Chapter 68: PLEASURE AND PAIN

INTRODUCTION

Pleasure and pain, writes Locke, “like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is… only by experience.” That pleasure and pain are elementary experiences, attributed to animals as well as enjoyed or suffered by men, is attested by poets and physiologists alike, by economists and theologians, by historians and moralists. Yet in the tradition of western thought, few of the great writers are content to leave the nature or meaning of pleasure and pain to the intuitions of experience alone.

Conflicting definitions are proposed. Psychologists disagree about the conditions under which the feelings of pleasure and pain occur, their causes and consequences, their relation to sensation, to desire and emotion, to thought, volition, and action. Moralists dispute whether pleasure is the only good and pain the only evil, whether pleasure is only one good among others to be assessed according to its worth in the scale of goods, whether pleasure and pain are morally indifferent, whether some pleasures are good, others bad, or all are intrinsically evil.

Not only in the theory of good and evil, but also in the theories of beauty and truth, pleasure and pain are fundamental terms. They are affected by all the difficulties which belong to these great themes; and also with the difficulties attendant on the ideas of virtue, sin, and punishment, of duty and happiness, into the consideration of which pleasure and pain traditionally enter.

The traditional use of the words “pleasure” and “pain” is complicated by more than the variety of definitions which have been given. Other words are frequently substituted for them, sometimes as synonyms and sometimes to express only one part or aspect of their meaning. Locke, for example, uses “pleasure” or “delight,” “pain” or “uneasiness,” and he observes that “whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, etc., on the one side, or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, etc., on the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing.” Other writers use “joy” and “sorrow” or “grief” as synonyms for “pleasure” and “pain.”

The words “pleasure” and “pain” are closely associated in meaning with “pleasant” and “unpleasant,” though Freud sometimes uses “unpleasure” (Unlust) to signify an opposite of pleasure which is not the same as ordinary pain (Schmerz). The pleasant is often called “agreeable,” “enjoyable,” or “satisfying.” In the language of Shakespeare, the words “like” and “dislike” have currency as the equivalents of “please” and “displease.” A person who is displeased by something says of it that “it likes me not.”

THE PROBLEM OF what pleasure and pain are seems logically to precede the ethical consideration of their relation to good and evil, happiness and misery, virtue and duty. But in the tradition of the great books, the psychological questions about pleasure and pain are usually raised in moral or political treatises, and sometimes in connection with discussions of rhetoric. What pleasure is, how it is caused, and the effects it produces are seldom considered apart from whether pleasures should be sought or avoided, whether some pleasures should be preferred to others, and whether pleasure is the sole criterion of the good. Sometimes, as with Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, the ethical point—that pleasure and pain are in one sense morally indifferent—is made without any psychological account of the nature and origin of these experiences. More frequently, as in Plato’s Philebus and Aristotle’s Ethics, or in the writings of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Mill, the psychological discussion is imbedded in an ethical or political context.

Even Lucretius and William James do not seem to be complete exceptions. James’ theory that the feeling of pleasure accompanies activity which is unimpeded, whereas pain attends arrested activity, seems to be a purely psychological observation, and one which can be readily divorced from moral considerations on the ground that it makes no difference to the occurrence of pleasure and pain whether the activity in question is ethically good or bad. Yet James makes this observation the basis for arguing against those whom he calls “the pleasure-philosophers”—those who make pleasure the only motive or goal of conduct. They confuse, he thinks, the pursuit of pleasure itself with the pleasure which accompanies the successful achievement of other things which may be the goals of activity.

A pleasant act, and an act pursuing a pleasure are in themselves two perfectly distinct conceptions, though they coalesce in one concrete phenomenon whenever a pleasure is deliberately pursued… Because a pleasure of achievement can become a pursued pleasure upon occasion, it does not follow that everywhere and always that pleasure must be pursued.

One might as well suppose that “because no steamer can go to sea without incidentally consuming coal, and because some steamers may occasionally go to sea to try their coal, that therefore no steamer can go to sea for any other motive than that of coal-consumption.”

Psychological observations of this sort have an obvious relevance to Aristotle’s theory of good and bad pleasures, as well as to Locke’s and Mill’s position that pleasure is the only good or the only object of desire. They reveal an ethical strain even in the psychologist’s view of pleasure and pain. The same point can be made with regard to James’ observation that “pleasures are generally associated with beneficial, pains with detrimental, experiences.”

Lucretius appears to give a purely physiological account of pleasure and pain in terms of the effect upon the sense-organs of various atomic configurations. “Those things which can touch the senses pleasantly are made of smooth and round bodies, but those which seem to be bitter and harsh are made up of particles more hooked, and for this reason are wont to tear a way into our senses… Hot fires and cold frost have particles fanged in different ways to prick the senses.” But Lucretius is concerned to point out not only the basis of pain in the atomic nature of things, but also the natural tendency of all sensible things to avoid pain as the one besetting evil. “Nature cries aloud for nothing else but that pain may be kept far sundered from the body, and that, withdrawn from care and fear, she may enjoy in mind the sense of pleasure.”

Without giving any psychological explanation of the pleasures of the mind, Lucretius sets them above the pleasures of the body because the latter—as his diatribe against love makes clear—seem to be inevitably followed by bodily torments or even to be admixed with them. The first maxim of nature, then, is not to seek pleasure, but to avoid pain; and among pleasures to seek only the unmixed or pure, the pleasures of knowledge and truth. The distinction between different qualities of pleasure (pleasures of the body and of the mind, mixed and pure pleasures), which is made by Plato and Mill as well as by Lucretius, inevitably tends to have at once both moral and psychological significance.

If, in the great books, there is any purely psychological theory of pleasure and pain, divorced from moral considerations, it is probably to be found in Freud. The pleasure-principle, according to him, automatically regulates the operation of the mental apparatus. “Our entire psychical activity,” he writes, “is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain.” Though pleasure and pain are for him primary elements of mental life, Freud admits the difficulty they present for psychological analysis.

We should like to know what are the conditions giving rise to pleasure and pain, but that is just where we fall short. We may only venture to say that pleasure is in some way connected with lessening, lowering, or extinguishing the amount of stimulation in the mental apparatus; and that pain involves a heightening of the latter. Consideration of the most intense pleasure of which man is capable, the pleasure in the performance of the sexual act, leaves little doubt upon this point.

Yet for Freud the pleasure-principle is not the only regulator of mental life. In addition to the sexual instincts, which aim at gratification and pleasure, there are the ego-instincts which, “under the influence of necessity, their mistress, soon learn to replace the pleasure-principle by a modification of it. The task of avoiding pain becomes for them almost equal in importance to that of gaining pleasure; the ego learns that it must inevitably go without immediate satisfaction, postpone gratification, learn to endure a degree of pain, and altogether renounce certain sources of pleasure. Thus trained, the ego becomes ‘reasonable,’ is no longer controlled by the pleasure-principle, but follows the reality-principle, which at bottom also seeks pleasure—although a delayed and diminished pleasure, one which is assured by its realization of fact, its relation to reality.”

This recognition of a conflict between pleasure and reality, with a consequent attenuation or redirection of the pleasure-principle, is not amplified by Freud into a moral doctrine. It does, however, bear a striking resemblance to the theories of moralists like Kant who oppose duty to pleasure; and also to the teachings of those who, like Aristotle and Aquinas, conceive virtue as the foregoing of certain pleasures and the endurance of certain pains, through a reasonable and habitual moderation of these passions.

IF PLEASURE AND pain were simply sensations, like sensations of color or sound, they would pose a problem for the physiological psychologist no different from the problems which arise in the fields of vision and audition. Modern physiological research claims to have discovered differentiated nerve-endings for pain which, together with the specific sense-organs for pressure, heat, and cold, make up the cutaneous senses. But whether there are special cells for the reception of pain stimuli or whether cutaneous pain results from the too intense stimulation of the pressure and thermal nerve-endings, there seems to be no evidence of organs sensitized to pleasure as, for example, the nerve cells of the retina are sensitized to light. The feeling of pleasure, it would seem to follow, is not a sensation. This seems to be confirmed by the traditional observation that every type of sensation, including the sensation of pain, can be pleasant.

Even if pain, unlike pleasure, is found to be a specific mode of sensation with a special sense-organ of its own, all other types of sensation—visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.—might still have painfulness or a feeling of unpleasantness as an attribute. That such is the case seems to be a matter of traditional observation. Locke, for example, says that “delight or uneasiness, one or the other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas of sensation and reflection: there is scarce any affection of our senses from without… which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain.” So understood, pleasure and pain—or the pleasant and the unpleasant—are not opposite sensations, as are hot and cold, but contrary attributes with which every sort of sensation can be affected. All need not be. Some sensations may be neutral with respect to what psychologists call “affective tone” or “affective quality.”

The kind of pleasure and pain which is called “bodily” or “sensuous” would thus be sensuous because it is an attribute of sensations, and bodily because sensations involve bodily organs. But in almost every great discussion of pleasure and pain, other types are recognized: intellectual delights, the pleasures and pains of learning, aesthetic pleasure in contemplating beauty with the mind as well as with the senses, and the pain of loss, the grief accompanying deprivation, which is so different from the torment of a painful affliction of the senses. The human suffering with which the great poems deal is much more often a torment of the spirit than of the flesh.

To cover these other types of pleasure and pain, we must go beyond sensation to two other terms traditionally connected with the psychological analysis of pleasure and pain. One is emotion, the other desire, the latter to be understood broadly as including both the sensitive and the rational appetites—both the passions and the will. Aquinas, for example, treats joy and sorrow as specific emotions which represent the appetite in a state of satisfaction or frustration. So, too, the will as an appetite can come to rest in the attainment of its object and, with fruition, be in a state of joy.

As conditions of the appetite, pleasure and pain (or joy and sorrow) can be either passions and, like all other emotions, bodily states; or they can be acts of the will and, according to Aquinas at least, spiritual states. But either way pleasure and pain seem to represent the satisfaction or frustration of desire rather than objects desired or averted. To be pleased by the attainment of an object desired, such as food and drink or knowledge, is not the same as to desire pleasure itself, as, for example, the pleasant sensations which may be involved in eating or drinking.

Aquinas talks about the desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain, as well as the pleasure and pain of satisfied and unsatisfied desires. Since the same words are almost always used to express both meanings, the two senses of pleasure and displeasure may go unnoticed unless by context or by explicit mention the author refers to pleasure as an object of desire or identifies it with the satisfaction of any desire, whether for pleasure or for some other object. As a passage already quoted from James indicates, and as we shall presently see more fully, the distinction between these two senses of pleasure has a critical bearing on the dispute between those who think that pleasure is the only good, and those who think that pleasure is one good among others.

The generally recognized difference between two kinds of pain—the pain of sense and the pain of loss or deprivation—parallels the distinction which most writers acknowledge between sensuous pleasure and the pleasure of possession or satisfaction. Plato’s example of the pleasure involved in the relief of itching by scratching seems to catch both meanings, and, in addition, to show that bodily pleasures may be either sensual objects or sensual satisfactions. In contrast, the pleasures of the mind are satisfactions of intellectual desire, as in the contemplation of beauty or the knowledge of truth.

Aristotle deals with pleasure and pain as objects when he defines temperance as a moderate pursuit of bodily pleasures, and courage as controlling the fear of pain and its avoidance. But he also conceives pleasure as that which completes any activity, whether of the senses and the body or of thought and the mind. “Without activity,” he writes, “pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure.” This meaning of pleasure seems to be analogous to, if not identical with, pleasure as satisfaction, at least insofar as the satisfaction of a desire is that which completes the activity springing therefrom. There can be as many different kinds of pleasure as there are kinds of activity; the quality of the pleasure is determined by the character of the activity it accompanies.

Though Mill refers to pleasure and freedom from pain as “the only things desirable as ends,” he admits many other objects of desire, in the attainment of which men find pleasure or satisfaction. It is wrong to suppose that human beings, he writes, are “capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.” Precisely because “human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites,” they have sources of pleasure or gratification not open to swine. Here as before two meanings of pleasure seem to be involved. In pointing out that “money, in many cases, is desired in and for itself,” Mill is naming an object of desire which, like health, knowledge, power, or fame, is not pleasure, yet which, through being desired, is a source of pleasure (i.e., satisfaction) when achieved. Like other objects of desire, sensual or bodily pleasures may also be sources of satisfaction.

THESE TWO MEANINGS of pleasure are most in need of clear distinction when the relation of pleasure to happiness is being discussed. If happiness, as Aristotle and Mill seem to say, consists in having all desires satisfied, then the content of the happy life can be described either in terms of the goods which the happy man possesses—the objects of desires fulfilled—or in terms of the pleasures which accompany the goods possessed, that is, the pleasures which are satisfactions of desire. If pleasure in the other meaning, especially sensual or bodily pleasure, is only one object of normal desire, then lack or deficiency of pleasure may, like loss of health or fortune, impair a man’s happiness. But the pursuit of pleasure in this sense cannot be identified with the pursuit of happiness. A life including every sort of bodily pleasure and free from every sort of bodily pain, if it lacked other things men normally desire, would be marred by many dissatisfactions inconsistent with happiness.

Talking to Don Quixote of the island he would like to govern, Sancho Panza says: “The first thing I would do in my government, I would have nobody to control me, I would be absolute… Now he that’s absolute, can do what he likes; he that can do what he likes, can take his pleasure; he that can take his pleasure, can be content, and he that can be content, has no more to desire.” Here, it would seem, Sancho conceives happiness as the sum of pleasures in the sense of satisfactions—all desires come to rest through the possession of their objects.

Dr. Johnson seems to make the opposite point about pleasure and happiness. Boswell asks him whether abstention from wine would be “a great deduction from life.” “It is a diminution of pleasure to be sure,” Johnson replies, “but I do not say a diminution of happiness.” But, Boswell asks, “if we could have pleasure always, should we not be happy?” Johnson explains his negative answer by saying that “when we talk of pleasure, we mean sensual pleasure. When a man says, he had pleasure with a woman, he does not mean conversation, but something of a different nature. Philosophers tell you that pleasure is contrary to happiness.”

This last observation does not seem to describe the position taken by those philosophers who make happiness the greatest good or ultimate end of human striving. Both Aristotle and Mill distinguish the life of pleasure, the bestial or swinish life, from one which employs the higher faculties peculiar to man. In this sense, perhaps, the life of pleasure can be regarded as contrary or opposed to what Johnson, along with Aristotle and Mill, calls “the rational life.” But pleasure itself, far from being inimical to happiness, either represents the state of satisfaction which is identical with happiness, or is one of the things a man desires and hence a constituent of the happy life.

Hobbes and Locke seem to go further in the direction of identifying pleasure with happiness or the good. “Pleasure,” writes Hobbes, “is the appearance or sense of Good… and Displeasure, the appearance or sense of Evil.” Similarly, Locke says that “things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure or to diminish pain in us… And, on the contrary, we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us.” As for happiness, it is, according to Locke, “the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which anyone cannot be content.”

In which sense of the term is Locke identifying pleasure with happiness? Not sensual pleasure, nor even pleasure as an object of desire, it would seem, for he says: “Let one man place his satisfaction in sensual pleasure, another in the delight of knowledge; though each of them cannot but confess there is great pleasure in what the other pursues, yet neither of them making the other’s delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys.” Yet his understanding of happiness as consisting in the pleasures or satisfactions accompanying the possession of things desired leads him to criticize “the philosophers of old” who “did in vain inquire whether the summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation; they might have as reasonably disputed whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plums, or nuts, and have divided themselves into sects upon it. For as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves, but on their agreeableness to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great variety; so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure… These, to different men, are very different things.”

The difference between Locke’s position and that of Mill seems, therefore, not to lie in a different conception of the relation of pleasure—as object or as satisfaction of desire—to happiness, but rather in Locke’s conception of degrees of happiness as being determined only by larger and smaller quantities of pleasure, whereas Mill insists upon diverse qualities of pleasure, and upon the possibility of ordering pleasures as higher and lower. In consequence, Mill can say what Locke would seem unable to approve, namely, that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”

Locke’s denial that happiness is the same for all men explicitly takes issue with Aristotle’s contrary view. It also involves an issue about pleasure. For Locke, as apparently for Hobbes and Mill, the good and the pleasant are inseparable. Nothing which satisfies a desire can be evil. Whether, as in Locke’s view, one satisfaction is as good as another, and the only thing which matters is the amount or number of satisfactions; or whether, as in Mill’s view one pleasure may be better than another, in no case is a pleasure bad so long as some one desires it, or desires the thing which produces satisfaction when possessed.

But, for Aristotle, desires themselves can be good or bad, and consequently there can be good and bad pleasures, as well as pleasures which vary in quality and in degree of goodness. “Since activities differ in respect of goodness and badness, and some are worthy to be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral, so, too,” Aristotle writes, “are the pleasures; for to each activity there is a proper pleasure. The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good, and that proper to an unworthy activity bad; just as the appetites for noble objects are laudable, those for base objects culpable.”

Pleasure and pain, in Aristotle’s judgment, are measured by virtue, not what is good and evil by pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are elements common to the good life and the bad, but only the pleasures which the good man enjoys, and the pains he willingly suffers, can be called good. That is why “in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain… for to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue or character.” Virtue is possessed only by those who habitually take pleasure in the right things.

AS INDICATED IN THE chapters on HAPPINESS and DUTY, the moralists who make duty rather than virtue the spring of right conduct, and who make the goodness of anything depend upon its rightness according to the moral law, see little difference among the various theories of pleasure and happiness as the ultimate good and the standard of conduct.

The most eloquent tribute which Kant can pay to the idea of duty is that it “embraces nothing charming or insinuating.” Reason, he says, “will never let itself be brought around” to the view that “there is any intrinsic worth in the real existence of a man who merely lives for enjoyment… even when in so doing he serves others.” Admitting that “the greatest aggregate of the pleasures of life, taking duration as well as number into account,” would appear to merit “the name of a true, nay, even of the highest good,” Kant adds that “reason sets its face against this, too.” The line of duty is always set against the seductions of pleasure or any calculations of utility, whether in terms of the means to achieving happiness or the ways of augmenting life’s satisfactions.

According to Stoics like Marcus Aurelius, “pleasure is neither good nor useful,” nor is pain an evil, for when we are “pained by any external thing,” we should remember that “it is not this thing which disturbs us, but our own judgment about it.” Pleasure and pain are morally indifferent, for like death and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure are things which “happen equally to good men and bad” and therefore “make us neither better nor worse… and are neither good nor evil.”

From the same observation, that pleasure is enjoyed by good and bad men, Aristotle and Plato seem to draw the conclusion, not that it is morally indifferent, but, as we have seen, that there are good and bad pleasures. Plato uses pleasure and wisdom to typify fundamentally different kinds of good. Wisdom is always true and good, but like opinion, which can be either true or false, there are true and false pleasures, good and evil pleasures. Furthermore, wisdom or knowledge represents the kind of good which is definite or intrinsically measured, whereas pleasure, like wealth, is an indefinite good, requiring something external to itself, something like wisdom, to measure it and limit its quantity.

If wisdom be allowed to choose among pleasures, Socrates suggests in the Philebus, it will choose those associated with itself in the activities of the mind, not the bodily pleasures which are always mixed with pain. So far as pleasure belongs to the realm of change or becoming, it is, again like opinion, inferior to knowledge and wisdom, which draw their goodness from the realm of immutable being. Yet Plato does not seem to think that knowledge and wisdom are the only goods. The argument against those who think so seems to be as conclusive as against those who think that pleasure is the only good.

Each of the simple lives—the life of pleasure or the life of wisdom—is deficient. Only the mixed life, the life which combines both pleasure and wisdom, is the complete life. Like the happy life in Aristotle’s view, it includes every kind of good; and the difficult problem, for Plato as for Aristotle, seems to be finding the principle which determines the goodness of the mixture or the right order and proportion in which the variety of goods should be combined.

THE MORAL ISSUES which have been raised here with respect to pleasure and pain are more broadly considered in the chapters on GOOD AND EVIL and on VIRTUE, TEMPERANCE, and SIN, as well as in the chapters on HAPPINESS and DUTY. Other issues are reserved entirely for discussion elsewhere, such as the role of pleasure in the perception of beauty and in judgments of taste (the chapter on BEAUTY), or the role of pain in relation to the government of men (the chapter on PUNISHMENT).

Two special problems which involve pleasure and pain remain to be briefly mentioned. The first concerns the contrast between asceticism and self-indulgence or even profligacy.

In the tradition of western thought and culture, and in the ancient as well as in the modern world, those who worship pleasure, though perhaps only as a minor deity to be celebrated in bacchic revels, stand opposed to those who turn away from pleasure, as from the world, the flesh, and the devil, even mortifying the flesh and sanctifying themselves with pain. In their less extreme forms these contrasting attitudes generate the traditional issue concerning the place of worldly recreations in man’s life and in the state. Is the pleasure of play a necessary and proper relief from the pain of work, or is it always an indulgence which provides occasions for sin? Are the enjoyment of the theatre, of music and poetry, the gaiety of public festivals, and the diversions of games or sports things to be promoted or prohibited by the state?

Man’s avidity for amusements and diversions of all sorts leads Pascal to say, “How hollow and full of ribaldry is the heart of man!” The fact that “men spend their time in following a ball or a hare” and that “it is the pleasure even of kings,” indicates to him how deep is the misery from which men try to escape through play and pleasure. “If man were happy,” Pascal suggests, “he would be the more so, the less he was diverted.” But “so wretched is man that he would weary, even without any cause of weariness, from the peculiar state of his disposition; and so frivolous is he, that, though full of a thousand reasons for weariness, the least thing, such as playing billiards or hitting a ball, is sufficient to amuse him.” Men need such diversions in order to “prevent them from thinking of themselves.”

Men indulge in pastimes for another reason, according to Aristotle. They “need relaxation because they cannot work continuously” and “amusement is a sort of relaxation.” But “happiness does not lie in amusement. It would, indeed, be strange,” he says, “if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and suffer hardship all one’s life in order to amuse one’s self.” It is true that “pleasant amusements” resemble happiness in having the nature of an end, because we engage in playful activity “not for the sake of other things,” whereas we do serious work for some end beyond itself. But in Aristotle’s opinion “a virtuous life requires exertion” and since “the happy life is thought to be virtuous,” it follows that “serious things are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement.”

These reflections on work and play, and the pains and pleasures they involve, lead us to the second of the two problems mentioned above. That concerns pleasure and pain in the life of learning. Here there seems to be no fundamental issue, for the tradition speaks with an almost unanimous voice of the pleasure all men find in knowing and the pain none can avoid in the process of seeking the truth. The problem is rather a practical and personal one which the great books put to their readers, to solve in their individual lives. Their invitation to learning should not be accepted, nor their promise of pleasure relied upon, by those unwilling to take the pains which, however great initially, gradually diminish as the mind, in the very process of learning, learns how to learn.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature of pleasure and pain
2. The causes of pleasure and pain
3. The effects or concomitants of pleasure and pain
4. The kinds of pleasure and pain: different qualities of pleasure
   1. The pleasant and unpleasant in the sphere of emotion: joy and sorrow, delight and grief
   2. Sensuous pleasure: the affective quality of sensations
   3. Intellectual pleasure: the pleasures of reflection and contemplation
      1. Pleasure in the beauty of nature or art: disinterested pleasure
      2. The pleasure and pain of learning and knowledge
   4. The pleasures of play and diversion
   5. The kinds of pain: the pain of sense and the pain of loss or deprivation
5. The quantity of pleasure: the weighing of pleasures; the limits of pleasure
6. Pleasure and the good
   1. Pleasure as the only good or as the measure of goodness in all other things
   2. Pleasure as one good among many: pleasure as one object of desire
   3. Good and bad pleasures: higher and lower pleasures
   4. Pleasure as the accompaniment of goods possessed: the satisfaction of desire
   5. Pleasure as intrinsically evil or morally indifferent
7. Pleasure and happiness: their distinction and relation
   1. Pleasure and pain in relation to love and friendship
   2. The life of pleasure contrasted with other modes of life: the ascetic life
8. The discipline of pleasure
   1. Pleasure and pain in relation to virtue: the restraints of temperance and the endurance of courage
   2. The conflict between pleasure and duty, or the obligations of justice: the pleasure principle and the reality principle
   3. Perversions or degradations in the sphere of pleasure and pain: sadism and masochism
9. The regulation of pleasures by law
10. The social utility of pleasure and pain
    1. The employment of pleasure and pain by parent or teacher in moral and mental training
    2. The use of pleasure and pain by orator or statesman in persuasion and government

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

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Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The nature of pleasure and pain

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 221c / Republic, BK IX, 421a-424a / Timaeus, 463d-464b / Philebus, 609a-639a,c esp 619d-633a / Laws, BK IX, 748a 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 36 [48b28-32] 67b / Topics, BK IV, CH 1 [121b27-39] 169b; BK VI, CH 6 [145a32-b16] 199a-b; CH 8 [146b13-19] 200c / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [589a4-9] 115b / Ethics, BK I, CH 8 [1099a7-30] 344c-d; BK VII, CH 5 [1148b15-18] 399a; CH 11-14, 403c-406a,c; BK X, CH 1-5, 426a-430d esp CH 4, 428b-429c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 6 [1362b5-9] 603b; CH 11 [1369b33-1370a3] 613a-b; [1370a27-28] 613c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 33, 282a; SECT 64, 284a-b; BK VIII, SECT 28, 287c; SECT 40-42, 288c-289a; SECT 47, 289b-c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 18-19, 167a-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VIII, par 7-8, 54c-55a; BK X, par 21, 76c-d / City of God, BK XIV, CH 15, 389c-390a; BK XIX, CH 1, 507a-509a passim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 48, AA 5-6, 263a-264d; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, 619d-620d; Q 31, 752b-759a; Q 35, 772b-780c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62b-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 531a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 11-12, 399d-400c; THE AFFECTS, DEF 2-3, 416d-417a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 1-6, 131c-132d esp SECT 2, 131c-d; CH VIII, SECT 13, 135b; SECT 16, 135c-d; SECT 18, 136a-b; CH XX, SECT 1-2, 176b-c; CH XXI, SECT 55-56, 192c-193b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 293c-d [fn 3] / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-386b esp 385c-d / Judgement, 470c-471b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 463c-d 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 39b-40a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 829b-830a; 860a-b 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 403d-404a / Instincts, 413d / General Introduction, 592d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639b-640a; 648d-649c; 663a-c / Ego and Id, 701a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 772d-773a

2. The causes of pleasure and pain

7 PLATO: Republic, BK IX, 422c-425b / Timaeus, 463d-464b / Philebus, 619d-633a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, CH 6 [145a36-b16] 199a-b / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b20-247a19] 330a-b / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 5 [1015a27-31] 535d; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b3-29] 602c-603a / Soul, BK III, CH 2 [426a27-b8] 658c-d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442a12-17] 679d; CH 5 [443b17-445a3] 681c-682d 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [589a4-9] 115b / Ethics, BK I, CH 8 [1099a7-30] 344c-d; BK III, CH 11, 365a-d passim; BK VII, CH 4, 398a-399a passim, esp [1147a23-30] 398a-b; CH 5 [1148b15-18] 399a; CH 12 [1152b34-1153a18] 404a-b; BK IX, CH 7 [1168a9-18] 421c; BK X, CH 4 [1174b15-1175a2] 429a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1369b15]-CH 11 [1372a3] 612d-615c; BK II, CH 1 [1378a20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a passim / Poetics, CH 24 [1460a12-19] 696b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [398-477] 20a-21a; BK III [231-257] 33a-b; BK IV [324-331] 48c; [615-672] 52b-53a; [1037-1072] 57d-58a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 16, 280d; BK VIII, SECT 47, 289b-c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 18-19, 167a-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 2-4, 13c-14b; BK IV, par 10, 21c-d; BK VIII, par 7-8, 54c-55a; BK X, par 21-22, 76c-77a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A 2, REP 2, 105c-106b; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, 619d-620d; Q 3, A 4, ANS and REP 3,5, 625a-626b; Q 4, A 2, 630b-631a; Q 31, A 1, REP 1, 752c-753c; Q 32, 759a-765b; Q 34, A 3, ANS and REP 1, 770c-771c; Q 35, A 1, 772c-773b; A 3, REP 1,3, 774a-c; Q 36, 780c-783c; Q 38, 786d-789d; Q 48, A 1, 822d-823b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 3, 897d-900d; Q 98, A 7, 1076d-1077b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62b-c 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, VI, 97b-98a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 11-57, 399d-415b passim 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK IV [877-945] 171b-173a esp [912-916] 172a-b 33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 401a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 4, 132a-c; CH VIII, SECT 13, 135b; SECT 16, 135c-d; SECT 18, 136a-b; CH XX, SECT 1-3, 176b-d; CH XXI, SECT 43, 188d; SECT 55-56, 192c-193b; SECT 71, 197b-198a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XIV, 102b,d-103c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 234c 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 293c-d [fn 3]; 314d-318b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 375a-b / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-386b / Judgement, 470c-471b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 39b-40a 50 MARX: Capital, 166c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 324a; 409b-410a; 812a-b; 829b-830a; 860b 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 403d-404b / Instincts, 413d / Repression, 422a-b / General Introduction, 592d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639a-640d; 648d-649c / Ego and Id, 701b-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 753b-754a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 772d-773b

3. The effects or concomitants of pleasure and pain

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 220d-221a; 233d-234c / Timaeus, 466a-b; 474b-d / Philebus, 628c-d; 637b-c / Laws, BK I, 645b-c; BK VII, 715b-716a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK IV, CH 5 [125b29-34] 175a; CH 6 [127a26-32] 177b / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413b17-24] 643d; CH 3 [414a28-b5] 644c; BK III, CH 7 [431a8-14] 663c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 9 [1109b1-13] 355a,c; BK III, CH 12 [1119b22-31] 365d-366a; BK VII, CH 6 [1149b20-1150a8] 400b-c; BK IX, CH 7 [1168a9-18] 421c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [31-40] 30b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 3, A 4, REP 1, 625a-626b; Q 32, A 4, REP 2, 761c-762a; Q 33, 765b-768c; Q 35, A 3, REP 3, 774a-c; QQ 37-38, 783c-789d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 86, A 3, REP 3-4, 994d-996a,c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [16-39] 80a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 77a; PART II, 163d-164a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 8c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 11-57, 399d-415b passim; THE AFFECTS, 416b-422a,c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 3-5, 131d-132c; CH XXI, SECT 34, 186a-b; SECT 54, 192b-c; SECT 59, 193d-194a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1, 413b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 314d-318b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 375a-b / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-386b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 220b-c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-309d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 94a-b; 526b-527a; 647a; 650b-651b; 654a-655a; 725b-726a; 808b-814b; 829b-830a 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 377c-380d esp 378b-d; 384c-385c / Narcissism, 402d-404b / Instincts, 419a-421a / Repression, 422a-427a,c esp 422a-d, 425b-c / General Introduction, 592c-593a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639a-663d esp 639a-640c, 648b-650a, 651a-d, 652b-d, 654a, 662c-663c / Ego and Id, 701b; 711c-712a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 737b-741c esp 737d, 741a-b; 742b-744a; 753c-d / New Introductory Lectures, 843d-846a

4. The kinds of pleasure and pain: different qualities of pleasure

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 220d-221a / Gorgias, 277d-280d esp 280b-d / Republic, BK VIII, 409d-410c; BK IX, 421a-425b / Philebus, 609a-610c; 619d-633a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 15 [106a36-b1] 150b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 10-11, 364b-365d; BK VII, CH 5 [1148b15-18] 399a; CH 13-14, 404d-406a,c; BK IX, CH 7 [1168a9-18] 421c; BK X, CH 3 [1173b8-19] 427d-428a; CH 5, 429d-430d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11, 613a-615c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [94-116] 31b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 64, A 3, 337a-c; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, ANS and REP 2-3, 619d-620d; Q 31, AA 3-7, 754a-758b; Q 35, 772b-780c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 72, A 2, ANS, 112b-113a; PART III SUPPL, Q 81, A 4, REP 4, 966d-967d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62a-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 432b-d; 537d-543a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27c-d; 73c-d 32 MILTON: L’Allegro, 17b-21a / Il Penseroso, 21a-25a / Paradise Lost, BK VI [327-343] 203b; [386-405] 204b-205a; [430-468] 205b-206b / Samson Agonistes [606-632] 352b-353a 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 441b-442a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, 176b-178a; CH XXI, SECT 55-56, 192c-193b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XIV, 103a-104a 42 KANT: Judgement, 477b-478a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 447b-450b 50 MARX: Capital, 292d-295a esp 293c-294a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XII, 577a-578b; BK XIV, 605b-d; BK XV, 630b-631c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 754b-758a; 812a-813b

4a. The pleasant and unpleasant in the sphere of emotion: joy and sorrow, delight and grief

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120b-c / Phaedo, 220b-221a / Republic, BK IV, 352d / Philebus, 628d-630c / Laws, BK I, 649d-650a; BK IX, 748a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK IV, CH 5 [125b28-34] 175a; CH 6 [127a26-32] 177b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 5 [1105b19-28] 351b; CH 9, 354d-355a,c; BK III, CH 8 [1116b23-1117a9] 363a-c; CH 9, 363d-364b; CH 12 [1119b23-31] 365d-366a; BK VII, CH 5 [1149a5-21] 399c-d; CH 6 [1149b20-1150a8] 400b-c; BK IX, CH 4 [1166b3-29] 419d-420a / Politics, BK V, CH 10 [1312b24-33] 515b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370a25-b32] 613c-614b; [1371a17-22] 614c; BK II, CH 1 [1378a20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1073-1085] 58a-b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 10, 257d-258a 14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 184a-c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 28, 172a-173b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 2-4, 13c-14b; BK IV, par 10, 21c-d; BK VIII, par 7-8, 54c-55a; BK X, par 39, 81b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 22, A 1, ANS, 720d-721c; QQ 31-39, 752b-792d; Q 48, A 1, 822d-823b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62b-c; 63b-d 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 1a,c 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 217d-218a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 11-57, 399d-415b passim; THE AFFECTS, 416b-422a,c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 2, 131c-d; SECT 5, 132c; CH XX, 176b-178a passim, esp SECT 3, 176d; CH XXI, SECT 40, 187d-188b; SECT 42, 188c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1, 413a-b 42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 103b-c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-309c passim, esp 308d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 197b; 324a; 391b-392a; 702a-703a; 718b-719a; 730a-b; 739b-740a; 754b-758a passim; 808b-809a 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 378c-d / Instincts, 418d-421a,c esp 419c-420a / Repression, 422a-425b esp 422a-d, 424a-b / General Introduction, 608d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640c-d; 641d-643c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-721c; 736d-740c esp 737a-b, 739b, 740c; 752c-754a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 843d-846a esp 845c-846a

4b. Sensuous pleasure: the affective quality of sensations

7 PLATO: Republic, BK I, 295d-296c; BK IX, 421a-425b / Timaeus, 463d-464b; 474b-d / Philebus, 619d-620b; 627c-628d / Laws, BK VII, 714c-715a 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a22-28] 499a / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413b17-24] 643d; CH 3 [414a28-b5] 644c; CH 9 [421a6-16] 652c; BK III, CH 2 [426a27-b8] 658c-d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 3 [439b26-440a1] 677a; CH 4 [442a12-29] 679d-680a; CH 5 [443b17-445a4] 681c-682d 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VII, CH 1 [581b11-22] 107b / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 17 [661a6-8] 188a / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 17 [721b12-18] 261c; CH 18 [723b33-724a3] 264a; CH 19 [727b6-12] 267c-d; CH 20 [727b34-728a14] 268a-b; [728b31-34] 268c / Ethics, BK I, CH 5, 340d-341b; BK III, CH 10-11, 364b-365d; BK VII, CH 11 [1152b17-18] 403d; CH 12 [1153a26-36] 404c-d; CH 14, 405b-406a,c; BK X, CH 3 [1173b7-19] 427d-428a; CH 4 [1174b15-1175a3] 429a-b; CH 5 [1176a8-14] 430c; CH 6 [1176b8-1177a11] 431a-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370a28-30] 613c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [398-477] 20a-21a; BK III [94-116] 31b-c; BK IV [324-331] 48c; [615-721] 52b-53d; [1037-1072] 57d-58a 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 19, 167b-d; CH 28, 172a-173b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VI, par 26, 42d-43a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 91, A 3, REP 3, 486b-487d; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, ANS and REP 2, 619d-620d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 81, A 4, REP 4, 966d-967d 22 CHAUCER: Wife of Bath’s Prologue [5583-5774] 256a-259a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Antony and Cleopatra, ACT II, SC II [175-245] 320c-321b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27c-d; 73c-d 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, VI, 97b-98a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 1-2, 176b-c; SECT 15, 177d; CH XXI, SECT 42-44, 188c-189b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345d-346b 42 KANT: Judgement, 477b-478a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 447b-450b passim 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 409c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3835-4205] 93b-103a; PART II [10160-175] 247b-248a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 307b-308b 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95d / Descent of Man, 301d-302a; 569a-b; 577b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 157a; 650b-651b; 755b-756a; 809b-810b [fn 1]; 829b 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 15d-16c / Sexual Enlightenment of Children, 119d-120b / Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c / Narcissism, 403a-c / General Introduction, 574a-576a; 578c-579b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 648b-c; 663a / Ego and Id, 701a-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 737a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 847b-849a esp 847c

4c. Intellectual pleasure: the pleasures of reflection and contemplation

7 PLATO: Symposium, 149d-150a; 167a-d / Phaedo, 220d-221a / Republic, BK I, 295d-296c; BK IX, 420d-425b / Philebus, 620b-621c; 631b 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a22-28] 499a; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b22-645a26] 168c-169a / Ethics, BK VII, CH 12 [1152b33-1153a1] 404a; BK X, CH 4 [1174b15-1175a2] 429a-b; CH 5-8, 429d-434a / Politics, BK VIII, CH 3 [1338a2-b3] 543b-d; CH 5, 544c-546a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1371b4-10] 615a / Poetics, CH 4 [1448b4-19] 682c-d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-61] 15a-d; BK III [1053-1075] 43c-d; BK V [1-54] 61a-d; BK VI [1-41] 80a-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 10, 185d-187a; CH 15, 190a-191a; CH 22, 195a-201a; BK IV, CH 4, 225a-228a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 6, 261a-c; SECT 9, 261d; SECT 12, 262b-c; BK IV, SECT 16, 264d; BK V, SECT 9, 270b-c; BK VI, SECT 12, 274c; BK X, SECT 12, 298c-d 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR IV, CH 12, 17d / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 30, 336b-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VI, par 26, 42d-43a; BK IX, par 23-25, 68a-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4, REP 1, 25d-26c; PART I-II, Q 3, A 4, ANS, 625a-626b; Q 4, AA 1-2, 629d-631a; Q 27, A 1, REP 3, 737b-d; Q 34, A 3, 770c-771c; Q 35, A 5, 775d-777a; Q 38, A 4, 788d-789b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 180, A 7, 614d-616a; PART III SUPPL, Q 90, A 3, 1014d-1016a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXX-XXXI, 99b-102b; PARADISE, X [7-27] 120b-c; XXX [40-66] 156c-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62c; 63a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 69d-72a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27c-d; 73c-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I, 1d / Meditations, III, 88d-89a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 53, 413a; PROP 58-59, 415c-416b; PART V, PROP 32-36, 460b-461c; PROP 42, 463b-d 32 MILTON: Il Penseroso, 21a-25a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, 176b-178a passim, esp SECT 1-2, 176b-c, SECT 15, 177d; CH XXI, SECT 42-44, 188c-189b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 645c-d 42 KANT: Judgement, 534c-539d; 551a-552a; 586d-587a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 447b-450b passim 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1178-1201] 29b; [3217-3239] 79a-b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 255a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 755a-758a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 773d-774c

4c(1) Pleasure in the beauty of nature or art: disinterested pleasure

4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK VIII, 222a-228a,c passim 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 266d-267a / Philebus, 630d-631b / Laws, BK II, 653a-656c; BK VII, 720c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [645a4-26] 168d-169a / Ethics, BK III, CH 10 [1118a1-9] 364c; BK VII, CH 12 [1153a24-26] 404c / Politics, BK VIII, CH 3 [1337b27-1338a29] 543a-c; CH 5, 544c-546a / Poetics, CH 4 [1448b4-23] 682c-d; CH 14 [1453b12-14] 688b-c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 2, 259d-260a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4, REP 1, 25d-26c; Q 91, A 3, REP 3, 486b-487d; PART I-II, Q 27, A 1, REP 3, 737b-d; Q 32, A 8, ANS, 764c-765b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, II [106-133] 55c-d; X [22-105] 67c-68c 26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT V, SC I [66-110] 431b-d 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 184b-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP 32, 460b 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes, 337a-338a 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 1a-2a; 49a-50c 42 KANT: Judgement, 470c-471b; 471d-473a; 476a-483d esp 479a-d; 485b-486d; 495a-496c; 509c-d; 516d-518d; 525a-527b; 532a-d; 534c-539d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 254c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 185c-d; PART I, 220b-c; PART II, 267b-268b 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [9218-9245] 224a-b; [9863-9869] 239b; [11288-303] 274b-275a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 95a-d / Descent of Man, 301c-302a; 568d-571b passim; 577b-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 235a-238a passim, esp 237c-238a; 257c-259a; BK VII, 278a-c; 288c-290b; 295c-296a; BK X, 450a-451c; BK XI, 497d-498b; BK XII, 575d-576a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 157a; 886b 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 600d-601b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 643c / War and Death, 756a-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 774a-c; 775b-c

4c(2) The pleasure and pain of learning and knowledge

5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [160-183] 53d-54a 7 PLATO: Apology, 208a / Republic, BK I, 296a-c; BK VI, 374d-375a; BK IX, 421a-425b / Theaetetus, 515d-517b 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a22-28] 499a 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b22-645a37] 168c-169b / Ethics, BK III, CH 10 [1117b28-32] 364b; BK VII, CH 12 [1153a21-23] 404c; BK X, CH 3 [1173b15-18] 427d-428a; CH 4 [1175a10-17] 429c / Politics, BK VIII, CH 3 [1337b27-1338a29] 543a-c; CH 5 [1339a27-29] 544d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1371a30-33] 614d; [1371b4-10] 615a / Poetics, CH 4 [1448b4-19] 682c-d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [921-950] 12b-c; BK IV [1-25] 44a-b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 14, 153d-155b; BK III, CH 23, 201a-203b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 14-16, 4c-5b; par 19-27, 5d-7d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 4, A 1, REP 3, 629d-630b; Q 32, A 1, REP 1, 759b-d; A 2, ANS, 759d-760d; A 3, 760d-761c; A 8, 764c-765b; Q 33, A 3, 767a-d; A 4, REP 1, 767d-768c; Q 34, A 3, ANS, 770c-771c; Q 37, A 1, 783d-784c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XX [124]-XXI [75] 84c-85d; PARADISE, IV [115]-V [12] 111d-112b 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62c; 63a; 78d; 79b-80a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 26d-27d; 29d-30c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 70d-74a; 111b-d; 244d-246a 26 SHAKESPEARE: Love’s Labour’s Lost, ACT I, SC I [70-93] 255a-b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 331c-332a 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 146a-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 3c-4a; 6d-7a; 27c-d 31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK I, 297a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 53, 413a; PROP 58, 415c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87a-b; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 44, 188d-189b; CH XXXIII, SECT 15, 250c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6, 453b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 523c-527a passim, esp 524a-b 42 KANT: Judgement, 532a-d; 551d 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 451c-d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 14b; 15a-c; 130b; 135b-136a; 309c-d 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1d-2a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [354-736] 11a-19b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 47b-48d; BK VIII, 306b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 524b-525a; 715b; 729b-730a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 779d-780b

4d. The pleasures of play and diversion

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK XXIII [262-897] 164a-170d / Odyssey, BK VIII, 222a-228a,c esp [104-255] 223b-224d 5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes [1-209] 340a-341c; [370-431] 343a-b / Cyclops [139-174] 441c-d; [495-589] 444d-445d 5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [241-279] 458a-b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 86b 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 396d; BK III, 442c-443a 7 PLATO: Symposium, 149a-173a,c / Gorgias, 281c-d / Laws, BK I-II, 644d-663d esp BK I, 647c-648c, 650c-652d, BK II, 653b-c, 655b-656c, 658c-660a, 662a-663d; BK VII, 717d-718c; BK VIII, 731d-735b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 7 [1108a23-26] 353d; BK IV, CH 8, 375a-d; BK VII, CH 14 [1154b22-19] 405c-406a,c; BK X, CH 6 [1176b8-1177a11] 431a-c / Politics, BK VII, CH 17 [1336a23-b24] 541b-d; BK VIII, CH 3 [1337b27-1338a29] 543a-c; CH 5 [1339a11]-CH 6 [1340b33] 544c-546b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370b14-17] 613b-c; [1370b34-1371a7] 614b-c; [1371b33-1372a1] 615b-c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [1053-1094] 43c-44a,c 14 PLUTARCH: Agesilaus, 489d-490b / Alexander, 572b-d 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK XIV, 145a-d; 146b-147a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 15-16, 4d-5b; BK III, par 2-4, 13c-14b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, A 6, REP 1, 614a-c; Q 32, A 1, REP 3, 759b-d 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [747-821] 172a-173a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 82b-d 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 1a-3a,c; 7a-8c; 14c-15c; 25a-26d; BK II, 97b-99b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 538d-540b 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 186d-187c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 54a-b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 125-183, 195b-204b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 265c-266d 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 346c-347d esp 347d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 90a-b; 502c-503a; 583d-584b 42 KANT: Judgement, 537b-539d 43 MILL: Liberty, 308d-309a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 88a; 287b-c esp 287d [fn 1]; 309a-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II, 267b-268b; PART III, 291d-292c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 10d-11b; 16a-18b; 37a-d; BK VI, 254c-260a; BK VII, 278a-287a; 296a-298d; BK VIII, 303a-305b esp 305a-b; BK XI, 486c-d; BK XII, 538a-539d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK VIII, 220c-235d; BK X, 284b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 716b-717a; 727b-729a; 732b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 250d-251a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 641d-643c; 651b-d / Group Psychology, 690b-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773a-b

4e. The kinds of pain: the pain of sense and the pain of loss or deprivation

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK XVIII [1-126] 130a-131c; BK XIX [276-368] 139d-140c; BK XXII [21-98] 155b-156a; [405-515] 159c-160d; BK XXIV, 171a-179d esp [480-805] 176b-179d 5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [399-455] 56b-57a 5 SOPHOCLES: Electra [86-309] 157a-158b 5 EURIPIDES: Medea [1090-1115] 221b-c / Alcestis [861-1005] 244d-245d / Trojan Women [572-705] 274d-276a; [1156-1333] 279d-281a,c / Electra [112-214] 328a-d 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 250b-251d / Gorgias, 277d-280d esp 280b-d / Philebus, 619d-633a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 11 [1118b28-1119a5] 365b-c; BK VII, CH 13-14, 404d-406a,c passim; BK X, CH 3 [1173b7-19] 427d-428a; CH 5 [1175b16-23] 430a-b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [459-525] 36a-d; [634-669] 38b-c; [830-1023] 40c-43b; BK IV [324-331] 48c; [1058-1191] 57d-59d 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [194-209] 108a-b; BK V [735-794] 145a-146b; BK IX [473-502] 291b-292b; BK X [833-856] 325a-b; BK XI [29-58] 328b-329b; [139-181] 331b-333a; BK XII [593-613] 370a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIV, CH 15, 388d-390a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 64, A 3, 337a-c; PART I-II, Q 35, 772b-780c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 15, A 6, 792c-793c; Q 18, A 6, REP 3, 814d-815d; PART III SUPPL, Q 97, A 2, 1066d-1067b; A 5, 1068c-1070a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, III [1-18] 4a-b; IV [13-45] 5c-d; V, 7a-8b esp [121-123] 8b; VI [94-111] 9b-c; XIV [4-72] 19c-20b; PURGATORY, VIII [1-36] 62c-d; XXIII [1-75] 88b-89a 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK V, 120b-155a esp STANZA 29-106, 124a-134a, STANZA 174-182, 143a-144a / Tale of Melibeus, par 4-7, 401b-402b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 62c; 79b-d; PART III, 195b-d; PART IV, 271a 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT III, SC VI [61-84] 83d-84a / Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT III, SC I [170-187] 242b / Romeo and Juliet, 285a-319a,c esp ACT III, SC III [1-70] 304d-305c, ACT V, SC III, 315d-319a,c / Richard II, ACT I, SC III [58-74] 323b-c; SC IV [139-309] 325a-326d; ACT III, SC I [1-72] 331a-d; ACT IV, SC I [162-318] 343b-344d / Much Ado About Nothing, ACT V, SC I [1-38] 524c-525a / Julius Caesar, ACT III, SC I [148-275] 582a-583b 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC II [68-117] 32b-d / Othello, ACT I, SC III [199-220] 211a-b / King Lear, ACT V, SC III [257-273] 282b / Antony and Cleopatra, ACT IV, SC XV [59-91] 344c-345a; ACT V, SC I [13-48] 345b-c 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 333b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 55, 413b-414a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK I [44-74] 94b-95a; BK II [81-92] 113a; [521-628] 122b-125a; BK VI [327-343] 203b; [386-405] 204b-205a; [430-468] 205b-206b / Samson Agonistes [606-632] 352b-353b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, 176b-178a passim 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II, 245b-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 109d-110a,c; BK XII, 551d-554a; BK XV, 614a-618b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 160b-163c, 169c-170b; BK XII, 398a-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 554a-b 54 FREUD: Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 736c-740c esp 736c-737b, 739b-c; 743b-744a; 752c-754a

5. The quantity of pleasure: the weighing of pleasures; the limits of pleasure

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 57d-62d / Phaedo, 225d-226b / Gorgias, 275d-277b / Republic, BK IX, 421a-425b / Timaeus, 474b-d / Philebus, 618a; 625c-631d / Laws, BK V, 689d-690c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b32-645a1] 168d / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 17 [721b12-18] 261c / Ethics, BK III, CH 10-11, 364b-365d passim; BK VII, CH 4, 398a-399a passim; BK X, CH 3 [1173a13-28] 427b-c; CH 4 [1174b15-1175a9] 429a-c / Politics, BK I, CH 9 [1258a2-14] 452a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 7 [1364b23-26] 606c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [1-36] 15a-c; BK III [931-962] 42a-c; [1076-1084] 44a; BK IV [1058-1120] 57d-58d; BK V [1412-1435] 79b-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, REP 2, 619d-620d; Q 30, A 4, REP 3, 751c-752b; Q 31, AA 5-6, 755c-757c; Q 32, A 1, REP 3, 759b-d; A 2, ANS and REP 1, 759d-760d; A 7, REP 3, 763c-764b; Q 33, A 2, ANS, 766a-767a; Q 36, A 3, REP 1, 782b-783a; Q 37, A 4, ANS, 785d-786d; Q 38, 786d-789d passim 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 28, A 3, 528d-529c; PART III SUPPL, Q 71, A 8, REP 3, 909d-910d; Q 93, A 1, ANS and REP 4, 1037d-1039a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VI [94-111] 9b-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 76d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 128c-129d; 326b-327b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 125-172, 195b-203b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 42-43, 188c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 363a-b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 234c 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 298d-300a / Judgement, 584d-585c 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-450b; 463a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 20, 17a; ADDITIONS, 15, 118d 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1765-1775] 42a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XII, 577c-578a; BK XIV, 605b-d; EPILOGUE I, 660d-661b 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 592d-593a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639a-663d esp 639a-640a, 643c, 645d-646a, 648b-650a, 662c-663a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 771c-776b esp 772a-b, 773c

6. Pleasure and the good

6a. Pleasure as the only good or as the measure of goodness in all other things

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 57d-62d / Gorgias, 275b-280b / Republic, BK VI, 384b-d; 386b-c / Philebus, 609a-639a,c 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 40, 68b / Topics, BK VII, CH 5 [160a16-23] 218a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 5 [1095b13-21] 340d; BK VII, CH 13 [1153b7-36] 404d-405b; BK X, CH 2, 426c-427b; CH 3 [1173b31-1174a12] 428a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-21] 15a-b 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 15, 74d-75b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK V, CH 20, 225b-226a; BK X, CH 18, 310c-d; BK XIX, CH 1, 507a-509a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, A 7, ANS, 614c-615a; Q 2, A 6, 619d-620d; Q 34, A 3, 770c-771c; Q 39, A 4, 792a-d 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK IV, 284c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71d-72a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 8, 426b-c; APPENDIX, XXX-XXXI, 450b-c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK IV [885-899] 171b-172a; BK XI [594-602] 312a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 1-2, 176b-c; CH XXI, SECT 31-48, 185c-190d esp SECT 43, 188d; SECT 55-56, 192c-193b; SECT 63, 194d-195a; CH XXVIII, SECT 5, 229c-d 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 298c-300d esp 298c-d; 314d-318b / Judgement, 478a-479a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-476a,c passim, esp 447b-457b, 461c-464d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 808b-814a esp 811b-813b 54 FREUD: Instincts, 418d-420c esp 420b-c / General Introduction, 574b-d; 592c-593a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 772a-c

6b. Pleasure as one good among many: pleasure as one object of desire

7 PLATO: Gorgias, 275b-280d / Republic, BK III, 310c-d / Philebus, 609a-639a,c 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 40, 68b / Topics, BK III, CH 2 [117a23-25] 163d; CH 3 [118b27-36] 165d-166a; CH 6 [119b37-p1] 166d; BK IV, CH 4 [124a15-20] 172d; [124b7-14] 173b 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 6 [700b23-30] 236a / Ethics, BK III, CH 4, 359a-c; BK VII, CH 11-14, 403c-406a,c; BK X, CH 2 [1172b23-34] 426d-427a; CH 3 [1174a8-12] 428b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 6 [1362b5-9] 603b; [1362b14-18] 603b-c; CH 7 [1365a7-13] 607c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 1-4, 507a-513c passim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 6, ANS and REP 2, 27c-28b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 6, REP 1, 614a-c; A 7, ANS, 614c-615a; Q 2, A 6, ANS and REP 2, 619d-620d; Q 34, A 2, REP 1, 769d-770c; A 3, ANS, 770c-771c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXX [100]-XXXI [63] 100b-101c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 90d-91a; 109d-112a; 424d-426b; 527b-528a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 192b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 461c-464d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 404b-c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 316a-317a esp 316b,d [fn 42] 53 JAMES: Psychology, 808b-814b esp 810b-811a, 812b-814b

6c. Good and bad pleasures: higher and lower pleasures

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 57d-62d / Gorgias, 277d-280d esp 280b-d / Republic, BK VIII, 409d-410c; BK IX, 421a-427b / Philebus, 635c-639a,c / Laws, BK V, 689c-690c; BK VIII, 736b-c; 738a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 8 [1099a7-30] 344c-d; BK III, CH 10-12, 364b-366a,c; BK VII, CH 4-5, 398a-399d; CH 11 [1152b19-23] 403d; CH 12 [1153a26-36] 404c-d; CH 14, 405b-406a,c; BK X, CH 3 [1173b20-1174a12] 428a-b; CH 5 [1175b24-1176a29] 430b-d; CH 6 [1176b8-1177a11] 431a-c / Politics, BK VIII, CH 3 [1338a1-9] 543b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1073-1078] 58a-b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR IV, CH 12, 17d / Third Ennead, TR V, CH 1, 100c-101b / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 26, 334c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VI, par 26, 42d-43a; BK VIII, par 7-8, 54c-55a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 34, AA 1-3, 768c-771c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 63a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d; 424d-426b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 6d-7a; 27c-d; 73c-74a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 56-57, 414a-415b; PART IV, PROP 43, 437b-c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 38b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 298c-300d esp 298c-d 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 447b-450b passim; 461c-464d

6d. Pleasure as the accompaniment of goods possessed: the satisfaction of desire

7 PLATO: Gorgias, 275b-278d / Republic, BK IX, 423c-424c / Philebus, 620a-b 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH 2 [117a23-25] 163d; CH 3 [118b27-36] 165d-166a / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 8 [1099a7-30] 344c-d; BK III, CH 10-11, 364b-365d passim; BK VII, CH 12-13, 403d-405b; BK X, CH 3 [1173b7]-CH 5 [1176a29] 427d-430d esp CH 4 [1175a10-22] 429c, CH 5 [1176a3-29] 430c-d / Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1267a5-12] 462c-d 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 27, 335b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VI, par 9-10, 37c-38b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 3-4, 625b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 6, ANS, 27c-28b; PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, 619d-620d; Q 3, A 4, 625a-626b; Q 4, AA 1-2, 629d-631a; Q 11, 666b,d-669b; Q 30, A 4, REP 3, 751c-752b; Q 32, A 1, ANS, 759b-d; Q 34, 768c-772b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, QQ 28-29, 527b-533a; PART III SUPPL, Q 69, A 4, ANS, 889c-890c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-39] 80a-b; PARADISE, III [58-90] 109d-110b; XXXIII [46-48] 156c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 76c-d 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 298a-300a; 341c-342a / Judgement, 470c-471b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448d-449c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 725b-726a; 812a-813b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 377c-d / Instincts, 412d-413d esp 413d / General Introduction, 574a-d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 663a / Ego and Id, 711d-712a

6e. Pleasure as intrinsically evil or morally indifferent

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 60d-61c / Phaedo, 224a-226c; 233d-234c / Gorgias, 263c-270c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 12 [1153a18-23] 404b-c; CH 13 [1153b1-20] 404d-405a; BK X, CH 1 [1172a28-33] 426b; CH 2 [1173a5-13] 427b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [14-21] 15a-b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 11, 151a-b; CH 19, 163c-164a; BK III, CH 24, 203c-210a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 10-12, 257d-258c; SECT 16, 259a; BK III, SECT 6, 261a-c; BK VI, SECT 16, 275b-d; SECT 51, 279b-c; BK VIII, SECT 27, 281d; SECT 64, 284a-b; BK VIII, SECT 10, 286b; SECT 19, 286d-287a; SECT 28, 287c; SECT 39, 288c; SECT 47, 289b-c; BK IX, SECT 1, 291a-c; BK X, SECT 34-35, 301a-b; BK XI, SECT 3, 307b-d 14 PLUTARCH: Marcus Cato, 277c 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IX, CH 4, 287a-288b; BK XIV, CH 8, 381c-383a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 34, A 1, 768c-769d; Q 39, 790a-792d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 90d-91b; 118a-122a; 124c-125a; 165c-169a; 202a-b; 234b-c; 432b-d; 537d-543a,c esp 541d-542c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 41-43, 437a-c; APPENDIX, XXXI, 450c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 160, 202a-b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 192c-193c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 238c-d / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-257d; 258d-259a; 262a-263c; 265b / Practical Reason, 297a-318b esp 298a-300a, 304d-307d; 325a-327d; 329a-331a; 338c-355d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b-366d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387b-388a / Judgement, 478a-479d passim 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 393a-b

7. Pleasure and happiness: their distinction and relation

5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [1155-1171] 140d-141a 5 EURIPIDES: Alcestis [773-802] 243d-244a / Cyclops [163-174] 441d 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 57d-62d / Gorgias, 275b-284d / Republic, BK IX, 421a-425b / Philebus, 635b-639a,c / Laws, BK I, 646a; BK II, 657b-658b; BK V, 689c-690c; BK VII, 715c-716a / Seventh Letter, 801b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 5 [1095b13-22] 340d; CH 8, 344a-345a esp [1099a7-30] 344c-d; BK VII, CH 11 [1152a1-8] 403c; CH 13 [1153b7-1154a7] 404d-405b; BK IX, CH 9, 423a-424b; BK X, CH 6, 430d-431c; CH 7 [1177a23-25] 431d-432a / Politics, BK VIII, CH 3 [1338a1-9] 543b; CH 5 [1339b32-40] 545b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 5 [1360b4-18] 600d-601a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-36] 15a-c; BK III [1003-1010] 43a; BK V [1412-1435] 79b-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 19, 162c-164b 14 PLUTARCH: Demetrius, 747b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR IV, CH 1-2, 12b-13c; CH 6-7, 15a-16a; CH 12, 17d; TR V, CH 4, 19c; CH 8, 20c / Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 15, 74d-75b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 26, A 4, ANS and REP 2, 151c-152a,c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 6, REP 1, 614a-c; A 7, ANS, 614c-615a; Q 2, A 6, 619d-620d; Q 3, A 4, 625a-626b; Q 4, AA 1-2, 629d-631a; Q 5, A 8, ANS, 642d-643d; Q 34, A 3, 770c-771c; Q 35, A 5, 775d-777a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 84, A 4, ANS, 176d-178a; PART II-II, Q 28, 527b-530a; Q 180, A 7, 614d-616a; PART III SUPPL, Q 81, A 4, REP 4, 966d-967d; Q 90, A 3, 1014d-1016a; Q 95, A 5, 1048a-1049d; Q 96, 1049d-1066a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, V-VI, 7a-9c; XI [67-90] 15d-16a; PURGATORY, XVI [82-105] 77d; XVII [125-139] 79d; XIX-XXVI, 81c-94c esp XIX [1-69] 81c-82a; XXX-XXXI, 99b-102b esp XXXI [22-63] 101a-c; PARADISE, I [103-142] 107b-d; XI [1-12] 122a 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [331-360] 165a / Pardoner’s Tale, 374a-382b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 60c-66b esp 65c-66b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d; 71a-73c; 90d-91a; 109d-112a; 128c-129d; 200d-205b; 235c-237d; 326b-327b; 394a-395b; 406a-408b; 424d-426b; 431c-432d; 527b-529b; 537d-543a,c 26 SHAKESPEARE: Love’s Labour’s Lost, ACT I, SC I [1-162] 254a-256a 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 193b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71d-72b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 125-183, 195b-204b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 2, 131c-d; SECT 5, 132c; CH XXI, SECT 42-47, 188c-190b passim, esp SECT 42-43, 188c-d; SECT 55-56, 192c-193b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 192b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 234c-d 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256c-257c; 258d-259a / Practical Reason, 298c-300d esp 298c-d; 314d-318b / Judgement, 478a-479d 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 447b-457b esp 448a; 461c-464d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 378a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 15, 118d 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1741-1775] 41b-42b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 259d-260a; BK VIII, 334d-335a; BK XIII, 577a-578b esp 577d; BK XIV, 605b-d; BK XV, 615a-d; 630c-631a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 1a-7a; BK III, 54b-58a; BK IV, 88d; BK XI, 343d; BK XII, 370b-d 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 599b-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 771a-776b esp 772a-c

7a. Pleasure and pain in relation to love and friendship

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK XVIII [1-126] 130a-131c; BK XIX [276-368] 139d-140c; BK XXII [21-98] 155b-156a; [405-515] 159c-160d; BK XXIV, 171a-179d esp [480-805] 176b-179d / Odyssey, BK XVII [290-327] 280a-c 5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [399-455] 56b-57a 5 EURIPIDES: Medea [1090-1115] 221b-c / Alcestis [861-1005] 244d-245d / Trojan Women [572-705] 274d-276a; [1156-1333] 279d-281a,c / Electra [112-214] 328a-d 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120b-122a; 126c-127c / Symposium, 160c / Republic, BK I, 333b-334b / Laws, BK VIII, 735b-738c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b32-645a1] 168d / Ethics, BK II, CH 7 [1108a26-29] 353d; BK IV, CH 6, 373d-374b passim; CH 8, 375a-d; BK VIII, CH 2-6, 407a-410c; CH 12 [1162b15-28] 414c-d; BK IX, CH 4, 419a-420a passim; CH 7, 421a-d passim; CH 9, 423a-424b; CH 11, 425a-d; BK X, CH 3 [1173b32-1174a1] 428a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370b19-24] 614a; [1371a17-24] 614c-d; [1371b21-24] 615b; BK II, CH 4 [1380b33-1381a14] 626c-627c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1037-1208] 57d-60a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 22, 167d-170a; BK IV, CH 2, 223d-224b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK IV [279-705] 174b-186b; BK VII [341-405] 245b-247b; BK XII [54-80] 355b-356a; [593-613] 370a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 16-17, 12c-13a; BK VI, par 26, 42d-43a / City of God, BK XIX, CH 5, 513d-514b; CH 7-8, 515a-516a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 21, A 3, ANS, 126a-c; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 4, A 8, ANS and REP 2, 636a-c; Q 31, A 6, REP 3, 756d-757c; Q 32, A 1, REP 1, 759b-d; A 3, REP 3, 760d-761c; AA 5-7, 762a-764b; Q 34, A 4, REP 1, 771c-772b; Q 36, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 780c-781b; A 2, ANS, 781c-782b; A 3, ANS, 782b-783a; Q 38, A 1, REP 3, 786d-787c; A 3, 788b-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 28, 527b-530a; Q 30, A 2, 534b-535a; PART III SUPPL, Q 94, AA 2-3, 1041b-1042c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, V, 7a-8b; PURGATORY, XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, 1a-155a esp BK I, STANZA 108-117, 15a-16a, BK II, STANZA 111-125, 36a-38a, BK III, STANZA 174-178, 77a-b, STANZA 219, 83a, BK V, STANZA 29-110, 124a-134b, STANZA 174-182, 143a-144a / Knight’s Tale, 174a-211a esp [1092-1186] 178a-179b, [1574-1627] 186a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 85b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 398c-399d; 426c-427d; 431c-433c 26 SHAKESPEARE: Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT III, SC I [170-187] 242b / Romeo and Juliet, 285a-319a,c esp ACT V, SC III, 315d-319a,c / Midsummer-Night’s Dream, ACT I, SC I [128-251] 353d-355a / Much Ado About Nothing, ACT V, SC I [1-38] 524c-525a / Julius Caesar, ACT III, SC I [148-275] 582a-583b 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC II [68-117] 32b-d; ACT III, SC I [206-225] 51b / Troilus and Cressida, ACT III, SC II [8-30] 120b-c; ACT IV, SC I [1-19] 126d; SC IV [11-108] 128b-129b / Othello, ACT I, SC III [199-220] 211a-b / King Lear, ACT III, SC VI [109-122] 267d; ACT V, SC III [257-273] 282b / Antony and Cleopatra, ACT I, SC III, 314c-315d; ACT V, SC I [13-48] 345b-c / Timon of Athens, 393a-420d / Sonnets, 586a-609d passim 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 73d-89c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 12-13, 400b-d; PROP 19-26, 402c-404b; PROP 33-46, 406c-410c; PROP 49, 411a-b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 4-5, 176d-177a 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 126c-127b; 235b-238d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345d-346b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 451b-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3620-3645] 88b-89a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-313a passim, esp 308d-309a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 30a-31a; 56b; BK II, 69a-c; BK III, 135c-137c; 140c-142d; BK IV, 167c-d; BK V, 203a-d; BK VI, 259d-260a; BK VII, 276b-277a; BK VIII, 319c-d; 323b-324b; 340d-341a,c; BK XV, 615a-d; 639a-b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 4a-5b; BK II, 32d-36c; BK III, 58d-59b; 69d-70c; BK IV, 95b-100c; BK VIII, 200c-201b; BK X, 282b-283c; BK XI, 324a-b; EPILOGUE, 402a-408a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 391b-392a 54 FREUD: Instincts, 418c-421a,c esp 420b-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 774d-775a; 782d-783b

7b. The life of pleasure contrasted with other modes of life: the ascetic life

OLD TESTAMENT: Numbers, 6:1-5 / Ecclesiastes, 2:1-11; 3:12-22; 5:18-20; 8:14-15—(D) Ecclesiastes, 2:1-11; 3:12-22; 5:17-19; 8:14-15 / Isaiah, 5:11-12; 22:12-13; 28:1,7-8—(D) Isaias, 5:11-12; 22:12-13; 28:1,7-8 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2 esp 2:1-9—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 2 esp 2:1-9 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-32; 19:1-2; 23:5-6—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-32; 19:1-3; 23:6 NEW TESTAMENT: Luke, 1:13-17; 8:5-15; 16:19-25 / Romans, 1:18-32; 8:1-13; 13:13-14 / I Corinthians, 5:9-13; 6:13-7:9; 7:36-38; 9:24-27 / Galatians, 5:16-25 / Philippians, 3:18-19 / Colossians, 3:5-8 / I Thessalonians, 4:3-7 / I Timothy, 4:1-10; 5:6 / II Timothy, 3 / Titus, 2:11-15; 3:3 / Hebrews, 11:24-26 / James, 4:1-6; 5:5 / I Peter, 4:1-5 5 EURIPIDES: Alcestis [782-802] 244a / Cyclops [139-174] 441c-d; [495-589] 444d-445d 5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [685-800] 551b-553a / Plutus [415-618] 633d-636d; [802-822] 638c 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 223d-225a / Republic, BK X, 439b-440c / Timaeus, 474b-d / Philebus, 635a-639a,c / Laws, BK II, 656c-658b; BK V, 689d-690c; BK VII, 715d-716a; BK VIII, 737c-738c / Seventh Letter, 801b-c; 806a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 5, 340d-341b; BK III, CH 10-12, 364b-366a,c; BK X, CH 9 [1179b20-1180a13] 434c-d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-54] 15a-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 10, 185d-187a; CH 15, 190a-191a; CH 22, 195a-201a; CH 24, 203c-210a; BK IV, CH 4, 225a-228a; CH 6, 230b-232c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 6, 261a-c; SECT 12, 262b-c; SECT 16, 262d-263a,c; BK V, SECT 8-9, 269d-270c; BK VIII, SECT 10, 286b 14 PLUTARCH: Alcibiades, 161d-162b / Demetrius, 732d-733a; 747b / Antony, 751b-c; 755d-756c; 757c-758c / Antony-Demetrius, 780c-d 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR IV, CH 4-16, 14a-19b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 2-8, 9b-10d; BK VIII, par 26-27, 60b-c / City of God, BK I, CH 16-18, 139c-140d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 18, A 2, REP 2, 105c-106b; Q 26, A 4, ANS, 151c-152a,c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 6, REP 1, 614a-c; A 7, ANS, 614c-615a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 179, A 2, REP 1,3, 607a-c; Q 186, AA 3-5, 652d-657d; PART III SUPPL, Q 81, A 4, REP 4, 966d-967d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [127-139] 79d; XXX-XXXI, 99b-102b esp XXXI [22-63] 101a-c; PARADISE, XI [1-12] 122a 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b / Wife of Bath’s Prologue [5583-5774] 256a-259a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 155d-156a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 46a-49c; 60c-66b esp 65c-66b; BK III, 126a-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d; 109d-112a; 128c-129d; 162c-167a esp 165c-167a; 406a-408b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Love’s Labour’s Lost, ACT I, SC I [1-162] 254a-256a / 1st Henry IV, ACT I, SC II [1-116] 435c-436c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 7a-8b; 54a-b; 69d-74b esp 71d-72a, 73c-74a 32 MILTON: Il Penseroso, 21a-25a esp [156-176] 24b-25a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 38a-b; 60a-c; 192a-193c; 593b,d-599a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 174c-175c 43 MILL: Liberty, 296b-c / Utilitarianism, 448a-449c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1765-1775] 42a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VII, 273c-274a,c; BK VIII, 321d-322d; 329c-333a; 334d-335a; 336b-337d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov esp BK I, 1a-7a, BK II, 15a-45d, BK III, 50c-62a, 64c-73b, BK IV, 88d, BK VI, 146b,d-170d 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 624a-625b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 772c-774d esp 772d

8. The discipline of pleasure

8a. Pleasure and pain in relation to virtue: the restraints of temperance and the endurance of courage

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 7:6-27 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 19:5—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 19:5 NEW TESTAMENT: James, 1:12-16 4 HOMER: Odyssey, 183a-322d esp BK IV [265-295] 201d-202a, BK V [192-224] 209d-210b, [282-493] 210d-213a,c, BK IX [82-104] 230a, BK XII [153-200] 251d-252b, BK XX [1-55] 296a-c 5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [160-183] 53d-54a 5 SOPHOCLES: Philoctetes, 182a-195a,c esp [1316-1347] 193d-194a, [1408-1444] 194d-195a,c 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 397b-c 7 PLATO: Laches, 32c / Phaedrus, 120a-122a / Gorgias, 275d-285a / Republic, BK IV, 347a-348d; BK VI, 374a-c; BK VII, 389d-390b; BK IX, 421a-425b / Timaeus, 474b-d / Laws, BK I, 644b-645c; BK II, 653a-c; 657b-658b; BK III, 669b-670c; BK V, 689c-690c; BK VII, 713d-716a; BK VIII, 737c-738c; BK IX, 748a-c / Seventh Letter, 807a; 814b 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, CH 8 [146b24-27] 200d / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [246b20-247a19] 330a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VII, CH 1 [581b11-22] 107b / Ethics, BK I, CH 5, 340d-341b; CH 8 [1099a7-30] 344c-d; BK II, CH 2 [1104a19]-CH 3 [1105a16] 349c-350c; CH 7 [1107b3-8] 353a; [1108a23-29] 353d; CH 9, 354d-355a,c; BK III, CH 4, 359a-c; CH 6-12, 361a-366a,c; BK IV, CH 6, 373d-374b; CH 8, 375a-d; BK VI, CH 5 [1140b11-19] 389b-c; BK VII, CH 4-10, 398a-403c; CH 12 [1153a27-36] 404c-d; BK IX, CH 4, 419a-420a passim; CH 9, 423a-424b passim; BK X, CH 1, 426a-c; CH 3 [1173b32-1174a11] 428a-b; CH 5 [1176a3-29] 430c-d; CH 6 [1176b8-1177a11] 431a-c / Politics, BK VIII, CH 5 [1340a1-28] 545c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 9 [1366b14-16] 609a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 21, 194a-b; CH 24, 203c-210a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 10-11, 257d-258b; BK III, SECT 6, 261a-c; SECT 16, 262d-263a,c; BK V, SECT 26, 272c; BK VII, SECT 16, 280d; BK VIII, SECT 10, 286b; SECT 28, 287c; SECT 39, 288c; SECT 47, 289b-c; BK IX, SECT 1, 291a-c 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 139a-140d / Coriolanus, 184a-c / Agesilaus, 489d-490b / Demetrius, 747b / Antony-Demetrius, 780c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 31, A 8, REP 1, 758b-759a; Q 32, A 6, 762d-763c; Q 34, A 1, 768c-769d; A 4, 771c-772b; Q 35, A 6, REP 3, 777b-778c; Q 39, AA 1-2, 790a-791b; A 3, ANS and REP 2, 791b-792a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 59, A 3, 47c-48c; Q 60, A 4, ANS, 52b-53a; A 5, ANS, 53a-54d; Q 61, A 2, ANS, 55c-56b; A 3, ANS, 56b-57a; A 4, 57a-58b; Q 74, A 6, 132b-133a; A 8, 134b-136a; Q 107, A 4, ANS, 329d-330d; PART II-II, Q 15, A 3, 453c-454c; QQ 35-36, 562d-570c; Q 46, A 3, 604d-605a,c; PART III, Q 15, AA 5-6, 791d-793c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, V [1]-VIII [64] 7a-11c; XI [67-90] 15d-16a; PURGATORY, XVI [82-105] 77d; XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; XIX-XXVI, 81c-94c esp XIX [1-69] 81c-82a; XXX-XXXI, 99b-102b esp XXXI [22-63] 101a-c; PARADISE, I [103-142] 107b-d 22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus, par 4-7, 401b-402b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 138d-139a; 163d-164a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 65c-66b; BK IV, 234a-240a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 28a-d; 71a-72a; 89b-91b; 109c-112a; 118a-119d; 162c-167a esp 165c-167a; 200d-205b; 234b-c; 350d-351b; 353c-354b; 365b-367b; 392a-b; 394a-395b; 406a-408b; 424d-426b; 431c-432d; 474b-d; 537d-543a,c esp 540c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71d-72a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 41-73, 437a-447a 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 390b-391a 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 64b-67b / Pensées, 160, 202a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 35, 186b-d; SECT 59, 193d-194a; SECT 71, 197b-198a 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 9a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 330d-331b; 343d-345c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 192b-193c; 596c-597a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 173c-d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 368d-369a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 461c-464d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 116b 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 315c-317a esp 316c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 15b-16a; BK II, 122b-c; BK V, 201a-c; 203a-d; BK VI, 245b-c; 248b-250a; BK VIII, 321d-322d; 336b-337d; BK IX, 369c-d; BK X, 426b; BK XI, 481a-482a; BK XII, 551d-554a; BK XIII, 577a-578b; BK XIV, 605b-d; EPILOGUE I, 652a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 343d 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 793a-794b / New Introductory Lectures, 831b

8b. The conflict between pleasure and duty, or the obligations of justice: the pleasure principle and the reality principle

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 5:1-13; 6:23-35; 7:6-27; 21:17; 23:20-21,29-35 / Ecclesiastes, 10:16-17 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-32; 19:1-5; 31:12-31; 37:29-31—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-32; 19:1-5; 31:12-42; 37:32-34 5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus [373-430] 228b-d 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK V, 506b-c 7 PLATO: Republic, BK III, 311a-315d / Laws, BK IX, 748a-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3, 108b-c; BK II, CH 11, 150a-151b; CH 19, 162c-164b; BK III, CH 2, 177c-178d; CH 10, 185d-187a; CH 24, 203c-210a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 6, 261a-c; BK VI, SECT 2, 274a; BK VIII, SECT 44, 282b-c; SECT 55, 283b-c; BK VIII, SECT 10, 286b; SECT 19, 286d-287a; SECT 32, 287d-288a; BK IX, SECT 1, 291a-c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 64b-67b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 234c-240b esp 235a-b, 238c-239a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-287d esp 256c-257d, 258d-259a, 261c-d, 262a-263c, 267b-d, 282b-283d, 286a-c / Practical Reason, 291a-361d esp 298a-300a, 304d-307d, 325a-327d, 329a-331a, 338c-355d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-379d esp 365b-366d, 369c-373b / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387b-388c / Judgement, 478a-479d; 584d-587a esp 586a-587a; 588b [fn 2]; 591b-592a; 594c-596c 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 452b-456a passim; 457c-461c passim; 464d-476a,c passim 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3025-3072] 73b-74b; [3217-3373] 79a-82a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 309c-314c passim, esp 310d 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 452c-d; 575a; 592c-593b; 599b-d; 624a-625b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640b-d / Ego and Id, 702c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 768b-c; 772b-d; 784a-d; 799c-800a / New Introductory Lectures, 837d-839b esp 838a-b

8c. Perversions or degradations in the sphere of pleasure and pain: sadism and masochism

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 19:4-11 / Exodus, 22:19 / Leviticus, 18:22-23; 20:13-16 / Deuteronomy, 27:21 NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 1:26-32 5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes, 340a-352a,c 7 PLATO: Laws, BK I, 645d-646c; BK VIII, 735d-738b 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VII, CH 1 [581b11-22] 107b / Ethics, BK VII, CH 5, 399a-d; CH 6 [1149b24-1150a8] 400b-c; BK X, CH 5 [1176a15-25] 430c-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3, 108b-c 14 PLUTARCH: Dion, 783c-784a 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK VI, 86a-b; BK XI, 103b-c; 107b-c; 108b-c; BK XIV, 145a-d; 146b-147a; BK XV, 166b-c / Histories, BK III, 265a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 18-21, 664d-666b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 31, A 7, 757c-758b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 65, A 1, REP 5, 879c-881d; PART III SUPPL, Q 81, A 4, REP 4, 966d-967d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XI [22-90] 15b-16a; XV-XVI, 21a-23d; XVII [1-99] 25b-26b; PURGATORY, XIX [1-69] 81c-82a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 89d-90c; 118a-122a; 166b-167a; 427b-d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Sonnets, CXXIX, 606a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, THE AFFECTS, DEF 48, EXPL, 421b-d; PART IV, APPENDIX, XIX, 449a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK IX [990-1133] 269a-272a 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 67b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 38a-b; 60a-c; 138d-139a; 389b-c; 484c-d; 649c-650b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 93d-94a; 169a-b; 174c-175c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 355a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART IV, 292b-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IV, 174b; 188a-190c; BK VI, 267c-d; 271c-273c; BK VIII, 305b-307d; BK XI, 505a-511b; 520b-c; EPILOGUE I, 660d-661b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 4a-d; BK II, 39a-40a; BK V, 121d-127b esp 122d-123a; BK XI, 307c-310c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 718a-720b 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 16d / Interpretation of Dreams, 204b-c / Instincts, 415d-418c / General Introduction, 570a-572d; 577a-579d passim / Civilization and Its Discontents, 790a-791b / New Introductory Lectures, 847c-849b passim; 850a-b

9. The regulation of pleasures by law

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:14,17 / Deuteronomy, 5:18,21; 21:18-21 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:27 5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes, 340a-352a,c esp [215-369] 341d-343a 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 283a-285a / Republic, BK III, 326c-328a; BK IV, 348a-d; BK X, 432a-434c / Laws, BK I-II, 643b-663d esp BK II, 663b-d; BK III, 675c-676b; BK VI, 708c-709a; 712b; BK VII, 713c-716b esp 713c, 716a-b; 718c-720d; BK VIII, 731d-738c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK V, CH 1 [1129b19-24] 377a; BK X, CH 9 [1179b31-1180a13] 434c-d / Politics, BK II, CH 9 [1269b13-1270a14] 465d-466b; BK VII, CH 17 [1336a23-b24] 541b-d 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 32a-48d esp 36b-37b / Lycurgus-Numa, 61b,d-62c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 31a-b; BK III, 57b-58d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 100, A 4, ANS and REP 3, 253d-255a; A 5, REP 5, 255a-257c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [85-114] 77d-78a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 131b-132a 27 SHAKESPEARE: Measure for Measure, 174a-204d passim, esp ACT II, SC II [225-270] 181a-c, ACT III, SC II [91-128] 190c-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 54a-b 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 390a-b; 393a-395b 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 8c-d 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK V, 19a-d; BK VII, 44d-47a; 47c-48a; 49a-50c; BK XIII, 86b; 87c-88a; BK XIV, 105c-106b; BK XVI, 119d; BK XXV, 210a-b 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 434b-435a 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK II, 149d-150a; BK IV, 211a-b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 100c-101b; 484c-d 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 93d-94a 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS, XVIII, 19c-d; XXI, 20c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 12, 58b-c 43 MILL: Liberty, 302d-312a; 314b-316b 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 301c-d 54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 690b-c

10. The social utility of pleasure and pain

10a. The employment of pleasure and pain by parent or teacher in moral and mental training

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 13:24; 19:18; 22:15; 23:13-14; 29:15 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 30:1-12 passim—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 30:1-12 passim 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [1303-1464] 504b-506c 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 46b / Republic, BK III, 339b-340b / Laws, BK II, 653a-663d esp 653a-656c, 662c-663d; BK VII, 713d-716a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 3 [1104b8-18] 350a; BK X, CH 1 [1172a18-23] 426a; CH 9 [1179b20-1180a5] 434c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 14-23, 4c-7a / City of God, BK XIX, CH 16, 521d-522a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 48, A 6, CONTRARY, 264a-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 1, ANS, 226c-227c; Q 99, A 6, ANS, 250a-251a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 26d-30c esp 30b-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 16c-d; 70d-74a; 90d-91a; 185c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 55, SCHOL, 413b-d; THE AFFECTS, DEF 27, EXPL, 419a-b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40d-41a 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264b [fn 1] / Practical Reason, 357c-360d 43 MILL: Liberty, 287b-c / Utilitarianism, 463c-464d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 191b-c; 199c-200d; 309c-d; 448a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 47b-48d; BK VIII, 306b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 290a-291a 54 FREUD: War and Death, 759b / New Introductory Lectures, 876c

10b. The use of pleasure and pain by orator or statesman in persuasion and government

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 45b-d / Apology, 208c-209b; 210b-d / Gorgias, 260a-262a / Sophist, 554c-d / Laws, BK I, 640a-652d esp 650c-652d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 3, 350a-c; BK VII, CH 11 [1152b1-3] 403c; BK X, CH 9 [1180a1-13] 434d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356a14-18] 595c; BK II, CH 1 [1378a20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 125b-130d / Caesar, 578b-579a; 598d-599b / Marcus Brutus, 810d-811a 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK IV, 269d-270b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 99, A 6, 250a-251a 23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH VIII, 14a-c; CH XXI, 33a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 82b-d; PART II, 109b; 128a-b; 145a-147b passim 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 176a-c; 181d-183a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 23a-26a 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 440b-442a 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 320c-321b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 79a-b; 139b-140c; 502c-503a 42 KANT: Judgement, 535b-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 245a-c

CROSS-REFERENCES

For: The relation of pleasure and pain to sensations and emotions, see EMOTION 1a; SENSE 3c(2). For: The discussion of intellectual pleasure with respect to beauty and truth, see BEAUTY 4; EDUCATION 5e; KNOWLEDGE 8b(4). For: Another discussion of the kinds of pain, see PUNISHMENT 1a. For: The aspect of infinity in the desire for pleasure, see DESIRE 7a(1). For: The problem of pleasure and pain in relation to good and evil, see GOOD AND EVIL 3d, 4a, 4c; and for the conception of pleasure as an object of desire and as the satisfaction of desire, see DESIRE 2b, 2d. For: The problem of pleasure in relation to happiness, see HAPPINESS 2b(2). For: Other discussions of pleasure and pain in relation to moral virtue, see COURAGE 1, 3; PUNISHMENT 3a; TEMPERANCE 1, 2; VIRTUE AND VICE 5a; and for the consideration of asceticism and pleasure-seeking, see TEMPERANCE 6a-6b. For: The conflict between duty and pleasure, see DUTY 8; and for the basic issue between an ethics of duty and an ethics of happiness, see DUTY 2; HAPPINESS 3. For: Pleasure and pain in relation to friendship and love, see LOVE 1b. For: Another discussion of pleasure in relation to law, see TEMPERANCE 5c. For: The role of pleasure and pain in moral training, see PUNISHMENT 3a; VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(2).

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• DESCARTES. The Passions of the Soul
• HUME. An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
• J. S. MILL. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, CH 25
• FREUD. Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, CH 1-5
• —. Mourning and Melancholia

II.

• EPICURUS. Letter to Menoeceus
• CICERO. De Finibus (On the Supreme Good), I-II
• —. Tusculan Disputations, II
• TERTULLIAN. De Spectaculis
• T. MORE. Utopia, BK II
• MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la vérité, BK IV, CH 5-13
• LEIBNIZ. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH 20
• FRANKLIN. Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain
• HUTCHESON. An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections
• BENTHAM. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, CH 1-5
• LAMB. Hospita on the Immoderate Indulgences of the Pleasures of the Palate
• DE QUINCEY. Confessions of an English Opium-Eater
• ALIBERT. Physiologie des passions
• LEOPARDI. Essays, Dialogues, and Thoughts
• COLERIDGE. The Pains of Sleep
• J. MILL. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, CH 17-23
• W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL II (41-46)
• EMERSON. “Compensation,” in Essays, I
• WHEWELL. The Elements of Morality, BK II, CH 25
• SCHOPENHAUER. “On the Sufferings of the World,” “On the Vanity of Existence,” in Studies in Pessimism
• BAIN. The Emotions and the Will
• HINTON. The Mystery of Pain
• E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious, II
• H. SIDGWICK. The Methods of Ethics, BK I, CH 4; BK II, CH 1-6; BK III, CH 14; BK IV
• SPENCER. The Principles of Ethics, PART I, CH 7
• T. H. GREEN. Prolegomena to Ethics, BK III, CH 4(a)
• AVEBURY. The Pleasures of Life
• FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART VI, CH 8
• RIBOT. The Psychology of the Emotions
• WUNDT. Outlines of Psychology, (7)
• BRADLEY. Ethical Studies, II
• —. Collected Essays, VOL I(14)
• TITCHENER. Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention, I-IV, VII
• MOORE. Principia Ethica, CH 2-3
• —. Ethics, CH 1-2
• ELLIS. Studies in the Psychology of Sex, VOL I, PART II, pp 66-188
• PROUST. Remembrance of Things Past
• A. H. ALLEN. Pleasure and Instinct
• POWYS. In Defence of Sensuality
• BEEBE-CENTER. The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness
• BERTRAND. The Art of Suffering
• C. S. LEWIS. The Problem of Pain