Chapter 71: PROGRESS

INTRODUCTION

LIKE the idea of evolution, with which it has some affinity, the idea of progress seems to be typically modern. Anticipations of it may be found in ancient and medieval thought, sometimes in the form of implicit denials of the idea. But in explicit formulation, in emphasis and importance, progress, like evolution, is almost a new idea in modern times. It is not merely more prominent in modern discussion; it affects the significance of many other ideas, and so gives a characteristic color or tendency to modern thought.

The idea of evolution affects our conceptions of nature and man. But the theory of evolution is itself affected by the idea of progress. Since it was a major theme at least two centuries before Darwin, progress does not depend for its significance upon the theory of biological evolution. The reverse relationship seems to obtain. The idea of evolution gets some of its moral, social, even cosmic significance from its implication that the general motion in the world of living things, perhaps in the universe, is a progress from lower to higher forms.

Darwin thinks ‘Von Baer has defined advancement or progress in the organic scale better than anyone else, as resting on the amount of differentiation and specialization of the several parts of a being”—to which Darwin adds the qualification that the organisms must be judged when they have arrived at maturity.

As organisms have become slowly adapted to diversified lines of life, their parts will have become more and more differentiated and specialized for various functions from the advantage gained by the division of physiological labor. The same part appears often to have been modified first for one purpose, and then long afterwards for some other and quite distinct purpose; and thus all the parts are rendered more and more complex. … In accordance with this view,” Darwin writes, “it seems, if we turn to geological evidence, that organization on the whole has advanced throughout the world by slow and interrupted steps. In the kingdom of the Vertebrata it has culminated in man.

Whether strictly biological evolution has a single or uniform direction may be disputed in the light of evidences of regression and the multiplication of lower as well as higher forms. But Darwin seems to think that since “natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection.” Whatever the evidence may be, the popular notion of evolution, especially when applied by writers like Herbert Spencer to human society or civilization, connotes progress—the gradual yet steady march toward perfection.

APART FROM THIS APPLICATION of the idea of evolution to man’s world, progress seems to be the central thesis in the modern philosophy of history. In the minds of some, the philosophy of history is so intimately connected with a theory of progress that the philosophy of history is itself regarded as a modern development. There seems to be some justification for this view in modern works on the tendency of history which have no ancient counterparts, such as the writings of Vico, Condorcet, Kant, Proudhon, Comte, J. S. Mill, Hegel, and Marx.

These writers do not all define or explain progress in the same way. Nor do they all subscribe to an inviolable and irresistible law of progress which has the character of a divine ordinance, replacing or transforming less optimistic views of providence. But for the most part the moderns are optimists. They either believe in man’s perfectibility and in his approach to perfection through his own efforts freely turned toward the realization of ideals; or they see in the forces of history—whether the manifestations of a world spirit or the pressure of material (i.e., economic) conditions—an inevitable development from less to more advanced stages of civilization, according to a dialectical pattern of conflict and resolution, each resolution necessarily rising to a higher level.

As opposed to the optimism of expecting a continual improvement in all things or an irreversible ascent to new heights, the pessimistic view denies that progress is either the law or the hope of history. It believes rather that everything which goes up must come down. As indicated in the chapter on HISTORY, the theory of cycle after cycle of rise and decline—or even the notion that the golden age is past, that it is never to be regained, and that things are steadily getting worse—prevails more in the ancient than in the modern world.

The modern exceptions to optimism in the philosophy of history are notably Spengler and, to a much less extent, Toynbee. But modern pessimism never seems to reach the intensity of the Preacher’s reiteration in Ecclesiastes that “there is no new thing under the sun” and that “all is vanity and vexation of spirit.” Nor does the modern theory of cycles of civilization, even in Vico, seem to be as radical as that of the ancients. In his vision of cosmic cycles Lucretius sees the whole world crumbling into atomic dust to be reborn again. Herodotus does not relieve the gloom of his observation that, in the life of cities, prosperity “never continues long in one stay.” The eternity of the world means for Aristotle that “probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished.”

LEAVING TO THE CHAPTER on HISTORY the discussion of progress so far as it concerns an explicit philosophy of history, we shall here deal with considerations of progress as they occur in economics, in political theory, in the history of philosophy and the whole intellectual tradition of the arts and sciences.

In this last connection, the great books play a dual role. They provide the major evidence which, on different interpretations, points toward opposite answers to the question whether or not there has been progress in the tradition of western thought. Whatever their readers may think on this subject, the great authors, having read the works of their predecessors, offer their own interpretations of the intellectual tradition. In many cases, especially among the modern writers, their point of departure—even the conception they entertain of the originality and worth of their own contribution—stems from their concern with a deplorable lack of progress, for which they offer new methods as remedies.

Before we enter upon the discussion of economic, political, or intellectual progress, it seems useful to distinguish between the fact and the idea of progress. When men examine the fact of progress, they look to the past and find there evidence for or against the assertion that a change for the better has taken place in this or that respect. Two things are involved: a study of the changes which have occurred and the judgment—based on some standard of appraisal—that the changes have been for the better. But when men entertain the idea of progress, they turn from the past and present and look to the future. They regard the past merely as a basis for prophecy, and the present as an occasion for making plans to fulfill their prophecies or hopes. The fact of progress belongs to the record of achievement; the idea of progress sets a goal to be achieved.

This distinction seems to be exemplified by the difference between ancient and modern considerations of progress. The ancients observe the fact of progress in some particulars—almost never universally. Thucydides, for example, in the opening chapters of his History, contrasts the power and wealth of the modern city-states of Greece with “the weakness of ancient times.” “Without commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness.”

But Thucydides does not seem to draw from these observations any general idea of progress. He does not concretely imagine a future excelling the Periclean age in the magnitude of its wars and the magnificence of its wealth, as that period dwarfs antiquity. He does not infer that whatever factors worked to cause the advance from past to present may continue to operate with similar results. It might almost be said that he does not think about the future; certainly he does not think of it as rich in promise. “Knowledge of the past,” he writes, is “an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it.”

Adam Smith’s thinking about economic progress represents the contrasting modern emphasis upon the future. In one sense, both Thucydides and Smith measure economic progress in the same way, though one writes of the wealth of cities, the other of the wealth of nations. Both Smith and Thucydides judge economic improvement in terms of increasing opulence, the growth of capital reserves, the expansion of commerce, and the enlarged power in war or peace which greater wealth bestows. But Smith, in the spirit of Francis Bacon, seeks to analyze the causes of prosperity in order to make them work for further progress. He is the promoter of progress, not merely the historian who witnesses the beneficial effect on productivity of an increasingly refined division of labor and of the multiplication of machinery.

To know how these things have operated to bring about the opulence of modern nations as compared with the miserable poverty of primitive tribes or even the limited property of ancient cities is to know how to formulate policies which shall still further expand the wealth of nations. For Smith the study of the means and methods by which economic progress has been made serves to determine the policy which is most likely to ensure even greater increments of progress in the future.

MARX APPEARS TO MEASURE economic progress by a different standard. The transition from the slave economies of antiquity through feudal serfdom to what he calls the “‘wage-slavery” of the industrial proletariat may be accompanied by greater productivity and vaster accumulations of capital stock. But the essential point for him about these successive systems of production is their effect upon the status and conditions of labor. The Communist Manifesto notes respects in which, under the capitalist system, the supposedly free workingman is worse off than were his servile ancestors. But if economic progress is conceived as the historically determined approach to the final liberation of labor from its oppressors, then capitalism represents both an advance over feudalism and a stage in the march to communism.

Each successive economic revolution brings mankind nearer to the goal of the ideal or classless economy. Capitalism creates the proletariat—the revolutionary class which is to be that system’s own undoing. The overthrow of the landed aristocracy by the bourgeoisie thus prepares the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as that in turn liquidates the obstacles to the realization of the perfect communist democracy.

We are not here concerned with the details of this history and prophecy but only with the theory of progress which it involves. In the first place, it seems to set an ultimate goal to progress, while at the same time it makes progress a necessary feature of what is for Marx, as it is for Hegel, the “dialectic of history.” Those who think that the inevitability of progress ought to render progress as interminable as history itself, find some inconsistency in this tenet of dialectical materialism, as well as in Hegel’s notion of the necessary dialectical stages by which the Absolute Idea reaches perfect realization in the German state. Can progress be the inner law of history and yet reach its goal before the end of time?

There may be some answer to this question in a second aspect of the theory of progress which goes with a dialectic of history. The progress which the successive stages of history represent resides in the quality of human institutions rather than in the nature of man. If more economic justice or greater political liberty is achieved, it is not because the later generations of men are born with a nature more disposed to goodness or virtue, but because better institutions have evolved from the conflict of historical forces. Furthermore, according to Marx, man’s nature is only partly determined at birth. Part remains to be determined by the social and economic circumstances of his life—by the system of production under which he lives. Hence though institutional progress may arrive at its historical goal with the establishment of the ideal economy, it may be possible for further progress to be made throughout the rest of time by the improvement of men themselves, when at last their natures can develop under ideal circumstances.

WE HAVE NOTED two great issues in the characteristically modern discussion of progress. Is the goal of progress definitely attainable, or is its goal an ideal progressively approximated but never realized? Is progress accomplished by the betterment of human institutions or by improvements in the nature of man?

The second question has a critical bearing on the first, especially for those who conceive man as infinitely perfectible. It also relates to the problem of the evolutionist: whether a higher form of life on earth will evolve from man or whether the future belongs to the progressive development of human nature—biologically or culturally. Darwin is unwilling to admit that “man alone is capable of progressive improvement,” but he does affirm that man “is capable of incomparably greater and more rapid improvement than is any other animal.”

Rousseau, on the other hand, claims that “the faculty of self-improvement” is one distinction between man and brute “which will admit of no dispute.” But he also thinks that this faculty is the cause of human decline as well as progress. “A brute, at the end of a few months,” he writes, “is all he will ever be during his whole life, and his species, at the end of a thousand years, exactly what it was the first year of that thousand. … While the brute, which has acquired nothing and has therefore nothing to lose, still retains the force of instinct, man, who loses, by age or accident, all that his perfectibility had enabled him to gain, falls by this means lower than the brutes themselves.”

One other issue concerning progress remains to be stated. It raises the question of freedom or necessity in history. Is progress inevitable in the very nature of the case, or does it occur only when men plan wisely and choose well in their efforts to better themselves or the conditions of their lives?

In his Idea of a Universal History and his Principle of Progress, Kant finds the possibility of progress in man’s potentialities for improvement. He regards the realization of this possibility as a work of freedom rather than a manifestation of historical necessity. Political progress may have an ultimate goal—the world republic or federation of states. But this, according to Kant’s conclusion in the Science of Right, is an impracticable idea, and serves only the regulative purpose of “promoting a continuous approximation to Perpetual Peace.” Hegel’s theory of the progressive realization of the idea of the state in history seems to represent the contrary position on both points. Progress is an historical necessity, and it reaches an historic consummation.

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ancients and moderns with respect to political progress seems to be the same as that which we observed between Thucydides and Adam Smith with regard to wealth. The ancients assert the superiority of the present over the past, and even trace the stages by which advances have been made from primitive to civilized conditions. But they do not extend the motion they observe into the future. The moderns look to the future as to a fulfillment without which present political activity would be undirected.

According to Aristotle, for example, the state is the last stage in the development of social life which begins with the family. “When several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village.” The village or tribal community, in turn, becomes the unit out of which a larger and more truly political community is formed. “When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence.”

Aristotle sees this development not merely as a progress from smaller and weaker societies to larger and more powerful ones, but also as an advance toward the realization of man’s political nature. Absolute or despotic government by the eldest, natural to the family, still persists in the tribe. “This is the reason why the Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are.” Not until the domestic or tribal form of government is replaced by political or constitutional government—not until kings and subjects are replaced by statesmen and citizens—is the state or political community fully realized.

But Aristotle does not conceive the development he describes as one continuing into the future. He does not imagine a larger political unity than the city-state, as Kant is able to envisage a world state as the ultimate formation toward which the progressive political unification of mankind should tend. Though Aristotle recognizes that new institutions have been invented and old ones perfected, his political theory, unlike Mill’s, does not seem to measure the goodness of the best existing institutions by their devotion to further progress.

Considering the criterion of a good form of government, Mill criticizes those who separate the maintenance of order, or the preservation of existing institutions, from the cultivation of progress. “Progress includes Order,” he writes, “but Order does not include Progress.” Order “is not an additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but a part and means of Progress itself. If a gain in one respect is purchased by a more than equivalent loss in the same or in any other, there is not Progress. Conduciveness to Progress, thus understood, includes the whole excellence of government.”

Progress fails to define good government, Mill adds, unless we understand by the term not merely “the idea of moving onward,” but “quite as much the prevention of falling back. The very same social causes… are as much required to prevent society from retrograding, as to produce a further advance. Were there no improvement to be hoped for, life would not be the less an unceasing struggle against causes of deterioration; as it even now is. Politics, as conceived by the ancients, consisted wholly in this … Though we no longer hold this opinion; though most men in the present age profess a contrary creed, believing that the tendency of things, on the whole, is toward improvement; we ought not to forget that there is an incessant and everflowing current of human affairs toward the worse.”

According to Mill, the ideally best polity is representative government on democratic principles. By a just distribution of political rights and by the fullest grant of liberties, it serves better than any other form of government “to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves.” This is the ultimate end of political progress. Inferior forms of government, such as despotic monarchy, may be justified for people as yet unfit for self-government, but only if they also work for progress, i.e., “if they carry those communities through the intermediate stages which they must traverse before they can become fit for the best form of government.”

The whole theory of good government is thus for Mill a theory of progress in which we must take “into account, not only the next step, but all the steps which society has yet to make; both those which can be foreseen and the far wider indefinite range which is at present out of sight.” We must judge the merits of diverse forms of government by that ideal form “which, if the necessary conditions existed for giving effect to its beneficial tendencies, would, more than all others, favour and promote not some one improvement, but all forms and degrees of it.”

IN THE FIELD OF THE ARTS and sciences or culture generally, the modern emphasis upon progress seems to be even more pronounced than in the spheres of economics and politics. Lack of progress in a science is taken to indicate that it has not yet been established on the right foundations or that the right method for discovering the truth has not yet been found. Lack of agreement in a particular field is the chief symptom of these defects.

The fact that philosophy “has been cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that have ever lived, and that nevertheless no single thing is to be found in it which is not a subject of dispute, and in consequence which is not dubious,” leads Descartes to propose his new method. He hopes this may ensure progress in philosophy, of the same sort which the new method has, in his view, accomplished in mathematics. The Novum Organum of Bacon seems to be dedicated to the same end of progressively augmenting knowledge in all those fields in which, according to the inventory made in the Advancement of Learning of the present state of the sciences, no or little progress has been made since antiquity. Similarly, Locke, Hume, and Kant insist that a study of the human mind should precede all other studies in order to save men from fruitless disputes concerning matters beyond their capacities for knowledge; they hope thereby to encourage research in areas where progress can be made.

The comparison of different disciplines or subject matters with respect to their progress leads to the condemnation of those which lag behind. The great scientific advances of the 17th century tend to intensify the complaint about philosophy, especially metaphysics. The progress which has been made from the beginning in mathematics and more recently in physics means to Kant that each of these disciplines has found the “safe way” or the “secure path” of a science. By comparison, metaphysics has not yet even made a beginning. A hundred years later, William James is still to say that, by comparison with the progress of knowledge in the natural sciences, metaphysics belongs to the future.

The notion that any field of learning has attained its full maturity seems to Bacon to be the presumption of those philosophers who, seeking “to acquire the reputation of perfection for their own art,” try to instill the “belief that whatever has not yet been invented and understood can never be so hereafter.” Whenever such belief prevails, learning languishes. “By far the greatest obstacle to the advancement of the sciences, and the undertaking of any new attempt or departure, is to be found in men’s despair and the idea of impossibility.”

THOUGH THE ANCIENTS do not evidence this presumption of perfection in their arts and sciences, neither do they fret about lack of progress. Nor does the disagreement of minds seem to them to signify an unhealthy condition which requires new and special methods to cure.

“The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy,” writes Aristotle. “An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.” Aristotle puts the intellectual tradition to use by adopting the policy of calling “into council the views of those of our predecessors who have declared any opinion” on whatever subject is being considered, “in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors.”

But, in the opinion of the moderns, the intellectual tradition can also be the greatest impediment to the advancement of learning if it is received uncritically and with undue reverence for the authority of the ancients. “The respect in which antiquity is held today,” Pascal says, “has reached such extremes in those matters in which it should have the least preponderance, that one can no longer present innovations without danger.” This is the common complaint of Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes, and Harvey. “The reverence for antiquity and the authority of men who have been esteemed great in philosophy have,” according to Bacon, “retarded men from advancing in science, and almost enchanted them.”

Harvey agrees with Bacon that philosophers or scientists should not “swear such fealty to their mistress Antiquity, that they openly, and even in sight of all, deny and desert their friend Truth.” Harvey has a much higher opinion than Bacon of the achievements of antiquity. “The ancient philosophers,” he writes, “whose industry even we admire, went a different way to work, and by their unwearied labor and variety of experiments, searching into the nature of things, have left us no doubtful light to guide us in our studies. In this way it is that almost everything we yet possess of note or credit in philosophy, has been transmitted to us through the industry of ancient Greece.”

His admiration for the ancients does not, however, lead Harvey to rest on their achievements. “When we acquiesce in the discoveries of the ancients, and believe (which we are apt to do through indolence) that nothing farther remains to be known,” then, in his opinion, “we suffer the edge of our ingenuity to be taken off, and the lamp which they delivered us to be extinguished. No one of a surety,” he continues, “will allow that all truth was engrossed by the ancients, unless he be utterly ignorant (to pass by other arts for the present) of the many remarkable discoveries that have lately been made in anatomy.”

In his own anatomical researches, Harvey adopts an attitude toward the work of his predecessors, both ancient and recent, which remarkably resembles the attitude expressed by Aristotle toward his scientific forebears. “As we are about to discuss the motion, action, and use of the heart and arteries, it is imperative on us,” Harvey declares, “first to state what has been thought of these things by others in their writings, and what has been held by the vulgar and by tradition, in order that what is true may be confirmed, and what is false set right by dissection, multiplied experience, and accurate observation.” It is precisely this attitude which Bacon expressly condemns.

Bacon sees no genuine method of science, but merely a cultivation of opinion, in those who prepare themselves for discovery by first obtaining “a full account of all that has been said on the subject by others.” Those who begin in this way, it is the judgment of Descartes, seldom go further. Particularly the followers of Aristotle “would think themselves happy,” he says, “if they had as much knowledge of nature as he had, even if this were on the condition that they should never attain to any more. They are like the ivy that never tries to mount above the trees which give it support, and which often even descends again after it has reached the summit; for it appears to me that such men also sink again—that is to say, somehow render themselves more ignorant than they would have been had they abstained from study altogether. For, not content with knowing all that is intelligibly explained in their author, they wish in addition to find in him the solution of many difficulties of which he says nothing, and in regard to which he possibly had no thought at all.”

Pascal takes a more moderate view. We can profit, he thinks, from a limited respect for the ancients. “Just as they made use of those discoveries which have been handed down to them only as a means for making new ones and this happy audacity opened the road to great things, so,” Pascal suggests, “must we accept those which they found for us and follow their example by making them the means and not the end of our study, and thus try to surpass them by imitating them. For what would be more wrong than to treat the ancients with more caution than they did those who preceded them, and to have for them this inviolable respect which they only deserve from us because they did not feel a similar respect for those who had the same advantage over them?”

MODERN WRITERS SEEM to conceive the law of intellectual progress by an analogy between the mind of the race and the individual mind. Where Aquinas says merely that “it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect,” adding, in the past tense, that hence the imperfect teaching of early philosophers “was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them,” Pascal generalizes the insight and gives it future significance. “Not only does each man progress from day to day in the sciences, but all men combined make constant progress as the universe ages, because the same thing happens in the succeeding generations of men as in the different ages of each particular man. So that the whole succession of men, in the course of so many centuries, should be regarded as the same man who exists always and learns continually.”

At this point Pascal applies his metaphor to effect a reversal of the relation between the moderns and the ancients. “Since old age is the time of life most distant from childhood, who does not realize that old age in this universal man should not be sought in the times closest to his birth, but in those which are farthest away from it? Those whom we call ancients were really novices in all things, and actually belonged to the childhood of man; and as we have added to their knowledge the experience of the centuries which followed them, it is in ourselves that may be found this antiquity which we revere in others.”

Whether by accident or borrowing, this characteristically modern view of the advantage progress confers upon modernity is expressed in similar language by Hobbes and Bacon. “Though I reverence those men of ancient times,” writes Hobbes, “who either have written truth perspicuously or have set us in a better way to find it out for ourselves; yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due; for if we will reverence age, the present is the oldest.” “Antiquity, as we call it,” writes Bacon, “is the young state of the world; for those times are ancient when the world is ancient; and not those we vulgarly account ancient by computing backwards; so that the present time is the real antiquity.”

To secure a sound, not specious, progress in all things of the mind, Bacon recommends the avoidance of two extremes, the affectations of antiquity and novelty, for “antiquity envies new improvements, and novelty is not content to add without defacing.” Since “antiquity deserves that men should stand awhile upon it, to view around which is the best way,” the great books of the past can lay the foundations for progress, but only if they are properly read. “Let great authors, therefore, have their due,” Bacon declares, “but so as not to defraud time, which is the author of authors, and the parent of truth.”

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

The idea of progress in the philosophy of history 1a. Providence and necessity in the theory of progress: the dialectical development of Spirit or matter; conflict as a source of progress 1b. Optimism or meliorism: the doctrine of human perfectibility 1c. Skeptical or pessimistic denials of progress: the golden age as past; the cyclical motion of history
The idea of progress in the theory of biological evolution
Economic progress 3a. The increase of opulence: the division of labor as a factor in progress 3b. The improvement of the status and conditions of labor: the goals of revolution and reform 3c. Man’s progressive conquest of the forces of nature through science and invention
Progress in politics 4a. The invention and improvement of political institutions: the maintenance of political order in relation to progress 4b. The progressive realization of the idea of the state 4c. The growth of political freedom: the achievement of citizenship and civil rights
Forces operating against social progress: emotional opposition to change or novelty; political conservatism
Intellectual or cultural progress: its sources and impediments 6a. Progress in the arts 6b. Progress in philosophy and in the sciences 6c. The use and criticism of the intellectual tradition: the sifting of truth from error; the reaction against the authority of the past 6d. Plans for the advancement of learning and the improvement of method in the arts and sciences 6e. Freedom of expression and discussion as indispensable to the progressive discovery of the truth

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

1. The idea of progress in the philosophy of history

1a. Providence and necessity in the theory of progress: the dialectical development of Spirit or matter; conflict as a source of progress

5 Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound [436-525] 44c-45b 7 Plato: Protagoras, 44a-45a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK XIII, par 49-51 124a-d / City of God, BK X, CH 14 307c-308a; BK XV-XVIII 397b,d-507a,c esp BK XV, CH 1-4 397b,d-400a, BK XVI, CH 3 423d-425b, CH 12 431b-c, BK XVII, CH 1-2 449a-450c, BK XVIII, CH 1 472b,d, CH 54, 506d-507a,c; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338c-339b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 32-33 20a-d; PART III, par 340-360 110b-114a,c esp par 342 110c-d; ADDITIONS, 36 122b-c / Philosophy of History 153a-369a,c esp INTRO, 156d-190b, 203a-206a,c, PART IV, 368d-369a,c 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 320d; 321c; 322d-323a; 328b-c; 596c 50 Marx: Capital, 6c-7d; 10a-11d esp 11b-d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 419b,d-425b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c esp 646b-c; EPILOGUE II, 675b-d; 676d-677b; 679b-680b 54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 654a-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 801d-802a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 882b-883c

1b. Optimism or meliorism: the doctrine of human perfectibility

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338b-c; 347d-348a / Social Contract, BK III, 420a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 633c-634a,c 42 Kant: Judgement, 586a-587a 43 Federalist: NUMBER 6, 41a; NUMBER 55, 174c-d 43 Mill: Liberty, 287d / Representative Government, 335d-336a / Utilitarianism, 452a-b; 460a-461b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 343 110d-111a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 178a-179c 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [570-573] 16a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 294d-295a; 317c-319a esp 318d; 328d-330a,c esp 329d-330a,c; 596b-597a,c esp 596d-597a,c 54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 654a-c / War and Death, 759d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781a; 801c-802a,c

1c. Skeptical or pessimistic denials of progress: the golden age as past; the cyclical motion of history

OLD TESTAMENT: Ecclesiastes, 1:1-15; 2:12 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 2b 7 Plato: Timaeus, 443d-446b / Critias, 479a-485d / Statesman, 586c-589c / Laws, BK I, 640d-641a; BK IV, 681b-d 8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 8 [1074b1-14] 604d-605a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [999-1010] 74a-b; [1405-1435] 79b-d 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 14 258d; BK VII, SECT 1 279b; SECT 49 282d; BK IX, SECT 14 293a; SECT 28 293d-294a; BK X, SECT 27 299d 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK VIII [306-336] 267a-268a 14 Plutarch: Sulla, 372a-b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b-c; 57c-58d; BK XIV, 146b-147a; 151d / Histories, BK II, 232d-233a; BK III, 255b-c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XII, CH 13 350a-d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, XV [94-120] 20c-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 103c-104d; 276b-279c; 439c-440b; 443a-b 27 Shakespeare: Sonnets, LIX 595b 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 27b-28a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 15a-b 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART II, 79a-80a; PART III, 118a-121b esp 121a-b; 126a; PART IV, 168a-b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 268c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 329a-334a,c; 342c-345c; 347a-348a; 362a-366d / Social Contract, BK III, 419c-420a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 23b; 32b-33a 42 Kant: Judgement, 586a-587a 43 Federalist: NUMBER 6, 41a 43 Mill: Representative Government, 335d-336a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 179d-180c; 183d-184d 47 Goethe: Faust, PROLOGUE [281-292] 8a; PART I [4072-4095] 99b-100a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 316b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 645a-646c 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 776c-777d

2. The idea of progress in the theory of biological evolution

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 334b,d 47 Goethe: Faust, PART II [8260-8264] 201a; [8321-8326] 202b-203a 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 1c-3b passim; 41c-42a; 60b-62a; 63b-64d; 96b-103c esp 96b-98a, 102d-103c; 176b-178a; 180c-d; 243b-d / Descent of Man, 294d-295c; 340d-341d 53 James: Psychology, 90b-91a; 95b 54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-654c esp 653b, 654a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 768d-769a

3. Economic progress

3a. The increase of opulence: the division of labor as a factor in progress

5 Aristophanes: Plutus 629a-642d esp [489-533] 634c-635b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 350d; 352c-d 7 Plato: Republic, BK II, 316c-317a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH V, SECT 42-50 34a-35d 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART IV, 154b-155b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XXIII, 191a-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 352a-353a; 365b-366b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 3a-6d; 30b-c; 31b; 38a; 40b-c; 55b-c; 71a-d; 75c-76a,c; 105a; BK II, 142d-151c; BK III, 163a-c; BK IV, 190b-191a; 291a-295c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 21c-23b; 498d; 642a-c; 655d-658b esp 655d-656a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 451d-452a 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253c / Judgement, 586a-587a 43 Federalist: NUMBER 12, 56b-d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 452a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 198-199 67b-c / Philosophy of History, PART II, 263b-d; PART IV, 323c-d; 335a-336c; 368c 50 Marx: Capital, 16c-d; 31a-37c passim, esp 32a-c, 34c-35a; 157a-180d passim, esp 160c-164a, 178c-179a; 218c-219a; 308d-311b; 377c-378a 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 421b-c

3b. The improvement of the status and conditions of labor: the goals of revolution and reform

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK I, CH 4 [1253b31-39] 447b-c; BK II, CH 9 [1269a33-b7] 465c; CH 12 [1273b36-1274a22] 470c-d / Athenian Constitution, CH 2 553a-c; CH 5-6 554d-555c 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 36a-37c / Solon, 68d-70c / Agis 648b,d-656d / Tiberius Gracchus 671b,d-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK XIII, 132a-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 4, ANS and REP 1-4 318b-321a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, 11a-c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 6a-d; 27b-37b esp 33c; 51a-62a passim; BK III, 165b-175b; BK IV, 182a-b; 200a-201a; 251c-d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 16c-17b; 144a-c; 628c-629a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 452d-453a,c 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE IV, SECT 2 [529-535] 16b; AMENDMENTS, XIII 18c 43 Mill: Representative Government, 332c; 339d-340c; 393c-394d 44 Boswell: Johnson, 172b-d 50 Marx: Capital, 7b; 8c-9c esp 9c; 111c-146c esp 113c, 115c, 131a-146c; 209c-215a; 231b-248d esp 235a, 236c-238c, 241a-c, 248c-d; 295a-d; 367b-368b; 377c-378d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 415c-416d; 419b,d; 423b-425b; 426b-d; 429b-c; 432b-434d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 211a-213a; BK VI, 235a 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 165b-c 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 787d-788a esp 787d-788b [fn 3] / New Introductory Lectures, 883d-884c

3c. Man’s progressive conquest of the forces of nature through science and invention

5 Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c-45a 5 Sophocles: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b 5 Euripides: Suppliants [195-218] 260a-b 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1241-1296] 77b-78a passim; [1361-1378] 78d-79a 13 Virgil: Georgics, I [121-146] 40b-41a 14 Plutarch: Marcellus, 252a-255a 28 Gilbert: Loadstone, BK V, 100c-101d 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 191b-193b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 14b-15a; 56b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 1-5 107a-b; APH 81 120b-c; APH 124 133c-d; APH 129 134d-135d; BK II, APH 39 169d-170c; APH 49-51 188b-194c / New Atlantis, 210d-214d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART VI 60d-67a,c esp 61b-d, 66d-67a,c 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 106a-107a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XVIII, 126c-d; BK XXIII, 191a-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 339b-c; 348d-353c; 363b; 365b-366b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 5b-6d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 633d-634a,c 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 452a-b 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 170a-172a; 183b-184a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 195b-d; PART I, 243d-244c; PART II, 267a-b; PART IV, 347d-348a 47 Goethe: Faust, PART II [6835-6860] 167b-168a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 204a-b 50 Marx: Capital, 86a-c; 170a-c; 180d-188c esp 181c-184b, 187d-188a; 239c-d; 253a-255a esp 253d-254b; 299b-d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 420d-421a; 421d 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a-c; 778b-779a; 802a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 882d-883a

4. Progress in politics

4a. The invention and improvement of political institutions: the maintenance of political order in relation to progress

5 Sophocles: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 366d-367a 7 Plato: Republic, BK II, 316c-318a; BK IV, 344b-d / Laws, BK III, 663d-666d 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK I, CH 2 445b-446d esp [1252b27-1253a1] 446a-b; BK II, CH 8 [1268b23-1269a28] 464d-465b; BK VII, CH 10 [1329b40-1330a5] 533d-534b / Athenian Constitution 553a-584a,c passim, esp CH 41 571c-572a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1011-1027] 74b-c; [1105-1160] 75c-76b 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK I [254-296] 110a-111a; BK VI [845-853] 233b-234a 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus 32a-48d / Solon 64b,d-77a,c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XXVI 36b-37d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 153c-154a; 164a,c 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XIII, SECT 157-158 61c-62b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 5, 453a-b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 9c-d; BK IV, 16a-17a; BK X, 62b-c; BK XI, 75b-d; BK XIV, 107d; BK XIX, 140d-141a; BK XXI, 170a; BK XXIV, 201b-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323a-325b esp 324d; 354d-355b; 356a-b / Political Economy 367a-385a,c / Social Contract, BK I, 391b-392a; BK II, 400c-406a; BK III, 420a-c; 423a-424a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 617a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71d-80b; 202a-d; 218c-219a; 403b-404d 42 Kant: Science of Right, 438d-439a; 450d-452a; 456b-458a,c / Judgement, 586b-c 43 Federalist: NUMBER 9 47a-49c; NUMBER 14, 60c-d; 62a-d; NUMBER 37-38 117d-125a; NUMBER 47-51 153c-165a passim; NUMBER 52, 165d-167b; NUMBER 63, 193c-194a; NUMBER 65, 200b-c; NUMBER 78, 230a-b 43 Mill: Liberty, 272a; 289c-d; 300d-302c / Representative Government, 327a-336c; 350b-355b passim; 370a-380b passim, esp 376a-c; 387c-d / Utilitarianism, 460a-461a; 475c-d 44 Boswell: Johnson, 172b-d; 204c-205b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 298 99c; ADDITIONS, 176 147c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 203b-206a,c; PART I, 208b-d; 258b-d; PART II, 263b-d; PART IV, 318b; 335a-336c; 342a-343a; 346a-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VIII, 238c-243d 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-781a

4b. The progressive realization of the idea of the state

46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 256 79d-80a; par 259-260 82a-83a; par 270 84d-89c; par 340-360 110b-114a,c esp par 349 111d-112a; ADDITIONS, 19-20 119c-120b; 152 141c-d; 164 144c-145a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c-178a; 180c-183c; 203b-206a,c; PART I, 230a-231b; PART IV, 315a; 333b-c; 342d-343a

4c. The growth of political freedom: the achievement of citizenship and civil rights

6 Herodotus: History, BK V, 171c-175b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 396b-397d; BK VIII, 590a-c 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 12 470b-471d; BK III, CH 15 [1286b8-21] 484d-485a; BK IV, CH 13 [1297b16-28] 498a; BK V, CH 4 [1304a18-38] 505d-506a / Athenian Constitution, CH 1-41 553a-572a passim, esp CH 41 571c-572a 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK VI [756-853] 231a-234a; BK VIII [626-731] 275b-278b 14 Plutarch: Theseus, 9c-d / Romulus, 22c / Poplicola, 79d-80a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b-52a; BK XI, 106a-d 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 94 46b-c; CH VIII, SECT 100-111 47c-51a; CH XIV, SECT 162-166 63a-64a 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 75b-78a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 170c-173b; BK IV, 269d-271d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 14a-d; 15c; 521a-523a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 403b-404d 43 Federalist: NUMBER 9, 47a-c; NUMBER 14, 62b-d; NUMBER 26, 92a-94b passim; NUMBER 84, 252b-c 43 Mill: Liberty, 267b,d-268c / Representative Government, 328d-332d esp 331a; 352a-b; 367b-c; 381b-382c; 394a-396d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART II, 275b-276a; PART III, 288c; 295d-296c; PART IV, 342a-346c 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 423d-425b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 10a-b

5. Forces operating against social progress: emotional opposition to change or novelty; political conservatism

5 Aristophanes: Birds 542a-563d esp [904-1057] 554a-555d / Ecclesiazusae [730-876] 623c-625b 7 Plato: Republic, BK IV, 344b-d / Laws, BK II, 654c-655b; BK IV, 678c-679a; BK VII, 717d-718d 14 Plutarch: Agis 648b,d-656d 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK XIV, 151d-152b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 2 236d-237b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XIV [91-126] 74c-75a; PARADISE, XV-XVI 128b-132a 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH VI, 9b-c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 154b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 47a-51a; 131b-132a; 208b-c; 281a-282a; 318c-319b; 458b-c; 462c-465c; 504c-506a 27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT II, SC II [119-128] 367b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 15a-b; 61b; 90b-d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 39-43 109c-110a; APH 90 124d-125a / New Atlantis, 205d-207b 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART II, 45c-d; PART VI, 61a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 294 225b-226b; 325 230b-231a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XIII, SECT 157-158 61c-62b; CH XIX, SECT 223-224 76c-77a 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 105a-106b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK V, 22a-b; BK XIV, 104c; BK XIX, 137c-140c passim 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324a-b / Social Contract, BK II, 401c-403a; 404c-405a; BK III, 419c-420a; BK IV, 437d-438b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 27b-37b esp 27b-28d, 33c-34b; 40b-c; 55b-d; 80c; 96d-97b; 109d-110d; BK IV, 201b-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 459a-c 43 Declaration of Independence: [15-25] 1b 43 Federalist: NUMBER 14, 62a-d; NUMBER 37-38 117d-125a passim; NUMBER 70, 211d-212a 43 Mill: Liberty, 293b-302c passim / Representative Government, 327b,d-332d; 335d-336c; 344a-b; 346c-348c passim; 350b-355b passim; 357c; 376a-c; 377b-378a; 387c-d 44 Boswell: Johnson, 189d-190b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 274 92a; par 355 112d-113a; ADDITIONS, 166 145b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 187d-188b; PART I, 209b; 235d-236a; 257a-c; PART II, 280b-281b; PART III, 302a-d; PART IV, 351b-353a; 367a-b 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [1972-1979] 46b-47a; PART II [7963-7964] 194a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 228b-229b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a 50 Marx: Capital, 6d-7a; 174b-c; 234a-236c; 239b-240b 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 424b-c; 426b-428d passim; 429c-433d passim, esp 433c-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 239a-240a; 240b-d; BK VIII, 303a-305b; BK IX, 354b-c; BK X, 403a-c; EPILOGUE I, 645a-646c; 647b-c; 666c-669d 53 James: Psychology, 79b 54 Freud: War and Death, 759c-761c esp 759c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 776c-777c; 780d-781d esp 781c; 783c-791d esp 785c, 791b-d; 799a-802a,c esp 800c-801c / New Introductory Lectures, 834c; 853a-b

6. Intellectual or cultural progress: its sources and impediments

10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 10 207b-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART IV, 274c-d 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 81d-82b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 271b-c 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 166c-d; 203c-d 28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c; 285b-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning 1a-101d esp 1a-15a, 20b-25c, 29a-32c, 33d-34a, 35b-36c, 38d-39a, 51d-54b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 38-46 109c-110c; APH 85 121d-122d; APH 129 134d-135d / New Atlantis, 203d-207b 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART II, 45b-46a 32 Milton: Areopagitica, 384a-b 33 Pascal: Vacuum, 355a-358b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 6-13 293a-294d passim 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 336a-337a; 337d-348a; 348d-353c; 362a-363a,c / Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 21c-24a,c; 88d-90d; 158d-159c; 601b-d; 627d-630a passim, esp 627d-628b; 633c-634a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 161c-162b; 225a-b; 298a-300c esp 300a-b; 326b-328a,c; 347a,c; 451c-453a,c; 522b-528a,c esp 523a-b, 527d-528a,c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 222a-c / Judgement, 504a-b; 586a-587a 43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-302c; 311d-312a / Representative Government, 336c-341d passim; 346c-348c passim; 387c-d / Utilitarianism, 452a-b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 211b-c; 297b; 307c-d; 380d-381a; 512d-513a 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 33a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 247 78a-b / Philosophy of History 153a-369a,c esp INTRO, 182b-c, 185a-186a, PART I, 217c-219c, 235d-236a, 248a-c, 251a-b, 253b-c, PART II, 277d-278a, PART III, 300d-301a, PART IV, 318a, 346c-348a, 351b-353a, 361a-362b 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [570-573] 16a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 320a-330a,c esp 323a-324b, 327b-330a,c; 596c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V,196b; BK XI, 498b-d; EPILOGUE II, 695d-696d 54 Freud: Psycho-Analytic Therapy, 125d-126a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 776d-780b; 781a-d; 801c-802a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 849d

6a. Progress in the arts

5 Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c-45a 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 49d-50a 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 350b-351a 7 Plato: Critias, 479c-d / Statesman, 601b-603a / Laws, BK II, 654c-655b 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 [183b16-184b8] 253a-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [981b13-24] 500a; BK XII, CH 8 [1074b8-13] 605a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098a21-25] 343c-d / Politics, BK II, CH 8 [1268b35-38] 464d / Rhetoric, BK III, CH 1 [1403b15-1404a39] 653b,d-654c / Poetics, CH 4-5 682c-684a 10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 1-4 1a-2c; par 12 4b-c 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [330-337] 65b-c; [925-1160] 73b-76b; [1241-1457] 77b-80a,c 13 Virgil: Georgics, I [121-146] 40b-41a 14 Plutarch: Marcellus, 252a-255a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XXII, CH 24, 610a-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 46, A 2, REP 4 253a-255a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 85c; PART III, 153d; PART IV, 267c-269b passim 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 81d-82b 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 85 121d-122d; APH 129 134d-135d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART VI, 61a-c 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 103b-115b esp 106a-107a 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 224b-225a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 336a-337a; 338d-339a; 339d-342c; 346d-347a; 348d-353c; 365b-366b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK IV, 190d-191a; BK V, 308c-309a,c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 18b-24a,c; 158d-159a; 171c; 237d-238b; 633c-634a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 291d-292c; 327a-328a,c; 451d-452a; 509d-510a,c 42 Kant: Judgement, 586a-587a 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 8 [214-217] 13b 43 Federalist: NUMBER 43, 139d-140a 44 Boswell: Johnson, 70d-71b; 195d; 406c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 69, 30b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182b-c; 185a-186a; PART I, 229b-d; 247c-248d; 251a-b; 253b-c; PART II, 261b; 267b-268b; 276a-d; PART III, 312c-d; PART IV, 323c-d; 335a-336c; 346c-348a 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 13c / Descent of Man, 278a-279a; 320a-321a passim; 329a-330a; 349b-d 50 Marx: Capital, 86b-c 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 420d-421a; 421d 53 James: Psychology, 727b 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a-c; 778b-779b

6b. Progress in philosophy and in the sciences

7 Plato: Statesman, 601b-603a 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 [183b16-184b8] 253a-d 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [642a25-30] 165b-c / Generation of Animals, BK V, CH 1 [778b7-10] 320d / Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098a22-25] 343c-d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK II, CH 8, 193b-c; BK III, CH 10 207b-d 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [62-79] 1d-2a; [1114-1117] 14d; BK III [1-30] 30a-b; BK V [1-54] 61a-d; [1448-1457] 79d-80a,c; BK VI [1-41] 80a-d 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK II, CH 6, 181d-182a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XXII, CH 24, 610a-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 153d; 164a,c; PART IV, 258c; 267c-269b 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 81d-82b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 271b-c; 276b-279c 28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 285b-c / On Animal Generation, 336d-337a,c; 433c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 2b-c; 14c-15a; 18b; 29b-c; 30d-31a; 32a-c; 33b-d; 34b; 51d-53d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 30-31 109a; APH 70-115 116b-130d 31 Descartes: Rules, IV 5a-7d / Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART IV-VI 51b-67a,c 33 Pascal: Vacuum, 355a-358b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, 88d-89c 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 17 409d-410a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 5, 453a-b; DIV 8-9, 454b-455a; SECT VII, DIV 48, 471b-c; SECT X, DIV 94, 492d-493a 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 118a-119a 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 224b-225a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 337d-342c; 346d-347a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337b esp 337a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 148a-b; 158d-159d; 601b-c; 658b-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 298a-300a; 326b-327d; 452a-b; 509d-510a,c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 1d-2b [fn 2]; 5a-8b; 248d-250a,c / Practical Reason, 299d; 317b-318b; 335b-c; 336d-337a,c; 339b-c / Judgement, 513d-514b; 586a-587a 43 Constitution of the U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 8 [214-217] 13b 43 Federalist: NUMBER 9, 47c-d; NUMBER 43, 139d-140a 43 Mill: Liberty, 287c-288a / Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim; 452a-b 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 7c 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 173a; 175b 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 391b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 136 138c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 185a-186a; PART I, 217c-219c; 229b-d; 251a-b; 253b-c; PART III, 312c-d; PART IV, 323c-d; 335a-b; 343d-344a; 346c-348a; 361a-362b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 105b; 204a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 590a 50 Marx: Capital, 170b-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-d; BK XIII, 563a-b; EPILOGUE II, 694d-696d 53 James: Psychology, 37b; 125b-127b passim 54 Freud: Psycho-Analytic Therapy 123a-127a,c passim / Interpretation of Dreams, 137b-139a esp 138d-139a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 777a-c / New Introductory Lectures, 880d-881c

6c. The use and criticism of the intellectual tradition: the sifting of truth from error; the reaction against the authority of the past

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 353d-354b 7 Plato: Phaedo, 240d-242b / Sophist, 564d-569a 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 [183b16-184b8] 253a-d / Physics, BK I, CH 2-9 259b-268d / Heavens, BK I, CH 10 [279b4-12] 370d; BK III, CH 7 [306a6-18] 397b-c; BK IV, CH 1 [307b28-308a8] 399a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3-10 501c-511d; BK II, CH 1 [993a30-b19] 511b,d-512a; BK III 513b,d-522a,c; BK IV, CH 4-8 525a-532d; BK V 533a-547d; BK XI, CH 1-2 587a-589a; CH 5-6 590a-592b; BK XII, CH 8 [1074b1-14] 604d-605a; CH 10 [1075a25-1076a4] 606a-d; BK XIII-XIV 607a-626d / Soul, BK I, CH 2-5 633a-641d 9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK III, CH 3 [513a7-11] 36c-d / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [642a25-30] 165b-c / Ethics, BK I, CH 6 341b-342c esp [1096a11-16] 341b 10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 12 4b-c / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 1 26a-d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 14, 178d-179a; CH 16 180c-182b esp 181d-182b; BK II, CH 8, 192a-b; CH 9, 198d-199a,c; BK III, CH 10 207b-d 16 Ptolemy: Almagest, BK I, 6b 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 508a 16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 846a-850a / Harmonies of the World, 1009b-1010a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK VII, par 13-15 47c-48c / City of God, BK VIII-X 264b,d-322a,c passim; BK XIX, CH 1-5 507a-514b / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 40 655b-656a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 44, A 2, ANS 239b-240a; Q 65, A 4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 66, A 1 343d-345c; A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q 75, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 378b-379c; Q 76, A 1, ANS 385d-388c; A 3, ANS 391a-393a; A 4, REP 4 393a-394c; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a-418c; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 5, ANS 446c-447c; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b; Q 88, A 1, ANS 469a-471c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 3 228c-229b; Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d; PART II-II, Q 1, A 7, REP 2 385c-387a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, I [61-87] 1d-2a; IV 5c-7a; PURGATORY, XXI [76]-XXII [129] 85d-87d; XXVI [88-148] 93d-94c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49d; 56b-d; 58d-61a passim; 71a-b; PART II, 114d-115a; 150c-151a; PART IV, 247a-248a; 267a-274d; 276c; CONCLUSION, 282b-283a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 65b-66b; 208b-c; 259d-261c; 271b-c; 276b-278a; 524d-525a 28 Gilbert: Loadstone, PREF, 2b-d; BK I, 3a-7b; BK II, 34c-36c; BK III, 60c-61a; BK IV, 77d-78a; 84a-d; BK VI, 107c-110d; 113c-115a 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 157b-160a 28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-269a; 274a-b; 279d-280c; 285b-c / Circulation of the Blood, 306a-c; 319c-d / On Animal Generation, 331a-332a; 336d-337a,c; 364a-365a; 377a-c; 457b; 458a-b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 14b-15d esp 15a-d; 16c; 27d-28c; 29b-c; 32a; 47d-48d; 64a-b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 56 112a; APH 84 121b-d; APH 94-97 126a-d 31 Descartes: Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART I, 42b-44c, PART II, 46c-48a, PART III, 49d-50b, PART VI 60d-67a,c / Objections and Replies, 278a-293a,c passim 32 Milton: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 384b-389a, 398a-b 33 Pascal: Vacuum, 355a-358b 34 Newton: Optics, BK III, 526b-529a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, 85a-c; BK I, CH II, SECT 23-24 119b-120c; BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 4, 373a-b 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, PREF 404a-b; INTRO, SECT 24 411d-412a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 346d-347a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 23d-24a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 198c-d; 298a-300a; 522d-528a,c esp 523b-c, 526c-527a, 527d-528a,c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 220b-221b / Judgement, 513d-514b 43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-293b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 129a 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 3b-d 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 332a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART II, 265c-266a; PART IV, 346c-348a; 361a-362b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 243a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 590a 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 428b-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II 675a-696d 53 James: Psychology, 125b-126a; 221a-239a; 305a-312a; 627a-635a; 879b-882a 54 Freud: General Introduction, 550d-551a / New Introductory Lectures, 879c-880b

6d. Plans for the advancement of learning and the improvement of method in the arts and sciences

9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 161a-165d esp [642a1-b4] 165b-d 10 Hippocrates: Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 1a-3b / The Law 144a-d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 10, 207d 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 331c-337a,c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning 1a-101d / Novum Organum 105a-195d / New Atlantis 199a-214d 31 Descartes: Rules 1a-40a,c passim, esp I-III, 1a-4a, IV 5a-7d / Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART I, 41d-42a, PART II, 45b-47b, 48a-b, PART III, 50b-51a, PART IV, 52a, PART V, 54b-c, PART VI, 61a-d, 62c-63c, 66d-67a,c / Geometry 295a-353b esp BK I, 298b, BK II, 322a, BK III, 353a 33 Pascal: Geometrical Demonstration, 430a-434a; 442a-443b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 22 319c-320a; CH IV, SECT 17 328d; CH XII 358c-363b esp SECT 14-15 362d-363b 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c; SECT 133-134 439c-440a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 49 471c-d 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART III, 106a-115b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 331b,d-356d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 5a-13d; 15c-16c; 19a-22a,c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253c-d 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 6d-7a,c 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 175b

6e. Freedom of expression and discussion as indispensable to the progressive discovery of the truth

7 Plato: Statesman, 601c-602c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK I, SECT 14 254b-c 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 283c-d 32 Milton: Areopagitica 381a-412b esp 384b-390a, 398a-b 35 Locke: Toleration, 15c / Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 20 319b-c 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 102 497b-d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 668d-671b esp 669b, 670b-c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 523a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 220b-221b; 223a-c 43 Mill: Liberty, 274b-293b; 297b-299a

CROSS-REFERENCES

For the general discussion of the philosophy of history, see DIALECTIC 2d; HISTORY 4a(2)-4a(3), 4b; and for the consideration of fate, fortune, and freedom in relation to progress, see CHANCE 2b; FATE 3; HISTORY 4a(1); LIBERTY 4a; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 3.
For the religious aspects of optimism and pessimism, see GOD 7h, 8e, 9f; HISTORY 5a; PROPHECY 4c-4d.
For the notion of progress in the theory of biological evolution, see EVOLUTION 4d.
For other discussions of the myth of a golden age, see LABOR 1a; MAN 9a; TIME 8b.
For discussions relevant to the theme of economic progress, see LABOR 4a, 5a-5d, 7c(2), 7f; LIBERTY 6b; REVOLUTION 4a, 5c; SLAVERY 3c, 5b; WEALTH 9b, 12.
For discussions relevant to the theme of political progress, see CONSTITUTION 10; DEMOCRACY 4d, 7; GOVERNMENT 6; LIBERTY 6a-6c; MONARCHY 4e(2); SLAVERY 5b; STATE 2a(3); TYRANNY 8; and for the distinction between utopian and practical ideals as goals of political progress, see CITIZEN 8; STATE 6, 10f; WAR AND PEACE 11d.
For attitudes toward change which have a bearing on progress, see CHANGE 12b; CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 8; TIME 7.
For evidences of progress in the arts and sciences, and for the comparative progress of different fields of learning, see ART 12; KNOWLEDGE 10; PHILOSOPHY 7.
For the conditions on which intellectual progress depends, see KNOWLEDGE 9b; LANGUAGE 6; OPINION 5b; SCIENCE 6a-6b; SIGN AND SYMBOL 4c; TRUTH 6, 8d.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.

Swift, The Battle of the Books
Hume, Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences
Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences
Kant, The Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-Political Plan
Kant, The Principle of Progress
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, VI, B (II)
J. S. Mill, “Civilization,” in VOL I, Dissertations and Discussions

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

Vico, The New Science
Voltaire, Candide
Voltaire, “Optimism,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, PART III
Lessing, Nathan the Wise
Lessing, The Education of the Human Race
Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man
Condorcet, Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind
Malthus, An Essay on Population, BK III
Proudhon, The Philosophy of Misery
Renan, The Future of Science
Tennyson, Locksley Hall
Tennyson, In Memoriam
Schopenhauer, Studies in Pessimism
Comte, The Positive Philosophy, BK VI
Comte, System of Positive Polity, VOL II, Social Dynamics
Lotze, Microcosmos, BK VIII
J. H. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine
J. H. Newman, Callista
Spencer, Progress: Its Law and Cause
Bagehot, Physics and Politics
S. Butler, Erewhon
George, Progress and Poverty
T. H. Huxley, Methods and Results, I-II
Maine, Ancient Law
Maine, Popular Government, III
Bellamy, Looking Backward
Frazer, The Golden Bough, PART I, CH 3, 5; PART II, CH 7; PART VII
Sumner, The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over
Jensen, The Long Journey
Sorel, Les illusions du progrès
B. Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom, CH 4-8
Spengler, The Decline of the West
Bury, The Idea of Progress
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, CH 13
Wells, The World of William Clissold
Dawson, Progress and Religion
MacIver, Society; Its Structure and Changes
Shaw, Back to Methuselah
Shaw, Doctors’ Delusions
A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History
Maritain, Theonas, Conversations of a Sage, VII-VIII, X
Maritain, True Humanism
Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, CH 9
Simon, Community of the Free, CH 3