Chapter 45: LANGUAGE

INTRODUCTION

The liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic are all concerned with language. Each of these disciplines establishes its own rules for the use of language, each by reference to a special standard of excellence or correctness which measures language as an instrument of thought or communication. Together these three arts regulate discourse as a whole. Their relation to one another represents the relation of the various aspects of discourse—the emotional, the social, and the intellectual.

The tradition of the great books is the tradition of the liberal arts. Their greatness consists not only in the magnitude of the ideas or problems with which they deal, but also in their formal excellence as products of liberal art. Some of the great books are expositions of logic or rhetoric. None is a treatise on grammar. But they all plainly exemplify, even where they do not expound, the special refinements of the arts of language; and many of them, especially the works of science, philosophy, and theology, and even some of the poetical works, deal explicitly with the difficulties of discourse, and the devices that have been used to overcome them. Language is their instrument, and they are consciously critical in its use.

One of the great books—Augustine’s treatise On Christian Doctrine—is directly and explicitly concerned with grammar in the broad sense of the art of reading. Addressed to “earnest students of the word,” it attempts to “lay down rules for interpretation,” and, in so doing, it is compared by Augustine to “one who teaches reading, that is, shows others how to read for themselves.” It is not reading in general, however, but the reading of one book—the Bible—with which Augustine is concerned. We shall return later to this special problem of interpreting the word of God, or language which is thought to be inspired.

In our day, there is a lively interest in the problems of language. This is partly because of the development of historical and comparative studies of the various human languages, and the scientific formulation of what is common to all languages in origin, structure, and change. But it also results in part from the claims of a discipline popularly called “semantics” to have discovered the properties of language as a medium of expression, and especially to have discovered its limitations. The claims of semantics often go so far as to find in the misuse of language the origin of many human ills. The novelty of semantics is supposed to lie both in the diagnosis and in the remedies proposed.

Of these two sources of current interest in language, the second calls attention to the vitality of the liberal arts, of which semantics is a contemporary formulation. It might almost be said that there is nothing new about semantics except the name. Hobbes, Bacon, and Locke, for example, deal explicitly with the abuses of language and the treachery of words. Each makes recommendations for the correction of these faults. Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Berkeley and Hume, are similarly concerned with ambiguity in speech, with the multiple senses in which discourse of every sort can be interpreted, and with the methods by which men can approximate precision in the use of language.

The other interest in language is also represented in the great books. Though the science of linguistics and the history of languages are researches of recent origin, speculation about the origin of language and, in that context, consideration of the natural and conventional aspects of language extend throughout the tradition. At all times the discussion of the nature of man and society considers language as one of the principal characteristics of the specifically human world or compares the language of men with the speech of brutes.

In addition there is the broad philosophical inquiry into the nature of signs and symbols in general. This is not limited to the problem of how written or spoken words get their meaning. The general question calls for an examination of every type of signifying and every sort of symbol, verbal and non-verbal, natural and artificial, human and divine. Though these matters are closely related to the problems of language and may therefore be touched upon here, their main treatment is reserved for the chapter on SIGN AND SYMBOL.

The treatment of language seems to have a different tenor in ancient and modern times. The philosophers of antiquity appreciate the need to safeguard discourse from the aberrations of speech. Plato and Aristotle usually preface their discussion of a subject with an examination of the relevant words in current use. Discovering the variety of meanings attached to common words, they take pains to enumerate the various senses of a word, and to put these meanings in some order. They pursue definitions or construct them to control the ambiguity that is latent in the language anyone must use to express or communicate ideas. But they do not expect to remove ambiguity entirely. They tend to accept the fact that the same word will have to be used in a number of senses; and they discriminate between the occasions when it is desirable to be precise about a word’s meaning and those times when the purpose of discourse is better served by permitting a word to carry a whole range of meanings. They see no special difficulty in abstract as opposed to concrete words, or in general names as distinguished from the proper names which designate individuals, or in words which refer to purely intelligible objects like ideas rather than to the objects of sense-experience.

The mood of the ancients, which also prevails for the most part among the philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages, seems to express a certain tolerance of the imperfections of language. If men do not think clearly, if they do not reason cogently or argue honestly, the fault is primarily the result of the misuse of their faculties, not of the betrayal of their intentions by the intractable character of language as an instrument. Even when men misunderstand one another, the inadequacy of language as a medium of communication is not solely responsible for the failure of minds to meet through the interchange of words. With greater effort, with a more assiduous application of the liberal arts, men can succeed even if language works against them.

Some things are inexpressible in human speech even as they are incapable of being fully grasped by human thought. “My vision,” Dante says when he reaches the mystic rose of Paradise, “was greater than our speech.” Such knowledge as we can have of “the highest matters and the first principles of things” Plato thinks “does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge.” In his Seventh Letter, he even goes so far as to say that “no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language.”

With these exceptions the ancients seem to adopt a mood of tolerance towards language. This does not imply an underestimation of the difficulties of using language well. It simply does not make of language an insidious enemy of clarity and truth. The deficiencies of language are like the weaknesses of the flesh. As man can in large part overcome them through the discipline of the moral virtues, so through the discipline of the liberal arts—by skill in grammar, rhetoric, and logic—he can make language express almost as much truth as he can acquire, and communicate it almost as clearly as he can think it. Men need not succumb to the tyranny of words if they will make the requisite effort to master language to serve their purpose.

But the liberal arts do not guarantee purity of purpose. Obscurantism, obfuscation, deception, and falsification are sometimes the aim. Men try to persuade others at all costs, or to win the argument regardless of where the truth lies. They try to confuse their opponents or mislead their audience. The use of language for such ends requires as much skill as its employment in the service of truth. If such use is a misuse, then language is equally available for use or misuse.

It is an ancient saying that only the competent in grammar can make grammatical errors intentionally. So, as Plato recognizes, the difference between the sophist and the philosopher is not one of skill but of purpose. When he criticizes the trickery of sophistical argument, he also acknowledges the cleverness with which the sophists juggle words and propound absurdities under the cover of superficially significant speech. The sophistical fallacies which Aristotle enumerates are seldom accidental errors. Far from being the result of the impediments which language places in the way of thought, they are in large measure artfully contrived equivocations. They are ways of using language against logic. According to Aristotle, they represent “foul fighting in disputation” and are resorted to only by “those who are resolved to win at all costs.”

In the modern treatment of language there is more of an imputation that words cause men unwittingly to deceive themselves as often as they enable one man intentionally to deceive another. Men are duped or tricked by the tendency of words to counterfeit a reality which does not exist. This, in the view of Hobbes or Locke, Berkeley or Hume, is particularly true of general or universal names—or words that signify nothing which can be perceived or imagined.

We cannot imagine anything infinite, says Hobbes. Hence a word like “infinite” is a form of absurd speech “taken upon credit (without any signification at all) from deceived philosophers and deceived, or deceiving, Schoolmen.” In addition to the deceptions of ordinary ambiguity and of metaphorical speech, Hobbes pays particular attention to the absurd, insignificant, or nonsensical use of words “whereby we conceive nothing but the sound”; he gives as examples, not merely “round quadrangle,” but “infused virtue,” “free will,” and “immaterial substance.”

In the light of the examples, this theory of insignificant or meaningless speech explains what Hobbes means when he says that “words are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools.” It also indicates how Hobbes uses the susceptibility of men to self-deception through language as a way of explaining the errors—he calls them “absurdities”—into which his predecessors have fallen. What is novel here is not that he disagrees with earlier thinkers on points of psychology and metaphysics or theology, but that he reduces what might be supposed to be an issue between true and false opinions to a difference between significant and absurd speech. His opponents might reply that unless his own views about matter and mind are true, his semantic criticism of them does not hold. They have been seduced by language into talking nonsense only if Hobbes is right in his metaphysics and psychology.

The criticism of arguments which seem to rely on metaphors is not peculiarly modern. In his attack on the Platonic theory of ideas, Aristotle dismisses the statement that the Forms “are patterns and other things share in them” as a use of “empty words and poetical metaphors.” But Hobbes carries this method of criticism much further. He frequently rests his case against other philosophers entirely on the ground that they are talking nonsense. Though he himself catches the imagination, almost as often as Plato does, by his skillfully wrought metaphors, he would insist that what he says can always be rendered literally, whereas the metaphors of others conceal the insignificance of their speech.

Bacon provides another illustration of the modern attitude which ascribes a diabolical character to language. “There arises from a bad and unapt formation of words,” he writes, “a wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances afford a complete remedy—words still manifestly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies.” He goes on to say that “the idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either names of things which have no existence… or they are names of actual objects, but confused, badly defined, and hastily or irregularly abstracted from things.”

Here, as in the case of Hobbes, a theory of reality and of the way in which the mind draws its ideas from experience seems to underlie the charge that language tangles the mind in a web of words, so that it deals with words rather than with things. In the same spirit, though not from the same premises, Locke tells his reader why he found it necessary to include in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding the long third book on language, which examines in detail the imperfections as well as the abuses of words, and the remedies therefor.

“Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language,” he says, “have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard or misapplied words with little or no meaning have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hinderance of true knowledge…. So few are apt to think they deceive, or are deceived in the use of words or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it.”

Without judging the fundamental issues involved concerning the nature of things and of man and his mind, one point seems to be clear. According as men hold different conceptions of the relation of language to thought (and in consequence assume different attitudes toward the imperfections or misuse of language), they inevitably take opposite sides on these issues. Whether the discipline of language is called semantics or the liberal arts, the standards by which one man criticizes the language of another seem to depend upon what he holds to be true.

The present work on the great ideas aims, in part, to record the agreements and disagreements among the great minds of the western tradition. It also records how those minds have used the same word in different senses or have used quite distinct words for the same thing. It could not do either unless it did both. This indicates the basic relationship between language and thought which the great books exemplify, even when they do not explicitly make it the basis of their discussion of the relation between language and thought.

The ideal of a perfect and universal language seems toarise in modern times from dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of ordinary language for the analytical refinement and precision of mathematics or science. As Descartes holds up the method of mathematics as the procedure to be followed in all other inquiries and subject matters, so his conception of a “universal mathesis” calls for a language which shall be the perfect instrument of analysis and demonstration.

It is sometimes supposed that the symbolism of mathematics is itself that perfect language. Lavoisier quotes Condillac to the effect that algebra, “in the most simple, most exact, and best manner, is at the same time a language and an analytical method.” Of the analytical equations “which Descartes was the first to introduce into the study of curves and surfaces,” Fourier remarks that “they extend to all general phenomena. There cannot be a language more universal and more simple, more free from errors and obscurities, that is to say, more worthy to express the invariable relations of natural things…. Its chief attribute is clearness; it has no marks to express confused notions…. It follows the same course in the study of all phenomena; it interprets them by the same language.”

This praise of mathematical symbolism indicates that one feature of the ideal is an exact correspondence between words and ideas. “Like three impressions of the same seal,” Lavoisier says, “the word ought to produce the idea, and the idea to be a picture of the fact.” If there were a perfect one-to-one correspondence between physical symbols and mental concepts, there would never be any failures of communication. Men would be able to understand each other as well as if they could see directly into each other’s minds. Though they still used external signs as a medium of communication, they would approximate the immediate communication which the theologians attribute to angels. In addition, the process of thinking itself, quite apart from communication, could be perfectly regulated by the rules of grammar—the rules for manipulating symbols.

In the sense in which Lavoisier says that “the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged,” the rules of thought might be reduced to the rules of syntax if there were a perfect language. If the symbols of mathematics lack the universality to express every sort of concept, then it may be necessary, as Leibnitz proposes, to construct a “universal characteristic” which would make possible a symbolic calculus for the performance of all the operations of thought. This conception seems to contain the principle and the motivation for the various logistical schemes which accompany the modern development of symbolic or mathematical logic, from Boole and Venn to Peano, Couturat, Russell, and Whitehead. The hopes to be realized by an algebra of logic find expression in Jevons’ plan for a logical abacus which, like an adding machine or comptometer, would be a thinking machine able to solve all problems that can be put in suitable terms.

Is the ideal of a perfect and universal language a genuine hope or a utopian dream? Not all modern scientists seem to agree with Lavoisier’s point that the improvement of a science and the improvement of its language are inseparable. Faraday, for example, apologizing for the invention of new words to name electrical phenomena, says that he is “fully aware that names are one thing and science another.” The utopian character of the ideal seems to be implied in Swift’s satirization of a universal language. On his voyage to the cloud-land of the scientists in Laputa, Gulliver learns of a project which is being considered by the professors of language. “Since words are only names for things, it would be more convenient for all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express the particular business they are to discourse on.” The substitution of things for words would thus provide a “universal language to be understood in all civilized nations.”

In the ancient world the imperfection of ordinary speech gives rise, not to the conception of a perfect language which man should try to construct, but to the consideration of the distinction between a hypothetical natural language and the existing conventional languages actually in use. If there were a natural language, it would not only be the same for all men everywhere, but its words would also be perfect images or imitations of things. That human language is conventional rather than natural may be seen not only in the plurality of tongues, but also in the fact that existing languages embody contradictory principles of symbolization.

This fact, Plato suggests in the Cratylus, indicates that human language does not originate as a gift from the gods, for if the gods had given men the names they use, signs would be perfectly and consistently adapted to things signified. The hypothesis of a natural or god-given language is not proposed as an ideal to inspire men to try to invent a perfect language for themselves. It functions rather as a norm for the criticism of man-made language and for discovering the natural elements common to all conventional languages.

Like human society, human language seems to be partly natural, partly conventional. As there are certain political principles, such as that of natural justice, common to all societies despite the diversity of their customs and institutions, so all conventional languages have certain common characteristics of structure which indicate their natural basis in the physical and mental constitution of man. In the tradition of the liberal arts, the search for a universal grammar, applicable to all conventional languages, represents not the hope to create a universal or perfect language, but the conviction that all languages have a common, natural basis.

The hypothesis of a natural language takes another form and has another implication in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, where it is discussed in the light of certain portions of revelation. Yet it retains the same fundamental relevance to the problem of the origin and characteristics of the many conventional languages which now exist.

Genesis relates how, after God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, He “brought them to Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.” The names which Adam devised constituted a natural language, at least insofar as, according to Augustine’s interpretation, it is the one “common language of the race” both before the flood and for some time after. But there is the further question whether the names which Adam gave to things were their rightful or proper names—whether they were natural signs in the sense of true representations of the natures of the things signified.

Hobbes suggests one answer when he says that “the first author of speech was God himself, who instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight”; Augustine suggests another answer by identifying the original language of man with Hebrew, and by affirming the continuity of the Hebrew spoken after Babel with the language all men spoke before the confusion of tongues.

At the time when men began to build “a tower whose top may reach unto heaven,” Genesis tells us that “the whole earth was of one language and one speech…. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do; and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech.”

This, according to Hobbes, means that the language “gotten and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.” If the further implication is that the lost language was unlike any of the conventional languages in the historical record, then it may be supposed to have been that natural form of speech in which each thing is named according to its nature. The modern ideal of a perfect and universal language may even be looked upon as an impious wish to achieve what God took away from men at Babel.

The problem of the origin of human language is not an easy one for the theologian. It is more difficult still for those who speculate about it in purely naturalistic terms. Rousseau tries to expose some of the perplexities in such speculations.

If speech did not become a social necessity until men passed from isolation in a state of nature to living together in society, how, he asks, could societies have been formed before languages had been invented? “If men need speech to learn to think,” he remarks, “they must have stood in much greater need of the art of thinking, to be able to invent that of speaking.” The development of languages already in existence, or the way in which the child learns to speak through living in an environment where speech exists, “by no means explains how languages were originally formed.”

Rousseau imagines a primitive condition in which men uttered instinctive cries “to implore assistance in case of danger, or relief in case of suffering”; he supposes that to such cries, men may have added gestures to signify visible and movable objects, and imitative sounds to signify audible ones. Such methods of expression being insufficient to convey ideas about absent or future things, men had at last to invent “the articulate sounds of the voice” and to institute these as conventional signs. But, as he observes, “such an institution could only be made by common consent… itself still more difficult to conceive, since such a common agreement must have had motives, and speech, therefore, seems to have been highly necessary in order to establish the use of it.”

The problem of the origin of human language is not only connected with the problem of the origin of human society, but also with the problem of the origin of man himself. The faculty of articulate speech does not, according to Darwin, “offer any insuperable objection to the belief that man has been developed from some lower form.” Though the habitual use of articulate language is peculiar to man, “he uses, in common with the lower animals, inarticulate cries to express his meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of the face.” The songs of birds and the speech of parrots show that animals can learn to make and repeat certain definite sounds, and even to connect words with things. It seems to Darwin quite credible that man’s articulate language “owes its origin to the imitation and modification of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man’s own instinctive cries, aided by signs and gestures.”

Such an account of the origin of human speech is not credible, however, to those who disagree with Darwin’s statement that “the lower animals differ from man solely in his almost infinitely larger power of associating together the most diversified sounds and ideas.” Those who hold that human rationality differs in kind, rather than degree, from animal intelligence tend to find a corresponding difference in kind between human language and the sounds of brutes. Aristotle, for example, says that man is the only animal whom nature “has endowed with the gift of speech. Mere vocalization is only an indication of pleasure and pain and is therefore found in other animals,” but men alone have the power to discuss the expedient and the just, and this fact distinguishes human association from the companionship of gregarious animals.

Human speech is, for Descartes, one of the two criteria by which we can “recognize the difference that exists between men and brutes. For it is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they can make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal… which can do the same. It is not the want of organs that brings this to pass, for it is evident that magpies and parrots can utter words just like ourselves, and yet they cannot speak as we do, that is, so as to give evidence that they think of what they say…. This does not merely show that the brutes have less reason than men, but that they have none at all.”

The difference between men and other animals is more fully discussed in the chapter on MAN. Here we are concerned with opposite opinions on that subject only in relation to opposite views of human language and its origin. When, as in Descartes’ view, human language is distinguished by syntax and grammar or, as in Locke’s, by man’s special power to use sounds “as signs of internal conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for ideas within his own mind,” the origin of human speech does not seem explicable in evolutionary terms.

The relation of grammar to the other liberal arts and to the various uses of language is considered in the chapters on LOGIC, POETRY, and RHETORIC. Isolated from these others, grammar is primarily concerned with the distinction of the parts of speech, such as noun and verb, or particle and adjective.

“By a noun,” says Aristotle, “we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest.” In contrast to the noun, the verb is defined by Aristotle as the sort of word which, “in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time…. Moreover,” he continues, “a verb is always a sign of something said of something else.” The grammatical function of nouns and verbs is, in Locke’s opinion, more generally recognized and better defined than that of particles, prepositions, and conjunctions. Such words, Locke writes, “show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, etc. [a man] gives to each respective part of his discourse…. He who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.”

Grammar is also concerned with the difference between words (or phrases) and sentences, or, in Aristotle’s terms, between simple and composite expressions; and with the rules of syntax which govern the order and agreement of words according to their function as parts of speech. By reference to these rules the grammarian criticizes the misuse of language and classifies a great variety of common errors.

One test of whether grammar is a universal art applicable to all languages—not just a set of rules for using a particular conventional language correctly—is the naturalness of its theoretical distinctions. Does Aristotle’s distinction between noun and verb, for example, respond to something natural in all discourse, or is it peculiar to the Greek or to the Indo-European languages?

There is a meaning of language which includes more than the speech of men and brutes. From Hippocrates on, the physician regards the symptoms of disease as if they were a connected system of signs, a language for which his diagnostic art provides a grammar of interpretation. This is particularly true in the psychological realm where, in the psychoanalysis of the neuroses and especially in Freud’s interpretation of dreams, both symptom and dream-symbol are treated as an elaborate language. That language serves to express the unconscious thoughts and desires which cannot be expressed in the ordinary language of social intercourse over which consciousness exercises some control.

These medical examples represent a conception of language according to which the whole of nature is a book to be read by the scientist. He penetrates the mysteries of nature by learning the grammar of natural signs. To know the relation of natural things as cause and effect or whole and part is to discover nature’s syntax. According to another conception, expressed by Galileo, the book of nature “is written in mathematical language, its symbols being triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it.”

The book of nature may also be read as the language of God. Prophecy or divination is such a reading of dreams or of other events as omens and portents which bespeak the divine purpose. When he reaches the highest heaven Dante finds in the vision of the Trinity, “bound up with love in one volume, that which is dispersed in leaves through the universe.” Berkeley goes further than this. All of the ideas which man gets by sense-perception are words in a divine vocabulary. The uniform appearances of nature “may not unfitly be styled the Language of its Author, whereby He discovers His attributes to our view and directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life.”

God speaks to man in still another way. Within the Judaeo-Christian tradition at least, God is believed to have revealed himself to man through the vehicle of human language. Written by men under divine inspiration, Sacred Scripture is the word of God. Because it is at once human and divine, this language is the most difficult for man to interpret.

The art of interpreting the Bible involves the most elaborate theory of signs, and of the types and levels of meaning. It involves special rules of reading. The development of this theory and these rules by Augustine and Aquinas, Maimonides and Spinoza, Hobbes and Pascal, has deepened the liberal arts and enlarged the scope of man’s understanding of other languages—his own or nature’s. Since the heart of this larger consideration of language lies in the analysis of meaning and the modes of signification, the discussion of the symbolism of nature and the word of God belongs to the chapter on SIGN AND SYMBOL; and, in its theological aspects, to the chapters on PROPHECY and RELIGION.

The discussion of language, as we have seen, cannot be separated from the consideration of human nature and human society. Because He “designed man for a sociable creature,” God, according to Locke, “made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society.”

It is not merely that the fellowship of men depends upon speech. According to Locke, men cannot enjoy “the comfort and advantage of society… without the communication of thoughts.” The fact that “man had by nature his organs so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate sounds… was not enough to produce language”—at least not human language, “for parrots, and several other birds, can be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough,” and yet, Locke writes, they are “by no means capable of language. Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary,” he insists, that the sounds men formed should be the instrument whereby “the thoughts of men’s minds [are] conveyed from one to another.”

Rousseau, on the other hand, seems to think that under the primitive circumstances surrounding the origin of both society and language, the association of men “would not require a language much more refined than that of rooks or monkeys, who associate together for much the same purpose. Inarticulate cries, plenty of gestures and some imitative sounds, must have been for a long time the universal language,” he writes; “and by the addition, in every country, of some conventional articulate sounds… particular languages were produced; but these were rude and imperfect, and nearly such as are now to be found among some savage nations.”

The plurality of conventional, historic languages seems to parallel the plurality of the Nations or societies into which mankind is divided. But underlying the diversity of tongues there is also a unity which implies the possibility of mankind’s unification. To the extent that language expresses thought, diverse languages are but different mediums for the same thing. “All men [may] not have the same speech sounds,” Aristotle declares, “but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all.”

The human community conceived in terms of the communication of thought extends as far as the bounds of such communication among men. It is not limited by political boundaries. It overcomes by translation the barriers set up by a diversity of tongues. It includes the living and the dead and extends to those as yet unborn. In this sense, human civilization can be described as the civilization of the dialogue, and the tradition of the great books can be conceived as the great conversation in which all men can participate. The extent of this conversation measures the range of western thought. The vocabulary of its language is the stock of ideas with which each individual can begin to think for himself when he turns from dialogue to soliloquy; for, as Plato observes, “thought and speech are the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with itself.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature and functions of language: the speech of men and brutes 1a. The role of language in thought 1b. The service of language to society
2. Theories of the origin of language 2a. The hypothesis of one natural language for all men 2b. The genesis of conventional languages: the origin of alphabets
3. The growth of language 3a. The invention of words and the proliferation of meanings 3b. The spoken and written word in the development of language 3c. Tradition and the life of languages
4. The art of grammar 4a. Syntax: the parts and units of speech 4b. Standards of correctness in the use of language: grammatical errors
5. The imperfections of language 5a. The abuse of words: ambiguity, imprecision, obscurity 5b. Insignificant speech: meaninglessness, absurdity
6. The improvement of speech: the ideal of a perfect language
7. Grammar and logic: the formulation and statement of knowledge
8. Grammar and rhetoric: the effective use of language in teaching and persuasion
9. The language of poetry
10. The language of things and events: the book of nature; the symbolism of dreams; prophetic signs
11. Immediate communication: the speech of angels and the gift of tongues
12. The language of God or the gods: the deliverances of the oracles; the inspiration, revelation, and interpretation of Sacred Scripture

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SEC) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The nature and functions of language: the speech of men and brutes

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 11:1-9 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 4:24—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 4:29 NEW TESTAMENT: I Corinthians, 14 / Ephesians, 4:29 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 61a-b 7 PLATO: Cratylus 85a-114a,c / Theaetetus, 547c-d / Sophist, 575d-577b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [4a32-36] 9b / Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-8] 25a / Soul, BK II, CH 8 [420b5-421a6] 651d-652c 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [488a33-b3] 9b-c; BK IV, CH 9 62a-63c / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 16 [659b28]-CH 17 [660a3] 186d-187c / Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1253a7-18] 446b-c / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 [1404b1-3] 654c; CH 10 [1410b9-28] 662c-d / Poetics, CH 6 [1450a10-15] 685a; CH 19 [1456a33-b8] 691d-692a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [1028-1090] 74c-75b 14 PLUTARCH: Demosthenes, 692a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR II, CH 3, 8a / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 18 151b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, CH 19 76a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 13 627d; BK II, CH 3 637c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 1, ANS 62c-63c; Q 34, A 1, ANS 185b-187b; Q 107, A 1, REP 1-3 549b-550b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 60, A 6, ANS 851b-852b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXVI [124-138] 147a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54c-55b; PART II, 100b; PART IV, 270a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215b-216b; 218a-c; 300c; 323c-324b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT I, SC III [154-173] 325b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 62c-63a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14 107d-108a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 59c-60b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [369-451] 240a-242a; BK IX [549-612] 259b-260b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 45 178b; 912 349b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI, SECT 8-11 145b-146a; CH XVIII, SECT 7 174d-175a; CH XXII, SECT 5 201d; CH XXVII, SECT 8 221a-222a; CH XXVIII, SECT 2 228c-229a; CH XXXII, SECT 7-8 244c-d; BK III, CH I 251b,c-252d; CH II 252d-254c passim; CH III, SECT 1-5 254d-256c; SECT 20 260a; CH VI, SECT 22 273d-274a; CH IX, SECT 1-4 285a-c; CH X, SECT 13 294c-d; BK IV, CH V, SECT 10 331a; CH VIII, SECT 7 347b-c; CH XXI, SECT 4 395a,c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 19-21 410c-411b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART III, 111a-b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 339d-342c; 349d-350a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 120a-b 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1a-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182b-c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 297c-300c; 349d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 18b; 35b-37b; 683b-685a; 715b-716a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 512d-513a

1a. The role of language in thought

7 PLATO: Cratylus 85a-114a,c / Phaedrus, 138c-139d / Timaeus, 447c-d / Critias, 478c-d / Theaetetus, 520b; 524c-d; 526b; 537d-538a; 547c-d / Sophist, 575d-577b / Statesman, 590d-591a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1-5 25a-26c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 10 [76b22-27] 105c / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 525a-528b / Soul, BK II, CH 8 [420b28-33] 652b 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 10 [1410b9-28] 662c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI, CH 5 90b-c; BK XII, CH 32-36 107a-108c; CH 41-43 110a-d; BK XIII, CH 36 120c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 13 627d; BK II, CH 3 637c-d; CH 36 653d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 1, ANS and REP 3 62c-63c; Q 34, A 1, ANS and REP 1-3 185b-187b; A 3, ANS 188b-189a; Q 63, A 8, REP 1 332c-333b; Q 107, A 1, REP 1-2 549b-550b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 6, A 6, REP 3 744d-745b; Q 60, A 6, ANS 851b-852b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54c-58c; PART IV, 270a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 75c-d; 253c-254a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 61b-c; 62c-63a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14 107d-108a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 26b-c / Discourse, PART V, 59c-60b / Objections and Replies, 137a; 290c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1 387b-388a; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 22-23 175b; 392 239b-240a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH 1, SECT 35 98d-99a; BK II, CH XVI, SECT 5-7 166b-167b; CH XXII, SECT 3-9 201b-203a; CH XXXII, SECT 7-8 244c-d; CH XXXIII, SECT 19 251c-d; BK III 251b,d-306d esp CH I, SECT 6 252c-d, CH III, SECT 1-5 254d-255c, SECT 10 256c-257a, SECT 20 260a, CH V, SECT 4 264b, SECT 10-11 266b-d, CH IX, SECT 1-2 285a-b, SECT 21 290c-291a, CH X, SECT 13 294c-d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 19 318b-319a; CH IV, SECT 17 328d; CH V, SECT 3-4 329b-d; CH VI, SECT 1-3 331b-d; CH XXI, SECT 4 395a,c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 19 410c; SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c; SECT 121-122 436d-437c 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 169a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 418a-419b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 339d-342c esp 340d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88d 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1a-c; 4a-5c; 7c 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 173a-b 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 362c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 78 32d-33a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182b-c; PART I, 218a-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1995-2000] 47a-b 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 299b-300a; 349d; 592a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 36b-37a; 127b-128b; 153b-154a; 156b; 159a-b; 161a-176a; 333a-334a; 447b-448a; 608b; 650b; 689a-b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 385b-c / Unconscious, 442a-443a / Ego and Id, 700b-701d; 714b-c

1b. The service of language to society

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 11:1-9 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-461] 44c-d 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [201-210] 260a-b 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120a-b / Gorgias, 270a 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1253a7-18] 446b-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 23 201a-203b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XVI, CH 11 429d-431a; BK XIX, CH 7 515a-c / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 4-5 637d-638a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 4 207d-208b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI [34-81] 46b-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54c; 55a-b; PART II, 132d-133a; 157c-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 253c-254a; 323c-324b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT I, SC III [159-173] 325b / 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [192-238] 452a-c / Henry V, ACT V, SC II [98-306] 564b-566a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 23a-26a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVIII, SECT 7 174d-175a; CH XXII, SECT 5-7 201d-202b; CH XXVIII, SECT 2 228c-229a; CH XXXII, SECT 7-8 244c-d; BK III, CH I, SECT 1 251b,d; CH II, SECT 1-2 252d-253c; SECT 4 253d; CH III, SECT 3-5 255a-c; SECT 20 260a; CH V, SECT 7 265a-c; CH VI, SECT 51 282d-283a; CH IX, SECT 1-4 285a-c; CH X, SECT 13 294c-d; SECT 23-31 298a-299a; CH XI, SECT 1 300a-b; SECT 5 300d; BK IV, CH V, SECT 10 331a-b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 19-21 410c-411b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 25b-26a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 340a-342c; 349d-350a; 350d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 15d-16c passim 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 300a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART IV, 347b-d 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 278a; 294d-295a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 450a-c / Group Psychology, 668c; 685a

2. Theories of the origin of language

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:19-20; 11:1-9 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-461] 44c-d 5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [201-210] 260a-b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49a-d 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44c / Cratylus 85a-114a,c esp 106b-c / Phaedrus, 138c-139b / Gorgias, 271b-272b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [1028-1090] 74c-75b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XVI, CH 4 425b-426a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 4-5 637d-638a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI [34-81] 46b-d; PARADISE, XXVI [70-142] 146c-147b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54d-55a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 218a-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2d-3a; 17d-18b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [267-277] 238a; [338-356] 239b-240a; BK XII [1-62] 319a-320b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH I, SECT 5 252b-c; CH II, SECT 1 252d-253a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 340a-342c; 350d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 509b 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 211b-c / Descent of Man, 298a-301c; 349d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 685b [fn 1] 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 512a-513b

2a. The hypothesis of one natural language for all men

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:19-20; 11:1-9 7 PLATO: Cratylus 85a-114a,c esp 110c-111c 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-9] 25a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XVI, CH 11 429d-431a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 4-5 637d-638a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI [34-81] 46b-d; PARADISE, XXVI [70-142] 146c-147b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54d-55a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 164a-b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2d-3a; 18b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [267-277] 238a; [338-356] 239b-240a; BK XII [1-62] 319a-320b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH II, SECT 1 252d-253a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 118 457c-d

2b. The genesis of conventional languages: the origin of alphabets

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 10:5; 11:1-9 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 12a-b; BK II, 60a-d; 80a-c; BK V, 171a-b 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 107c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 138c-139b / Philebus, 612d-613a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK XI, 103c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 4 637d-638a; CH 24 648d-649a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI [34-81] 46b-d; PARADISE, XXVI [70-142] 146c-147b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54c-55a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 62d-63a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [38-62] 320a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXII, SECT 2 201a-b; SECT 5-7 201d-202b; CH XXVIII, SECT 2 228c-229a; BK III, CH II, SECT 1 252d-253a; SECT 8 254b-c; CH V, SECT 8 265c-266a; CH VI, SECT 43-51 280c-283a passim, esp SECT 51 282d-283a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 340a-342c; 349d-350a; 350d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 10d esp 675d [n 83]; 756a [n 43] 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 225a-b; 338b; 342b-c; 706c [n 22] 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 509b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 221a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 2b-c / Descent of Man, 300c-301c; 329a-b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 685b [fn 1]

3. The growth of language

3a. The invention of words and the proliferation of meanings

5 ARISTOPHANES: Ecclesiazusae [1167-1182] 628c-d 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK IV, 128d 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 89a-107b 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 11 [104b34-105a1] 148c / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 [1006a29-b4] 525c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 [1405a3-b21] 655b-656a; CH 3 [1406b5-19] 657c-d; CH 10 [1410b5-15] 662c; CH 11 [1412a18-21] 664c / Poetics, CH 21 [1457b1-1458a7] 693a-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 10 640d-641a; CH 16 644b-d; BK III, CH 5 659d-660a; CH 24-25 666d-667c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 2, REP 2 63c-64d; A 8 70d-71b; Q 37, A 2, ANS 199a-200c; Q 67, A 1 349d-350b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 30c-31a; BK II, 77b-78b; BK III, 178b-179c; 182c-184c; 203d-204c; BK IV, 280d-281d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 422c-423c 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, 2b-c 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336d-337a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 42c-43a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 59 112b-c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 290c-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVIII, SECT 7 174d-175a; CH XXII, SECT 2 201a-b; SECT 5-7 201d-202b; CH XXVIII, SECT 2 228c-229a; BK III, CH I, SECT 5 252b-c; CH III, SECT 6-9 255c-256c; CH V 263d-268a; CH VI, SECT 25 274d; SECT 43-51 280c-283a passim, esp SECT 51 282d-283a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341a-342b; 349d-350a / Social Contract, BK III, 419b-c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 775c-776a,c [n 173-174] 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 106b-c; 773d [n 23] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-c / Practical Reason, 294b-c; 337c-338a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 467b-c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 59d-60d; 191a; 353c-354a; 410a-b; 454a 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 4a-5d; PART I, 24c-d; 25c-29d 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 361a-362d; 829d-830a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 300c-301b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 689a-b 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 509d; 512c-513b; 516b-c; 517c-518b

3b. The spoken and written word in the development of language

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK V, 171a-b 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 85a-107c esp 100d-101a, 102c-d / Phaedrus, 138c-139a 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a3-8] 25a 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 1 [1404a15-34] 654b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XVIII, CH 39 494c-495a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 4 637d-638a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXVI [70-142] 146c-147b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341a-b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88c-d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 253a-b; 330d-331a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182b-c; PART I, 218a-c; 247d-248c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 329a-b 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 540b-541a

3c. Tradition and the life of languages

OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 6:4-9 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, CH 10 [148b16-23] 202d-203a / Metaphysics, BK V 533a-547a,c 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 11 641a-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 1, A 9 388d-389d 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK II, STANZA 2-4 21b-22a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, CONCLUSION, 282c-d 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 81d-83b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 77c-79a; 422c-423c; 476b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 11b-12b; 42c-43a 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 290c-d 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 22c-d / Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXII, SECT 7 202a-b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART III, 128a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 350d 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 334c-335b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 15d-16c; 628a-b; 629a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 106b-c; 152a; 300a-b; 325c-328a,c esp 325c-326a, 327a-b; 338b; 522b-528a,c esp 522c-523a, 526a-c, 527d-528a,c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-115c 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 467b-c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 151c-d; 166d; 307c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 211b-c / Descent of Man, 300c-301a

4. The art of grammar

4a. Syntax: the parts and units of speech

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 105d-106a; 109a-b / Sophist, 575d-576b 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 [1a16-19] 5b; CH 4 [1b25-2a10] 6a; CH 7 [6b6-8] 11a; [6b31-36] 11c / Interpretation, CH 1-5 25a-26c / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 3 [1014a26-32] 534c 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 [1404b26-1405a2] 655a-b / Poetics CH 19-21 691d-694a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PART I, Q 13, A 1, REP 3 62c-63c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 64c-65a; PART III, 182b; PART IV, 270a-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 70d-71a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 62a-b; 62c-63c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VII 283a-284b esp SECT 2 283b-c 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 287b-288a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342c esp 341b-c, 342b-c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 23d-24b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 229b-c 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 516b-c

4b. Standards of correctness in the use of language: grammatical errors

5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [635-693] 496c-497a 8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 14 239a-d; CH 32 250d-251c 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2 654c-656b; CH 5 657d-658c / Poetics, CH 22 694a-695a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK I, SECT 10 254a 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 13 642b-643a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 70d-71a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX, SECT 4 238d-239a; CH XXXI, SECT 4-5 240b-d; BK III, CH VI, SECT 51 282d-283a; CH IX, SECT 8 286c-d; CH XI, SECT 11 302b-c 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 287b-288a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 361d-362a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 164a-b

5. The imperfections of language

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK IV, 131d-132a 7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Cratylus, 108c-110b / Phaedrus, 138c-140a / Republic, BK V, 369b / Critias, 478b-d / Theaetetus, 526b; 534a / Sophist, 561d-563b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 525a-528b 9 ARISTOTLE: Poetics, CH 25 [1461a9-b18] 697c-698b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [136-139] 2d 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR VII, CH 6, 242c / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 13 349b-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 6 626a-b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, AA 1-2 62c-64d; A 3, ANS 64d-65c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVII [1-6] 41b; XXXIV [1-27] 51b-c; PURGATORY, XXXI [133-145] 102b; PARADISE, I [38-81] 106c-107a; X [28-48] 120c-d; XXIII [40-69] 141d-142a; XXX [19-36] 152a; XXXIII 156b-157d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 101d-102a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 253c-254a; 422c-423c; 476b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 336d-337a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c; 65b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 43 109d-110a; APH 59-60 112b-113a 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, II, 80d-81a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIII, SECT 18 152a-c; BK III, CH V, SECT 16 267d-268a; CH VI, SECT 43 280c-d; CH IX, SECT 1-CH XI, SECT 7 285a-301c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c; SECT 52 422d-423a; SECT 74 427c; SECT 143-144 441c-d 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 307b-308b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 340d-341a; 342a-c / Social Contract, BK II, 401c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40c-d 42 KANT: Science of Right, 400d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 70d-71b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182b-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b esp [3451-3458] 84b; PART II [8691-8692] 211b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VII, 302c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 127b-128b; 153b-154a; 159a-b 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 662a-b

5a. The abuse of words: ambiguity, imprecision, obscurity

5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [1178-1200] 503a-b / Frogs [923-991] 575a-576a; [1119-1197] 577d-578d 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VI, 192b-c 7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c esp 68c-d / Phaedrus, 138c-140a / Theaetetus, 520b; 526b; 534d / Sophist, 552b-c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6b36-7b14] 11c-12b / Topics, BK I, CH 15 149d-152a; CH 18 [108a18-36] 152b-d; BK II, CH 3 154d-155d; BK V, CH 4 [133a15-134a4] 184d-185b; BK VI, CH 1 [139a12]-CH 2 [140a22] 192b-193b; CH 14 [151a3-11] 206c; BK VIII, CH 3 [158b8-159a2] 215b-c; CH 7 217c-d / Sophistical Refutations, CH 1 [165a5-19] 227b-c; CH 4 [165b24-166a19] 228b-229c; CH 19-23 243d-247a; CH 24 [179b38-180a22] 247d-248b; CH 33 [182b13-32] 251d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 525a-528b; BK VII, CH 11 [1037a5-9] 560c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 2 [648a37]-CH 3 [649a22] 172d-174b / Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129a26-31] 376d / Politics, BK III, CH 3 [1261b16-31] 456c / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 2-5 654c-658c passim / Poetics, CH 25 [1461a9-b19] 697c-698b passim 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR VII, CH 6, 242c 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 10 640d-641a; CH 12 641c-642b; BK III, CH 1-4 657b,d-659d 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK II, STANZA 37 26b; STANZA 147-149 40b-41a; BK V, STANZA 257 153b-154a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b; 57d-58a; 78a-b; PART II, 135c; 157c 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 66b-67d; BK II, 77b-78b; 101b-106a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 75a-77d; 148a-149a; 253c-254a; 284d-285c; 422c-423c; 448d-449a; 517b-519a 26 SHAKESPEARE: Taming of the Shrew, ACT I, SC II [1-44] 208b-c / Romeo and Juliet, ACT II, SC IV [38-140] 297d-298d / Merchant of Venice, ACT II, SC II [34-120] 412b-413a / Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC I [5-36] 568b,d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT V, SC I [29-68] 64d-65b; [123-154] 65d-66a 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK II, 73d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 11b-13c; 60b-c; 61b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 43 109d-110a; APH 59-60 112b-113a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XIII, 26b-c / Meditations, II, 80d-81a / Objections and Replies, 208c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1 387b-388a; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 1a-14a / Vacuum, 370b; 374b; 376b-377a / Geometrical Demonstration, 432a-434a 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 12 27d-28a / Human Understanding, 89a-c; BK II, CH XIII, SECT 18 152a-c; SECT 28 155a-b; CH XXIX, SECT 6-12 234d-236c; CH XXX, SECT 4 238d-239a; BK III, CH V, SECT 16 267d-268a; CH VI, SECT 30 276d-277b; SECT 48-51 282b-283a; CH IX, SECT 1-CH XI, SECT 7 285a-301c esp CH X, SECT 5-13 292d-294d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 19, 318c-d; SECT 30 323a-c; CH IV, SECT 13-17 326d-328d esp SECT 17 328d; CH VIII, SECT 11 348b-c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c; SECT 52 422d-423a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT VIII, DIV 62-63 478b-d; DIV 74 484a-c 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 38c-39a; 264b-c 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XII, 89c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 342a-c / Social Contract, BK III, 419b-c 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK II, 123b-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-c / Practical Reason, 315d-316a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 120a-b; NUMBER 41, 135c-136a passim 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 6d-7a,c 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 851a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 218a-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1995-2000] 47a-b; PART II [8691-8692] 211b 50 MARX: Capital, 104d [fn 4] 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 517c-518b; 540b-541b

5b. Insignificant speech: meaninglessness, absurdity

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 107c-108c 8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 13 238d-239a; CH 31 250c-d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 [1006a12-b11] 525b-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49d; 54b-c; 56b-d; 57c; 59a-60a; 71a-b; 78a; PART IV, 269b-272c; 274a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 77b-78b 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 370b; 374b / Geometrical Demonstration, 432b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 89a-c; BK III, CH II, SECT 7 254a-b; CH IV, SECT 8-10 260d-261d passim; CH V, SECT 16 267d-268a; CH X, SECT 2-4 291d-292c; SECT 26 298c; SECT 31 299a; CH XI, SECT 8 301c-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 23-24 411c-412a; SECT 54 423b; SECT 79-81 428b-d; SECT 88 430a-b 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1948-1963] 46a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 534a-c; BK XIV, 612d-613a; BK XV, 620b-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 168b-172a

6. The improvement of speech: the ideal of a perfect language

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 107c-114a,c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6a36-7b14] 11b-12b / Topics, BK I, CH 18 [108a18-36] 152b-d / Sophistical Refutations, CH 19-23 243d-247a 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 1-12 653b,d-667b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 1 167a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 7 515a-c / Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 1-4 657b,d-659d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 60c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 142d-143a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 12b-c; 60b-c; 62c-64a esp 63a-b 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 290c-d 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-431b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH I, SECT 6 252c-d; CH XI 300a-306d esp SECT 8-27 301c-306d 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART III, 109b-111b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 340d-341a 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 294b-c; 339b-d 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 120a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 70d-71b; 81b-82c 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1a-c; 4a-5d; 6d-7a,c 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 173a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 218a-c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 301a-b

7. Grammar and logic: the formulation and statement of knowledge

7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Cratylus 85a-114a,c / Phaedrus, 138c-139d / Symposium, 172b-c / Theaetetus, 534d; 541d-542a / Sophist, 561d-563b; 569d-577b / Seventh Letter, 809a-811a esp 809a-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 1-4 5a-6a / Interpretation, CH 4 [17a1-7] 26b / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 34-41 66b-68c / Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 13 [97a38-39] 133c / Topics, BK I, CH 15 149d-152a; CH 18 [108a17-37] 152b-d; BK II, CH 3 154d-155d; CH 9 [114a26-b14] 160a-b; BK IV, CH 3 [124a10-14] 172d; CH 4 [124b35-125a4] 173d; BK V, CH 2 [130a11-15] 180d; CH 4 [133a15-134a4] 184d-185b; CH 7 [136b15-32] 188c-d; BK VI, CH 1 [139b12]-CH 3 [141a22] 192b-194c; CH 10 202b-203a; CH 14 [151a3-11] 206c; BK VIII, CH 3 [158b8-15] 215b; CH 7 217c-d / Sophistical Refutations, CH 1 [165a1-18] 227b-c; CH 4 [165b24-166a21] 228b-229c; CH 10 [170b1-41] 234d-235b; CH 13-14 238d-239d; CH 19-23 243d-247a; CH 31-32 250c-251c; CH 33 [182b13-31] 251d / Physics, BK I, CH 8 [191a33-b9] 267b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 525a-528b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 3 [1147a17-24] 397b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, CH 32-36 107a-108c; CH 41-43 110a-d; BK XIII, CH 36 120c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 13 627d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55a-57c; 58a-60b; 65c-d; PART III, 172a; PART IV, 269b-c; 270a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 18d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 253c-254a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 56b-66a esp 58c-59a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 26b-c / Discourse, PART I, 43b; PART VI, 66d / Objections and Replies, 137a; 290c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 22-23 175b; 392 239b-240a / Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-434a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXIII, SECT 19 251c-d; BK III, CH III, SECT 10 256d-257a; CH VII 283a-284b; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 17 328d; CH V 329a-331b passim; CH VI, SECT 1-3 331b-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 19 410c; SECT 52 422d-423a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 339d-342c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1a-c; 4a-5d; 6d-7a,c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 40c-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 672a-b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 144a-b 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 662a-b

8. Grammar and rhetoric: the effective use of language in teaching and persuasion

NEW TESTAMENT: I Corinthians, 14 5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights [1373-1383] 486d-487a / Clouds 488a-506d esp [882-1105] 499b-502a 7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedrus, 131b-141a,c / Symposium, 172b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-8] 25a; CH 4 [17a1-7] 26b 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 1-12 653b,d-667b / Poetics, CH 21 [1457b1-1458a7] 693a-d; CH 22 694a-695a 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [142-156] 107a 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 42c-43b / Alcibiades, 159a-b / Marcus Cato, 279d-281b / Phocion, 606c-d / Demosthenes, 692d-695d passim / Marcus Brutus, 803b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, CH 7-8 14c-15a; BK V, CH 10-11 29b-30a; CH 23-24 33c-34b / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 6 638a-d; BK IV 675a-698a,c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PROLOGUE 1a-b 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK II, STANZA 2-4 21b-22a; STANZA 147-149 40b-41a / Prologue [725-746] 171b-172a / Franklin’s Prologue 351a / Prologue to Melibeus 400b-401a / Manciple’s Tale [17,154-186] 491a-b / Parson’s Prologue [17,341-375] 494a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 127d; 128d; PART IV, 270a; CONCLUSION, 282c-d 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 77b-78b; 101b-106a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 75a-77d; 309c-310c; 422c-424c; 448d-449c; 482b-483b 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, 2b-c 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 1b-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 1b-2b; 12b-c; 16c; 31a-d; 39b-d; 58c-59a; 64b-c; 65a-c; 66b-68b; 83d-84a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 43b; PART VI, 66d 32 MILTON: Vacation Exercise [1-58] 59a-60b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 14-16 174a-b; 22-23,25-27 175b; 48-59 178b-179b; 797-798 327b-328a / Geometrical Demonstration, 439b-446b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 34 299d-300a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 20 410d-411a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 287b-289b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341a-b; 342b-c / Social Contract, BK II, 401c-402a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 343a-b; 529d 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 327a-c; 526a-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 3c-d 43 MILL: Liberty, 292b-293b passim 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 59c-61d; 284b; 353c-354a; 381d-382a; 454a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 40c-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 347b-348a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 450b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 662a-b

9. The language of poetry

5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [341-350] 492a; [1351-1378] 504d-505b / Peace [734-764] 534c-535a / Birds [1373-1409] 559b-c / Frogs [755-1533] 573a-582c;c / Thesmophoriazusae [99-272] 601c-602b 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 52d-57a / Ion, 143a-c; 144b-d / Republic, BK III, 328b-333a; BK X, 430b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 4 [17a5-7] 26b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK IV, CH 8 [1128a18-25] 375b-c / Politics, BK VIII, CH 7 [1342a32-b18] 548a,c / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 1-12 653b,d-667b / Poetics, CH 1 [1447a29-b23] 681b-c; CH 6 [1450a13-15] 685a; CH 19-22 691d-695a esp CH 22 694a-695a; CH 24 [1460a2-5], CH 25 [1460b9-13] 696d; [1461a9-18] 697c-698b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XI, CH 18 331d-332a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 6 638a-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 9, REP 1 8d-9c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI [1-12] 47c; PURGATORY, XXIV [49-63] 90a-b; PARADISE, X [28-48] 120c-d; XXIII [40-69] 141d-142a; XXX [19-36] 152a; XXXIII 156b-157d 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK II, STANZA 1-4 21b-22a; STANZA 147-149 40b-41a; BK V, STANZA 256-257 153b-154a / Prologue [725-945] 171b-172a / Clerk’s Prologue [7888-7932] 295a-296a / Franklin’s Prologue 351a / Prologue to Melibeus 400b-401a / Manciple’s Tale [17,154-186] 491a-b / Parson’s Prologue [17,341-375] 494a-b / L’Envoy 550a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 67b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 62b-c; 76b-c; 104d-105c; 195d-197a; 309c-310c; 422c-423c 26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [121-135] 451b-c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC II [454-466] 45a / Sonnets, XXI 589b-c; LXXVI 597d-598a; LXXVIII-LXXIX 598b; CXXX 606a-b 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, xii-xvi; lb-c; PART II, 251a-252b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 11b-12c; 39b-d; 63b-c; 99b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 43b 32 MILTON: Vacation Exercise [1-58] 59a-60b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 25-35 175b-177a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 327a-c; 573a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 167d-168b; 180c; 307c; 381d-382a; 455b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 115a-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 687a-688a

10. The language of things and events: the book of nature; the symbolism of dreams; prophetic signs

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 9:8-17; 37:1-11; 40-41 / Exodus, 4:1-9,28-31 / Deuteronomy, 4:32-36; 7:17-19 / Judges, 6:36-40; 7:13-15 / I Kings, 13:1-6 / II Kings, 20:8-11 / Esther, 10 / Job, 12:7-9; 35:11-12; 36:24-25; 37:7 / Psalms, 19:1-6; 65:8—(D) Psalms, 18:1-7; 64:9 / Isaiah, 38:6-8; 45:5-6 / Jeremiah, 18:1-6 / Daniel, 2; 4-5; 7-8 APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, 10:4-11:12 / Wisdom of Solomon, 13:1-7 / Ecclesiasticus, 43 / II Maccabees, 7:28; 15:11-16 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:26-30; 24:3-34; 26:26-29 / Mark, 13:4-30; 14:22-25 / Luke, 2:8-15; 12:24-28; 21:7-13; 22:17-20 / John, 6:32-35,47-58 / Acts, 2:16-22 / Romans, 1:20 / I Corinthians, 11:23-29 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [301-368] 13a-d passim; BK XIII [821-832] 96d-97a,c / Odyssey, BK XIX [509-581] 294c-295a,c 5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [176-225] 17a-c / Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c-45a / Agamemnon [104-159] 53a-d / Choephoroe [523-553] 75b-c 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [976-983] 108b / Oedipus at Colonus [1447-1517] 127b-128a / Antigone [988-1094] 139c-140b / Trachiniae [663-722] 175d-176b 5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [42-60] 411c-d 5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [708-722] 551d-552a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 8a-b; 12b-d; 17a-b; 18b; 25b-31a esp 25b-d, 28c-29a; 38a-b; 39c-40a; 47a-c; BK II, 79a-c; BK III, 90d-91a; 95d; 103b-104b; 106c-d; 116a-b; BK IV, 124d-125a; 135b-c; 146d-147a; BK V, 170c-d; 183d-184a; BK VI, 190c-d; 199d-200a; 200d-201a; 204b-c; 205d-206a; 208b; 211a; BK VII, 216d-220b; 223b-c; 227a; 238d-239a; BK VIII, 267a; 268d-269a; 270c-271a; 278c; 285c-286a; BK IX, 289d-290a; 309d-310a; 313d-314a 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 389a-b; BK III, 438d-439a; BK VII, 552a-c; 560d-561a 7 PLATO: Crito, 213b-d / Theaetetus, 520b / Statesman, 591b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 27 92a-93a,c / Dreams 702a-706d / Prophesying 707a-709a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357a23-b24] 596d-597c / Poetics, CH 16 [1454b19-30] 689d-690a 10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics, PAR 25 26a,c / Epidemics, BK I, SECT II, PAR 1 49c-d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [931-977] 42a-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 17 122d-124a; BK III, CH 1 177a-b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [385-401] 113b-114a; BK II [162-233] 128b-130b; [671-704] 143a-144a; BK III [132-191] 150b-152b; [356-409] 157a-158b; [530-550] 161b-162a; BK IV [54-67] 168b-169a; [450-473] 179b-180a; BK VI [185-211] 216a-b; BK VII [59-80] 237b-238a; BK VIII [31-89] 259b-261b; [520-540] 273a-b; BK XII [244-265] 360b-361a 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 8d-9a; 14d-15a,c / Numa Pompilius, 52b-c; 56d-57b / Pericles, 123c-124a / Alcibiades, 174a-d / Timoleon, 198c-d / Pelopidas, 239d-240c / Marcellus, 259c-260c / Pyrrhus, 329c-d / Sulla, 371d-372c / Cimon, 398d-399b / Lucullus, 411a-b / Nicias, 429d-430b / Eumenes, 473a-b / Alexander, 548d-549a / Dion, 789b-790a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 9a-b; BK II, 26c-27a; 27b; BK IV, 79b; BK VI, 95d-96a; BK XI, 101b; 103a-b; BK XII, 112d-113a; 119b; 124b; BK XIII, 141a-b; BK XIV, 147a-b; 149b-c; BK XV, 159b-c; 168d-169a / Histories, BK I, 189d-190a; 195b-c; 206a; BK II, 228a-b; 235a-c; BK III, 256d-257a; BK IV, 293a-294a 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 853b-854a / Harmonies of the World, 1080b-1085b passim 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, CH 13 4b-c; BK III, CH 19-20 18b-19a; BK XI, CH 6-48 112a-124a passim / City of God, BK I, PREF 129a-d; CH 36 149c-d; BK II, CH 2-3 150c-151c; BK IV, CH 33-34 206c-207a,c; BK V, CH 1 207d-208c; CH 11-26 216c-230a,c; BK X, CH 5 301b-302a; CH 8 303a-d, CH 12-20 306d-311c; BK XI, CH 18 331d-332a; CH 24-28 335c-338d; BK XV, CH 1 397b,d-398c; CH 21-22 415b-416c; BK XVI, CH 25 438a-b; BK XVII, CH 1-3 449a-451c; BK XVIII, CH 1-2 472b,d-473d; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 2 624d-625a; BK II, CH 1-3 636b,d-637d esp CH 1, 637a; BK IV, CH 21, 690d-691b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 57, A 4, ANS 298a-299a; Q 104, A 4, ANS and REP 1 538a-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12, A 3, REP 2 778b-779a; QQ 60-65 847a-884a,c esp Q 60, A 2, ANS and REP 1 848a-d, A 4, REP 1 849c-850b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXIV [1-21] 34d; XXXIII [1-90] 49c-50c; PURGATORY, IX [13-69] 66a-c; XIX [1-69] 81c-82a 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK V, STANZA 52-55 127a-b; STANZA 177-185 143b-144b; STANZA 207-217 147a-148b; STANZA 245 152a / Nun’s Priest’s Tale [14,898-15,162] 451a-455b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-d; 80b-c; 81d-82b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 146a-147d; 148d-150d; 154a-156c; 159d-163c; 166a-169d; 175c-178a; 215c-218a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 69b-d; 212a-c; 215a-216b; 218a-c 26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT I, SC II [17-40] 36c-d / 3rd Henry VI, ACT V, SC VI [44-79] 103c-104a / Richard III, ACT I, SC IV [1-83] 114d-115c / Romeo and Juliet, ACT I, SC IV [49-103] 291a-c / Richard II, ACT II, SC IV [7-24] 334c-d / Midsummer-Night’s Dream, ACT I, SC I [145-156] 360b-c / 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [1-63] 450a-d / 2nd Henry IV, ACT I, SC I [60-103] 468d-469b / Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC III [1-78] 572c-573b; ACT II, SC I [71-90] 578d-579a; ACT V, SC I [71-92] 592d-593a / As You Like It, ACT II, SC I [3-20] 603c-d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC I [64-125] 30b-31a / King Lear, ACT I, SC II [112-164] 249a-b / Macbeth, ACT V, SC I 306b-307a / Cymbeline, ACT V, SC IV [30-151] 481c-482c; SC V [426-465] 488b-d 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 200a-b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 331b-332a 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 381a-b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 54c-55a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 44a-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 25, COROL 365b; PART II, DEF 1 373a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [28-128] 176a-178a; BK V [308]-BK VIII [653] 182a-246b esp BK VIII [283-499] 238b-243a; BK XI [193]-BK XII [649] 303b-333a / Areopagitica, 389a-b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 173 203b-204a; 643-646 290b-291b esp 643 290b-291a; 652-657 292a-293a; 670 295a-b; 675 296b-297a; 693-736 301b-317b, 803-856 328b-341b 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 369a-371a / Optics, BK III, 528b-529a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 44 420d-421a, SECT 65-66 425d-426a, SECT 108-109 434a-b, SECT 146-154 442a-444b passim, esp SECT 148 442b-d 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 162b-163a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 294a-296b; 547a-b; 571a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 398b-399b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II, 263d-265c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [430-481] 12b-14a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 1a-3a; 115b-117a; 120a-b; 135a-136a; 138b-145a; 204a-205a; 231a; 331a-332a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 198b-203a; BK VI, 248d-250a; 259c-d; BK VII, 298d-299b; 300c-301b; 302c-d; BK VIII, 340d-341a,c; BK IX, 377d-379a; BK X, 428a-429a; BK XI, 481b-482a; BK XII, 546a-d; 561b-562a; BK XIV, 608a-b; EPILOGUE I, 673d-674a,c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 36b-c; BK VI, 147c-148a; BK VII, 189a-191a,c 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 11b-12a passim / Hysteria, 57a-59d / Interpretation of Dreams, 137a-138d; 173a-174d; 178a-205c esp 178b-179c, 194b-d, 197b-198d; 230b-231c; 252c-340a esp 252c-253a, 264c-272c, 282a-285b, 332a-333b / Unconscious: 440c-442b / General Introduction, 467a-b; 489c-494d esp 492d-493c; 504d-519d esp 505b-506c, 513d-518d / New Introductory Lectures, 808d-810d; 812d-817a esp 813c-814a, 814d-816b

11. Immediate communication: the speech of angels and the gift of tongues

OLD TESTAMENT: Numbers, 11:16-17,24-30 NEW TESTAMENT: Mark, 16:17 / Acts, 2:1-21; 10:44-47; 19:5-6 / I Corinthians, 12-14 esp 14 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 18 151b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XVI, CH 6 426c-427a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QQ 106-107 545c-552b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 4, ANS 15a-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [1-21] 110d; VII [1-24] 115a-c; XI [13-27] 122a-b; XV [1-90] 128b-129b; XX [70-139] 142a-c; XXVI [82-108] 146c-147a; XXIX [1-12] 150b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55a-b / New Atlantis, 203c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH XXIII, SECT 36 213c-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 189b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 846a-847b esp 846b-847b [fn 3] 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 820c-829d esp 820d-821a, 822b-823d, 829a-c

12. The language of God or the gods: the deliverances of the oracles; the inspiration, revelation, and interpretation of Sacred Scripture

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1 / Exodus, 4:11-12; 24:12; 31:18; 32:15-16; 34:1 / Numbers, 12:6-8; 22:20-38 / Deuteronomy, 4:2; 8:3; 9:10; 18:18-22; 29:29; 30:11-14 / Job, 38-42 / Psalms, 12:6; 33:6,9; 119:105,130—(D) Psalms, 11:7; 32:6,9; 118:105,130 / Proverbs, 30:5-6 / Isaiah, 28:9-13; 34:16; 40:8; 51:15-16; 55:8-11; 59:21 / Jeremiah, 1:7-9; 5:14; 13:1-11; 15:16; 18:1-6; 23:28-32; 24; 36:1-4 / Ezekiel, 2:7-3:11 / Daniel, 2:20-22,28-29,47; 5:5-28 / Joel, 2:28-29 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 16:26 / Ecclesiasticus, 1:5; 39:16-17; 42:15,19; 43:26—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1:5; 39:16-17; 42:15,19; 43:28 / I Maccabees, 12:9 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 4:4; 10:19-20; 11:25; 13:1-53; 15:10-20; 16:16-17; 19:3-9; 21:33-45; 22:29 / Mark, 2:23-28; 4:3-34; 10:2-9; 12:24; 14:49 / Luke, 1:70; 2:25-26; 8:4-15; 10:21; 11:28; 20:37-38; 21:33; 24:27,32,44-45 / John, 5:38-39,46-47; 10:1-14,35; 12:47-50; 14:24; 16:25-29 / Acts, 2:17-18; 17:11 / Romans, 1:20; 10:8; 15:4; 16:25-27 / I Corinthians, 2:7-16; 14:26-39 / II Corinthians, 3:2-7; 12:1-7 / Galatians, 1:11-12 / Ephesians, 3:2-5 / II Timothy, 3:14-17 / Hebrews, 1:1-3; 4:12 / I Peter, 1:10-13,23-25; 2:5-8 / II Peter, 1:19-21; 3:5,7,15-16 / I John, 2:20,27 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK I [59-67] 3d; BK II [1-34] 10a-b / Odyssey, BK XIV [321-336] 263b-c; BK XIX [291-307] 292b 5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [744-777] 35b-c / Prometheus Bound [640-682] 46d-47b / Choephoroe [269-305] 72d-73a; [1021-1076] 80a-d / Eumenides [1-33] 81a-b 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c / Oedipus at Colonus [386-419] 117d-118a / Trachiniae [155-177] 171c; [821-830] 177b 5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [1234-1283] 422b-c / Iphigenia at Aulis [872-883] 433a 5 ARISTOPHANES: Knights [108-233] 471b-472d; [941-1099] 481d-483d / Peace [1017-1126] 537c-539a / Birds [959-991] 554c-555a / Lysistrata [762-780] 593a-b / Plutus [1-78] 629a-630a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 4d; 10a-c; 11b-d; 14a-15c; 20a-b; 21b-22a; 38a-b; 39c-d; BK II, 60d-61b; 70d-71a; 77a-b; 80c; 81d-82b; 83b-c; BK III, 101d-102b; 103b-d; BK IV, 126d-127a; 153b-d; BK V, 160a-b; 175b-c; 178a-180a; 183d-184a; BK VI, 189a-b; 191d-192b; 194d-195b; 197d-198a; 199d-201a; 201d-202c; 211b-d; 212d-213a,c; BK VII, 234d; 239c-240d; 241c-242a; 246b-c; 248b-c; 250b; 255c-d; BK VIII, 263b-c; 268b-d; 269c-270a; 273b-c; 276d-277a; 281a; 284d-285b; BK IX, 295d-296c; 302b-c; 308a-c 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 355b-c; 378a-b; 380a-d; BK II, 392a-b; 401a-b; 415d-416c; BK III, 442c-443a; BK V, 489a-b 7 PLATO: Ion 142a-148a,c esp 142d-145c / Apology, 201d-203a / Timaeus, 467b-c 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK II [108-136] 127a-b; BK III [84-191] 149b-152a; BK VI [42-101] 212a-213b; BK VII [81-106] 238a-239a 14 PLUTARCH: Aristides, 268a-d / Cimon, 392b-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 37a-b / Histories, BK II, 235a-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, CH 9 15a-b; BK VI, CH 6-8 36c-37c; BK XI-XIII 89b-125a,c / City of God, BK XI, CH 3 323d; BK XV, CH 26-27, 419d-421d; BK XVI, CH 2, 423c-d; CH 6 426c-427a; BK XVII, CH 3 450c-451c; BK XVIII, CH 23 483d-485a; CH 42-44 496d-498c; CH 46-47 500a-501b; BK XX 530a-560a,c esp CH 21, 549d, CH 28-29 556c-557c / Christian Doctrine 621a-698a,c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, AA 9-10 8d-10c; Q 3, A 1, REP 1-5 14b-15b; Q 34 185a-189a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, QQ 101-103 265d-304a; PART II-II, Q 1 380a-390d; PART III, QQ 60-65 847a-884a,c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [22-48] 110d-111a; XIX [40-66] 135c-d; XXIV [52-114] 143b-d; XXV [67-102] 145a-b; XXVI [1-69] 145d-146c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 70c-71a; 81d-82a; PART II, 160b-c; PART III, 165a-167b; 171a-172a; 176d-177b; 181a-186c; 215b-216b; 241a-242a; 246c; PART IV, 247a-258b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 284d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Cymbeline, ACT V, SC IV [91-122] 482a-b; SC V [426-485] 488b-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 97c-100b / New Atlantis, 202d-203c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 123d-124a; 227a-228a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [544-576] 187a-b 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b; 163a-164b / Pensées, 570-588 273b-277b passim; 642-736 290b-317b; 775 323b-324a; 803-856 328b-341b 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 5a-b; 21c-22d / Human Understanding, BK III, CH IX, SECT 9 286d-287b; SECT 23 291b-c; CH X, SECT 12 294b-c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 44 420d-421a; SECT 65-66 425d-426a 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, 401c-402a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186d-188a passim 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 230c-232c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 120a-b 43 MILL: Liberty, 290a-291d passim / Utilitarianism, 455b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 308c-309d 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1220-1237] 30a-b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 30a-36b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 127b-137c

CROSS-REFERENCES

• For the other major discussion of language in terms of the variety of signs and the modes of signification, see SIGN AND SYMBOL.
• Other considerations of language as an instrument of thought, see IDEA 4a; JUDGMENT 5a; LOGIC 3a; MATHEMATICS 3d; RHETORIC 1b, 2c-2d; SIGN AND SYMBOL 1d, 4b, 4e.
• The distinction of the natural and the conventional as applied to language, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 1; SIGN AND SYMBOL 1b, 1d, 1f.
• The general discussion of the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic, see ART 6b; and for the relation of grammar to these other arts, see LOGIC 3a; RHETORIC 1b, 3c.
• Another analysis of the imperfections of language, and for the remedies proposed by semantics, see SIGN AND SYMBOL 3a, 3c.
• The language of poetry, see POETRY 8b.
• The language of symptoms in medicine, of dreams in psychoanalysis, and of omens and portents in prophecy and divination, see MEDICINE 3c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8d-8e; PROPHECY 3b-3c; SIGN AND SYMBOL 4c, 5b, 6a-6c.
• The language of God or the gods in Sacred Scripture or oracular utterances, and for the problem of interpreting the divine word, see GOD 6c(1); PROPHECY 3a-3d; RELIGION 1b(1); SIGN AND SYMBOL 5e; THEOLOGY 4b.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

1. Hobbes. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, PART I, CH 13
2. Dante. De Vulgari Eloquentia
3. —. Convivio (The Banquet), FIRST TREATISE, CH 5-7; 9-13
4. Milton. Grammar
5. Spinoza. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Theological-Political Treatise), CH 7-13
6. Locke. Conduct of the Understanding
7. Rousseau. Essai sur l’origine des langues
8. A. Smith. A Dissertation on the Origin of Languages
9. J. S. Mill. A System of Logic, BK I; BK IV, CH 3-6

II.

1. Epicurus. Letter to Herodotus
2. Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory), BK I-III
3. John of Salisbury. Metalogicon, BK I
4. Maimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART I; PART II, CH 30; PART III, CH 1-7
5. R. Bacon. Opus Majus, PART III
6. Suárez. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXX (13), XLI (3)
7. John of Saint Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica, PART I, QQ 1-3
8. Arnauld and Lancelot. A General and Rational Grammar Containing the Principles of the Art of Speaking
9. Arnauld. Logic or the Art of Thinking, PART I, CH 15; PART II, CH 1-2
10. Leibnitz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK III
11. J. Harris. Hermes, or A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Universal Grammar
12. Burke. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, PART V
13. Voltaire. “Languages,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
14. Condillac. La langue des calculs
15. —. Logique, PART II
16. Blair. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, XI-XIV
17. Tooke. The Diversions of Purley
18. D. Stewart. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, PART II, CH I
19. A. Johnson. A Treatise on Language
20. J. Mill. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, CH 4
21. Emerson. Nature
22. Grimm. Über den Ursprung der Sprache
23. Trench. On the Study of Words
24. Comte. System of Positive Polity, VOL II, Social Statics, CH 4
25. Boole. An Investigation of the Laws of Thought
26. Lotze. Microcosmos, BK V, CH 3
27. Renan. De l’origine du langage
28. Müller. The Languages of the Seat of War in the East. With a Survey of the Three Families of Language, Semitic, Arian, and Turanian
29. —. Comparative Mythology
30. —. The Science of Language
31. Schleicher. Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language
32. Farrar. Chapters on Language
33. Wedgwood. On the Origin of Language
34. E. Hartmann. The Philosophy of the Unconscious, (B) VI
35. Whitney. Oriental and Linguistic Studies
36. Jevons. On the Mechanical Performance of Logical Inference
37. —. The Principles of Science, CH 6 (17-18)
38. Sayce. Introduction to the Science of Language
39. Venn. Symbolic Logic
40. —. Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, CH 6, 22
41. Bradley. Appearance and Reality, BK I, CH 2
42. Bréal. Semantics
43. A. Sidgwick. The Use of Words in Reasoning
44. Croce. Aesthetic as Science of Expression
45. Couturat and Leau. Histoire de la langue universelle
46. Dilthey. Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung
47. Whitehead and Russell. Principia Mathematica, INTRO
48. Shaw. Pygmalion
49. Pareto. The Mind and Society, VOL I, CH 1-2
50. Sapir. Language
51. Vendryés. Language
52. Ogden and Richards. The Meaning of Meaning, CH 1, 9-10
53. H. Delacroix. Le langage et la pensée
54. Jespersen. Language
55. —. The Philosophy of Grammar
56. Cassirer. Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, VOL I, Die Sprache
57. —. Language and Myth
58. Dewey. Experience and Nature, CH 5
59. Head. Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech
60. Whitehead. An Introduction to Mathematics, CH 5
61. —. Process and Reality, PART II, CH I (5)
62. Bühler. Sprachtheorie
63. R. A. Wilson. The Miraculous Birth of Language
64. Richards. Interpretation in Teaching
65. Joyce. Finnegans Wake
66. Urban. Language and Reality
67. Ayer. Thinking and Meaning
68. Carnap. The Logical Syntax of Language
69. —. Introduction to Semantics
70. —. Meaning and Necessity
71. B. Russell. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, CH 1-6, 13-15, 25
72. —. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART II