Chapter 73: PRUDENCE

INTRODUCTION

Of the qualities or virtues attributed to the intellect, prudence seems to be least concerned with knowledge and most concerned with action. When we call a man a scientist or an artist, or praise the clarity of his understanding, we imply only that he has a certain kind of knowledge. We admire his mind, but we do not necessarily admire him as a man. We may not even know what kind of man he is or what kind of life he leads. It is significant that our language does not contain a noun like “scientist” or “artist” to describe the man who possesses prudence. We must use the adjective and speak of a prudent man, which seems to suggest that prudence belongs to the whole man, rather than just to his mind.

Prudence seems to be almost as much a moral as an intellectual quality. We would hardly call a man prudent without knowing his manner of life. Whether he behaved temperately would probably be much more relevant to our judgment of his prudence than whether he had a cultivated mind. The extent of his education or the depth of his learning might not affect our judgment at all, but we probably would consider whether he was old enough to have learned anything from experience and whether he had actually profited from experience to become wise.

These observations not only express the ordinary sense of the word “prudence,” but also give a summary indication of the idea for which that word stands in the great books. Like other fundamental traits of mind or character, prudence is considered by the poets and historians in terms of precept and example. For the definition of the term or for an analysis of its relation to other fundamental ideas, such as virtue and happiness, desire and duty, one must go to the great works of moral and political theory or of theology.

Even there, however, the conception of prudence is used more frequently than it is expounded. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, and Kant seem to be the exceptions, and of these only Aristotle and Aquinas offer an extended analysis—Aristotle in his book on intellectual virtue in the Ethics, Aquinas in certain questions of his Treatise on Habits in the Summa Theologica, but more extensively in his Treatise on Prudence (see the questions from the Summa Theologica cited in the list of Additional Readings).

THAT PRUDENCE IS NOT KNOWLEDGE

in the ordinary sense of the term—that it is a product of experience and a possession of reason which, unlike science or art, cannot be expressed in propositions—seems to be clearly implied by Hobbes.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design, or what design they may conduce to; if his observations are such as are not easy or usual; this wit of his is called Prudence, and depends on much experience and memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore.

Whereas science can achieve some certainty, the judgments of prudence are, according to Hobbes, all uncertain, “because to observe by experience and remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible.” It is the opposition between experience and science which seems to lead Hobbes to distinguish prudence from wisdom. “As much experience is prudence, so is much science sapience. For though we usually have one name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins did always distinguish between prudentia and sapientia, ascribing the former to experience, the latter to science.”

The Greeks also had two words—phronesis and sophia—both of which are sometimes translated in English by “wisdom.” But Aristotle, like Hobbes, insists upon the distinction between the wisdom which is the ultimate fruit of the speculative sciences or philosophy and the wisdom which belongs to the sphere of moral and political action. Wishing to preserve Aristotle’s sense that phronesis and sophia have something in common which deserves the eulogistic connotation of “wisdom,” his translators usually render these words in English by the phrases “practical wisdom” or “political wisdom” (for phronesis), and “speculative wisdom” or “philosophical wisdom” (for sophia). The English rendering of Aquinas, on the other hand, usually translates his prudentia by “prudence,” and his sapientia by “wisdom.”

Whether it is permissible to use “prudence” and “practical wisdom” as synonyms may be more than a question of verbal equivalence; for there is a fundamental issue in theory concerning the unity of wisdom, on which Plato differs from both Aristotle and Aquinas. The question about the relation of knowledge and virtue may be differently answered according to the view of wisdom which denies its division into speculative and practical, and according to the view which conceives the possibility that a man may be wise in one way without being wise in the other. In the language of Aquinas, a man may have acquired wisdom through science and understanding without having the moral character of a prudent man.

“That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident,” Aristotle declares. This is confirmed, he adds, “by the fact that while young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The reason is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience.”

Hobbes and Aristotle seem to agree that experience is important for the development of prudence or practical wisdom precisely because “it is practical and practice is concerned with particulars.” But though both also agree that this explains the distinction between prudence and scientific knowledge—which is concerned not with action but with the nature of things—Aristotle alone raises a further question about the distinction between practical wisdom and art.

In making something, the artist also deals with particulars. In this sense, art is also practical. But, according to Aristotle, the word “productive” should be used in distinction from “practical” to signify the difference between making and doing—two kinds of human activity which, though alike as compared with scientific knowing, represent knowledge differently applied. The knowledge which the artist possesses can, furthermore, be formulated in a set of rules. An individual can acquire the skill of an art by practicing according to its rules. What a man knows when he is prudent seems to be much less capable of being communicated by precept or rule. What he knows is how to deliberate or calculate well about things to be done.

This, in Aristotle’s view, marks prudence off from all other virtues. That prudence is a quality of mind seems to follow from the fact that it involves deliberation, a kind of thinking about variable and contingent particulars of the same sort which belong to the realm of opinion. That prudence is also a moral quality, an aspect of character, seems to follow no less from Aristotle’s statement that prudence is not deliberation about the means to any sort of end, but only about those “which conduce to the good life in general.”

PRUDENCE IS NOT ALWAYS DESCRIBED

as skill of mind in deliberating about alternative courses of action, nor is it always regarded as entirely praiseworthy or admirable—inseparable from virtue and the good life.

It is, for example, sometimes identified with foresight or even conjecturing about the future. So conceived, prudence does not seem to require rational power so much as memory and imagination, in order to project past experience into the future. In this sense, Aristotle admits it may be said that “even some of the lower animals have practical wisdom, viz., those which are found to have a power of foresight with regard to their own life.”

Identifying prudence with foresight, Hobbes conceives perfect prudence as belonging only to God. When the event answers expectations, the prediction is attributed to prudence, yet human foresight being fallible, “it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come.” Aquinas gives a quite different reason for saying that “prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God.” It is that the ordering of things toward their ultimate end is “the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are directed—namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future.”

Prudence is sometimes described, not as a virtue of the mind, or even as the power of foresight, but as a temperamental trait, an emotional disposition. It is associated with timidity or caution in those who are fearful of risks or unwilling to take chances. It is in this sense that Bacon seems to oppose hopefulness to prudence, “which is diffident upon principle and in all human matters augurs the worst.” The cautiousness of the over-deliberate man may involve thought as well as fear. Hamlet thinks too much and on too many sides of every action. His action being “sicklied o’er by the pale cast of thought,” he is irresolute. He laments his misuse of reason. “Whether it be bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple of thinking too precisely on the event—a thought, which quartered, hath but one part wisdom and ever three parts coward—I do not know why yet I live to say ‘this thing’s to do,’ since I have cause, and will, and strength, and means to do it.”

When prudence is conceived as excessive caution, its opposite is usually described as rashness, precipitateness, or impetuosity. Thucydides portrays these opposites in the persons of Nicias and Alcibiades. Their speeches to the Athenian assembly on the question of the Sicilian expedition do not merely present an opposition of reasons for and against the undertaking, but also represent an opposition of types of human character. Both come to grief: Nicias, the overcautious leader of the expedition, who earns a not inevitable defeat by his ever-delaying tactics, and Alcibiades, who does not stop at treachery or treason when the moment seems ripe for action which, if quickly taken, may succeed.

Aristotle and Aquinas would use such facts to argue against what, in their view, is the misconception of the prudent man as the opposite of the impetuous. The prudent man, in their opinion, does not stand at the other extreme of undue caution. In their theory of the virtues as means between extremes of excess and defect, prudence, like courage or temperance, represents a mean consisting in neither too much nor too little. As cowardice and foolhardiness are the opposite vices of too much and too little fear—and as both are opposed to the mean of courage which involves a moderation of fear—so excessive caution and impetuosity are the vices opposed to prudence as well as to each other.

Nor are prudence and imprudence simply matters of temperament. Men may differ in their temperamental dispositions; but, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, these are not to be confused with virtues and vices. One man may be by nature more fearful or fearless than another, but regardless of these differences in emotional endowment, either may become courageous, by forming the habit of controlling fear for the right reasons. So, too, one man may be naturally more impulsive or more circumspect than another, but either can acquire prudence through learning to take sufficient counsel and to deliberate enough before action, while also forming the habit of resolving thought into action by reaching decisions and commanding their execution. Failing to satisfy these conditions of prudence, either may develop the vices of imprudence, becoming, like Hamlet or Nicias, irresolute; or, like Alcibiades, impatient of counsel or ill advised, lacking care in deliberation and soundness in judgment.

THE CONCEPTION OF PRUDENCE

as itself the extreme of caution, whether temperamental or habitual, is not the only challenge to the Aristotelian theory of prudence as a virtue. Other moralists, especially those who take a different view of virtue generally, do not seem to look upon prudence as wholly admirable. Even when they do not condemn prudence as an indisposition to act promptly or decisively enough, they seem to give prudent deliberation the invidious connotation of cold and selfish calculation.

A suggestion of this appears in Mill’s contrast between duties to ourselves and duties to others, wherein he remarks that “the term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect and self-development.” It would seem to be implied that prudence means something less—something more selfish—than a proper and justifiable self-interest, the violation of which involves “a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself.”

Kant, more explicitly than Mill, associates prudence with expediency and self-seeking, and separates it from action in accordance with duty under the categorical imperative of the moral law. Prudence has meaning only in relation to a hypothetical imperative “which expresses the practical necessity of an action as a means to the advancement of happiness.” Granted that a man seeks his individual happiness, then “skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being may be called prudence.” Consequently, “the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one’s happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as a means to another purpose,” or, as Kant says elsewhere, “the maxim of self-love (prudence) only advises; the law of morality commands.” Furthermore, he holds that “what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone; but what it is to bring true durable advantage, such as will extend to the whole of one’s existence, is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity, and much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule founded on it to the ends of life, even tolerably, by making exceptions.”

In terms of Kant’s division of the imperatives of conduct into the pragmatic and the moral, according as they refer to welfare and happiness or duty and law, prudence is merely pragmatic. It does not belong to morality. The pragmatic imperative of prudence is more like the technical imperative of art, which is also conditional and concerned with determining means to an end—in this case, the thing to be produced by skill. “If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of happiness, the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with those of skill.”

As Kant sees it, “the sole business of reason in the moral philosophy of prudence is to bring about a union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end—that of happiness, and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot present to us any more than pragmatical laws of free action, for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is incompetent to give us the laws which are pure and determined completely a priori.” Hence the precepts of prudence “are used by reason only as counsels, and by way of counterpoise against seductions to an opposite course.”

The issue between Kant and Aristotle (or Aquinas) with respect to prudence thus appears to be part of the larger issue between them on the fundamental principles of morality, discussed in the chapters on DUTY and HAPPINESS. In Kant’s view, Aristotle and Aquinas, no less than Mill, are pragmatists rather than moralists. They are all utilitarians in the sense that they regard happiness as the first principle of human conduct and concern themselves with the ordering of means to this end. Since the consideration of means necessarily involves the weighing of alternatives as more or less expedient, prudence becomes indispensable to the pursuit of happiness. The choice of the best means is second in importance only to the election of the right end.

Kant admits that those who live for happiness require a great deal of prudence, in order to adapt practical rules to variable circumstances and to make the proper exceptions in applying them. None is required by those who live according to the moral law. “The moral law commands the most punctual obedience from everyone; it must, therefore, not be so difficult to judge what it requires to be done, that the commonest unpracticed understanding, even without worldly prudence, should fail to apply it rightly.” That “the principle of private happiness” is “the direct opposite of the principle of morality” Kant seems to think is evident from the questionable worth of prudence; “for a man must have a different criterion when he is compelled to say to himself: I am a worthless fellow, though I have filled my purse; and when he approves himself, and says: I am a prudent man, for I have enriched my treasure.”

Kant does not limit his criticism of prudence as pragmatic—or practical rather than moral—to the fact that it serves what he calls “private happiness.” It may serve the public welfare. “A history is composed pragmatically,” he writes, “when it teaches prudence, i.e., instructs the world how it can provide for its interests better.” But he also distinguishes between worldly and private prudence. “The former is a man’s ability to influence others so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own lasting benefit.” Nevertheless, the prudence which aims at individual happiness is primary, for “when a man is prudent in the former sense, but not in the latter, we might better say of him that he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent.”

THOSE WHO TAKE THE VIEW

that happiness is the first principle of morality would still agree with Kant that the man who is skillful in exercising an influence over other men so as to use them for his own purposes, is clever or cunning rather than prudent. Hobbes, for example, says that if you permit to prudence “the use of unjust or dishonest means . . . you have that Crooked Wisdom, which is called Craft.” Aristotle goes even further in his insistence that “it is impossible to be practically wise without being good,” or, as the same point is made in the language of Aquinas, “one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues; since prudence is right reason about things to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue.”

“To be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves” is, according to Aristotle, to be clever. “If the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness.” Hence the man of prudence has a certain cleverness, but the clever man who is merely smart cannot be called practically wise. By this criterion the clever thief who plans and executes a successful robbery, the shrewd businessman who, without regard to justice, calculates well how to maximize his profits, or Machiavelli’s prince who exercises cunning to get or keep his power, exhibits, not prudence, but its counterfeits. In some cases, the cleverness or shrewdness may simulate prudence without involving the knavery of craft or cunning. Some men have what Aquinas conceives as artistic (or technical) rather than moral prudence. Those who are “good counsellors in matters of warfare or seamanship are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent. Only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.”

Aristotle and Aquinas make the relation between prudence and moral virtue reciprocal. The moral virtues depend, for their formation and endurance, as much upon prudence as prudence depends upon them. “Virtue makes us aim at the right end,” Aristotle writes, “and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.” The rightness of the means requires not merely that they be adapted to an end, but that the end itself be right. The right end cannot be achieved unless the means to it be rightly chosen. Hence no skill of mind in deliberating about and choosing means is truly the intellectual virtue of prudence unless the man who habitually calculates well is also habitually inclined by the moral virtues to choose things for the right end, whether that be happiness or the common good of society.

Conversely, the moral virtues depend upon prudence because, in Aristotle’s view, they are formed by the making of right choices. His definition of moral virtue names prudence as an indispensable cause. Since the mean between extremes, in which the virtues consist, is in most cases subjective or relative to the individual, it cannot be determined by objective measurements. Reason must determine it by a prudent consideration of the relevant circumstances.

The interdependence of prudence and the moral virtues seems to be the basis, for both Aristotle and Aquinas, of the insight that it is impossible to have one moral virtue without having all. On this basis, Aristotle says, we can “refute the dialectical argument… that the virtues exist in separation from one another.” As no moral virtue can exist apart from practical wisdom, so with it, all must be present.

Aquinas mentions another intellectual virtue as indispensable to the moral virtues, namely, the virtue of understanding which consists in knowing the first principles in practical as well as speculative matters. The first principles of the practical reason (i.e., the precepts of the natural law) underlie prudence as well as the moral virtues. Just as sound reasoning in speculative matters “proceeds from naturally known principles . . . so also does prudence which is right reason about things to be done.” Nevertheless, though prudence and the moral virtues depend upon it, Aquinas does not include understanding—as he does not include art, science, and wisdom—in his enumeration of the four cardinal virtues, cardinal in the sense of being the virtues indispensable to a good human life.

THESE MATTERS, ESPECIALLY

the interconnection of the virtues and the theory of the cardinal virtues, are discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE. The problem of the relative worth of the moral and the intellectual virtues is also considered there and in the chapter on WISDOM, where the contributions to happiness of prudence and wisdom—or of practical and speculative wisdom—are specifically compared.

Here there remains to be considered the Socratic conception of the relation between knowledge and virtue, for there seems to be an issue between his theory of this matter and the foregoing view of the relation between prudence and the moral virtues.

In the Meno, Socrates argues that whatever a man desires or chooses he either knows or deems to be good. The man who chooses something evil for himself does not do so knowingly, but only through the mistake of deeming that which is in fact evil to be advantageous or good. Except for such mistakes, “no man,” says Socrates, “wills or chooses anything evil.” Apart from error or ignorance, evil is never voluntarily chosen. Hence, if virtue consists “in willing or desiring things which are good, and in having the power to gain them,” it would seem to follow that knowledge of the good is closely related to its practice.

Subsequently, Socrates suggests that “if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge.” To test these hypotheses, he proceeds to consider the various things which—whether or not they are the same as virtue—are like virtue in being advantageous to men. None of these things, such as courage or temperance, seems to profit men unless accompanied by what, in English translations, is sometimes called “wisdom” and sometimes “prudence.”

Socrates points out that “everything the soul attempts, when under the guidance of wisdom”—or prudence—“ends in happiness; but in the opposite when under the guidance of folly”—or imprudence. “If then,” he says, “virtue is a quality of the soul, and if it be of necessity always advantageous, then virtue must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either advantageous or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made advantageous or hurtful by the addition to them of prudence or imprudence”—wisdom or folly. From this, says Socrates, we can conclude that “prudence is virtue, either the whole of virtue or some part of it at least”—or, as this is sometimes translated, “virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom.”

In the light of his own view that all the moral virtues depend on practical wisdom, Aristotle criticizes the Socratic position. “Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray. In thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying that they implied practical wisdom he was right . . . Socrates thought the virtues were rules or rational principles… while we think they involve a rational principle.” Similarly, in considering the question whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue, Aquinas writes: “Although virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it according to right reason, insofar as it inclines a man to do that which is in accord with right reason as the Platonists maintained; but it also needs to be joined with right reason, as Aristotle declares.”

Aquinas furthermore interprets the opinion that “every virtue is a kind of prudence,” which he attributes to Socrates, as meaning that when “a man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin, and that everyone who sins does so through ignorance.” This, he says, “is based on a false supposition, because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition.” Nevertheless, “there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin; provided that this knowledge involves the use of reason in the individual act of choice.”

Whether those who criticize the position of Socrates accurately perceive his intention and state the issue fairly are problems of interpretation as difficult as the question of where in this matter the truth lies. If Socrates is saying that a man will do good if he knows the good, what sort of knowledge is implied—knowledge of the good in general or knowledge of what is good in a particular case? Do both types of knowledge of the good lead as readily or surely to good or virtuous action?

Whether or not, in addition to knowledge, a good will or right desire is essential, it may be held that prudence is required to apply moral principles—aiming at the good in general—to particular cases. “There exists no moral system,” writes Mill, “under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty points, both in the theory of ethics and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct. They are overcome practically, with great or less success, according to the intellect and virtue of the individual.” Mill seems to imply that both prudence and virtue are essential to good action on the level of particulars, and that without them the kind of knowledge which is expressed in moral principles does not necessarily lead a man to act well.

ONE OTHER PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION

must be mentioned. It occurs with respect to Aristotle’s statement concerning diverse modes of prudence.

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the general name of ‘political wisdom’ . . . Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of it which is concerned with the individual man, and this is known by the general name ‘practical wisdom.’ Of the other kinds, one is called domestic, another legislative, a third political; and of this last, one part is called deliberative and the other judicial.

Does this mean that skill of mind in determining the best means to an end is different according to differences in the end—whether the happiness of an individual or the common good of a society? Does it mean, furthermore, that the prudence involved in managing a household is different from the prudence concerned with political affairs; and that, in the state, the prudence of the ruler (prince or statesman) is different from the prudence of the ruled (subject or citizen), because the one moves on the level of general laws, the other on the level of particular acts in compliance with law? Within the sphere of jurisprudence, or the prudence of laws, is the prudence of the legislator or lawmaker different from the prudence of the judge who applies the law?

In his Treatise on Prudence, Aquinas answers these questions affirmatively. He distinguishes between private, domestic, and political prudence, and within the political sphere places special emphasis upon what he calls “reignative prudence,” the sort of prudence Dante calls “a kingly prudence,” which sets the prince apart from ordinary men. Hobbes, on the other hand, asserts that “to govern well a family and a kingdom, are not different degrees of prudence, but different sorts of business; no more than to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater than life, are different degrees of art.”

This issue is intimately connected with the problem of the forms of government. If only a few men are fitted by nature to acquire the special mode of prudence which is reignative or legislative, would not government by the few or by the one seem to be naturally best? If, however, in a republic, those who are citizens rule and are ruled in turn, should not each citizen have the prudence requisite for both tasks, whether it be the same or different? Finally, if the democratic theory is that all men are capable of being citizens—though not all, perhaps, are equally eligible for the highest public offices—must not political prudence be conceived as attainable by all men?

The question remains open whether those who deserve the highest magistracies have a special mode of reignative prudence; or merely a higher degree of the same prudence by which they govern their private lives and their domestic establishments; or, as Hobbes suggests, have other abilities whereby they can apply the same prudence to a different kind of business.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature of prudence: as practical wisdom, as a virtue or quality of the deliberative mind [480]

2. The place of prudence among the virtues of the mind [481]

2a. Practical or political wisdom distinguished from speculative or philosophical wisdom
2b. Prudence distinguished from art: action or doing contrasted with production or making
2c. The relation of prudence to intuitive reason or to the understanding of the natural law: the moral perception of particulars

3. The interdependence of prudence and the moral virtues: the parts played by deliberation, will, and emotion in human conduct [482]

3a. Moral virtue as determining the end for which prudence makes a right choice of means: right desire as the standard of practical truth
3b. Prudence as a factor in the formation and maintenance of moral virtue: the determination of the relative or subjective mean
3c. Shrewdness or cleverness as the counterfeit of prudence: the abuses of casuistry
3d. Prudence, continence, and temperance
3e. The vices of imprudence: precipitance and undue caution

4. The sphere of prudence [483]

4a. The confinement of prudence to the things within our power: the relation of prudence to free will, choice, and deliberation
4b. The restriction of prudence to the consideration of means rather than ends

5. The nature of a prudent judgment [484]

5a. The conditions of prudent choice: counsel, deliberation, judgment
5b. The acts of the practical reason in matters open to choice: decision and command, leading to execution or use
5c. The maxims of prudence [485]

6. Prudence in relation to the common good of the community

6a. Political prudence: the prudence of the prince or statesman, of the subject or citizen
6b. Jurisprudence: prudence in the determination of laws and the adjudication of cases [486]

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) I Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation ‘esp’ calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; ‘passim’ signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The nature of prudence: as practical wisdom, as a virtue or quality of the deliberative mind

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 1:4; 19:22; 34:9-10 —(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1:4; 19:19; 34:9-10
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 383d-384a
7 Plato: Charmides, 7b-c / Protagoras, 43a-b / Meno, 183d-184c; 188b-189d
8 Aristotle: Topics, BK IV, CH 2 [121b24-122a2] 169d-170a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1103a4-10] 348c-d; BK VI, CH 5 389a-c; CH 7 390a-d esp [1141b8-23] 390c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 9 [1366b20-23] 609a-b
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 1 105a-106c; BK II, CH 5 142c-144a; CH 23 170a-172d; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 10 185d-187a; BK IV, CH 5 228a-230b
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 11 258a-b; BK V, SECT 9 270b-c; SECT 34 273c; BK VI, SECT 12 274c; BK VIII, SECT 16-17 286d; SECT 48 289c
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 4, 512a / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 10, 662a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, A 3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, AA 4-5 38a-40a; Q 58, A 2, REP 1 42a-43a; A 3, REP 1 43b-44a; Q 65, A 1 70b-72a; PART II-II, Q 181, A 2 617d-618c
22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-54a; 60c; 67d-68a; 84c-d
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 201b-c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 520b-c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 42a-c; 81d-95b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 395a-396a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 349b
42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 261c-d; 266b-c esp 266b,d [fn 1]; 267b-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 305d; 339b-d; 361c-d / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 376c-377d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 191 66b
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 315b-c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK X, 424a-c
53 James: Psychology, 13a-15a passim

2. The place of prudence among the virtues of the mind

2a. Practical or political wisdom distinguished from speculative or philosophical wisdom

7 Plato: Statesman, 581c-582a / Philebus, 633a-635b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 8 [1098a24-26] 344b; BK VI, CH 1 [1138b17]-CH 3 [1139b18] 387a-388b; CH 7-8 390a-391c; CH 11 [1143b14]-CH 12 [1144a36] 393b-394a; CH 13 [1145a6-12] 394d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1371b26-28] 615b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 6, ANS 6b-7a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 66, A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISO, XII [88-104] 126b-c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 60c-61a; 84c-d; PART IV, 267a-b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 327b-d; 520b-c
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 16d-17a; 42a-c; 55b-d; 65d-66a; 86b-c
31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, PART I, 44a-b; PART III, 48b-c
34 Newton: Optics, BK III, 543b-544a
35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 5-6 94b-95a
35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 1-5 451a-453b
38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 373c-374a
42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 60b-c; 190c-191a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261d; 266c-d; 271a-c / Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-296d; 319c-321b; 329a-330c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Critique of Judgement, 461a-475d esp 463a-464c, 474b-475d
43 Mill: Representative Government, 346c-347a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 4b-7a

2b. Prudence distinguished from art: action or doing contrasted with production or making

7 Plato: Charmides, 5c-6d / Philebus, 633a-635b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VI, CH 2 [1139a32-b5] 388a; CH 4 [1140a1]-CH 6 [1141a1] 388d-389d; CH 12 [1143b17-1144a6] 393b-c
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 34, A 1, REP 3 768c-769d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, A 3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, A 4 38a-39a; A 5, REP 1,3 39a-40a; Q 58, A 2, REP 1 42a-43a; A 5, REP 2 44d-45c; Q 65, A 1, REP 4 70b-72a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 42a-c
42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 266c-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-d / Critique of Judgement, 515b-c; 523d-524a

2c. The relation of prudence to intuitive reason or to the understanding of the natural law: the moral perception of particulars

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095b30-12] 340c-d; CH 7 [1098a35-b8] 343d-344a; BK II, CH 9 [1109b20-23] 355c; BK III, CH 3 [1112b34-1113a2] 358d-359a; BK VI, CH 5-6 389a-d; CH 8 [1142a12-31] 391b-c; CH 11 [1143a25-b5] 392d-393a; BK VII, CH 3 [1147a25-b6] 397c-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, A 3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, A 4, ANS and REP 2 38a-39a; A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; A 6, ANS and REP 3 40a-41a; Q 58, A 4, ANS 44a-d; A 5, ANS and REP 1 44d-45c

3. The interdependence of prudence and the moral virtues: the parts played by deliberation, will, and emotion in human conduct

4 Homer: Odyssey 183a-322d esp BK IV [265-295] 201d-202a, BK V [282-493] 210d-213a,c, BK XII 250a-254d, BK XIII [185-440] 257a-259d, BK XVI 272a-276d
5 Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound 40a-51d esp [259-398] 42d-44a, [930-1093] 50a-51d
5 Sophocles: Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-134] 182d-183c
5 Euripides: Hippolytus [373-387] 228b-c / Phoenician Maidens [697-747] 384a-d
6 Herodotus: History, BK VIII, 269c-270a
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 370a-c; BK II, 389d-390b; BK IV, 474a-c
7 Plato: Protagoras, 48a-50d; 58a-64d / Meno, 174d-176a; 183d-184d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [1103b27-1104a9] 349b-c; CH 6 351c-352d passim; BK VI, CH 12-13 393b-394d; BK VII, CH 9 [1151a29]-CH 10 [1152a24] 402b-403b; BK X, CH 8 [1178a16-19] 432d
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 5 257b-c
13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK VIII [18-25] 259b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 113, A 1, REP 2 576a-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 4, ANS 38a-39a; A 5, ANS 39a-40a; Q 58, AA 4-5 44a-45c; Q 61 54d-59d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 64a-c; 65b-c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 20d-22a; 159a-162c
26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, ACT III, SC I [60-69] 575a
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT IV, SC IV [32-66] 59a-c
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 256c-d; 291d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 86c-95b
31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, PART III 48b-51b
35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 46-54 189d-192c; SECT 69 196d-197a
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 45b-c; 395a-396a
42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260a-c; 261c-d; 266a-267d / Critique of Practical Reason, 305d-307d; 318c-d; 339b-d; 341c-342a / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 114 42a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-166b
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310c-313a esp 311b-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 211a-213a; BK VI, 235a
53 James: Psychology, 13a-15a passim, esp 14b-15a; 794a-808a passim

3a. Moral virtue as determining the end for which prudence makes a right choice of means: right desire as the standard of practical truth

8 Aristotle: Topics, BK III, CH 1 [116a22-26] 163b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [1103b27-1104a9] 349b-c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; CH 5 [1140b4-19] 389b-c; CH 9 [1142b17-34] 391d-392b; CH 12 [1144a6-37] 393d-394a; CH 13 [1144b30-1145a6] 394c-d / Politics, BK VII, CH 13 [1331b24-38] 536b-c
14 Plutarch: Pericles, 121a-122b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 113, A 1, REP 2 576a-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, A 2, REP 3 30c-31a; A 3, ANS 31a-32b; A 4, REP 4 32b-33c; Q 57, A 4, ANS 38a-39a; A 5, ANS and REP 3 39a-40a; Q 58, A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; A 4, ANS and REP 1 44a-d; A 5 44d-45c; Q 65, A 1, ANS and REP 3-4 70b-72a; A 2, ANS and REP 3 72a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 1 72d-73d; PART II-II, Q 181, A 2 617d-618c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 52c-53c
42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 235a-b / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-b; 259c-260c; 266b-267d; 268b; 271d-279d esp 271d-272b, 274a-275b / Critique of Practical Reason, 305d-307d; 318c-d; 357c-360d / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 376c-377d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387d-388a
43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 456d-457b passim
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 122 44a; PAR 140 49b-54a

3b. Prudence as a factor in the formation and maintenance of moral virtue: the determination of the relative or subjective mean

7 Plato: Protagoras, 61c-62a / Meno, 183d-184c / Phaedo, 226a-b / Republic, BK X, 439b-d / Laws, BK I, 643c-d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [1103b27-1104a9] 349b-c; CH 6 351c-352d passim, esp [1106b36-1107a2] 352c; CH 9 354d-355a,c; BK V, CH 9 [1137a5-26] 385b-c; BK VI, CH 5 389a-c; CH 9 [1142b17-34] 391d-392b; CH 12-13 393b-394d; BK X, CH 8 [1178a16-19] 432d
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK III, CH 12 187b-188b
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK VI, SECT 16 275b-d
18 Augustine: City of God, BK IX, CH 4 287a-288b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 113, A 1, REP 2 576a-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 56, A 2, REP 2 30c-31a; Q 57, A 5 39a-40a; Q 58, A 2 42a-43a; A 4 44a-d; Q 65, A 1 70b-72a
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 256c-d; 291d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 79b-c; 86b-95b
31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, PART III 48b-51b
33 Pascal: Pensées, 359 235a; 378-381 238a-b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 45b-c
42 Kant: Critique of Practical Reason, 305d-307d / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b-d; 376c-377d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387d-388a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 140 49b-54a

3c. Shrewdness or cleverness as the counterfeit of prudence: the abuses of casuistry

5 Aristophanes: Frogs [534-541] 570b
6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 95d-96b; BK VIII, 279d-280b
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VII, 575b-d; 584b-585a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VI, CH 12 [1144a12]-CH 13 [1144b16] 393d-394b; BK VII, CH 10 [1152a8-15] 403a
14 Plutarch: Aratus, 829b-d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 58, A 4, REP 2 44a-d; Q 93, A 6, REP 2 219d-220d
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVIII [55-136] 40a-41b
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XVIII, 25a-b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 68a
27 Shakespeare: Othello, ACT I, SC III [302-410] 212b-213a
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 27a-127a
36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 75b-76a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 142c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 532d-533a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 204c-206a; 228b-230c; BK X, 424a-c; BK XI, 476c-480a

3d. Prudence, continence, and temperance

7 Plato: Charmides, 7a-c / Protagoras, 59b-62b / Meno, 183d-184c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1103a3-10] 348c-d; BK III, CH 12 [1119a35-b19] 366a,c; BK VI, CH 5 [1140b11-19] 389b-c; CH 9 [1142b17-34] 391d-392b; BK VII, CH 1 [1145a17-19] 395c; CH 2-3 395c-398a esp CH 2 [1145b21-1146a8] 395c-396a; CH 4 [1148a4-22] 398b-c; CH 6 399d-400c; CH 8-10 401c-403c esp CH 10 [1152a7-24] 403a-b; CH 11 [1152b15-18] 403d; CH 12 [1153a21-23] 404c; [1153a27-35] 404c-d
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 4, 512a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 58, A 2, ANS 42a-43a; A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; Q 65, A 1 70b-72a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 312c-314b
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XI [334-369] 306b-307a; [527-551] 310b-311a / Samson Agonistes [38-59] 340b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XXVIII, 259b

3e. The vices of imprudence: precipitance and undue caution

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 25:29-34 / Proverbs, 7:6-27; 14:16,29; 18:13; 19:2; 20:21; 25:8; 29:11 / Ecclesiastes, 5:2-3; 7:9—(D) Ecclesiastes, 5:1-2; 7:10
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 2:2; 4:29; 6:7-8; 8:19; 9:18; 19:4,8-9; 20:8; 21:25-26; 28:11; 30:24—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 2:2; 4:34; 6:7-8; 8:22; 9:25; 19:4,8-9; 20:8; 21:28-29; 28:13; 30:26
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 13:19-23 / Mark, 4:3-20 / Luke, 8:5-15 / Acts, 19:36
4 Homer: Iliad, BK I [1-492] 3a-8a; BK IX [1-172] 57a-58d / Odyssey, BK IX [461-542] 234a-d; BK XII [260-419] 252d-254c
5 Aeschylus: Persians 15a-26d esp [739-786] 23a-c / Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c esp [631-719] 34a-35a / Prometheus Bound 40a-51d esp [259-398] 42d-44a, [930-1093] 50a-51d
5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c / Antigone 131a-142d esp [633-767] 136c-137d / Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [654-683] 148d-149a, [748-783] 149c-d / Electra 156a-169a,c esp [121-403] 157b-159b, [938-1057] 163c-164d / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c
5 Euripides: Rhesus 203a-211d esp [1-148] 203a-204c / Suppliants [465-510] 262b-d / Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [215-433] 341d-343b / Phoenician Maidens [443-593] 381d-383a
6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 94c-d; 97b-c; BK VII, 216d-218b; 225c-d
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 370a-c; BK II, 393a-c; 402a-404d esp 402c-d, 403b-c; BK IV, 449b-c; 462d-463a; BK V, 507a-c; BK VII, 545b-c
7 Plato: Protagoras, 62b-64a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [1104a10-26] 349c-d; BK VI, CH 5 [1140b13-19] 389b-c; CH 9 [1142b17-34] 391d-392b; BK VII, CH 6 399d-400c; CH 9 [1151a28-b16] 402b-c / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 12 [1389a2]-CH 14 [1390b11] 636b-638a
13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK VIII [572-600] 252a-b; BK XI [376-444] 338b-340a
14 Plutarch: Fabius-Pericles, 154d / Pelopidas, 232a-233a; 244c-245a / Marcellus-Pelopidas, 262c / Nicias 423a-438d / Alexander, 547b-548a / Caius and Tiberius Gracchus-Agis and Cleomenes, 690c-691a,c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 61b / Histories, BK I, 205d-206a; BK III, 252c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 108, A 3, REP 5 334a-336b
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVI [49-142] 38c-39c
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK II, STANZA 42-47 60a-b; STANZA 129 71a-b / Nun’s Priest’s Tale 450a-460b esp [15,273-452] 457b-460b / Manciple’s Tale [17,206-311] 491b-493b
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XXV, 36b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 77d; 79c-d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 22d-23b; 53c-55d; 174a-d
26 Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet, ACT III, SC III 304d-306d / 1 Henry IV, ACT I, SC III 437d-440d; ACT II, SC III 443b-444b; ACT III, SC I [147-190] 451c-452a; ACT IV, SC III [1-29] 459b-c
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet 29a-72a,c esp ACT IV, SC IV [33-66] 59a-c / Troilus and Cressida, ACT III, SC III [184-241] 124b-125a / Othello 205a-243a,c esp ACT V, SC II [338-356] 242d-243a / King Lear 244a-283a,c / Coriolanus 351a-392a,c esp ACT III, SC II-III 373c-377a / Timon of Athens 393a-420d esp ACT II, SC II 400c-403b / Henry VIII, ACT I, SC I [122-149] 551b-c; SC II [68-88] 553c-d
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 8c-10a; 116a-117b; PART II, 252c-257a; 291d
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 92 125b-d
33 Pascal: Pensées, 172 203b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 203a-207b
44 Boswell: Life of Samuel Johnson, 149b-c
48 Melville: Moby Dick esp 148b-150a
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 15d-18b; BK II, 139a-c; BK V, 211a-213a; BK VIII, 321d-322d; 328c-333a; 334d-335a; 336b-337d; BK IX, 344b-346a; 366d-367b; BK X, 426b; BK XII, 569d-570b; BK XIV, 596c-d; 603a-604b; EPILOGUE I, 655c-656b
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK X, 273a-d
53 James: Psychology, 799b-807a passim, esp 800a-801a, 806b-807a

4. The sphere of prudence

4a. The confinement of prudence to the things within our power: the relation of prudence to free will, choice, and deliberation

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK III, CH 2-3 357b-359a; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a32-b11] 388a-b; CH 5 [1140a31-b5] 389a-b; CH 7 [1141b8-14] 390c
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 1 105a-106c; CH 18 124a-125a; CH 29 134d-138a; BK II, CH 5 142c-144a; CH 10 148c-150a; CH 23 170a-172d; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 10 185d-187a; CH 18 192a-c; BK IV, CH I 213a-223d
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 6 257c; SECT 9 257d; SECT 11 258a-b; SECT 16 259a; BK V, SECT 19 272a; SECT 34 273c; BK VI, SECT 16 275b-d; SECT 22 276a; BK VII, SECT 16 280d; BK VIII, SECT 16-17 286d; SECT 28 287c; SECT 48 289c; BK IX, SECT 7 292b; BK X, SECT 34-35 301a-b; BK XII, SECT 3 307b-d
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 13, AA 4-6 675a-677b; Q 14, AA 3-6 678c-681a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, AA 4-6 38a-41a
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XXV, 35a-b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 52c-53c; 100a-101c; 136b-139b; 393b-394a; 451d-452d; 514d-515a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 76d-78a
31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, PART III 48b-51b
35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 48-54 190c-192c passim; SECT 57 193b-c
42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 266c-267d / Critique of Practical Reason, 318c-321b esp 320c-321b; 357c-360d
53 James: Psychology, 199b-201b

4b. The restriction of prudence to the consideration of means rather than ends

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 9 [1137a5-26] 385b-c; BK VI, CH 5 389a-c; CH 9 [1142b17-34] 391d-392b; CH 12 [1144a6-37] 393d-394a; CH 13 [1144b30-1145a6] 394c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 9 [1366a20-22] 609a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 14, A 2 678b-c; Q 15, A 3 682c-683b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 5, ANS 39a-40a; Q 58, A 4, ANS 44a-d; A 5, REP 1 44d-45c
42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 266b-267d
53 James: Psychology, 796a-b

5. The nature of a prudent judgment

5a. The conditions of prudent choice: counsel, deliberation, judgment

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 11:14; 12:15; 13:10,16; 14:18; 15:22; 19:20; 20:5,18; 24:6
APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 4:18—(D) OT, Tobias, 4:19 / Ecclesiasticus passim, esp 6:6, 8:17, 25:4-5, 32:18, 34:9-11, 37:7-16—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus passim, esp 6:6, 8:20, 25:6-7, 32:22-23, 34:9-12, 37:7-20
5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [333-523] 5a-7c / Persians [739-786] 23a-c
5 Sophocles: Antigone [633-767] 136c-137d
5 Euripides: Rhesus [1-148] 203a-204c / Suppliants [465-510] 262b-d / Phoenician Maidens [443-593] 381d-383a; [697-747] 384a-d / Iphigenia at Aulis [378-414] 428b-c
5 Aristophanes: Birds [366-382] 546d-547a
6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 31c-d; 46c-d; BK VII, 217a; 218c; 219a-c; 258d; BK VIII, 269c-270a
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 383d-384a; BK II, 397b-c; BK III, 427a-c
7 Plato: Meno, 183d-184c; 188b-189a / Republic, BK III, 337b-338a; BK X, 439b-441a,c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b29-1095a12] 340a-b; CH 4 [1095a30-b12] 340c-d; BK III, CH 2-3 357b-359a; BK V, CH 9 [1137a5-26] 385b-c; BK VI, CH 5 389a-c; CH 7 [1141b8-23] 390c-d; CH 8 [1142a13-22] 391b; CH 9-11 391c-393b
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK III, CH 6 181d-182b
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 12 264c
14 Plutarch: Timoleon, 197c-198a
15 Tacitus: Histories, BK II, 234b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 1 127d-128d; Q 83, A 1, ANS 436d-438a; A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 438d-439c; PART I-II, Q 13, A 1 672d-673c; A 3, ANS 674c-675a; Q 14 677b-681a; Q 44, A 2 808b-d; A 4, ANS 809c-810a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 4, REP 3 38a-39a; A 5, ANS and REP 2 39a-40a; A 6 40a-41a
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK I, STANZA 90-93 12b-13a / Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a esp PAR 7-13 402b-405a, PAR 17-31, 407b-414a, PAR 59-78 427a-432a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53a; 53c-d; 60c-d; 64a-c; 65a-c; 66c-68a; 77d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 393b-394a; 450d-451a; 520b-522d
26 Shakespeare: Comedy of Errors, ACT II, SC I [85-106] 157b
27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, ACT III, SC II 113c-115d
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 235d-237a
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 86c-95b
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 39a / Pensées, 381-383 238b
35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 48 190c-d; SECT 53 191d-192b; SECT 57 193b-c
35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 36, 465a-d [fn 1]
42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 266b-c / Critique of Practical Reason, 318c-321b; 357c-360d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 2, 32b-d; NUMBER 8, 46d-47a
43 Mill: On Liberty, 276b-277a; 287b-c; 295a / Representative Government, 410c-d / Utilitarianism, 456a-457b
44 Boswell: Life of Samuel Johnson, 149b-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 227 74b-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 211a-213a; BK VI, 235a
53 James: Psychology, 13a-15a; 794a-798b esp 796a-b, 797b-798a
54 Freud: A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 624d-625b

5b. The acts of the practical reason in matters open to choice: decision and command, leading to execution or use

8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK III, CH 10 [433a13-31] 665d-666a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 2 [1103b27-1104a9] 349b-c; BK III, CH 2-3 357b-359a; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; CH 7 [1141b8-23] 390c-d; CH 10 [1143a4-10] 392b-c; CH 12-13 393b-394d; BK VII, CH 2 395c-396c esp [1145b20-1146a8] 395c-396a; CH 10 [1152a8-24] 403a-b
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 127d-128d; PART I-II, Q 17 686b,d-693d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 6, ANS and REP 2 40a-41a; Q 61, A 3, ANS 56b-57a
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT IV, SC IV [33-66] 59a-c
38 Rousseau: The Social Contract, BK III, 409d
42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260a-c; 265c-267d esp 266c-267d / Critique of Practical Reason, 305d-307d; 314d-321b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 38 21d; PART III, PAR 214 71a-c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 235a; BK X, 411c-412d; 421c-426a; 440c-442c; 459d-461d; BK XI, 488c-489c; BK XII, 536b; BK XIII, 584c-585c; 586d-587d; EPILOGUE I, 654a-655c; EPILOGUE II, 685a
53 James: Psychology, 794a-798b esp 797b-798a

5c. The maxims of prudence

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs passim / Ecclesiastes passim
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 1-43 passim—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1-43 passim
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:19-34 / Luke, 12:13-32 / Acts, 19:36 / I Corinthians, 7:29-35 / Ephesians, 5:15-16 / Philippians, 4:6 / I Peter, 5:7
5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes [631-719] 34a-35a / Prometheus Bound [259-398] 42d-44a; [887-906] 49c-d; [930-1093] 50a-51d
5 Sophocles: Antigone [1-99] 131a-132a / Electra [121-403] 157b-159b; [938-1057] 163c-164d
6 Herodotus: History, BK VII, 225b-226a; BK VIII, 269c-270a
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 370a-c; BK V, 507a-c
14 Plutarch: Pericles, 131b-c
22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK I, STANZA 101-118 14a-16b; STANZA 136-139 18b-19a; BK III, STANZA 233-236 85a-b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 51a-55d esp 52c-53c; 136b-139b; 174a-d
26 Shakespeare: Henry V, ACT I, SC I [183-220] 535d-536b
27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT I, SC III [59-80] 35a
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 331d-333b
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 81d-95b
31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, PART III 48b-51b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 45, SCHOL 438b-c
35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 36, 465d [fn 1]
43 Mill: Representative Government, 345b; 410c-d

6. Prudence in relation to the common good of the community

6a. Political prudence: the prudence of the prince or statesman, of the subject or citizen

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 41:33-41 / I Kings, 3:16-28—(D) III Kings, 3:16-28 / Proverbs, 11:14; 20:18,28; 23:1-3; 24:6; 25:6-7; 29:12; 31:4-5 / Ecclesiastes, 8:2-4
APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 12:7—(D) OT, Tobias, 12:7 / Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-3—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 10:1-3
4 Homer: Iliad, BK I [1-492] 3a-8a; BK IX [1-172] 57a-58d
5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [333-523] 5a-7c / Persians 15a-26d esp [739-786] 23a-c
5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [1-512] 99a-103d / Antigone [1-99] 131a-132a; [633-767] 136c-137d / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-134] 182d-183c
5 Euripides: Rhesus 203a-211d esp [1-148] 203a-204c / Suppliants [103-597] 259a-263c / Bacchantes [266-271] 342a-b / Phoenician Maidens [443-593] 381d-383a; [697-747] 384a-d / Orestes [682-716] 400d-401a / Iphigenia at Aulis 425a-439d esp [1-542] 425a-429d
5 Aristophanes: Acharnians [480-571] 460d-461c; [971-999] 466c-d / Knights 470a-487a,c esp [1316-1408] 486a-487a,c / Frogs [686-737] 572a-d; [1417-1514] 581a-582a,c / Lysistrata [541-602] 590a-591a
6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 6a-b; 41c-d; BK III, 97b-c; BK VII, 216d-218a; 225a-226b; 242a-b; 245d-246b
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 365c-367a; 370a-c; 383d-384a; BK II, 389d-391b; 393a-c; 397b-c; BK III, 427a-c; 436d-438b; BK IV, 451a-c; 462d-463a; 474a-c; BK V, 483c-485b; 507a-c; BK VI, 511c-516a; BK VII, 545b-c; BK VIII, 564a-c; 569c-570a; 574c-575d
7 Plato: Protagoras, 43a-b / Meno, 174d-176a / Statesman, 604c-608d / Laws, BK III, 669b-670c; BK IX, 754a-b; BK XII, 785d-786b / Seventh Letter, 806d-807b; 813d-814d
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VI, CH 5 [1140b4-11] 389b; CH 8 [1141b23-1142a12] 390d-391a; BK X, CH 9 434a-436a,c / Politics, BK III, CH 4 473c-475a; CH 11 479b-480c; BK IV, CH 14 498b-499c; BK V, CH 8-11 509d-518c; BK VII, CH 2-3 528a-530a
12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK III, CH 7 182b-184a
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 5 261a; BK IV, SECT 4 264a; BK V, SECT 16 271c-d; BK VII, SECT 5 280a-b; BK IX, SECT 23 293c; BK X, SECT 6 297a-b; BK XI, SECT 8 303a-b
13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK XI [296-444] 336a-340a
14 Plutarch: Pericles, 129a-141a,c / Alcibiades, 167c-168a / Alexander 540b,d-576d passim / Phocion, 604b,d-605d / Caius and Tiberius Gracchus-Agis and Cleomenes 689b,d-691a,c / Demetrius, 736c-737b / Dion, 781b,d / Brutus-Dion 824b,d-826a,c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK IV, 72b-73a; BK XVI, 176b-d / Histories, BK I, 193d; 211c-212b; BK II, 247a
19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 1, ANS 127d-128d
21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVIII [55-136] 40a-41b; PARADISO, XII [88-111] 126b-c
23 Machiavelli: Prince 1a-37d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 60d-61a; 67d-68a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 51a-55d; 381a-388c; 451d-452d; 488b-489b; 490d-491d
26 Shakespeare: 1 Henry IV, ACT III, SC II [29-84] 453b-d / 2 Henry IV, ACT I, SC III 472d-474a / Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC II [154-191] 576a-c; ACT IV, SC I 587a-c
27 Shakespeare: Antony and Cleopatra, ACT III, SC I [1-27] 318c-d / Coriolanus 351a-392a,c esp ACT II, SC III [53-160] 366c-367c, ACT III, SC II [28-92] 373d-374c
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 331a-333b; 340d-343a; 353b-356d; 361a-d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 20d-26a; 74b-c; 81d-82a; 94b-95b
35 Locke: Concerning Civil Government, CH XIII, SECT 156-158 61a-62b
36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 7b-8a; 28b-29b; PART III, 112a-115b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 39b
38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 368b-c; 373c-374a / The Social Contract, BK III, 409d
39 Smith: The Wealth of Nations, BK I, 109d-110d; BK II, 126a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1b-2a passim; 50a; 331b-332d; 609d-610a; 645a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 168c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 5, 37d; NUMBER 27, 96b; NUMBER 31, 105b-c; NUMBER 40, 130c-132a; NUMBER 62, 190d-191a; NUMBER 74, 222b-d
43 Mill: Representative Government, 334b-c
44 Boswell: Life of Samuel Johnson, 255a-256a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 274 92a; ADDITIONS, 166 145b-c / Philosophy of History, PART II, 271d-272a; PART IV, 361d-362a
49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 315b-c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 9c-10d; BK II, 65d-66d; BK X, 421c-426a; 440c-442c; 459d-461d; BK XII, 570a-b; 584c-585c

6b. Jurisprudence: prudence in the determination of laws and the adjudication of cases

5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [397-777] 85c-89a
5 Aristophanes: Wasps 507a-525d
6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 32b-c; BK III, 95d-96b
7 Plato: Apology 200a-212a,c / Republic, BK III, 337b-338a / Theaetetus, 544a-c / Statesman, 599c-603a / Laws, BK IX, 744b-c; BK XI, 782a-b; 784a-b; BK XII, 792a-c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 10 385c-386b; BK VI, CH 8 [1141b23-33] 390d-391a / Politics, BK II, CH 8 [1268b5-23] 464c; BK III, CH 11 [1282a1-14] 480b-c; CH 15 [1286a10-30] 484b-c; CH 16 [1287a24-28] 485d; [1287b15-25] 486a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354a21-b15] 593c-d
14 Plutarch: Solon, 70d-71b
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 61c-62a
18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 6 514b-515a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, A 3, REP 3 209d-210c; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; A 5, 224d-225d; Q 95, A 1, REP 2-3 226c-227c; AA 2-3 227c-229b; Q 96, A 1, REP 2 230d-231c; A 6 235a-d; Q 97, AA 1-2 236a-237b; A 4 238b-239b; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 7-8 309d-316a
22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, PAR 11 403b-404a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 58b; 78b-c; PART II, 123b-d; 134a-136b; 136d; PART III, 234d
24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 85c-92c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 283a; 516c-517a
26 Shakespeare: Merchant of Venice, ACT IV, SC I 425c-430b
27 Shakespeare: Measure for Measure, ACT I, SC I-II 178d-184a
29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 332d-333b; 340d-343a; 353b-356d; 360d-361d
30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95b
33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 27a-62a; 90a-99a; 102a-117b
36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 152b-154a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 33a-35c; 39b; 42c-d; BK XXVI, 214b,d-215a; BK XXIX, 262a-b
38 Rousseau: The Social Contract, BK IV, 433a-b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 244d-245b; 343b-c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 75d-78b
42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 60a-c / The Science of Right, 397a-b; 399c-400d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 65 198a-200c passim; NUMBER 78, 231c-232a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 214 71a-c; PAR 222-223 73b-d; PAR 225-229 73d-75b; ADDITIONS, 134 138b-c
48 Melville: Moby Dick, 292a-295a
52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK XII 348b,d-401d passim

CROSS-REFERENCES

For: The distinction between prudence and wisdom, or between practical and speculative wisdom, see KNOWLEDGE 6e(1); MIND 9a; PHILOSOPHY 2a; WISDOM 1b.
For: The relation of prudence to the other intellectual virtues, see ART 1; HABIT 5d; KNOWLEDGE 6e(2), 8b(3); LAW 4a; SCIENCE 1a(1); VIRTUE AND VICE 2a(2); WISDOM 2a.
For: The relation of prudence to the moral virtues, see COURAGE 4; KNOWLEDGE 8b(1); PRINCIPLE 4a; TEMPERANCE 1b; TRUTH 2c; VIRTUE AND VICE 1c, 3b, 5b.
For: The relevance of freedom and of the distinction between means and ends to the operations of prudence, see GOOD AND EVIL 5c; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5a(1)-5a(2); WILL 2c(1)-2c(3), 5b(2).
For: The elements which enter into the making of a prudent judgment, see EXPERIENCE 6a; JUDGMENT 3; OPINION 6b; REASONING 5c(3); WILL 2c(3), 5b(2).
For: Considerations of the prudence of the statesman or citizen, and of the legislator or jurist, see CITIZEN 5; GOVERNMENT 3d; LAW 5d, 5g; MONARCHY 3a; STATE 8d.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

Augustine. On the Morals of the Catholic Church, CH I, XXIV
Aquinas. Summa Theologica, PART II-II, QQ 47-56, 155-156
F. Bacon. “Of Counsel,” in Essays
A. Smith. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, PART VI, SECT I
Kant. Lectures on Ethics
J. S. Mill. A System of Logic, BK VI, CH 12

II.

Horace. Epistles
Perkins. The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience
Gracián y Morales. The Art of Worldly Wisdom
Sanderson. De Obligatione Conscientiae (On the Obligations of Conscience)
J. Taylor. Ductor Dubitantium
Molière. L’école des femmes (The School for Wives)
Shaftesbury. Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, TREATISE IV
J. Butler. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature
Chesterfield. Letters to His Son
S. Johnson. History of Rasselas
Bentham. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
Emerson. The Conduct of Life
Maurice. The Conscience
Hodgson. The Theory of Practice
H. Sidgwick. The Methods of Ethics, BK III
Spencer. The Principles of Ethics, PART I, CH 1, 13
L. Stephen. The Science of Ethics, CH 6 (4), 9 (5)
Bosanquet. The Intellectual Virtues
Dewey. The Study of Ethics, CH 5-6
Lecky. The Map of Life, CH 6, 8-9, 11
Santayana. Reason in Common Sense, CH 9
Adler. Art and Prudence, PART III, CH 12

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