Chapter 43: KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

KNOWLEDGE, like being, is a term of comprehensive scope. Its comprehensiveness is, in a way, correlative with that of being. The only thing which cannot be an object of knowledge or opinion, which cannot be thought about in any way except negatively, is that which has no being of any sort—in short, nothing. Not all things may be knowable to us, but even the skeptic who severely limits or completely doubts man’s power to know is usually willing to admit that things beyond man’s knowledge are in themselves knowable. Everyone except Berkeley would agree that the surfaces of bodies which we cannot see are not, for that reason, in themselves invisible.

The consideration of knowledge extends, therefore, to all things knowable, to all kinds of knowers, to all the modes of knowledge, and all the methods of knowing. So extensive an array of topics exceeds the possibility of treatment in a single chapter and requires this chapter to be related to many others.

The Cross-References which follow the References indicate the other chapters which deal with particulars we cannot consider here. For example, the nature of history, science, philosophy, and theology, and their distinction from one another, are treated in the chapters devoted to those subjects. So, too, the chapters on metaphysics, mathematics, physics, mechanics, and medicine deal with the characteristics and relations of these special sciences. The psychological factors in knowing—the faculties of sense and mind, of memory and imagination, the nature of experience and reasoning—also have their own chapters. Still other chapters deal with the logical elements of knowledge, such as idea and judgment, definition, hypothesis, principle, induction, and reasoning, logic and dialectic.

THE PROGRAM which Locke sets himself in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is often taken to include the basic questions about knowledge. His purpose, he tells us, is “to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.” Two other matters, not explicitly mentioned by Locke in his opening pages, assume central importance in the fourth book of his essay. One is the question about the nature of knowledge itself. The other concerns the kinds of knowledge.

It may be thought that certain questions are prior to these and all others. Is knowledge possible? Can we know anything? The man the skeptic challenges is one who thinks that knowledge is attainable and who may even claim to possess knowledge of some sort. But the issue between the skeptic and his adversaries cannot be simply formulated. Its formulation depends in part upon the meaning given knowledge and the various things with which it is sometimes contrasted, such as belief and opinion, or ignorance and error. It also depends in part on the meaning of truth and probability. It would seem, therefore, that some consideration of the nature of knowledge should precede the examination of the claims concerning knowledge which provoke skeptical denials.

The theory of knowledge is a field of many disputes. Most of the major varieties of doctrine or analysis are represented in the tradition of the great books. But the fact that knowledge involves a relationship between a knower and a known seems to go unquestioned. William James expresses this insight, perhaps more dogmatically than some would allow, in the statement that knowledge “is a thoroughgoing dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known… Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the other. They just stand face to face in a common world, and one simply knows, or is known unto, its counterpart.” This remains true even when attention is turned to the special case of knowledge about knowledge or the knower knowing himself. The mind’s examination of itself simply makes the mind an object to be known as well as a knower.

This suggests a second point about the nature of knowledge which seems to be undisputed. If knowledge relates a knower to a known, then what is somehow possessed when a person claims to have knowledge, is the object known. It does not seem possible for anyone to say that he knows something without meaning that he has that thing in mind. “Some sort of signal,” James writes, “must be given by the thing to the mind’s brain, or the knowing will not occur—we find as a matter of fact that the mere existence of a thing outside the brain is not a sufficient cause for our knowing it: it must strike the brain in some way, as well as be there, to be known.” What is not in any way present to or represented in the mind is not known in any of the various senses of the word “know.” What the mind cannot reach to and somehow grasp cannot be known. The words which are common synonyms for knowing—“apprehending” and “comprehending”—convey this sense that knowledge somehow takes hold of and surrounds its object.

That knowledge is a kind of possession occasions the comparisons which have been made between knowledge and love. The ancients observed that likeness and union are involved in both. Plato, for example, suggests in the Symposium that both the knower and the lover strive to become one with their object. “Love is also a philosopher,” Diotima tells Socrates, and, as “a lover of wisdom,” the philosopher is also a lover.

With regard to some objects, love and knowledge are almost inseparable. To know them is to love them. But this does not hold for all objects, nor does the inseparability of knowledge and love in certain cases prevent their analytical distinction in all. Like is known by like, but unlikes attract each other. Furthermore, according to one theory of knowledge, expounded by Aquinas, the knower is satisfied to possess an image of the thing to be known. This image provides the likeness through which knowledge occurs; and thus, Aquinas writes, “the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands.” The lover, on the other hand, is “inclined to the thing itself, as existing in itself.” He seeks to be united with it directly. The nobility or baseness of the object known does not affect the knower as the character of the object loved affects the lover. This understanding of the difference between knowledge and love leads Aquinas to say that “to love God is better than to know God; but, on the contrary, to know corporeal things is better than to love them.”

The principle of likeness between knower and known does not go undisputed. On the contrary, the opposite views here form one of the basic issues about the nature of knowledge. The issue is whether the thing known is actually present to the knower, existing in the mind or consciousness exactly as it exists in itself; or whether the thing is represented in the mind by a likeness of itself, through which the mind knows it. In this view, the mode of existence of the thing outside the mind is different from the way in which its representative exists in the mind.

Berkeley, at one extreme, identifies being and being known. “As to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible,” he writes. “Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”

At the other extreme are those like Kant for whom the thing in itself is unknowable precisely because there can be no resemblance between the phenomenal order of objects represented under the conditions of experience and the noumenal order of the unconditioned. “All conceptions of things in themselves,” he writes, “must be referred to intuitions, and with us men these can never be other than sensible, and hence can never enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as appearances. … The unconditioned,” he adds, “can never be found in this chain of appearances.”

In between these extremes there are those who agree that things exist apart from being known without ceasing to be knowable, but who nevertheless differ with respect to whether the thing exists in reality in the same way that it exists in the mind. The several forms of idealism and realism, distinguished in the chapter on IDEA, mark the range of traditional differences in the discussion of this difficult problem.

For any theory of what knowledge is there is a distinction between knowledge and ignorance—between having or not having something in mind. Nor does anyone confuse ignorance and error. The mind in error claims to know that of which, in fact, it is ignorant. This, as Socrates points out in the Meno, makes it easier to teach a person aware of his ignorance than a person in error; for the latter, supposing himself to know, resists the teacher. Hence getting a person to acknowledge ignorance is often the indispensable first step in teaching.

But though the difference between knowledge and ignorance and that between ignorance and error seems to be commonly understood, it does not follow that everybody similarly agrees upon the difference between knowledge and error. This much is agreed, that to know is to possess the truth about something, whereas to err is to be deceived by falsity mistaken for truth. The disagreement of the philosophers begins, however, when the meaning of truth and falsity is examined.

Truth is one thing for those who insist upon some similarity between the thing known and that by which it is known or represented in the mind. It is another for those who think that knowledge can be gained without the mediation of images or representations. In the first case, truth will consist in some kind of correspondence between what the mind thinks or understands and the reality it tries to know. In the other, truth will be equivalent to consistency among the mind’s own ideas.

The examination of this fundamental disagreement is reserved for the chapter on TRUTH. Here the identification of knowing with having the truth calls for the consideration of another distinction, first made by Plato. In his language, as in that of Aristotle and others, it is the difference between knowledge and opinion. Sometimes, as with Locke, a similar distinction is made in terms of knowledge and judgment; sometimes it is made in terms of knowledge and belief; sometimes in terms of adequate and inadequate, or certain and probable, knowledge.

The difference between these opposites, unlike that between knowledge and error, is not a matter of truth and falsity. There is such a thing as “right opinion,” according to Socrates, and it is “not less useful than knowledge.” Considering the truth so far as it affects action, Socrates claims that the man with right opinion “will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth.” The difference between right opinion and knowledge is here expressed by the contrast between the words “thinks” and “knows.” It does not consist in the truth of the conclusion, but in the way that conclusion has been reached or is held by the mind.

The trouble with right opinion as compared with knowledge, Socrates explains, is that it lacks stability and permanence. Right opinions are useful “while they abide with us… but they run away out of the human soul and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause”—or, in other words, until they are fixed in the mind by the reasons on which they are grounded. “When they are bound,” Socrates declares, “they have the nature of knowledge and… they are abiding.”

At this point in his conversation with Meno, Socrates makes the unusual confession that “there are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them,” namely, that “knowledge differs from true opinion.” It may be that Socrates claims to know so little because he regards knowledge as involving so much more than simply having the truth, as the man of right opinion has it. In addition to having the truth, knowledge consists in seeing the reason why it is true.

This criterion can be interpreted to mean that a proposition which is neither self-evident nor demonstrated expresses opinion rather than knowledge. Even when it happens to be true, the opinion is qualified by some degree of doubt or some estimate of probability and counter-probability. In contrast, when the mind has adequate grounds for its judgment, when it knows that it knows and why, it has the certainty of knowledge.

For some writers, such as Plato, certitude is as inseparable from knowledge as truth is. To speak of “a false knowledge as well as a true” seems to him impossible; and “uncertain knowledge” is as self-contradictory a phrase as “false knowledge.”

Others use the word “knowledge” more loosely to cover both adequate and inadequate knowledge, the probable as well as the certain. They make a distinction within the sphere of knowledge that is equivalent to the distinction between knowledge and opinion.

Spinoza, for example, distinguishes three kinds of knowledge. He groups the perception of individual things through the bodily senses, which he calls “knowledge from vague experience,” with knowledge “from signs” which depends on ideas formed by the memory and imagination. “These two ways of looking at things,” he writes, “I shall hereafter call knowledge of the first kind—opinion or imagination.” In contrast, that which is derived “from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things,” he calls “reason and knowledge of the second kind.”

The third kind, which he calls “intuitive science,” is that sort of knowing which “advances from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.” Knowledge of the second and third kinds, he maintains, “is necessarily true.” That there can be falsity in the first kind, and only there, indicates that it is not genuinely knowledge at all, but what other writers would insist upon calling “opinion.”

The several meanings of the word “belief” are determined by these distinctions. Sometimes belief is associated with opinion, sometimes with knowledge, and sometimes it is regarded as an intermediate state of mind. But in any of these meanings belief stands in contrast to make-believe, and this contrast has a bearing on knowledge and opinion as well. To know or to opine puts the mind in some relation to the real or actual rather than the merely possible, and subjects it to the criteria of truth and falsity. The fanciful or imaginary belongs to the realm of the possible (or even the impossible) and the mind in imagining is fancy-free—free from the restraints and restrictions of truth and reality.

SKEPTICISM in its most extreme form takes the position that there is nothing true or false. But even those who, like Montaigne, deny certitude with respect to everything except matters of religious faith, do not go this far.

In his Apology for Raimond de Sebonde he concedes that if opinions are weighed as more or less probable, their truth or falsity is implied—at least as being the limit which an increasing probability or improbability approaches. Referring to ancient skeptics of the Academic school, he comments on the fact that they acknowledged “some things to be more likely than others”—as, for example, that snow is white rather than black. The more extreme skeptics, the Pyrrhonians, he points out, were bolder and also more consistent. They refused to incline toward one proposition more than toward another, for to do so, Montaigne declares, is to recognize “some more apparent truth in this than in that.” How can men “suffer themselves,” he asks, “to incline to and be swayed by probability, if they know not the truth itself? How should they know the similitude of that whereof they do not know the essence?”

In this respect Montaigne’s own skepticism tends to be of the more moderate variety, since, in the realm of action at least, he would admit the need for judgments of probability. But in all other respects, he takes a firm skeptical stand that nothing is self-evident, nothing has been proved. The contradictory of everything has been asserted or argued by someone. “Men can have no principles,” he writes, “if not revealed to them by the Divinity; of all the rest, the beginning, the middle, and the end are nothing but dream and vapor…. Every human presupposition and every declaration has as much authority, one as another. … The persuasion of certainty is a certain testimony of folly and extreme uncertainty.”

The skeptical extreme is represented in the great books only through references to it for the purpose of refutation. Aristotle in the Metaphysics, for example, reports the position of those who say that all propositions are true or that all propositions are false, and who therefore deny the principle of contradiction and with it the distinction between true and false. But if all propositions are true, then the proposition “Some propositions are false” is also true; if all propositions are false, the proposition “All propositions are false” is also false. The skeptic may reply, of course, that he is not checked by arguments which try to make him contradict himself, for he does not mind contradicting himself. To this there is only one answer, which is not to argue with the skeptic any further.

From the skeptic’s point of view his position is irrefutable so long as he does not allow himself to accept any of the standards by which refutation can be effected. From his opponent’s point of view complete skepticism is self-refuting because if the skeptic says anything definite at all, he appears to have some knowledge or at least to hold one opinion in preference to another. His only choice is to remain silent. If he insists upon making statements in defiance of self-contradiction, his opponent can do nothing but walk away.

“It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the skeptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination,” Hume writes, “yet this is the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes.” He has in mind the excessive skepticism, or Pyrrhonism, from which he tries to distinguish a mitigated and beneficial form of skepticism. Referring to Berkeley’s arguments against the independent reality of matter or bodies, Hume says their effect is skeptical, despite Berkeley’s professed intention to the contrary. That his arguments are skeptical “appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of skepticism.”

Here and elsewhere, as in his comment on Descartes’ skeptical method of doubting everything which can be doubted, Hume does not seem to think that excessive skepticism is refutable or even false. But it is impractical. “The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of skepticism,” he says, “is action, and employment, and the occupations of life.” Extreme skepticism becomes untenable in thought the moment thought must face the choices of life and take some responsibility for action.

There is, however, “a more mitigated skepticism or academical philosophy which may be both durable and useful.” This, according to Hume, consists in becoming “sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding,” and consequently in “the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.”

His own view of the extent and certainty of human knowledge seems to him to exemplify such mitigated skepticism in operation. The only objects with respect to which demonstration is possible are quantity and number. Mathematics has the certitude of knowledge, but it deals only with relations between ideas, not with what Hume calls “matters of fact and existence.” Such matters “are evidently incapable of demonstration.” This is the sphere of “moral certainty,” which is not a genuine certainty, but only a degree of probability sufficient for action. Probabilities are the best that experimental reasoning or inquiry about matters of fact can achieve. If probability is characteristic of opinion rather than knowledge, then we can have nothing better than opinion concerning real existences.

THE DIAMETRICAL opposite to the extreme of skepticism would have to be a dogmatism which placed no objects beyond the reach of human knowledge, which made no distinction between degrees of knowability and admitted equal certitude in all matters. Like excessive skepticism this extreme is not a position actually held in the great books. All the great thinkers who have considered the problem of human knowledge have set limits to man’s capacity for knowledge. They have placed certain objects beyond man’s power to apprehend at all, or have distinguished between those which he can apprehend in some inadequate fashion, but cannot comprehend. They have indicated other objects concerning which his grasp is adequate and certain.

They all adopt a “mitigated skepticism”—to use Hume’s phrase—if this can be taken to mean avoiding the extremes of saying that nothing is knowable at all and that everything is equally knowable. But they differ in the criteria they employ to set the limits of knowledge and to distinguish between the areas of certainty and probability. Consequently they differ in their determination of the knowability of certain types of objects, such as God or the infinite, substance or cause, matter or spirit, the real or the ideal, the self or the thing in itself.

For example, Plato and Aristotle agree that knowledge must be separated from opinion and even appeal to certain common principles in making that separation; but they do not define the scope of knowledge in the same way, as is indicated by their disagreement about the knowability of sensible things. Nor do Descartes and Locke, Bacon and Spinoza, Hume and Kant agree about the knowability of God or of the soul or about the conditions any object must meet in order to be knowable. All alike proceed from a desire to be critical. Each criticizes what other men have proposed as knowledge and each proposes a new method by which the pursuit of knowledge will be safeguarded from illusory hopes or endless controversy.

In this last respect the moderns depart most radically from their mediaeval and ancient predecessors. At all times men have been interested in examining knowledge itself as well as in exercising their powers to know. But in the earlier phase of the tradition knowledge about knowledge does not seem to take precedence over all other inquiries or to be prerequisite to them. On the contrary, the ancients proceed as if the study of knowledge necessarily presupposed the existence of knowledge. With them the examination takes place because the mind is essentially reflexive rather than for reasons of self-criticism. But beginning with Descartes’ Discourse on the Method, in which a method of universal doubt is proposed to clear the ground before the foundations of the sciences can be laid, the consideration of knowing is put before any attempt to know.

Sometimes, as with Descartes and Bacon, the emphasis is upon a new method which will at last establish knowledge on a firm footing or advance learning. Sometimes, as with Locke and Hume, attention is given first of all to the faculty of understanding itself.

“If we can find out,” says Locke, “how far the understanding can extend its views, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state. … When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate of what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts to work at all, in despair of knowing anything; nor, on the other side, question everything, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood.”

Hume also proposes that a study of human understanding precede everything else, to “show from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity” what subjects it is or is not fitted to investigate. “There is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding.” No one can doubt that a science of the mind—or knowledge about knowing—is possible unless he entertains “such a skepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculations, and even action.”

Disagreeing with the principles of Locke and Hume, as well as with their conclusions, Kant does approve the priority they give to the question of the possibility of knowing certain objects. To proceed otherwise, as Kant charges most other philosophers with doing, is dogmatism. The use of the word “critique” in the title of Kant’s three major works signifies his intention to construct a critical philosophy which does not presume that “it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysic without a previous criticism of pure reason.” He does not object to what he calls “the dogmatical procedure of reason” in the development of science, but only after reason’s self-criticism has determined just how far reason can go. For Kant, as for Bacon, dogmatism and skepticism are the opposite excesses which only a critical method can avoid.

These two different approaches to the theory of knowledge seem to result in different conclusions concerning the nature and scope of human knowledge. Those who begin with the established sciences and merely inquire into their foundations and methods, appear to end with unqualified confidence in man’s ability to know. Those who make the inquiry into the foundations and methods of science a necessary preparation for the development of the sciences, tend for the most part to set narrower boundaries to the area of valid knowledge. The two approaches also affect the way in which the various kinds of knowledge are distinguished and compared.

There are two sorts of comparison involved in the classification of kinds of knowledge. One is a comparison of human knowledge with divine, or with angelic knowledge and the knowledge of brute animals. The other is a comparison of the parts or modes of human knowledge according to such criteria as the objects to be known, the faculties engaged in the process of knowing, and the manner of their operation. Though made separately, these two comparisons are seldom independent of one another. As the nature of man is conceived in relation to other beings, superior or inferior to himself, his faculties will be rated accordingly, and his power as a knower will suggest the methods or means available to him for knowing.

Aquinas, for example, attributes to man the kind of knowledge appropriate to his station in the hierarchy of beings. Man is superior to the brutes because he has a faculty of reason in addition to the faculties of sense and imagination which he shares with them. Man is inferior to purely spiritual beings—the angels and God—because, since he is corporeal, his intellect cannot function independently of his bodily senses and imagination. Unlike the angels and God, he is not a purely intellectual being.

Accordingly, the essential characteristics of human knowledge are, first, that it is always both sensitive and intellectual, never merely sense-perception as with the brutes or pure intellectual intuition as with the angels; second, that its appropriate object is the physical world of sensible, material things, with respect to which the senses enable man to know the existence of individuals, while the intellect apprehends their universal natures; and, finally, that the way in which the human mind knows the natures of things is abstractive and discursive, for the intellect draws its concepts from sense and imagination and proceeds therefrom by means of judgment and reasoning.

This analysis denies innate ideas. It denies man’s power to apprehend ideas intuitively or to use them intuitively in the apprehension of things. It can find no place for a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, since sense-perception and rational activity contribute elements to every act of knowing. It affirms that knowledge is primarily of real existence, not of the relations between ideas; but it does not limit human knowledge to the changing temporal things of the material universe. Though these are the objects man is able to know with greatest adequacy, he can also know something of the existence and nature of immaterial and eternal beings.

Yet, according to Aquinas, even when man’s knowledge rises above the realm of experienceable things, it is obtained by the same natural processes and involves the cooperation of the senses with reason. The theologian does, however, distinguish sharply between knowledge gained through man’s own efforts and knowledge received through divine revelation. In addition to all knowledge acquired by the natural exercise of his faculties, man may be elevated by the supernatural gift of knowledge—the wisdom of a faith surpassing reason.

The foregoing summary illustrates, in the case of one great doctrine, the connection between an analysis of the kinds of knowledge and a theory of the nature and faculties of man in relation to all other things. There is no point in this analysis which is not disputed by someone—by Plato or Augustine, Descartes, Spinoza, or Locke, by Hume, Kant, or William James. There are many points on which others agree—not only Aristotle and Bacon, but even Augustine, Descartes, and Locke.

These agreements or disagreements about the kinds of knowledge, or the scope of human knowledge, its faculties, and its methods, seldom occur or are intelligible except in the wider context of agreements and disagreements in theology and metaphysics, psychology and logic. Hence most of the matters considered under the heading “kinds of knowledge” receive special consideration in other chapters. The Cross-References should enable the reader to examine the presuppositions or context of the materials assembled here.

THE CULT OF IGNORANCE receives little or no attention in the tradition of the great books. Even those who, like Rousseau, glorify the innocence of the primitives, or who satirize the folly so often admixed with human wisdom and the foibles attending the advance of learning, do not seriously question the ancient saying that all men by nature desire to know. Nor is it generally doubted that knowledge is good; that its possession contributes to the happiness of men and the welfare of the state; that its pursuit by the individual and its dissemination in a society should be facilitated by education, by the support and freedom of scholars and scientists, and by every device which can assist men in communicating what they know to one another.

But knowledge is not valued by all for the same reason. That knowledge is useful to the productive artist, to the statesman, to the legislator, and to the individual in the conduct of his life, seems to be assumed in discussions of the applications of science in the various arts, in the consideration of statecraft, and in the analysis of virtue. In this last connection, the problem is not whether knowledge is morally useful, but whether knowledge of good and evil is identical with virtue so that sin and vice result from error or ignorance.

If there is a negative opinion here, it consists in saying that knowledge is not enough. To know is not to do. Something more than knowledge is required for acting well.

The more radical dispute about the value of knowledge concerns the goodness of knowledge for its own sake, without any regard to its technical or moral utility. Is the contemplation of the truth an ultimate end, or does the goodness of knowledge always consist in its power to effect results in the mastery of nature and the guidance of conduct? The utility of knowledge is seldom denied by those who make speculative wisdom and theoretic science good in themselves, even the highest goods, quite apart from any use to which they may be put. The contrary position, however, does not admit the special value of contemplation or the separation of truth from utility. To those who say that “the contemplation of truth is more dignified and exalted than any utility or extent of effects,” Francis Bacon replies that “truth and utility are perfectly identical, and the effects are more of value as pledges of truth than from the benefit they confer on men.”

How knowledge and action are related is one question; how knowledge itself is divided into the speculative and practical is quite another. Bacon, for example, insists upon the necessity of distinguishing the speculative and practical branches of natural philosophy—concerned with “the search after causes and the production of effects.” Unlike Aristotle and Kant he does not use the word “practical” for the kind of knowledge which is contained in such sciences as ethics or politics, but only for the applied sciences or technology. Ethics and politics fall under what he calls “civil philosophy.”

Despite these differences in language, the way in which Bacon divides the whole sphere of knowledge closely resembles Aristotle’s tripartite classification of the sciences as theoretic, productive (or technical), and practical (or moral); and, no less, a similar threefold division by Kant. But Kant and Aristotle (and, it should be added, Aquinas) give a more elaborate analysis of these three types of knowledge, especially with regard to the principles appropriate to each, the nature of the judgments and reasoning by which they are developed, and the character and criteria of their truth.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature of knowledge: the relation between knower and known; the issue concerning the representative or intentional character of knowledge
2. Man’s natural desire and power to know
3. Principles of knowledge
4. Knowledge in relation to other states of mind a. Knowledge and truth: the differentiation of knowledge, error, and ignorance b. Knowledge, belief, and opinion: their relation or distinction c. The distinction between knowledge and fancy or imagination d. Knowledge and love
5. The extent or limits of human knowledge a. The knowable, the unknowable, and the unknown: the knowability of certain objects (1) God as an object of knowledge (2) Matter and the immaterial as objects of knowledge (3) Cause and substance as objects of knowledge (4) The infinite and the individual as objects of knowledge (5) The past and the future as objects of knowledge (6) The self and the thing in itself as objects of knowledge b. The distinction between what is more knowable in itself and what is more knowable to us c. Dogmatism, skepticism, and the critical attitude with respect to the extent, certainty, and finality of human knowledge d. The method of universal doubt as prerequisite to knowledge: God’s goodness as the assurance of the veracity of our faculties e. Knowledge about knowledge as the source of criteria for evaluating claims to knowledge
6. The kinds of knowledge a. The classification of knowledge according to diversity of objects (1) Being and becoming, the intelligible and the sensible, the necessary and the contingent, the eternal and the temporal, the immaterial and the material as objects of knowledge (2) Knowledge of natures or kinds distinguished from knowledge of individuals (3) Knowledge of matters of fact or real existence distinguished from knowledge of our ideas or of the relations between them (4) Knowledge in relation to the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the sensible and supra-sensible b. The classification of knowledge according to the faculties involved in knowing (1) Sensitive knowledge: sense-perception as knowledge; judgments of perception and judgments of experience (2) Memory as knowledge (3) Rational or intellectual knowledge (4) Knowledge in relation to the faculties of understanding, judgment, and reason; and to the work of intuition, imagination, and understanding c. The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of knowing (1) Vision, contemplation, or intuitive knowledge distinguished from discursive knowledge (2) The distinction between immediate and mediated judgments: induction and reasoning, principles and conclusions (3) The doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence: the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge (4) The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge: the transcendental, or speculative, and the empirical (5) The distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge: knowledge based on sense or reason distinguished from knowledge by faith or through grace and inspiration d. The classification of knowledge according to the degrees of assent (1) The distinction between certain and probable knowledge (2) The types of certainty and the degrees of probability (3) The distinction between adequate and inadequate, or perfect and imperfect knowledge e. The classification of knowledge according to the end or aim of the knowing (1) The distinction between theoretic and practical knowledge: knowing for the sake of knowledge and for the sake of action or production (2) The types of practical knowledge: the use of knowledge in production and in the direction of conduct; technical and moral knowledge
7. Comparison of human with other kinds of knowledge a. Human and divine knowledge b. Human and angelic knowledge c. Knowledge in this life compared with knowledge in the state of innocence and knowledge hereafter d. The knowledge of men and brutes
8. The use and value of knowledge a. The technical use of knowledge in the sphere of production: the applications of science in art b. The moral use of knowledge and the moral value of knowledge (1) The knowledge of good and evil: the relation of knowledge to virtue and sin (2) Knowledge as a condition of voluntariness in conduct (3) Knowledge in relation to prudence and continence (4) The possession or pursuit of knowledge as a good or satisfaction: its relation to pleasure and pain; its contribution to happiness c. The political use of knowledge: the knowledge requisite for the statesman, legislator, or citizen
9. The communication of knowledge a. The means and methods of communicating knowledge b. The value of the dissemination of knowledge: freedom of discussion
10. The growth of human knowledge: the history of man’s progress and failures in the pursuit of knowledge

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

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1. The nature of knowledge: the relation between knower and known; the issue concerning the representative or intentional character of knowledge

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 124c-126c esp 126a-c / Meno, 179d-183a esp 180a-b, 182c-183a; 188d-189b / Phaedo, 228a-230d; 231b-232b / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK V, 371b-373c; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c esp BK VI, 397a-398c / Timaeus, 476b / Theaetetus, 515d-517b; 521d-522b; 538d-541a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [6b1-6] 11a; [7b22-8a12] 12c-13a; CH 8 [11a20-39] 16b-c / On Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-9] 25a / Topics, BK IV, CH 1 [121a1-6] 168d; CH 4 [124b15-19] 173b; [124b27-34] 173c-d; BK VI, CH 5 [143a9-12] 196c; CH 6 [145a12-18] 198d; CH 8 [146b37-59] 200b-c; CH 12 [149b3-23] 203d-204a / Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-248a6] 330b-d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 15 [1021a27-3] 542c-d; BK IX, CH 6 [1048b18-34] 574a-c; CH 9 [1051a22-34] 577b-c; BK X, CH 1 [1053a32-b3] 580a; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b14-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 605a-d; BK XIII, CH 10 [1087a10-25] 619c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 5 [409b18-411a7] 639c-641a; BK II, CH 2 [414a4-14] 644a-b; CH 5 [416b32-417a2] 647b; [417b17-21] 647d; [418a2-6] 648c-d; BK III, CH 2 [425b17-26] 657d-658a; CH 3 [427a16-b6] 659c-d; CH 4 661b-662c; CH 5 [430a14-16] 662c; [430a20-22] 662d; CH 7 [431b1-8] 663c; CH 8 664b-d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [450a25-451a19] 691a-692b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 1 [1139a6-11] 387c 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [26-109] 44b-45c; [722-817] 53d-54d 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4a / Third Ennead, TR VIII, CH 6, 132a; CH 8, 132d-133b; CH 9, 134a-b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 4, 210b-c; TR IV, CH 4-5 217b-218c; CH 10-13 221b-224b; TR V, CH 1-2 228b-229d; TR IX, CH 7 249b-c / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 36-41 339c-342c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 11-38 74a-81a esp PAR 17 75c-d, PAR 19 76a-b, PAR 22-24 76d-77c, PAR 27-28 78b-d / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 38, 654c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, REP 1 16a-d; Q 5, A 4, REP 1 25d-26c; Q 8, A 3, REP 3 36b-37c; Q 12, A 1, REP 4 50c-51c; A 2 51c-52c; A 4, ANS and REP 1 53b-54c; AA 9-10 58b-59d; Q 13, A 7, ANS and REP 6 68d-70d; Q 14, A 1, ANS and REP 3 75d-76c; A 2 76d-77d; AA 5-6 79a-81c esp A 5, REP 2-3 79a-80a, A 6, REP 1,3 80a-81c; A 8 82c-83b; A 9, REP 2 83b-d; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; A 15, REP 1 89b-90b; Q 15, A 1, ANS 91b-92a; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 17, A 3, ANS 102d-103c; Q 18, A 4, ANS and REP 2 107d-108c; Q 19, A 3, REP 6 110b-111c; Q 27, A 1, ANS and REP 2 153b-154b; A 2, ANS and REP 2 154c-155b; A 3, ANS 155c-156a; A 4, ANS and REP 2 156b-d; Q 28, A 4, REP 1 160c-161d; Q 34, A 1, REP 2-3 185b-187b; A 2, REP 1 187b-188a; A 3, ANS 188b-189a; Q 54, A 1, REP 3 285a-d; A 2, ANS and REP 2 285d-286c; QQ 55-57 288d-300b; Q 58, A 2 301b-d; Q 59, A 2 307c-308b; Q 60, A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 75, A 1, REP 2 378b-379c; Q 78, A 1, ANS and REP 3 407b-409a; A 3, ANS 410a-411d; A 4, ANS and REP 2 411d-413d; Q 82, A 3, ANS and REP 1 433c-434c; Q 84 440b-451b; Q 85, A 1, REP 3 451c-453c; A 2 453d-455b; A 3, REP 1,4 455b-457a; A 4 457a-d; A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; A 8, REP 3 460b-461b; Q 86, A 1, ANS 461c-462a; Q 87, A 1 465a-466c; Q 88, A 1, REP 2 469a-471c; Q 89, A 2, ANS and REP 2 475a-d; A 6, ANS and REP 2 478b-d; PART I-II, Q 28, A 1, REP 3 740b-741a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 5, REP 1 10b-d; Q 51, A 1, REP 2 12b-13c; PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A 3 971a-972d; Q 92, A 1 1025c-1032b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; PART II, 162c; PART IV, 261a; 262a-b 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 332b-333c 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, RULE XII 18b-25a passim, esp 24a-c; RULE XIV, 29b-c; 30c-d / Meditations on First Philosophy, II, 82b-87a passim; VI, 99a-b / Objections and Replies, 108b-109d; AXIOM V 131d-132a; 137a; 219b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 4,6 355d; PROP 30-31 366c-367a; PART II, PROP 7 375a-c; PROP 11-13 377b-378c; PROP 17, SCHOL 381b-d 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX, SECT 2 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 8 244d; SECT 14-16 245c-246b; BK IV, CH I 307a-309b; CH IV, SECT 1-12 323d-326d; SECT 18 328d-329a; CH XIII 363c-364b; CH XV, SECT 2 371d-372b; CH XVIII, SECT 8 377b-d 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1-91 413a-431a esp SECT 2-4 413b-414a, SECT 8-9 414c-d, SECT 25-33 417d-419a, SECT 48-49 422a-b, SECT 56 423c-d, SECT 86-91 429c-431a; SECT 135-142 440a-441c; SECT 147-148 442b-d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 118, 504d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 7b-d; 12c-d [fn 1]; 14a-b; 15d-16c; 22a,c; 23a-24a; 34a-35b; 55a-56c; 88b-91d; 99a-101b; 101d-102a; 109d-110d; 115b-c; 121a-123b; 125b [fn 1] / The Critique of Practical Reason, 292d [fn 1]; 307d-310c / The Critique of Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 604b-c; 612c-d 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 146-147 55c-56a; PAR 343 110d-111a / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-161a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 128a-129a; 140b-143b; 153b-154a; 176a-184a esp 176a-178a, 179b-180a; 194b-196b esp 196a-b; 213a-239a passim, esp 213b-214a, 219a-b, 223a-b, 228a-b, 232b-238b; 258b-259b; 307a-311a esp 307a-308a, 309a; 325a-327a esp 326a-b [fn 1]; 450a-451b; 454a-455a; 469a-b; 851b-852a

2. Man’s natural desire and power to know

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 125b-c / Theaetetus, 535b-c / Sophist, 557c-d / Seventh Letter, 810b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-248a9] 330b-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a22-28] 499a / On the Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429a18-20] 661c; CH 5 [430a14-15] 662c 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a14-17] 594b 11 NICOMACHUS: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-d 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK I [921-934] 12b-c; BK IV [1-9] 44a-b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 2, 106d 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 121a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 10 73d-74a / The City of God, BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 1, ANS 50c-51c; A 2, ANS and REP 1 51c-52c; AA 3-6 52c-56a; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; A 11, ANS and REP 3 59d-60d; A 12 60d-61c; Q 14, A 2, REP 3 76d-77d; A 10, REP 1 83d-84c; Q 18, A 2, ANS and REP 1 105c-106b; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a; Q 54, A 4 287b-288a; Q 60, A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 61, A 2, REP 3 315c-316a; Q 62, A 1, ANS 317d-318c; Q 75, A 2, ANS 379c-380c; Q 78, A 1, ANS and REP 3 407b-409a; Q 79 413d-427a; Q 84, AA 1-3 440d-444d; Q 88, A 1, REP 2 469a-471c; Q 117, A 1 595d-597c; PART I-II, Q 3, A 8, ANS 628d-629c; Q 22, A 1, REP 1 720d-721c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; PART III, Q 10, A 4, REP 1 771b-772a; Q 11, A 1, ANS and REP 1 772b-773a; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 2,15 1025c-1032b 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVI [112-120] 39b; PURGATORY, XVIII [49-60] 80b-c; XX [124]-XXI [75] 84c-85d; PARADISE, IV [115]-V [12] 111d-112b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 63a; 77a; 78d-80a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 244d-246a; 503b-d; 517b-519a 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 124b-125b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, DEF 3 373b; AXIOM 2 373d; PART IV, PROP 26-28 431a-c; PART V, PROP 25-26 458d-459a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 7 139a-b 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 3 405b-c; SECT 105 433b-c 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 236b-238a 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-c 44 BOSWELL: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 130b; 151d 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 157b-158a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [354-517] 11a-14b; [522-601] 15a-16b; [1765-1784] 42b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 4b-5a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 522b-525a esp 524b-525a; 711b-712b; 729a-730a; 851b-852a 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 16b

3. Principles of knowledge

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228a-230c / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK IV, 350d-351b; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Theaetetus, 544d-547c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b; CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 499a-500b; BK V, CH 1 [1013a14-23] 533b; CH 6 [1016b18-25] 537b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413a11-13] 643a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 [1139b25-34] 388c; CH 6 389d 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK I [690-700] 9c; BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 1 1a-b; BK IV, PAR 25 25c; BK V, PAR 4 27d-28a; BK X, PAR 65 87d-88a; BK XIII, PAR 46 123a-c / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 4-7 266d-269d; CH 9-10 270d-271d; BK X, CH 2 299d-300a; BK XI, CH 7 326a-c; CH 24-25 335c-336d; CH 27-29 337b-339b; BK XXII, CH 18 523a-b / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 37-40 635b-636a,c; BK II, CH 7 638d-639c; BK III, CH 37, 674a-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3 10d-11d; Q 15 91b-94a passim, esp A 3, ANS 93b-94a; Q 18, A 2, ANS 105c-106b; Q 84, AA 4-6 444d-449a; Q 85, A 3 455b-457a; Q 88, A 3, REP 1 472c-473a; Q 105, A 3 540c-541b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a; A 5, ANS 613a-614a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; Q 51, A 1, ANS 12b-13c; PART III, Q 11, A 6, REP 3 775d-776b 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [49-60] 80b-c; PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 285c-286a 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-335c esp 333d-334d 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 39d-40a; 58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14 107d-108a; APH 39-40 109c 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, I 1a-2a; IV, 5c-d; 6d; VI, 8d-9a; VIII, 13c-d / Discourse on the Method, PART IV 51b-54b / Meditations on First Philosophy, I 77d-81d / Objections and Replies, 224b,d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-40 386b-388b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 23, 120a; BK II, CH I 121a-127d passim, esp SECT 1-8 121a-123a, SECT 22-25 127a-d; CH VII, SECT 10 133a-b; CH IX, SECT 15-CH X, SECT 2 141a-c; CH X, SECT 8 142d-143a; CH XII 147b-148d; CH XIV, SECT 2 155b-c; CH XVII, SECT 22-CH XVIII, SECT 1 173d-174a; CH XVIII, SECT 6 174c-d; CH XXII, SECT 9 202c-203a; CH XXV, SECT 9 216d; SECT 11 217a; BK III, CH I, SECT 5 252b-c; CH XI, SECT 23 305a-b; BK IV, CH I, SECT 9-CH II, SECT 1 308c-309d; CH III, SECT 7-8 310d-311a; CH VII, SECT 1-2 313a; CH VII 337a-344d esp SECT 1 337a, SECT 10-11, 339b-340a; CH XII, SECT 1-6 358c-360a; SECT 15 363a-b 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 4 405c-d; SECT 25 412a,c; SECT 1-2 413a-b; SECT 25-33 417d-419a; SECT 89 430b-c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II 455b-457b esp DIV 13-14 455d-456b; SECT VII, DIV 49 471c-d; DIV 61, 477c 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 338c-339b 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 34a-35b; 66d-72c esp 67d-68a / The Critique of Practical Reason, 343a / The Critique of Judgement, 492c-d; 517d [fn 2]; 550a-551a,c; 562a-d; 570b-572b; 577b; 578a-d 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, INTRO, PAR 2 9b-10a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 213b-214a; 299a-300a; 315a-319a esp 317b-318a; 360a; 453a-459b esp 453b-454a, 455a-457a; 859a-860b 54 FREUD: The Ego and the Id, 700a-701d

4. Knowledge in relation to other states of mind

4a. Knowledge and truth: the differentiation of knowledge, error, and ignorance

7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b / Meno, 179b-183a esp 180d, 181d, 182c-d; 188c-189b / Apology, 201d-202d / Gorgias, 256b / Republic, BK V, 368c-373c; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 447b-d; 450b-c; 457c-d / Parmenides, 490b-d / Theaetetus, 535c-536a; 542a-544a / Sophist, 557c-558b / Laws, BK IX, 748a 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 21 87d-89b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 6 [75a12-18] 103a; CH 16-18 109b-111c / Topics, BK VI, CH 9 [147a16-21] 201a-b; [147b26-148a9] 201d-202a; CH 14 [151a32-b3] 206b-c / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 511b,d-512b; BK IV, CH 7 [1011b25-29] 531c; [1012a1-17] 531d-532a; BK V, CH 29 [1024b27-38] 546d-547a; BK VI, CH 4 550a,c; BK IX, CH 10 577c-578a,c; BK XII, CH 10 [1075a20-24] 606c / On the Soul, BK III, CH 3 [427a16-b6] 659c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 9 [1142b7-12] 391d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1355a21-39] 594c-d 11 ARCHIMEDES: On the Sphere and Cylinder, BK I, 403b 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 5 110b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 10 73d-74a; PAR 19 76a-b; BK XII, PAR 5 100a-b / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 36 634d-635b; BK II, CH 38, 654c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1, REP 1-2 3b-4a; Q 2, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3 10d-11d; Q 13, A 12, REP 3 74c-75b; Q 14, A 8, REP 3 82c-83b; A 9, REP 1 83b-d; A 12, ANS and REP 3 85d-86d; A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; QQ 16-17 94b-104b; Q 54, A 2, ANS and REP 2 285d-286c; A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; Q 58, A 5 303c-304c; Q 59, A 2, REP 3 307c-308b; Q 60, A 1, REP 3 310b-311a; Q 79, A 9, REP 3-4 422b-423d; Q 84, A 6, REP 1 447c-449a; A 7, REP 3 449b-450b; Q 85, A 1, REP 1 451c-453c; A 2, ANS 453d-455b; A 6 458d-459c; A 7, ANS 459c-460b; Q 88, A 3, REP 1 472c-473a; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478b; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a; Q 101, A 1, REP 2 522c-523a; Q 117, A 1, ANS 595d-597c; PART I-II, Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-722c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93, A 2, ANS 216c-217b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 3, REP 8 1034b-1037c 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [115]-V [12] 111d-112b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-60a; 78a-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 150d-151a; 238c-d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 39-45 109c-110b 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, I-II 1a-3b; XII, 24a-c / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 52a / Meditations on First Philosophy, I 75a-77c; IV 89a-93a / Objections and Replies, 126a-b; 168b-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 43, SCHOL 388d-389b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 263 221a-b; 327 231a-b / On the Vacuum, 358b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH V 329a-331b esp SECT 8-9 330d-331a; CH VI, SECT 16 336d; CH XX, SECT 1, 388d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 224a-c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PREF, 7a; INTRO, PAR 1 9a; PART III, PAR 140, 52c-54a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 141a-142a 54 FREUD: A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 560c-561a / New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 879c-d

4b. Knowledge, belief, and opinion: their relation or distinction

6 THUCYDIDES: The Peloponnesian War, BK I, 353d-354b 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 125a-126c / Symposium, 163b / Meno, 188b-189a / Gorgias, 256b-257a / Republic, BK IV, 354d-355a; BK V, 370c-373c; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c; BK X, 430d-431d / Timaeus, 447b-d; 450b-c; 457c-d / Theaetetus, 531a-532a; 534a; 536b-549d / Sophist, 559c-561d / Philebus, 632d-635a 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [8b35-14] 13b-c / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 13 [32b4-23] 48b-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b8-16] 97d-98a; CH 33 121b-122a,c / Topics, BK IV, CH 1 [121a20-26] 169a-b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4 [1008b27-32] 528b; BK VII, CH 15 [1039b31-1040a8] 563d-564a; BK IX, CH 10 577c-578a,c / On the Soul, BK III, CH 3 [427b16-428a9] 659c-660d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b12-28] 339d-340a; BK III, CH 2 [1112a7-8] 357d; BK VI, CH 3 [1139b14-18] 388b; CH 5 [1140a33-b4] 389b; [1140b25-28] 389c; CH 9 [1142a32-b16] 391c-d passim; CH 10 392b-c; BK VII, CH 3 [1146b23-34] 396d-397a / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 25 [1402b13-1403a17] 652b-653a 10 HIPPOCRATES: The Law, PAR 4 144d 11 NICOMACHUS: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-d 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 7 249b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 1 1a-b; BK VI, PAR 5-8 36b-37c / The City of God, BK XXII, CH 4-5 588b-590a; CH 7 591c-d / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 40 636a,c; BK II, CH 7 638d-639c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 8, REP 2 7c-8d; Q 12, A 7, ANS and REP 2-3 56a-57b; A 13, REP 3 61c-62b; Q 14, A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 16, A 8 99d-100d; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 79, A 9, REP 3-4 422b-423d; Q 108, A 7, REP 2 560b-561a; PART I-II, Q 17, A 6, ANS 690b-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 3 14b-15a; Q 53, A 1, ANS 19d-21a; Q 57, A 2, REP 3 36a-37b; Q 67, A 3 83b-84d; Q 77, A 2, REP 3 145d-147c; PART II-II, Q 1, AA 4-5 382c-384b; Q 2 390d-400b; Q 4, A 1 402a-403d; PART III, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XX [67-148] 137b-138b esp [88-93] 137c 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 29 92b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58d-59a; 65b-66c; PART III, 241c-242a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 98b-99a; 150c-151a; 238c-239c; 240c-246a; 258c-261c; 267c-268a; 271b-273b 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 333c-d; 335a-b 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 16a-b; 95d-96a 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II-III 2a-5a / Discourse on the Method, PART VI, 64a-d / Meditations on First Philosophy, 72b,d; I 75a-77c; V, 95b-96a / Objections and Replies, 123a-d; 167a-d; 218c-d; 226d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 406a-b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 99 191a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 2-5 93b-94d; BK I, CH III, SECT 23-25 119b-120d; BK IV, CH I, SECT 2 307a; CH II, SECT 14, 312b; CH VI, SECT 13 335c-d; CH XIV-XV 364b-366c esp CH XV, SECT 1-3 365a-d; CH XVI, SECT 14 371b-c; CH XVIII, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT 14-24 378c-380d passim; CH XVIII-XIX 380d-388d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30 461d-462b; SECT VI, 469d [fn 1] 36 SWIFT: Gulliver’s Travels, PART IV, 165a-b 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335d-336a 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 2a-4a,c; 228c-d; 240b-243c / The Critique of Judgement, 601d-607c esp 601d-602a, 603a-b, 603d-604b, 604d-606d 43 MILL: On Liberty, 274b-293b passim 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PREF 1a-7d passim; INTRO, PAR 1 9a; PART III, PAR 132, 46b-c; PAR 147 55d-56a; PAR 316 104c; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: The Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 11a-b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 636a-638b passim 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661c-662a / New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 881d-882b

4c. The distinction between knowledge and fancy or imagination

7 PLATO: Ion, 142a-148a,c / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-389c; BK X, 427c-431d esp 430b-431b / Sophist, 577a-b / Laws, BK IV, 684b-c / Seventh Letter, 809b-810b 8 ARISTOTLE: On the Soul, BK III, CH 3 659c-661b 14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 191d-192b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 10-11 15b-16a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 3, ANS and REP 3 52c-53b; A 11, REP 1 59d-60d; A 13, ANS and REP 2 61c-62b; Q 17, A 2, REP 2 102a-d; Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 84, A 2, REP 1 442b-443c; A 6, REP 1-2 447c-449a; A 7, REP 2 449b-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q 93, A 6, REP 4 496b-498a; PART I-II, Q 17, A 7, REP 3 690d-692a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, REP 3 896a-897d 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [13-45] 78c-79a 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 335a-c 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 189d-193c; PART II, 205a-209d; 273c-278a; 326c-331a 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 32d; 33c-d; 38d-39b; 55a-d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 15 108a; APH 60 112c-113a / New Atlantis, 203a 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, III, 4a-b; VII, 13a; 14b; XIV, 29b-31c / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b; 54a-b / Meditations on First Philosophy, I, 75d-76c; II, 79a-81d; III, 82d-86a; VI 96b-103d passim, esp 96b-d / Objections and Replies, 122c-d; 136d-137a; 212a; 218c-d; 219b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17, COROL 381d; PROP 17, SCHOL-PROP 18 381b-382b; PROP 26 384a-b; PROP 40, SCHOL 1 387b-388a; PROP 44, SCHOL 389b-390a; PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d passim; PART V, PROP 34 460c-d 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [95-128] 177b-178a; BK VIII [179-197] 236a-b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 82-86 186b-189a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX 238a-239b; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 1-12 323d-326d passim, esp SECT 1-3 323d-324c; SECT 18 328d-329a; CH V, SECT 7-8 330b-d 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 29-30 418c; SECT 33 419a; SECT 36 419c-d; SECT 82 428d-429a; SECT 84 429b-c; SECT 86 429c-d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 39-40 466c-467c 40 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 345c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 173b-174a / The Critique of Judgement, 528c-529c; 532b-d; 575b-c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, PART I, 220c-221a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 639a-641a; 646b-655a; 659a-660b

4d. Knowledge and love

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 126a-129d / Symposium, 164d-165b; 167a-d 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VI, CH 2 10d / Third Ennead, TR V, CH 3, 102a-b; CH 7, 104a-c / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 34-35 338b-339c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 1-6 1a-2c; BK X, PAR 33-35 79d-80c; PAR 38 81a; BK XI, PAR 3 89d-90a / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 4-5, 267c-268b; CH 8-10 270a-271d; BK X, CH 3 300b-301a; BK XI, CH 7 326a-c; CH 25-29 336b-339b; BK XIV, CH 28 397a-d / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 36-40 634d-636a,c; BK II, CH 7 638d-639c; CH 38, 654c; CH 41-42 656a-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 6, REP 3 6b-7a; A 8, REP 2 7c-8d; Q 8, A 3, REP 3 36b-37c; Q 12, A 6, ANS 55b-56a; A 7, REP 1 56a-57b; Q 14, A 15, REP 1 89b-90b; Q 16, A 1, ANS 94b-95c; A 4 esp ANS and REP 1-2 97a-c; Q 23, A 4 135a-d; Q 27, AA 3-5 155c-157c; Q 28, A 4, ANS 160c-161d; Q 30, A 2, REP 2 168a-169b; Q 35, A 2, ANS 189d-190d; Q 36, A 2, ANS and REP 4-5 192a-194c; Q 37 197c-200c; Q 59, A 2 307c-308b; Q 60, A 1, REP 3 310b-311a; A 2 311a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 3 311d-312b; A 5, REP 5 313b-314c; Q 64, A 1, ANS 334a-335c; Q 78, A 1, ANS and REP 3 407b-409a; Q 82, A 3, ANS and REP 3 433c-434c; Q 87, A 1, REP 1 465a-466c; Q 93, AA 7-8 498a-500c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 8 615a-c; Q 3, A 4 625a-626b; Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-722c; Q 27, A 2 737d-738c; Q 28, A 1 esp REP 3 740b-741a; A 2, ANS and REP 2 741a-742a; A 3, ANS and REP 1 742a-d; A 4, REP 2 742d-743c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 5, REP 1 10b-d; Q 66, A 6, REP 1 80c-81b; Q 86, A 1, REP 2 184a-d; PART II-II, Q 23, A 6, REP 1 487a-d; Q 27, A 4 523c-524a 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [1-75] 78c-79b; PARADISE, IV [115]-V [12] 111d-112b; XXVI [25-36] 146a; XXVIII [88-114] 149c-150a 26 SHAKESPEARE: Love’s Labour’s Lost, ACT I, SC III [289-365] 271c-272a 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 227b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, AXIOM 3 373d; PROP 48-49 391a-394d; PART V, PROP 24-33 458d-460c; PROP 34, COROL 460d; PROP 35-37 460d-461c; PROP 42 463b-d 33 PASCAL: On Geometrical Demonstration, 440a

5. The extent or limits of human knowledge

5a. The knowable, the unknowable, and the unknown: the knowability of certain objects

7 PLATO: Meno, 179d-183a esp 180a / Parmenides, 489d-491a; 492a-504c esp 495b-c, 504c; 507c-d; 509d-510b esp 510b; 511c-d / Theaetetus, 544c-547c / Sophist, 560a-b 8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 3 [16b19-26] 25d-26a / Physics, BK II, CH 4 [197a5-7] 273a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b30-b3] 500c-d; BK VI, CH 2 548c-549c; BK VII, CH 10 [1036a9-12] 559c; CH 15 563c-564c 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b21-645a5] 168c-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 20 164c-166c 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR III 215d-226c esp CH 13 223d-224b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 1-6 1a-2c / The City of God, BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XII, CH 7 346c-d; BK XXI, CH 5 563d-564d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 5, A 2, ANS 24b-25a; Q 12, A 1 50c-51c; Q 14, A 3, ANS 77d-78b; A 10, ANS and REP 4 83d-84c; Q 16, A 3 96b-d; Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 55, A 1, REP 2 289a-d; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 79, A 3 416a-417a; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; Q 87 464d-468d passim 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 10, A 3 769d-771b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1 1025c-1032b 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96] 10b-c; PURGATORY, III [16-45] 56a-b; PARADISE, XIX [22-99] 135b-136a; XXI [73-102] 139a-b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 98b-99a; 238c-239c; 246a-261c passim; 271b-273a; 291b-294b; 439c-440a 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC I [56-88] 47c-d 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 363d-364a; 389b; 492c 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 96d-97b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 1 107a 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II 2a-3b; VIII, 12a-14a; XII, 22b-c / Meditations on First Philosophy, IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 112a-d; 215a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 30 366c-d; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, AXIOM 5 373d 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [544-576] 187a-b; BK VII [109-130] 219b-220a; BK VIII [114-130] 234b-235a; [179-214] 236a-b / Samson Agonistes [60-67] 340b-341a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72 181a-184b; 263 221a-b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 3-7 93d-95c; BK II, CH I, SECT 1-8 121a-123a; SECT 24 127b-c; CH III, SECT 3 128b-c; CH VII, SECT 10 133a-b; CH XIV, SECT 26 160c-d; CH XV, SECT 11 165a-b; CH XXII, SECT 9 202c-203a; CH XXIII 204a-214b passim; CH XXXI, SECT 6-13 240d-243b; CH XXXII, SECT 24 247c-d; BK III, CH III, SECT 15-18 258b-259c; CH VI 268b-283a passim; BK IV, CH III 313a-323d; CH VI, SECT 4-16 331d-336d passim; CH VIII, SECT 9 347d-348a; CH X, SECT 19 354a-c; CH XII, SECT 7-13 360b-362d; CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a; CH XVII, SECT 9-10 377d-378a; SECT 23 380b-c; CH XVIII, SECT 7 383b 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 2-3 405b-c; SECT 81 428c-d; SECT 89 430b-c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 7-10 453c-455b; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT VIII, DIV 62, 478c; SECT IX, DIV 84, 488b [fn 1]; SECT XII 503c-509d 40 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 159a-c; 308c-d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 19d-20c; 117b-118a; 120c-121a; 175b [fn1]; 215d-216c; 224a-c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 281c-282d; 285a-287d / The Critique of Practical Reason, 292a-c; 296a-d; 309b; 337a-c; 354d-355d / The Critique of Judgement, 465a-c; 564a-c; 599d-600d; 604a-b 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [672-675] 18a; PART II [11,441-452] 278b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 366a-b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 116a-119b esp 117b, 119b; 122b; 223b-224a; 656b-657a; 822b 54 FREUD: The Interpretation of Dreams, 383b-c

(1) God as an object of knowledge

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33:12-23 / Deuteronomy, 34:10 / I Chronicles, 28:9—(D) I Paralipomenon, 28:9 / Job, 11:7-9; 26:14; 36:26; 38:1-42:6 / Psalms, 19:1-4; 46:10; 83:18; 100:3—(D) Psalms, 18:1-5; 45:11; 82:19; 99:3 / Proverbs, 2:5 / Ecclesiastes, 3:11; 8:16-17; 11:5 / Isaiah, 11:9; 49:22-26; 60:16—(D) Isaias, 11:9; 49:22-26; 60:16 / Jeremiah, 24:7; 31:34—(D) Jeremias, 24:7; 31:34 / Ezekiel, 6:9-10,13-14; 28:22-26—(D) Ezechiel, 6:9-10,13-14; 28:22-26 / Hosea, 2:20; 6:2-3,6—(D) Osee, 2:20; 6:3,6 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 8:1-4; 9:13-16; 13:1-9—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 8:1-4; 9:13-16; 13:1-9 / II Maccabees, 7:28—(D) OT, II Machabees, 7:28 NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1:1-5,18; 14:7-11; 17:25-26 / Acts, 17:22-31 / Romans, 1:18-21; 11:33-36 / I Corinthians, 2:16; 8:1-7; 15:34 / II Corinthians, 4:6 / Ephesians, 1:17; 3:2-5 / Colossians, 1:9-15 / I Timothy, 6:14-16 / Hebrews, 8:11; 11:3 / I John, 4:7-21 5 AESCHYLUS: The Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b 5 EURIPIDES: Helen [1137-1150] 309a 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 447c 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b28-983a11] 501a-b; BK XII, CH 8 [1074a1-14] 604d-605a 14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 53b-c / Coriolanus, 191d-192b 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VIII, CH 9, 133d-134b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 1 208a-c; TR IV, CH 13-14, 224a-c; TR V, CH 6 231b-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 7-38 73a-81a; PAR 65 87d-88a; BK XIII, PAR 17-19 115a-d / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 10 271a-d; BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XXII, CH 29 614b-616d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1 3b-4a; A 7, REP 1 7a-c; Q 2, AA 1-2 10d-12c; Q 3, A 3, REP 1 16a-d; A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; A 5 17c-18b; QQ 12-13 50b-75b; Q 32 175d-180d; Q 42, A 2, REP 1,4 225d-227a; Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 56, A 3 294a-d; Q 57, A 5 299b-300b; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; A 7, REP 3 449b-450b; Q 86, A 2, REP 1 462a-463a; Q 88, A 2, REP 4 471c-472c; A 3 472c-473a; Q 89, A 2, REP 3 475a-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93, A 2 216c-217b; PART III, Q 9, A 3, REP 3 765b-766b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1 1025c-1032b 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, III [16-45] 56a-b; PARADISE, II [37-45] 108a; IV [28-48] 111a; XIX [22-99] 135b-136a; XX [130-148] 138a-b; XXI [73-102] 139a-b; XXXIII [46-145] 156c-157d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54b-c; 78d-79a; 79d-80b; PART II, 162a-163b; PART IV, 271b-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 98b-99a; 208c-209c; 212a-d; 238c-239c; 246a-257d passim 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 17b-20a; 38a; 45a-46a; 95d-101d esp 96d-97b, 99c-100a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART IV 51b-54b passim / Meditations on First Philosophy, 69b-d; 74a,c; III 81d-89a; IV, 89b; V 93a-96a / Objections and Replies, 108a-114c; 120c-d; 121a-123a; 127b-c; POSTULATE V 131b-c; PROP I-III 132b-133a; 211c-212a; 213a; 213d-214a; 215b-c; 227b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 11, SCHOL 358d-359b; PART II, PROP 1-2 373d-374a; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART V, PROP 24-32 458d-460b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VII [109-130] 219b-220a; BK VIII [114-130] 234b-235a / Samson Agonistes [60-62] 340b-341a; [293-325] 346a-b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 184-241 205a-217b passim, esp 233-241 213b-217b 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 370b-371a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 12, 107c-d; CH III, SECT 7-18 113d-117c; BK II, CH XVII, SECT 1 167d-168a; SECT 17 172b-c; CH XXIII, SECT 33-37 212d-214b passim; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11 271b-d; BK IV, CH X 349c-354c passim 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, PREF, 404a; SECT 146-156 442a-444d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 14 456b; SECT XI 497b-503c 40 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 308b-309a 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 33a-d; 143a-145c; 152a-153c; 177b-179c; 186d-187a; 190a-192d; 218d-223d; 239a-c; 241d-242c / The Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-292c; 348b-352c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 384a,c / The Critique of Judgement, 575b-577a; 588d-589c; 603b-607c esp 606d-607c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c-160b; PART IV, 349b-350a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 196b-197b; BK XV, 630d-631c

(2) Matter and the immaterial as objects of knowledge

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 456a-458a 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 7 [191a8-12] 266d / Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12 493d-494d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [991a8-11] 509b; BK VII, CH 10 [1036a2-12] 559b-c; BK IX, CH 2 [1046b7-15] 571c-d / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a25-b19] 632b-d 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK I [265-328] 4b-5a; [418-448] 6b-c 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIII, CH 9 31c-32a / Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 10 53b-d; CH 12 54c-55b; TR V, CH 4-5 59c-60c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI-XIII 89b-110d / The City of God, BK XI, CH 3 323d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 9 8d-9c; Q 12, A 1, REP 2 50c-51c; A 2, ANS 51c-52c; Q 13, A 12, REP 3 74c-75b; Q 14, A 11 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, REP 3-4 93b-94a; Q 16, A 5, REP 3 97c-98b; Q 29, A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; Q 54, A 4, ANS and REP 2 287b-288a; Q 56 291d-294d; Q 57, AA 1-2 295a-297a; Q 76, A 2, REP 3 388c-391a; Q 84, A 7, ANS and REP 3 449b-450b; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; Q 86, A 1, ANS and REP 3-4 461c-462a; A 2, REP 1 462a-463a; A 3 463b-d; Q 87, A 1, ANS 465a-466c; Q 88 468d-473a; Q 89, A 2 475a-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 11, A 1, REP 2 772b-773a; Q 12, A 1, REP 3 776c-777b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 12 1025c-1032b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 172a-d; PART IV, 269c-270c 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 41d-42a; 43d-44c 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, 74a,c; I-II 75a-81d esp II, 81b-c / Objections and Replies, 120b-c; 122c; POSTULATE II 131a; 152b,d-155d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72, 184a-b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 11 165a-b; CH XXIII 204a-214b passim, esp SECT 5 205a-b, SECT 15 208c-d, SECT 29 211d-212a; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11-12 271b-272b; CH XI, SECT 23 305a-b; BK IV, CH III, SECT 6 313c-315b; SECT 9-17 315c-317c passim, esp SECT 17 317c; SECT 23-27 320a-322a; CH VI, SECT 14 335d-336b; CH X, SECT 19 354a-c; CH XI, SECT 12 357c-d; CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 16-20 416a-417a; SECT 25-27 417d-418b; SECT 86-89 429c-430c esp SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 135-148 440a-442d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 123 506a 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 336b-c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 186b-d / The Critique of Practical Reason, 319c-321b / The Critique of Judgement, 603a-d

(3) Cause and substance as objects of knowledge

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 4 [196b5-7] 273a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [983a5-10] 501b; BK III, CH 2 [996a18-b26] 514d-515b; CH 4 [999a24-29] 518a; CH 6 [1003a5-17] 521d-522a,c; BK VII, CH 15 563c-564c; BK XI, CH 2 [1060a20-23] 588d; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742b17-35] 283d-284a 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK V [526-533] 67d-68a; BK VI [703-711] 89c-d 16 COPERNICUS: On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 11 348b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 8, ANS 57b-58b; Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; Q 29, A 1, REP 1,3 162a-163b; Q 56, A 1, REP 2 292a-d; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 77, A 1, REP 7 399c-401b; Q 84, A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 86, A 1, ANS 461c-462a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 2, REP 3 2b-4a 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, III [24-45] 56a-b; XVIII [49-60] 80b-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78a-80c; PART IV, 271c-272c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 271b-272c; 497d-498a 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 45a-46a / Novum Organum, BK II, APH 2 137b-c / New Atlantis, 210d 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 108a-112a; 209c-210b; 211b-c; 215a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 3-4 355b; AXIOM 4 355d; PROP 8, SCHOL 2 356d-357d; PROP 10 358a-b; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 184-241 205a-217b passim, esp 233-241 213b-217b 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 19 117c-d; BK II, CH XIII, SECT 17-20 152a-d; CH XXI, SECT 1-6 178b-180a; CH XXIII 204a-214b passim, esp SECT 2 204b-c, SECT 5 205a-b, SECT 15 208c-d, SECT 28-29 211b-212a; CH XXV, SECT 11-CH XXVI, SECT 2 217a-d; CH XXXI, SECT 6-13 240d-243b; CH XXXII, SECT 24 247c-d; BK III, CH III, SECT 15-18 258b-259c; CH VI 268b-283a passim, esp SECT 7-10 270b-271b; CH IX, SECT 11-17 287d-290a; CH XI, SECT 19-25 304b-306c esp SECT 22 305a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 9-17 315c-317c; SECT 24-29 320c-323a esp SECT 29 322c-323a; CH IV, SECT 12 326c-d; CH VI, SECT 4-16 331d-336d; CH VIII, SECT 9 347d-348a; CH XII, SECT 9-12 360d-362c; CH XVI, SECT 12, 370b-c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 101-102 432c-433a 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 18-SECT VIII, DIV 74 457c-484c passim; SECT XI, DIV 105 498d-499a; DIV 115 503b-c; SECT XII, DIV 127 507b-c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 46d-47c; 57c-d; 58d-59b; 63d-64a; 76c-83b esp 81b-83b; 86c-d; 95a-d; 99a-100d esp 100c-d; 110b; 133a; 140b,d-145c; 171a-172c; 214b,d [fn 1] / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 267d-268a; 285c-286a / The Critique of Practical Reason, 294c-295d; 302a-d; 313b-314d / The Critique of Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 556b-c; 557c-558b; 564a-c; 574a-b; 584c-d; 611d-613a,c 45 FOURIER: Analytical Theory of Heat, 169a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 563a-b; EPILOGUE I, 646c-647b passim; 650b-c; EPILOGUE II, 693c; 694d-695c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 89b-90a; 885b-886a

(4) The infinite and the individual as objects of knowledge

7 PLATO: Philebus, 610d-617d 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [2b-37] 6c-7a / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c / Physics, BK I, CH 4 [187b9-14] 262d; CH 5 [189a5-7] 264b-c; CH 6 [189a11-19] 264c; BK III, CH 6 [207a21-31] 285c-d; BK VII, CH 3 [247b3-7] 330b / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 2 [994b17-30] 513a-b; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-29] 518a; CH 6 [1003a5-17] 521d-522a,c; BK VII, CH 10 [1036a2-7] 559b-c; CH 15 563c-564c; BK XI, CH 2 [1060a20-23] 588d; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356b28-35] 596b-c 11 NICOMACHUS: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 812a 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VI, CH 3 311c-312b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, PAR 20-21 49d-50a; BK XII, PAR 3-6 99d-100c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 12, A 1, REP 2 50c-51c; A 7, ANS 56a-57b; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 14, AA 11-12 84c-86d; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 22, A 2, ANS and REP 1 128d-130d; Q 29, A 1, REP 1 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4 170c-171b; Q 32 175d-180d; Q 56, A 1, REP 2 292a-d; Q 57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 84, A 7, ANS and REP 1 449b-450b; Q 86, AA 1-3 461c-463d; Q 89, A 4, ANS 476c-477a; PART I-II, Q 14, A 6, REP 3 680c-681a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 10, A 3 769d-771b; Q 11, A 1, REP 3 772b-773a; Q 12, A 1, REP 3 776c-777b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, REP 12 1025c-1032b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54b-c; PART IV, 262b 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-333b 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, III, 86a-d; 88c-89a / Objections and Replies, 112a-d; 121d-122b; 169a; 211c-d; 212c-213a; 213d-214a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 10, SCHOL 376d-377a; PROP 30-31 385a-c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72 181a-184b; 233 213b-216a / On Geometrical Demonstration, 435a-b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XIII, SECT 4 149b; CH XIV, SECT 26-31 160c-162a passim; CH XV, SECT 2-3 162c-d; SECT 12 165b-c; CH XVI, SECT 8 167c; CH XVII 167d-174a esp SECT 15 171b-172a; CH XXIII, SECT 31 212b-c; SECT 33-34 212d-213b; CH XXIX, SECT 15-16 237a-238a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 2 405b 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, PART II, 278a-b 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1810-1815] 43a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XV, 631a-c; EPILOGUE II, 693c-694d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 312a; 631a

(5) The past and the future as objects of knowledge

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 27:1 / Ecclesiastes, 6:12; 8:6-7; 9:11-12; 11:2,6—(D) Ecclesiastes, 7:1; 8:6-7; 9:11-12; 11:2,6 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 8:8—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 8:8 NEW TESTAMENT: James, 4:13-14—(D) James, 4:13-15 5 AESCHYLUS: The Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [463-512] 103c-d; [1524-1530] 113c / Ajax [1419-1421] 155c 5 EURIPIDES: Medea [1415-1419] 224c / Alcestis [1159-1163] 247c / Helen [1688-1692] 314c / Andromache [1284-1288] 326c / The Bacchae [1388-1392] 352a,c 6 THUCYDIDES: The Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349b; 354a-c 7 PLATO: Critias, 470d / Theaetetus, 531a-532a 8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 9 28a-29d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [449b3-29] 690a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 19 [1392b14-1393a8] 640b-c 10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics, PAR 1 19a-b; Epidemics, BK III, SECT III, PAR 16 59b-c 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [713-755] 230a-231a 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 1a-b / Pericles, 129a 15 TACITUS: The Annals, BK IV, 79b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 23-24 77a-c; BK XI, PAR 17-41 93b-99b / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 30 651c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 13 86d-88c; A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 57, A 3 297b-298a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 5 411d-413d; Q 79, A 6, ANS and REP 2 419b-420d; Q 86, A 4 463d-464d; Q 89, A 3, REP 3 475d-476c; A 7, REP 3 478d-479c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 12, A 1, REP 3 776c-777b 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 56 95b-96a; STANZA 136-154 106a-108b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-54a; 65b-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41c-d; 439c-440a 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 13d-14a; 54c-55a 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 259a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 62, SCHOL 443c-d; PROP 66, DEMONST 444c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 12 165b-c; BK IV, CH XI, SECT 11 357b-c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 59 420d-421a; SECT 105 433b-c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT VI 469d-470d 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 348a,c / The Social Contract, BK IV, 428a 40 GIBBON: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 88a-c; 96b,d; 413b-d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 234d / The Critique of Judgement, 579d-580a; 583d-584c 44 BOSWELL: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 277c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 155b-c; 181b-d; 190a-b 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [570-585] 16a; PART II [8591-8603] 209b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 366b 49 DARWIN: The Origin of Species, 42a; 59d-60a; 166a,c; 231d-233b esp 233a-b; 242b-243c / The Descent of Man, 287d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XII, 584d-585b; EPILOGUE II, 685a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 852b 54 FREUD: The Interpretation of Dreams, 387a,c

(6) The self and the thing in itself as objects of knowledge

8 ARISTOTLE: On the Soul, BK III, CH 6 [430b21-26] 663d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 27, 133a-b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK XI, SECT 1, 302a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR IX, CH 3, 137c-d / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 2 159d-160b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 1-8 215d-220d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 7 73a; PAR 21-25 76c-77d; PAR 41 81c-d / The City of God, BK XI, CH 26 336d-337b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 2, REP 1,3 76d-77d; Q 56, A 1 292a-d; Q 78, A 4, REP 2 411d-413d; Q 87 464d-468d; Q 88, A 1, REP 1 469a-471c; A 2, REP 3 471c-472c; Q 89, A 2, ANS 475a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 332b 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 88c-89b 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, II 77d-81d esp 81b-c / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE I 131a; 209d-210a; 215b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 19-30 382b-383c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH IX, SECT 2-3 349a-c 38 ROUSSEAU: A Discourse on… Inequality, 362c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c esp 1b-d; 7d-8b; 9a-10b; 12c-d [fn]; 32a-c; 49c-50c; 51b-c; 55a-56c; 120c-129c; 200c-204c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 281c-282d; 285a-287d esp 285c-286a / The Critique of Practical Reason, 292a-293b; 307d-310c; 311d-314d; 327d-329a; 331c-337a,c; 337a-c / The Critique of Judgement, 465a-c; 497a-498b; 574b-577a; 594d [fn 1]; 599d-600d 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 35 21a-b; PAR 44 23c; ADDITIONS, 22 120c-d / The Philosophy of History, PART I, 257d-258a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 370b-371b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 688b-c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 121a-125b; 177b-178a; 191a-197a esp 196a-197a; 213a-238b esp 213b-217a, 223b-224a, 227b-228b, 232b-233b; 471b-472b 54 FREUD: The Unconscious, 428a-430c esp 429c-430c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 767a-768d

5b. The distinction between what is more knowable in itself and what is more knowable to us

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 23 [68b30-36] 90c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b28-72a6] 98b-c / Topics, BK VI, CH 4 [141b6-142a2] 194c-195c; BK VIII, CH 1 [155b35-156a7] 211d-212a / Physics, BK I, CH 1 259a-b; CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c; CH 7 [189b30-33] 265b-c / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 3 [318a13-319a2] 415b-d / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 [993b30-11] 511b,d; BK VII, CH 3 [1029a35-b12] 552a / On the Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413a11-19] 643a-b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [1095b1-4] 340c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 5, REP 1-2 5c-6a; A 9 8d-9c; Q 2, A 1, ANS 10d-11d; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 11d-12c; Q 3, A 3, REP 1 16a-d; Q 10, A 1, ANS and REP 1 40d-41d; Q 12, A 1, ANS and REP 2 50c-51c; AA 7-8 56a-58b; Q 13 62b-75b passim; Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 85, A 3 455b-457a; A 8 460b-461b; Q 88, A 1, REP 3-4 469a-471c 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART IV 51b-54b / Meditations on First Philosophy, 69b-d; II 77d-81d passim; IV, 89b; V 93a-96a / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE II 131a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 47, 390c-d 42 KANT: The Critique of Judgement, 601d

5c. Dogmatism, skepticism, and the critical attitude with respect to the extent, certainty, and finality of human knowledge

7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c / Cratylus, 86b-d / Meno, 179b-180b / Apology, 203a / Phaedo, 236c-238a / Timaeus, 447b-d / Theaetetus, 521d-526b 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 13 [32b4-23] 48b-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [71a26]-CH 2 [72b4] 97c-99a; CH 6 102b-103c; CH 33 121b-122a,c / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 5 [287b29-288a3] 379b-c / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5-6 528c-531c; BK X, CH 1 [1053a31-b3] 580a; CH 6 [1057a7-11] 584b; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b12-1063a14] 590d-592a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b11-27] 339d-340a; CH 7 [1098a20-b2] 343c-d; BK II, CH 2 [1103b26-1104a9] 349b-c; BK VI, CH 3 388b-c 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 17 158d-161a; CH 20 164c-166c; BK III, CH 2, 177c-178b; CH 21 193d-195a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, PAR 19 32b-c / The City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1 3b-4a; A 5, ANS and REP 1 5c-6a; Q 84, A 1, ANS 440d-442a; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b; Q 86, AA 1-3 461c-463d; Q 87, A 1 465a-466c; Q 88, A 1 469a-471c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 64, AA 3-4 68b-70a; PART II-II, Q 4, A 8 409a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 65c; PART IV, 267a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 197b-200a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 208a-294b esp 240c-246a, 253c-254a, 257d-264a, 269d-279c, 285c-294b; 308c-d; 318a-319b; 439c-440a; 497b-502c; 516b-524a 28 GILBERT: On the Loadstone, PREF, 1c-2a 28 HARVEY: On the Motion of the Heart and Blood, 267b,d-268d / On the Generation of Animals, 411c-d 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 13a-c; 15a-17b esp 15d-16b; 47d-48d; 57d-58b / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; BK I, APH 37 109b-c; APH 67 115d-116a; APH 75 118b-d; APH 95 126b-c; APH 126 134b 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, IV, 5a-d / Discourse on the Method, PART I 44c-48b / Meditations on First Philosophy, 72b,d; I 75a-77c; III, 83b-84a / Objections and Replies, 168b-d; 272a-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, DEF 4 373b; PROP 37-47 386b-391a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 381-385 238b-239a; 432 248a; 434-435 248a-251a / On the Vacuum, 355a-358b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, INTRO 93a-95d esp SECT 4-7 94a-95c; BK I, CH III, SECT 24 120a-c; BK II, CH III, SECT 3 128b-c; CH XV, SECT 11 165a-b; CH XXIII, SECT 12-13 207a-208b; SECT 36 213c-d; BK III, CH VI, SECT 1-9 268b-271a esp SECT 9 270d-271a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 22-30 319c-323c esp SECT 22 319c-320a; CH VI, SECT 4-16 331d-336d passim; CH X, SECT 19 354a-c; CH XII, SECT 9-13 360d-362d; CH XIV, SECT 1-2 364b-c; CH XVII, SECT 9-10 377d-378a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 3-4 405b-d; SECT 17 409d-410a; SECT 86-88 429c-430b; SECT 101-102 432c-433a; SECT 133 439c-440a 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 7-10 453c-455b; SECT IV, DIV 20-21 458a-c; DIV 26 460b-c; SECT IV, DIV 28-SECT V, DIV 38 460d-466c passim; SECT VII, DIV 60, 477a; SECT XII 503c-509d esp DIV 129-130 508a-d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 15c-16c; 19a-22a,c; 101d-102a; 129c-130a; 133c-134d; 146a-149d; 157d; 187c-188b; 193a-b; 196b-197c; 218d-227a esp 221c-222b; 248d-250a,c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253c-d; 277d-279d / The Critique of Practical Reason, 292d-293b; 295b-d; 311d-313d; 320c-321b; 331a-332d; 335b-c; 336d-337a,c / The Critique of Judgement, 492c-d; 567c-568a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103d-104a; NUMBER 37, 119b-120b 43 MILL: On Liberty, 274b-293b 44 BOSWELL: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 121c-d; 126a-b 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PREF, 7a; INTRO, PAR 31 19c-20a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [656-675] 17b-18a; [1064-1067] 26b; [1810-1815] 43a; [1868-2050] 44b-48b esp [1948-1963] 46a-b, [1968-1979] 46b-47a, [2011-2022] 47b-48a; [4343-4362] 107a-b 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 78a-b; 250b; 257a; 276a-b 49 DARWIN: The Descent of Man, 253d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 195a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 881b 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 828b-c; 873d-884d passim, esp 874d-875a, 878d-880b, 883d-884a

5d. The method of universal doubt as prerequisite to knowledge: God’s goodness as the assurance of the veracity of our faculties

31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II 2a-3b / Discourse on the Method 41a-67a,c esp PART II 44c-48b, PART IV 51b-54b / Meditations on First Philosophy, 72b,d; I 75a-77c; II, 82b-d; IV, 89b-c; V, 95b-96a / Objections and Replies, 119c; 123a-d; 124b-125b; POSTULATE VI 131c; 134b-c; 142c; 143c; 162a; 167a-c; 206a-c; 207b; 215c-d; 226d-227a; 229c-d; 237b-238b; 239a-240a; 242c-244c; 245c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVI, SECT 13 223b-d; BK IV, CH IX, SECT 3 349b-c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 3 405b-c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 116, 503d-504a; DIV 120 505b; DIV 129-130 508a-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 881b

5e. Knowledge about knowledge as the source of criteria for evaluating claims to knowledge

35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO 93a-95d esp SECT 4-7 94a-95c; BK IV, CH III, SECT 22 319c-320a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 4 405c-d; SECT 17 409d-410a 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 7-10 453c-455b; SECT II, DIV 17 457a-b; SECT VII, DIV 49-53 471c-474b esp DIV 49 471c-d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-12d esp 1b-d, 8c-9a, 55a-56c; 99a-101b; 121a-123b / The Critique of Practical Reason, 292d-293b; 294a-b; 307d-310c; 331a-332d

6. The kinds of knowledge

6a. The classification of knowledge according to diversity of objects

(1) Being and becoming, the intelligible and the sensible, the necessary and the contingent, the eternal and the temporal, the immaterial and the material as objects of knowledge

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 86b-d; 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 125a-126c / Symposium, 167a-d / Phaedo, 223d-232d esp 223d-225a, 228b-232d / Republic, BK III, 333b-334b; BK V, 368c-373c esp 372a-373b; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Timaeus, 447b-d; 457b-458a / Theaetetus, 521d-522b; 534d-536b / Sophist, 565a-569a esp 568a-569a / Statesman, 595a-c / Philebus, 610d-613a; 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [4a10-b19] 8b-9a / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 13 [32b4-23] 48b-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b8-16] 97d-98a; CH 4 [73a21-b30] 100a-101a; CH 6-8 102b-104b; CH 30 119d; CH 33 121b-122a,c / Physics, BK II, CH 2 270a-271a; CH 7 [198a22-31] 275b-c / On the Heavens, BK I, CH 1 [298b13-24] 390a-b; CH 7 [306a10-12] 397b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 5 [986b25-987a1] 504d-505a; CH 6 [987a29-b18] 505b-d; CH 8 [989b21-990a8] 507d-508a; BK II, CH 1 511b,d-512b; CH 3 [995a15-20] 513d; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b4] 518a-b; BK IV, CH 5-6 528c-531c; BK VI, CH 1 547b,d-548c; BK VII, CH 15 [1039b31-1040a8] 563d-564a; BK IX, CH 10 577c-578a,c; BK X, CH 1 [1053a31-3] 580a; CH 6 [1057a7-11] 584b; BK XI, CH 2 588a-589a; CH 6 [1062b12-1063a14] 590d-592a; CH 7 [1063b36]-CH 8 [1065a6] 592b-593b; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a30-b2] 598b-c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a25-b19] 632b-d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [449b30-450a10] 690c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b21-645a5] 168c-d / Ethics, BK VI, CH 1 [1139a3-13] 387b-d; CH 3 [1139b19-25] 388b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357a14-b21] 596d-597c 11 NICOMACHUS: Introduction to Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-812a 14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252b-c 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 1, 228c-229c; TR IX, CH 7 249b-c / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 36 339c-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, PAR 3-5 27c-28c; BK VI, PAR 6 36c-d; BK VII, PAR 23 50b-c; BK X, PAR 8-11 73b-74b; BK XII, PAR 5 100a-b / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6 268d-269c; CH 10 271a-d; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 8 626c-627a; BK II, CH 27-39 650a-655b esp CH 27 650a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1, REP 2 3b-4a; A 9 8d-9c; Q 2, AA 1-2 10d-12c; Q 5, A 2, ANS 24b-25a; Q 10, A 1, ANS 40d-41d; Q 12, A 4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; AA 8-10 57b-59d; Q 13, A 12, REP 3 74c-75b; Q 14, A 13, ANS and REP 3 86d-88c; Q 16, A 1, REP 2 94b-95c; Q 54, A 4, ANS and REP 2 287b-288a; QQ 56-57 291d-300b; Q 79, A 9 422b-423d; QQ 84-88 440b-473a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 66, A 5 79b-80c; Q 84, A 1, REP 3 174b-175a; Q 93, A 2 216c-217b; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART II-II, Q 9, A 2 424b-425a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 291b-294b 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 40a-c; 41b-42a; 43d-44c 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II 2a-3b; XII, 21b-c / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b / Meditations on First Philosophy, I 77d-81d esp 81b-c; V 93a-96a passim / Objections and Replies, 122b-c; POSTULATE II 131a; 218c-d; 219b-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 8 355c; PROP 7 356c; PROP 8, SCHOL 2 356d-357d; PART II, PROP 10, SCHOL 376d-377a; PROP 24-45 383c-390b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72, 184a-b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15-37 208c-214b; BK IV, CH III, SECT 9-17 315c-317c passim, esp SECT 17 317c; SECT 23-27 320a-322a passim; CH VI, SECT 5-16 332b-336d passim; CH XI, SECT 1-12 354c-357d passim, esp SECT 12 357c-d; CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 25-27 417d-418b; SECT 135-142 440a-441c; SECT 148 442b-d 39 SMITH: The Wealth of Nations, BK V, 336b-c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 16a-b; 113c-115a / The Critique of Judgement, 551a-552c 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 120a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 365a-b

(2) Knowledge of natures or kinds distinguished from knowledge of individuals

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 24 116b-118a; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, CH 19 [100a14-b3] 136d / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980b25-981a13] 499b-500a; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b4] 518a-b; CH 6 [1003a5-17] 521d-522a,c; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b35-1036a8] 559b-c; CH 15 563c-564c; BK XI, CH 2 [1060a20-23] 588d; BK XIII, CH 10 618c-619a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 6 389d; CH 7 [1141a20-34] 390a-b; [1141b14-20] 390c-d; CH 11 [1143a32-b5] 392d-393a; BK X, CH 9 [1180b13-23] 435b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356b28-35] 596b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 2, REP 2 4a-c; Q 12, A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 14, A 11 84c-85c; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 29, A 1, REP 1 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4 170c-171b; Q 55, A 1, REP 3 289a-d; A 3, REP 2 291a-d; Q 56, A 1, REP 2 292a-d; Q 57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 59, A 1, REP 1 306c-307b; Q 75, A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 79, A 5, REP 2 418c-419b; A 6, ANS and REP 2 419b-420d; Q 84, A 7, ANS and REP 1 449b-450b; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; A 2, REP 2 453d-455b; A 3 455b-457a; Q 86, A 1 461c-462a; AA 3-4 463b-464d; Q 89, A 4 476c-477a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 11, A 1, REP 3 772b-773a 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 1-9 137a-140c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 167c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-39 386b-387a; PROP 44, COROL 2-PROP 46 390a-c 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, SECT 6-8 244b-d; BK III, CH III, SECT 7-9 255d-256c; CH VI, SECT 32-33 277c-278c; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 5-8 324d-325c; CH VII, SECT 9 338d-339b 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 132 509a-d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 211c-218d / The Critique of Judgement, 572a-b; 572d-574b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 305a-312a esp 309a-312a

(3) Knowledge of matters of fact or real existence distinguished from knowledge of our ideas or of the relations between them

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 1, REP 1 440d-442a; Q 85, A 2 453d-455b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-b; 65c; 71c-d 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 15-16 98d-99c; SECT 23 101b-102a; BK III, CH V, SECT 12 266d-267a; SECT 14 267b-c; CH VI, SECT 43-51 280c-283a esp SECT 43 280c-d; BK IV, CH I, SECT 1-7 307a-308a; CH II 309b-313a passim, esp SECT 14 312b-d; CH III 313a-323d esp SECT 29 322c-323a; CH IV, SECT 1-12 323d-326d passim; SECT 18 328d-329a; CH V, SECT 6-8 330a-d; CH VI, SECT 13 335c-d; SECT 16 336d; CH IX 349a-c; CH XI 354c-358c esp SECT 13-14 357d-358c; CH XII, SECT 6-13 360a-362d; CH XVII, SECT 8 377b-d 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20 416b-417a; SECT 23 417b-c 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-463d esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30 461d-462b; SECT V, DIV 34-38, 464b-466c; SECT IX 487b-488c esp DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PREF, 5c-6a / The Philosophy of History, PART IV, 354b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 157b-161a esp 158b-159b; 301b-304b passim; 453a-b; 867a-890a esp 868b-869a, 879b-882a, 886a, 889a-b

(4) Knowledge in relation to the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the sensible and supra-sensible

42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 25c-26a; 27b-33d; 37b-d; 53b-59b; 93c-99a esp 94b-95a, 96a-97b, 97d-98c; 101b-108a,c esp 106b-107b; 117b-118a; 120c-121d; 153a-157d; 164a-165c; 172c-173a; 193a-b; 224a-230c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 264d; 281c-282d; 285a-287d / The Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-296d esp 292a-293b; 307d-314d esp 307d-308b, 310d-311d; 319c-321b; 328a-329a; 331a-332d; 337a-c; 340a-342d esp 340c-341c; 349b-355d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 383c-d; 390b / The Critique of Judgement, 465a-c; 474b-475d esp 474d [fn1]; 497a-498b; 500c-d; 501d-502a; 506d-507a; 510b-c; 530a; 541a-542a; 543a; 543c-544c; 564a-c; 570b-572b; 574b-577a; 578d-579a; 581a-b; 584c-d; 587d-588a; 596c-598b; 599d-600d; 603a-b; 603d-606d esp 603d-604b, 606a-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 233a-234b

6b. The classification of knowledge according to the faculties involved in knowing

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-232d esp 224a-225a, 228b-232d / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c; BK X, 431c-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b34-100b3] 136b-d / Topics, BK IV, CH 4 [125a25-33] 174b / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a28-982a1] 499a-500b; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-5] 518a-b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 [417b17-28] 648b-c 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4a / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 13 164d-165b; TR VI, CH 2 189d-190b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 2-3 216b-217b; TR V, CH 1, 228c-229c; CH 7 231d-232b; TR IX, CH 7 249b-c / Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 18, 291a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 10-11 15b-16a; BK X, PAR 8-38 73b-81a / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6-7 268d-269d; BK XI, CH 2-3 323a-d; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 12 627c-d; BK II, CH 27-39 650a-655b esp CH 27 650a; BK IV, CH 5, 677b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 3 52c-53b; A 4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 14, A 1, ANS 75d-76c; A 2, REP 1 76d-77d; Q 18, A 2, ANS and REP 1 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 85, A 1, ANS 451c-453c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; PART II-II, Q 8, A 1, ANS 417a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-b; 71c-d 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 32d; 55b-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XIV, 29b-31c / Meditations on First Philosophy, VI 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, 119d-120c; 124d-125a; POSTULATE I-II 130d-131a; AXIOM V 131d-132a; 136d-137a; 157c-d; 162d-165d; 211d-212a; 217c-d; 218c-d; 219b-c; 228c-229c; 229d-230c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 10 376c-377a; PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 44 388a-390a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II 309b-313a passim, esp SECT 14 312b-d; CH III, SECT 2-5 313a-c; CH IX, SECT 2 349a; CH XI, SECT 13-14 357d-358c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1 405a-b; SECT 18 416b-c; SECT 27 418a-b 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 227 74b-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 144b-145a; 157b-167b esp 157b-161a, 167b; 450a-451b; 453a-457a esp 453b, 455a

(1) Sensitive knowledge: sense-perception as knowledge; judgments of perception and judgments of experience

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-232a / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c esp BK VI, 386d-387a, 387d-388a, BK VII, 389b, 392c-393a / Timaeus, 447b / Theaetetus, 517b-536a esp 521d-526d, 533a-536a 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b20-100b5] 136a-d / Topics, BK II, CH 8 [114a18-26] 159d-160a / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 264b-c / On the Heavens, BK III, CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a20-b24] 499a; [981b10-13] 499d-500a; BK IV, CH 5 [1009b1-17] 528d-529a; [1010b1-1011a2] 530a-c; BK XI, CH 6 [1062b34-1063a9] 591a-b; CH 7 [1064a4-9] 592b / On the Soul, BK II, CH 5 647b-648d; BK III, CH 2 657d-659c 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 23 [731a30-b5] 271c-d / Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098b35-c8] 343d-344a; BK II, CH 9 [1109b20-23] 355c; BK VI, CH 8 [1142a12-31] 391b-c; BK VII, CH 3 [1147a25-b19] 397c-398a 10 HIPPOCRATES: On Surgery, PAR 1 70b 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [379-521] 49a-51a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 6, 110c-111c 14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252b-c 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 6-7 3c-4a / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 23 153d-154b; CH 26, 155c; TR IV, CH 23-25 169c-171b; TR VI, CH 1-2 189b-190b / Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 1, 228c-229c; TR IX, CH 7 249b-c / Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 18, 291a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 10-11 15b-16a; BK IV, PAR 15-17 23a-c; BK X, PAR 8-11 73b-74b / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 27-30 650a-651d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4, REP 1 25d-26c; Q 12, A 4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; Q 14, A 1, ANS 75d-76c; A 2, ANS and REP 1 76d-77d; A 6, REP 1 80a-81c; A 11, ANS and REP 1-2 84c-85c; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 17, A 2 102a-d; A 3, ANS 102d-103c; Q 18, A 2, ANS and REP 1 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 59, A 1, REP 1 306c-307b; Q 75, A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c-381b; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 77, A 5, REP 3 403d-404c; Q 78, A 1, ANS 407b-409a; AA 3-4 410a-413d; Q 79, A 3, ANS and REP 1-2 416a-417a; A 6, ANS and REP 1-2 419b-420d; Q 84, A 1, ANS and REP 2 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4, ANS and REP 2 444d-446b; A 6 447c-449a; Q 85, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3 451c-453c; A 2 453d-455b; A 3, ANS 455b-457a; A 6, ANS 458d-459c; Q 86, A 1, ANS and REP 2,4 461c-462a; A 3 463b-d; Q 87, A 3, REP 3 467b-468a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 82, AA 3-4 971a-974c 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 285c-286a 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-335c 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 41 109c-d; APH 50 111b; BK II, APH 40 170c-173d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53b / Meditations on First Philosophy, I 75a-77c passim; II, 80c-81d; III, 83d-84a; VI 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, 119d-120c; 124d-125a; POSTULATE I-II 130d-131a; AXIOM V 131d-132a; 162d-165d; 211a-b; 211d-212a; 228c-230c; 231a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, AXIOM 4-5 373d; PROP 11-13 377b-378c; POSTULATE 5 380b; PROP 14-17 380c-381d; PROP 19 382b-c; PROP 22-29 383b-385a 34 NEWTON: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, BK III, RULE III 270b-271a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX, SECT 8-10 139b-140b; BK III, CH VI, SECT 9 270d-271a; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14 312b-d; CH III, SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 21 319c; CH XI 354c-358c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1 405a-b; SECT 18 416b-c; SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim; SECT 135-142 440a-441c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 108a-d 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 227 74b-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 450a-471a esp 453a-459b, 469a-b, 470b-471a; 502a-525a passim, esp 503a-505b, 508a; 564a-b

(2) Memory as knowledge

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK II, CH 4 [111b24-31] 156d-157a; BK IV, CH 4 [125b4-14] 174c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a28-981a1] 499a-b / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [449b1]-CH 2 [452a13] 690a-693d 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 25-TR IV, CH 9 154d-163a passim; TR VI, CH 3 190b-191c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 12-38 74b-81a / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 9 640c-d; BK IV, CH 5, 677b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 5 411d-413d; Q 79, AA 6-7 419b-421c; Q 89, A 6, REP 1 478b-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 3 14b-15a; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, REP 4 896a-897d 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, V [34-42] 112c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50b-c; 53a-54a 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 32d 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, III, 4c-d; VII, 10b-c; XI 17b-18b; XII 18b-25a passim / Meditations on First Philosophy, V, 95d-96a / Objections and Replies, 125a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 18, SCHOL 382a-b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 21 118b-119a; BK II, CH X, SECT 2 141b-c; BK IV, CH I, SECT 8-9 308b-309b; CH XI, SECT 11 357b-c; CH XVI, SECT 1-2 366d-367a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 145a; 421a-422a passim; 424b-427a; 450a-451b 54 FREUD: The Unconscious, 428d / A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 484c-486a

(3) Rational or intellectual knowledge

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 125a-b / Phaedo, 224a-232d esp 224a-225a, 228b-232d / Republic, BK VI-VII, 383d-398c esp BK VI, 387a-388a, BK VII, 389b, 393a-c / Theaetetus, 534d-536a / Laws, BK X, 765b 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 3 [247b1-248a9] 330b-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980b25-982a1] 499b-500b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 1 [1139a6-11] 387c; CH 3-7 388b-390d 12 LUCRETIUS: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a 14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 53b-c / Marcellus, 252b-c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 1 159a-d; TR VI, CH 2 189d-190b / Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 1, 228c-229c; TR IX, CH 7 249b-c / Sixth Ennead, TR III, CH 18, 291a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 10 73d-74a; PAR 16-19 75b-76b; PAR 30 79b-c; PAR 36 80c-d / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31-38 651d-654c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 1, ANS 75d-76c; A 2, ANS and REP 1 76d-77d; A 11, ANS and REP 1-2 84c-85c; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 17, A 3 102d-103c; Q 18, A 2, ANS and REP 1 105c-106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 54 284d-288d passim; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 59, A 1, REP 1 306c-307b; Q 78, A 1, ANS 407b-409a; A 4, ANS and REP 4-6 411d-413d; Q 79 413d-427a; QQ 84-89 440b-480c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, QQ 57-58 35a-45c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-61a; 65c-d; 71c; PART II, 163a; PART IV, 267a-c 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 32d 31 DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy, II 77d-81d passim; VI 96b-103d passim / Objections and Replies, 119d-120c; 124d-125a; PREF I-II 130a-b; AXIOM V 131d-132a; 162d-165d; 228c-230c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-40 386b-388b; PROP 44, COROL 2-PROP 46 390a-c; PART V, PROP 29 459b-d 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II, SECT 1-8 309b-311a; CH III, SECT 2-4 313a-c; CH IX, SECT 2 349a; CH XI, SECT 13-14 357d-358c 35 BERKELEY: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 1 405a-b; SECT 89 430b-c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 227 74b-d 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 299a-314b esp 302b-304b, 313b-314a

(4) Knowledge in relation to the faculties of understanding, judgment, and reason; and to the work of intuition, imagination, and understanding

42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-110d esp 25b-c, 27c, 28d-29d, 32a-c, 34a-c, 37b-39c, 41c-45b, 48c-d, 52c-55a, 57d-59b, 65d-66d, 94b-95a, 99a-101b, 109d-110d; 130b-c; 166c-171a; 193a-195a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c / The Critique of Judgement, 461a-476c; 493c-495a,c; 518a-d; 542b-543c; 570b-572b 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 232b-235a

6c. The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of knowing

(1) Vision, contemplation, or intuitive knowledge distinguished from discursive knowledge

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 125a-126c / Symposium, 150c-151a; 167a-d / Phaedo, 224a-225a / Republic, BK VI-VII, 386d-389c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 10 [1036a1-8] 559b-c; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 [1075a5-11] 605c-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 8 [1178b20-32] 433b-c 16 KEPLER: The Harmonies of the World, 1083b-1084b 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 18 151b-c; TR IV, CH 1 159a-d / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 216c-217b; TR V, CH 1-2 228b-229d passim; CH 7 231d-232b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IX, PAR 23-25 68a-c; BK XII, PAR 16 102d-103a / The City of God, BK IX, CH 16, 294a-b; CH 22 296d-297a; BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; CH 7 326a-c; CH 21 333a-d; CH 29 339a-b; BK XVI, CH 6 426c-427a; BK XXII, CH 29, 614b-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12 50b-62b esp A 10 59a-d; Q 14, A 1, REP 2 75d-76c; A 7 81d-82b; A 9, ANS 83b-d; A 12, REP 1-2 85d-86d; A 13, ANS and REP 3 86d-88c; A 14 88d-89b; A 15, REP 2-3 89b-90b; Q 16, A 5, REP 1 97c-98b; Q 19, A 5, ANS 112d-113c; Q 34, A 1, REP 2 185b-187b; Q 46, A 2, REP 3 253a-255a; Q 57, A 1, REP 2 295a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 2 297b-298a; Q 58 300b-306b esp A 4 302d-303c; Q 59, A 1, REP 1 306c-307b; Q 60, A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 78, A 4, REP 6 411d-413d; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a-418c; A 8 421c-422b; Q 85, A 5 457d-458d; Q 86, A 2, ANS 462a-463a; A 4, ANS 463d-464d; PART I-II, Q 14, A 1, REP 2 677b-678a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 8 416d-423b; Q 9, A 1, REP 1 423c-424b; Q 180, AA 3-6 609c-614d; PART III, Q 11, AA 3-4 773d-775a; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 3 1034b-1037c 21 DANTE: The Divine Comedy, PARADISE, II [37-45] 108a; XXX [1-123] 151d-153a; XXXIII [46-145] 156c-157d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 15 149a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [469-505] 185b-186a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1-5 171a-173a; 277-288 222b-224b 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH IX, SECT 2-3 349a-c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 33a-d; 52c-53b / The Critique of Practical Reason, 320c-321b; 337a-c; 350c-351b / The Critique of Judgement, 572d-574b 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, PART IV, 349b-350a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 276a-b 54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 874a-875a

(2) The distinction between immediate and mediated judgments: induction and reasoning, principles and conclusions

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1-3 97a-100a; CH 15 109a-b; CH 22 [83b32-84a2] 114c-115b; CH 23 [84b19-85a1] 115c-116a; CH 31 [88a5-17] 120b-c; CH 33 [88b30-89a1] 121b-c; [89b17-22] 121d; BK II, CH 9 128a-b; CH 13 [97b31-39] 133c; CH 19 136a-137a,c / Topics, BK I, CH 12 148d / Physics, BK VIII, CH 1 [252a19-b5] 335d-336b / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 2 [994b16-27] 513a-b; BK III, CH 2 [997a25-b32] 515d-516a; BK IV, CH 3 [1005b5]-CH 4 [1006a12] 524c-525b; CH 6 [1011a3-14] 530d; BK VII, CH 17 [1041b9-11] 565d; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b18-1052a4] 577d-578a,c; BK XI, CH 1 [1059a29-34] 587b; CH 6 [1063b7-12] 591d; CH 7 [1064a4-9] 592b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098b35-c4] 343d; BK VI, CH 3 [1139b25-34] 388c; CH 6-7 389d-390d; CH 8 [1142a23-31] 391b-c; CH 11 [1143a32-b5] 392d-393a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, AA 7-8 7a-8d; Q 2, AA 1-2 10d-12c; Q 12, A 8, ANS 57b-58b; Q 14, A 1, REP 2 75d-76c; A 7, ANS and REP 2-3 81d-82b; Q 17, A 3, REP 2 102d-103c; Q 19, A 5, ANS 112d-113c; Q 58, A 3, ANS and REP 2 301d-302d; A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 60, A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 79, A 8, ANS 421c-422b; A 12, ANS 425c-426b; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c; Q 87, A 1, REP 1 465a-466c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a; A 5, ANS 613a-614a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 2 36a-37b; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; PART II-II, Q 8, A 1, REP 2 417a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58d-59a; 65c-d; 71c 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 59c; 61d; 96d-97a / Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; BK I 107a-136a,c esp APH 11-26 107d-108d, APH 69 116a-b, APH 103-106 127d-128c; BK II, APH 5, 139a; APH 10 140c-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II, 2d-3a; III, 4a-d; VII, 10c-12a; IX, 14d; XI 17b-18b; XII-XIV, 20d-28b / Discourse on the Method, PART VI, 62a-b / Objections and Replies, 123a-b; 125a-b; 224b,d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 42 388a-c; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-391a; PART V, PROP 28 459b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1-5 171a-173a 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 1 103d-104a; SECT 4 104d-105a; CH III, SECT 23 119b-120a; BK IV, CH I, SECT 9-CH II, SECT 4, 309b-313c; CH VII, SECT 1-11 337a-342d passim; CH IX, SECT 2-3 349a-c; CH XV, SECT 1 365a-c; SECT 3 365d; CH XVII, SECT 2-3 371d-372b; SECT 14-17 378c-379c 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 39a-c; 66d-72c esp 67d-68a; 99a-b; 109d-111c; 211c-218d / The Critique of Judgement, 542d-543a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER 83, 244b-c 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 461c 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of Right, PREF, 1a-c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 144a-b; 167b; 453a-457a esp 453b-454a, 456a

(3) The doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence: the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124a-126c / Meno, 179d-183a; 188d-189a / Phaedo, 228a-230d / Theaetetus, 515d-517b 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [71a26-9] 97c-d; BK II, CH 19 [99b20-33] 136a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b24-993a11] 511a-c 10 GALEN: On the Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12, 173a-b 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 11 150a-151b 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR II, CH 4, 8b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 25 154d-155c; TR IV, CH 5 160d-161b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, PAR 10 73d-74a; PAR 16-19 75b-76b; PAR 26-38 78a-81a / The City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c / On Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 9 627a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 54, A 4, ANS and REP 1 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2 289d-290d; Q 57, A 1, REP 3 295a-d; Q 58, A 1 300c-301a; Q 60, A 1, REP 3 310b-311a; A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 84, A 3 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 89, A 1, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, A 1, ANS 595d-597c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 264d-265b 28 HARVEY: On the Generation of Animals, 333d-334d 30 BACON: The Advancement of Learning, 1b-c 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, IV, 5c-d; 6d; VI, 8d-9a; VIII, 13c-d / Discourse on the Method, PART V, 54c; PART VI, 62a / Meditations on First Philosophy, II 77d-81d esp 81a-d; III, 83b; 88c-d; VI, 96d-97a / Objections and Replies, 120c-d; 140b-c; 215b-c; 224b,d-225a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP 23, SCHOL 458c-d 35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK I 95b,d-121a,c passim; BK II, CH I, SECT 6 122b-c; CH IX, SECT 6 139a 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 17, 457b,d [fn 1] 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 113b-115a / The Critique of Practical Reason, 352c-353a / The Critique of Judgement, 551a-552c 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 633a-635a; 851a-862a esp 851a-852b, 856a-858a, 859a-860a; 867a-868a; 877b-878a; 879b-880a; 889a-b; 897a-b 54 FREUD: A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, 512b-513b; 526c-d; 532b; 599a-b

(4) The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge: the transcendental, or speculative, and the empirical

35 LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH IV, SECT 6-8 325a-c; CH IX, SECT 1 349a; CH XII, SECT 6-13 360a-362d; CH XVI, SECT 2, 371d 35 HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30, 462a; SECT V, DIV 34-38, 464b-466c; SECT X, DIV 89 490b-c; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d 42 KANT: The Critique of Pure Reason, 5a-d; 14a-108a,c esp 14a-20c, 23a-24a, 25b-26b, 27b-28b, 29d-33d, 35b-36a, 41c-42b, 46a-48d, 57d-59b, 64b-66d; 115d-120c; 121a-d; 170d-171a; 172c-173a; 177d; 199a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253c-254d / The Critique of Practical Reason, 307d-308b; 309b-d / The Science of Right, 405b-d / The Critique of Judgement, 600d-603d esp 603a-b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passim 46 HEGEL: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-158a 53 JAMES: The Principles of Psychology, 232b-238b passim, esp 235a; 851a-897b esp 851a-853a, 859a-862a, 865b-866a, 868b-869a, 879b-880a, 889a-b, 897a-b

(5) The distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge: knowledge based on sense or reason distinguished from knowledge by faith or through grace and inspiration

OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 4:5-6 / I Kings, 3:3-15; 4:29-34—(D) III Kings, 3:3-15; 4:29-34 / II Chronicles, 1:7-12—(D) II Paralipomenon, 1:7-12 / Job, 28:28 / Psalms, 111:10; 119:97-104—(D) Psalms, 110:10; 118:97-104 / Proverbs, 1:7; 2:5-6; 9:10 / Isaiah, 11:1-4—(D) Isaias, 11:1-4 / Jeremiah, 8:8-9—(D) Jeremias, 8:8-9 / Daniel, 1-2 esp 2:17-23 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 6-9 passim, esp 7:7, 7:15-21, 8:21, 9:13-18—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 6-9 passim, esp 7:7, 7:15-21, 8:21, 9:13-18 / Ecclesiasticus, 1; 6:32-37; 17:6-7,11; 24:23-27—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1; 6:33-37; 17:5-6,9; 24:32-37 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 11:25-27 / Luke, 8:4-18 esp 8:10; 10:21-22; 21:12-15 / John, 1:1-18; 8:31-32; 10:37-38; 12:28-30; 14:10-12; 16:12-14; 20:24-29 / Romans, 10:17 / I Corinthians, 1:4-5; 1:17-2:16; 3:18-21; 8:1-2; 12:8-11 / II Corinthians, 1:12; 4:3-6; 12:1-6 / Ephesians, 1:15-18; 3:1-12 / Colossians, 2:8 / I Thessalonians, 2:13 / II Thessalonians, 2:10-14 / Hebrews, 4:2; 11:1-3 / James, 1:5; 3:13-18 / II Peter, 1:19-21 14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 191d-192b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 1 1a-b; BK IV, PAR 25 25c; BK VI, PAR 6-8 36c-37c; BK VII, PAR 16 48c-49a; BK VIII, PAR 28-29 60d-61a; BK IX, PAR 23-25 68a-c; BK XIII, PAR 46 123a-c / The City of God, BK X, CH 2 299d-300a; BK XI, CH 2-4, 323a-324a; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b; BK XXII, CH 4-5 588b-590a; CH 7 591c-d / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 40 655b-656a; CH 42 656c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1 3a-10c; Q 2, A 2, REP 1 11d-12c; Q 8, A 3, ANS and REP 4 36b-37c; Q 12 50b-62b esp AA 11-13 59d-62b; Q 32, A 1 175d-178a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a; Q 56, A 3 294a-d; Q 57, A 5 299b-300b; Q 58, A 1, ANS and REP 2 300c-301c; AA 5-7 303c-306b; Q 62, A 7 322d-323b; Q 64, A 1, ANS 334a-335c; Q 84