make nothing of it.” Pantagruel conducts the proceedings in an unusual style. When the counsellors and attorneys “delivered into his hands the bags wherein were the writs and pancarts concerning that suit, which for bulk and weight were almost enough to load four great couillard or stoned asses,” Pantagruel said unto them:

Are the two lords, between whom this debate and process is, yet living?

Upon being told they are alive:

to what a devil, then, said he, serve so many paltry heaps and bundles of papers and copies which you give me? Is it not better to hear their controversy from their own mouths, whilst they are face to face before us, than to read these vile fopperies, which are nothing but trumperies, deceits, diabolical cozenages of Cepola, pernicious slights and subversions of equity.

Furthermore, Pantagruel continues:

seeing the laws are excerpted out of the middle of moral and natural philosophy, how should these fools have understood it, that have, by G—, studied less in philosophy than my mule? In respect of human learning, and the knowledge of antiquities and history, they are truly laden with these faculties as a toad is with feathers. And yet of all this the laws are so full, that without it they cannot be understood. … Therefore, if you will that I make any meddling in this process, first, cause all these papers to be burned; secondly, make the two gentlemen come personally before me, and, afterwards, when I shall have heard them, I will tell you my opinion freely, without any feignedness or dissimulation whatsoever.

The trial which Pantagruel then conducts, in which the two lords are forced to plead without benefit of counsel, is a choice and proper piece of litigation.

The problems of casuistry, with which Pascal deals at length in his Provincial Letters, are sometimes thought of as peculiar to the canon law, but casuistry, in the sense of distinguishing cases and examining them in relation to general rules, necessarily occurs in the judicial application of any body of law. The most difficult cases are those which may fall under the letter of a law but seem to be inconsistent with its spirit. The reverse also happens; cases fall outside the letter of the law but the purpose of the law seems to cover them. All such cases indicate an unavoidable defect in rules of law.

The defect is unavoidable, Aristotle says. Law aims at universality “but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.” To remedy this defect, the intention of the lawmaker should be consulted. The particular case should be treated as he would have treated it if he had had it in mind when he framed the general rule. Such handling of the difficult case is what Aristotle means by the equitable—“a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality.”

The law which equity is called upon to correct may be a just rule, but that does not prevent its being unjustly applied. Equity prevents the injustice of misapplication by dispensing justice in the particular case according to the spirit, not the letter, of the law. It is a kind of justice, Aristotle says; “not legal justice but a correction of legal justice … not better than absolute justice but better than the error which arises from the absoluteness of the rule.”

Those who share Aristotle’s theory of equity acknowledge a standard of justice by which not only the law’s application, but also the law itself, is to be measured. In his terms, natural justice provides this standard. The justice of laws made by the state is not only relative to the constitution of the state, but since the constitution itself can be more or less just, there is a standard of justice prior to and independent of the state—in this sense, natural.

Essentially the same point is made by those who, like Montesquieu and Locke, appeal to the natural law, both as a measure of constitutions and as a criterion for distinguishing good from bad law. “Before laws were made,” Montesquieu writes, “there were relations of possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not equal.”

The law of nature, according to Locke, does not apply only to the conduct of men living in a state of nature. The law of nature which Locke describes as a rule “of common reason and equity which is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security,” is not abolished when men enter into civil society. “The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to enforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others.” The rules of positive law, writes Locke, must “be conformable to the law of nature, i.e., to the will of God, of which that is the declaration.” The municipal laws of any particular state “are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.”

The position of Locke and Aquinas makes natural law the source as well as the standard of positive law. As a source, natural law gives rise to positive law in a way which, for Aquinas at least, differentiates it from the law of nations or the ius gentium.

“Something may be derived from the natural law in two ways,” he writes. “First, as a conclusion from premises; secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way,” he explains, “is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles; while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape.” Now “to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g., just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal…. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself.”

Aquinas exemplifies the determinations of positive law by pointing out that “the law of nature has it that the evildoer should be punished; but that he be punished in this way or that, is a determination of the law of nature,” which the positive law must institute. He might also have used as an example the fact that the universal prohibition of killing is a conclusion from the principle of natural law that “one should do harm to no man,” whereas the various kinds and degrees of murder are differently defined in different countries according to the determination of the natural law made by the positive law of homicide in each country.

The rules of positive law cannot be arrived at deductively. They do not follow necessarily from principles. They are only determinations which particularize the precepts of natural law in a manner which fits the contingent circumstances of a particular society. Whatever is made determinate by positive law is something which the natural law leaves indeterminate because no point of justice or right is involved. Other determinations could have been made. An element of choice is involved in the making of positive laws. In addition to being formulated by the reason, they must be posited by the will of whoever has the authority to make laws.

Rules of positive law are the work of reason to the extent that reason is called upon to propose various possible determinations of the natural law, e.g., one or another definition of murder in the first degree, one or another definition of the penalty for it. Since a definite rule of positive law cannot be instituted until a choice is made among the alternative possibilities, the positive law cannot be solely the work of reason. Choice, according to Aquinas, is always an act of the will.

Though he recognizes the role of choice, and hence of the will, in the enactment of positive law, Aquinas does not go to the other extreme of making the will the sole arbiter of what is law. The legality of the state’s ordinances does not depend entirely on their being posited by the will of a sovereign authority. If a positive regulation is not derived from the natural law, it cannot be a just rule. Quoting Augustine’s remark that “a law which is not just is a law in name only,” Aquinas goes on to say: “Every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it departs from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.”

An ordinance which had no other foundation than the will of a sovereign prince or government might have the coercive force of law, but it would lack the moral authority of law. It would bind men, not through conscience, but only through their fear of punishment for disobedience. “That force and tyranny may be an element in law,” writes Hegel, “is accidental to law, and has nothing to do with its nature.”

A completely opposite view is taken by those who deny natural law or principles of innate right and natural justice. There is, in addition, a theory of natural law which leads to an opposite view of the legal and the just, though the opposition in this case is qualified to some extent.

According to Hobbes, “civil and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law.” The law of nature and the civil law, he says, “contain each other and are of equal extent.” But he also says that “the laws of nature … are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience.”

Before the formation of a commonwealth, by the contract or covenant whereby men transfer the rights and liberties which they possess in a state of nature, the natural law directs men, first, to preserve their lives in the war “of every man against every man”; and second, to seek the security of peace by leaving the natural state of war to join with their fellow men in the order of a civil society. The nineteen precepts of natural law which Hobbes enumerates seem to set forth reason’s recognition of the advantages of civil society over the state of nature and also reason’s understanding of the conditions indispensable to a firm foundation of the commonwealth.

These rules of reason “are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes, and which only concern the doctrine of civil society.” But until the commonwealth exists, the laws of nature bind in conscience only, and they are therefore not effective in achieving their end, which is security. “When a commonwealth is settled, then they are actually laws and not before; as being then the commands of the commonwealth, and therefore also civil laws. For it is the sovereign power which obliges men to obey them.”

The distinction between natural and civil law then becomes a distinction between unwritten and written rules; but the test of whether any rule is actually a law is the same, namely, whether it is adopted and enforced by the sovereign. “All laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth,” Hobbes writes.

The difference between the Hobbesian theory and that of Locke or Aquinas reveals itself in its consequences. Under what circumstances can a subject or citizen refuse obedience to the laws of the state? On the ground that they are unjust or tyrannical? By the criterion that they violate precepts of natural law or the positive commandments of God? Is the individual bound in conscience to obey every command of the civil law, because the civil law includes the natural law, interprets it, and gives it the authority and force of law; and because the natural law itself commands obedience to the civil law once a commonwealth has been instituted? Or, on the contrary, is an individual in conscience free to disobey those positive enactments which lack the authority of law because they are not in conformity to the natural law or the divine law?

To questions of this sort, and to the whole problem of the right of rebellion, different answers seem to be given in terms of different views of the nature of law, the sources of its authority, and its sanctions.

At one extreme there is the doctrine that rebellion is never justified, that the security of peace, which the maintenance of law and order provides, is always better than the anarchy and war which result from rebellion. Hobbes, for example, holds that “nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury.” The rebel would, therefore, always be a criminal, a man who takes the law into his own hands, and uses force to gain his ends. A man may be justified in using force, according to Hobbes, only to repel force used against him, and then only in defense of his life. So much the law of nature permits or requires. But it does not permit or require him to decide which laws enacted by his sovereign he shall obey or disobey.

At the other extreme there is the doctrine of civil disobedience as expounded by Thoreau and, of course, Gandhi. Unjust laws, or laws which violate a man’s conscience, may have the force of the state behind them. But they exert no authority over him. The just man is called upon to break them and to submit gladly to the consequences of breaking them, by suffering whatever penalties may be attached to their breach. It is not enough for the individual citizen to salve his conscience by criticizing the government and joining with like-minded fellow citizens in an effort to get unjust laws abolished or reformed. He is obliged in conscience not to await help from others or to be patient in the use of gradual means. He is obliged to act alone and at once—by disobeying the unjust laws.

Kant seems to go this far when he interprets the precept “Do wrong to no one” as meaning “Do no wrong to anyone, even if thou shouldst be under the necessity, in observing this duty, to cease from all connection with others and to avoid all society.” But he qualifies this somewhat by the precept: “Enter, if wrong cannot be avoided, into a society with others in which everyone may have secured to him what is his own.”

Another sort of qualification limits disobedience, rebellion, or secession from society—even when the individual conscience recoils from the injustice or illegality of a civil ordinance. The principle, as stated by Aquinas, seems to be that the common good may, under certain circumstances, be better served by acquiescence than by disobedience. Unless what the law commands involves a transgression of God’s commandments, an unjust law may be obeyed “in order to avoid scandal or disturbance.”

Even with regard to reforming law by legal means Aquinas recommends that the disadvantages resulting from the change of law be weighed against the advantages. The effectiveness of law depends upon the habits of obedience it forms and upon the customary behavior it establishes. “Consequently,” Aquinas says, “when a law is changed, the binding power of law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished.” This harm to the common welfare may, of course, be compensated either by “the benefit conferred by the new enactment” or by the fact that “the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful.”

Locke states the principle somewhat differently. So long as due process of law is available to remedy unjust ordinances or illegal acts, the individual is not justified in disobedience, for such action would “unhinge and overturn all polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.” Nor is it effective for the individual to act alone in using force to resist tyranny or injustice. But if these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people “and they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps, their religion too, how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force used against them, I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments.” There is no alternative then but rebellion—“properly a state of war wherein the appeal lies only to heaven.”

As the foregoing discussion indicates, the basic issues in the philosophy of law are inseparable from questions about justice and liberty, the rights of the individual and the authority of the state, the powers of government, and the fundamental alternatives of crime and punishment, war and peace. These matters are considered in the chapters appropriate to the terms mentioned above. More particular consequences of the theory of law, especially natural law, are found in such chapters as REVOLUTION, SLAVERY, and TYRANNY, CITIZEN, CONSTITUTION, and WEALTH.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The definition of law
   • 1a. The end of law: peace, order, and the common good
   • 1b. Law in relation to reason or will
   • 1c. The authority and power needed for making law
   • 1d. The promulgation of law: the need and the manner of its declaration
2. The major kinds of law: comparison of human, natural, and divine law; comparison of natural and positive, innate and acquired, private and public, abstract and civil rights
3. The divine law
   • 3a. The eternal law in the divine government of the universe: the law in the nature of all creatures
     • (1) The natural moral law as the eternal law in human nature
     • (2) The distinction between the eternal law and the positive commandments of God
   • 3b. The divine positive law: the difference between the law revealed in the Old and the New Testament
     • (1) Law in the Old Testament: the moral, the judicial, and the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law
     • (2) Law in the New Testament: the law of love and grace; ceremonial precepts of the New Law
4. The natural law
   • 4a. The law of reason or the moral law: the order and habit of its principles
   • 4b. The law of men living in a state of nature
   • 4c. The a priori principles of innate or abstract right: universal law in the order of freedom; the objectification of the will
   • 4d. The natural law as underlying the precepts of virtue: its relation to the moral precepts of divine law
   • 4e. The relation of natural law to natural rights and natural justice
   • 4f. The relation of natural law to civil or municipal law: the state of nature and the regulations of the civil state
   • 4g. The relation of natural law to the law of nations and to international law: sovereign states and the state of nature
   • 4h. The precepts of the natural law and the condition of the state of nature with respect to slavery and property
5. The human or positive law: the sanction of coercive force
   • 5a. The difference between laws and decrees
   • 5b. The kinds or divisions of positive law
   • 5c. The justice of positive law: the standards of natural law and constitutionality
   • 5d. The origins of positive law in the legislative process: the function of the legislator
   • 5e. The mutability or variability of positive law: the maintenance or change of laws
   • 5f. The relation of positive law to custom
   • 5g. The application of positive law to cases: the casuistry of the judicial process; the conduct of a trial; the administration of justice
   • 5h. The defect of positive law: its need for correction or dispensation by equity
6. Law and the individual
   • 6a. Obedience to the authority and force of law: the sanctions of conscience and fear; the objective and subjective sanctions of law; law, duty, and right
   • 6b. The exemption of the sovereign person from the coercive force of law
   • 6c. The force of tyrannical, unjust, or bad laws: the right of rebellion or disobedience
   • 6d. The educative function of law in relation to virtue and vice: the efficacy of law as limited by virtue in the individual citizen
   • 6e. The breach of law: crime and punishment
     • (1) The nature and causes of crime
     • (2) The prevention of crime
     • (3) The punishment of crime
7. Law and the state
   • 7a. The distinction between government by men and government by laws: the nature of constitutional or political law
   • 7b. The supremacy of law as the principle of political freedom
   • 7c. The priority of natural to civil law: the inviolability or inalienability of natural rights
   • 7d. Tyranny and treason or sedition as illegal acts: the use of force without authority
   • 7e. The need for administrative discretion in matters undetermined by law: the royal prerogative
   • 7f. The juridical conception of the person: the legal personality of the state and other corporations
8. Historical observations on the development of law and on the diversity of legal systems or institutions
9. The legal profession and the study of law: praise and dispraise of lawyers and judges

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR’S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference. Line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The definition of law

7 Plato: Statesman, 599c-601b / Laws, BK I, 650a-b; BK IV, 681b-c; BK IX, 743a-b; 754a-b; 757a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129b14-19] 377a; BK X, CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / Politics, BK III, CH 16 [1287a28-32] 485d; [1287b3-5] 486a; BK VII, CH 4 [1326a29-32] 530b-c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK XI, SECT 1 302a-b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90 205a-208b esp A 4, ANS 207d-208b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 130b-c; 131a-c; 149c; 157b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VI, SECT 57 36d-37b; CH IX, SECT 124 53d-54a; CH XI 55b-58b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1a-2b; 3c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330b-d / Political Economy, 370b-d / Social Contract, BK II, 399b-400c esp 399c-d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 110c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 266c-d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-394a,c esp 392b / Science of Right, 397a-399c 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 33, 108d-109a; NUMBER 62, 191b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 203d-204a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 4a-b; INTRO, PAR 3 10a-12c; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d

1a. The end of law: peace, order, and the common good

7 Plato: Republic, BK I, 301b-304a; BK II, 311b-c; BK V, 363b-365d; BK IX, 425c-427b esp 426c-d / Theaetetus, 531a-b / Statesman, 599c-601b / Laws, BK I-III 640a-677a esp BK I, 643a-644a, 650a-b, BK III, 669b-d, 676b-c; BK IV, 677d; 681b-682c; BK VI, 706b-c; BK IX, 747d; 754a-b; 757a; BK XI, 795c-796b / Seventh Letter, 804b-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129b14-19] 377a; CH 6 [1134a29-32] 382a / Politics, BK III, CH 16 [1287a18-b35] 485c-486c; BK VII, CH 4 [1326a29-32] 530b-c 14 Plutarch: Solon, 72b 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 17 522b-523a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 2 206b-207a; A 3, ANS and REP 3 207a-c; Q 91, A 1, REP 3 208b-d; A 5, ANS 211c-212c; A 6, REP 3 212c-213c; Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3-4 213c-214c; Q 93, A 1, REP 1 215b,d-216c; A 4, CONTRARY 218b-d; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; A 3, REP 1 223a-c; Q 95, A 1 226c-227c; A 3 228c-229b; A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, AA 2-3 231c-233a; A 4, ANS 233a-d; A 6, ANS 235a-d; Q 97, A 1, ANS and REP 3 236a-d; A 2, ANS and REP 2 236d-237b; A 4 238b-239b; Q 98, A 1, ANS 239b-240c; Q 99, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 245c-246b; A 2, ANS 246b-247a; A 3, ANS 247a-248a; Q 100, A 2, ANS 252b-253a; A 8, ANS 259d-261a; A 9, CONTRARY 261b-262b; A 11, REP 3 263c-264d; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 1,4 309d-316a; Q 107, A 1, ANS 325c-327b; A 2, ANS 327b-329a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [85-102] 77d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 103a; 131b-c; 157b-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a 35 Locke: Toleration, 8c; 11b; 15c; 16a-17b passim / Civil Government, CH I, SECT 3 25d; CH VI, SECT 57 36d-37b; CH IX 53c-54d; CH XI 55b-58b; CH XV, SECT 171 65a-b; CH XIX, SECT 219 75b-c 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 262a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 2c-3d passim 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 353d-355b esp 354d-355a; 359c-d / Political Economy, 370b-d; 375b-c / Social Contract, BK II, 399b-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 617a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114b-115a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259c-261d esp 259c-d; 272a-b; 274a-277b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 373d / Science of Right, 398c-399c; 408c-409c; 412c-414a 44 Boswell: Johnson, 204b-c; 219d-220a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 299 99c-100b; ADDITIONS, 135 138c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-171c; PART II, 271d-272a 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-d

1b. Law in relation to reason or will

7 Plato: Gorgias, 271c-272b / Republic, BK I, 301c-302c / Laws, BK I, 650a-b; BK III, 669b-670c; BK IV, 679c-680d; 681b-682c; 685d; BK IX, 754a-b; BK XII, 792c-d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1253a31-37] 446d; BK III, CH 16 485b-486c esp [1287a19-32] 485c-d; BK VI, CH 3 521c-522a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 4 264a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 21, A 2, REP 1 125c-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 1 205b-206b; A 3 207a-c; Q 95, A 1 226c-227c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86b-87a; 96b; PART II, 127b; 131d-132b; 133a; 160b-c; PART IV, 272c 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 6-8 26b-27a; CH VI, SECT 57-63 36d-38c; CH XI 55b-58b passim; CH XIII, SECT 151 59d-60a; CH XIX, SECT 212 74a-b 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 266a-b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1a; 3c 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 368d-371a / Social Contract, BK II, 395b-d; 399b-400c; BK III, 419c-420a 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264b-d; 273d-274a / Practical Reason, 309d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 390b; 393a / Science of Right, 435a; 448b-d; 450a-b / Judgement, 596c-598b 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 78, 230d-232a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 4 12d-13a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-171c; PART IV, 328a; 364d-365a 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 427a-b

1c. The authority and power needed for making law

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / Politics, BK III, CH 16 485b-486c; BK VI, CH 3 521c-522a 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 32a-48d esp 34b-d, 47a-c / Numa Pompilius, 52b-c / Solon, 64b,d-77a,c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 3 207a-c; Q 92, A 2, REP 3 214d-215a,c; Q 95, A 1 226c-227c 23 Machiavelli: The Prince, CH XII, 18a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 100c-101a; 123a-b; 130b-132a; 137b-138b; 157b; 160c-161a; PART III, 171a-172a; 201a-b; 231d-234d 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 147a; PART II, 362b 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART VI, 61a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 87-88 44a-c; CH IX 53c-54d; CH XI 55b-58b; CH XIII, SECT 149 59b-d; CH XIX, SECT 212 74a-b / Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 5-6 105a-c; SECT 12-13 107b-108c; BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 5-12 229c-231c passim, esp SECT 6 229d 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 369a / Social Contract, BK II, 399d-400a; 400c-402a; BK III, 420a-421c 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 393c / Science of Right, 398b-c; 399c; 405d-406c; 412c-414c; 435c-436c; 438b-c 43 Declaration of Independence: [43-47] 2a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 33, 107b-108a; 108d-109a; NUMBER 44, 145c-146d; NUMBER 78, 230d-232a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 94 36b; PART III, PAR 212 70d-71a / Philosophy of History, PART I, 207b-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 680d-684a

1d. The promulgation of law: the need and the manner of its declaration

Old Testament: Deuteronomy, 27:1-8 / Joshua, 8:30-35—(D) Josue, 8:30-35 New Testament: Romans, 2:14-15 5 Sophocles: Antigone [450-460] 135a 5 Euripides: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [1435-1499] 424a-d 7 Plato: Laws, BK IV, 684c-686b; BK IX, 745c-746a; BK X, 760c-761b 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK III, CH 3 [1113b3-13] 359a / Athenian Constitution, CH 7, PAR 1 555c 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 38c / Numa Pompilius, 60d-61c / Solon, 73d-74a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 4 207d-208b; Q 91, A 1, REP 2 208b-d; Q 93, A 2 216c-217b; A 5, REP 1 219a-d; Q 106, A 1 321a-322a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 132b-133d; 137b-138b; 143b-c; 157c-d; 160b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47c-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95a 35 Locke: Toleration, 14b / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 9 27a-b; CH VI, SECT 57-60 36d-38a; CH IX, SECT 124 53d-54a; CH XI, SECT 136-137 56c-57b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XXIX, 266b-268c 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 371a / Social Contract, BK II, 401c-402a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 616d-617a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73a; 73d-74b passim 42 Kant: Science of Right, 435a-b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 203d-204c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 210-211 69d-70c, PAR 215 71c-d, PAR 217 72b-c; PAR 224 73d, ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d, 141 139c

2. The major kinds of law: comparison of human, natural, and divine law; comparison of natural and positive, innate and acquired, private and public, abstract and civil rights

5 Sophocles: Antigone [441-525] 134d-135c; [891-943] 138d-139a / Ajax [1047-1421] 152a-155a,c 5 Euripides: Suppliants [513-565] 262d-263b / Bacchantes [878-911] 347b-c 7 Plato: Laws, BK IV, 681b-683a 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, CH 12 [173a7-31] 238b-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 7 382c-383a / Politics, BK I, CH 6 448c-449b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1368b7-10] 611d; CH 13 [1373b1-17] 617c-d 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, PAR 15 17a-b; PAR 17 17d-18a / City of God, BK XIX, CH 17 522b-523a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 63, A 2, ANS 64b-65a; Q 91 208b-213c; Q 97, A 3, REP 1 237b-238b; Q 100, A 1 251b-252a; A 2, ANS 252b-253a; Q 107, A 1, ANS 325c-327b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXX [97-123] 152d-153a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-d; PART II, 131a-c; 136d-137b; 138c; 151a-c; PART III, 245c-246a; PART IV, 249a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 281a-283c; 516c-517a; 519a-b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 100d 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II 25d-28c passim; CH IV, SECT 21 29d; CH VI, SECT 56-59 36d-37d; CH IX 53c-54d passim / Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 13 107d-108c; BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 6-13 229d-231c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1a-3a; BK XXIV, 202b-c; BK XXVI, 214b,d-215a; 218a; 221c-d 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK II, 399b-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 72a 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 392b / Science of Right, 400b,d-403b; 429a-c; 434b-436b 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 467c-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 3, 10a-11b; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d

3. The divine law

3a. The eternal law in the divine government of the universe: the law in the nature of all creatures

Old Testament: Psalms, 119 esp 119:91—(D) Psalms, 118 esp 118:91 / Proverbs, 8:15-30 18 Augustine: City of God, BK V, CH 11 216c-d; BK XI, CH 22 333d-334c; BK XIX, CH 11-14 516d-520d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 21, A 1, REP 2 124b-125b; A 2 125c-d; PART I-II, Q 19, A 4 705b-c; A 6, ANS and REP 2 707a-708a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 1 208b-d; A 2, ANS and REP 3 208d-209d; Q 93 215b,d-220d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d, XXX [97-123] 152d-153a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 159d-160b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 71a-b 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART V, 55a-b 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 30-32 418c-419a passim 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1a-2b 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 243b-d

3a(1) The natural moral law as the eternal law in human nature

Old Testament: Psalms, 37:30-31—(D) Psalms, 36:30-31 New Testament: Romans, 2:11-16 5 Sophocles: Antigone [450-460] 135a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, PAR 9, 10d; BK III, PAR 13-15 16c-17b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 19, A 4 705b-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 2 208d-209d; Q 93, A 2 216c-217b; A 6 219d-220d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 96b; PART II, 134c; 136d-137a; 160b-c; PART III, 171a-c; 216c-217a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 100d 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 5-6 105a-c passim; BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 7-8 229d-230a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 2b-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330d-331d / Social Contract, BK IV, 437a

3a(2) The distinction between the eternal law and the positive commandments of God

New Testament: Romans, 2:11-16 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 4, ANS and REP 1 210c-211c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 136d-138b; 160b-c; PART III, 171a-c; 199b; 216c-217a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 71a-b; 100d

3b. The divine positive law: the difference between the law revealed in the Old and the New Testament

Old Testament: Genesis, 9:8-17; 17:4-14; 26:2-5 / Exodus, 19:3-6; 20 / Deuteronomy, 5; 17:18-19; 27:1-8; 31:26 / Joshua, 8:30-35—(D) Josue, 8:30-35 / Psalms, 1; 40:8; 78; 119 passim, esp 119:1-16, 119:33-40, 119:129-136—(D) Psalms, 1; 39:9; 77; 118 passim, esp 118:1-16, 118:33-40, 118:129-136 / Proverbs, 3:1-2; 6:20-23 / Jeremiah, 31:33—(D) Jeremias, 31:33 Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 2:16; 17:11; 19:17-20; 32:15; 33:2-3; 39:1-11—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 2:19; 17:9; 19:17-18; 32:19; 33:2-3; 38:39-39:15 New Testament: Matthew, 5:17-44 esp 5:17-20; 22:36-40 / Luke, 16:16-17 / John, 1:17; 7:19-23 / Acts, 10:1-48; 13:38-39; 15:22-29; 21:19-28 esp 21:20-25 / Romans passim / I Corinthians, 9:19-21; 10:23-33 / Galatians passim, esp 2:1-5:12 / Ephesians, 2:14-15 / Colossians, 2:13-23 / I Timothy, 1:5-11 / Hebrews esp 7-10 / James, 1:25; 2:8-12 18 Augustine: City of God, BK X, CH 17 309c-310b; CH 25 313c-314c; BK XVIII, CH 11 477c-d; BK XX, CH 4 532b-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, AA 4-5 210c-212c; QQ 98-108 239b-337d; PART II-II, Q 16 454c-456d; Q 22 480d-482c; Q 44 592d-598c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 137b-138b; 160b-c; PART III, 171a-172a; 177c-180a; 199b-207b; 215b-219d; 240c-241a; PART IV, 257c-258a 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XII [101-314] 321b-326a; [401-419] 328a 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 79b / Pensées, 520 263b-264a; 522 264a; 620 285a-286a; 672 296a 35 Locke: Toleration, 14b-c 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK II, 402a; BK IV, 435c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 181b-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 252c

3b(1) Law in the Old Testament: the moral, the judicial, and the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law

Old Testament: Genesis, 9:3-7; 17:9-14; 26:2-5 / Exodus, 12-13; 20-31; 34-35; 40 / Leviticus / Numbers passim, esp 15, 17-19, 27-30, 35-36 / Deuteronomy esp 4-27 / Joshua, 1:7-8; 8:30-35; 22:1-6—(D) Josue, 1:7-8; 8:30-35; 22:1-6 / I Samuel, 13:9-14—(D) I Kings, 13:9-14 / II Kings, 21:8—(D) IV Kings, 21:8 / I Chronicles, 22:12-13—(D) I Paralipomenon, 22:12-13 / II Chronicles, 34-35 esp 35:1-19—(D) II Paralipomenon, 34-35 esp 35:1-19 / Ezra, 9-10—(D) I Esdras, 9-10 / Nehemiah, 1:5-9; 9:16-38—(D) II Esdras, 1:5-9; 9:16-38 / Psalms, 78; 89:30-32; 94:12; 105:43-45; 119 passim—(D) Psalms, 77; 88:31-33; 93:12; 104:43-45; 118 passim / Proverbs, 3:1-2; 4:1-2; 6:20-23 / Isaiah, 1:10-17; 5:24-25; 42:21-25; 51:7-8—(D) Isaias, 1:10-17; 5:24-25; 42:21-25; 51:7-8 / Jeremiah, 6:19; 9:13-16; 16:10-13; 26:4-6; 30:33; 44:10-14,23—(D) Jeremias, 6:19; 9:13-16; 16:10-13; 26:4-6; 31:33; 44:10-14,23 / Ezekiel, 5:6-9; 11:18-20; 18; 22:26; 36:25-27; 43-48—(D) Ezechiel, 5:6-9; 11:18-20; 18; 22:26; 36:25-27; 43-48 / Daniel, 9:1-15 / Hosea, 4:6; 8:1—(D) Osee, 4:6; 8:1 / Micah, 6:6-8—(D) Micheas, 6:6-8 / Zephaniah, 3:1-7—(D) Sophonias, 3:1-7 / Zechariah, 7:12-14—(D) Zacharias, 7:12-14 / Malachi, 2:1-10; 3:7—(D) Malachias, 2:1-10; 3:7 Apocrypha: Ecclesiasticus, 2:16, 10:19; 11:15; 17:11; 19:17-20; 24:1-23 esp 24:23; 32:15; 33:2-3; 39:1-11; 45:5—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 2:19; 10:23; 11:15; 17:9; 19:17-18; 24:1-33 esp 24:32-33; 32:19; 33:2-3; 38:39-39:15; 45:5-6 / I Maccabees, 1:38-63; 2:19-68—(D) OT, I Machabees, 1:40-66; 2:19-68 / II Maccabees, 6-7; 15:1-5—(D) OT, II Machabees, 6-7; 15:1-5 18 Augustine: City of God, BK X, CH 17 309c-310b; CH 25 313c-314c; BK XX, CH 4 532b-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 5 211c-212c; A 6, ANS and REP 1 212c-213c; QQ 98-105 239b-321a; Q 106, A 3, ANS 323a-324a; A 4, ANS and REP 1,3 324a-325c; Q 107 325c-330d passim; Q 108, A 1, ANS and REP 3 331a-332b; A 2 332b-333d; A 3, REP 1-3 334a-336b; PART II-II, Q 16 454c-456d; Q 22 480d-482c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 137b-c; 154b-155c; 160b-c; PART III, 177c-188a; 199b-204a; 212d-213a; 216c-218a; 223a-c; 226b-d; 231b; PART IV, 268b-c; 269a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 18b-c 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XII [223-371] 324a-327a esp [223-230] 324a, [287-309] 325b-326a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 619-620 284b-286a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 180b-182c passim; 208a-c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 467c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART I, 246c-247a

3b(2) Law in the New Testament: the law of love and grace; ceremonial precepts of the New Law

New Testament: Matthew, 5-7 esp 5:17-20; 16:18-19; 18:18; 22:34-40; 28:19 / Mark, 12:28-34 / Luke, 6:20-49; 10:25-37; 16:16-17; 22:15-20 / John, 3:1-8, 6 esp 6:47-58; 13:31-17:26; 20:21-23—(D) John, 3:1-8; 6 esp 6:47-59; 13:31-17:26; 20:21-23 / Acts, 2:37-42; 8:14-17,26-40; 10:34-48; 13:2-4,38-39; 15:22-29; 19:1-7; 21:20-25 / Romans esp 3-13 / I Corinthians, 11:23-34; 13 / Galatians esp 3-6 / Colossians / I Timothy, 4:14 / Hebrews, 7-10 / James, 5:14-15 / I Peter, 4:8-11 / I John / II John 18 Augustine: City of God, BK X, CH 25 313c-314c; BK XX, CH 4 532b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 22-30 629b-633b, CH 35 634c-d; BK III, CH 10 661c-662a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 5 211c-212c; Q 98, A 4, ANS 242b-243c; Q 101, A 2, ANS 267a-268a; A 4, REP 2 269a-270b; Q 102, A 1, REP 1 270c-271b; A 4, REP 2-4 276d-283c; A 5, REP 3 283c-292c; Q 103, A 3, ANS 300d-302a; QQ 106-108 321a-337d; PART II-II, Q 16, A 1, REP 2 454c-455c 22 Chaucer: Parson’s Tale, PAR 31 517b-518b; PAR 68 533b-534a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART III, 180c-d, 206c-207a; 218a-219d; 240d; PART IV, 257c-258a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 81a; 100d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XII [285-314] 325b-326a; [576-605] 331b-332a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 672 296a 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259a / Practical Reason, 327c-d 43 Mill: Liberty, 286b-287a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 525c-526b 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 121d-137c esp 121d-122b, 126c-127b; BK VI, 150a-c; 166c-170a

4. The natural law

4a. The law of reason or the moral law: the order and habit of its principles

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 11 262a-b; BK IV, SECT 4 264a; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; BK XI, SECT 1 302a-b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, PAR 9, 10d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 79, A 12 425c-426b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 58, AA 4-5 44a-45c; Q 63, A 1 63a-64a; Q 90, A 1 205b-206b; Q 91, A 2 208d-209d; A 5, REP 3 211c-212c; A 6 212c-213c; Q 94 220d-226b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86b-87a; 91a-96b esp 96b; PART II, 132c-d, 133b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 23b-c; 184a-b; 520c-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 96a-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 31-35 432a-434a; PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II 25d-28c esp SECT 6-11 26b-27d; CH VI, SECT 56-63 36d-38c; CH IX, SECT 124 53d-54a / Human Understanding, 90d; BK I, CH II, SECT 5-6 105a-c passim; SECT 13, 108b-c 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK II, 399b 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 235a-b; 236d-237a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254d; 259c-261d, 264b-265a, 268d [fn 2], 271c-d; 282b-287b / Practical Reason, 306d-310b; 314d-321b; 360d-361d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-387a,c; 388b-c, 390b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 140, 52a-53a, PART III, PAR 213 71a; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170d-171a

4b. The law of men living in a state of nature

7 Plato: Republic, BK II, 311b-312d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 84c-87b; PART II, 99a-b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II-III 25d-29d; CH IX 53c-54d 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 2b-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330a-331b; 333b-d; 342c-348a esp 343b-345c / Social Contract, BK I, 389d-390a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 237c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 222b-c / Science of Right, 402c; 433c-436c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 93 36a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 171c-172b

4c. The a priori principles of innate or abstract right: universal law in the order of freedom; the objectification of the will

42 Kant: Pure Reason, 110c; 114b-115a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 390b; 392b / Science of Right, 400b,d-402a; 412c-414c; 416b-417b; 429a-c; 435a-436b 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 446a-d; 458d-459d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 4-36 12d-19c esp PAR 4 12d-13a, PAR 15 16a-b, PAR 22 17c-d, PAR 27-30 18d-19c; PAR 33 20b-d; PART I 21a-39d esp PAR 36 21b-c, PAR 94 36b; PART II, PAR 106-114 40a-42b; PAR 133 47a; PAR 135 47b-d; PART III, PAR 142-157 55a-57d esp PAR 149 56b; PAR 209 69d; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d; 123d-124a; 84 129b; 86 129c; 94 132b; 131 137d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-171c; PART IV, 362b-d; 364c-d

4d. The natural law as underlying the precepts of virtue: its relation to the moral precepts of divine law

Old Testament: Exodus, 20:1-17 / Deuteronomy, 5:6-21 / Jeremiah, 31:33—(D) Jeremias, 31:33 New Testament: Romans, 1:18-32; 2:11-16; 3 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, PAR 9, 10d; BK III, PAR 13-15 16c-17b; PAR 17 17d-18a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 19, A 4 705b-c; A 6, ANS and REP 2 707a-708a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 1, ANS 12b-13c; Q 91, A 4, ANS and REP 1 210c-211c; Q 94, A 3 223a-c; A 5 224d-225d; Q 98, AA 5-6 243c-245b; Q 99, A 2 246b-247a; A 4, REP 2 248a-d; A 5, ANS 249a-250a; Q 100 251a-265d; PART III, Q 61, A 3, REP 2 856c-857c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 91a-96b esp 95d-96b; PART II, 131a-b; 136d-137a; PART III, 216c-217a; 240d-241a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 96a-c; 100d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 4-6 25d-26c / Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 5-6 105a-c passim 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1c-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 343b-345c; 366c-d 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 275b / Practical Reason, 317b-318c; 327c-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART IV, 361c-d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 33c-34b

4e. The relation of natural law to natural rights and natural justice

5 Sophocles: Antigone [441-525] 134d-135c 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK I, CH 5 447d-448c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 13 [1373b1-17] 617c-d 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 4 264a; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 21 524a-525a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 96, A 1 510b-511b; A 4 512d-513c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 2 208d-209d; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; Q 95, A 2 227c-228c; A 4 229b-230c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-d; PART II, 131a-c; 138c 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II [163-188] 115b-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a; APPENDIX, VIII 447d 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [888-902] 359a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II-IX 25d-54d passim; CH XI, SECT 135-137 55d-57b; CH XV, SECT 171-172 65a-c 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 53b-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330a-331b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 61b; BK II, 140b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 86d-87a 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 392b / Science of Right, 397a-b; 421c-422d; 429a-c; 430a-432c; 434a; 435a-457b esp 436c, 437c-d, 447b-450b, 451c-d 43 Declaration of Independence: [1-28] 1a-b 43 Mill: Liberty, 272d-273b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 171c-172b

4f. The relation of natural law to civil or municipal law: the state of nature and the regulations of the civil state

5 Sophocles: Antigone [450-460] 135a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 7 [1134b18-1135a4] 382c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 13 [1373b1-18] 617c-d; CH 15 [1375a26-b8] 619d-620a; [1376b3-31] 621a-c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, PAR 15 17a-b; PAR 17 17d-18a / City of God, BK I, CH 21 142d-143a; BK XIX, CH 12 517b-519a; CH 21 524a-525a, CH 24 528b-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 3 209d-210c; Q 94, AA 4-6 223d-226b passim; Q 95, A 2 227c-228c; A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 99, A 3, REP 2 247a-248a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 84c-87b; 91a-96b passim; PART II, 99a-b; 103a; 115b-c; 124d-125a; 131a-c; 132c-d; 134b-135b; 138c; 142a-c; 156b-c; PART IV, 273c-d 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 87a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 281a-282a; 516c-517a; 519a-520b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [888-902] 359a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 7-13 26c-28b; CH VII, SECT 89 44d; CH IX 53c-54d; CH XI 55b-58b; CH XIII, SECT 149 59b-d; CH XIV, SECT 159 62b-c; SECT 168 64b-c; CH XV, SECT 171 65a-b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1c-d; BK VIII, 52a; BK XVI, 119d; BK XXVI, 215b-218a; 219d-221c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 333b-c; 353d-355b; 361c-362a / Political Economy, 369a-b; 370d / Social Contract, BK I, 393b-394d; BK II, 397a; 399b-c; 403d-406a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 52b-c; 61b; BK IV, 228a; BK V, 397a-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 82b; 86d-89b esp 87a-b 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 222b-c / Science of Right, 397a-b; 402c; 405d-406c; 426b-429a; 430a-432c; 433c-434d; 435c-436b 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 43, 143b-c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 470d-471b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 120b-c; 275d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 214 71a-c; PAR 217 72b-c; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 186a-c; PART I, 207b-c; 208b-d; PART IV, 361c-d

4g. The relation of natural law to the law of nations and to international law: sovereign states and the state of nature

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 4 264a 14 Plutarch: Camillus, 108b-109a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 4 223d-224d; Q 95, A 2, ANS 227c-228c; A 4 229b-230c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86a; PART II, 114b-c, 159c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 13a-b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 9 27a-b; SECT 14 28b-c; CH III, SECT 19 29b-c; CH XII, SECT 145-146 58d-59a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 2d-3b; BK X, 61b,d-63d; BK XXIV, 201b-c; BK XXVI, 223c-224a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 355b-c / Political Economy, 369a-b / Social Contract, BK I, 389d-390d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 604c [n 107] 42 Kant: Science of Right, 435a-b; 452a-455c esp 452a-d; 456b-457a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 64, 197d-198a; NUMBER 75, 223b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 338 110a-b / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 361c-d

4h. The precepts of the natural law and the condition of the state of nature with respect to slavery and property

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK I, CH 5-6 447d-449b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 13 120b-c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 15 521a-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 92, A 1, REP 2 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 5, REP 3 224d-225d 22 Chaucer: Parson’s Tale, PAR 65-67, 531a-532a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 85d; 86b; 91a-b; 94b-c; PART II, 103a; 124d-125c 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH IV-V 29d-36a; CH VII, SECT 85 43c-d; SECT 87 44a-b; CH IX 53c-54d passim; CH XI, SECT 138-140 57b-58a; CH XV, SECT 171-173 65a-c; CH XVI, SECT 183 67d-68b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, 109b-110a; 110d-111b; BK XXVI, 216a-217b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 333b-d; 348b,d; 353a; 353d-355b; 356c-357a; 357c-358b / Political Economy, 368a / Social Contract, BK I, 388a-c; 389a-390d; 393c-394d 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 52b-c; BK IV, 228a; BK V, 309a-311c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 86d-87b 42 Kant: Science of Right, 401b-402a; 413d-414a; 421c-422d; 445c-446a; 454a-455a 43 Declaration of Independence: [7-10] 1a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 49 24c-25a 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 427b

5. The human or positive law: the sanction of coercive force

7 Plato: Crito 213a-219a,c esp 216d-219a,c / Republic, BK IV, 344a-345d / Statesman, 599c-604b / Laws, BK IV, 684b-686c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 9 [1179b35-1180a28] 434a-435c / Politics, BK III, CH 15 [1286a28-41] 485b / Athenian Constitution, CH 12, PAR 4 557d-558a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 17, 522d-523a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 1 205b-206b; A 3, REP 2 207a-c; QQ 95-97 226b-239b 23 Machiavelli: The Prince, CH XII, 18a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 103a; 113c; 130b-138d 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 362b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b 35 Locke: Toleration, 3a; 3c-4a / Civil Government, CH IX 53c-54d passim; CH XIX, SECT 219 75b-c / Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 5 105a-b, BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 6 229d; SECT 9-13 230b-231c esp SECT 9 230b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 345d / Political Economy, 371a-c / Social Contract, BK II, 399b-400c; BK IV, 426b-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71b,d-96d 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 392b / Science of Right, 439a-b 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 15, 65a-d; NUMBER 16 66c-68d passim, esp 67d-68a; NUMBER 21, 78b-d; NUMBER 28, 96c; NUMBER 33, 108d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 467d-468c passim 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 211-228 70a-75b; ADDITIONS, 131 137d / Philosophy of History, PART III, 290a-b; PART IV, 364d-365a

5a. The difference between laws and decrees

7 Plato: Laws, BK IX, 745c-746a 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK IV, CH 4 [1292a4-37] 491b-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 96, A 1, REP 1 230c-231c 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH IX, SECT 131 54d; CH XI, SECT 136-137 56c-57b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 6b; BK VI, 33a-34d; BK XXIX, 268c 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK II, 395b-d; 397b-c; 399c-400a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73d-74b 42 Kant: Science of Right, 438a-b 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 64, 197a-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 299 99c-100b / Philosophy of History, PART I, 207b-c

5b. The kinds or divisions of positive law

7 Plato: Laws, BK III, 674b 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 2 [1130b30-1131a9] 378b-c / Politics, BK IV, CH 1 [1289a13-25] 488a-b 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 38c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 4 229b-230c; Q 100, A 2, ANS 252b-253a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 136b-137b; 138b-c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XXVI, 221c-223b passim 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK II, 406a-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 96a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 81, 241c-d; NUMBER 84, 252a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 40 21d-22c; PART III, PAR 211 70a-c

5c. The justice of positive law: the standards of natural law and constitutionality

5 Sophocles: Antigone [450-460] 135a 5 Euripides: Bacchantes [878-911] 347b-c 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 396c-d 7 Plato: Protagoras, 52b / Gorgias, 271b-272b; 273d-274c / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 680c-683b; BK IX, 747c; BK X, 760c 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, CH 12 [173a7-19] 238b-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129b12-24] 377a; CH 7 382c-383a; CH 9 [1136b32-35] 385a; CH 11 [1138a4-13] 386b-c / Politics, BK I, CH 6 [1255a3-b4] 448c-449a; BK III, CH 11 [1282b1-14] 480b-c; CH 16 [1287a28-b5] 485d-486a; BK IV, CH 1 [1289a13-25] 488a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1368b4-10] 611d; CH 13 [1373b1-17] 617c-d; CH 15 [1375a25-b25] 619d-620b; [1376b3-b31] 621a-c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 4 264a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, PAR 15 17a-b; PAR 17 17d-18a / City of God, BK II, CH 21 161b-162d; BK XIX, CH 21 524a-525a; CH 24 528b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK IV, CH 18 686d-687d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 3 209d-210c; Q 93, A 3 217b-218a; Q 95, A 2 227c-228c; Q 96, A 4, ANS 233a-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 91a-b; PART II, 131a-c; 132a-b; 134b-135b; 156b-c; 157b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47c-48a; 281a-282a; 384b-c; 519a-520b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [888-902] 359a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 291-338 225a-233a; 878-879 345a-b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 12 27d-28a; CH IX 53c-54d; CH XI 55b-58b; CH XVIII 71a-73c passim; CH XIX, SECT 221-222 75d-76c; SECT 240-242 81b-d 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1c-d; 3c-d; BK VI, 39b; BK VIII, 54b; BK XII, 85c-86d; BK XIX, 136a; 138a-c; BK XXVI, 214b,d-225a passim, esp 214b,d-215a; BK XXIX, 262a-b; 265d 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 369c-d; 370d / Social Contract, BK II, 399b-400a; 405a-406a; BK IV, 426b-d 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 61b; BK II, 140b; BK IV, 228a; 284d; BK V, 397a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 525d-526c; 617b-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 76d-77b; 89d-94b passim; 403b-404d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Science of Right, 429a-c; 434a; 435a-436a; 450d-451c 43 Declaration of Independence: 1a-3b 43 Constitution of the U.S.: PREAMBLE 11a,c; ARTICLE I, SECT 8-10 13a-14b; ARTICLE VI [583-590] 16d; AMENDMENTS, I-X 17a-18a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 33, 108b-109b; NUMBER 44, 145c-147a; NUMBER 78, 230d-232d passim; NUMBER 81, 237d-238b 43 Mill: Liberty, 302d-323a,c passim / Utilitarianism, 465d-466b; 467c-d 44 Boswell: Johnson, 203d-204a; 205b-c; 363c-364a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 212-213 70d-71a / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 364b

5d. The origins of positive law in the legislative process: the function of the legislator

7 Plato: Republic, BK I, 301c-302b; BK IV, 344a-346a / Theaetetus, 531a-b / Statesman, 599c-600d / Laws, BK III, 666b-c; BK IV, 679c-680d; 684b-686c; BK VI, 705d-706c; BK IX, 745c-746a; 754a-d; BK XI, 782a-b / Seventh Letter, 807a-b 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VI, CH 8 [1141b23-33] 390d-391a; BK X, CH 9 434a-436a,c / Politics, BK III, CH 11 [1282b1-14] 480b-c; BK IV, CH 14 498b-499c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354a13-1355a3] 593b-594a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1143-1160] 76a-b 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 32a-48d / Solon, 64b,d-77a,c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51a-52a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 4 207d-208b; Q 95, A 1 226c-227c; A 4, ANS 229b-230c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 103a; 123b-d; 130d-131a; 131d-132a; 133d-134a; 151c-152a; PART IV, 273d 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 363d-364a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95a 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART II, 44d-45a 35 Locke: Toleration, 11b; 16a-c / Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 88-89 44c-d; CH IX, SECT 127-CH X, SECT 132 54a-55b; CH XI, SECT 134 55b-d; CH XI, SECT 141-CH XII, SECT 143 58a-d; CH XIII, SECT 150 59d; CH XIX, SECT 212-217 74a-75a 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 73a-74b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 6b; BK VI, 33a-35c; BK XI, 69d; 71a-72b passim; BK XXIX 262a-269a,c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324c-d / Political Economy, 368c-369a / Social Contract, BK II, 399b-402a; BK III, 419c-423a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 27d-28a; 154a-b; 616d-617a; 624b-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71d-75b esp 72a, 73b-c; 79d-80b; 93b-c; 108a-c 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 393c / Science of Right, 397a-b; 436b-c; 438b-c; 451d-452a 43 Declaration of Independence: [29-47] 1b-2a; (62-64) [78-79] 2b 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 1-9 11a-14a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 33, 107b-108c; NUMBER 38, 121b-124a; NUMBER 40, 130c-132a; NUMBER 44, 145c-146d; NUMBER 53, 168b-169b 43 Mill: Representative Government, 356b-362c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 255d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 298 99c / Philosophy of History, PART II, 271d-273a; PART III, 290a-b; PART IV, 364d-365d

5e. The mutability or variability of positive law: the maintenance or change of laws

Old Testament: Esther, 1:19 / Daniel, 6 esp 6:8, 6:15 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 6c; BK II, 108c 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 435a-c; 438a-b 7 Plato: Republic, BK IV, 344b-345d; BK VIII, 403a-404a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 679c-680d; BK VI, 705d-706c; 707a-b; BK VII, 717d-718c; BK VIII, 740c-d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 7 [1134b18-1135a4] 383c-d / Politics, BK II, CH 8 [1268b23-1269a28] 464d-465b; BK V, CH 9 [1310a12-19] 512b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 15 [1375a25-b25] 619d-620b 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 38c; 47a-48a / Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a,c / Solon, 69c-d / Agesilaus, 494a-c / Agesilaus-Pompey, 539a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 21b-c; BK III, 51a-52a; 57d-58b; BK XI, 106d; BK XIV, 151d-152c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97 235d-239b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78b-c; PART II, 116a-b; 157c-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47a-51a; 131b-132a; 281a-c; 318c-319b; 462c-465c; 504c-506a; 516c-517a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XIII, SECT 157-158 61c-62b; CH XIX, SECT 223 76c-d 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 77d; BK XIV, 102b; 104c; BK XVIII, 126d; BK XIX, 135d-136a; BK XXIX, 268d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324d / Social Contract, BK II, 405d-406b; BK III, 419c-420a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 166a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 78b-81c passim, esp 80d-81b; 96b-c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 441b-c; 450d-452a 43 Declaration of Independence: [76-77] 2b 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE V 16c 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 37, 118d-119b; NUMBER 39, 127d-128b; NUMBER 40 128b-132a; NUMBER 43, 143a-b; NUMBER 49-50 159b-162c; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 62, 190d-191c; NUMBER 64, 197a-c; NUMBER 73, 220a-b; NUMBER 81, 239a-b; NUMBER 85, 257a-259a 43 Mill: Representative Government, 359a-d, 360c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 203d-205a; 205d; 276a-b; 277b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 3, 11c-d; PART III, PAR 216 71d-72a; ADDITIONS, 176 147c-d 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [1972-1979] 46b-47a 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 427a-b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 238c-243d; BK VII, 308d

5f. The relation of positive law to custom

5 Euripides: Bacchantes [877-911] 347b-c / Hecuba [798-805] 359d 6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 97d-98a 7 Plato: Symposium, 154a-c / Republic, BK IV, 344b-d; BK VII, 401c-d / Statesman, 600a-b / Laws, BK I, 666b-c; BK IV, 678d-679a; BK VII, 713c-716b; 718b-c; 730d-731b; BK VIII, 736c-737a 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK II, CH 3 [995a4-6] 513c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 7 382c-383a / Politics, BK II, CH 8 [1268b23-1269a28] 464d-465b; BK III, CH 16 [1287b5-7] 486a; BK V, CH 8 [1307b30-38] 509d-510a; CH 9 [1310a12-19] 512b-c 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 32a-48d esp 38b-d / Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a / Themistocles, 99b-c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK XII, 111b-c; BK XIV, 151d-152c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XV, CH 16, 411a-d; BK XIX, CH 17, 522d-523a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 2, REP 3 227c-228c; Q 96, A 2, ANS 231c-232b; Q 97, AA 2-3 236d-238b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78b-c; PART II, 108c; 130d-131a; 131c; 136d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 46b-48b; 131b-132a; 281a-283c; 462d-463b 27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, ACT I, SC I [1-4] 178d-179a / King Lear, ACT I, SC I [1-22] 247d-248a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 294 225b-226b; 312 229a; 325-326 230b-231a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XIII, SECT 157-158 61c-62b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3c-d; BK X, 65b; BK XIV, 106b; BK XIX, 135a-146a,c; BK XXI, 168d-169a; BK XXIII, 197c-198a; BK XXVIII, 237a-d, 240b; 261a-262a,c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324d / Social Contract, BK II, 406c-d; BK III, 419d-420a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 616d-617a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71d-73a passim; 75b-d; 77c-d; 79d-80d passim; 96b-c 43 Declaration of Independence: [15-22] 1b 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 27, 95c-d; NUMBER 49, 159d-160a 43 Mill: Liberty, 269c-271b; 307b-d / Representative Government, 329d-330a; 330d-331a 44 Boswell: Johnson, 204c-205b; 276a-b; 277b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 211 70a-c; PAR 274 92a; PAR 339 110b; PAR 355 112d-113a; ADDITIONS, 132 137d-138b / Philosophy of History, PART II, 271d-272d; PART III, 294c-d 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 292a-297a 50 Marx: Capital, 235a-236c

5g. The application of positive law to cases: the casuistry of the judicial process; the conduct of a trial; the administration of justice

Old Testament: Exodus, 18:20-22; 23:1-3,6-9 / Numbers, 5:11-31 / Deuteronomy, 1:16-17; 16:18-19; 17:2-13; 19:15-20 / I Kings, 3:16-28—(D) III Kings, 3:16-28 / Daniel, 13 New Testament: Acts, 21-26 5 Aeschylus: Eumenides 81a-91d esp [397-822] 85c-89c 5 Euripides: Hecuba [1129-1251] 362c-363c 5 Aristophanes: Wasps 507a-525d 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 32b-c; BK III, 95d-96b; BK IV, 135c-d; BK V, 164c; BK VI, 211d-212a 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 381d-382d; BK III, 429c-434c; BK VI, 523b-c; 524d-525d 7 Plato: Apology 200a-212a,c / Republic, BK III, 337b-338a / Theaetetus, 544a-c / Statesman, 599c-603a / Laws, BK VI, 704c-705c; BK VIII, 740c-d; BK IX, 744b-c; 754a-d; BK XI, 782a-b; 783c-784b; BK XII, 792a-793a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 4 379b-380b esp [1132a19-b18] 379d-380b; BK VI, CH 8 [1141b23-33] 390d-391a / Politics, BK II, CH 8 [1268b5-23] 464c; BK III, CH 11 [1282b1-6] 480b-c; CH 15 [1286a10-30] 484b-c; CH 16 [1287a24-28] 485d; [1287b15-25] 486a-b; BK IV, CH 16 501c-502a,c / Athenian Constitution, CH 45 573d-574a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354a13-1355a3] 593b-594a; CH 15 619d-622d 14 Plutarch: Solon, 70d-71b / Alcibiades, 162d-165b / Coriolanus, 179c-184c / Aristides, 264b-c / Agesilaus, 494a-c / Pompey, 526a-d / Agesilaus-Pompey, 539a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 46d-49b; 61c-62a; BK XIV, 151c / Histories, BK I, 216d-217a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XX, CH 6 514b-515a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 1, REP 2-3 226c-227c; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 7-8 309d-316a; PART III SUPPL, Q 87, A 1, ANS 997b-998c 22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, PAR 11 403b-404a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78b-c; PART II, 123b-d; 134b-136b; PART III, 234d; PART IV, 275a 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 85c-92c; BK III, 204c-215c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47c-48a; 283a; 516c-520b passim 26 Shakespeare: Merchant of Venice, ACT IV, SC I 425c-430b 27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure 174a-204d esp ACT I, SC I-II 178d-184a / King Lear, ACT III, SC VI 266c-267d / Coriolanus, ACT III, SC III 375b-377a / Henry VIII, ACT II, SC I [51-136] 558c-559c 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 332d-333b; 340d-343a; 353b-356d; 361a-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 27a-62a; 90a-99a; 102b-117b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH IX, SECT 125 54a 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 73b-75a; PART IV, 152b-154a 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 260a-b; 266a-b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 8c-10c; 28c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 33a-37d; 42c-d; BK XXIX, 262a-b 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK IV, 433a-b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 311c-315a,c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 244d-245b; 251b-d; 343b-c; 618a-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 77b-78b; 93b-c; 94c-95c; 403c-404b; 458c-d; 459b 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 60a-c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372b-d 43 Declaration of Independence: [52-55] 2a; [70-71] 2b 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE III 15c-16a; AMENDMENTS, V-VIII 17b-d; XI 18a; XIV, SECT 1 18d 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 15, 65a-b; NUMBER 17, 69d-70a; NUMBER 22, 83d-84a; NUMBER 65 198a-200c passim; NUMBER 73, 221b-c; NUMBER 78-83 229d-251a passim 44 Boswell: Johnson, 133b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 85 35a-b; PART III, PAR 214 71a-c; PAR 219 72d-73a; PAR 222-229 73b-75b, ADDITIONS, 141 139c / Philosophy of History, PART II, 250d-251a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 292a-295a 50 Marx: Capital, 139b-140b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XII, 547a-d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 168c-d; BK IX 235b,d-271d; BK XII 348b,d-401d

5h. The defect of positive law: its need for correction or dispensation by equity

7 Plato: Laws, BK VI, 699d-700b; BK IX, 754b-d; BK XI, 777d-778b; BK XII, 785c-786a 8 Aristotle: Topics, BK VI, CH 3 [141a15-18] 194b 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 10 385c-386b esp [1137b10-28] 385d-386a / Politics, BK III, CH 15 [1286a10-37] 484b-d; CH 16 [1287a24-28] 485d; [1287b15-25] 486a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 13 [1374a17-b24] 618c-619a 14 Plutarch: Fabius, 150d-151a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 96, A 6 235a-d; Q 97, A 4 238b-239b; Q 100, A 8, ANS and REP 1 259d-261a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 94d; PART II, 132d; 133d-135d; 136b; 156b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 50b-51a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XIV, SECT 159-160 62b-d 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART IV, 152b-154a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 343c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73d-74b; 77d-78a; 91b-c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 399c-400d 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 78, 232c-d; NUMBER 80, 237a-b; NUMBER 83, 248d-249a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 214 71a-c; PAR 223 73c-d

6. Law and the individual

6a. Obedience to the authority and force of law: the sanctions of conscience and fear; the objective and subjective sanctions of law; law, duty, and right

Old Testament: Deuteronomy, 5:28-29; 13:11; 17:12-13; 19:18-20; 21:20-21; 28:58-59 / Ecclesiastes, 12:13 New Testament: Romans, 13:1-5 / I Peter, 2:13-16 5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [490-565] 86b-87a; [681-710] 88b-c 5 Sophocles: Antigone 131a-142d esp [362-372] 134b, [640-680] 136d-137a / Ajax [666-676] 148d; [1047-1421] 152a-155a,c 5 Euripides: Orestes [491-525] 399a-b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 370b-c; BK II, 396c-d; 400d-401a; BK III, 425a-c 7 Plato: Apology, 206b-d / Crito 213a-219a,c / Republic, BK II, 311b-312b / Statesman, 599c-604b / Laws, BK I, 675c-676b / Seventh Letter, 807a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VI, CH 12 [1144a12-21] 393d; BK X, CH 9 [1179b35-1180a28] 434a-435c / Politics, BK II, CH 8 [1269a12-23] 465a-b; BK III, CH 15 [1286a28-41] 485b; BK IV, CH 8 [1294a1-8] 493d; CH 11 [1295b2-20] 495c-d; BK V, CH 8 [1307b30-38] 509d-510a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1143-1160] 76a-b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK IV, CH 7, 234d-235a 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 38c; 48a / Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a,c / Solon, 66a / Agesilaus, 480b,d-481a / Cleomenes, 659d-660a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 2 213c-214c; A 2, ANS and REP 4 214d-215a,c; Q 95, A 1, ANS and REP 1 226c-227c; Q 96, AA 4-6 233a-235d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 90b-d; PART II, 99a-b; 112b-d; 115a-b; 130b-131c; 132d-133d; 149b-c; 153b-c; PART III, 224d; 240a-241a; 244d-246a,c; CONCLUSION, 279a-c; 283c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 48b-50a; 319b; 383c-d; 480b-c; 520b 27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT III, SC I [263-336] 372c-373b 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 68b-73a; 177a-b; PART II, 362b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [1334-1379] 368b-369b 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 114b / Pensées, 297-303 227a-b 35 Locke: Toleration, 3a; 16c-17c / Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 94 46a-c; CH VIII, SECT 97 47a-b; SECT 120-122 52d-53c; CH IX 53c-54d passim; CH XI, SECT 134 55b-d / Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 5-6 105a-c passim; SECT 13 107d-108c; BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 6 229d 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 76, 485a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 69a-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 366d / Political Economy, 371a-372b / Social Contract, BK II, 398d; 401c-402a; 406c-d; BK IV, 426b-d 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 308a; 309a-311c passim; 397a-c 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254b; 259a-c; 273d-287d esp 273d-274a, 275b-d, 277d-279d, 281c-282d, 283b-d / Practical Reason, 325d-326b; 356a-c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b-366d; 375b-d; 379b-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 389a-b; 391a-c / Science of Right, 399c; 400b-d 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 15, 65a-b; NUMBER 16 66c-68d passim; NUMBER 17, 69d-70a; NUMBER 27 94d-96c 43 Mill: Liberty, 295d-296b; 302d-303a / Representative Government, 329c-330a; 339c-340d / Utilitarianism, 457c-461c; 465d-466b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 181b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2b-3a; 4d-5a; PART III, PAR 144 55b; PAR 261 83a-d; PAR 270 84d-89c passim; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d; 93 132a; 140 139b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 186b-c; PART I, 207b-c; 211a-c; PART III, 271d-272d; PART IV, 333c-d; 353c-d; 365b-c 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 304a-305c esp 305a; 310a-317d esp 310d, 313d-314c, 317a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 670c-671a

6b. The exemption of the sovereign person from the coercive force of law

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 95d-96b; 107c-d 7 Plato: Laws, BK IV, 682b-c; BK IX, 754a-b / Seventh Letter, 807a-b 14 Plutarch: Alexander, 564d-566b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 96, A 5, REP 3 233d-234d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 102b-c; 125b-c; 130d; 149d-150a; 153b 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 177a-b 30 Bacon: New Atlantis, 208b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH XVI, SECT 195 70a-b; CH XVIII, SECT 205-206 72a-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 357b-c / Political Economy, 370d-371a / Social Contract, BK II, 399d-400a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 27b-c; 51c-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 74c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 438b-c; 439c; 446a-b 43 Articles of Confederation: V [74-81] 6a 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 6 [132-142] 12c; ARTICLE II, SECT 4 15c 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 69, 207b-c; NUMBER 81, 240c-241a 44 Boswell: Johnson, 120a-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 284 96b

6c. The force of tyrannical, unjust, or bad laws: the right of rebellion or disobedience

5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes [1011-1082] 38b-39a,c 5 Sophocles: Antigone 131a-142d esp [1-99] 131a-132a, [441-525] 134d-135c, [640-680] 136d-137a, [891-943] 138d-139a 5 Euripides: Phoenician Maidens [1625-1682] 392b-d 7 Plato: Apology 200a-212a,c / Crito 213a-219a,c / Laws, BK VI, 706b-c / Seventh Letter, 800c-d 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK IV, CH 8 [1294a1-8] 493d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 13 [1373b1-17] 617c-d; CH 15 [1375a26-b25] 619d-620b; [1376b3-b31] 621a-c 14 Plutarch: Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d / Marcus Brutus, 805c-811a 15 Tacitus: Histories, BK IV, 269d-270b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, PAR 15-17 17a-18a / City of God, BK XIX, CH 17 522b-523a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 1, REP 3 205b-206b; Q 92, A 1, REP 4 213c-214c; Q 93, A 3, REP 2 217b-218a; Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, A 4, ANS and REP 2-3 233a-d; Q 97, A 2 236d-237b; PART II-II, Q 42, A 2, REP 3 584b-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 102b-c; 113d-114b; 115a-116a; 134c-135b; 153c; 157b; PART III, 228b; 238b-c; PART IV, 273a-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 7c; 504c-506a 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [888-902] 359a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 326 231a 35 Locke: Toleration, 16c-17c / Civil Government, CH XIII, SECT 155 60d-61a; CH XIV, SECT 168 64b-c; CH XVI-XIX 65d-81d passim 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK I, 388d-389a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 397a-c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 439a-441d; 450d-451b 43 Declaration of Independence: 1a-3b passim 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 16, 68b-c; NUMBER 28, 97c-d; NUMBER 33, 108b-109a; NUMBER 78, 230d-232d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 465d-466b; 467c-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 668a-669d

6d. The educative function of law in relation to virtue and vice: the efficacy of law as limited by virtue in the individual citizen

5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [681-710] 88b-c 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 35c-d; BK VII, 232d-233a; 233c-d 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 370b-c; BK II, 396c-d 7 Plato: Protagoras, 45b-47c / Apology, 203d / Republic, BK IV, 344a-345d; BK IX, 426c-d / Statesman, 607b-608d / Laws, BK I, 640a-644b; BK III, 669d-670a; BK IV, 684b-686c; BK V, 690d-691b; BK VI, 706b-c; BK VIII, 735c-738c; BK XII, 792c-d; 794a-799a,c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1102a8-25] 347c; BK II, CH 1 348b,d-349b passim, esp [1103b3-7] 349a; BK V, CH 1 [1129b12-24] 377a; CH 2 [1130b20-29] 378b; BK X, CH 9 [1179b35-1180a28] 434a-435c / Politics, BK VII, CH 14 537b-538d esp [1332a33-1333b29] 537c-538c 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 32a-48d / Lycurgus-Numa, 63d-64a / Solon, 64b,d-77a,c / Lysander, 361b-d / Cleomenes, 659d-660a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 57b-58d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 92 213c-215a,c; Q 95, A 1 226c-227c; Q 96, AA 2-3 231c-233a; Q 98, A 6, ANS 244c-245b; Q 100 251a-265d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [85-105] 77d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 131a-b; 140b-141b; 149b-c; 153a-155c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 131b-132a 27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, ACT I, SC I [19-39] 177c; ACT II, SC I [225-270] 181a-c; ACT V, SC I [318-324] 202b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 78d-81c 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XII [285-306] 325b-326a / Areopagitica, 383a-395b 35 Locke: Toleration, 8c; 14a / Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 9-13 230b-231c 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 267b-268b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK IV, 13b,d-17b; BK V, 18b,d-23a; BK VII, 44d-45c; 47c-50c; BK XII, 86b; 87c-88a; BK XIV, 104a-108d passim; BK XVI, 119d; BK XIX, 138c-142a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 345d, 359d / Political Economy, 372a-377b esp 372a-373a, 375d-377a / Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c; BK II, 400d-401a; BK IV, 434b-435a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 100c-101b; 291d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 93d-94a 42 Kant: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367b-c; 373b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-b / Science of Right, 448d-449c 43 Constitution of the U.S.: AMENDMENTS, XVIII 19c-d; XXI 20c 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 12, 58b-c 43 Mill: Liberty, 272d-273d; 302d-312a passim, esp 306b-307a; 315d-316b / Representative Government, 336c-337b / Utilitarianism, 467b-468a 44 Boswell: Johnson, 222d-223b; 301c-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 150 56c-57a; PAR 153 57c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 166b; PART IV, 333c-d 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 328c-d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 30d-32a 54 Freud: War and Death, 758c-d

6e. The breach of law: crime and punishment

6e(1) The nature and causes of crime

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 400d-401a; BK III, 436d-438b 7 Plato: Laws, BK II, 654c-d; BK V, 690d-691b; BK IX, 743c; 746a-750a; BK X, 758b-760c; BK XI 771b-784b passim; BK XII, 784b-786b; 791c-d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 2 [1130b30-1131a9] 378b-c; CH 11 [1138a4-13] 386b-c / Politics, BK II, CH 7 461d-463c esp [1267a2-16] 462c-d; BK IV, CH 11 [1295b3-12] 495c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10-14 611c-619d 18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 10, 662a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 139c-144d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 23b-c; 334b-335a 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 6-13 26b-28b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 271c-273a,c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XII, 85c-86d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 364d 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 309a-c; 397a-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 35a; 175c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 92c; 93c 42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 391d-392a / Science of Right, 446a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 95-102 36b-39b; PART III, PAR 218 72c-d; PAR 319, 106a 50 Marx: Capital, 364a-c 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 33c-34b 54 Freud: Ego and Id, 714a-b

6e(2) The prevention of crime

5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [490-565] 86b-87a 5 Sophocles: Electra [1501-1507] 169a,c 5 Euripides: Orestes [491-525] 399a-b 5 Aristophanes: Clouds [1303-1464] 504b-506c 6 Herodotus: History, BK II, 87a-b; BK V, 164c 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 400d-401a; BK III, 424d-429a 7 Plato: Protagoras, 45b-d / Gorgias, 267c-270c / Republic, BK III, 321d-322d / Laws, BK V, 688d-689a; 690d-691b; BK IX, 743a-c; 757a; BK X, 769d-770c; BK XI, 782a-b; BK XII, 786a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK III, CH 5 [1113b21-1114a2] 359d-360a; BK X, CH 9 [1179b33-1180b32] 434a-435a / Politics, BK II, CH 7 461d-463c esp [1267a2-16] 462c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 12 [1372b23-27] 615d-616a; CH 14 [1375a1-7] 619b-c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 61c-d; BK XIV, 151d-152c; BK XV, 162c-d 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 16 521d-522a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 87, A 3, REP 2 187b-188b; Q 105, A 2, REP 9 309d-316a 22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, PAR 40 418b-419a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 94a; PART II, 140a; 141b; 143d; 145a; 145d; 147a-b; 157d-158a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 446a-b 26 Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet, ACT I, SC I [71-110] 286b-d 27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, ACT I, SC III 177b-d; ACT V, SC I [318-324] 202b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a; PROP 51, SCHOL 439d; PROP 63, SCHOL 444a 35 Locke: Toleration, 3a / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 7-12 26c-28a / Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 13 107d-108c 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 76, 485a 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 150b; 267b-268b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 37d-38a; 38d-40b; BK XIX, 139c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 351b-d / Political Economy, 371a-c; 372c / Social Contract, BK II, 399a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 309a-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 175c-d; 216a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 83c; 85a-c; 92b 42 Kant: Science of Right, 446a-449c esp 446b-447c, 448b-d 43 Mill: Liberty, 271c-272d; 313a-316b / Representative Government, 334d-335a / Utilitarianism, 471b-472d 44 Boswell: Johnson, 7d-8a; 204b-c; 301c-d; 335c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 99 37b-d; PART III, PAR 232 75c-d; PAR 319, 106a; ADDITIONS, 62 126a / Philosophy of History, PART I, 214d-216a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 314b 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 30d-32a; 33c-34b; BK VI, 165c 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 787c

6e(3) The punishment of crime

5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [490-562] 86b-87a; [681-710] 88b-c 5 Sophocles: Antigone [640-680] 136d-137a / Electra [1501-1507] 169a,c 5 Euripides: Orestes [491-604] 399a-400a 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 32b-c; BK III, 116b-117a; BK IV, 135c-136a; BK V, 164c; BK VII, 251a-b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 427d-428a 7 Plato: Protagoras, 45a-46d / Gorgias, 267c-270c / Statesman, 601c-602d / Laws, BK V, 690d-691b; BK IX 743a-757d esp 747d, 757a; BK X, 769d-770c; BK XI 771b-784b passim; BK XII, 784b-786b; 792c-793a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 4 379b-380b; CH 5 [1132a21-30] 380b-c; CH 11 [1138a4-13] 386b-c; BK X, CH 9 [1179b33-1180b32] 434a-435a / Politics, BK VI, CH 8 [1321b40-1322a8] 525d-526a; BK VII, CH 13 [1332a10-16] 536d / Athenian Constitution, CH 52 576b-d; CH 57-59 579b-580c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 12 [1372a3-b16] 615c-616b; CH 14 619a-d 14 Plutarch: Solon, 70d; 73a / Themistocles, 97b-d / Cicero, 711c-712d / Artaxerxes, 851a-b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 57d 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 6 514b-515a; BK XXI, CH 11 570b-571a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 92, A 2, ANS and REP 3-4 214d-215a,c; Q 96, A 5 233d-234d; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 9-12 309d-316a 22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, PAR 40 418b-419a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 145a-148b; 157d-158a; CONCLUSION, 281a-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 519a-c 26 Shakespeare: 2nd Henry VI, ACT III, SC I [1-15] 44c-d / Romeo and Juliet, ACT I, SC I [71-110] 286b-d; ACT III, SC I [146-202] 302c-303a / Richard II, ACT I, SC II [118-153] 324d-325b / 2nd Henry IV, ACT V, SC II [65-145] 498d-499b / Henry V, ACT II, SC II 539a-541a 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 68b-73a 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 51, SCHOL 439d 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 108b-109a 35 Locke: Toleration, 3a / Civil Government, CH I, SECT 3 25d; CH II, SECT 6-13 26b-28b; CH VII, SECT 87-88 44a-c; CH IX, SECT 128 54b-c; SECT 130 54c; CH XV, SECT 171 65a-b / Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 6 229d, SECT 9 230b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 76, 485a 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART I, 28a-b; 29b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 37d-43d; BK XII, 85c-92b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 351b-d / Political Economy, 371a-c / Social Contract, BK II, 398b-399a; 406c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 175d-176a; 388c-d; 617b-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 83b-c; 91a-94c 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 306b-c / Science of Right, 446a-449c esp 446b-447c, 448a-d; 450a 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 9 [271-272] 13d; SECT 10 [300-301] 14a; ARTICLE II, SECT 4 15c; ARTICLE III, SECT 3 [507-511] 16a; AMENDMENTS, V 17b-c; VIII 17d; XIII 18c 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 15, 65a-b; NUMBER 21, 78b-d; NUMBER 65 198a-200c passim 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 471d-472d; 474d 44 Boswell: Johnson, 204b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 90-103 35d-39b esp PAR 96-100 36c-38a; PART II, PAR 132 46b-47a; PART III, PAR 218 72c-d; PAR 220 73a-b; PAR 233 75d; PAR 319, 106a; ADDITIONS, 60 125d; 138 139a-b / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 320b-c 50 Marx: Capital, 364a-367a, passim 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 505a-511b 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 30b-32a; BK VI, 168c-d; BK XII, 398b-d

7. Law and the state

7a. The distinction between government by men and government by laws: the nature of constitutional or political law

5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [681-710] 88b-c 5 Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus [907-931] 122d-123a 5 Euripides: Suppliants [399-462] 261d-262b 5 Aristophanes: Wasps [463-507] 512d-513c 6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107c-d; BK VII, 233a-d 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 368c-d; BK II, 396b-c 7 Plato: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 667c-d; BK IV, 681b-682c; BK IX, 754a-b / Seventh Letter, 805d; 807a-b 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 6 [1134a25-b8] 382a-b; BK X, CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a6-16] 445a-b; CH 5 [1254a34-b9] 448a; CH 7 [1255b15-20] 449b; CH 12 453d-454a; BK II, CH 10 [1272a35-b11] 468d-469a; BK III, CH 10 [1281a29-38] 479a; CH 11 [1282b1-14] 480b-c; CH 15 [1285b34]-CH 17 [1288a5] 484b-486c; BK IV, CH 4 [1292a4-37] 491b-d; CH 6 492b-493a; CH 8 [1293b22-27] 493c; CH 10 [1295a9-23] 495a-b 14 Plutarch: Cato the Younger, 635a-b; 638b-639a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 36b; BK III, 51b-c; 61c-62a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 3 207a-c; Q 95, A 1, REP 2 226c-227c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 149d-150a, PART IV, 273a-c 27 Shakespeare: Henry VIII, ACT I, SC II [91-101] 553d 35 Locke: Civil Government 25a-81d esp CH IV, SECT 21 29d, CH VI, SECT 57 36d-37b, CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c, CH XI, SECT 137 56d-57b, CH XVIII, SECT 199-202 71a-72a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a; 7c-9a,c; BK III, 12a-13c; BK VI, 33a-35a; BK XIX, 137c-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323d-324a; 358b; 361c-362a / Social Contract, BK II, 400a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 96d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Science of Right, 401c; 436c-d; 451b-c / Judgement, 586c 43 Declaration of Independence: 1a-3b passim 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE VI [583-599] 16d 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 33 107b-109b passim; NUMBER 44, 146d-147a; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b 43 Mill: Representative Government, 340a-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 260-271 82a-89c; PAR 349 111d-112a; ADDITIONS, 171 146b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 198b-199c; PART I, 213b; PART II, 271d; PART III, 303a-b; PART IV, 329b-c; 342b-c 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-d

7b. The supremacy of law as the principle of political freedom

5 Euripides: Suppliants [429-441] 262a-b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 396c-d; BK III, 438a-b 7 Plato: Laws, BK III, 672d-674d 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 17 [1288a11-14] 486d; BK IV, CH 4 [1292a4-37] 491b-d; BK V, CH 9 [1310a25-36] 512c / Athenian Constitution, CH 45 573d-574a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK I, SECT 14 254b-c 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH IV, SECT 21 29d; CH VI, SECT 57-60 36d-38a; CH IX, SECT 124-131 53d-54d; CH XI, SECT 136-139 56c-58a; CH XVIII, SECT 202 71d-72a; SECT 206 72c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 34c-d; BK XI, 69a-b; BK XII, 85a-c; BK XV, 109c; 112c-d; BK XXVI, 223c-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 353d-355b esp 354d-355a / Political Economy, 370b-d; 375b-c / Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 314d-315a,c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 398c-399c; 436c-d 43 Declaration of Independence: [1-47] 1a-2a passim; [72-79] 2b 43 Constitution of the U.S.: PREAMBLE 11a,c; AMENDMENTS, V-VII 17b-d; XIII, SECT 1-XIV, SECT 1 18c-d 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 1, 30a-c; NUMBER 9, 47b-c; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 57, 177d-178a; NUMBER 84, 251b-253d 43 Mill: Liberty 267a-323a,c passim, esp 267b,d-274a / Representative Government, 339d-340c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 208 69c; PAR 265 84b; PAR 286 96c-97a; ADDITIONS, 129 137c; 135 138c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-171c; 180c-d; PART I, 230a-c; PART II, 271d-272d; PART IV, 321a; 342b-d; 345a-b; 364b-c

7c. The priority of natural to civil law: the inviolability or inalienability of natural rights

5 Sophocles: Antigone [450-460] 135a 9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 13 [1373b1-17] 617c-d; CH 15 [1375a25-b13] 619d-620a; [1376b3-b31] 621a-c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK II, CH 21 161b-162d; BK XIX, CH 21 524a-525a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, AA 4-6 223d-226b; Q 95, A 2 227c-228c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-87d; 90a-b; 94b-95a; PART II, 115b-116a; 131a-c; 134c; 138c; 142b-c; 153c; PART IV, 273c-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 519a-520b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b 35 Locke: Toleration, 20d-21a / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 10-12 27b-28a; CH III, SECT 16-19 28d-29c; CH IV, SECT 21 29d; CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c; CH IX 53c-54d; CH XI, SECT 135-140 55d-58a; CH XIV, SECT 168 64b-c; CH XVI-XIX 65d-81d passim 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1c-d; 2b-d; BK XV, 109b-110a; 111a-b; BK XXVI, 215b-217c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 357c-358b / Social Contract, BK I, 393d-394d; BK II, 397a-b; 399b-c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 52b-c; 61b; BK II, 140b; BK IV, 228a 42 Kant: Science of Right, 408d-409c; 426b-429b esp 426b-c; 434a; 436a-b; 456b-457a 43 Declaration of Independence: 1a-3b esp [1-28] 1a-b 43 Constitution of the U.S.: AMENDMENTS, IX 17d-18a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 28, 97c; NUMBER 43, 143b-c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 465d-466b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 363c-364a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 66 29a-c; PART II, PAR 127 45b-c; PART III, PAR 323-324 107a-d; ADDITIONS, 43 123c / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 362d-363a; 364d-365a

7d. Tyranny and treason or sedition as illegal acts: the use of force without authority

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 432b-c 7 Plato: Laws, BK IX, 744c-d 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 10 [1281a19-28] 478d-479a; BK V, CH 10 [1313a8-18] 515c-d; BK VII, CH 2 [1324b23-41] 528d-529a 14 Plutarch: Poplicola, 77a-80d; 81d / Timoleon, 196c-197b / Lysander-Sulla, 387b,d-388c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 36b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 92, A 1, REP 4 213c-214c; Q 93, A 3, REP 2 217b-218a; Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, A 4, ANS and REP 2 233a-d; PART II-II, Q 42, A 2 584b-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 101a-102c; 114d-115a; 115d-116a; 121b-122b; 144a; 147c; 150c-151a; 152b-c; 153c; PART IV, 273a-c 26 Shakespeare: Henry V, ACT II, SC II [102-144] 540b-c 33 Pascal: Pensées, 298 227a; 325-326 230b-231a; 332 232a-b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XI, SECT 136-140 56c-58a; CH XIII, SECT 155 60d-61a; CH XVII-XIX 70c-81d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 361c-362a / Social Contract, BK I, 388d-389a; BK III, 419a-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 251d; 525a-526c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 92d-93c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 439a-441d 43 Declaration of Independence: 1a-3b esp [25-30] 1b 43 Articles of Confederation: IV [37-44] 5d; V [74-81] 6a 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE II, SECT 4 15c; ARTICLE III, SECT 3 15d-16a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 16, 68b-c; NUMBER 43, 140c-d; NUMBER 65 198a-200c passim; NUMBER 74, 222b-d 43 Mill: Liberty, 274b,d [fn 1] 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 278 92c-98a / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 328b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 8d-10d; BK XI, 505a-511b; EPILOGUE I, 668a-669d

7e. The need for administrative discretion in matters undetermined by law: the royal prerogative

7 Plato: Statesman, 600a-b / Laws, BK VI, 705d-706c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 10 385c-386b passim, esp [1137b26-31] 386a / Politics, BK III, CH 16 [1287a24-28] 485d; [1287b15-25] 486a-b / Athenian Constitution, CH 9 556c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354b4-7] 593c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 1, REP 3 226c-227c; Q 96, A 6, REP 3 235a-d; Q 97, A 4 238b-239b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 103c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XII, SECT 147 59a-b; CH XIV 62b-64c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73d-75b 42 Kant: Science of Right, 448a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 214 71a-c; ADDITIONS, 134 138b-c

7f. The juridical conception of the person: the legal personality of the state and other corporations

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 96c-98a,c; PART II, 100c-102c; 104a-b; 117b-119a; 119d-120c; 122b-124b esp 122b-c; 130b-d; 132a-b; 151c-152a 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 368d-369a / Social Contract, BK I, 392a; 393a; BK II, 396d-397a; BK III, 408b-409a; 412c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 429b; 438b; 454a-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 46 23d-24a; PART III, PAR 279, 93c; ADDITIONS, 191 150a-c / Philosophy of History, PART III, 285b-d; 302d-303c

8. Historical observations on the development of law and on the diversity of legal systems or institutions

New Testament: Romans, 3:1-5:21 / Galatians, 3:1-5:14 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 6c; 14a-c; BK II, 77d-78b; 87a-b; BK III, 96a-b 7 Plato: Critias, 484c-485d / Laws, BK III, 664b-670a esp 666b-c, 668a; 674d-676b 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 7-12 461d-471d passim / Athenian Constitution 553a-584a,c passim, esp CH 27, PAR 3-5 565b-c, CH 63-69 581d-584a,c 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1136-1160] 76a-b 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 26a-b / Lycurgus 32a-48d passim / Numa Pompilius 49a-61d passim / Lycurgus-Numa 61b,d-64a,c / Solon 64b,d-77a,c / Poplicola, 81b-82a / Poplicola-Solon, 86d-87b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 44b-c; BK III, 51b-c; 57b-58d; 61c-62a; BK IV, 67d-68a; BK XII, 111a-d; BK XIV, 151d-152c; BK XV, 162c-d 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, PAR 13-14 16c-17a / City of God, BK X, CH 25 313c-314c; BK XVIII, CH 11 477c-d; BK XX, CH 4 532b-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; QQ 98-108 239b-337d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, VI [1-30] 113c-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 144c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47c-48a; 281a-283c; 519b-520b 26 Shakespeare: Henry V, ACT I, SC II [33-95] 534b-535a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 95b 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 374b-376a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws 1a-315d passim 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324c-325a; 330a-d; 353d-355c; 366a-b / Political Economy, 369c-d / Social Contract, BK II, 401d-402a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 51d; 175b-176a; 616d-618d; 624b-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71b,d-96d; 108a-c; 210b-c; 403b-404d 42 Kant: Science of Right, 451d-452a 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 2, 32a-d; NUMBER 9, 47b-d; NUMBER 38, 121b-122b; NUMBER 53, 167d; NUMBER 84, 252b-c 43 Mill: Liberty, 295d-296b / Representative Government, 329d-330a / Utilitarianism, 467c-d 44 Boswell: Johnson, 204c-205b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 3 10a-12c; ADDITIONS, 176 147c-d / Philosophy of History, PART I, 229d-230a; PART II, 271d-272a; PART III, 290a; 296b-297a; 312c-d; PART IV, 345a-b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 292a-297a 50 Marx: Capital, 114d-115c; 131a-145c; 194a-b; 195b-196d; 236c-238a; 241a-244b; 357a-358b; 364a-368b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 238c-243d

9. The legal profession and the study of law: praise and dispraise of lawyers and judges

Old Testament: Deuteronomy, 1:12-17; 17:8-13 / I Samuel, 8:3—(D) I Kings, 8:3 / Isaiah, 1:21-26—(D) Isaias, 1:21-26 / Jeremiah, 5:26-29—(D) Jeremias, 5:26-29 / Micah, 3:9-12—(D) Micheas, 3:9-12 New Testament: Luke, 11:45-46,52-54; 18:1-8 / I Corinthians, 6:1-9 5 Aristophanes: Clouds [428-475] 493c-494b / Birds [27-48] 542c-d; [1035-1057] 555c-d; [1410-1469] 559c-560b 6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 95d-96b 7 Plato: Apology, 200a-c / Republic, BK III, 337b-338a / Theaetetus, 528c-529a; 544b-c / Statesman, 604c-605c / Laws, BK XI, 784a-b; BK XII, 792c-d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 9 [1180b12-1181b24] 435b-436a,c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354a13-1355a3] 593b-594a; CH 12 [1372a17-21] 615d; [1372b3-b5] 616a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK XI, 101c-102a; BK XIV, 151c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 6 514b-515a 22 Chaucer: Prologue [309-330] 164b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78b-c; PART II, 132a-b; 135b; 150b 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 85c-92c; BK III, 204c-215c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47c-48a; 238a-b; 283a; 516c-520b 26 Shakespeare: 2nd Henry VI, ACT IV, SC II [83-91] 58c / Merchant of Venice, ACT IV, SC I 425c-430b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 5b-6a; 94d-95a 32 Milton: Sonnets, XVIII 67b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 12 294b-c 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 73b-75a; PART IV, 152a-154a 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 260a-b; 266b; 374b-376a 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 54b-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330a-d 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 314b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 244d-245d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 72d-73a; 75d-80b 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 78, 233a-c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 157c-d; 191c-d; 209d-210a; 216c; 251d-252b; 281c-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 3 10a-12c; PART III, PAR 212 70d-71a; PAR 215 71c-d; PAR 228 74d-75b; PAR 297 99b; ADDITIONS, 135 138c 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [1968-1979] 46b-47a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 295b-297a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 243c; BK XII, 547b-d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK IX, 247b-d

CROSS-REFERENCES

For other discussions bearing on the kinds of law, see CONSTITUTION 2b; GOD 7c; JUSTICE 1e, 10a; LIBERTY 1b, 3c; LOVE 5b(1); NATURE 2b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5c; PRINCIPLE 4, 4b; PUNISHMENT 4c; STATE 3b(2)-3c; VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(3); WAR AND PEACE 1; WILL 5a(4); WORLD 1c; and for the comparable distinctions in the sphere of rights, see JUSTICE 6-6b.

For the relation of law to liberty, justice, and peace, see DEMOCRACY 4a; JUSTICE 10-10c; LIBERTY 1d, 1g; MONARCHY 4e(1); TYRANNY 5a; WAR AND PEACE 11a, 11c; and for the distinction between government by law and government by men, see CONSTITUTION 1; MONARCHY 1a(1); TYRANNY 5-5b.

For the relation of law to duty, virtue, and sin, see DUTY 3, 5; EDUCATION 4c; SIN 1; VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(3); WILL 8d.

For the conception of the common good as an end of government and law, see GOOD AND EVIL 5d; GOVERNMENT 1c; HAPPINESS 5-5b; LIBERTY 1e; STATE 2f.

For other discussions of the making of law, see GOVERNMENT 3c-3c(2); PRUDENCE 6b.

For the factors of authority and power in lawmaking, see GOVERNMENT 1d; TYRANNY 1a; and for law in relation to sovereignty, see GOVERNMENT 1a; LIBERTY 1b; TYRANNY 5c; WAR AND PEACE 11d.

For other discussions of the application of laws to particular cases, see GOVERNMENT 3d-3d(2); OPINION 6b; PRUDENCE 6b; and for the problem of equity in the application of law, see JUSTICE 10d; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 6c.

For the relation of law to custom and habit, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 6b; HABIT 7.

For the consideration of punishment for the breach of human and divine law, see GOD 5i; JUSTICE 10c; PUNISHMENT 4-4d, 5a-5e(2); SIN 6-6e.

For other discussions of the use of lawless force, and of the right of rebellion or civil disobedience, see JUSTICE 10b; REVOLUTION 6a-6b.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• Augustine. On the Spirit and the Letter
• Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, BK III, CH 111-121, 128-130
• —. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, Q 16
• —. The Two Precepts of Charity and the Ten Commandments
• F. Bacon. The Maxims of the Law
• Hobbes. Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, CH 2-4
• —. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic
• —. A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England
• Spinoza. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Theological-Political Treatise), CH 4, 12
• Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK III, PART II, SECT XI
• —. Of the Original Contract
• A. Smith. Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms
• Kant. Lectures on Ethics, pp 47-70
• Hegel. The Philosophy of Mind, SECT II, SUB-SECT A,C (cc, α, β)
• Freud. Totem and Taboo

II.

• Cicero. De Republica (The Republic), III
• —. De Legibus (The Laws)
• Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory), BK V; BK VII, CH 5-7, 10
• Gaius. Commentaries
• Talmud
• Justinian. The Digest
• —. The Institutes
• Saadia Gaon. The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, TREATISE III
• Ranulf de Glanville. The Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England
• Maimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART III, CH 25-53
• Bracton. De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England)
• Njáls saga
• Legnano. On War, Reprisals, and the Duel
• Fortescue. Governance of England
• —. De Laudibus Legum Angliae (In Praise of English Law)
• Saint-German. Dialogues Between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student in the Laws of England
• Vitoria. De Indis et De Jure Belli
• Soto. Libri Decem de Justitia et Jure
• Hooker. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity
• Suárez. A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver
• Coke. Institutes of the Laws of England
• Grotius. The Rights of War and Peace
• Pufendorf. De Jure Naturae et Gentium (On the Law of Nature and Nations)
• Vico. Il diritto universale
• Burlamaqui. Principles of Natural and Politic Law
• Blackstone. Commentaries on the Laws of England
• Vattel. The Law of Nations
• Voltaire. “Crimes or Offenses,” “Criminal,” “Law (Natural),” “Law (Salic),” “Law (Civil and Ecclesiastical),” “Laws,” “Laws (Spirit of),” in A Philosophical Dictionary
• J. Wilson. Works, PART I, CH I-V, XII; PART III
• Jefferson. The Commonplace Book
• Bentham. A Comment on the Commentaries, SECT I-XII
• —. A Fragment on Government, CH 4-5
• —. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
• Austin. Lectures on Jurisprudence
• —. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined
• Whewell. The Elements of Morality, BK VI, CH 1
• Thoreau. Civil Disobedience
• Dickens. Pickwick Papers
• —. Bleak House
• Trendelenburg. Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik
• Maine. Ancient Law
• H. Sidgwick. The Methods of Ethics, BK I, CH 6
• Ibsen. Pillars of Society
• Ihering. The Struggle for Law
• —. Law as a Means to an End
• O. W. Holmes Jr. The Common Law
• Brentano. The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, PAR 1-13, 37-49
• Pollock. Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, CH 2
• —. The Expansion of the Common Law
• Dicey. The Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century
• Vecchio. The Formal Bases of Law
• Kohler. Philosophy of Law
• Duguit. Law in the Modern State
• B. Russell. Proposed Roads to Freedom, CH 5
• T. Veblen. The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts, CH 2
• Pound. The Spirit of the Common Law
• Cardozo. The Nature of the Judicial Process
• —. The Growth of the Law
• Kafka. The Trial
• Vinogradoff. Common Sense in Law
• —. Custom and Right
• Hocking. Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights
• Malinowski. Crime and Custom in Savage Society
• C. K. Allen. Law in the Making
• Dewey. “Logical Method and Law,” “Nature and Reason in Law,” in Philosophy and Civilization
• F. Cohen. Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals
• M. R. Cohen. Reason and Nature, BK III, CH 4
• —. Law and the Social Order
• A. J. Carlyle. Political Liberty
• Maritain. The Rights of Man and Natural Law
• Kelsen. General Theory of Law and State