Chapter 88: SOUL

INTRODUCTION

In the language of the poets as well as in the discourse of the philosophers, body and soul are correlative terms. Each affects the meaning of the other. The words are used together in daily speech. Men who are unaware of, or deny, the metaphysical and theological significance of having a soul, nevertheless use the word “soul” with a sense of contrast to body, even if only to refer to vague manifestations of spirit—feelings and sympathies which seem to be alien to the world of matter.

With few exceptions, traditional theories of the soul involve its distinction from and relation to the body. Berkeley represents one of the major exceptions. Denying the reality of matter, he conceives the soul as existing in and by itself; souls or spirits differ from God as finite from infinite spiritual beings. The something “which knows and perceives” and which “exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering,” Berkeley says, “is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself.” Berkeley, therefore, would not speak of himself or other men as having souls, but rather as being souls.

The other major exception is exemplified by Lucretius. It is not that Lucretius denies soul as Berkeley denies body. Nor does he deny that soul adds something to body which differentiates living organisms from inorganic things. On the contrary, he declares the mind to be “a part of man no whit less than hand and foot and eyes are parts of the whole living being.” Distinct from mind, soul is also part of a living being. “Mind and soul are held in union one with the other, and form of themselves a single nature,” but whereas the mind is, as it were, the lord or head of the whole body, “the rest of the soul, spread abroad throughout the body, obeys and is moved at the will and inclination of the mind.”

But when Lucretius refers to mind and soul as parts of the body, he means no more than is implied in speaking of the hand and eye as parts of the body. “The nature of mind and soul is bodily,” he writes. Just as flesh and bones are composed of atomic particles, so the mind is formed of atoms “exceeding small and smooth and round,” and the soul is “made of very tiny seeds linked together throughout veins, flesh, and sinews.”

APART FROM THESE EXCEPTIONS, the traditional discussion of soul considers it as somehow conjoined with body to constitute a whole of which it is the immaterial principle or part. Even those who, like Descartes, define the soul as an immaterial substance, capable of existing by itself, do not actually ascribe to the human soul complete independence of the human body. Nor do the theologians who think of God as a purely spiritual being and of angels as immaterial substances attribute soul to them.

Precisely because God and the angels do not have bodies, neither do they have souls. Whether everything which has a body also has a soul is another question. It is variously answered; but certainly those who, like Plato and Plotinus, speak of a world-soul or a soul of the universe, confirm the point that soul is the co-principle or complement of body. The same point appears in theories of the celestial bodies which conceive them as being alive and as therefore having souls.

Unfolding to Socrates the story of the creation, Timaeus says: “Using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God.” To the world, Timaeus explains, God “gave a body, smooth and even, having a surface in every direction equidistant from the center, a body entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the center, he put the soul which he diffused throughout the body, making it also to be the exterior environment of it.”

Comparing the magnetic force of the loadstone with the animation of a soul, Gilbert says that “this one eminent property is the same which the ancients held to be a soul in the heavens, in the globes, and in the stars, in sun and moon…. The ancient philosophers… all seek in the world a certain universal soul, and declare the whole world to be endowed with a soul. Aristotle held that not the universe is animate, but the heavens only…. As for us,” Gilbert writes, “we deem the whole world animate, and all globes, stars, and this glorious earth, too, we hold to be from the beginning by their own destinate souls governed… Pitiable is the state of the stars, abject the lot of earth, if this high dignity of soul is denied them, while it is granted to the worm, the ant, the roach, to plants and morels; for in that case, worms, roaches, moths, were more beauteous objects in nature and more perfect, inasmuch as nothing is excellent, nor precious, nor eminent, that hath not a soul.”

On the question whether the earth, each heavenly body, or the whole world is endowed with life, intelligence, and soul, Kepler differs from Gilbert, Augustine from Plato and Plotinus, Aquinas from Aristotle. Nevertheless, the many-sided controversy indicates the traditional connection of soul with life and mind on the one hand, and with animate or organic bodies on the other—bodies which manifest certain properties and tendencies to motion.

THE MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING SOUL seem to follow from these traditional associations. Does the soul which is somehow conjoined with a body exist as an immaterial substance or principle, in such a way that the being composed of body and soul consists of two distinct substances or entities, united as related parts of a whole? Or is the soul the substantial form of an organic body, with the consequence that the form and matter together constitute a single composite substance, which is the living thing? In the latter alternative the unity of soul and body, according to Aristotle, is like that of “the wax and the shape given to it by the die.”

On either conception of soul and its relation to body or matter, further questions arise concerning the soul’s existence apart from the body. Does it exist before being united to the body? Does it exist after the union is dissolved? How does it exist when it exists separately or apart from matter? For those, like Lucretius, who conceive the soul as itself composed of material particles within the framework of the body, such questions can have little meaning. For those, like Plato and Descartes, who conceive the soul as an immaterial entity having being in its own right, these questions can be immediately answered in favor of the soul’s capacity for separate existence. Only when the soul is conceived as a form which, together with matter, constitutes the substance of a living body, does there seem to be both meaning and difficulty to the question whether the soul continues to endure separately when a plant, an animal, or a man dies, i.e., when such composite substances decompose.

If the individual soul ceases to be when the body with which it is somehow united perishes, it is as mortal as the body. The traditional theories of personal immortality—such as the Platonic myths concerning the transmigration or reincarnation of souls, and the Christian doctrine of man’s immortal soul, specially created for union with the body, but destined to survive its separation from the body—are theories which involve conceptions of the soul as capable of self-subsistence. The controversy over these doctrines is dealt with in the chapter on IMMORTALITY. Here we are concerned to see how different implications for immortality necessarily follow from various theories of the soul.

Still other issues concerning soul arise in connection with other chapters. For example, the question whether soul is to be found only in living things, or only in animals but not in plants, or in man alone, is discussed in the chapters on LIFE AND DEATH and on MIND. If soul, on any conception, is the principle or cause of life, then the distinction between animate and inanimate bodies is identical with the distinction between things which have and things which do not have a soul. If, furthermore, the kind of life possessed by a vegetable or plant is radically different from animal life, and that in turn from human life, then souls, too, may have to be differentiated in kind according to the mode of life or the range of vital powers of which each type is the principle.

Some writers, however, tend to equate “soul” with “mind” or “understanding.” When, as by Descartes, soul is identified with rational soul or thinking substance, it is usually attributed to man alone. Soul is then not thought necessary to explain the phenomena of life in plants and animals, at least in no sense of soul which implies either an incorporeal or a formal principle; that is, anything beyond the complex interaction of organic parts. Other authors, like Locke, who conceive soul or understanding not merely in terms of rational thought, but also in terms of sensation, imagination, and memory, may exclude plants, but not animals, from the possession of soul or mind.

Descartes takes notice of these ambiguities in the traditional use of the word “soul.” Probably because “men in the earliest times,” he writes, “did not distinguish in us that principle in virtue of which we are nourished, grow, and perform all those operations which are common to us with the brutes… from that by which we think, they called both by the single name soul; then, perceiving the distinction between nutrition and thinking, they called that which thinks mind, believing also that this was the chief part of the soul. But I, perceiving that the principle by which we are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think, have declared that the name soul when used for both is equivocal; and I say that, when soul is taken to mean the primary actuality or chief essence of man, it must be understood to apply only to the principle by which we think, and I have called it by the name mind as often as possible to avoid ambiguity; for I consider the mind not as part of the soul, but as the whole of that soul which thinks.”

In another place, he uses the word “soul” to stand for “that subtle fluid styled the animal spirits” which, pervading the organs of brute animals, accounts for their peculiar type of animation. “We can recognize no principle of motion in them beyond the disposition of their organs and the continual discharge of the animal spirits that are produced by the beat of the heart as it rarefies the blood.” Soul in this sense is not to be confused with “the incorporeal and spiritual nature of man’s soul.” It is “something corporeal, of a fine structure and subtle, spread throughout the external body, and the principle of all sensation, imagination, and thought. Thus there are three grades of being, Body, the Corporeal or soul, and Mind or spirit.”

IN THE OPENING PAGES of his treatise On the Soul, Aristotle says that “to attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world.” The difficulty seems to apply both to what the soul is and to whether it exists. The questions are connected. Even Lucretius, who regards the soul as material in nature, does not claim to know its existence by direct observation. It is not, like the body itself or like other parts of the body, a sensible object. It must be inferred to exist. Just as the existence of unobservable atoms is inferred in order to explain the constitution and change of all natural objects, so the existence of soul is inferred in order to explain the constitution and motion of living things. Those who conceive the soul as immaterial—whether as substance, principle, or form—would seem to face an even greater difficulty in establishing its existence and in describing its nature. Admittedly, the soul as some sort of immaterial being cannot be discovered by observation and experiment. The alternatives, which represent traditional solutions of the problem, seem to include the soul’s reflexive knowledge of its own existence, inferential knowledge about the soul based on observed facts, various religious beliefs concerning the nature and destiny of the soul, and the postulation of the soul’s existence on practical, not theoretic, grounds.

Not all writers agree with Aristotle that the soul is an object difficult to know, or with Kant that it is absolutely impossible for us to reach any sound theoretic conclusions about the soul’s existence. Descartes, for example, says that if there are “any persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of the soul by the reasons which I have brought forward, I wish them to know that all other things of which they perhaps think themselves more assured (such as possessing a body, and that there are stars and an earth and so on) are less certain.”

The argument for the soul’s existence which precedes this remark is the famous Cogito, ergo sum—“I think; therefore, I am.” From the fact that, in the very act of doubting the existence of everything else, he could not doubt that he was doubting, and hence thinking, Descartes assures himself of his own existence, or, more precisely, of the existence of himself as a thinking being. “I knew,” he writes, “that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this ‘me,’ that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if the body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.”

Locke appears to agree that “if I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that…. I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting,” he goes on, “as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are.”

But Locke does not turn the proposition that a thinking being exists into the assertion that a spiritual being, the soul as an immaterial substance, exists. “We have the idea of matter and thinking,” he writes, “but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking.”

For Locke, however, our idea of soul is as clear as our idea of body. “Our idea of body,” he says, “is an extended, solid substance capable of communicating motion by impulse; and our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought… I know that people whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses, that they seldom reflect on anything beyond them, are apt to say, that they cannot comprehend a thinking thing; which, perhaps, is true: but I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.” And in another place, he adds: “If this notion of immaterial spirit may have, perhaps, some difficulties in it, not easy to be explained, we have, therefore, no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body, because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties, very hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained or understood by us.”

Berkeley differs from Locke not only in maintaining that we have no idea of matter at all, but also in holding that, if we use the word “idea” for sense-impressions or the images derived from them, we can have no idea of soul or spiritual substance. But we can, he thinks, form what he calls a “notion” of the soul, which grasps the meaning of the word “spirit” as signifying “that which thinks, wills, or perceives.” He differs from Locke further in proportion as he tends to agree with Descartes, asserting that the existence of a spiritual substance, a thinking being, necessarily follows from the undeniable existence of thinking itself.

For both Descartes and Berkeley, the immortality of the soul can be directly concluded from our knowledge of the soul’s existence and nature. “The soul,” writes Berkeley, “is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies… cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, ‘the soul of man is naturally immortal.’”

The arguments in Plato’s Phaedo for the proper existence of the soul before it joins a particular body, and for its existence after it leaves the body to dwell apart before entering another body—arguments, in short, for the soul’s immortality—seem to stem from a slightly different principle. It is not merely that the soul is simple or uncompounded and hence indissoluble, or that the knowledge we have of the absolute ideas requires us to posit a principle of knowledge other than the bodily senses which can apprehend only changing things. In addition, Socrates argues that the knower must be like the known. If it is the soul which knows the unchangeable and eternal essences, it must be as unchangeable and eternal as they are. When the soul uses “the body as instrument of perception,” Socrates says, it is “then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable… But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred.”

AGAINST ANY FORM OF ARGUMENT for the existence and immortality of the human soul which proceeds from the nature of our thought or knowledge, Kant takes the position that the premises do not warrant the conclusion. He claims to expose the fallacies in what he calls the “paralogism of a rational psychology.” The “I” of the Cogito, ergo sum may be the necessary logical subject of all our judgments, but this does not give us intuitive knowledge of a really existing substance which has the attributes of simplicity, spirituality, and permanence or immortality.

“In all our thinking,” Kant writes, “the I is the subject in which our thoughts are inherent; nor can that I ever be used as a determination of any other thing. Thus everybody is constrained to look upon himself as the substance, and on thinking as the accident of his being.” But, he goes on, “though the I exists in all thoughts, not the slightest intuition is connected with that representation by which it might be distinguished from other objects of intuition…. Hence it follows that in the first syllogism of transcendental psychology reason imposes upon us an apparent knowledge only, by representing the constant logical subject as the knowledge of the real subject in which that knowledge inheres. Of that subject, however, we have not and cannot have the slightest knowledge…. In spite of this, the proposition that the soul is a substance may well be allowed to stand, if only we see that this concept cannot help us on in the least or teach us any of the ordinary conclusions of rational psychology, as, for instance, the everlasting continuance of the soul amid all changes and even in death; and that it therefore signifies a substance in idea only, and not in reality.”

Similarly with respect to the simplicity of the soul, Kant contends that the absolute, but merely logical, unity of apperception or thought is illegitimately converted into the absolute unity of a real substance. The proposition, I am a simple substance, he declares, “teaches us nothing at all with reference to myself as an object of experience.” Its only value is to enable us “to distinguish the soul from all matter, and thus to exempt it from that decay to which matter is at all times subject.”

To this extent, rational psychology may “guard our thinking self against the danger of materialism.” The concept of the soul as an immaterial and simple substance may thus function regulatively, but we deceive ourselves with the illusion of knowledge when we treat that concept as if it had intuitive content—when, as he says, we change “thoughts into things.” Kant does not deny that the “I” is substantial in concept or simple in concept. Though these propositions are “incontestably true,” he says, “nevertheless, what we really wish to know of the soul, becomes by no means known to us in that way, because all these predicates are with regard to intuition non-valid, entailing no consequences with regard to objects of experience, and therefore entirely empty.”

The existence and immortality of the soul is, for Kant, a postulate or demand of the practical reason. “Of the psychic substance, regarded as an immortal soul, it is absolutely impossible to obtain any proof from a theoretical point of view,” but if such an object must be thought a priori in order for “pure practical reason to be used as duty commands,” it becomes what Kant calls “matter of faith.” Immortality seems to him rationally required as the practically necessary condition for the fulfillment of the moral law and the endless progress of the soul toward holiness of will.

William James questions even such practical arguments for the soul. The imperishability of a simple substance does not, he thinks, guarantee “immortality of a sort we care for.” Nor, following Locke, does it seem to him that a substantial soul is required for personal identity and moral responsibility. Writing as an empirical or scientific psychologist, who feels “entirely free to discard the word Soul” because he finds the concept useless “so far as accounting for the actually verified facts of conscious experience goes,” James tells those who may find “any comfort in the idea” that they are “perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul; they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes.”

JAMES’ CONCLUSION that “the substantial Soul… explains nothing and guarantees nothing,” along with the arguments of Kant and Locke, may not apply to the soul conceived as the principle of life rather than as the agent of thought, or to the soul conceived as the form of an organic body rather than as a spiritual being associated with or somehow imprisoned in the body. Precisely because this other conception affirms reality of soul as something other than a complete substance, precisely because it applies to plants and animals as well as men, this other conception of soul would seem to require a different sort of criticism.

The Greek and Latin words—psyche and anima—which we translate by “soul” seem to have life as their primary connotation. In the Cratylus, Socrates suggests that “those who first used the name psyche meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival.” Other dialogues express the Greek conception of the living thing as that which has the power of self-motion, and ascribe this power to the soul as source. In the Phaedo, for example, Socrates asks, “What is that the inherence of which will render the body alive?” to which Cebes answers, “Soul,” and agrees with Socrates’ further statement that “whatever the soul takes possession of, to that she comes bearing life.” In the Laws, Cleinias having identified the power of self-motion with life, the Athenian Stranger gains his assent to the proposition that whatever has life or self-motion also has soul.

To this much Aristotle also agrees. “What has soul in it,” he says, “differs from what has not, in that the former displays life”; to which he adds that “living may mean thinking or perception or local movement, or movement in the sense of nutrition and growth,” so that we must “think of plants also as living,” and as having souls. But Aristotle goes further. In defining soul as the cause of life, and in differentiating three kinds of souls—vegetative, sensitive, and rational—according to the vital powers manifested by the activities of plants, animals, and men, he uses his general theory of corporeal substances to state precisely what the soul is and how it is related to the body.

Corporeal substances are, according to him, all composite of two principles, form and matter. “What is called matter is potentiality, what is called form, actuality.” As exemplified in works of art, wood is the matter which has the potentiality for a certain shape and a certain function that is the actuality or form of a chair. In the case of natural things, that which determines “the essential whatness” of a body is its form or, as Aristotle sometimes says, “its formulable essence.”

If living things are essentially distinct from inert bodies, as Aristotle supposes them to be, then the forms which determine their essences must be different from the forms of inanimate substances. It is this difference in forms which Aristotle appropriates the word “soul” to signify. In each kind of living thing, the soul is the substantial form or “the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.”

He speaks of the first grade of actuality here to distinguish merely being alive or besouled from the various acts which, as operations of the vital powers, constitute living. If an axe or an eye had a soul, it would consist of its power to cut or to see, not in its actually cutting or seeing. While nourishing or thinking “is actuality corresponding to the cutting and the seeing, the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool… As the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal.”

From this conception of soul as the form or actuality of a living substance, “it indubitably follows,” Aristotle says, “that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are—for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts.” Where Plato holds that the soul is prior in existence to the body, Aristotle holds that soul and body come into existence together when the organism is generated. Where Plato attributes an independent mode of being to the soul, distinct in character from that of bodies, Aristotle says that “the soul cannot be without a body. Yet it cannot be a body; it is not a body, but something relative to a body. That is why it is in a body and a body of a definite kind,” being nothing more than “the actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses the potentiality of being besouled.”

FURTHER CONSEQUENCES FOLLOW from these conflicting conceptions of soul. In the Timaeus, Plato advances the view that only the lowest grade of soul—the plant soul—is mortal, in contrast to the souls of animals and men. Aristotle would seem to attribute mortality to every grade of soul. If any exception is to be made, it is only for the human soul because it involves the power of rational thought. Mind or the power to think, he writes, “seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable.”

The critical point is whether thinking, unlike all other psychic powers, is an activity of the soul alone. For the most part, “there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body…. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but,” Aristotle adds, “if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as the condition of its existence. If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible.”

Is there any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul? Aristotle seems to answer this question affirmatively when he says that “insofar as the realities it knows are capable of being separated from their matter, so is it also with the powers of mind.” On one interpretation this means that the mind or intellect is as immaterial in its mode of operation as some of its objects are in their mode of being; with the further consequence that what is capable of acting apart from body is also able to exist apart from body. But whether Aristotle’s further statement that “mind set free from its present conditions… is immortal and eternal” applies to the intellect alone or to the rational soul as a whole, has been disputed by various interpreters. Adopting Aristotle’s conception of soul as the form which is the actuality of life in an organic body, Aquinas for one seems to think that the immortality of a rational soul can be demonstrated from the special character of its intellectual powers.

A theory of the soul which regarded it as a simple and incorporeal substance, or as having a being independent of the body, would seem to harmonize more readily with the Christian belief in the human soul’s special creation and its individual survival after death. But Aquinas rejects such a theory on the ground that then man would be two substances or two beings, not one; or else if the human person is identified with the soul, man would be a soul using a body rather than a single substance of composite nature. The doctrine of body and soul which holds them to be related as matter and form, preserves the unity of man and, in the opinion of Aquinas, fits the way in which man learns through his senses, experiences passions, and, in thinking, depends upon imagination.

But though he admits that men cannot think without images, Aquinas also insists, contrary to Locke, that thinking, insofar as it involves abstract concepts, cannot be performed by matter. To make matter think is beyond even the power of God. Unlike nourishing or sensing, understanding is not and cannot be “the act of a body, nor of any corporeal power.”

This theory—that the acts of understanding by which the intellect abstracts and receives universal concepts cannot be accounted for by the motions of the brain—is further discussed in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR. Here we are concerned simply to note that, for Aquinas, the fact that the concepts with which men think are universal, means that they are abstracted from matter; and the fact that they are abstracted from matter means that the various acts of understanding must also be immaterial—that is, not acts of bodily organs like the brain. To these premises Aquinas adds one further principle, namely, that a thing’s mode of being is indicated by its mode of operation. In these terms he concludes that, since the intellect has “an operation per se apart from the body,” the human soul, which is called rational because of its power of understanding, can have a being per se apart from the body. Hence it is “something incorporeal and subsistent.”

Nevertheless, according to Aquinas, though the human soul can subsist separately, it belongs to its nature to be embodied, that is, to be the form of a material substance. “The soul, as part of human nature,” he writes, “has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.” Furthermore, if the entire nature of man were to be a soul—the soul making “use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses a ship”—there would be no need for the resurrection of the body after the Last Judgment. The Christian dogma of the resurrected body more properly accords, in Aquinas’ view, with a conception of soul “united to the body as form to matter”; for, as he says in another place, “if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural for it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection.”

In the consideration of the relation of body and soul, an opposite estimation of the body’s role goes with an opposite theory of the soul’s nature. Socrates, in the Phaedo, describes the body as the soul’s prison-house, or worse, the source of the soul’s contamination by the impurities of sense and passion. “In this life,” he says, “we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature.” But complete purification requires “the separation of the soul from the body… the release of the soul from the chains of the body.” That is why, Socrates tells his friends gathered in the cell where he is to drink the hemlock, “true philosophers are ever seeking to release the soul” and “are always occupied in the practice of dying.”

It is also the opinion of Plotinus that it is evil for the soul to be in the body. But Christian theologians, for the most part, take a contrary view. Aquinas, for example, criticizes Origen for holding that “souls were embodied in punishment of sin.” To him there is nothing “of a penal and afflicting nature” in the soul’s union with the body. Though Scripture says that “the corruptible body weigheth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle presseth down the mind,” Augustine interprets this to mean, not that the flesh is evil in itself, but that man is beset by sin when “the flesh lusteth against the spirit.”

“There is no need, therefore,” according to Augustine, “that in our sins and vices we accuse the nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, for in its own kind and degree the flesh is good.” Man is both body and soul, human nature is a thing of both flesh and spirit, and “he who extols the nature of the soul as the chief good,” Augustine continues, “and condemns the nature of the flesh as if it were evil, assuredly is fleshly both in his love of the soul and his hatred of the flesh.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. Conceptions of soul * 1a. Soul as the ordering principle of the universe: the world soul and its relation to the intellectual principle; the souls of the heavenly bodies * 1b. Soul as the principle of self-motion or life in living things: soul as the form of an organic body * 1c. Soul as the principle of distinction between thinking and non-thinking beings: the identity or distinction between soul and mind or intellect * 1d. Soul as the principle of personal identity: the doctrine of the self; the empirical and the transcendental ego

2. The analysis of the powers of the soul * 2a. The distinction between the soul and its powers or acts * 2b. The order, connection, and interdependence of the parts of the soul: the id, ego, and super-ego in the structure of the psyche * 2c. The kinds of soul and the modes of life: vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls and their special powers * (1) The vegetative powers: the powers proper to the plant soul * (2) The sensitive powers: the powers proper to the animal soul * (3) The rational powers: the powers proper to the human soul

3. The immateriality of the soul * 3a. The soul as an immaterial principle, form, or substance * 3b. The immateriality of the human soul in comparison with the materiality of the plant and animal soul: the intellect as an incorporeal power * 3c. The relation of soul and body: the relation of formal and material principles, or of spiritual and corporeal substances * 3d. The denial of soul as an immaterial principle, form, or substance: the atomic theory of the soul * 3e. The corporeal or phenomenal manifestation of disembodied souls as ghosts, wraiths, or spirits

4. The being of the soul * 4a. The unity of the human soul: the human mode of the vegetative and sensitive powers * 4b. The issue concerning the self-subsistence or immortality of the human soul: its existence or capacity for existence in separation from the human body * 4c. The origin of the human soul: its separate creation; its emanation or derivation from the world soul * 4d. The life of the soul apart from the body * (1) The doctrine of transmigration or perpetual reincarnation * (2) Comparison of separated souls with men and angels * (3) The need of the soul for its body: the dogma of the body’s resurrection for the soul’s perfection * (4) The contamination of the soul by the body: the purification of the soul by release from the body

5. Our knowledge of the soul and its powers * 5a. The soul’s knowledge of itself by reflection on its acts: the soul as a transcendental or noumenal object; the paralogisms of rational psychology * 5b. The concept of the soul in empirical psychology: experimental knowledge of the soul

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, Bk. II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

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1. Conceptions of soul

1a. Soul as the ordering principle of the universe: the world soul and its relation to the intellectual principle; the souls of the heavenly bodies

7 Plato: Cratylus, 93c-d / Phaedrus, 124b-d / Apology, 204d-205a / Phaedo, 241b-242b / Timaeus, 447a-455d esp. 449c-450c / Philebus, 618b-619d / Laws, Bk. X, 757d-765d esp. 762b-765d; Bk. XII, 797c-798b 8 Aristotle: On the Heavens, Bk. II, Ch. 1 [284a27-b1] 376a; Ch. 12, 383b-384c / Metaphysics, Bk. XII, Ch. 6 [1071b32-1072a3] 601d / On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 3 [406a26-407b25] 636b-637b; Ch. 5 [411a6-23] 641a-b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, Bk. I, Ch. 14, 120d-121c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. IV, Sect. 29, 266a; Sect. 40, 267a-b; Bk. V, Sect. 30, 273a; Bk. VI, Sect. 38, 277c-d; Bk. VII, Sect. 9-10, 280b-c; Bk. VIII, Sect. 7, 286a; Bk. X, Sect. 6-7, 297a-c; Bk. XII, Sect. 30, 310a-b 13 Virgil: Aeneid, Bk. VI [724-751] 230b-231a 16 Kepler: Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, Bk. IV, 853b-856a; 890a-895b; 896a-897a; 914a-b; 932a-933a; 959a-960a / Harmonies of the World, 1080b-1085b esp. 1083b-1085b 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 4, 36d-37b; Tr. II, 40a-42a; Tr. III, Ch. 2, 42c-d; Ch. 13, 46c-47b; Ch. 16-18, 48b-50a; Tr. IX, Ch. 4, 67c-68a; Ch. 7-9, 69c-72a passim / Third Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 4, 79d-80a; Tr. II, Ch. 3, 84b; Tr. IV, Ch. 6, 99d; Tr. V, Ch. 6, 103b-104a; Tr. VII, Ch. 11-13, 126a-129a; Tr. VIII, Ch. 4-5, 130b-131d / Fourth Ennead, Tr. II, Ch. 1-2, 141c-143b; Ch. 4, 143d-144b; Ch. 6-7, 144c-145d; Ch. 9-10, 146d-148b; Tr. IV, Ch. 6-16, 161b-166b; Ch. 22, 168d-169c; Ch. 26-27, 171b-172a; Ch. 29-45, 173b-183a passim; Tr. VII, Ch. 1-2, 200d-202a passim; Tr. VIII, Ch. 7-Tr. IX, Ch. 5, 204b-207a,c / Fifth Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 2, 208d-209a; Ch. 6-8, 211a-213a; Ch. 10, 213c; Tr. II, Ch. 2, 215a-c; Tr. IX, Ch. 3, 247b-d; Ch. 13-14, 251a-d 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. IV, Ch. 11-12, 194c-196a; Bk. VII, Ch. 6, 248a-b; Ch. 9, 249d-250a; Ch. 13, 251c-252a; Ch. 23, 256b-257b; Bk. XIII, Ch. 16, 367c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 3, A. 8, Ans., 19d-20c; Q. 18, A. 1, Rep. 1, 104c-105c; Q. 47, A. 1, Ans., 256a-257b; Q. 70, A. 3, 365b-367a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part III Suppl., Q. 79, A. 1, Ans., 951b-953b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part II, 162b 28 Gilbert: On the Loadstone, Bk. I, 38b; Bk. V, 104b-105d 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 426b-429b 34 Newton: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Bk. III, General Scholium, 370a / Optics, Bk. III, 542b-543a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 767c [n. 18] 42 Kant: Critique of Judgement, 565d 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 115b-117a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, Bk. V, 216d-218b; Bk. XII, 561b-c; Bk. XIV, 608a-b 53 James: Psychology, 658b-659a

1b. Soul as the principle of self-motion or life in living things: soul as the form of an organic body

7 Plato: Cratylus, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-c / Phaedo, 244b-246c / Laws, Bk. X, 763a-764a 8 Aristotle: Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 6 [127b13-18] 177a-b / Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 8 [1017b10-17] 538b; Bk. VII, Ch. 10 [1035b14-28] 559a-b; Bk. VIII, Ch. 3 [1043a29-b4] 567d; Bk. XII, Ch. 5 [1071a2-4] 600c; Bk. XIII, Ch. 2 [1077a20-23] 608c / On the Soul, 631a-668d esp. Bk. II, Ch. 1-3, 642a-645b 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [640b30-641a33] 163c-164b / Generation of Animals, Bk. I, Ch. 19 [726b15-30] 266d-267a; Bk. II, Ch. 1 [731b29-31] 272a; [733b23-735a28] 274a-276a; Ch. 3 [737a18-34] 278a-b; Ch. 4 [738b18-27] 279c; Ch. 4 [740b25]-Ch. 5 [741a30] 281d-282b; Bk. III, Ch. 11 [762a18-b27] 303b-d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 167a-b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. IV, Sect. 21, 265b-c; Bk. IX, Sect. 9, 292b-d 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, 1a-6b passim / Second Ennead, Tr. II, Ch. 13, 46c-47b; Tr. IX, Ch. 7, 69c-70a / Fourth Ennead, Tr. I, 139a-b; Tr. III, Ch. 8, 146b-d; Ch. 19, 151d; Ch. 23, 153d; Tr. IV, Ch. 29, 173b-174b; Tr. V, Ch. 7, 188b-c; Tr. VII, 191c-200c / Fifth Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 2, 208c-209b; Tr. II, Ch. 2, 215a-c / Sixth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 16, 305a 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VII, Ch. 23, 256b-c; Bk. XIII, Ch. 2, 360b-361a; Bk. XIX, Ch. 3, 510a-b; Bk. XXI, Ch. 3, 561c-d; Bk. XXII, Ch. 4, 588b-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 3, A. 1, Ans., 14b-15b; Q. 18, A. 3, Ans. and Rep. 1, 106b-107c; Q. 51, A. 1, Rep. 3, 275b-276b; Q. 70, A. 3, Ans. and Rep. 2, 365b-367a; Q. 72, A. 1, Rep. 1, 368b-369d; QQ. 75-76, 378a-399b; Q. 97, A. 3, Ans., 515a-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 56, A. 1, Rep. 1, 30a-c; Part II-II, Q. 23, A. 2, Rep. 2, 483d-484d; Part III, Q. 2, A. 5, Ans. and Rep. 3, 715a-716b; Q. 5, A. 3, 737d-739a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XVIII [40-54] 80b-c; XXV [1-108] 91b-92c; Paradise, II [127-148] 109a-b; IV [49-54] 111b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Intro, 47a-b; Part IV, 251a 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 384d-390b passim; 488d-496d passim 53 James: Psychology, 139b-140a

1c. Soul as the principle of distinction between thinking and non-thinking beings: the identity or distinction between soul and mind or intellect

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 3 [406b26-407a13] 636b-637b 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. III [94-416] 31b-35c 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part IV, 51d-52a; Part V, 56a-b; 59a-60c / Meditations on First Philosophy, 71b-d; II, 77d-81d / Objections and Replies, 119d-120a; Def. VI, 130c; 135b-136b; 152b,d-156a passim; 207a; 208c-d; 219b-220a; 224d-226d; 249d-250b 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. XXIII, Sect. 5, 205a-b; Sect. 15, 208c-d; Sect. 18-22, 209a-d; Sect. 28-32, 211b-212d; Ch. XXVII, Sect. 12-14, 223a-224b passim 35 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 26-28, 418a-c; Sect. 89, 430b-c; Sect. 98, 432a; Sect. 135-142, 440a-441c passim; Sect. 148, 442b-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, Part I, Par. 47, 24a-b 53 James: Psychology, 85a-b; 130b-131a; 139b-140a

1d. Soul as the principle of personal identity: the doctrine of the self; the empirical and the transcendental ego

35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, Ch. III, Sect. 4-5, 113b-c; Bk. II, Ch. XXVII, Sect. 7, 220d-221a; Sect. 9-29, 222a-228c esp. Sect. 12-14, 223a-224b 35 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 139, 440d 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 49c-51d esp. 51c-d; 120c-129c esp. 121a-124d, 126a-128b; 200c-204c esp. 203d-204c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, Part I, Par. 47, 24a-b; Additions, 28, 121b 53 James: Psychology, 188a-197a esp. 191a-192b, 194b-196a; 213a-240a esp. 213a, 216b-220a, 221a-225b, 232b-238b

2. The analysis of the powers of the soul

2a. The distinction between the soul and its powers or acts

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [402a9-12] 631d; Ch. 5 [411b5-31] 641c-d; Bk. II, Ch. 1 [412a21-28] 642b; Ch. 2 [413b10-414a4] 643c-644a; Bk. III, Ch. 9 [432a15-b9] 664d-665a; Ch. 10 [433a33-b4] 666a-b 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, Bk. II, Ch. 7 [652b7-16] 177d-178a 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, Bk. I, Ch. 2, 168b-c 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, Tr. VI, Ch. 2, 107a-108a / Fourth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 23-25, 169c-171b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 77, A. 1, 399c-401b; AA. 5-6, 403d-405c; Q. 79, A. 1, 414a-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 50, A. 2, 7c-8a; Q. 83, A. 2, Rep. 3, 172b-173a; Q. 110, A. 4, 350d-351d; Part III, Q. 6, A. 2, Ans. and Rep. 1, 3, 741c-742a; Part III Suppl., Q. 70, A. 1, Rep. 4, 893d-895d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, IV [1-18] 57c; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 54b-c 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 20a-b / Objections and Replies, 135b-136b; 208c-209a 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. I, Sect. 9-25, 123a-127d esp. Sect. 10, 123b-d; Ch. XIX, Sect. 4, 176a-b; Ch. XXI, Sect. 6, 179d-180a; Sect. 14-20, 181b-183a 35 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 98, 432a 53 James: Psychology, 130b-131a

2b. The order, connection, and interdependence of the parts of the soul: the id, ego, and super-ego in the structure of the psyche

7 Plato: Phaedrus, 128a-129c / Republic, Bk. III-IV, 316a-356a; Bk. IX, 425c-426a / Timaeus, 466a-467a 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 5 [411a23-b31] 641b-d; Bk. III, Ch. 9-13, 662d-668d 9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, Ch. 10 [703a28-b1] 239a / Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 13, 347b-348d; Bk. V, Ch. 11 [1138a5-15] 387a,c; Bk. VI, Ch. 1 [1138b35]-Ch. 2 [1139a13] 387b-388b; Bk. IX, Ch. 4 [1166a13-24] 419d-420a / Politics, Bk. I, Ch. 5 [1254a34-1255a2] 448a-c; Ch. 13 [1260a4-8] 454c; Bk. III, Ch. 4 [1277a5-12] 474a; Bk. VII, Ch. 14 [1333a17-25] 538a 11 Nicomachus: Introduction to Arithmetic, Bk. I, 826d-827a 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, 1a-6b passim / Fourth Ennead, Tr. III, Ch. 3, 143b-c; Ch. 19, 151d-152b; Tr. IV, Ch. 17, 166c-d / Sixth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 15, 304c-d 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. XIX, Ch. 13, 519a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 77, AA. 4-7, 403a-406b; Part I-II, Q. 9, AA. 1-2, 657d-659c; Q. 37, A. 1, Ans., 783d-784c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part III, Q. 15, A. 9, Rep. 3, 794c-795b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, IV [1-18] 57c; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part I, 151a-d 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 444c-445c; 447a-b 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, Bk. XII [79-97] 321a / Areopagitica, 407b 54 Freud: The Ego and the Id, 701d-703a; 703c-708c; 712a-717a,c esp. 712b-c, 714b-c, 715c-716a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721d-722c esp. 722b-c / New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 830a-840a esp. 836d-839d

2c. The kinds of soul and the modes of life: vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls and their special powers

7 Plato: Republic, Bk. IV, 350c-353c; Bk. IX, 421a-427b / Timaeus, 469d-470a 8 Aristotle: Topics, Bk. V, Ch. 4 [133a28-33] 184c; Bk. VI, Ch. 10 [148a23-37] 202b-c / On the Heavens, Bk. II, Ch. 12 [292a1-11] 384a / On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [402b1-403a2] 631c-632a; Ch. 3 [407a3-6] 636b-c; Ch. 5 [410b16-411a2] 640d-641a; Bk. II, Ch. 2-3, 643a-645b 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [641a33-b10] 164b-c / Generation of Animals, Bk. II, Ch. 3 [736a25-737a19] 276d-278a; Ch. 4 [740b25]-Ch. 5 [741a30] 281d-282b; Bk. III, Ch. 7 [757b14-30] 298c-d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 167a-b 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. III [231-322] 33a-34b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. II, Sect. 16, 262d-263a,c; Bk. IX, Sect. 9, 292b-d 16 Kepler: Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, Bk. IV, 854b 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, 1a-6b passim / Second Ennead, Tr. II, Ch. 3, 41c-42a; Tr. IX, Ch. 2, 67a / Third Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 2, 97d / Fourth Ennead, Tr. III, Ch. 19, 151d-152b; Ch. 23, 153d-154b; Tr. IV, Ch. 12, 164d-165b; Ch. 28, 172a-173b; Tr. VII, Ch. 14, 200b-c; Tr. IX, Ch. 3, 206a-b / Fifth Ennead, Tr. II, Ch. 2, 215a-c; Tr. III, Ch. 9, 220d-221b 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VII, Ch. 23, 256b-c; Ch. 29, 261a-b; Bk. XIX, Ch. 13, 519a / Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, Ch. 8, 626c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 18, AA. 1-2, 104c-106b; A. 3, Ans., 106b-107c; Q. 69, A. 2, Rep. 1, 361c-362c; Q. 70, A. 3, 365b-367a; QQ. 77-83, 399b-440b; Q. 118, AA. 1-2, 600a-603b; Part I-II, Q. 17, AA. 8-9, 692a-693d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 110, A. 4, Rep. 3, 350d-351d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, IV [1-18] 57c; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b; Paradise, VII [121-148] 116b-c 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 369a-370b; 386b-388a; 397c-398c; 441a-443b; 445c; 447a-b 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part V, 60b-c / Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 207a 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, Bk. V [469-490] 185b-186a 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. IX, Sect. 11-15, 140b-141a; Ch. XXVII, Sect. 4-5, 220a-c 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 271a 42 Kant: Critique of Judgement, 465c-467a

2c(1) The vegetative powers: the powers proper to the plant soul

7 Plato: Timaeus, 469d-470a 8 Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, Ch. 5, 417b-420b / On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 5 [411a27-31] 641d; Bk. II, Ch. 2 [413a20-34] 643b-c; [413b5-9] 643c; Ch. 4, 645b-647b; Bk. III, Ch. 12 [434a22-26] 667a-b 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, Bk. II, Ch. 4 [740b9-741a5] 281c-282a 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, 167a-215d esp. Bk. I, Ch. 1, 167a-b, Ch. 5-8, 169b-171a 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 2, 97d-98a / Fourth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 22, 168d-169c; Ch. 26-27, 171b-172a 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VII, Ch. 23, 256b-c; Ch. 29, 261a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 18, A. 3, Rep. 3, 106b-107c; Q. 78, A. 1, Ans., 407b-409a; A. 2, 409a-410a; Q. 118, A. 1, 600a-601c; Q. 119, A. 1, Ans., 604c-607b; A. 2, Ans., 607b-608d; Part I-II, Q. 17, A. 8, 692a-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 50, A. 3, Rep. 1, 8b-9a; Part III Suppl., Q. 80, A. 4, Ans., 959c-963a 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 384d-390b passim; 404b; 418b-419d; 427c-428b 31 Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy, II, 78d-79a / Objections and Replies, 207a; 244b-c

2c(2) The sensitive powers: the powers proper to the animal soul

7 Plato: Timaeus, 466a-467d 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 5 [411a27-31] 641d; Bk. II, Ch. 2 [413b4-10] 643c; [413b17-24] 643d; [414a1-3] 644a; Ch. 3 [414a29-b20] 644c-d; Bk. II, Ch. 5-Bk. III, Ch. 3, 647b-661b; Bk. III, Ch. 8-13, 664b-668d / On Sense and the Sensible, Ch. 7 [448b17-449a21] 687d-688d 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [641a33-b10] 164b-c; Bk. III, Ch. 5 [667b21-32] 196a / Motion of Animals, Ch. 10, 238c-239a / Generation of Animals, Bk. II, Ch. 3 [736a24-737a19] 276d-278a; Ch. 5 [741a6-30] 282a-b / Ethics, Bk. VI, Ch. 2 [1139a17-21] 387d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 167a-b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. IX, Sect. 9, 292b-d 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 11, 5b-c / Fourth Ennead, Tr. III, Ch. 19, 151d-152b; Ch. 23, 153d-154b; Tr. IV, Ch. 20-21, 167d-168c; Ch. 23-25, 169c-171b 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VII, Ch. 23, 256b-c; Ch. 29, 261a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 72, A. 1, Rep. 1, 368b-369d; Q. 75, A. 3, 380c-381b; Q. 78, A. 1, 407b-409a; AA. 3-4, 410a-413d; QQ. 80-81, 427a-431d; Q. 118, A. 1, 600a-601c; Part I-II, Q. 17, A. 2, Rep. 2, 687d-688b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XXV [34-78] 91d-92a 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 369d-370a 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-20a / Discourse on Method, Part V, 56a-b; 59a-60c / Meditations on First Philosophy, II, 78d-79a / Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 226a-d 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. IX-X, 138b-143d passim, esp. Ch. IX, Sect. 11-15, 140b-141a, Ch. X, Sect. 10, 143c-d; Ch. XXVII, Sect. 5, 220b-c

2c(3) The rational powers: the powers proper to the human soul

7 Plato: Republic, Bk. IV, 350b-353d; Bk. VI, 386d-388a; Bk. VII, 389d-390b; Bk. IX, 421a-c / Timaeus, 453b-454a / Theaetetus, 535b-536a 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, Bk. IX, Ch. 2, 571c-572a; Ch. 5, 573a-c / On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 3 [414b17-20] 644d; [415a7-12] 645b; Bk. III, Ch. 3-8, 659c-664d 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, Bk. VIII, Ch. 1 [588a18-b4] 114b,d / Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 7 [1097b23-1098a19] 343a-c; Ch. 13, 347b-348d; Bk. VI, Ch. 1 [1138b35]-Ch. 2 [1139a5] 387b-388a / Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [1355a3] 594d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, Bk. I, Ch. 12, 173a-c 12 Epictetus: Discourses, Bk. II, Ch. 23, 170a-171d; Bk. IV, Ch. 7, 233a-b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. II, Sect. 15-16, 262d-263a,c; Bk. V, Sect. 16, 271c-d; Bk. IX, Sect. 8-9, 292b-d; Bk. XI, Sect. 1, 302a-b 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, Tr. VIII, Ch. 3, 202c / Fifth Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 10, 213d-214a 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VII, Ch. 23, 256b-c; Ch. 29, 261a-b; Bk. XII, Ch. 23, 357d-358a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 3, A. 1, Rep. 2, 14b-15b; Q. 7, A. 2, Rep. 2, 31d-32c; Q. 76, A. 5, Rep. 4, 394c-396a; Q. 78, A. 1, Ans., 407b-409a; QQ. 79-80, 413d-428d; QQ. 82-83, 431d-440b; Q. 118, A. 2, 601c-603b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 50, AA. 4-5, 9a-10d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XVIII [1-75] 79d-80c; XXV [61-84] 92a-b 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 427d-428a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 55b-d 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part V, 56a-b; 59c-60c / Meditations on First Philosophy, 71b-d; III, 82d-83a; IV, 89a-93a; VI, 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 207a 31 Spinoza: Ethics, Part I, Axiom 2, 373d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, Bk. V [95-116] 177b 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. VI, 131b-c; Ch. XI, 143d-147b esp. Sect. 9-11, 145b-146a; Ch. XXI, Sect. 4-21, 178d-183b passim, esp. Sect. 5-6, 179c-180a, Sect. 15-20, 181c-183a; Ch. XXIII, Sect. 5, 205a-b; Sect. 15, 208c-d; Sect. 18, 209a; Sect. 22, 209d; Sect. 28-30, 211b-212b; Bk. IV, Ch. XIV, Sect. 3-4, 364d-365a; Ch. XVII, Sect. 1-3, 371c-372b 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 270a-271b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 164b-c / Critique of Judgement, 465c-467a esp. 466a-c; 474b-475d; 522b; 568c-575b esp. 568c-d, 570c-571c, 572b-575b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, Intro, 168b-d; Part I, 257d-258a; Part III, 304d-305b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 278a-b 53 James: Psychology, 85a-b 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 384c-385c esp. 385b-c / The Unconscious, 429c-d / A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 532a

3. The immateriality of the soul

3a. The soul as an immaterial principle, form, or substance

7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124b-126c / Phaedo, 223d-225c; 231c-234b / Republic, Bk. X, 435a-436c / Timaeus, 449b-450c; 452d-454a / Sophist, 567c-d / Laws, Bk. X, 761a-765d 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 10 [1035b14-28] 559a-b; Bk. VIII, Ch. 3 [1043a29-b4] 567d; Bk. XIII, Ch. 2 [1077a20-23] 608c / On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [403a3-19] 632a-d; Bk. II, Ch. 1-2, 642a-644c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. IV, Sect. 21, 265b-c; Bk. XII, Sect. 30, 310a-b 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, 1a-6b / Third Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 8-9, 81d-82b; Tr. VI, Ch. 2, 107a-108a / Fourth Ennead, Tr. I-II, 139a-141c; Tr. II, Ch. 2, 142a-143b; Ch. 8, 146b-d; Ch. 20-23, 152b-154b; Tr. VII, 191c-200c; Tr. IX, Ch. 4, 206c-d / Fifth Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 2, 215a-c / Sixth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 1, 297b-d; Ch. 4-5, 299a-300a; Ch. 12-16, 303a-305c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 51, A. 1, Rep. 3, 275b-276b; Q. 75, A. 1, 378b-379c; AA. 4-5, 381b-383b; Q. 76, A. 1, 385d-388c; A. 4, Rep. 1, 393a-394c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part IV, 269d-271b 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part IV, 51d-52a; Part V, 59c-60c / Meditations on First Philosophy, 71b-d; 72d-73c; II, 78a-80a; VI, 96b-103d passim, esp. 98c-d, 101d-102a / Objections and Replies, 114d-115a,c; 119d-120a; 127c-d; Def. VI-VII, 130c-d; Def. X, 130d; Prop. IV, 133c; 135d-136b; 153c-155d; 170b-c; 207d-208a; 209c; 224d-225d; 231a-232d; 261a-b; 276b-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, Part V, Pref., 451a-452c 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. XXIII, Sect. 5, 205a-b; Sect. 15, 208c-d; Sect. 22, 209d; Sect. 28-32, 211b-212d passim; Ch. XXVII, Sect. 12-17, 223a-225a passim; Sect. 27, 227d-228a; Sect. 29, 228b-c; Bk. IV, Ch. III, Sect. 6, 313c-315b 35 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 26, 418a; Sect. 89, 430b-c; Sect. 141, 441a-b; Sect. 148, 442b-d 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 271a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 186b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 120c-129c esp. 124d-128a; 203d-204c 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 27b-28a 53 James: Psychology, 220b-223b esp. 221a-222b

3b. The immateriality of the human soul in comparison with the materiality of the plant and animal soul: the intellect as an incorporeal power

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 4 [408b18-29] 638c; Ch. 5 [411b13-18] 641c-d; Bk. II, Ch. 2 [413b24-29] 643d-644a; Bk. III, Ch. 4 [429a10-b23] 661b-662a; Ch. 5, 662c-d 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, Bk. II, Ch. 3 [736b15-737a12] 277b-d 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, Tr. VI, Ch. 2, 107b-c / Fourth Ennead, Tr. VII, Ch. 8, 195b-196a 18 Augustine: Confessions, Bk. VII, Par. 2, 43c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 3, A. 1, Rep. 2, 14b-15b; Q. 7, A. 2, Rep. 2, 31d-32c; Q. 75, AA. 2-3, 379c-381b; AA. 5-6, 382a-384c; Q. 79, A. 1, Rep. 4, 414a-d; A. 2, Rep. 1, 414d-416a; A. 3, Rep. 3, 416a-417a; A. 4, Rep. 4-5, 417a-418c; A. 5, Rep. 1-2, 418c-419b; A. 6, Rep. 1-2, 419b-420d; Q. 83, A. 1, Rep. 5, 436d-438a; Q. 84, A. 1, Ans., 440d-442a; A. 2, Ans., 442b-443c; A. 4, Ans., 444d-446b; A. 6, Ans., 447c-449a; Q. 85, A. 6, Ans., 458d-459c; Q. 87, A. 3, Rep. 3, 467b-468a; Q. 89, A. 1, Ans., 473b-475a; Part I-II, Q. 2, A. 6, Ans., 619d-620d; Q. 35, A. 5, Ans., 775d-777a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 50, A. 4, 9a-10b; Q. 53, A. 1, Ans. and Rep. 2-3, 19d-21a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XXV [61-84] 92a-b 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 494a-b 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 20a-b / Discourse on Method, Part V, 60b-c / Objections and Replies, 226a-b

3c. The relation of soul and body: the relation of formal and material principles, or of spiritual and corporeal substances

7 Plato: Charmides, 2d-3c / Cratylus, 93b-d / Phaedo, 220a-251d / Republic, Bk. III, 334b-c / Timaeus, 453b-454a; 466a-467d; 474d-475d / Laws, Bk. X, 761b-765d 8 Aristotle: Topics, Bk. VI, Ch. 14 [151a20-31] 206a / Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 10 [1035b14-28] 559a-b; Bk. VIII, Ch. 3 [1043a29-b4] 567d; Ch. 6, 569d-570d; Bk. XII, Ch. 10 [1075b34-37] 606d / On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [403a3-24] 632a-b; Ch. 3 [407b13-25] 637b; Ch. 5 [410a10-16] 640c; [411a23-b31] 641b-d; Bk. II, Ch. 1-2, 642a-644c; Ch. 4 [415b8-28] 645d-646a / On Sense and the Sensible, Ch. 1 [436a3-8] 673b-c / On Longevity and Shortness of Life, Ch. 2 [465b18-32] 710c-d / On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death, On Breathing, Ch. 1-4, 714a-716b passim; Ch. 14, 720d-721a 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [640b30-641a33] 163c-164b; Ch. 5 [645b14-19] 169c; Bk. II, Ch. 7 [652b7-17] 177d-178a; Bk. III, Ch. 5 [667b15-32] 195d-196a / Motion of Animals, Ch. 9-10, 238a-239a / Generation of Animals, Bk. II, Ch. 4 [738b18-27] 279c / Politics, Bk. I, Ch. 5 [1254a34-1255a2] 448a-c 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. III [94-829] 31b-40c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. III, Sect. 3, 260b; Bk. IV, Sect. 21, 265b-c; Bk. XII, Sect. 30, 310a-b 13 Virgil: Aeneid, Bk. VI [724-751] 230b-231a 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 29a-b 16 Kepler: Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, Bk. IV, 893a 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, 1a-6b / Second Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 5, 37c; Tr. II, Ch. 3, 41c-42a / Third Ennead, Tr. VI, Ch. 4-5, 108c-109d / Fourth Ennead, Tr. I-II, 139a-141c; Tr. III, Ch. 4, 143d-144b; Ch. 8-23, 146b-154b; Tr. IV, Ch. 18, 166d-167b; Ch. 20-21, 167d-168c; Ch. 23-25, 169c-171b; Ch. 29, 173b-174b; Tr. V, Ch. 7, 188b-c; Tr. VII, 191c-200c esp. Ch. 8, 197c-198b; Tr. IX, 205a-207a,c / Fifth Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 2, 208c-209b / Sixth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 1, 297b-d; Ch. 4-5, 299a-300a; Ch. 12-16, 303a-305c; Tr. VII, Ch. 4-5, 323c-324b 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. X, Ch. 29, 317b-c; Bk. XIII, Ch. 2, 360b-361a; Bk. XIV, Ch. 5, 379c-380b; Bk. XIX, Ch. 3, 510a-b; Ch. 13, 519a; Bk. XXI, Ch. 3, 561a-562a; Bk. XXII, Ch. 4, 588b-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 8, A. 1, Rep. 2, 34d-35c; A. 2, Rep. 2-3, 35c-36b; Q. 51, A. 1, Ans. and Rep. 3, 275b-276b; Q. 52, A. 1, 278d-279b; Q. 75, A. 1, 378b-379c; A. 2, Ans., 379c-380c; A. 4, 381b-382a; A. 5, Ans., 382a-383b; Q. 76, 385c-399b; Q. 81, A. 3, Rep. 2, 430c-431d; Q. 84, A. 4, Ans., 444d-446b; Q. 89, A. 1, Ans., 473b-475a; Q. 110, A. 2, Rep. 1, 565d-566d; Part I-II, Q. 4, A. 5, Rep. 5, 632c-634b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 56, A. 4, Rep. 3, 32b-33c; Q. 58, A. 2, Ans., 42a-43a; Part III, Q. 2, A. 1, Ans. and Rep. 2, 710a-711c; A. 5, 715a-716b; Q. 6, A. 1, 740b-741b; AA. 3-4, 742a-743d; Q. 8, A. 2, Ans., 757c-758a; Q. 17, A. 2, Rep. 4, 808d-809d; Q. 62, A. 1, Rep. 2, 858c-859d; A. 4, Rep. 1, 3, 861a-862a; Part III Suppl., Q. 70, A. 3, Ans., 897d-900d; Q. 75, A. 1, Rep. 3-4, 935b-937a; Q. 80, A. 1, Ans. and Rep. 1, 956c-957c; Q. 92, A. 1, Ans. and Rep. 8-10, 1025c-1032b; Q. 93, A. 1, 1037d-1039a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XXV [10-108] 91c-92c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part IV, 250c-251b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 264a-b 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 431b-434a esp. 433c-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 49b-50b 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part IV, 51d-52a; Part V, 56a-b; 60b-c / Meditations on First Philosophy, 72d-73c; II, 77d-81d passim; VI, 96b-103d esp. 99d-101a / Objections and Replies, 114d-115a,c; 119d-120c; 127c-d; Def. VI-VII, 130c-d; Def. X, 130d; Prop. IV, 133c; 135d-136b; 152b,d-156a; 170b-c; 207d-208a; 219b-220a; 224d-226d; 231a-232d; 248b; 261a-b; 276a-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, Part III, Prop. 11-13, 377b-378c; Part V, Pref., 451a-452c 33 Pascal: Pensées, 512, 262a 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. I, Sect. 11-12, 123d-124c; Ch. XXI, Sect. 4, 178d-179c; Ch. XXIII, Sect. 15-32, 208c-212d; Ch. XXVII, Sect. 27, 227d-228a 35 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 18-20, 416b-417a; Sect. 26-27, 418a-b; Sect. 148, 442b-d 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. VII, Div. 51-52, 472b-473c esp. Div. 52, 472d; Div. 58, 476a-b 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 231a-b; 270a-271b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 136d 42 Kant: Critique of Judgement, 557c-558a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, Part I, Par. 48, 24b-c; Additions, 2, 115d; 16, 118d-119a / Philosophy of History, Part I, 255c-256b 47 Goethe: Faust, Part II [6891-6896] 168b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 27b-28a; 68a-b 53 James: Psychology, 1a-4a esp. 2b-3a; 118b-119b; 139a-140a 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a

3d. The denial of soul as an immaterial principle, form, or substance: the atomic theory of the soul

7 Plato: Phaedo, 235b-236c; 238b-240a / Sophist, 567a-568a / Laws, Bk. X, 761b 8 Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, Ch. 6 [334a10-15] 435a / On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 2-5, 633a-641d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, Bk. I, Ch. 12, 172d-173c 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. III [94-829] 31b-40c; Bk. IV [722-817] 53d-54d; [877-961] 55d-56d 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 3, 79b-c / Fourth Ennead, Tr. VII, 191c-200c esp. Ch. 1-4, 191c-193c, Ch. 8, 195b-196a, 196c-197c 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VIII, Ch. 5, 268b-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 75, A. 1, 378b-379c; Q. 84, A. 2, Ans., 442b-443c; A. 6, Ans., 447c-449a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part I, 80a-b; Part III, 176d; Part IV, 250c-251c; 269d-271b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 264b-267a 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 226a-d 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. III, Sect. 6, 313c-315b; Ch. X, Sect. 5, 350a-b; Sect. 10, 351b-352a; Sect. 17, 353b-c 35 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 93, 431b; Sect. 137, 440b-c; Sect. 141, 441a-b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 126c-d / Critique of Judgement, 582b-c; 600c-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, Part I, 255d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, Epilogue II, 689c-690a 53 James: Psychology, 95a-119b

3e. The corporeal or phenomenal manifestation of disembodied souls as ghosts, wraiths, or spirits

Old Testament: I Samuel, 28:8-19—(D) I Kings, 28:8-19 4 Homer: Iliad, Bk. XXIII [54-107] 161d-162b / Odyssey, Bk. XI, 243a-249d; Bk. XXIV [1-203] 317a-319a 5 Aeschylus: Persians [623-842] 21d-24b / Eumenides [94-139] 82a-c 5 Aristophanes: Birds [1552-1564] 561b 6 Herodotus: History, Bk. IV, 126d-127a; Bk. V, 179c-180a 7 Plato: Phaedo, 232d-233b 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. I [102-135] 2b-d; Bk. IV [26-41] 44b-d 13 Virgil: Aeneid, Bk. II [771-794] 146a-b; Bk. V [719-745] 206a-b; Bk. VI, 211a-235a 14 Plutarch: Cimon, 392b-c / Caesar, 603d-604d / Dion, 781d-782a / Marcus Brutus, 816d-817c 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, Tr. VII, Ch. 15, 200c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 89, A. 8, Rep. 2, 479c-480c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part III Suppl., Q. 69, A. 3, 887d-889c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, III [16-33] 56a; XXV [79-108] 92b-c; Paradise, III [1-30] 109b-c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part I, 51b-52b; 80a; Part IV, 250c-251c passim; 258c-d; 270c-271b passim; 274b-c 26 Shakespeare: Richard III, Act V, Sc. iii [118-176] 144d-145c / Julius Caesar, Act IV, Sc. iii [275-308] 591c-d 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, Act I, Sc. i [40-175] 30a-31c; Sc. iv [38]-Sc. v [91] 36b-37d; Act III, Sc. iv [102-136] 55d-56a / Macbeth, Act III, Sc. iv [37-107] 298a-d / Cymbeline, Act V, Sc. iv [30-122] 481c-482b 44 Boswell: Life of Johnson, 95b; 114b-115a esp. 115a-b [fn. 1]; 189a-b; 193b-c; 373a; 394c-d; 412a-b; 472b-c 54 Freud: Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, 763d-764a

4. The being of the soul

4a. The unity of the human soul: the human mode of the vegetative and sensitive powers

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 5 [410a10-16] 640c; [411b23-31] 641b-d; Bk. II, Ch. 2 [413b10-414a4] 643c-644a; Bk. III, Ch. 9 [432a15-b8] 664d-665a; Ch. 10 [433a32-b4] 666a-b 9 Aristotle: Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 13 [1102a27-32] 347d 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, Tr. III, Ch. 3, 143b-c; Ch. 19, 151d-152b; Tr. VII, Ch. 14, 200b-c; Tr. IX, Ch. 2-3, 205c-206b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 76, AA. 1-3, 385d-393a; Q. 78, A. 4, Rep. 5, 411d-413d; Q. 81, A. 3, Rep. 2, 430c-431d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part III, Q. 2, A. 2, Rep. 2, 711d-712d; Part III Suppl., Q. 79, A. 2, Rep. 3, 953b-955c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, IV [1-12] 57c; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b; Paradise, II [127-148] 109a-b

4b. The issue concerning the self-subsistence or immortality of the human soul: its existence or capacity for existence in separation from the human body

5 Euripides: Helen [1013-1016] 307d 6 Herodotus: History, Bk. II, 75b 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124b-c / Meno, 179d-183a / Apology, 211b-212a,c / Phaedo, 220a-251d / Republic, Bk. X, 434d-436a / Laws, Bk. XII, 793c-d / Seventh Letter, 806a 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, Bk. XII, Ch. 3 [1070a21-28] 599c / On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1 [403a2-24] 632a-b; Ch. 2 [405a29-34] 634d; Bk. II, Ch. 1 [413a3-9] 643a; Ch. 2 [413b24-29] 643d-644a; Bk. III, Ch. 4 [429a29-b4] 661c-d; Ch. 5, 662c-d 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, Bk. II, Ch. 3 [736b15-737a12] 277b-d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. III [323-349] 34b-c; [417-1094] 35c-44a,c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. II, Sect. 14, 258d; Sect. 17, 259b-d; Bk. IV, Sect. 21, 265b-c; Bk. V, Sect. 13, 271b; Bk. VIII, Sect. 37, 288c; Bk. XII, Sect. 5, 307d-308a; Sect. 14, 308c 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 29a-b 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 2, 1c / Fourth Ennead, Tr. I, 139a-b; Tr. IV, Ch. 15, 165c-d; Tr. VII, 191c-200c 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VII, Ch. 12, 243c-d; Bk. X, Ch. 31, 319b-d; Bk. XIII, Ch. 2, 360b-361a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 61, A. 2, Rep. 3, 315c-316a; Q. 75, A. 2, 379c-380c; A. 6, 383c-384c; Q. 76, A. 3, Rep. 1-2, 391a-393a; Part I-II, Q. 22, A. 1, Rep. 3, 720d-721c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 85, A. 6, 182d-184a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XXV [1-108] 91b-92c; Paradise, VII [121-148] 116b-c 22 Chaucer: Second Nun’s Tale [15787-800] 467a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part III, 192c-193c; Part IV, 250c-251c; 253b-255b; 269d-271b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 264a-269b 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part V, 60b-c / Meditations on First Philosophy, 69a-71a,c passim; 72d-73c / Objections and Replies, 127c-d; Def. VI-VIII, 130c-d; Def. X, 130d; Prop. IV, 133c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, Part V, Prop. 23, 458b-d; Prop. 29-33, 459b-460c; Prop. 36-40, 461a-462d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, Bk. X [720-844] 290a-292b 33 Pascal: Pensées, 194-195, 206b-210b; 556, 271b 35 Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 141, 441a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 186a-187b 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 120c-129c esp. 124d-128a; 201b-c; 203d-204c; 218d-223d esp. 219b-d; 234c-240b esp. 234c-235c, 237d-238a / Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 344a-c; 348b-351b / Critique of Judgement, 600c-d; 603b-d; 606d-607c; 610a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, Part I, 246d-247a; 255c-256b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 25b-28a esp. 27b-28a; 380b-381a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 593c-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, Bk. VII, 295b-c 53 James: Psychology, 224a-225a 54 Freud: Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, 763d-764b

4c. The origin of the human soul: its separate creation; its emanation or derivation from the world soul

Old Testament: Genesis, 1:26-27; 2:7; 5:1-2 / Ecclesiastes, 12:7 / Isaiah, 42:5; 57:16—(D) Isaias, 42:5; 57:16 / Ezekiel, 18:4—(D) Ezechiel, 18:4 / Zechariah, 12:1—(D) Zacharias, 12:1 Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23; 15:11—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 2:23; 15:11 New Testament: I Corinthians, 15:45 7 Plato: Timaeus, 452c-454a / Philebus, 618b-619d 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. III [323-349] 34b-c; [670-712] 38d-39b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. IV, Sect. 21, 265b-c; Bk. XII, Sect. 30, 310a-b 13 Virgil: Aeneid, Bk. VI [724-751] 230b-231a 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, Tr. IX, Ch. 3-4, 67b-68a; Ch. 7-8, 69c-70d / Third Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 2-5, 97d-99b / Fourth Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 1-Tr. II, Ch. 7, 139c-145d; Tr. III, Ch. 9-18, 146d-151c; Tr. VII, Ch. 13, 200a-b; Tr. VIII, Ch. 3-Tr. IX, Ch. 5, 202a-207a,c / Sixth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 4, 299a-d; Ch. 12-16, 303a-305c 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. VII, Ch. 29, 261a-b; Bk. X, Ch. 31, 319b-d; Bk. XI, Ch. 22, 334c; Bk. XII, Ch. 23, 357d-358a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 75, A. 6, Rep. 1, 383c-384c; Q. 90, 480c-484a; Q. 100, A. 1, Rep. 2, 520d-521c; Q. 118, 600a-604b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part III, Q. 6, A. 3, Rep. 2, 742a-743a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XVI [85-93] 77d; XXV [37-84] 91d-92b; Paradise, IV [49-54] 111b; VII [64-75] 115d-116a; [121-148] 116b-c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, Part III, 173d; 176d; Part IV, 251a-b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 264b-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 54b-c 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part V, 56a-b; 60b-c / Meditations on First Philosophy, III, 88b-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, Part I, Prop. 29-31, 366b-367a; Part II, Prop. 11, Corol., 377b-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 186b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 640a-b [n. 8] 42 Kant: Critique of Judgement, 565d

4d. The life of the soul apart from the body

4d(1) The doctrine of transmigration or perpetual reincarnation

4 Homer: Odyssey, Bk. XI [298-304] 246a 6 Herodotus: History, Bk. II, 75b 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 125b-126a / Meno, 179d-183a / Phaedo, 226c-234c; 246d-250b / Republic, Bk. X, 437c-441a,c / Timaeus, 452d-453b; 476b-477a,c / Laws, Bk. X, 767c-768d 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 3 [406b30-c5] 635d; [407b13-25] 637b 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, Bk. I [102-119] 2b-c; Bk. III [670-783] 38d-40a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. IV, Sect. 21, 265b-c 13 Virgil: Georgics, IV [219-227] 89b / Aeneid, Bk. VI [703-751] 229b-231a 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 29a-b 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 11, 5b-c / Third Ennead, Tr. II, Ch. 13, 88d-89b; Ch. 17, 91d-92b; Tr. III, Ch. 4, 95b-c; Tr. IV, Ch. 2-3, 97d-98c; Ch. 6, 99b-100b / Fourth Ennead, Tr. III, Ch. 8, 145d; Ch. 9, 146d; Ch. 13-15, 149b-150c; Ch. 24, 154b-d; Ch. 27, 156d; Tr. IV, Ch. 5, 161a-b; Tr. VII, Ch. 14, 200b-c; Tr. VIII, Ch. 3-5, 202a-203d / Sixth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 14-16, 304a-305c; Tr. VII, Ch. 6-7, 324c-325a 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. X, Ch. 30, 318b-319b; Bk. XII, Ch. 20, 355b-357a; Bk. XIV, Ch. 5, 379d-380b; Bk. XXII, Ch. 27-28, 613b-614a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part III Suppl., Q. 77, A. 1, Ans., 943a-944d; Q. 79, A. 1, Ans., 951b-953b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Paradise, IV [49-63] 111b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 206c-207a; 249b-250a; 264b-265c; 268a-269a 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. XXVII, Sect. 6, 220c-d; Sect. 14, 223d-224b; Sect. 27, 227d-228a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, Bk. XXV, 207a-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 2d-3a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 135a; 226b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, Intro, 187a-b; Part I, 255c-256b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 316b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, Bk. VII, 295b-c 54 Freud: Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, 764b

4d(2) Comparison of separated souls with men and angels

New Testament: Luke, 20:34-36 17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, Tr. III, Ch. 18, 151b-c 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. XIII, Ch. 1, 360a-b; Bk. XXI, Ch. 10, 569d-570b; Bk. XXII, Ch. 29, 614b-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 29, A. 1, Rep. 5, 162a-163b; Q. 62, A. 5, Contrary, 321b-322a; Q. 77, A. 8, 406b-407a; Q. 89, 473a-480c; Part I-II, Q. 4, A. 5, Rep. 6, 632c-634b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I-II, Q. 67, 81b-87c; Q. 68, A. 6, 93c-94c; Part II-II, Q. 26, A. 13, 519d-520d; Part III Suppl., Q. 69, A. 3, Rep. 5, 887d-889c; Q. 70, 893c-900d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XXV [1-108] 91b-92c 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. XVII, Sect. 14, 378c-d 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 318b 44 Boswell: Life of Johnson, 192d-193a; 363a-b 52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, Bk. II, 22c-23a

4d(3) The need of the soul for its body: the dogma of the body’s resurrection for the soul’s perfection

18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. X, Ch. 29, 317b-318b; Bk. XIII, Ch. 16-20, 367a-371a; Bk. XIV, Ch. 3, 378a-d; Ch. 5, 379c-380b; Bk. XXI, Ch. 3, 561d-562a; Bk. XXII, Ch. 26-27, 612c-613c / Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, Ch. 24, 630c-631a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 29, A. 1, Rep. 5, 162a-163b; Q. 51, A. 1, Ans., 275b-276b; Q. 89, A. 1, Ans., 473b-475a; A. 2, Rep. 1, 475a-d; Part I-II, Q. 3, A. 3, Ans., 624b-625a; Q. 4, AA. 5-6, 632c-635a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part III Suppl., Q. 75, 935a-939c; Q. 80, A. 1, Ans. and Rep. 1, 956c-957c; A. 3, Ans. and Rep. 2, 958b-959c; Q. 81, A. 4, 966d-967d; Q. 93, A. 1, Ans., 1037d-1039a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Hell, VI [94-111] 9b-c; Paradise, XIV [1-66] 126d-127c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 311a-b

4d(4) The contamination of the soul by the body: the purification of the soul by release from the body

7 Plato: Cratylus, 93d; 95c / Phaedo, 223a-226c; 230d-234c / Republic, Bk. IV, 350c-355c; Bk. VII, 388a-390b; Bk. IX, 425c-427b; Bk. X, 434c-441a,c / Timaeus, 474b-476b / Seventh Letter, 805d-806a 12 Epictetus: Discourses, Bk. I, Ch. 9, 115a-c 13 Virgil: Aeneid, Bk. VI [724-751] 230b-231a 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 4, 2b; Ch. 9-10, 4c-5b; Ch. 12, 5c-6a; Tr. II, 6b-10a esp. Ch. 4-5, 8a-9a; Tr. IV, Ch. 4-16, 14a-19b; Tr. VI, Ch. 6, 24a-c; Tr. VII, Ch. 3, 26d-27a; Tr. VIII, Ch. 4, 28c-29a; Ch. 7-8, 30c-31c; Ch. 11, 33a-d / Second Ennead, Tr. IX, Ch. 15, 74d-75b; Ch. 17-18, 76b-77d / Third Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 8-10, 81d-82b; Tr. IV, Ch. 2-6, 97d-100b passim; Tr. VI, Ch. 4-5, 108c-109d / Fourth Ennead, Tr. III, Ch. 32, 158c-159a; Tr. IV, Ch. 17, 166c-d; Tr. VII, Ch. 10, 198d-199c; Tr. VIII, Ch. 1, 200d-201b; Ch. 3-8, 202a-205a passim / Fifth Ennead, Tr. I, Ch. 1-2, 208a-209b; Ch. 10-12, 213c-214c; Tr. III, Ch. 17, 226a-c / Sixth Ennead, Tr. IV, Ch. 14-16, 304a-305c; Tr. VII, Ch. 34-36, 338b-339d; Tr. IX, Ch. 8-11, 358b-360d 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. XIII, Ch. 16, 367a-d; Bk. XIV, Ch. 3, 378a-d; Ch. 5, 379c-380b; Bk. XIX, Ch. 4, 512a-513c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 89, A. 1, Ans., 473b-475a

5. Our knowledge of the soul and its powers

5a. The soul’s knowledge of itself by reflection on its acts: the soul as a transcendental or noumenal object; the paralogisms of rational psychology

7 Plato: Phaedo, 220a-251d / Republic, Bk. IV, 350c-353d 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 631a-632d; Bk. II, Ch. 4 [415b14-22] 645b-c; Bk. III, Ch. 4 [429b5-9] 661d; [429b25-29] 662b; [430a2-9] 662b-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, Bk. IX, Ch. 9 [1170a28-b1] 424a 12 Epictetus: Discourses, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 105a-b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, Bk. XI, Sect. 1, 302a-b 18 Augustine: City of God, Bk. XI, Ch. 26-27, 336d-338a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, Part I, Q. 87, 464d-468d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, Purgatory, XVIII [49-60] 80b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 261c-269b passim 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 54b-c 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, Part IV, 51b-54b passim, esp. 51c-52a / Meditations on First Philosophy, 69a-71a,c; II, 77d-81d; VI, 96b-103d / Objections and Replies, 207b; 224b,d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, Part II, Prop. 19-23, 382b-383c 35 Locke: Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. I, Sect. 1-8, 121a-123a esp. Sect. 7-8, 122c-123a; Sect. 10, 123b-d; Ch. IX, Sect. 1-2, 138b-c; Ch. XIX, Sect. 1-2, 175b-d; Ch. XXI, Sect. 30, 185a-c; Ch. XXIII, Sect. 15-32, 208c-212d 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. I, Div. 7-10, 453c-455b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 150c 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-b; 32a-c; 55a-56c; 99a-101b; 120c-129c esp. 124d-128a; 200c-209d passim; 218d-223d esp. 219b-d; 234c-240b esp. 234c-235c, 237d-238a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 271a-c; 281c-282d; 285c-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-293b esp. 291a-b, 292a-293b; 294a-b; 307d-310c; 311d-314d; 337a-c; 344a-c; 348b-349b / Critique of Judgement, 599d-600d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, Intro, Par. 7, 14a-c; Part I, Par. 35, 21a-b; Additions, 22, 120c-d; 25, 121a / Philosophy of History, Part I, 257d-258a; Part III, 304a-b 53 James: Psychology, 121a-b; 122b-126a; 177a-178a; 191a-197a esp. 191a-193a, 196a-197a; 232b-238b esp. 233a-b, 236b [fn. 1] 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 383b-c / The Unconscious, 429c-430c / A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 451b; 620a

5b. The concept of the soul in empirical psychology: experimental knowledge of the soul

53 James: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 1a-4a; 118b-119b; 126a-127b; 221a-226a esp. 221b-223a, 225b-226a; 822b 54 Freud: The Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 12d-13d esp. 13c-d / Interpretation of Dreams, 154d-155a / The Unconscious, 428a-429c; 431b-d; 434c / A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 549d-550b / New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 830a-831c passim, esp. 831c

CROSS-REFERENCES

• For: Other discussions of the notion of a world soul and of the theory that the heavenly bodies have souls, see: ASTRONOMY 8b; WORLD 1a.
• For: Another consideration of the soul as the principle of life, see: ANIMAL 1a; LIFE AND DEATH 1-2; and for other considerations of the soul as identical with mind or intellect and as the principle of thought, see: MIND 1b-1d, 1f.
• For: The problem of personal identity, see: ONE AND MANY 3b(5); SAME AND OTHER 1b.
• For: Other discussions of the parts or powers of the soul, and for discussions relevant to the distinction of several kinds of soul, see: ANIMAL 1-1c(2); LIFE AND DEATH 3-3b; MAN 1-1c, 4-5a; SENSE 1a, 2a-2c.
• For: The treatment of specific powers of the soul and of their relation to one another, see: DESIRE 3-3d, 5-6c; EMOTION 1-1a, 2-2c, 4a; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1-1d; MIND 1a-1a(4), 1e-1f, 1g(2); ONE AND MANY 3b(5), 4a; OPPOSITION 4a; SENSE 1a-1d, 3-3e; WILL 1-3b.
• For: The controversy over the immateriality of the soul and its relation to the body, see: ANIMAL 1e; BEING 7b(2), 7b(4); ELEMENT 5e-5f; FORM 2c-2c(1), 2d; LIFE AND DEATH 2; MAN 3a-3c; MATTER 2d, 3a, 4c-4d; MECHANICS 4c; MIND 2a-2e; ONE AND MANY 3b(4); and for the related controversy over the immortality of the soul, see: IMMORTALITY 2-3b; METAPHYSICS 2d.
• For: Other discussions of the transmigration of souls, see: IMMORTALITY 5a.
• For: Theories about the state and operations of the soul in separation from the body, see: ANGEL 4; IMMORTALITY 5b; MAN 3b; MIND 4e; and for the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, see: GOD 7g; IMMORTALITY 5g.
• For: Other discussions relevant to the spiritual dignity of human nature which requires all men to be treated as ends, see: JUSTICE 6, 6c; LIBERTY 1a; SLAVERY 2d, 3d; WILL 7a.
• For: The nature and problems of psychology as the science of the soul or of man, see: KNOWLEDGE 5a(6); MAN 2a-2b(4); MIND 6; and for discussions relevant to the distinction between rational and empirical, or philosophical and scientific psychology, see: PHYSICS 2; SCIENCE 1c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• Plutarch, “Concerning the Procreation of the Soul, as Discoursed in Timaeus,” in Moralia
• Augustine, On the Immortality of the Soul
  • —, The Magnitude of the Soul
  • —, The Soul and Its Origin
• Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Ch. IV
  • —, Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, Ch. 56-90; Bk. IV, Ch. 79-95
  • —, On Spiritual Creatures, A. 11
  • —, Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, Q. 19; De Anima, AA. 1-2, 6-15, 17-21
  • —, The Unicity of the Intellect, II
• Dante, Convivio (The Banquet), Third Treatise, Ch. 5-8
• Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 7-8, 11-12, 52-53, 62-65; Part IV, 196-197
• Hobbes, Concerning Body, Part I, Ch. II
• Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous
• Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. V-VI
  • —, Of the Immortality of the Soul
  • —, Of Suicide
• Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, Par. 46-49

II.

• Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus
• Tertullian, A Treatise on the Soul
• Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection
• Proclus, The Elements of Theology, (X)
• Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise VI-VII
• Albertus Magnus, De Natura et Origine Animae
  • —, On the Intellect and the Intelligible, Treatise I-II
• Melanchthon, Commentarius de Anima
• John of the Cross, Spiritual Canticle
  • —, Dark Night of the Soul
  • —, The Living Flame of Love
• Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, XI (14), XXXIV (5)
• Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, Part I, Sect. I, Memb. II, Sub-sect. 5-11
• John of Saint Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Philosophia Naturalis, Part I, QQ. 1-12
• Marvell, A Dialogue Between the Soul and Body
• Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérité, Bk. I, Ch. 10 (1, 3)
  • —, Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, I
• Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, XXIII-XXXIV
  • —, Philosophical Works, Ch. 12 (A New System of the Interaction of Substances), 13 (The Reply of M. Foucher Concerning the Interaction of Substances), 23 (Considerations on the Doctrines of a Universal Spirit), 34 (The Principles of Nature and of Grace)
  • —, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. 9
  • —, Monadology, Par. 19-28
• La Mettrie, Histoire naturelle de l’âme
• La Mettrie, Man a Machine
• Voltaire, “Soul,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
• Helvétius, Traité de l’esprit
  • —, A Treatise on Man
• Schelling, Von der Weltseele
• Emerson, “The Over-Soul,” in Essays, I
• Gratry, Philosophie. De la connaissance de l’âme
• Bain, Mind and Body
• Clifford, “Body and Mind,” in Vol. II, Lectures and Essays
• Lotze, Microcosmos, Bk. II-III
  • —, Metaphysics, Bk. III, Ch. 1
  • —, Outlines of Psychology
• Frazer, The Golden Bough, Part VI; Part III, Ch. 7; Part V, Ch. 16; Part VII, Ch. 10-11
• Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Bk. I, Ch. 9-10; Bk. II, Ch. 23
  • —, Collected Essays, Vol. I (20)
• Vonier, The Human Soul and Its Relations with Other Spirits
• Driesch, Mind and Body
• Bergson, Matter and Memory, Ch. 4
  • —, Mind-Energy, Ch. 2
• Whitehead, Religion in the Making, Ch. 3
  • —, Adventures of Ideas, Ch. 2
• B. Russell, Religion and Science, Ch. 5
• Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul
  • —, Psychology and Religion
• Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, Ch. 24, 26
  • —, The Realm of Matter, Ch. 8-9
  • —, The Realm of Spirit, Ch. 1-3