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Chapter 53: MATTER

INTRODUCTION

“After we came out of the church,” says Boswell in his Life of Johnson, “we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, ’tis impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it thus.’”

But Berkeley’s argument anticipated Dr. Johnson’s style of refutation. “I do not argue,” he says, “against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence I deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest ofmankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.”

The rest of mankind does need to be instructed, however, that when they use the word “matter,” they speak of nothing. They may from careless habit suppose they are referring to the most obvious something there is in the world—the solid, massy, concrete stuff of which tangible, visible, movable, and moving things are made. Of them, Berkeley would ask how they know such stuff exists. It is not itself perceptible.

We perceive a variety of qualities—colors, shapes, temperatures, textures, sizes, or extensions—but these, Berkeley argues, have their being in being perceived. Even if certain of these sensible qualities, sometimes called “primary,” such as figure, size, or weight, are supposed to belong to bodies when they are not actually being sensed, they are not matter, but only its properties. Matter itself is not sensible. Those who assert its existence postulate it as a substratum or support for the sensible qualities they perceive.

The question, therefore, is whether such a substratum is a necessary or an unnecessary hypothesis. Berkeley does not deny the existence of beings which cannot be directly sensed. He affirms the existence of the human spirit or mind, of minds other than his own, and the spiritual being of God. These must be inferred to exist in order to explain the phenomena of our sensible experience and the experience of our own activities in thinking, imagining, willing. If, in addition, the existence of matter or a material substance were necessary to explain the phenomena, Berkeley would not object to affirming its existence by inference, even if it could in no way be directly perceived.

His argument therefore involves, first, a denial of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Supposing it to be generally agreed that colors, sounds, odors have no actual existence except in the perceiving mind, he denies that perceptible figure, size, or motion can exist otherwise. “It having been shown that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter.”

Matter is not needed as a substratum or support for the qualities we perceive. This is the second main point in Berkeley’s argument. “Though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident that the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition.”

Berkeley’s arguments against matter, which occupy the greater part of his Principles of Human Knowledge, may not have the same force when they are applied against different theories of matter. Berkeley seems to regard his attack on materialism as the refutation of an error at the root of skepticism, atheism, and irreligion. He also thinks materialism creates difficulties for the sciences. But are all affirmations of matter to be lumped together as materialism in the same sense? Are Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke materialists in the same sense as Lucretius, Hobbes, and perhaps Marx? Does it make no difference whether bodies are said to be the only real existences, or whether, in addition to bodies, immaterial substances or spiritual beings are also said to exist?

Does it make no difference how matter is conceived—whether as a self-subsistent substance in its own right, capable of existing apart from any qualities except extension and motion which belong to its very essence, or merely as one factor in the constitution of bodies, the factor of potentiality which, as will be presently explained, has no existence apart from the forms which actualize it? Are skepticism, atheism, and irreligion to be associated with all affirmations of matter, in view of the fact that theologians like Augustine and Aquinas seem to think that a sound view of matter supports the truths of religion against the errors of the materialists?

There seem to be, in short, three distinct positions to which Berkeley’s blanket denial of matter stands opposed. The diametrically opposite view seems to be the blanket denial of anything except bodies, or of anything which cannot be reduced to a property or function of matter. The atomism of Lucretius, discussed in the chapter on ELEMENT, may be taken as representative of this view, though Engels would insist that materialism can be dialectical rather than atomistic or mechanical.

Between the two extremes, there appear to be two middle positions which are alike insofar as both affirm the immaterial as well as the material. Although they are alike in asserting the existence of spiritual substances, they may, of course, define the nature of these immaterial things differently, and differently interpret their relation to the realm of matter. But, as theories of matter, their principal difference consists in the way in which they conceive the being of bodies, material substances, or the bodily mode of substance.

In the conceptions of Descartes and Locke, for example, it is matter which gives actuality to sensible bodies. We have “no other idea or notion of matter,” Locke writes, “but something wherein those many sensible qualities, which affect our sense, do subsist.” The entire substance of sensible bodies consists of matter. All their properties derive from the essence or nature of matter. But in the conceptions of Aristotle and Plotinus, bodies would not exist at all if they were composed only of matter, for matter is no more than a capacity for being, not something which by itself actually is. Sensible bodies derive their being and all their attributes from the forms which matter assumes when its potentialities are actualized. Matter totally devoid of form is not the nothing Berkeley calls it, but it is so near to nothing that Plotinus says it is “more plausibly called a non-being . . . a bare aspiration towards substantial existence.”

These theories of matter or corporeal being seem to be as contrary to one another as together they are contrary to Berkeley’s doctrine. Yet each of the two middle positions leans toward one of the opposite extremes.

The conception of matter seems to be very much the same in the complete materialism of Lucretius and Hobbes and in the view of Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke. In the former, only bodies exist. In the latter, bodies do not comprise the whole of existence, but matter is the whole substance of bodies. The separation of body and mind, or matter and spirit, into distinct substances, or modes of substance, leaves matter the same kind of stuff that it is in a world which admits of no other reality. Atomism, furthermore, may be common to both theories, at least to the extent that it is held that the complex bodies we perceive are composed of minute and insensible particles. Unlike Lucretius, Locke may not insist upon the absolute indivisibility of the particles, or upon the eternity of the uncreated atoms of matter; but he, like Hobbes and Newton, carries the division of the familiar bodies of sense-experience down to parts which cannot be perceived and yet have, in a way, a more ultimate reality as units of matter than the complex bodies they constitute.

“Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend,” Locke writes, “I doubt not but that would produce quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow color of gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts, of a certain size and figure.”

At the other extreme, Berkeley’s complete denial of matter has less in common with the view of Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, and Aquinas than the theory of Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke has with the materialism of Lucretius and Hobbes. They would appear to be close enough, for one seems to hold that matter is almost non-being and the other that matter is simply nothing at all. But where Berkeley denies any role to matter, Aristotle and those who take his view affirm matter to be an indispensable factor in the constitution of physical things. They do not question the reality of bodies or their existence apart from mind. On both of these points they are as opposed to Berkeley as they would be if they were complete materialists. Nevertheless they lean toward Berkeley rather than toward the other extreme in one respect. Where Berkeley denies the existence of matter, they deny its substantiality. Where Berkeley says matter has no being, they say it has the lowest grade of being—on the very verge of not being.

In spite of all the differences noted, the idea of matter has a certain constant meaning throughout the tradition of the great books.

It is generally associated with the idea of quantity, and especially the basic magnitudes, such as time, space, and mass. Sometimes it is said that the essence of matter itself is extension; sometimes that bodies—not matter itself—have the property of tridimensionality. But in either case that which is or has matter in it necessarily occupies space.

The manner of that occupation is also generally agreed upon. Two bodies or two distinct quantities of matter cannot occupy the same place at the same time. A body may not be impenetrable in the sense of being indivisible, but so long as it remains the whole that it is, it offers resistance to other bodies tending to move into the place it occupies.

There is another connection between matter and quantity. To those who ask what makes two otherwise identical things two in number—or what is involved in the merely numerical difference of things alike in every other respect—the usual answer is in terms of matter. Matter is traditionally spoken of as “the principle of individuation.” Aquinas, for example, holds that angels, unlike physical substances, cannot differ from one another as do numerically distinct individuals. Because they are immaterial, they can differ only as do species or kinds. “Such things as agree in species,” he writes, “but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances.”

The way in which matter is related to individual differences can be exemplified in works of art. Two coins, stamped out of the same kind of matter by the impression of the same die, may differ in no other discernible respect than that they are two of the same kind. Their twoness seems to be somehow related to the fact that each consists of a distinct quantity of matter. But it may be asked how two units of matter have the distinction of being two while they differ in no other respect. One answer to this difficult question is that their distinction consists in their occupying different places. In the Platonic theory of the origin of many particulars all participating in the same form, diversity of place seems to play the role which matter plays for Aristotle and Aquinas.

Plato’s doctrine of the receptacle, which is discussed in the chapter on FORM, is sometimes interpreted by conceiving the receptacle as space, and sometimes by conceiving it as matter. The receptacle, it is said in the Timaeus, is that which, “while receiving all things, never departs at all from her own nature and never in any way, or at any time, assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her.” This, according to Plotinus, means that “its one form is an invincible formlessness.”

But Plotinus, who combines Plato’s doctrine of the receptacle and the forms with Aristotle’s theory of potentiality and actuality, holds that it is matter, not space, which is “the receptacle and nurse of all generation.” He says that “recipient and nurse” is a better description of matter than the term “mother,” for that term “is used by those who think of a mother as matter to the offspring, as a container only, giving nothing to them.” In his own view, matter is more than space or mere receptivity. He is willing to admit the “parallel with motherhood” only to the extent that “matter is sterile, not female to full effect, female in receptivity only, not in pregnancy.”

Traditionally, the distinction between universal and particular is understood as a distinction between the intelligible and the sensible. This indicates another traditional meaning of matter or the material. The realm of sensible things is the realm of bodies. But the atoms which are the elementary bodies are also usually called “insensible particles of matter.” This, however, can be interpreted to mean, not that a definite material mass or bulk is in itself absolutely intangible or imponderable, but that, because of the limitation in our senses, it is imperceptible to us. On this interpretation it would then seem possible to say that all bodily existence is sensible existence.

But if we ask about the sensibility of matter itself, rather than of bodies large or small, questions arise which are more difficult to solve. On one theory of matter, matter devoid of form is as insensible as it is unintelligible, yet forms which are not material, that is, not in matter, are also insensible but not unintelligible. On the contrary, they are regarded as more perfectly intelligible than embodied forms. How, then, does matter which is itself insensible cause the forms which it assumes to become sensible when they are materialized?

The theory of matter which does not regard it as a co-principle with form seems to be confronted with a different problem of sensibility. It is supposed that some of the qualities which we sense in bodies are actually in them whether we sense them or not—such properties as size, figure, weight, motion. Other sensible qualities, such as colors, odors, temperatures, or sounds, are supposed to be effects produced by the motions of material particles acting on the sensitive apparatus of animals. This distinction between what Locke calls “primary and secondary qualities”—found also in Lucretius and Descartes—is more fully considered in the chapters on QUALITY and SENSE, but here it calls attention to the problem of how matter, devoid of certain sensible qualities, causes these qualities to arise.

For Lucretius the peculiar difficulty of the problem seems to lie in the fact that the sensitive animal is itself nothing but a material system. All its powers and acts are conceived as functions of matter in motion. How, then, does moving matter within the organism generate certain qualities which do not belong to moving matter outside the organism? For Locke the problem raises a difficulty of still another sort. Secondary qualities, such as colors, sounds, odors, exist only as sensations in the mind. In corporeal substances, or bodies, such qualities, he writes, “are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses; which ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as anything is in its cause.” Though they result from the impact of moving particles on the bodily sense-organs, they do not belong to the world of matter at all, but to the realm of spirit. How, then, do the motions of matter cause effects which exist only in the immaterial domain of mind?

These questions indicate some of the problems of matter as an object, condition, or cause of knowledge. They also show how the nature of the problem varies with different conceptions of matter, both in itself and in its relation to mind. There are still other problems which confront those theories of mind which separate reason or intellect from the sensitive faculty.

In such theories the consideration of matter’s relation to mind goes beyond the question of the origin of sensations. It takes sensations and images as somehow the functions of living matter—the acts of the various sense-organs and the brain. But sensations and images, because they are acts of corporeal organs, have the same limitation which belongs to everything material. As matter is said to cause the individuality or numerical diversity of bodies, so is it said to make sensations and images “particular intentions of the mind”—that is, capable of representing only particular objects, not general kinds or classes. Hence such theories face the problem of the relation of sensations and images to the “universal intentions of the mind,” its general concepts or abstract ideas.

One more traditional meaning of matter remains to be mentioned. The sciences of physics or mechanics are concerned with change or motion. They are not concerned with mutability in general, but with the kind of mutability that is manifested by material things. Material things are never conceived as unmovable or unchangeable.

The question whether matter itself is immutable has different meanings for different theories of matter. On the theory (discussed in the chapter on CHANGE) that matter and form are together principles of change in changing substances, it is neither matter nor form but the substance composite of matter and form which changes. Those who think that the motions of the physical world are without beginning and end, attribute a similar eternity to matter and conceive it as imperishable. The theologians who think that God can annihilate whatever He creates, do not hold that matter is indestructible, but they nevertheless attribute everlasting endurance to matter in God’s plan. Aquinas, for example, in his treatise on the end of the world, describes the final conflagration which will purge the material universe but leave its matter in existence under the forms of the elements and the heavenly bodies. “The world will be renewed,” he writes, “in such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain forever at rest.” Hence nothing can be “the subject of that renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption,” such as “the heavenly bodies, the elements, and man.”

On other theories of matter the fact that motion is regarded as an intrinsic property of bodies seems to be similarly consistent with the notion that matter itself is immutable or indestructible. This indestructibility may be conceived in terms of the absolute indivisibility of the atoms, as in Lucretius and Newton; or, as in Spinoza, it may be established by the uncreated and eternal nature of God. “By body,” Spinoza writes, “I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the essence of God in so far as He is considered as the thing extended.”

In the modern development of the science of mechanics the law of the conservation of matter seems to be another expression of the same insight. “We may lay it down as an incontestable axiom,” Lavoisier writes, “that in all the operations of art and nature, nothing is created; an equal quantity of matter exists both before and after the experiment.” What appears to be the destruction of a body is merely the transformation of its matter into another physical condition, without loss of mass unless there is an equivalent gain in energy. The total quantity of matter and energy remains constant throughout all physical changes.

But though change or motion seems to be inherent in the material world, the mutability of bodies, as well as the immutability of matter, seems to be differently conceived according to different conceptions of matter. The difference between the physics of Aristotle and the physics of Descartes can be expressed in terms of contrary definitions of motion, or divergent notions of causality, but neither of these differences is fully intelligible apart from the variance of these theories from one another on the nature of matter.

When matter is an actual substance, whose essence is extension and whose chief property is local motion, the principles of physics are mechanical. The laws of mechanics, with time, space, and mass as their fundamental variables, seem to have a universality adequate for describing all natural phenomena. All changes in material things are either the local motions of bodies or the result of the local motions of their parts. Motions are determined in their magnitude and direction by the impressed force which one body exerts upon another and the resistance of that other. Motion is itself completely actual, as matter is; and the only type of cause to which physics need appeal is the efficient cause, that is, the push or pull of one body upon another.

Physicists who share this conception of matter may not agree, as Descartes and Newton do not, in their mechanical formulations. They may or may not be atomists. They may, like Lucretius, think that local motion is an absolutely intrinsic property of the eternal particles; or, like Descartes and Newton, they may think that God first imparted motion to matter at the world’s creation. They may hold that all subsequent motions issue therefrom in a continuous chain of cause and effect. But when matter is the only factor in the constitution of bodies, and one body differs from another only in its quantitative determinations, the consequence for physical theory seems to be one or another sort of mechanical formulation.

When matter is nothing more than a body’s potentiality for change, and when neither what the body is nor how it changes can be explained by reference to its matter alone, physical theory seems to be constructed in other than mechanical terms. Its concepts and principles resemble those of biology. It finds natural tendencies or desires, and ends or final causes, in the motion of inert as well as animate bodies.

Central to Aristotle’s physics are his theory of the four causes, discussed in the chapter on CAUSE, and his theory of the four types of change, discussed in the chapter on CHANGE. But even more fundamental is his definition of motion as the actualization of that which is potential in a respect in which it is potential. With motion so defined, the principles of physics must include the correlative factors of potentiality and actuality which Aristotle conceives in terms of matter and form.

Remove matter entirely from a thing and, according to Aristotle, you remove its capacity for physical change. Remove form, and you remove its existence, for nothing can exist without being actual or determinate in certain respects. When a thing changes physically, it loses certain determinate characteristics and acquires others. The determinations it acquires it had previously lacked, yet all the while it must have had a capacity for acquiring them. The thing is “capable both of being and of not being,” Aristotle says, “and this capacity,” he goes on to say, “is the matter in each.” The matter of an existing substance is thus conceived as that which has certain forms (the respects in which the substance is actually determinate), and lacks certain forms which it can assume (the respects in which the substance is both indeterminate and potential).

As the chapter on ART indicates, Aristotle frequently uses artistic production to afford a simple illustration of his theory of matter and form as principles of change. When a man sets out to make a bed, he chooses material, such as wood, which can be shaped in a certain way. The same wood could have been made into a chair or a table. With respect to these various possible determinations in structure, the wood is itself indeterminate and determinable.

Before the artist has worked on it productively, the wood is in a state of both privation and potentiality with regard to the form of a bed, a chair, or a table. The transformation which the artist effects consists in his actualizing certain potentialities in the material for forms or determinations which the material at the moment lacks. When the bed is made, the wood or matter which is now actually in the form of a bed may still have the potentiality for being remade into a chair or table.

The wood, of course, remains actually wood throughout these artificial changes, as it does not when it suffers the natural change of combustion. This indicates that though the wood may be called matter or material by the artist, it is not matter, but a substance, a thing composite of matter and form; for when the wood is reduced to ashes by fire, the matter which had the form of wood assumes another form.

In the analysis of accidental change, which artistic production illustrates, it suffices to treat a composite substance, like wood or iron or bronze, as the material principle. But in the analysis of substantial change, when matter itself changes from being one kind of matter to being another in the coming to be or perishing of composite substances, the material principle must be pure matter—matter totally devoid of form. Where a whole substance can be regarded as the matter or substratum of accidental change (in quality, quantity, or place) the substratum of substantial change, which Aristotle calls “generation and corruption,” must be matter in a condition of absolute indeterminacy and pure potentiality.

Referring to this ultimate substratum as “the underlying nature,” Aristotle says that it “is an object of scientific knowledge by analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, so is the matter and the formless before receiving form to anything which has form, and so also is the underlying nature to substance, i.e., the actually existing.”

Aristotle’s definition of matter as “the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result” not only signifies an object which the physicist must apprehend analogically (i.e., by comparison with substantially formed matter like wood and bronze), but also indicates that matter, by definition, must be in itself both unintelligible and non-existent.

What Aristotle calls “the primary substratum” is later called by Plotinus “primal matter,” by Augustine “formless matter,” and by Aquinas “prime matter.” Since they all agree that that which is without form lacks all determination and actuality, they deny that it can have existence by itself or be an object of knowledge, either by sense or reason.

Augustine and Aquinas go further. They deny even to God’s omnipotence the power of creating matter without form. They speak of matter not as created, but as concreated, that is, united at the very instant of its creation with the forms it must assume in order to exist. God “made formless matter of absolutely nothing, and the form of the world from this formless matter,” Augustine writes. Yet He “created both simultaneously, so that form came upon matter with no space of time intervening.”

In the tradition of Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics, especially as developed by Aquinas, matter and form become basic analytic terms, often having a significance remote from their original meaning in the analysis of change. The conception of prime (or formless) matter as the substratum of substantial change leads to the designation of the formed matter underlying accidental change as “second matter.” This, in turn, is called “signate matter” when, considered as the matter of an individual substance, it is viewed as having the limiting determinations of individuality.

“Matter is twofold,” Aquinas writes, “common, and signate or individual; common, such as flesh and bones; and individual, as this flesh and these bones.” When the intellect forms concepts of different kinds of physical substances, it abstracts “from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter.” In defining the nature of man, for example, we abstract, Aquinas says, from “this flesh and these bones, which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual”; but we do not abstract from the fact that man, consisting of body and soul, is a thing of flesh and bones.

To say that man consists of body and soul is to indicate that common matter enters into the definition of man as a physical substance. But in distinction from definitions of this type, which are proper to physics, mathematical and metaphysical definitions carry the abstraction from matter still further. In mathematics, Aquinas declares, the intellect abstracts “not only from individual sensible matter, but also from common sensible matter.” In conceiving numbers and figures, the intellect does not, however, abstract from matter entirely, but only from individual intelligible matter. The common intelligible matter which is represented by “substance as subject to quantity” underlies all mathematical notions. “But some things,” Aquinas maintains, “can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as being, unity, potency, act and the like, all of which can exist without matter.” Such abstraction characterizes the concepts of metaphysics. Aquinas thus differentiates the three speculative sciences of physics, mathematics, and metaphysics in terms of three grades of abstraction, each distinguished by the type of matter from which the concepts of the science are abstracted.

With one exception physical matter is not said to be of different kinds when it exists under different forms. The one exception for both Aristotle and Aquinas is the matter of terrestrial and celestial bodies.

Basing his inference on the observations available to him, Aristotle holds that the heavenly bodies are eternal—“not subject to increase or diminution, but unaging and unalterable and unmodified.” Immutable in every other way, they are, however, subject to local motion. Since they are eternal, both their matter and their motion must be different from that of perishable terrestrial bodies. “All things that change have matter,” Aristotle writes, “but matter of different sorts; of eternal things those which are not generable but are movable in space have matter—not matter for generation, however, but for motion from one place to another.” That motion from place to place is, unlike terrestrial motion, circular; it has the appropriate characteristic of endlessness.

Kepler challenges this theory of a radical difference between celestial and terrestrial matter of motion, and as the chapter on ASTRONOMY shows, by so doing he not only gives impetus to the Copernican system, but also paves the way for Newton to frame laws of motion applicable to matter everywhere in the universe. Because their matter is the same, it is possible, Kepler insists, to explain the motion of the heavenly bodies by the same principles which account for the motion of bodies on earth.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

  1. The conception of matter as a principle of change and as one constituent of the being of changing things: the receptacle or substratum 1a. Matter and the analysis of change: prime and secondary matter; privation and form; participation and the receptacle 1b. Matter in relation to the kinds of change: substantial and accidental change; terrestrial and celestial motion 1c. Matter and the distinction between individual and universal: signate and common matter; sensible and intelligible matter
  2. The conception of matter as extension, as a bodily substance, or as a mode of substance: atoms and compound bodies 2a. The properties of matter: hypotheses concerning its constitution 2b. The motions of matter or bodies 2c. Matter as the support of sensible qualities 2d. The diremption of body and mind, or matter and spirit
  3. The existence of matter 3a. Matter as the sole existent: materialism, atomism 3b. Matter as the most imperfect grade of being or reality 3c. Matter as a fiction of the mind 3d. The relation of God to matter: the creation of matter and its motions
  4. Matter as an object or condition of knowledge 4a. The knowability of matter: by sense, by reason 4b. The role of matter in the concepts and definitions of the several sciences: the grades of abstraction in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics 4c. The material conditions of sensation, imagination, and memory 4d. The material conditions of thought: the relation of matter to the existence and acts of the mind
  5. Matter in relation to good and evil
  6. Criticisms of materialism and its consequences

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The conception of matter as a principle of change and as one constituent of the being of changing things: the receptacle or substratum

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 48e-53c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 4-9 262a-268d; BK III, CH 7 [207b35-208a4] 286c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [987b19]-CH 7 [988b5] 505d-506c; CH 8 [988b22-989b24] 506d-508a; BK II, CH 3 [995b15-17] 513d; BK V, CH 2 [1013a24-27] 533b; CH 4 534d-535c; BK VII, CH 3 551b-552a; CH 7-17 555a-566a,c esp CH 7-9 555a-558a, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK VIII 566a-570d; BK XII, CH 10 [1075a25-33] 606a / Soul, BK III, CH 5 [430a10-14] 662c 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 23 281b; BK XII, SECT 30 310a-b 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VII, CH 10, 32a-b / Second Ennead, TR IV-V 50a-60c; TR VII, CH 3 64b-c / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 7-19 110d-119a / Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 2-8 281c-285d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, par 6 100b-c; par 14 102b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, ANS and REP 3 15c-16a; Q 4, A 1, ANS and REP 2 20d-21b; Q 7, A 1, ANS 31a-d; A 2, ANS and REP 3 31d-32c; Q 14, A 2, REP 1,3 76d-77d; Q 15, A 3, REP 3 93b-94a; Q 18, A 4, REP 2-3 107d-108c; Q 47, A 1, ANS 256a-257b; Q 86, A 3 463b-d; PART I-II, Q 10, A 1, REP 2 662d-663d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 52, A 1, ANS 15d-18a; PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK I, 25b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 15 295a-c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 11 415a-b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-76c esp 74b-76c; 186b-d / Judgement, 565b-d; 566d-567a

1a. Matter and the analysis of change: prime and secondary matter; privation and form; participation and the receptacle

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 48e-53c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 4-9 262a-268d; BK II, CH 1 [193a9-b21] 269b-270a; CH 3 [194b16-195a21] 271a-d; BK III, CH 7-BK IV, CH 3 275b-280c; BK IV, CH 2 [209b1-210a13] 288b-289a; CH 4 [211b5-212a2] 290c-291a; CH 9 [217a20-26] 297a-c; BK VI, CH 10 [240b8-241a26] 324c-325b / Heavens, BK I, CH 3 360d-362a; BK III, CH 2 [301b33-302a9] 393b; BK IV, CH 5 403d-404d / Generation and Corruption 409a-441a,c esp BK I, CH 3 413c-416c / Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12 [389b22-390a7] 493d-494a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [987b30-988a8] 506a; BK II, CH 2 [994a1-6] 512b; [994b19-28] 512c-d; BK III, CH 4 [999b24-1000a4] 518a-c; BK V, CH 4 [1014b27-1015a10] 535a-b; CH 6 [1016a17-24] 536c-d; BK VI, CH 2 [1026b27-1027a15] 549a-b; CH 3 [1027a15-17] 549d; BK VII, CH 7-9 555a-558a; BK VIII, CH 1 [1042a24-27] 566b-d; CH 4-6 568d-570d; BK IX, CH 7 574c-575a; BK XI, CH 9 [1065b20-35] 594a-b; BK XII, CH 2-5 598c-601a; CH 10 [1075a25-34] 606a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 20 [729a10]-CH 22 [730b33] 269b-271a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 23 281b 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1078a-b 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR III, CH 18-TR IV, CH 5 49c-60c / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 7-19 110d-119a / Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 2-8 281c-285d; TR V, CH 8 307d-308c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, par 3-6 99d-100c; par 8 101a-b; par 14-16 102b-103a; par 24-26 104c-105b; par 28-31 105c-107a; par 38-40 108d-110a; BK XIII, par 48 124a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, ANS 15c-16a; A 8, ANS 19d-20c; Q 4, A 1, ANS and REP 2 20d-21b; Q 5, A 3, REP 3 25a-d; Q 7, A 2, REP 3 31d-32c; Q 9, A 1, ANS 38c-39c; Q 29, A 2, REP 3-5 163b-164b; Q 45, A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; A 8 249b-250a; Q 46, A 1, REP 6 250a-252d; Q 47, A 1, ANS 256a-257b; Q 48, A 3, ANS 261b-262a; Q 66, A 1 343d-345c; Q 77, A 1, REP 2 399c-401b; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; Q 86, A 3 463b-d; Q 92, A 2, REP 2 489d-490c; A 3, REP 1 490c-491b; A 4, ANS and REP 1 491b-d; Q 103, A 1, REP 2 528b-529a; Q 104, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 534c-536c; Q 110 564c-568b; Q 117, A 3 598c-599b; PART I-II, Q 22, A 1, REP 1 720d-721c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 60, A 1 49d-50c; Q 85, A 6 182d-184a; PART III, Q 24, A 11, ANS 498b-499c; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, REP 12 1025c-1032b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, VII [121-148] 116b-c; XII [52-87] 126a-b 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK I, 25b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 407c-409b; 412a-415b; 494a-496d esp 494b, 495c-496a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH X, SECT 15 295a-c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 11 415a-b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 74b-76c; 100d-101b

1b. Matter in relation to the kinds of change: substantial and accidental change; terrestrial and celestial motion

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 1 [200b26-201a14] 278b-c; CH 3 [202b22-29] 280c; BK IV, CH 9 296b-297c esp [217a20-26] 297a-c; BK V, CH 1-2 304a-307b / Heavens, BK I, CH 2-5 359d-364a; CH 9-12 369a-375d; BK II, CH 4 [287a15-21] 379b; BK IV, CH 3 [310a2-311a12] 402b-c; CH 4 [312a3-22] 403c-d / Generation and Corruption 409a-441a,c esp BK I, CH 4 [320a2-6] 417a / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 7-9 555a-558a esp CH 7 [1032a15-22] 555a-b; BK VIII, CH 1 [1042a24-29] 566b-d; CH 4 [1044a2]-CH 5 [1044b29] 569a-c; BK IX, CH 7 [1049a19-b1] 574d-575a; CH 8 [1050a20-28] 576c-d; BK XI, CH 1 [1067b1]-CH 12 [1068b25] 596a-597d; BK XII, CH 2-5 598c-601a esp CH 2 [1069b24-27] 599a / Soul, BK I, CH 3 [406b26-407a13] 636b-637b 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5a-6a; 8b; 10b-11b; BK XIII, 429a-b 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, BK I, 517b-518a; 519b-520a 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 888b-890b; 894a; 929b-930b 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR I, CH 1-4 35a-37b; TR IV, CH 6 51d-52a; TR V, CH 6 103b-104a / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 8-19 111c-119a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7, A 2, ANS and REP 3 31d-32c; Q 45, A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; Q 46, A 1, REP 1,3,5-6 250a-252d; Q 48, A 3, ANS 261b-262a; Q 55, A 2, ANS 289d-290d; Q 66, A 1, ANS 343d-345c; A 2 345d-347b; Q 84, A 3, REP 1 443d-444d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 4, ANS 5a-6a 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK VI, 110b-c

1c. Matter and the distinction between individual and universal: signate and common matter; sensible and intelligible matter

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [987b19-988a16] 505d-506b; BK III, CH 3 [998b20-999a13] 517a-b; CH 4 [999b24-1000a4] 518a-d; CH 6 [1003a5-16] 521d-522a,c; BK VII, CH 10-11 558a-561a; CH 15 [1039b27-31] 563d; BK VIII, CH 6 [1045a33-36] 570a-b; BK X, CH 1 [1052a28-37] 578d; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c / Soul, BK II, CH 1 [412a6-8] 642a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK XII, SECT 30 310a-b 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 2-5 50b-51d / Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 282a-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 3 15c-16a; A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 4, A 1, REP 3 20d-21b; Q 7, A 1, ANS 31a-d; Q 14, A 11, ANS 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 29, A 1 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; A 3, REP 4 164c-165c; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 50, A 4, ANS 273b-274b; Q 56, A 1, REP 2 292a-d; Q 65, A 3, ANS 341c-342b; Q 75, A 4, ANS 381b-382a; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; A 7, ANS 384d-385c: Q 76, A 2 388c-391a; Q 85, A 1, REP 2 451c-453c; Q 115, A 1, ANS and REP 1-3 585d-587c; Q 119, A 1, ANS 604c-607b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 2, ANS 711d-712d; A 3, REP 3 713a-714c

2. The conception of matter as extension, as a bodily substance, or as a mode of substance: atoms and compound bodies

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-448] 2d-6c; [483-634] 7a-8d 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 7, 52c; CH 12 54c-55b; TR VII, CH 3 64b-c / Third Ennead, TR I, CH 2, 78d; TR VI, CH 7, 111a; CH 12, 114b-c; CH 16-19 116c-119a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 271d-272a 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131d-132a 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XIV 28a-33b / Meditations, II 77d-81d esp 78c-d, 80b-d / Objections and Replies, 114d-115a,c; DEF VII 130c-d; 153c-154b; 231a-232a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 14, COROL 2-PROP 15 360a-361d; PART II, DEF 1 373a; PROP 2 374a 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 537a-b; 541b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIII, SECT 11-27 150d-154d passim; CH XXIII 204a-214b passim; BK III, CH X, SECT 15 295a-c; BK IV, CH X, SECT 9-19 351b-354c passim 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-17 414d-416b passim; SECT 37 419d; SECT 50 422c; SECT 91-96 430d-431d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 123 506a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 99a-100d esp 100c-d / Judgement, 580c-d 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 3b-4a 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d-855a,c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 876a-b; 882a-884b

2a. The properties of matter: hypotheses concerning its constitution

8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK III, CH 4 [303b3-8] 394b-d / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 410d-413c; CH 8 423b-425d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 4 [985b3-19] 503c-d 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-920] 2d-12b; BK II [333-990] 19b-27c 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 936a-937a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 271d-272a 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK II, 29c-30a 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY 178a-196d passim 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 8 140b; APH 25 155a-d; APH 40 170c-173d; APH 48 179d-188b 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, II, 78c-d; 80b-d / Objections and Replies, DEF VII 130c-d; 154a; 231a-232a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 14, COROL 2-PROP 15 360a-361d; PROP 25, COROL 365b; PART II, DEF 1 373a; PROP 2 374a 34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF I 5a; DEF III 5b; BK I, PROP 40, SCHOL 246a-b; BK III, RULE III 270b-271a; PROP 6, COROL III-IV 281b; PROP 7 281b-282b; GENERAL SCHOL 371b / Optics, BK II, 479b-485b; BK III, 531a-543b esp 541b-543a 34 HUYGENS: Light, CH I, 566b-569b; CH V, 601b-603b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH IV 129b-131a; CH VIII, SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim; CH XIII, SECT 21-27 152d-154d; CH XXI, SECT 2-4 178c-179c; SECT 75 200b-d; CH XXIII, SECT 1-32 204a-212d passim; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d esp 239d; BK III, CH VI, SECT 5, 269b-c; SECT 21 273c-d; CH X, SECT 15 295a-c; BK IV, CH III, SECT 6 313c-315b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-18 414d-416c passim; SECT 37 419d; SECT 47 421c-422a; SECT 85 429c; SECT 91 430d-431a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-100d esp 100c-d; 137a-140c; 152a-d 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 9a-10c; 12d-13d; 16b-c 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169b-170a 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 273a-276a; 386c-390d; 604c-632d esp 604c-607a,c, 626c-632d; 819a-c; 850b,d-855a,c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 695c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 68a-b

2b. The motions of matter or bodies

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK IV, CH 6-9 292c-297c / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 8 423b-425d 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [329-397] 5b-6a; [951-1113] 12d-14d; BK II [62-332] 15d-19b; BK III [177-205] 32b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 47, A 1, ANS 256a-257b; Q 115, A 1, ANS and REP 3,5 585d-587c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50a-b; PART IV, 268d; 271d-272a 28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 157b-171b; THIRD DAY-FOURTH DAY 197a-260a,c 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 66 114d-115c; BK II, APH 35-36 162a-168d; APH 40 170c-173d; APH 48 179d-188b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V 54b-60c / Objections and Replies, 114d-115a; DEF VII 130c-d; 231a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, LEMMA 1-7 378c-380b 34 NEWTON: Principles 1a-372a / Optics, BK III, 541b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 2-4 178c-179c; CH XXIII, SECT 17 209a; SECT 22 209d; SECT 28-29 211b-212a 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1b 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 41b-c 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 694d-695c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a; 883a-884b passim

2c. Matter as the support of sensible qualities

8 ARISTOTLE: Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442a30-b24] 680a-c; CH 6 [445b4-446a20] 683b-684c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [398-477] 20a-21a; [730-885] 24b-26b; BK IV [522-721] 51a-53d 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 8-13 52c-55d / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 6-19 109d-119a / Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, 196a-b / Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 29 267c-268b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49b-d; 57a-b; PART III, 172b 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 40 170c-173d 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, II, 78c-d; 80b-d / Objections and Replies, DEF VII 130c-d; 228c-229b; 229d-230c; 231a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII, SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim; CH XXIII 204a-214b passim, esp SECT 1-6 204a-205c, SECT 15 208c-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 7-21 414b-417a; SECT 37 419d; SECT 49 422b; SECT 73 427b-c; SECT 76-78 427d-428b; SECT 91 430d-431a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 122-123 505c-506a esp DIV 123 506a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; 100c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 185a; 331a; 503a

2d. The diremption of body and mind, or matter and spirit

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I 1a-6b esp CH 3-7 1d-4a / Sixth Ennead, TR IV, CH 1 297b-d; CH 4-6 299a-300b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 76, A 4 393a-394c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51d-52a / Meditations, II 77d-81d passim; VI 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, DEF VI-VII 130c; DEF X 130d; PROP IV 133c; 153c-155c; 224d-225d; 231a-232d; 248b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 14, COROL 2 360a; PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-361d; PART II, PROP 1-7 373d-375c; PROP 10-13 376c-378c; PART III, PROP 2 396c-398b; PART V, PREF 451a-452c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIII, SECT 16 151d-152a; CH XXIII, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15-32 208c-212d passim; CH XXVII, SECT 27 227d-228a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 28 322a-c; CH X, SECT 9-19 351b-354c passim 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20 416b-417a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 84a-93b esp 88a-90a; 95b-98a; 115a-119b esp 118b-119b; 139a-140a; 221a-226a esp 221a-222b, 225b-226a

3. The existence of matter

3a. Matter as the sole existent: materialism, atomism

7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-568a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 1 [193a9-28] 269b-c / Heavens, BK III, CH 4 [303b3-8] 394b-d / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 410d-413c; CH 8 423b-425d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [983b7]-CH 4 [985b21] 501d-503d; CH 8 [988b23-989b20] 506d-507d; BK VII, CH 13 [1039a2-11] 562d; BK XIII, CH 10 [1075b25-1076a5] 606a-d 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-634] 2d-8d 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IX, SECT 39 295a; BK X, SECT 6 297a-b 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 1 50a-b; CH 7, 52c / Third Ennead, TR I, CH 3 79b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 2-4 192a-193c / Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 25-30 265b-268c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, par 19-21, 32c-33b; par 25 34b-c; BK VII, par 1-2 43b-44a; par 7 45a-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 47, A 1, ANS 256a-257b; Q 50, A 1, ANS 269b-270a; Q 75, A 1, ANS 378b-379c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 172b; PART IV, 269b-272b 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 8 140b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH X, SECT 8-17 351a-353c passim 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b-98a; 106a; 671b [fn 1]; 882a-884b

3b. Matter as the most imperfect grade of being or reality

7 PLATO: Republic, BK IX, 423c-424a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IX, SECT 36 294d-295a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIII, CH 4-5 28c-29c; CH 7-8 30c-31c / Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 5 51b-d; CH 15-16 56c-57c; TR V, CH 4-5 59c-60c / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 11-14 113a-116a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, par 3-8 99d-101b; par 15 102b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 8, ANS and REP 3 19d-20c; Q 4, A 1, ANS and REP 2 20d-21b; Q 5, A 3, REP 3 25a-d; Q 7, A 2, REP 3 31d-32c; Q 14, A 11, REP 3 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, REP 3 93b-94a; Q 46, A 1, REP 1 250a-252d; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; Q 103, A 1, REP 2 528b-529a; Q 115, A 1, REP 4 585d-587c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXIX [13-36] 150b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 2 178c; CH XXIII, SECT 28 211b-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 123 506a

3c. Matter as a fiction of the mind

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1-96 413a-431d passim; SECT 133 439c-440a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 123 506a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 85d-91d esp 88b-c 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 134c-d

3d. The relation of God to matter: the creation of matter and its motions

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 11:17—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 11:18 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 448b-449a; 450b-451b; 458a-b; 466a-b 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 6 [1071b19-32] 601c; CH 10 [1075b16-24] 606c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-158] 2d-3a; BK V [146-194] 63a-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 7 45a-d; BK XI, par 7 90d-91a; BK XII, par 3-9 99d-101c; par 15-16 102b-103a; par 24-26 104c-105b; par 28-31 105c-107a; par 38-40 108d-110a; BK XIII, par 45 123a; par 48 124a / City of God, BK XI, CH 23 334c-335c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 4, ANS and REP 1 37c-38c; Q 15, A 3, REP 3-4 93b-94a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 44, A 2 239b-240a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; A 8 249b-250a; Q 46, A 1 esp REP 1,3,5-6 250a-252d; Q 47, A 1, ANS 256a-257b; Q 65, A 3 341c-342b; Q 66 343d-349d; Q 75, A 5, REP 1,4 382a-383b; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; Q 91 484a-488c; Q 92, A 2, REP 2 489d-490c; A 4 491b-d; Q 103, A 1, REP 2 528b-529a; Q 105, AA 1-2 538d-540c; Q 110, A 2, ANS 565d-566d; Q 117, A 3, ANS and REP 2 598c-599b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 85, A 6 182d-184a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, VII [121-148] 116b-c; XI [52-84] 126a-b; XXIX [13-45] 150b-c 22 CHAUCER: Knight’s Tale [2987-3016] 209a-b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17b-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 54d-56b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 15 360a-361d; PART II, DEF 1 373a; PROP 2 374a; PROP 7, SCHOL 375b-c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK III [694-735] 150b-151b esp [708-735] 150b-151b; BK V [468-505] 185b-186a; [577-599] 187b-188a; BK VII [59-640] 218b-231a esp [70-108] 218b-219b, [192-386] 221b-225b 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 541b-543a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 2 178c; CH XXIII, SECT 28 211b-d; BK IV, CH X, SECT 9-19 351b-354c 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 67-79 426b-428b passim; SECT 91-94 430d-431c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 132, 509d [fn 1] 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-157b

4. Matter as an object or condition of knowledge

4a. The knowability of matter: by sense, by reason

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228d-229c / Republic, BK IX, 423c-424a / Timaeus, 456a-458a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 7 [191a8-11] 266d / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 15 [1039b20-1040a8] 563c-564a; BK IX, CH 7 [1049a19-b1] 574d-575a / Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429b10-430a9] 661d-662c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [265-328] 4b-5a; BK II [80-141] 16a-d 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIII, CH 9 31c-32a / Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 10 53b-d; CH 12 54c-55b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XII, par 3-6 99d-100c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 14, A 11 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, REP 3-4 93b-94a; Q 50, A 1, ANS 269b-270a; Q 57, A 1 295a-d; Q 66, A 1, REP 1 343d-345c; QQ 84-86 440b-464d; Q 87, A 1, ANS 465a-466c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 12 1025c-1032b 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 66 114d-115c

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, I-II 75a-81d passim; VI 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, 229d-230c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-361d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII, SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim; CH XXIII, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15-17 208c-209a; SECT 22-32 209d-212d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 6 313c-315b; SECT 9-17 315c-317c passim; SECT 23-27 320a-322a passim; CH VI, SECT 14 335d-336b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 16-24 416a-417d; SECT 54 423b 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 123 506a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 186b-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 52 25a-c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 231a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 140b-145a; 502a-503b passim

4b. The role of matter in the concepts and definitions of the several sciences: the grades of abstraction in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 48e-53c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 2 270a-271a; CH 7-9 275b-278a,c / Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12 493d-494d / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 3 [995b15-20] 513d; BK III, CH 3 [998b20-999a13] 517a-b; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b28-1026a6] 547d-548a; BK VII, CH 10-11 558a-561a; CH 15 [1039b20-1040a8] 563c-564a; CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK VIII, CH 2-3 566d-568d; CH 6 569d-570d; BK X, CH 8-9 585b-586c; BK XI, CH 7 [1064a1-28] 592c; BK XII, CH 9 [1074b37-1075a2] 605c; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077b11]-CH 3 [1078a31] 609a-d / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a15-b19] 632b-d; BK III, CH 7 [431b13-19] 664b 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [641a14-31] 163d-164a 16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK I, 5b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1, REP 2 3b-4a; Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 18, A 4, REP 3 107d-108c; Q 29, A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; Q 50, A 2, REP 1 270a-272a; Q 75, A 4 381b-382a; Q 85, A 1, REP 2 451c-453c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, REP 3 424b-425a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 51 111c; APH 66 114d-115c; BK II, APH 8 140b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 19a-c; XIV 28a-33b / Objections and Replies, 169c-170a 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 50 422c; SECT 118-131 436b-439c

4c. The material conditions of sensation, imagination, and memory

7 PLATO: Meno, 177b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a5-20] 632a-b; BK II, CH 12 [424a25-b19] 656a-d; BK III, CH 3 [429a4-7] 661b; CH 4 [429b29-430a4] 661c-d / Sleep, CH 1 [454a1-12] 696b-c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [398-477] 20a-21a; [730-864] 24b-26a; BK IV [26-268] 44b-47d; [324-336] 48c; [522-817] 51a-54d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 75, A 2, ANS 379c-380c; A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c-381b; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A 3, ANS 410a-411d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 6, ANS 447c-449b; A 7, ANS 449b-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d-464d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-51b; 62b; PART III, 172b-d; PART IV, 258b-c; 261a; 262a-b 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII 18b-25b passim / Meditations, VI 96b-103d passim 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17-18 380d-382b 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 518b-519b; 522a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 23 127b; CH VIII, SECT 4 133d; CH X, SECT 5 142a-b; SECT 10 143c-d; CH XXIX, SECT 3 234b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 6 249a-b 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20 416b-417a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 102 432d-433a 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 123 506a 45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 1d-2a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 85d-87a / Descent of Man, 568d-569a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 13a-19b esp 15b-17b, 19a-b; 26b-42a; 49b-50a; 98b-106b passim; 348a-359a esp 348a, 358a-b; 367a-373a esp 368b-369a, 370a-b; 427b-433a esp 428b-430a; 453a; 455b-457a; 459a-479a passim, esp 460a-464a, 469a; 497a-501b; 520a-521a; 758a-759a 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351c-352d esp 352a-b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b-648a esp 646c-d, 647d-648a

4d. The material conditions of thought: the relation of matter to the existence and acts of the mind

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 4 [408b18-32] 638c-d; BK III, CH 4-5 661b-662d; CH 7 [431a14-19] 663d-664b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [94-176] 31b-32b; BK IV [722-817] 53d-54d 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, 195b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q 14, A 2, REP 1-3 76d-77d; A 11, REP 1 84c-85c; Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 55, A 2, ANS and REP 2 289d-290d; Q 57, A 1, REP 3 295a-d; Q 75, A 5 382a-383b; Q 76 385c-399b; Q 77, A 5 403d-404c; A 8 406b-407a; Q 79, A 3 416a-417a; QQ 84-88 440b-473a esp Q 84, A 6-8; Q 85, A 3 447c-457a; Q 110, A 2, REP 1 565d-566d; Q 117, A 3 598c-599b; PART I-II, Q 22, A 1 720d-721c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 85, A 6 182d-184a; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 10 1025c-1032b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; 52b-c; 54b-c; PART III, 162c; PART IV, 262b 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 51 111c 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 18b-20d; XIV-XV 28a-33d / Discourse, PART IV, 53b; PART VI, 61c / Objections and Replies, 215b-c; 229d-230c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVII, SECT 27 227d-228a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a esp 23b; 34a-b; 36b-c; 45d-46a; 48d-49a; 63a; 63d-64a; 69c-72c; 81b-83b; 85d-91d; 95a-d; 115b-c; 117b-119a; 173b-174a; 187a-c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 281c-282d / Practical Reason, 349b-350c esp 350b-c / Judgement, 542b-543c; 570b-572c; 604a-b 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 288c-d 50 MARX: Capital, 11b-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 2b-3b; 8a-67a esp 9a-12b, 15b-17b, 43a-44a, 46a-47a, 51b-52a, 53a-54a, 66b-67a; 69b-73b; 82b; 84a-93b esp 84a-85a, 88a-90b, 91a-93a; 116a-119b esp 119b; 151a-153a; 291a-295b; 367a-373a esp 368a-369a, 370b-371a; 455b-456a; 690a-b; 758a-759a; 827b-835a; 856b-858a 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of Dreams, 154d-155a; 367b-c; 382a-c; 384c-385a / Unconscious, 431c-d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b-649c

5. Matter in relation to good and evil

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-226c; 231c-234c / Timaeus, 452d-453b; 474b-d / Statesman, 587a-589c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [191b35-192a24] 267d-268c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 6 [988a7-16] 506a-b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 9 114c-116b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 3 260b; BK IX, SECT 36 294d-295a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIII 27b-34a esp CH 3-5 28a-29c, CH 7, 30d / Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 16 57b-c / Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 10, 250c / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 27-29 334d-336b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, par 19-21, 32c-33b; BK VII, par 1-7 43b-45d; par 18-22 49a-50a; BK XIII, par 45 123a / City of God, BK XI, CH 23 334c-335c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 2, ANS 15c-16a; Q 4, A 1, ANS and REP 2 20d-21b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 8, REP 1 692a-c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [97-142] 107b-d; XII [52-87] 126a-b 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 330a-b

6. Criticisms of materialism and its consequences

7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-568a 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK I, CH 2-5 633a-641d 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [640b5-641a33] 163a-164b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c; BK II, CH 3, 185a; CH 6 188c-191a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR I, CH 2, 78d; CH 3 79b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 6-8, 194b-197b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 75, A 1, REP 1 378b-379c; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; A 6, ANS 447c-449b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 355b-d; 495c-496d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 21 417a; SECT 35 419c; SECT 50 422c; SECT 85-88 429c-430b; SECT 92-96 431a-d; SECT 102 432d-433a; SECT 133 439c-440a; SECT 141 441a-b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 126c-d / Judgement, 558b-559d; 579d-580a; 582b-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 140b; 143a-c; BK X, 449b-c; BK XI, 469a-472b; BK XIII, 570d; BK XIV, 589c-590c; 609b; EPILOGUE II, 678a-b; 689c-690a; 694d-696d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 5a; 8b-9a; 84a-119b; 291a-295b; 655b-656a; 745a-b; 823a-825a 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 882b-884c

CROSS-REFERENCES

  • For other considerations of matter as a principle of change, see ART 2b; BEING 7b(5); CHANGE 2a; FORM 1d(1)-1d(2); and for the theory of celestial and terrestrial matter as distinct in kind, see ASTRONOMY 8a; BEING 7b(3); CHANGE 7c(4); WORLD 6a.
  • The conception of matter as potentiality in relation to form as actuality, and for the theory of physical substances as composite of matter and form, see BEING 7b(2), 7c(3); FORM 2c(1)-2c(3); INFINITY 4c; MAN 3a; MIND 2b; ONE AND MANY 3b(4); SOUL 3c.
  • Considerations relevant to the doctrine that matter is the source of numerical diversity or the principle of individuality in material things, see SAME AND OTHER 1a; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 3.
  • For the conception of matter or extension as a substance, or as a mode of substance, see BEING 7b(4); FORM 2d; MAN 3a; MIND 2d; SOUL 3c.
  • Atomism as a theory of matter and as a materialistic philosophy of nature, see ELEMENT 5a-5b; MIND 2e; and for discussions bearing on materialism as a philosophy of nature, society, and history, see ELEMENT 5; HISTORY 4a(2); MAN 3c; WILL 5c.
  • Matter in relation to mind, or body in relation to soul, see MAN 3a; MIND 2a-2e; SOUL 3c, 3e; and for the discussion of immaterial substances, spirits, or beings which exist apart from matter, see ANGEL 2, 3b; BEING 7b(2); ETERNITY 4a; FORM 2a, 2d; GOD 4c; MAN 3a(1); MIND 2a; SOUL 3a-3c.
  • The theological problems of matter, its creation and conservation, see GOD 7a; WORLD 4e-4e(1).
  • The physical properties of matter or bodies and the laws of their motion, see ASTRONOMY 8c(3); MECHANICS 4a, 5a-5f(2), 6a-6e; QUANTITY 5d-5e; SPACE 1a-1d; and for the problem of the infinity of matter or of an infinite body, see INFINITY 4a-4b.
  • Matter as an object of knowledge, see KNOWLEDGE 5a(2).
  • Matter in relation to sensation and to sensible qualities, see ELEMENT 5c; MECHANICS 4b; QUALITY 1; SENSE 3c(3).
  • Matter in relation to thought, abstract ideas, or definitions, see DEFINITION 6a; FORM 3c; IDEA 2g; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(1); MIND 1a(2); SENSE 5a; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

  • AQUINAS. On Being and Essence
    • On the Power of God, Q 4
    • De Natura Materiae et Dimensionibus Interminalis
  • DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 4-8, 11-12, 62-65; PART II, 22-23; PART III, 48-102; PART IV, 1-27, 31-48
  • HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART II, CH 8
  • BERKELEY. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous
  • KANT. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
  • J. S. MILL. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, CH 12-13
  • ENGELS. Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outline of Classical German Philosophy

II.

  • EPICURUS. Letter to Herodotus
  • ERIGENA. De Divisione Naturae
  • JUDAH HA-LEVI. Kitab al Khazari
  • CRESCAS. Or Adonai, PROPOSITIONS 10-12, 16, 19-24
  • SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, V (3), X (3); XII (3), XIII-XV, XVI (1), XXVI (2), XXVII, XXX (4), XXXI (8, 10, 13), XXXIV (5-6), XXXV (3, 6), XXXVI
  • JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART I, QQ 2-3, 9, 11
  • DIGBY. The Nature of Bodies
  • MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la vérité, BK III (II), CH 8 (2)
  • LEIBNIZ. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, APPENDIX, CH I
  • VOLTAIRE. “Matter,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
  • HOLBACH. The System of Nature
  • J. PRIESTLEY and PRICE. A Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity
  • SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL III, SUP, CH 24
  • BÜCHNER. Force and Matter
  • HELMHOLTZ. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, VII
  • LANGE. The History of Materialism
  • B. STEWART. The Conservation of Energy
  • MAXWELL. Matter and Motion
  • LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK II, CH 5-6
  • PLANCK. Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie
  • C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL VI, par 238-286
  • PEARSON. The Grammar of Science, CH 8
  • MACH. “On the Principle of the Conservation of Energy,” in Popular Scientific Lectures
  • BERGSON. Matter and Memory, CH 4
  • PLEKHANOV. In Defense of Materialism
    • Essays in the History of Materialism
  • MEYERSON. Identity and Reality, CH 4-5, 7-8
  • LENIN. Materialism and Empirio-criticism
  • CASSIRER. Substance and Function, SUP IV
  • WEYL. Space—Time—Matter
  • WHITEHEAD. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, CH 15
  • MCTAGGART. The Nature of Existence, CH 34
  • STOUT. Mind and Matter
  • BROAD. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, CH 4
  • DESCOQS. Essai critique sur l’hylémorphisme
  • G. N. LEWIS. The Anatomy of Science, ESSAY IV
  • B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 53
    • The Problems of Philosophy, CH 2-4
    • Mysticism and Logic, CH 7
    • The Analysis of Matter, CH 1-14
  • MCDOUGALL. Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution
  • SANTAYANA. Scepticism and Animal Faith, CH 19-20
    • The Realm of Matter, CH 2-3, 10
  • LENZEN. The Nature of Physical Theory, PART V, CH 15
  • DE KONINCK. Le problème de l’indéterminisme