Chapter 66: PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
The difficulties which attend the consideration of any great idea—by philosophers or others—appear with peculiar force in the traditional discussion of philosophy itself. The word “philosophy” not only varies in its descriptive significance, now designating one part of learning, now another, and sometimes even an attitude of mind or a way of life; but it also varies as a term of evaluation. It is seldom used without expressing either praise or dispraise of the methods and accomplishments of philosophy, or of the calling and character of the philosopher.
On the descriptive side the meaning of the word ranges from a conception of philosophy which covers all branches of scientific knowledge and which contrasts philosophy with poetry, history, and religion, to a conception of philosophy in which the primary point is its contrast to science and its association with poetry and religion as works of vision, speculation, or belief rather than of knowledge.
On its evaluative side, the word “philosophy” sometimes eulogizes the love and search for truth, the pursuit and even the attainment of wisdom. At the other extreme, it derogates vain learning, idle disputation, and the dogmatism of unsupported opinion. At one time, the good name of the philosopher stands in contrast to the questionable reputation of the sophist. At another, “philosopher” carries almost the same invidious connotation as “sophist.” The dismissal of philosophy as useless, or at best ornamental, in the practical affairs of society is sharply opposed to the vision of an ideal state which can come to pass only if philosophers are kings, or kings philosophers.
These shifts in the meaning of the words “philosophy” and “philosopher” record crises in the history of western thought. They reflect the characteristic formations of our culture in its major epochs.
The great books of antiquity, for example, seem to give no intimation of a division between science and philosophy. Particular bodies of knowledge, such as physics or mathematics, are indifferently regarded as sciences or branches of philosophy. The crown of knowledge is wisdom, approached as one rises in the hierarchy of knowledge to the highest science or the first philosophy. Aristotle and Plato may disagree in naming or defining the type of knowledge which deserves to be called wisdom, yet for both it is the ultimate attainment of philosophical inquiry or scientific work.
The differences between Plato and Aristotle discussed in the chapters on DIALECTIC and METAPHYSICS—the one using “dialectic” as the name for the supreme form of knowledge, the other using “theology” to name the summit of the sciences—do not affect their agreement that the philosopher is a man of knowledge, not opinion, and that his ultimate goal is wisdom.
If there is any distinction in antiquity between science and philosophy, it seems to find expression in the sense in which Socrates speaks of philosophy as the love of wisdom, implying thereby its pursuit rather than its attainment. A man would not be called a scientist in a particular field—mathematics, let us say—unless he actually had some mathematical knowledge; but a man who is not actually wise can be called a philosopher by virtue of his effort to become wise. Apart from this point of distinction, the Greeks tend to identify philosophy with the fundamental sciences, which somehow yield speculative or practical wisdom.
Considering the whole of human learning, all its arts and disciplines, we see that the things the ancients distinguish from philosophy are poetry, history, and the particular productive arts or crafts. Here again Plato and Aristotle do not make the distinction in the same terms. Plato compares the poet unfavorably with the philosopher in the Republic. The poet is an imitator of imitations and moves on the level of images and beliefs, whereas the philosopher rises above the imagination to the level of ideas which are the only true objects of knowledge. Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to pay poetry a compliment when in the Poetics he says that it is more philosophical than history because it deals with the universal rather than the particular. These attitudes toward poetry in relation to philosophy are somewhat reversed by the fact that for Plato myth and poetry provide materials from which philosophical insights can sometimes be distilled, whereas for Aristotle sense-experience is the source from which, by induction, the principles or axioms of philosophical knowledge are obtained. Despite these differences their accord on the supremacy of the philosopher remains unaffected.
More than poetry and history—and all the knowledge that can be applied productively—philosophy represents the highest use of man’s faculties. On this Aristotle and Plato seem to be agreed, even though Aristotle distinguishes the philosophical from the political life and assigns the most perfect happiness to the contemplative activity of the philosopher, whereas Plato—in the Republic at least—brings the philosopher back to the shadows of the cave after he has seen the light of truth itself, so that he can put his wisdom to practice in the government of his less fortunate fellow man.
The practice of philosophy seems to become, for the Roman writers, more important than the content of philosophy as a body of doctrine. “What is that which is able to conduct a man?” asks Marcus Aurelius. “One thing and only one, philosophy.” It keeps the inner man “free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose.” It enables him to “accept all that happens and all that is allotted… and finally to wait for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded.” To Aurelius his imperial court is like a stepmother to whom one must be dutiful, philosophy like a mother from whom one gains solace and help. “Return to philosophy frequently and repose in her,” he tells himself, so that “what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee tolerable, and thou tolerable in the court.”
The Stoic conception of philosophy as a moral discipline and as a consolation creates that sense of the word in which the familiar injunction to a person in distress—“Be philosophical”—carries the same meaning as “Be stoical.” Philosophy provides only peace of mind, not worldly riches or external power. “Philosophy does not promise to secure to man anything outside himself,” says Epictetus. Nor does it fulfill its promise of inner strength without stern resolution to withdraw desire from the goods of fortune.
“Do you suppose that you can be a philosopher if you do as you do now?” Epictetus asks. “Do you suppose that you can eat and drink as you do now, and indulge your anger and displeasure just as before? No, you must sit up late, you must work hard, conquer some of your desires… When you have carefully considered these drawbacks, then come to us… if you are willing to pay this price for peace of mind, freedom, tranquility.” Do not try to be “first a philosopher, then a tax-collector, then an orator, then one of Caesar’s procurators. These callings do not agree… You must be busy either with your inner man, or with things outside, that is, you must choose between the position of a philosopher and that of an ordinary man.”
There seems to be no difference between the Stoic and Epicurean conception of philosophy. Lucretius praises Epicurus, “thanks to whom sweet solaces of life soothe the mind,” for as soon as his philosophy “begins to proclaim aloud the nature of things, the terrors of the mind fly away.”
But for Lucretius philosophy achieves this boon not merely by curbing the passions and quieting desires, but also, and primarily, by the truth of its teachings about the constitution of the world and the causes of things. Nor is it merely that the philosophical mind is able “to dwell in the calm high places, firmly embattled on the heights by the teaching of the wise, whence you can look down on others, and see them wandering hither and thither, going astray as they seek the way of life.” Philosophy provides a more specific remedy for the deepest of human ills by “freeing the mind from the close bondage of religion.”
Men fear the thunderbolts of the gods, their intervention in the course of nature and human affairs, and the punishments of the after-life. Before Epicurus taught them the mortality of the soul and the atomic determination of all things, “the life of man lay foul to see and grovelling upon the earth, crushed by the weight of religion.” His teaching concerning “what can come to be and what cannot, and in what way each thing has its power limited,” rids the mind of the terrors fostered by religion. This “darkness of mind must needs be scattered… by the outer view and the inner law of nature.”
Except for Lucretius, the triumph of philosophy over religion does not seem to be central to ancient conceptions of philosophy’s contribution to the mind and life of man. In the pagan world, religious belief is either combined with philosophy to constitute the worship of the gods, which seems to be Plato’s view in the Laws; or it represents the superstitions of the ignorant as opposed to the sophistication of the educated. Gibbon describes the rift between religion and philosophy not as a matter of intellectual controversy, but as a division of society into classes lacking or having the benefits of education—or, what is the same in the ancient world, instruction in philosophy.
But in the mediaeval world, the distinction between philosophy and religion seems to be essential to the consideration of the nature and value of philosophy. The importance of the distinction appears alike in the great books of the Christian tradition and in the great writings of the Mohammedan and Jewish cultures—in Augustine and Aquinas, Avicenna, Averroës, and Maimonides—though the problem of philosophy’s relation to religion and theology may be quite differently solved by each. In all three religious communities secular learning and sacred doctrine are set apart by their origin—the one from the efforts of human reason, the other from the word of God as revealed to the faithful. Even when it is held in highest esteem as the best achievement of secular learning, philosophy is for the most part regarded as inferior to the teachings of religion.
There are those—the simply religious, the devout, the mystical—who abominate the pretensions of reason and the vanity of philosophers who claim either merit or need for any knowledge beyond the truths which God himself has revealed. This position is expressed by such Christian writers as Tertullian, Peter Damian, Bernard of Clairvaux; or, in the Arabic tradition, by Al-Ghazzali’s The Destruction of Philosophy. Al-Ghazzali is answered by Averroës in his Destruction of the “Destruction” which asserts the supremacy of philosophy. Averroës reserves philosophy for men of requisite intellectual strength and relegates theology and religion to those who must substitute opinion and imagination for reason.
Neither Augustine nor Aquinas goes to these extremes. They do not dismiss philosophy as useless learning or as dangerous folly, subversive of the wisdom of faith; but neither do they admit the sufficiency of philosophy for knowledge of God—the mysteries of the divine nature, God’s providence and His gracious gift of salvation to man.
Quoting St. Paul’s warning to “beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit according to the tradition of men and the rudiments of the world, and not according to Christ,” Augustine defends his praise of the Platonic philosophy which in his judgment comes nearest to the Christian faith, on the ground that the Apostle also said to the gentiles that “that which is known of God is manifest among them, for God has manifested it to them.” Yet he adds that “the Christian man who is ignorant of their writings… is not, therefore, ignorant that it is from the one true and supremely good God that we have that nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace with which, by cleaving to Him, we are blessed.”
Philosophy, according to Augustine, can thus be dispensed with in all the major concerns of knowledge, love, or action. But Augustine does not argue that it should therefore be discarded. “If those who are called philosophers,” he says, “and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of it,” even as the spoils of the Egyptians belong to the Jews.
Though Augustine and Aquinas conceive the relation of faith and reason differently, they seem to share a conception of philosophy as the handmaiden of theology when faith seeks understanding. For Aquinas this does not appear to imply lack of dignity or even the loss of a certain autonomy on the part of philosophy. On the contrary, so highly does he regard the demonstrations of Aristotle, whom he calls “the philosopher,” that he opens the Summa Theologica with the question “Whether, besides the philosophical sciences, any further doctrine is required.”
He answers that “it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason can investigate, it was necessary that man be taught by a divine revelation. For the truth about God, such as reason can know it, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors; whereas man’s whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth…. It was, therefore, necessary that besides the philosophical sciences investigated by reason, there should be a sacred science by way of revelation.” That sacred science is theology—not the theology which is a part of philosophy, but the theology whose principles come from faith rather than from reason.
“There is no reason,” Aquinas writes, “why those things which are treated by the philosophical sciences, so far as they can be known by the light of natural reason, may not also be treated by another science so far as they are known by the light of the divine revelation.” On this view, sacred theology may treat of certain things, such as the mystery of the Trinity, which do not belong properly to the philosopher because they exceed the power of reason to demonstrate; but other matters concerning nature, man, and God may belong both to the philosopher and to the theologian, who consider them according to their different lights. Since a truth cannot conflict with a truth, though reason sponsors one and faith the other, there can be no conflict between philosophy and theology.
Some modern philosophers, like Bacon and Locke, seem to agree with mediaeval theologians about the subordination of philosophy to theology. But for the most part the modern tendency, increasingly evident in the writings of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, is to insist upon the complete autonomy of philosophy.
Hegel, for example, challenges “the imputation against Philosophy of being shy of noticing religious truths, or of having occasion to be so,” and the insinuated “suspicion that it has anything but a clear conscience in the presence of these truths. So far from this being the case,” Hegel remarks, “the fact is that in recent times Philosophy has been obliged to defend the domain of religion against the attacks of several theological systems.”
The diverse aspects of the problem of the relation of philosophy to theology, and of theology to faith, are discussed in the chapters on METAPHYSICS, THEOLOGY, and RELIGION. The problem which is more characteristic of the modern consideration of philosophy concerns its relation to science.
To state the problem some distinction between the two is necessary, and making this distinction represents a novel departure, both in thought and language. As we have seen, philosophy and science are almost identified throughout the ancient and mediaeval tradition. Insofar as the word “science” means knowledge rather than opinion, the result of philosophical inquiry is science, and philosophy as a whole is divided into a number of sciences. There may be, as ancient writings seem to suggest, sciences which aim at useful productions rather than at speculative or practical wisdom, and fall below the level of philosophy; or there may be, as some Christian theologians hold, a sacred science superior in its wisdom to all the philosophical sciences. But these exceptions to the identity of philosophy and science merely confirm the point that in the ancient or mediaeval view philosophy is scientific and consists of sciences, even though there may be sciences which are not philosophical.
This use of the words “science” and “philosophy” persists well into modern times. Hobbes, for example, presents his classification of the types of knowledge under the heading “science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences, which is also called Philosophy.” Bacon proposes to “divide sciences into theology and philosophy.” Descartes uses the words “science” and “philosophy” interchangeably. “Among the different branches of Philosophy,” he says, “I had in my younger days to a certain extent studied Logic; and in those of Mathematics, Geometrical Analysis and Algebra—three arts or sciences which seemed as though they ought to contribute to the design I had in view.” In the Prefatory Letter to his Principles of Philosophy, he likens “philosophy as a whole” to “a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences. These reduce themselves to three principal ones, viz., medicine, mechanics, and morals.”
Even as near the end of the eighteenth century as Hume, the word “philosophy” continues to be the general name for the particular sciences. It covers the experimental study of natural phenomena as well as what are for Hume the non-experimental sciences of mathematics and psychology. But it excludes divinity or theology, insofar as “its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation”; metaphysics, which is “nothing but sophistry and illusion”; and all inquiries into particular as opposed to general facts, such as “history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.”
Nor is this use of terms confined to what readers today would call books of philosophy. The authors of the books which are today regarded as among the foundations of modern science—Galileo, Newton, Huygens and, in the eighteenth century, Lavoisier and Fourier—refer to themselves as philosophers and to the science in which they are engaged, e.g., mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, as parts or aspects of natural philosophy. They do, however, indicate an awareness of how they differ from ancient and mediaeval scientists (who also called themselves philosophers) by calling their own work “experimental philosophy.”
In this phrase lies the root of the distinction between philosophy and science as that distinction is generally understood by writers since the eighteenth century. The word “experimental” applied to philosophy signifies a radical difference in the method of inquiry and even in the objects to be investigated, for certain objects can be known only by experimental or empirical research. Kant appears to be the first (in the great books at least) to make a sharp separation between the investigation of either nature or mind by what he calls “empirical” as opposed to “rational” methods. He still uses the name “science” for both sorts of investigation, but he appears to restrict “philosophy” to the latter—the pure, the a priori, the rational sciences.
Two other innovations must be noted. Though Kant regards it as a rational discipline, he excludes mathematics entirely from philosophy and criticizes its misleading influence upon those philosophers who have tried to imitate mathematical thought. And though he sometimes uses “metaphysics” narrowly to designate the critical examination of pure reason itself, he also says that “this name of metaphysic may be given to the whole of pure philosophy… excluding all that belongs to the empirical and the mathematical employment of reason.” Considering that it has only two objects, nature and freedom—that which is and that which ought to be—Kant divides philosophy into the speculative and the practical use of pure reason, which gives rise to a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. “Metaphysic, therefore, that of nature as well as that of morals, and particularly the criticism of our adventurous reason which forms the introduction to and preparation for it, constitute together,” Kant writes, “what may be termed philosophy in the true sense of the word. Its only goal is wisdom, and the path to it, science.”
Kant’s innovations in vocabulary plainly announce the separation of philosophy from mathematics and experimental science, which is only intimated by earlier modern writers. But Kant still uses the word “science” for both the philosophical and the empirical sciences. The final step is taken in the nineteenth century when the word “science” is restricted to mathematics and to such knowledge of nature, man, and society as can be obtained by the methods of experimental or empirical research. William James, for example, stresses the fact that he is trying to expound psychology as one of the natural sciences, and to that end he tries to separate the problems which are capable of empirical investigation from those which belong to philosophical speculation. For Freud that separation is an accomplished fact, and one which leaves to philosophy no problem that can be solved by science.
According to Freud, “it is inadmissible to declare that science is one field of human intellectual activity, and that religion and philosophy are others, at least as valuable, and that science has no business to interfere with the other two.” On the contrary, Freud thinks it is right for scientific research to look “on the whole field of human activity as its own,” and to criticize the unscientific formulations of philosophy. The trouble with philosophy is that “it behaves itself as if it were a science… but it parts company with science, in that it clings to the illusion that it can produce a complete and coherent picture of the universe.” It is this illusion which science continually punctures, since, in Freud’s opinion, “that picture must needs fall to pieces with every new advance in our knowledge.”
When science and philosophy are set apart at last, it is possible to make sense of the typically modern questions concerning philosophy. How does it stand in relation to science? Does it consist of verifiable knowledge comparable to that which can be obtained in the natural and social sciences? If not, what is the standard of truth in philosophy? Does it consist of definitions and postulates leading to rigorously demonstrated conclusions in a manner comparable to mathematics, especially in its modern construction? If not, must it not be regarded as opinion or speculation rather than as knowledge in any strict sense? Or if philosophical thought can be compared with mathematics, does not the diversity of definitions and postulates employed by different philosophers reduce philosophy to a collection of competing “systems” rather than a single discipline in which philosophers work cooperatively as do scientists and mathematicians?
However the foregoing questions are answered, there are still others. Does philosophy have distinct branches, divided according to their objects of study like the natural sciences, or is philosophy to be identified with metaphysics? If, in addition to metaphysics, there is a philosophy of nature, how are its principles and conclusions related to the findings of the natural sciences which appear to study the same object? Similarly, if psychology is a branch of philosophy, how is it related to experimental or clinical psychology? What is the relation of moral and political philosophy to the empirical social sciences concerned with describing, not judging or regulating, human conduct and social institutions? Is economics a science or is it a branch of moral philosophy; or, if it is both, how are the two related?
What is the use of philosophy, especially in its theoretic branches, if, unlike science, it cannot be applied to the mastery of physical nature and the production of utilities, whether bridges or bombs? What, finally, at the end of its long history, does philosophy come to if, in such marked contrast to the continuously accelerated progress of the sciences, it cannot claim any signal advance on which all philosophers are agreed, but instead must admit that most of its problems seem to be perennially debated, now as in every preceding century?
Some of these questions, as well as certain answers to them, are considered in other chapters: the comparison of empirical research and philosophical thought as constituting different types of science, in the chapter on SCIENCE; the distinction and relation between natural philosophy and natural science, in the chapter on PHYSICS; the difference between philosophical and scientific psychology, in the chapter on MAN; the function of definitions, hypotheses, postulates, or axioms in the foundation and method of philosophy and science, in the chapter on PRINCIPLE; the difference between the practical use of philosophy in the sphere of morals and the use of science in the sphere of the productive arts, in the chapter on KNOWLEDGE; the accumulation of truth as measuring advances in science and philosophy, in the chapter on PROGRESS.
Here we must observe that such answers to these questions as tend to subordinate philosophy to science originate exclusively with modern views of the nature of knowledge, of the criteria of truth, and of the capacities of the human mind, especially the power of reason. Even those modern authors who write at a time when the words “science” and “philosophy” are, for the most part, interchangeable tend in this direction. The points they make about the nature, aim, and method of what they call either science or philosophy have the effect of giving the status of knowledge only to mathematics and the empirical sciences, and of reducing philosophical speculation to the status of opinion.
Bacon’s insistence, for example, that genuine knowledge gives us power over nature and generates productions, seems to have this effect, certainly upon any part of traditional philosophy which cannot meet this test. Hume’s insistence upon experimental reasoning with respect to all matters of fact seems to eliminate not only metaphysics, but any science or philosophy of nature which is not experimental. The methodological reforms in philosophy which these philosophers and others, like Hobbes, Descartes, and Spinoza, propose seem to be reforms which eliminate whatever in philosophy cannot become either experimental science or a quasi-mathematical system of thought.
Among the modern reformers of philosophy, Kant represents the exception. By his critical method he hopes to establish philosophy above and independent of all the empirical sciences; and to institute metaphysics as a science which neither imitates mathematics nor accepts it as an equal in the scale of reason’s accomplishments. Yet even Kant seems to betray the typically modern attitude toward philosophy. The intellectual revolution which he projects as the philosophical parallel to the Copernican revolution in astronomy is motivated by his desire to secure for philosophy a stability and development comparable to that enjoyed by mathematics and the empirical sciences.
“In the progress of society,” writes Adam Smith, “philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves dexterity and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably increased by it.”
Despite his use of the word “philosophy,” it seems likely that Adam Smith is describing the division of labor in scientific research and the specialization of scientists. Though philosophy has divisions, and though the distinction and order of its parts are discussed by the great philosophers, their own work exhibits a spirit opposed to specialization. In fact, one measure of the greatness of a philosopher is the comprehensiveness of his thought, the range of subject matters and the scope of the problems with which he deals.
Those philosophers, like Aristotle, Bacon, Hobbes, or Kant, who show great interest in the divisions of philosophy seem to be largely concerned with distinguishing the different objects of philosophical thought and differentiating the concepts or principles peculiarly relevant to each. Other chapters deal with subject matters, sciences, or disciplines that have been regarded, by one philosopher or another, as major divisions of philosophy, e.g., LOGIC, METAPHYSICS, THEOLOGY, DIALECTIC, MATHEMATICS, PHYSICS, and psychology (in the chapter on MAN). But one group of sciences or disciplines is not discussed elsewhere and must be briefly noted here. Traditionally within the province of the philosopher, they are sometimes expanded to his whole domain. They come nearer to what the ordinary man means by “philosophy” when he speaks of having a philosophy of life—an over-all yet personal view of the human situation, illuminated by a sense of the values which should direct conduct.
The disciplines in question are traditionally called ethics and politics, or moral philosophy. Socrates is credited with having accomplished the first great reform in philosophy when he turned to such subjects and away from the inquiries of his predecessors. “I do not mean to speak disparagingly of the students of natural philosophy,” he says at his trial, “but the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations.” Subsequently he tells his judges that he “will never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy”—reproaching those whom he questions with “under-valuing the greater and over-valuing the less,” enjoining them not to take thought of their persons or their properties, “but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul.” He will not foreswear philosophy even to save his life. “I cannot hold my tongue,” he says. “Daily discourse about virtue… is the greatest good of man,” for “the unexamined life is not worth living.”
The conception of ethics and politics and of their relation to other branches of philosophy seems to depend upon the acceptance or rejection of a fundamental principle in the division of philosophy. Aristotle and Kant, for example, divide the philosophical sciences into the theoretic or speculative and the practical or moral, according as they consider what is (the nature and causes of things) or what ought to be (the objects of choice, the ends and means, in the conduct of life and the institutions of society). According to this conception of the practical, the practical sciences are ethics and politics, and with them economics and jurisprudence; or in another statement of the same divisions, the parts of practical philosophy are moral philosophy, the philosophy of right, the philosophy of law. They are all conceived as normative, prescriptive, or regulative disciplines, determining what is good and evil or right and wrong, and directing action in the sphere of human freedom.
Hobbes proceeds on a different principle. He separates natural philosophy (including philosophia prima) from civil philosophy, or the theory of the body politic. But he includes ethics and poetics under natural philosophy as part of the theoretic study of human nature. The distinction between the theoretic and the practical seems to be here ignored, or even implicitly denied insofar as Hobbes would reject the basis of the distinction—the difference between natural necessity and human freedom. Necessity governs the motions of the human body and of the body politic as much as it does the bodies studied by the physicist, and so ethics, politics, and physics are alike sciences of determined consequences.
Still another view seems to be taken by Bacon who separates natural from human and civil philosophy and divides natural philosophy into two main speculative branches (physics and metaphysics) and two main practical branches (mechanics and magic). Psychology, logic, and ethics belong to human philosophy; politics and jurisprudence to civil philosophy. But with respect to all of these Bacon does not apply the distinction between the speculative and the practical which seems to him of the utmost importance in natural philosophy. The reason seems to be that Bacon uses the word “practical” to mean the production of effects resulting from the knowledge of causes, rather than actions to be performed by men as the result of choice. His practical sciences correspond, therefore, to what Aristotle conceives as arts, or productive sciences—the sphere of making or poetics in general—not to what Aristotle means by the practical, the sphere of doing rather than of making, of prudence rather than of art. These matters are discussed in the chapters on ART and POETRY.
The problem of the relation of science to art becomes, if restated in Bacon’s terms, the problem of the relation of the theoretic to the practical (i.e., productive) sciences. But in terms of Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant, the problem of the relation between the speculative and practical branches of philosophy becomes the quite different problem of how knowledge of being or nature relates to knowledge of what should be sought or ought to be done. In Hobbes’ terms the problem shifts in still another direction to the consideration of the bearing of physics upon psychology, ethics, and politics.
How, on any of the foregoing views, do speculations concerning the nature of things affect the theory of human life and society, or the practical principles by which man tries to lead a good life and organize a good society? What relation do the truths of physics and metaphysics, or the major philosophical issues in these fields, bear to the truths and issues in psychology, ethics, and politics? Or, as William James puts the question, must not any man who has a philosophy of life also have, implicitly at least, a metaphysics?
Upon the answers to such questions depends the varying esteem in which philosophy is held in the great periods of western culture. Unlike supernatural religion and empirical science, and especially when separated from them, philosophy does not promise eternal salvation or earthly prosperity. The uses of philosophy, as compared with religion and science, must somehow be assessed in the terms which, from the beginning of philosophy, are of its essence—the love of wisdom, and through it the search for a human wisdom which shall be at once speculative and practical.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
1. The definition and scope of philosophy * 1a. The relation of philosophy to theology or religion * 1b. The relation of philosophy to mathematics * 1c. The relation of philosophy to experimental or empirical science * 1d. The relation of philosophy to myth, poetry, and history
2. The divisions of philosophy * 2a. The distinction between theoretic or speculative and practical or moral philosophy: the distinction between natural and civil philosophy * 2b. The branches of speculative philosophy: the divisions of natural philosophy * 2c. The nature and branches of practical or moral philosophy: economics, ethics, politics, jurisprudence; poetics or the theory of art
3. The method of philosophy * 3a. The foundations of philosophy in experience and common sense * 3b. The philosopher’s appeal to first principles and to definitions * 3c. The processes of philosophical thought: induction, intuition, definition, demonstration, reasoning, analysis, and synthesis * 3d. The methodological reformation of philosophy
4. The uses of philosophy: diverse conceptions of its aim, function, and value * 4a. The philosophic mode of life: contemplation and happiness * 4b. Philosophy as a moral discipline: the consolation of philosophy * 4c. The social role of philosophy: the philosopher and the statesman; the philosopher king
5. The character and training of the philosopher: the difficulty of being a philosopher
6. Praise and dispraise of the philosopher and his work * 6a. The philosopher as a man of science or wisdom: the love and search for truth * 6b. The philosopher and the man of opinion: sophistry and dogmatism, idle disputation, perpetual controversy * 6c. The philosopher as a man of reason: the limits of reason; its supplementation by experience or faith * 6d. The philosopher as a man of theory or vision: neglect of the practical; withdrawal from the affairs of men and the marketplace
7. Observations on the history of philosophy: the lives of the philosophers in relation to their thought
REFERENCES
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR’S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1. The definition and scope of philosophy
7 PLATO: Lysis, 20a / Euthydemus, 74b-76b / Republic, BK II, 320b; BK V, 368c-373c; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Sophist, 570a-574c esp 571a-c / Philebus, 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh Letter, 809a-811a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 1 [184a10-16] 259a; CH 9 [192a33-b2] 268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [194a9-15] 271a; CH 7 [198a22-31] 275b-c / Metaphysics, BK I-VI 499a-550a,c esp BK I, CH 3 501c-502d, BK III, CH 1 511b,d-512b, BK III, CH 1-2 513b,d-516d, BK IV, CH 1-3 522a-525a, BK VI 547b,d-550a,c; BK XI, CH 1 587a-588a; CH 3-4 589a-590a; CH 7-8 592b-593d / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403b10-17] 632d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; CH 6 389d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 11 150a-151b; CH 17 158d-161a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 8 14d-15a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 1 264b,d-265b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1 3b-4a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-b; 65c-d; 71c-d; 72a-d; PART IV, 267a-272b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 39d-41b; 42a-46a; 48d-49b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 54 111c-d; APH 66 114d-115c; APH 80 120a-b; APH 95 126b-c; APH 107 128c; BK II, APH 9 140b-c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I-III 1a-5a / Discourse, PART III, 47a-48b; PART IV, 51b-52a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I 451a-455b passim; SECT VIII, DIV 81 487a; SECT XII, DIV 130-132 508c-509d 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 5d-6a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 211c-218d; 243c-250a,c esp 245a-246a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-c; 254b-c; 264b-d; 270c-d / Practical Reason, 337a-338c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c / Judgement, 463a-467a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1b-7d; ADDITIONS, 3 116a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-158a; 184d-185d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 641a-b; 758a 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874a
1a. The relation of philosophy to theology or religion
7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 345d-346a / Theaetetus, 528c-531a / Laws, BK XII, 797c-798b 8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK I, CH 1 [284a1-5] 376a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b28-983a11] 501a-b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [62-79] 1d-2a; BK III [1-93] 30a-31b; BK V [1-90] 61a-62b 14 PLUTARCH: Nicias, 435b-d 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 1-12 264b,d-273a; BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XVIII, CH 37 493c-494a; CH 41 495b-496c / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 40 655b-656a; CH 42 656c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1 3a-10c esp A 1 3b-4a, AA 4-6 5a-7a, A 8 7c-8d; Q 2, A 2, REP 1 11d-12c; Q 12, AA 12-13 60d-62b; Q 14, A 6, REP 2 80a-81c; Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; Q 32, A 1 175d-178a; Q 39, AA 7-8 209a-213a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 71, A 6, REP 5 110b-111b; PART II-II, Q 2, AA 3-4 392d-394b; Q 19, A 7, ANS 469d-470c; Q 45 598c-603c esp AA 3-4 600c-601c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 65b-66c; 70c; 83b; PART II, 137b-c; 160b; 163a-b; PART III, 165b; PART IV, 247d; 260b-c; 267a-c; 269b-271c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 89c-d; 155a-c; 208d-209c; 212a-d; 238c-239c; 267c-268a; 271b-273b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c; 12c-13c; 16a-b; 19d-20a; 33c-d; 39d-48d esp 41b-d; 55b-d; 95d-101d esp 96c-97c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 65 114b-c; APH 89 124a-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules, II, 4d-5a / Discourse, PART I, 43c / Meditations, 69a-71a,c / Objections and Replies, 125b-126a; 127d; 162c-165d; 168b-169a; 283d-284d esp 284d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 77 186a; 185-195 205a-210b; 219 212a; 226 212b-213a; 243-253 218a-220a; 265-290 221b-225a; 543 266a; 557-567 272b-273b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI 497b-503c 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12d-13b; 159a-d; 186a-d; 200d-201a; 204c-206d passim; 307b-309d esp 308b-309b; 670b-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 119a-c; 176a-c; 177b-192d esp 190a-192d; 236b-240b esp 239a-b / Practical Reason, 346b-347a; 349b-353a / Judgement, 578a-b; 588a-613a,c esp 593d-599d, 604d-606d, 607d-609b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 455a-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-160b; 177c-d; PART III, 308c-309d; PART IV, 368d-369a,c 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 875b
1b. The relation of philosophy to mathematics
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 75b / Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII, 391b-398c / Philebus, 633a-635a / Laws, BK VII, 728b-730d 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 2 [194a9-15] 271a / Heavens, BK II, CH 10 [279b32-280a11] 371b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992a24-b9] 510c-d; BK III, CH 3 [995a15-20] 513d; BK IV, CH 1 522a; BK VI, CH 1 547b,d-548c; BK XI, CH 3 [1061a29]-CH 4 [1061b34] 589c-590a; CH 7 592b-593a; BK XIII, CH 8 [1073b3-7] 603d / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403b10-19] 632d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-19] 391b 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-813d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 58a-b; 59b-c; PART IV, 267a-b; 268c-269b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 80 120a-b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I 2a-3b; IV 5a-7d; XIV, 29a-b / Discourse, PART I, 46c-47d / Objections and Replies, 169c-170a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 370b-c 34 NEWTON: Principles, 1a-2a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 17d-19a; 211c-218d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 376c-d / Judgement, 551a-552c 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 695b-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a-883a
1c. The relation of philosophy to experimental or empirical science
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-242c / Republic, BK VII, 391b-398c 8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK II, CH 13 [293a15-31] 384d / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d 10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 20 7b-d 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, 1a-b; BK II, 27b-c 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 202d-203a; 214d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b; 42a-43d; 46c-47c / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; BK I, APH 15 108a; APH 51 111c; APH 54 111c-d; APH 62-64 113b-114b; APH 66 114d-115c; APH 80 120a-b; APH 95 126b-c; APH 107 128c; BK II, APH 9 140b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 43d; PART VI, 61b-c; 66d 34 NEWTON: Principles, 1a-2a; BK III, 269a; RULE I-IV 270b-271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK III, 542a-543b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d esp 5c-6c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-d / Judgement, 561c-562a,c; 578a-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d-183c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 694c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 882a-886a passim 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 722a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 873d-875a esp 874d-875a
1d. The relation of philosophy to myth, poetry, and history
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 57a-c / Phaedrus, 122d-123a; 138c-140d / Ion 142a-148a,c / Republic, BK II-III, 319c-334b; BK X, 427c-434c esp 434a-c / Timaeus, 443b-447d / Statesman, 586c-589d 9 ARISTOTLE: Poetics, CH 9 [1451a36-b11] 686a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 67b-c; 71c-d; 72a-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41b-42a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 38d-39b; 44c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, III, 3c-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 5, 452d-453a; SECT VIII, DIV 65, 479b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 333d-334a; 348a,c 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 345b-346b; 544c-545c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40b-41a 42 KANT: Judgement, 575b-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3 10a-12c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-190b esp 177c-d, 184d-185d; PART IV, 368d-369a,c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 690a-b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 239c-240a; 246b-248c passim / Civilization and Its Discontents, 796c
2. The divisions of philosophy
2a. The distinction between theoretic or speculative and practical or moral philosophy: the distinction between natural and civil philosophy
7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-8a / Statesman, 581a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 14 [105b19-29] 149c; BK VI, CH 6 [145a12-18] 198d / Heavens, BK III, CH 7 [306a14-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1-2 499a-501c esp CH 2 [982a30-b27] 500c-501a; BK II, CH 1 [993b19-31] 512a-b; BK IV, CH 4 [1008b2-32] 527d-528b; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b18-28] 547d; BK XI, CH 7 [1064a10-19] 592b-c; BK XII, CH 9 [1074b35-1075a2] 605c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b32-640a10] 162a-b / Ethics, BK I, CH 3 339d-340b; CH 7 [1098a20-b8] 343c-344a; BK II, CH 2 [1103b26-1104a9] 349b-c; CH 4 350d-351b; BK III, CH 3 [1112a30-b12] 358b-c; BK VI, CH 1-2 387a-388b; CH 5 389a-c; CH 7-8 390a-391c; CH 12-13 393b-394d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 26 131b-132b; BK III, CH 6 181d-182b 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 4 266d-267c; BK XI, CH 25 336b-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 4 5a-b; A 5, ANS 5c-6a; Q 14, A 16 90b-91b; Q 79, A 11 424d-425b; Q 84, A 8, ANS 450b-451b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 6, REP 2 614a-c; Q 3, A 5 626b-627a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 56, A 3, ANS 31a-32b; Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; Q 84, A 1, REP 3 174b-175a; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART III, Q 1, A 1, REP 3 772b-773a; Q 13, A 1, REP 3 780a-781b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 72a-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16d-17a; 40a-c; 42a-c; 55b-d; 65d-66a; 86b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 3 107b; BK II, APH 9 140b-c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I 1a-2a / Discourse, PART III, 48b-49b; PART VI, 61b-c / Objections and Replies, 126a-b; 162d; 206c-207a; 215a-b; 237b-c; 243c-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 5-6 94b-95a; BK I, CH II, SECT 1 103d-104a; SECT 3-4 104b-105a; BK IV, CH XXI 394d-395a,c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I 451a-455b; SECT VIII, DIV 65, 479b-c; SECT XI, DIV 104 498b-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-13d; 190c-191a; 234c-235a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 260d-261d; 266c-d; 271a-c; 283d-284d / Practical Reason, 291a-297c; 307d-314d esp 310a-b; 319c-321b; 329a-337a,c esp 329b-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-d / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 463a-467a, 474b-475d; 578a-b; 596c-598b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 5c-6a; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 865b-866a
2b. The branches of speculative philosophy: the divisions of natural philosophy
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VII, 388a-398c esp 396d-398c / Philebus, 634b-635b 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 14 [105b19-29] 149c / Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a33-b2] 268c-d; BK II, CH 2 [194a9-15] 271a; CH 7 [198a22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, BK III, CH 1 [298a13-24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992a29-b9] 510c-d; BK IV, CH 2 [1004a2-9] 523a; BK VI, CH 1 547b,d-548c; BK VII, CH 11 [1037a13-21] 560d; BK XI, CH 3 [1061a29]-CH 4 [1061b34] 589c-590a; CH 7 592b-593a; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a30-b2] 598b-c; CH 8 [1073b1-7] 603d / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403b10-17] 632d 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [641a33-b10] 164b-c 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 812b-813d 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III, CH 4-6 11a-12b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 4 266d-267c; BK XI, CH 25 336b-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1, REP 2 3b-4a; Q 85, A 1, REP 2 451c-453c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 71c-d; 72a-d; PART IV, 269b-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 15d; 39d-48d esp 40a-41b, 42a-c, 43a-45a; 55b-61d esp 56c-58c, 59c-60c / Novum Organum, BK II, APH 9 140b-c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I-II 1a-3b; IV 5a-7d / Discourse, PART III, 46c-48b / Objections and Replies, 169c-170a 34 NEWTON: Principles, 1a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XXI 394d-395a,c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 101, 432c 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 15c-16c; 34a-37d esp 34c-35b; 59c; 210b-c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 264d; 266c-d / Practical Reason, 300d [fn 1]; 351b-352c / Judgement, 463a-467a esp 463b-464a; 476a-479d; 485b-486d; 488a-495a,c; 515b-c; 578a-b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 867a
2c. The nature and branches of practical or moral philosophy: economics, ethics, politics, jurisprudence; poetics or the theory of art
7 PLATO: Republic, BK X, 427c-434c / Statesman, 604c-608d 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 14 [105b19-29] 149c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [993b20-23] 512a; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b19-28] 547d; BK XI, CH 7 [1064a10-19] 592b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 1-4 339a-340d; CH 7 [1098a20-b8] 343c-344a; BK II, CH 2 [1103b26-1104a9] 349b-c; CH 4 350d-351b passim; BK III, CH 3 [1112a30-b12] 358b-c; BK VI, CH 8 390d-391c; BK X, CH 9 434a-436a,c / Politics, BK IV, CH 1 487a-488b / Poetics 681a-699a,c passim, esp CH 1-5 681a-684a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 14 16d-17a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 8 270a-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, AA 4-5 5a-6b; Q 14, A 16 90b-91b; Q 86, A 3, CONTRARY 463b-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [40-72] 80b-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-b; 72a-d; 78b-c; 80d-81a; 95d-96b; PART II, 112c-d; 128d-129b; 158c-d; 164a,c; PART IV, 268d; CONCLUSION, 282c-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 81d-95b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 3 107b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART VI, 61b-c; 66d-67a,c 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 543b-544a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH XI, SECT 15-18 303b-304b esp SECT 16 303c-d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 18-20 317d-319c; CH IV, SECT 7-10 325b-326b; CH XII, SECT 8 360c; CH XXI, SECT 1-3 394d-395a; SECT 5 395c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 1-5 451a-453b passim; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d passim, esp DIV 132, 509c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-334a,c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 75d-80b passim 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-254b; 264b-d; 266c-d; 271a-c; 283d-287d / Practical Reason, 291a-296d; 300d [fn 1]; 304a-d; 307d-321b; 327c-d; 329a-337a,c esp 329b-d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 366d-368a; 370d-372a; 373b-c; 374a-c; 378a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-d; 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Science of Right, 398a-399c / Judgement, 463a-467a; 515b-c; 523d-524a; 596c-598b 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47a-d; NUMBER 31, 103c-104a passim 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim; 453c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1d-7c; INTRO, par 1 9a 50 MARX: Capital, 6a-11d passim, esp 6a-d, 8a-9b; 178d-179c; 265a-266a; 267c-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 680d-684a; 689b-c 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 800c-801b
3. The method of philosophy
3a. The foundations of philosophy in experience and common sense
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 30 [46a18-28] 64a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 18 111b-c; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 2 [90a24-30] 123b-c; CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b / Heavens, BK III, CH 1 [298a13-24] 390a-b; CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d; CH 3 [318b19-31] 415c-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 499a-500b / Sense and the Sensible, CH 1 [436b13-437a16] 673c-674a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [418-448] 6b-c; [693-700] 9c; BK IV [353-521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 267a-b 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On Animal Generation, 331b-335c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 19-22 108b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, I 75a-77c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 10, SCHOL 376d-377a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 4, 451d-452a; SECT XII, DIV 130 508c-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-b; 15c-16c; 19a; 236d-237a; 247a-b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-c; 254b-c; 263b-d; 271a-c; 281c-282d / Practical Reason, 320c-321b; 329d-330c; 358a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-388a / Science of Right, 397b-398a / Judgement, 551a-552c; 562d-563b; 603a-b; 604a-b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-446b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 655a-659a
3b. The philosopher’s appeal to first principles and to definitions
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a; BK VII, 388a-398c esp 396d-398c 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c esp BK I, CH 1-3 97a-100a, CH 9 104b-d, CH 11 105d-106b, CH 19-22 111c-115b, CH 31-32 120a-121b, BK II, CH 1-10 122b,d-128d, CH 13 131b-133c / Topics, BK I, CH 1 [100a25-b21] 143a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b25-28] 500c; BK II, CH 2 [994a16-30] 513a-b; BK III, CH 1 [995b6-10] 514a; CH 2 [996b26-997a15] 515b-d; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-1026a6] 547b,d-548a; BK XI, CH 1 [1059a23-26] 587a; CH 4 [1061b17]-CH 7 [1064a28] 589d-592c; BK XIII, CH 4 [1078b13-30] 610a-b / Soul, BK I, CH 1 631a-632d; BK II, CH 2 [413a11-19] 643a-b; CH 3 [414b20-415a14] 644d-645b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095a30-b12] 340c-d; CH 7 [1098a20-b8] 343c-344a; BK VI, CH 6 [1140b31]-CH 7 [1141a19] 389d-390a; CH 11 [1143a32-b10] 392d-393a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 2, ANS and REP 1 4a-c; Q 2, A 2 11d-12c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-60a; 65d; PART IV, 269b-c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, IV, 5c-d; 6d; XII, 21b-c / Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART IV 51b-54b / Meditations, 69a-72d; I 75a-77c / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE I-III 130d-131a; 206a-207a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 10, SCHOL 376d-377a 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-434a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 24-25 120a-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 2 451b-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 179d-182b; 215d-217a / Practical Reason, 293c-294c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1b-c; INTRO, par 2 9b-10a; ADDITIONS, 3 116a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-158a
3c. The processes of philosophical thought: induction, intuition, definition, demonstration, reasoning, analysis, and synthesis
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 50d-52d; 57a-c / Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Phaedrus, 134a-d; 139d-140b / Meno, 179d-183c / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Parmenides 486a-511d esp 491a-d / Theaetetus, 514b-515d; 525d-526b / Sophist, 570a-574c esp 571a-c / Statesman 580a-608d esp 595a-d / Philebus, 609a-613c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c esp BK I, CH 1-3 97a-100a, BK II, CH 1-10 122b,d-128d / Topics, BK VIII, CH 1 [155b1-16] 211a-b; CH 14 [163a8-16] 222a / Sophistical Refutations, CH 16 [175a1-12] 241a / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b; CH 2 [184b25-185a19] 259c-260a; BK II, CH 7-9 275b-278a,c / Heavens, BK II, CH 13 [294b6-14] 386a; BK III, CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 [997a25-34] 515d-516a; BK IV, CH 2 522b-524b esp [1004a25-31] 523b-c, [1004b18-27] 523d; CH 4 [1005b35-1006a28] 525a-c; CH 7 [1012a18-24] 532a-b; CH 8 [1012b5-8] 532c; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-16] 547b; BK XI, CH 1 [1059b29-34] 587b; CH 3 589a-d esp [1061a10-18] 589b; CH 5 [1061b34-1062a19] 590a-c; CH 7 [1064a4-9] 592b; BK XIII, CH 4 [1078b13-30] 610a-c / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402a1]-CH 2 [403b23] 631a-633a; BK II, CH 4 [415a14-22] 645b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 339d-340b; CH 4 [1095a30-b12] 340c-d; CH 7 [1098a20-b8] 343c-344a; BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; CH 6 389d; CH 11 [1143a32-b11] 392d-393a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III, CH 4-6 11a-12b / Sixth Ennead, TR II, CH 4 270c-271a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 2-8 265b-270d passim 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 2 11d-12c; Q 32, A 1, REP 2 175d-178a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-60b; 65c-d; PART IV, 267a-c; 269b-c 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 101b-106a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 42a-c; 56c-59c / Novum Organum 105a-195d 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I-XII 1a-27d / Discourse, PART II, 46c-47d / Meditations, I 75a-77c / Objections and Replies, 119c-120c; 128a-129a 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 442a-443b 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULES 270a-271b / Optics, BK III, 543a-544a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 3-5 93d-94d; BK I, CH III, SECT 24-25 120a-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 2 451b-c; DIV 7-9 453c-455a; SECT II, DIV 17 457a-b; SECT XII, DIV 116, 503d-504a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 339d; 341b-342b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 16a-c; 109d-112d; 115d-116a; 119a-b; 184b-c; 185b-c; 193a-200c esp 193d-194b, 199a-c; 211c-218d / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264d / Practical Reason, 294a-b; 330d-331a; 336d-337a,c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a; 376c-d 43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 690a-b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 674a-675b esp 675b; 687a
3d. The methodological reformation of philosophy
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 11a-17b esp 12a-13c, 15a-b, 16a; 30b-c; 40a-c; 47d-48d; 65a-c / Novum Organum 105a-195d 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I-XII 1a-27d / Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART II-IV 48b-54b / Meditations, 69a-71a,c; I 75a-77c / Objections and Replies, 119c-d; 126a-b; 128a-129a; POSTULATE I-PROP IV 130d-133a,c; 134b-c; 167a-c; 206a-207a; 237b-238b; 267a-277a,c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XII 358c-363b esp SECT 14-15 362d-363b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO 405a-412a,c passim, esp SECT 25-25 411b-412a,c; SECT 133-134 439c-440a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 7-10 453c-455b; SECT VII, DIV 49 471c-d; SECT XI, DIV 116, 503d-504a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-13d; 19a-22a,c; 36d-37b; 101d-102a; 133c-134d; 146a-149d; 157d; 196b-197c; 218d-227a esp 224a-227a; 248d-250a,c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253c-d; 260d-261c; 273d-274a; 277d-279d / Practical Reason, 292a-296d esp 292d-293b, 294a-b; 299d; 311d-313d; 320c-321b; 331a-332d; 335b-c; 336d-337a,c / Judgement, 492c-d; 567c-568a 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 875a
4. The uses of philosophy: diverse conceptions of its aim, function, and value
4a. The philosophic mode of life: contemplation and happiness
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Phaedrus, 122b-128a / Symposium, 167b-d / Meno, 183c-184c / Apology 200a-212a,c / Phaedo, 223a-226c; 231c-234c / Republic, BK V-VII, 368c-401d / Timaeus, 476a-b / Theaetetus, 528b-531a / Philebus 609a-639a,c esp 633a-639a,c / Laws, BK I, 643c-d / Seventh Letter, 808c-809a 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 2 [118b6-16] 164d-165a / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b14-29] 602d-603a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 8 [1098b19-1099a6] 344a-c; BK VI, CH 12 [1144a2-6] 393c; BK X, CH 7-8 431d-434a / Politics, BK I, CH 7 [1267a8-14] 462d; BK VII, CH 1-3 527a-530a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-61] 15a-d; BK V [1-54] 61a-d; BK VI [1-79] 80a-81b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 4 108d-110a; CH 15 121c-d; CH 27 132b-133b; CH 29 134d-138a; BK II, CH 1 138b,d-140c; CH 12 151b-152c; CH 14 153d-155b; CH 17 158d-161a; BK III, CH 5 180d-181d; CH 10 185d-187a; CH 15 190a-191a; CH 21-22 193d-201a; BK IV, CH 6 230b-232c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 6 261a-c: SECT 9 261d; SECT 12 262b-c; BK IV, SECT 16 264d; BK V, SECT 8-9 269d-270c; BK VI, SECT 12 274c; BK X, SECT 12 298c-d 13 VIRGIL: Georgics, II [490-493] 65b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III, CH 5-6 11c-12b; TR IV, CH 4-16 14a-19b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 5 267d-268d; CH 8 270a-d; BK X, CH 2 299d-300a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 26, A 2, ANS and REP 2 150c-151a; PART I-II, Q 3, AA 4-5 625a-627a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 66, A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c 22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 70d-72a; 107a-112d; 231d-246a; 395d; 503b-504c; 508a-512a; 538a-543a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 69d-76a esp 70b-72c, 73c-74a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I, 1d / Discourse, PART I, 41d-42a; PART III, 49d-50b / Meditations, III, 88d-89a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, APPENDIX, IV 447b-c; XXX 450c-d; PART V 451a-463d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6 453b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345a / Political Economy, 373d-374a 42 KANT: Judgement, 591b-592a 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 451c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART IV, 368d-369a,c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [614-685] 17a-18a; [1194-1201] 29b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 255a; 308a-b
4b. Philosophy as a moral discipline: the consolation of philosophy
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Meno, 183c-184c / Phaedo, 222a-226c; 231c-234c / Timaeus, 476a-b / Theaetetus, 528c-531a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [62-145] 1d-2d; BK II [1-61] 15a-d; BK III [1-93] 30a-31b; [307-322] 34a-b; [830-1094] 40c-44a,c; BK V [1-54] 61a-d; BK VI [1-41] 80a-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses 105a-245a,c esp BK I, CH 4 108d-110a, CH 9 114c-116b, CH 15 121c-d, CH 17 122d-124a, CH 24 129a-d, CH 27 132b-133b, CH 29 134d-138a, BK II, CH 1 138b,d-140c, CH 14-17 153d-161a, BK III, CH 5 180d-181d, CH 21-23 193d-203b, BK IV, CH 1 213a-223d, CH 10 238d-240d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK II, SECT 11-12 258a-c, SECT 14 258d, SECT 17 259b-d, BK III, SECT 3 260b, BK IV, SECT 3 263b-264a, SECT 5 264b, SECT 46 267c, SECT 48 267d-268a, SECT 50 268c, BK V, SECT 9 270b-c, SECT 14 271b, BK VI, SECT 12 274c, SECT 24 276b, SECT 47 278d, SECT 49 279a, BK VII, SECT 32,35 282a, BK VIII, SECT 1 285a-b, SECT 25 287b-c, SECT 31 287d, SECT 58 290d, BK IX, SECT 3 291d-292a, SECT 21 293b-c, SECT 41 295c, BK XII, SECT 35-36 310c-d 13 VIRGIL: Georgics, II [490-493] 65b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 3 266a-d; CH 8 270a-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 21d-22a; 28a-36b; 55d-62a; 69d-75a; 231d-237d; 240c-242d; 283b-284c; 401c-d; 503b-504c; 508a-512a; 529c-530c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26a-c; 73d-74a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 67-73 444d-447a; PART V, PROP 25-42 458d-463d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 67 180b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 1-4 451a-452c; SECT V, DIV 34 463d-464b 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 388a-417b 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 35a-d; 182a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 373d-374a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 644d-646a 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 261c-d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 368c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART III, 303b-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [614-685] 17a-18a; PART II [11,398-407] 277b
4c. The social role of philosophy: the philosopher and the statesman; the philosopher king
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 83c-d / Apology, 207a-208a / Gorgias, 272b-273b; 291c-292b / Republic, BK V-VI, 368c-383c; BK VII, 390b-391b; 398c-401d / Theaetetus, 525c-526a: 528c-531a / Statesman, 598b-608d / Laws, BK I, 643c-d / Seventh Letter, 801b-802c; 806b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982a5-19] 500b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 7-8 390a-391c; BK X, CH 9 434a-436a,c / Politics, BK VII, CH 2-3 528a-530a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-61] 15a-d; BK V [1113-1135] 75c-d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VI, SECT 14 274d-275a 14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 47a-48c / Numa Pompilius, 59c-60b / Solon 64b,d-77a,c / Pericles, 122d-123c / Alcibiades, 156c-158b / Marcus Cato, 287d-288c / Alexander, 543b-544a; 566a-567d; 571b-572a / Cicero, 717a-b / Dion, 782c-788b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK XIV, 153d-155a; BK XV, 172c-173d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 164a,c 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 127b,d-131a,c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5a-b; 20b-26a; 27c; 30a-c 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 383a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 8-9 293c-294a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 4, 452a; DIV 5 452d-453b; SECT XI, DIV 113-114, 502d-503b 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XXVI, 202d-203a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345a / Political Economy, 373d-374a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 32a-b; 205d-206a: 284a-c; 338d-339c; 390d; 669b-c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40b-41a: 72c: 76d-77b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 360d-361d 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 49, 159d-160a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 4b-7c / Philosophy of History, PART III, 279d-281a; PART III, 303b-c; PART IV, 360b-c; 363d-364c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 107a-b 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780a-b
5. The character and training of the philosopher: the difficulty of being a philosopher
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 84a,c / Phaedrus, 125b-126c / Symposium, 163a-168a; 169c-172d / Apology 200a-212a,c / Phaedo, 223a-226c; 231c-234c / Gorgias, 271a-b; 273b-d; 291c-292b / Republic, BK I, 320b-c; BK V-VII, 368c-401d / Timaeus, 476a-b / Parmenides, 491a-c / Theaetetus, 525c-526b; 528c-531a / Seventh Letter, 808c-809a 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 9 [76a26-30] 104d / Topics, BK VIII, CH 14 [163a8-16] 222a / Heavens, BK II, CH 12 [291b24-29] 383b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 500b-501c / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402a1-22] 631a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096a11-17] 341b; BK X, CH 7 [1177a19-b3] 431d-432a 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 14, 178d-179a; BK III, CH 10, 207d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 8 113d-114c; CH 26 131b-132b; CH 29 134d-138a; BK II, CH 1 138b,d-140c; CH 3 141d-142a; CH 8-9 146a-148c; CH 11-12 150a-152c; CH 17 158d-161a; CH 19 162c-164b; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 19 192c-d; CH 21-22 193d-201a; BK IV, CH 6 230b-232c; CH 8 235b-237d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK V, SECT 9 270b-c; BK VII, SECT 3 279d-280a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III 10a-12b; TR IV, CH 4-16 14a-19b / Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 1-2, 246c-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a esp 60a-c; 70d-72a; 150c-151a; 451a-c; 539d-540a 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On Animal Generation, 331c-332a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b; 26a-27a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART II-III 44c-51b, PART VI 60d-67a,c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 4 172b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6 453b-c 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 81c-82a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 31d-32b; 644b-646a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 526c-527a 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 337a-338b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1d-2a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [614-685] 17a-18a; [1868-2050] 44b-48b
6. Praise and dispraise of the philosopher and his work
6a. The philosopher as a man of science or wisdom: the love and search for truth
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 125b-126c / Symposium, 163a-168a; 169c-172d / Apology 200a-212a,c / Phaedo, 222a-224a / Gorgias, 271a; 280d-294d / Republic, BK II, 319c-320c; BK V-VII, 368c-401d / Timaeus, 476a-b / Theaetetus, 528c-531a / Sophist, 551a-552c; 569a-571c / Seventh Letter, 808c-809a 8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK II, CH 12 [291b24-29] 383b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1-2 499a-501c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 6 [1096a11-17] 341b; BK VI, CH 7 [1141a9-19] 390a; BK IX, CH 1 [1162a2-6] 417b; BK X, CH 7 [1177a19-b3] 431d-432a / Politics, BK VII, CH 2 [1324a24-34] 528b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 10, 207d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [62-79] 1d-2a; BK III [1-30] 30a-b; BK V [1-54] 61a-d; BK VI [1-41] 80a-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 22 167d-170a; CH 24 172d-174b; BK III, CH 9 184c-185d; CH 21-22 193d-201a; BK IV, CH 5 228a-230b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK V, SECT 9 270b-c 14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-255a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR III 10a-12b / Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 1-2, 246c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 8 14d-15a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 3 266a-d; CH 10 271a-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a; 70d-72a; 150c-151a; 446d-450a 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On Animal Generation, 331c-332a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 1a-28d esp 17b-27c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART I, 41d-42a; 43d-44a; PART III, 50b-51a; PART VI 60d-67a,c esp 66d-67a,c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 261 221a; 327 231a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87a-b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I 451a-455b passim, esp DIV 2 451b-c, DIV 5-10 452d-455b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 526c-527a 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 337c-338b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b [fn 1] 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1d-2a
6b. The philosopher and the man of opinion: sophistry and dogmatism, idle disputation, perpetual controversy
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds 488a-506d esp [93-267] 489a-491a, [412-476] 493c-494b 7 PLATO: Laches, 36a / Protagoras, 42a-43b / Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Gorgias, 271b-273b / Republic, BK I, 300b-301c; BK VI, 379c-d / Theaetetus, 518d-519a; 525d-526b / Sophist 551a-579d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK IX, CH 1 [1164a22-b6] 417a-b; BK X, CH 9 [1180b29-1181b12] 435d-436a,c 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 13, 174c-175a; CH 14-15, 177a-179d esp CH 14, 178d-179a; BK II, CH 9, 199a,c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 8 113d-114c; CH 25-26 129d-132b; BK II, CH 17 158d-161a; CH 19-20 162c-166c; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 21 193d-195a; BK IV, CH 8 235b-237d 14 PLUTARCH: Marcus Cato, 287d-288c / Alexander, 566a-567d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49d; 54b-c; 56d; 57c-d; 59a-60a; 71a-b; 84a; PART II, 163a-b; PART IV, 267a-274d passim; 276c 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 18b-24a; BK II, 78b-80d; 101b-106a; 124d-125b; BK III, 197b-200d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-62a; 74d-77d; 89c-d; 239d-294b passim, esp 240c-246a, 257d-264a, 276b-278a; 448d-449a; 517b-519a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 1a-28d esp 2c-17b; 57d-58b; 66c-67c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 44 110a-b; APH 54 111c-d; APH 56 112a; APH 62-65 113b-114c; APH 71 117a-c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, I 2a-3b; X, 16d-17a / Discourse, PART I, 43d-44b; PART II, 46b; PART VI, 64a-c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 327 231a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 89a-c; BK III, CH IV, SECT 7-11 260d-262b passim; CH VI, SECT 24 274c; CH VIII, SECT 2 284c-285a; CH X, SECT 2 291d-292a; SECT 6-14 293a-295a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 30 323a-c; CH VII, SECT 11, 341a-d; CH VIII, SECT 9 347d-348a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 17 409d-410a; SECT 20, 411a; SECT 85 429c; SECT 88 430a-b; SECT 97 431d-432a; SECT 143 441c-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6-7 453b-454a passim; SECT VIII, DIV 62-63, 478c-d; SECT XII, DIV 132, 509d 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 227a-228a; 234b-236b; 318b-321a; 329b-336a; 421b-422b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 336b-337a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 159a-d 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 299a-b; 526d-527a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 36a-37d esp 36d-37b; 120c-121c; 187c-188b; 221c-222b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261d / Practical Reason, 299d / Judgement, 607d-608c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2d-4a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1908-1963] 45b-46b; [4343-4366] 107a-b; PART II [7843-7846] 191a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 243b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 227b; 235b 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874c-875b esp 875a; 877b-c
6c. The philosopher as a man of reason: the limits of reason; its supplementation by experience or faith
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 8 14d-15a; BK IV, par 30-31 26b-27a; BK V, par 3-5 27c-28c; BK VI, par 6-8 36c-37c / City of God, BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XVIII, CH 41 495b-496c; BK XIX, CH 1-4 507a-513c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1 3b-4a; Q 2, A 2, REP 1 11d-12c; Q 12, A 12 60d-61c; Q 32, A 1 175d-178a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, III [16-45] 56a-b; PARADISE, XXIV [52-81] 143b-c; XXIX [70-126] 151a-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 208a-294b esp 208d-209c, 212a-215a, 238c-239c, 257d-264a, 267c-268a, 271b-273b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 96d-97b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 65 114b-c; APH 95 126b-c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, II 2a-3b; VII, 13a-14a / Discourse 41a-67a,c esp PART I, 43c, PART III 48b-51b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 77-79 186a; 184-241 205a-217b passim; 245 218b; 248 219a; 265-290 221b-225a; 425-428 243b-244b; 434-435 248a-251a; 561-567 272b-273b; 585-588 277a-b / Geometrical Demonstration, 440a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO 93a-95d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1-4 405a-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I 451a-455b passim, esp DIV 2 451b-c, DIV 7-10 453c-455b; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT V, DIV 34 463d-464b; SECT VIII, DIV 81 487a; SECT XII, DIV 116, 503d-504a; DIV 129-130 508a-d 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 379c-380a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186a-d esp 186c; 200c-201b; 308b-309b; 390d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 129c-173a esp 133c-d; 217d-218a; 219a-220b; 227a-235a esp 231c-232a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 285a-287d / Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 296a-d; 320c-321b; 337a-355d / Judgement, 497a-498b; 551a-552c; 570b-572b; 575b-c; 588a-607c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [354-514] 11a-14b; [614-807] 17a-21a; PART II [10,113-121] 246b-247a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 307a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 242c-243b; BK IX, 361d-365c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 337a-346a
6d. The philosopher as a man of theory or vision; neglect of the practical; withdrawal from the affairs of men and the marketplace
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 54c-55a / Symposium, 149d-150a / Apology 200a-212a,c / Gorgias, 272b-273b; 291c-292b / Republic, BK VI, 375b-376c; BK VII, 390b-391b / Theaetetus, 528c-531a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 4 [1105b5-19] 351a-b; BK VI, CH 7 [1141a34-b8] 390b-c / Politics, BK I, CH 11 [1259a5-21] 453b-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 22 127c-128c; CH 26 131b-132b; BK III, CH 6 181d-182b; CH 22 195a-201a; BK IV, CH 1 213a-223d; CH 8 235b-237d 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 130c-d / Marcellus, 252a-255a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 55d-57b; 63d-75a; 327b-d; 478c-482b; 514a-c; 538a-543a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 1a-28d esp 2c-17b; 30b-c; 73d-74c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 97 431d-432a; SECT 119 436c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 2-4 451b-452c; SECT V, DIV 34, 463d-464a 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 78b 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 421b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345a / Political Economy, 373d-374a 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335d-337a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 187c-188b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 263b-264a; 266a-b / Practical Reason, 304d-305a; 320c-321b; 358a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b-c / Judgement, 607a-608c 43 MILL: Representative Government, 346c-347a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 5c-6a / Philosophy of History, PART III, 303b-c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 116a-117a; 255a 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 430d-432a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 361d-365c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 271a-b 54 FREUD: Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 722a-b
7. Observations on the history of philosophy: the lives of the philosophers in relation to their thought
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 54c-55a / Apology 200a-212a,c / Phaedo, 240d-242b / Sophist, 564c-568a / Seventh Letter 800a-814d 8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 [183b16-184a8] 253a-d / Physics, BK I, CH 2-9 259b-268d / Heavens, BK I, CH 10 [279b4-12] 370d; BK III, CH 7 [306a6-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [983b24]-BK II, CH 1 [993b19] 501c-512a; BK XI, CH 6 590d-592b; BK XII, CH 8 [1074b1-14] 604d-605a; CH 10 [1075b25-1076a4] 606a-d / Soul, BK I, CH 2-5 633a-641d 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [642a25-30] 165b-c / Ethics, BK I, CH 6 341b-342c / Politics, BK I, CH 11 [1259a5-21] 453b-c 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 10 207b-d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [62-79] 1d-2a; BK III [1-30] 30a-b; BK V [1-54] 61a-d; BK VI [1-34] 80a-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 12 151b-152c; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 6, 182a; CH 21-22 193d-201a 14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 65c-d / Themistocles, 88d / Pericles, 122d-123c / Marcellus, 252a-255a / Marcus Cato, 287d-288c / Sulla, 381c / Lucullus, 420b-d / Nicias, 435b-d / Alexander, 543b-544a / Cicero, 705b-c; 720a-b 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK XIV, 153d-155a; BK XV, 172c-173d 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 1-12 264b,d-273a; BK XVIII, CH 37 493c-494a; CH 41 495b-496c; BK XIX, CH 1-3 507a-511a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 44, A 2, ANS 239b-240a; Q 65, A 4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 66, A 1 343d-345c; A 2, ANS 345d-347b; Q 75, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 378b-379c; Q 76, A 1, ANS 385d-388c; A 3, ANS 391a-393a; A 4, REP 4 393a-394c; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a-418c; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b; Q 88, A 1, ANS 469a-471c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 3 228c-229b; Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 164a,c; PART IV, 267c-269b; 274c-d; 276c; CONCLUSION, 282c-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 65b-66b 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-268d; 279d-280c / On Animal Generation, 336d-337a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning 1a-101d esp 2c-5a, 7b-c, 9a-b, 14a-15a, 15c-d, 16c, 22a-b, 23a-b, 24c, 29b-c, 30d-31a, 39d-48d, 54b-61d, 69d-76a, 81d-85a, 97b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 38-105 109c-128c esp APH 56 112a, APH 78 119b-c, APH 95-96 126b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse 41a-67a,c / Meditations, 70a / Objections and Replies, 278a-293a,c 33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 355a-358b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH IV, SECT 7-10 260d-261d; CH VIII, SECT 2 284c-285a; CH X, SECT 2 291d-292a; SECT 6-14 293a-295a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 30 323a-c; CH VII, SECT 11, 341a-d; CH XVII, SECT 4, 373a-b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 17 409d-410a; SECT 85 429c; SECT 88 430a-b; SECT 119 436c; SECT 143 441c-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 4, 451d-452a; DIV 5, 453a-b; DIV 8-9, 454b-455a; SECT V, DIV 34 463d-464b; SECT VII, DIV 48, 471b-c; SECT XI, DIV 102 497b-d; SECT XII, DIV 122, 505d [fn 1] 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XXI, 169a-b; BK XXVI, 202d-203a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-334a,c / Political Economy, 373d-374a 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 5d-6a; BK V, 335b-337b; 338d-339a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12d-13b; 23d-24a; 31d-32b; 159a-d; 186a-c; 204d-206d; 307b-308c; 364a-d; 644b-646a; 668d-671b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 40b-d; 299a-b; 326b-327a; 522b-528a,c passim, esp 526c-527a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-8b esp 5b, 5d-6d; 100a-d; 101d-102a; 177b-179b; 218d-222b; 224a-227a; 248d-250a,c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 273d-274a / Practical Reason, 299d; 307a-d; 311d-313d; 317b-318b; 327c-d; 332c-d; 335b-c; 339b-d / Judgement, 485b-486d; 513d-514b; 551a-552c; 580c-d; 600d-601c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47a-d 43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim / Utilitarianism, 445a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 2d-5c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158a-159a; PART I, 218c-d; 229b-d; PART II, 279d-281a; PART III, 303a-c; 308c-309d; PART IV, 341c-342a; 363d-364c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 243a 50 MARX: Capital, 25c-d; 190d [fn 2]; 301c esp 301d [fn 3]; 305a-306b [fn 2] 50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 428b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 221a-239a; 305a-312a; 627a-635a; 879b-882a
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: another discussion of the nature of philosophical science, see SCIENCE 1a, 1c; and for various conceptions of the highest philosophical knowledge, see DIALECTIC 2a; KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); METAPHYSICS 1; WISDOM 1a.
For: the relation of philosophy to theology and religion, see RELIGION 6g; SCIENCE 2a; THEOLOGY 2, 4a; TRUTH 4a.
For: the relation between philosophy and mathematics, see MATHEMATICS 1a-1b; PHYSICS 1b.
For: the relation of the philosophical to the experimental and empirical sciences, see PHYSICS 2-2b; PROGRESS 6b; SCIENCE 1c.
For: the comparison of philosophy, poetry, and history, see HISTORY 1; POETRY 5b; SCIENCE 2b.
For: discussions relevant to the distinction between theoretic and practical philosophy, see JUDGMENT 2; KNOWLEDGE 6e(1); MIND 9a; PRUDENCE 2a; SCIENCE 3a; THEOLOGY 3b, 4d; TRUTH 2c; WISDOM 1b.
For: other treatments of the branches of speculative or natural philosophy and their relation to one another, see DIALECTIC 4; LOGIC 1; MAN 2b, 2b(4); MATHEMATICS 1a; METAPHYSICS 3a-3c; PHYSICS 1-1a; SCIENCE 1a(2); THEOLOGY 3a; TRUTH 4c.
For: other treatments of the branches of practical, moral, or civil philosophy, see KNOWLEDGE 6e(2), 8a-8c; LOGIC 4e; POETRY 8; SCIENCE 3a; STATE 8d; WEALTH 9.
For: discussions relevant to the method of philosophy, see DEFINITION 6a-6c; EXPERIENCE 2c, 4a-4b; INDUCTION 1a, 3; KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); LOGIC 4d; METAPHYSICS 2c, 4b; PRINCIPLE 3-4; REASONING 6a, 6c-6d.
For: the uses of philosophy in the conduct of life and the organization of society, see HAPPINESS 2b(7); WISDOM 2c.
For: the conception of the philosopher as a man of wisdom or as seeking wisdom, see TRUTH 8e; WISDOM 3; and for the comparison of philosophical with supernatural wisdom, see THEOLOGY 2; WISDOM 1d.
For: the association or contrast of the philosopher with the sophist, the rhetorician, or the dogmatist, see DIALECTIC 6; METAPHYSICS 4a; OPINION 4b; RHETORIC 1a; WISDOM 3.
For: the comparison of progress in philosophy and science, and for the conditions of progress in philosophy, see PROGRESS 6b-6c.
ADDITIONAL READINGS
Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I.
- AUGUSTINE. Soliloquies, BK I, CH 7
- Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil, BK II, CH XVIII
- AQUINAS. On the Trinity of Boethius, QQ 2, 5-6
- DANTE. Convivio (The Banquet), SECOND TREATISE, CH 12-16; THIRD TREATISE, CH 11-15; FOURTH TREATISE, CH 1
- DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PREF
- HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART I, CH 1
- GIBBON. An Essay on the Study of Literature, XLIV-LV
- KANT. Introduction to Logic, II-IV, X
- HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, PREF
- The Philosophy of Mind, SECT III, SUB-SECT C
- Lectures on the History of Philosophy
- ENGELS. Herr Eugen Duhring’s Revolution in Science, PART I
- W. JAMES. Pragmatism, LECT I-II
- A Pluralistic Universe, LECT I
- Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 1
II.
- TERTULLIAN. On Idolatry
- Apology
- CICERO. De Oratore (On Oratory), III, CH XV-XVI
- DIOGENES. Lives of Eminent Philosophers
- PHILOSTRATUS. Lives of the Sophists
- BOETHIUS. De Fide Catholica (On the Catholic Faith)
- AL-GHAZZALI. The Destruction of Philosophy
- ABELARD. Ethics (Scito Teipsum)
- JUDAH HA-LEVI. Kitab al Khazari
- JOHN OF SALISBURY. Metalogicon
- AVERROES. The Destruction of the “Destruction”
- R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART II
- DUNS SCOTUS. Oxford Commentary, BK I, DIST 3, Q 4
- THOMAS À KEMPIS. The Imitation of Christ, BK I, CH 1-5; BK III, CH 43-45
- ERASMUS. The Praise of Folly
- GLANVILL. The Vanity of Dogmatizing
- VOLTAIRE. “Philosopher,” “Sophist,” “Philosophy,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
- COLERIDGE. Biographia Literaria, CH 9
- HEINE. Religion and Philosophy in Germany
- COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO, CH 1
- W. HAMILTON. Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform
- Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL I (1-7)
- WHEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, VOL I, BK I, CH 2
- LOTZE. Outlines of Encyclopedia of Philosophy, SECT I-II
- C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL I
- NIETZSCHE. Beyond Good and Evil, CH 1
- The Will to Power, BK II (2-3)
- H. SIDGWICK. Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations
- BOSANQUET. Science and Philosophy, 1
- T. VEBLEN. The Place of Science in Modern Civilization, pp 56-179
- BERGSON. An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp 75-92
- DEWEY et al. “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” in Creative Intelligence
- SANTAYANA. Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies, CH 98
- B. RUSSELL. The Problems of Philosophy, CH 14-15
- Mysticism and Logic, CH 6
- BEARD. The Economic Basis of Politics
- CROCE. Politics and Morals
- DEWEY. Reconstruction in Philosophy, CH 1
- The Quest for Certainty, CH 11
- J. S. HALDANE. The Sciences and Philosophy, LECT X-XI
- M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK II, CH 5
- TENNANT. Philosophy of the Sciences
- WHITEHEAD. Science and the Modern World, CH 9
- Process and Reality, PART I
- Adventures of Ideas, CH 9-10
- CARNAP. Philosophy and Logical Syntax
- MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, CH 1
- De la philosophie chrétienne
- Science and Wisdom, pp 137-220
- Scholasticism and Politics, CH 2
- GILSON. Christianisme et philosophie
- The Unity of Philosophical Experience
- History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education
- JASPERS. The Perennial Scope of Philosophy