Chapter 41: JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The word “judgment” has a range of meanings which includes three principal variants referring to (1) a quality of the mind, (2) a faculty of the mind, and (3) an act of the mind. Of these three meanings, it is the third which is extensively considered in this chapter; and it is this meaning of “judgment” which many writers use the word “proposition” to express. They sometimes substitute the one word entirely for the other; sometimes they use both words, not as strict synonyms, but to express distinct yet closely related aspects of the same fundamental phenomenon.

The sense in which judgment is a quality of the mind is the sense in which we ordinarily speak of a person as having sound judgment or poor judgment. “We credit the same people,” Aristotle says, “with possessing judgment and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding.” To be “a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgment,” he continues, is to be “able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned.”

The capacity to judge well concerning what is to be done is often connected with the capacity to deliberate about the advantages and disadvantages or other circumstances relevant to the action in question. It may or may not be accompanied by a capacity to resolve thought into action, to carry into execution the decision which judgment has formed. These three qualities of mind—deliberateness, judgment, and decisiveness—are conceived by Aristotle and Aquinas as belonging together as parts of the intellectual virtue they call “prudence” or “practical wisdom.” The qualities may occur separately, but the prudent man will possess all three.

This meaning of “judgment” is reserved for discussion in the chapter on PRUDENCE; and in the chapter on LAW will be found the consideration of the judgment which a court renders—the judgment which is the decision of a judge when he applies the law to the particular case. In the legal sense of a judicial decision, judgment reflects not so much the quality of the judge’s mind as his duty and authority to dispose of the case and to have his decision executed by the appropriate officers of the law. The legal significance of judgment is not primarily psychological or logical; and, just as the moral consideration of judgment falls under prudence, the legal consideration is also more appropriately developed in the context of other ideas.

We are left with the meanings which belong to psychology, logic, and the theory of knowledge. The sense in which “judgment” designates a faculty or function of the mind—a distinct sphere of mental operation—is much more special than the sense in which “judgment” or “proposition” signifies a particular act of the mind in the process of knowing or in the verbal expression of that process. Many authors discuss the kinds of judgment which the mind makes, and the kinds of propositions it forms and asserts or denies, but only a few—notably Locke and Kant—use the word “judgment” to name a mental faculty.

Locke, for example, says that “the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood.” One is the faculty of knowing; the other of judging. “The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree and disagree, or, which is the same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs.” The way in which Locke distinguishes between knowing and judging and the fact that he relates this distinction to the difference between certainty and probability suggest the parallel distinction between knowledge and opinion. The faculty of judgment for Locke is the equivalent of what other writers treat as the forming of opinions.

Kant also makes judgment a faculty. Along with understanding and reason, judgment is one of the three faculties of cognition. It has a distinct function of its own and is coordinate with the other two. As the laws of nature are the work of the understanding in the sphere of speculative reason; as the rules of the moral law are the work of the reason in the practical sphere, wherein it is related to the faculty of desire; so the purposiveness of nature comes under the faculty of judgment which operates in relation to the faculty of pleasure and pain.

Kant divides all the faculties of the soul into “three which cannot be any further derived from one common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire.” He sees each of the three cognitive functions (of understanding, judgment, and reason) as standing in a peculiar relation to these three primary faculties. The faculty of judgment functions with respect to pleasure and pain, which is connected with the faculty of desire. Yet the aesthetic judgment of beauty and the teleological judgment of purposiveness in nature are of a speculative rather than a practical character. Because of these two related facts, Kant holds that “the judgement in the order of our cognitive faculties, forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason.”

Kant, perhaps more than any other thinker, makes judgment—both as a faculty and as an act—one of the central terms in his philosophy. It is pivotal in each of the three critiques, but it is the Critique of Judgement which serves to connect the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. “The Understanding legislates a priori for nature as an object of sense—for theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience. Reason legislates a priori for freedom and its peculiar causality; as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical knowledge. The realm of the natural concept under one legislation, and that of the concept of freedom under the other, are entirely removed from all mutual influence which they might have upon one another (each according to its fundamental laws) by the great gulf that separates the supersensible from phenomena.” It is the judgment, according to Kant, which “furnishes the mediating concept between the concept of nature and that of freedom.”

Kant’s THEORY of the faculties of understanding, judgment, and reason is so complex a doctrine that it cannot be readily compared with other analyses of the capacities or functions of mind. His threefold division bears a superficial—perhaps only a verbal—resemblance to Aquinas’ division of mental acts into conception, judgment, and reasoning.

According to Aquinas, judgment is the second of the three acts of a single cognitive faculty variously called “mind” or “intellect” or “reason.” This faculty, he writes, “first apprehends something about a thing, such as its essence, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and various dispositions affecting the essence. Thus it necessarily relates one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it necessarily proceeds to another, and this is reasoning.”

The first act of the mind is conception, i.e., the simple apprehension of the essence and properties of a thing. Judgment, the second act, unites or separates concepts by affirming or denying one of another. As in the Kantian analysis, judgment is a kind of mediating link; for after the judgment is formed by what Aquinas calls the “composition or division” of concepts, it in turn serves as the unit of the mind’s third act, which is reasoning. Reasoning is the process of going from judgment to judgment.

The act of judgment is that act of the mind, and the only act, which can have the quality of truth or falsity. “Truth,” Aquinas writes, “resides in the intellect composing and dividing”; for when the intellect “judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then it first knows and expresses truth…. In every proposition,” the mind “either applies to, or removes from, the thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate.” Moreover, the judgment involves assertion or denial as the concept does not. Whatever truth there is implicitly in concepts must be explicated in judgments and the truth of the conclusion in reasoning depends upon the truth of the judgments which are the premises. The judgment, therefore, is the basic unit of knowledge.

On this last point Kant seems to be in agreement with earlier writers. It is possible, therefore, to compare Kant’s classification of judgments or propositions with the classifications of Aristotle, Descartes, or Locke. But it is necessary, first, to consider the relation between judgment and proposition. After that we can examine the difference between theoretic and practical judgments. With respect to the theoretic judgment (or proposition), we shall be able to state opposite views of the nature of the judgment and diverse views of the formal structure of judgments, their material content, their relation to one another and to the whole process of knowing.

THE SENTENCE “all men are mortal” can be interpreted as expressing a judgment or a proposition. From certain points of view, the choice of interpretation makes no difference; for example, it does not matter whether, in a consideration of “all men are mortal” and “some men are not mortal,” the comparison is expressed in terms of universal and particular, affirmative and negative, judgments or propositions, or whether it is said that these are contradictory judgments or contradictory propositions. The basic problems of logic seem to be conceived in the same way by writers like Aristotle and Locke, who tend to use “proposition” in place of “judgment,” and by writers like Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant, who tend to use both words with some difference in meaning.

What is the difference? It is sometimes understood as a difference between an act of the mind, asserting or denying, and the subject matter being asserted or denied. The proposition is that which may be either asserted or denied; or in the third alternative stressed by Descartes, the mind may suspend judgment and merely entertain the proposition. It may decline to judge it true or false, and so refuse to assert or deny it. The fact that the proposition is itself either affirmative or negative does not signify its assertion or denial by a judgment of the mind, for an affirmative proposition can be denied and a negative can be affirmed.

Judgment adds to the proposition in question the mind’s decision with respect to its truth or falsity. That decision may be right or wrong. A proposition which is in fact true may be denied. The truth of the proposition is unaffected by the falsity of the judgment, or if the mind suspends judgment on a proposition which is true, the truth of the proposition has failed to elicit a judgment. This seems to confirm the separation between the proposition and the judgment.

Sometimes the difference between the judgment and the proposition is found in the difference between the mind’s act of “composing” or “dividing” concepts and the formulation of that act in words. On this view, the proposition is related to the judgment as the term to the concept, as the physical to the mental word, as language to thought. In consequence, there is no separation for either the judgment or the proposition between that which can be asserted or denied and the assertion or denial of it. The affirmative judgment is an assertion, the negative a denial; and the same holds for the affirmative and the negative proposition.

But on either theory of the difference, it is thought necessary to distinguish between the sentence and the proposition, especially when the proposition is also regarded as a verbal formulation—a statement of thought in words. This is particularly important in a logical treatise like Aristotle’s, which analyzes terms, propositions, and syllogisms rather than concepts, judgments, and reasonings.

In both the Categories, which deals with terms, and the treatise On Interpretation, which deals with propositions, Aristotle differentiates between a grammatical and a logical handling of the units of language. His distinction, for example, between simple and composite expressions (words and phrases on the one hand, and sentences on the other) is related to, but it is not identical with, his distinction between terms and propositions. Not every simple expression can be used as a term. For example, prepositions and conjunctions cannot be used as terms, as nouns and verbs can be. Nor can every sentence be used as a proposition.

“A sentence is a significant portion of speech,” Aristotle writes, “some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the expression of any positive judgment…. Every sentence has meaning,” he goes on, “by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false. Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.”

It seems possible to relate the two separate distinctions we have been considering—that between sentence and proposition and that between proposition and judgment. As the proposition can be regarded as a sentence logically (rather than grammatically) construed, so it can also be regarded as the linguistic expression of a judgment of the mind. The proposition thus appears to be a kind of middle ground between language and thought, for when a sentence is used for the purpose of stating a proposition it can also express a judgment. When a judgment is expressed in words, the verbal statement is also a proposition. The proposition is thus the logical aspect of a sentence and the verbal aspect of a judgment. A similar consideration of terms in relation to words and concepts occurs in the chapter on IDEA.

WHAT IS PERHAPS the most fundamental division in the sphere of judgments—the separation of the practical from the theoretic or speculative—can be initially explained by reference to the forms of language. Aristotle’s remark about sentences and propositions tends to identify propositions with declarative sentences. Sentences in the subjunctive mood state prayers or wishes, not propositions. An interrogative sentence asks a question to which the answers may be propositions, or they may be hopes and desires. The imperative sentence issues a command to act in a certain way, whether the command is a direction for others or a decision for one’s self. This last type of sentence represents the practical mood of thought as well as speech—thought concerned with actions to be done or not done, rather than with what does or does not exist.

The imperative sentence is not the only kind of practical statement. It is merely the most terse and emphatic. It is also the expression of that type of practical judgment which most immediately precedes action itself, or the execution of a command. There are other sentences which, because they are apparently declarative in form, conceal their imperative mood. Yet upon examination their essentially practical rather than theoretic significance can be discovered.

Sentences which contain the words “ought” or “should” are of this sort, e.g., “Men ought to seek the truth,” “You should work for peace,” “I ought to make this clear.” By omitting “should” or “ought,” these sentences can be changed into the strictly declarative mood of theoretic propositions, e.g., “Men do seek the truth,” “You will work for peace,” “I shall make this clear.” They can also be made plainly imperative, e.g., “Seek the truth,” etc. The chief difference between the blunt form of the imperative and its indicative expression using “ought” or “should” is that the latter indicates the person to whom the command is addressed.

The contrast in significance between a declarative and an imperative statement does, therefore, convey the distinction between a theoretic and a practical proposition or judgment. Kant’s further division of practical judgments into the hypothetical and the categorical simply differentiates commands or “oughts” which involve no preamble from those which propose that action be taken to achieve a certain end, or which base a direction to employ this or that means on the supposition that a certain end is desired or sought. Examples of hypothetical or conditional imperatives would be such judgments as “If you want to be happy, seek the truth” or “Seek the truth in order to be happy.”

The distinction between theoretic and practical judgments is currently made in terms of the contrast between statements of fact and statements of value or, as in judicial procedure, between statements of fact and rules of law. A rule of law has the form of a general practical statement, usually a conditional rather than a categorical imperative; whereas the decision of a court applying the rule to a case is a particular practical judgment.

Beginning with Francis Bacon, the distinction between the theoretic and the practical is also made in terms of the difference between the pure sciences and their applications in technology. Technical judgments, prescribing the way to make something or produce a certain effect, are traditionally associated, under the head of the practical, with moral judgments concerning the good to be sought and the ways of seeking it. Both are prescriptive of conduct rather than descriptive of existence or nature in the manner of theoretical statements.

Thinkers like Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, who divide science or philosophy into the theoretical disciplines (e.g., physics, mathematics, metaphysics) and the practical or moral disciplines (e.g., ethics, economics, politics), place the discussion of the difference between theoretical and practical judgments in the context of other distinctions; as, for example, between the speculative and the practical reason, or between theoretic and practical knowledge; or in the context of considering the kinds of truth appropriate to each, and the modes of inference or demonstration in each. These related distinctions and considerations are treated in the chapters on KNOWLEDGE, MIND, REASONING, and TRUTH.

For the most part, however, the great books in the tradition of logic itself do not give an analysis of practical judgments or reasoning in any way comparable to their treatment of the theoretic forms of thought and statement. The logical problems concerning propositions or judgments, now to be considered, apply only to the theoretic forms.

TWO BASIC ISSUES in the theory of propositions or judgments have their origin in the tradition of the great books, but for their explicit and full development other works must be consulted—the special treatises on logic, of relatively recent date, listed in the Additional Readings. One of these two issues has already been briefly commented on, but for the full implications of the distinction between propositions and judgments one must go to such writers as Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, Cook Wilson, W. E. Johnson, and John Dewey, who make this distinction the crux of a controversy over the scope of formal logic.

The other basic issue lies in the opposition between what has come to be called “subject-predicate logic” and “relational logic.” Here one side is fully represented by the Organon of Aristotle and by the later books which adopt the Aristotelian logic of predication. The other logical theory is intimated but not fully developed by such writers as Locke, Hume, Kant, and William James who, though they sometimes employ the subject-predicate formulation, tend to construct the unit of knowledge—the proposition or judgment—as a relation between ideas or concepts.

The fact that Kant places substance and accident under the category of relation can be taken as exemplifying this tendency, as can Locke’s emphasis on the connection of, and agreement or disagreement between, our ideas. Nevertheless, these are at most intimations of the theory that the proposition is a relation of two or more terms, not the application of a predicate to a subject. As indicated in the chapter on LOGIC, the relational theory does not receive an adequate exposition until the modern development of symbolic or mathematical logic, beginning with the writings of Boole, Jevons, and Venn, and culminating in such works as the Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead.

In the Aristotelian logic, simple propositions consist of a subject and a predicate—what is being talked about and what is said of it. The copula “is” is the sign of predication; it also signifies an affirmation of the unity of subject and predicate. For example, in “Socrates is a man” the predicate man is applied to the subject Socrates, and the unity of being Socrates and being a man is affirmed. All the terms of discourse can be classified according to their character as subjects and predicates; so, too, can propositions be classified by reference to the type of subject-term and the type of predicate-term which comprise them. The formal structure not only of the proposition, but also of the syllogism, is determined by the order of subjects and predicates. “When one term is predicated of another,” Aristotle writes, “any term which is predicable of the predicate will also be predicable of its subject.”

According to the theory of the proposition as a relation of terms or of classes, predication represents merely one type of relationship—the membership of an individual in a class, or the inclusion of one class in another. There are many other types of relation which, it is held, cannot be reduced to class-membership or class-inclusion; as, for example, the relationship stated by the proposition “John hit James,” or the proposition “January comes before February.” Propositions can be classified according to the number of terms involved in a single relationship, or by reference to the type of relation which organizes them, whether it is symmetrical or asymmetrical, transitive or intransitive, reflexive or irreflexive. In this theory it is the character of the relationship, not the character of the terms, which is the fundamental element in logical analysis, and this determines the formal structure of inference as well as of propositions.

It has been claimed for each of these logical theories that it is the more general analysis and that it is able to reduce the formulations of the opposite theory to its own terms or subsume them as a special case. Certainly it is verbally possible to convert all predications into statements of relationship, or all relational statements into subject-predicate propositions. But this by itself does not seem to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of either theory; each side contends that such reductions violate its fundamental principles. Stated in its most drastic form, the unresolved question is whether there is one logic or two—or perhaps more.

WITHIN THE tradition of Aristotelian logic, there are divergent schemes for classifying propositions or judgments. So far as the great books are concerned, this can be best illustrated by mentioning Kant’s departures in analysis.

Aristotle distinguishes between simple and composite propositions, the former consisting of a single subject and predicate, the latter “compounded of several propositions.” For example, since the two predicates in the proposition “This man is good and a shoemaker” do not form a unity, the sentence expresses a conjunction of two simple propositions: “This man is good” and “This man is a shoemaker.” Other types of compound propositions are the hypothetical and the disjunctive, e.g., “If Socrates is a man, Socrates is mortal,” and “Either all men are mortal or no men are mortal.” Kant treats these distinctions under the head of relation. He calls the proposition which is a “relation of the predicate to the subject, categorical” and he regards the hypothetical or disjunctive judgment (based on relations of cause and effect or of the parts of a whole) as concerned with propositions “in relation to each other.”

Aristotle classifies simple propositions by reference to their quantity and quality. In regard to quantity he distinguishes between the universal (e.g., “All men are mortal”) and the particular (e.g., “Some men are mortal”). To these he adds the indefinite proposition which leaves the quantity (all or some) undetermined. Under the head of quantity, Kant makes a threefold division according to unity, plurality, and totality. He adds the singular proposition “Socrates is mortal” to Aristotle’s particular and universal. The difference between the singular on the one hand, and the particular and the universal on the other, seems to be represented in Aristotle’s thought by the distinction between propositions about an individual subject and propositions about a universal subject.

The quality of categorical propositions, according to Aristotle, is either affirmative (i.e., positive) or negative, e.g., “All men are mortal” and “Some men are not mortal.” To these two Kant adds a third type of judgment under the head of quality—the infinite judgment which affirms a negative predicate of a subject, e.g., “The soul is non-mortal.” Though Aristotle recognizes the special character of a term like “non-mortal,” since it is both negative and indefinite, he does not seem to think that the use of such terms affects the quality of a proposition.

Finally, Aristotle divides propositions according to whether they are simple assertions of fact or are assertions qualified by the notions of necessity or contingency (i.e., possibility). Every proposition, he says, “states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else.” The distinction between the necessary and contingent modes of statement has come to be called a difference in “modality,” and statements which have one or another modality are called “modal propositions.”

It is sometimes thought that the Aristotelian classification treats only necessary and contingent propositions, with their several opposites, as modal propositions, and separates the simple or pure assertion from them as non-modal. In contrast to this, Kant makes a threefold division of judgments under the head of modality: the “problematical” (i.e., the possible, what may be), the “assertoric” (i.e., the existent, what is), and the “apodictic” (i.e., the necessary, what must be).

THE CLASSIFICATION of the types of judgment or proposition is usually preliminary in logical analysis to a consideration of their order and connection.

The formal pattern of what is traditionally called “the square of opposition” is determined by the quality and quantity of the simple propositions which are therein related as contradictory, contrary, and sub-contrary. Two propositions are contradictory if they are opposite in both quality and quantity (e.g., “All men are mortal” is contradicted by “Some men are not mortal”). Two universal propositions are contrary if one is affirmative and the other negative (e.g., “All men are mortal” is contrary to “No men are mortal”); and an affirmative and a negative particular proposition are related as sub-contraries (e.g., “Some men are mortal” and “Some men are not mortal”). The significance of these three basic relationships for the truth and falsity of the opposed propositions is discussed in the chapter on OPPOSITION; and in the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY the special problems of opposition among modal propositions are examined.

Other than their opposition, the only formal relationship of propositions or judgments occurs in the structure of inference or reasoning. According to the traditional analysis, the implication of one proposition by another—insofar as that is determined by the form of each—is immediate inference. In contrast, the pattern of mediated inference or reasoning always involves at least three propositions, ordered not only with respect to the sequence from premises to conclusion, but also by the relation of the premises to one another. These matters are discussed in the chapter on REASONING.

With respect to their origin, status, or import, judgments or propositions are subject to further distinctions in type. The certainty or probability with which propositions are asserted or judgments are made is connected by some writers with the distinction between knowledge and opinion, by others with the difference between science and dialectic, and by others with the difference between knowing the relation of ideas and knowing matters of fact or real existence. Propositions which express certain knowledge are, furthermore, divided by some analysts into those which are axiomatic, self-evident, or immediate and those which are known only by mediated inference, reasoning, or demonstration, not by intuition or induction. The former are also sometimes called “principles,” the latter “conclusions.”

Locke’s distinction between “trifling” and “instructive” propositions, like Kant’s distinction between “analytic” and “synthetic” judgments, is made in the general context of an examination of how we learn or know.

Trifling propositions, according to Locke, “are universal propositions which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge.” All “purely identical propositions” are of this sort—propositions such as “body is body” or “a vacuum is a vacuum.” Such propositions “teach nothing but what every one who is capable of discourse knows without being told, viz., that the same term is the same term, and the same idea the same idea.” They are all instances of the law of identity; or, as Locke expresses it, they are all “equivalent to this proposition, viz., what is, is.” If the trifling proposition, the analytical judgment, or what in our day is called a “tautology,” goes beyond the statement of an identity between subject and predicate, it goes no further than the explication of a definition. It predicates, Locke says, “a part of the definition of the word defined,” as, for example, in the proposition “Lead is a metal.”

Analytical or explicative judgments, Kant says in the Prolegomena, “express nothing in the predicate but what has already been actually thought in the concept of the subject…. When I say, ‘all bodies are extended,’ I have not amplified in the least my concept of body, but have only analyzed it…. On the contrary, this judgment, ‘All bodies have weight,’ contains in its predicate something not actually thought in the general concept of body; it amplifies my knowledge, by adding something to my concept, and must therefore be called synthetical.”

For Locke not all axioms or self-evident propositions are trifling or tautological, for some go beyond statements of identity or the explication of definitions, as, for example, that the whole is greater than the part. Nor are they all useless. Some which Locke distinguishes from the rest by calling them “maxims,” are of use, he maintains, “in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are advanced, but of little or none in advancing them further. They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinate wranglers, and bringing those contests to some conclusion.”

For Kant there is a further division of judgments into the a posteriori and the a priori, according as their truth is or is not grounded in the data of experience. The former are empirical in origin, the latter transcendental, that is, they have a foundation which transcends experience. These two types of judgment express two corresponding types of knowledge—a priori knowledge by which Kant understands “not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience.”

In Kant’s view, there is no problem about the truth of analytic judgments, for these have an a priori foundation in the principle of contradiction. (The contradictory of an analytic judgment is always self-contradictory.) Nor do synthetic judgments which are empirical or a posteriori raise any special difficulties. The central question in the theory of knowledge concerns the possibility and validity of synthetic judgments a priori.

“If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize another, B, as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on,” Kant asks, “whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want. Let us take, for example, the proposition, ‘everything that happens has a cause.’ In the conception of something that happens, I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes, and from this I can derive analytical judgments. But the conception of a cause lies quite outside the above conception, and indicates something entirely different from ‘that which happens,’ and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general conception—‘that which happens’—something entirely different from that conception, and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it, yet as belonging to it, and even necessarily? What is here the unknown X, upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found, outside the conception A, a foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it?” It is the discovery and solution of this problem which Kant believes to be the signal contribution of his transcendental logic of the judgment.

It may be wondered whether this problem can be stated in terms other than those peculiar to Kant’s analytical vocabulary. Other writers admit that propositions which are particular and contingent have “existential import.” Their truth concerns real existences, and so whether they are true or not can and must be learned from experience. These are like Kant’s synthetic judgments a posteriori. Universal and necessary propositions, on the other hand, are sometimes interpreted as having no existential significance. Instead of being read as asserting that anything exists, they are taken simply as statements of the relation between our own ideas. These, for Locke and Hume, are like Kant’s a priori analytic judgments.

What remains is to discover a parallel for Kant’s synthetic judgments a priori. In terms other than Kant’s, the most likely parallel seems to be the universal and necessary proposition conceived as a statement about reality rather than about relations in the realm of our own concepts. When universal propositions are so interpreted, two questions arise. How do we establish that the subjects of such propositions really exist? What is the ultimate ground for the truth of such propositions, the unlimited universality of which outruns experience? In these two questions we find a problem which is at least analogous to Kant’s problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. Judgment as an act or faculty of the mind: its contrast with the act of conception or with the faculties of understanding and reason
2. The division of judgments in terms of the distinction between the theoretic and the practical
3. The analysis of practical or moral judgments: judgments of good and evil, means and ends; categorical and hypothetical imperatives
4. The distinction between the aesthetic and the teleological judgment
5. The nature of theoretic judgments
   • 5a. The linguistic expression of judgments: sentences and propositions
   • 5b. The judgment as a predication: the classification of subjects and predicates
   • 5c. The judgment as relational: types of relation
6. The division of theoretic judgments according to formal criteria
   • 6a. The division of judgments according to quantity: universal, particular, singular, and indefinite propositions
   • 6b. The division of judgments according to quality: positive, negative, and infinite propositions
   • 6c. The division of judgments according to modality: necessary and contingent propositions; problematic, assertoric, and apodictic judgments
   • 6d. The classification of judgments by reference to relation: simple and composite propositions; categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments
7. The order and connection of judgments
   • 7a. The formal opposition of judgments: the square of opposition
   • 7b. The conversion of propositions: the problem of immediate inference
   • 7c. Reasoning as a sequence of judgments: the chain of reasoning
8. The differentiation of judgments according to origin, ground, or import
   • 8a. Self-evident and demonstrable propositions: immediate and mediated, intuitive and reasoned judgments
   • 8b. Analytic and synthetic judgments: trifling and instructive propositions
   • 8c. A priori and a posteriori, non-existential and existential judgments: the problem of a priori synthetic judgments
   • 8d. The division of judgments into the determinant and the reflective: judgments as constitutive or as regulative
9. Degrees of assent: certainty and probability
10. The truth and falsity of judgments

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows, e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation ‘esp’ calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; ‘passim’ signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. Judgment as an act or faculty of the mind: its contrast with the act of conception or with the faculties of understanding and reason

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [2a4-10] 6a / On Interpretation, CH 1 [16a9-18] 25a-b / Metaphysics, BK VI, CH 4 [1027b18-28] 550a,c; BK IX, CH 10 577c-578a,c / On the Soul, BK III, CH 6 662d-663c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 23 50b-c; BK X, par 10 73d-74a / City of God, BK VII, CH 6, 269b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 13, A 12, ANS 74c-75b; Q 14, A 14 88d-89b; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 17, A 3 102d-103c; Q 58, A 2, ANS 301b-d; A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 85, A 5, ANS and REP 3 457d-458d; A 6 458d-459c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, A 2 381a-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 66c-67a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59c-61d esp 59c-60a; 64a-b 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 21d-22a / Meditations on First Philosophy, III, 81a; IV 89a-93a esp 89c-90a / Objections and Replies, 124b-c; 141a; 215d-216c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 48-49 391a-394d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, SECT 8 179c-d; BK IV, CH V, SECT 5-6 329d-330b; CH XIV 364b-365a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16d-19a; 34a-45b esp 39a-c, 41c-42c; 51d-52b; 59c-64a esp 60a-c; 64d-66d; 99a-101b; 108a-112d esp 110d-111c; 166c-171a; 193a-200c; 240b-243c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-c / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 465c-467d, 474b-475d; 550a-551a,c; 558a; 572b-575b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 178a-179a; 213b-214a; 313b; 638a-b; 859a; 861b

2. The division of judgments in terms of the distinction between the theoretic and the practical

8 ARISTOTLE: On the Heavens, BK II, CH 7 [306a14-18] 397b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 499a-500b; BK IV, CH 4 [1008b2-32] 527d-528b / On the Soul, BK III, CH 7 [431b2-12] 664a-b; CH 9 [432b26-433a9] 665c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 339d-340b; CH 7 [1098a25-35] 343d; BK II, CH 2 [1103b26-1104a9] 349b-c; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a21-31] 387d-388a; CH 5 [1140b11-19] 389b-c; CH 8 [1142a13-19] 391b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 16 90b-91b; Q 79, AA 11-13 424d-427a; PART I-II, Q 13, A 6, REP 2 676c-677b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; Q 90, A 1, REP 2 205b-206b; A 2, REP 3 206b-207a; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART II-II, Q 11, A 1, REP 3 772b-773a; Q 13, A 1, REP 3 780a-781b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART I, 44a-c / Objections and Replies, 126a-b; 237b-c; 243c-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 1 103d-104a 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-191a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b; 271a-c / Practical Reason, 297a-c, 300d [fn 1]; 310a-b; 319c-321b; 329a-330c esp 329a-d; 343a-d / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 463a-467a, 474b-475d 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 5c-6a; PART II, par 227 74b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 186a

3. The analysis of practical or moral judgments: judgments of good and evil, means and ends; categorical and hypothetical imperatives

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH 1-4 162a-166b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 499a-500b; BK IV, CH 4 [1008b2-32] 527d-528b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 339d-340b, BK II, CH 2 [1103b27-1104a9] 349b-c passim; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a21-31] 387d-388a; CH 5 [1140b11-19] 389b-c; CH 8 [1142a13-19] 391b, CH 10-11 392b-393b; BK VII, CH 3 396c-398a / Politics, BK III, CH 11 [1281b39-1282a23] 479d-480a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 7 604c-607d 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 1 106b-107a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 13 16c-d; BK VII, par 23 50b-c / City of God, BK VII, CH 8 270a-d; BK XIX, CH 1-14 507a-520d / Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 10, 661d-662a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 59, A 3, ANS and REP 1 308b-309a; Q 79, AA 11-13 424d-427a; Q 83, A 1, ANS 436d-438a; A 2, ANS and REP 1 438a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 2 438d-439c; PART I-II, Q 17, A 1 686d-687c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 6, ANS and REP 2-3 40a-41a 22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a esp par 7-13 402b-405a, par 17-36 407b-417b, par 59-78 427a-432a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a-54a, 60d; 61d-62a; 65b-c; 66c-67d; 68b-c; 96a; PART II, 149b-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 51a-55d esp 52c-53c; 136b-139b; 520b-522a 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II 113c-115d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 86c-95b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method, PART III, 49a-b / Objections and Replies, 126a-b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 4 172b; 98 190b; 375-385 237b-239a; 456-457 254a; 505 261a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 36, 465a-d [fn 1] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 114d-115a; 190c-d; 236d-237a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260a-261d; 266a-267d; 268c-271a; 272a-b / Practical Reason, 318c-321b esp 320c-321b; 327d-329a; 357c-360d / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367c; 368d; 369b-c; 373d; 377c-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d; 387b, 387d-388a; 390b,d-391c; 392b-393a / Science of Right, 397b-398a; 416b-417b / Judgement, 477b-c; 557d [fn2]; 586a-b; 595a-d; 596c-598b; 605d-606b [fn 2] 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1, 29d 43 MILL: Liberty, 275a-278c passim, esp 276b-277b, 287b-c / Utilitarianism, 446d-447a; 455c-457b passim; 461c-462a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 140 49b-54a; PART III, par 191-192 66b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-166b; PART IV, 362d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 202b; 794a-798b; 886b-888a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 792b-c; 801d

4. The distinction between the aesthetic and the teleological judgment

42 KANT: Judgement, 471b-473a; 476a-483d; 485b-489a; 492b-493b; 513b-516b; 516d-517c; 528b-c; 548c-549d, 550c-551a,c; 558a-b; 559c-560c; 562a-564c, 567c-570a; 572b-578a

5. The nature of theoretic judgments

• 5a. The linguistic expression of judgments: sentences and propositions 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 85d-86b; 109a-b / Sophist, 574d-577b 8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 4-5 26a-c / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24a16-b15] 39a-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [72a7-14] 98c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 12 74c-75b, Q 85, A 2, REP 3 453d-455b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, A 2 381a-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 60a; PART IV, 270a-c 33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 433a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, SECT 19 251c-d; BK III, CH VII, SECT 1 283a-b; BK IV, CH V 329a-331b passim; CH VI, SECT 1-3 331b-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 144a-b

• 5b. The judgment as a predication: the classification of subjects and predicates 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2-3 5b-d; CH 5 [2a11-3b24] 6a-8a / On Interpretation, CH 4-8 26a-28a; CH 11 31c-32c / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 27 [43a25-44] 60c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 4 [73a21-b24] 99d-100a / Topics, BK I, CH 4-9 144b-147b / Physics, BK I, CH 3 [186b22-187a10] 261b-262a; CH 6 [189a28-33] 264d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, ANS 10d-11d; Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 13, A 5 66b-67d; A 12, ANS 74c-75b; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; A 6, ANS 98b-d; Q 58, A 2 301b-d; A 4 302d-303c; Q 76, A 3, ANS 391a-393a; Q 85, A 5, REP 3 457d-458d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 270a-c 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, PART IX 130d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 51d-52b; 180c-182b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 144a-b; 313a-b; 638b; 861b; 870b-873a

• 5c. The judgment as relational: types of relation 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH I, SECT 1-7 307a-308a; CH XII, SECT 6-8 360a-c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20 458a-b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 39c-41c esp 40c-d; 51d-52b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 174b-176a; 302b-304b; 638b; 869a-873a esp 870b-871a, 872b; 878a-879b; 889a-b

6. The division of theoretic judgments according to formal criteria

• 6a. The division of judgments according to quantity: universal, particular, singular, and indefinite propositions 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 2 5b-c / On Interpretation, CH 7 [17b37-18a16] 26d-27a / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24a16-21] 39a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-56a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH V, SECT 10 331a; CH VI 331b-336d passim; CH IX, SECT 1 349a; CH XI, SECT 13-14 357d-358c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 39c-41c esp 39d-40a

• 6b. The division of judgments according to quality: positive, negative, and infinite propositions 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 10 [12b6-15] 17d-18a / On Interpretation, CH 5 [17a8-9] 26b; CH 6 26c-d; CH 10 29d-31c / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 3 [25b19-26] 40c; CH 46 70b-71d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 25 [86b30-38] 118d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 12, ANS 74c-75b 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 33 161b-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VII, SECT 1 283a-b; BK IV, CH V, SECT 5-6 329d-330b passim 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 39c-41c esp 40a-c; 210c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 53 25c-d

• 6c. The division of judgments according to modality: necessary and contingent propositions; problematic, assertoric, and apodictic judgments 8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 12-13 32d-35c / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 3 40a-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 13, REP 2 86d-88c; Q 19, A 3, ANS 110b-111c; A 8, REP 1,3 116a-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 22a-b; 23a-c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14c-15c; 39c-41c esp 40d-41c; 179c-180c, 193a-200c esp 194b-d; 217c-d / Judgement, 491c-495a,c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 851a

• 6d. The classification of judgments by reference to relation: simple and composite propositions; categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments 8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 5 [17a20-24] 26c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 13, REP 2 86d-88c; Q 19, A 8, REP 1,3 116a-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 39c-41c esp 40c-d, 44a-b; 110d-111c esp 111b; 194b-c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 265c-266d / Practical Reason, 297a-298a / Judgement, 483d-491c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 859b

7. The order and connection of judgments

• 7a. The formal opposition of judgments: the square of opposition 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 10 [13a1-35] 19a-c / On Interpretation, CH 6-7 26c-27d; CH 10 29d-31c; CH 12-14 32d-36d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [72a13] 98c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 64, A 3, REP 3 68b-69b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 64d-65c; 156d-157b; 174b-d

• 7b. The conversion of propositions: the problem of immediate inference 8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 7 [17a23-37] 27b-c; CH 10 [20a16-37] 30d-31b / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 2-3 39d-40c; BK II, CH 8-10 79b-81b; CH 22 [67b26-68a24] 89b-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18a; 109d-111c esp 109d-110a, 110d-111c

• 7c. Reasoning as a sequence of judgments: the chain of reasoning 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 3 [1b10-16] 5c-d / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1-3 39a-40c; CH 23 [40b30-41a7] 57c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1-2 97a-99a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 7, ANS 81d-82b; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d; A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 79, AA 8-9 421c-423d; Q 85, A 5, ANS 457d-458d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-c; 60a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59c-60a 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XIV, 28b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II, SECT 2-8 309d-311a; CH XV, SECT 1 365a-c; CH XVII, SECT 4, 373a-375a passim; SECT 15-17 378d-379c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 110d-112d; 115d-119a / Practical Reason, 329a-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 313b; 666b-674b esp 667b-668a, 672b; 868b-879b esp 870b-873a, 878a

8. The differentiation of judgments according to origin, ground, or import

• 8a. Self-evident and demonstrable propositions: immediate and mediated, intuitive and reasoned judgments 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 97a-d; CH 3 99b-100a; CH 15 109a-b; CH 19-22 111c-115b; CH 23 [84b19-85a1] 115c-116a; CH 31 [88a5-17] 120b-c; BK II, CH 9 128a-b; CH 19 136a-137a,c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 [1139b25-34] 388c; CH 6 389d; CH 8 [1142a25-29] 391b-c; CH 11 [1143a32-b5] 392d-393a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356b26-27] 596b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1 10d-11d; Q 14, A 1, REP 2 75d-76c; A 7, ANS 81d-82b; Q 17, A 3, REP 2 102d-103c; Q 79, A 12, ANS 425c-426b; Q 84, A 3, REP 3 443d-444d; Q 85, A 6, ANS 458d-459c; Q 117, A 1 595d-597c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 2 36a-37b; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART II-II, Q 1, A 4, ANS 382c-383b; Q 8, A 1, REP 2 417a-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 259d-261a; 272a-d 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59c-d; 97a 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II, 4a-d; XII, 20d-25a / Objections and Replies, 123a-b; 125a-b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 1 171a-172a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15-16 98d-99c; SECT 18 99d-100b; SECT 23 101b-102a; CH II, SECT 1 103d-104a; SECT 4 104d-106a; CH III, SECT 23 119b-120a; BK IV, CH I, SECT 9 308c-309b passim, esp 309b; CH II 309b-313a; CH III, SECT 2-4 313a-c; CH VII, SECT 1-11 337a-342d passim; CH IX, SECT 2-3 349a-c; CH XV, SECT 1 365a-c; CH XVII, SECT 2-3 371d-372b; SECT 14-17 378c-379c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 39a-c; 99a-c; 110d-111c; 211c-218d / Judgement, 542d-543a 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-d; NUMBER 83, 244b-c 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 446a-447a

• 8b. Analytic and synthetic judgments: trifling and instructive propositions 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH VIII, SECT 6, 330b; CH VIII 345a-348d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16d-19a; 31a-d; 64d-66d; 179c-182b / Practical Reason, 339a; 351c / Science of Right, 405b-c / Judgement, 516b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 879b-880b [fn 2]

• 8c. A priori and a posteriori, non-existential and existential judgments: the problem of a priori synthetic judgments 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15-16 98d-99c; SECT 23 101b-102a; BK IV, CH I, SECT 1-7 307a-308a; CH III, SECT 17-21 315b-319c; CH IX, SECT 1 349a; CH XI, SECT 13-14 357d-358c; CH XVII, SECT 2, 371d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30, 462a; SECT V, DIV 34-38, 464b-466c; SECT X, DIV 89 490b-c; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d passim 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-8b; 14a-108a,c esp 14a-20c, 23a-24a, 25b-26b, 27b-28b, 29d-33d, 35b-36a, 41c-42b, 46a-48d, 57d-59b, 64b-66d, 85d-88a; 108b-d; 110a-113b; 134c-d; 146a; 179c-182b; 192a-b; 211c-218d; 224a-227a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 268b-d; 280a-b; 283b / Practical Reason, 309b-d; 329d-330c; 351c / Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367d-368a / Science of Right, 405b-407a esp 405b-d / Judgement, 467a-475d; 570b-572d; 603a-b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-446d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-158a; 182d-183c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 639a-641a esp 640b; 659a-660a; 851a-890a esp 851a-852a, 859a-861b, 867a-869a, 879b, 880b-881a, 884b-885a, 889b-890a; 897a-b

• 8d. The division of judgments into the determinant and the reflective: judgments as constitutive or as regulative 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-74b; 193a-200c esp 193c-d, 194b-c; 201d-202a; 206a-207b / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 471b-474b; 550a-551a,c; 558a, 559a-560c; 562a-d; 564a-c; 567b-568c; 570b-572c; 577b; 584d-585a; 588c; 597b-599b; 601d

9. Degrees of assent: certainty and probability

8 ARISTOTLE: On Interpretation, CH 9 28a-29d / Topics, BK V, CH 3 [131b19-30] 182b-c / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 8 [1074a14-16] 604c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b11-28] 339d-340a; CH 7 [1098a25-35] 343d; BK II, CH 2 [1103b27-1104a9] 349b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1357a23-24] 596d-597c; BK II, CH 25 [1402b13-1403a1] 652b-d 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 13 86d-88c; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 58, A 7, REP 3 305c-306b; Q 86, A 4, ANS 463d-464d; PART I-II, Q 17, A 6, ANS 690b-d 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 3 14b-15a; Q 67, A 3, ANS 83b-84d; PART II-II, Q 1, AA 4-5 382c-384b; Q 4, A 8 409a-d; Q 9, A 1, ANS and REP 1 423c-424b; A 2, ANS 424b-425a; Q 18, A 4 464c-465a; PART III, Q 7, A 3, REP 3 747b-748a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 65b-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 240c-242a; 272a-d; 292a-d; 499c-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, II-III 1a-3b; XII, 23a-c / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 53c-d; PART VI, 63c-64d / Meditations on First Philosophy, 74a,c; IV, 92c-93a / Objections and Replies, 125b-126b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 2-6 93b-95a; BK IV, CH VI 331b-336d passim, esp SECT 13 335c-d; CH XI, SECT 3 355a-b; SECT 8-12 356b-357d; CH XIV-XVII 364b-371c; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT 14-17 378c-379c; CH XIX, SECT 1 384c-d 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VI 469d-470d; SECT X, DIV 86-91 488d-491e passim, esp DIV 87 489b-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 194b-c; 228c-d; 240b-243c / Judgement, 600d-604b passim 43 MILL: Liberty, 275a-277b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 636a-638b, 659a-660b 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 463d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661c-662a / New Introductory Lectures, 818c-819b

10. The truth and falsity of judgments

7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 71c-74a / Cratylus, 85d-86d; 109a-b / Theaetetus, 541a-544a / Sophist, 561d-577b esp 575a-577b 8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [2a4-10] 6a; CH 5 [4a10-b19] 8b-9a / On Interpretation, CH 1 [16a9-18] 25a-b; CH 4-14 26a-36d passim, esp CH 5 [17a1-4] 26b, CH 7 26d-27d, CH 9 28a-29d, CH 14 35c-36d / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 7 [1011b25-29] 531c; [1012a1-17] 531d-532a; CH 8 [1012b29-1013a22] 532b-d; BK VI, CH 4 550a,c; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b34-1052a18] 577d-578b / On the Soul, BK III, CH 3 [427b15-25] 660a; CH 6 662d-663c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 7 [1107a27-31] 352d-353a; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a21-31] 387d-388a; CH 3 [1139b14-18] 388b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [353-521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 7 269b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31-32 651d-653b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 13, A 12 74c-75b; Q 14, A 15, REP 3 89b-90b; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; A 7, ANS and REP 4 99a-d; A 8, REP 3-4 99d-101b; Q 17, AA 3-4 102d-104b; Q 58, A 4, REP 2 302d-303c; A 5 303c-304c; Q 85, A 1, REP 2 451c-453c; A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; A 6 458d-459c; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 57, A 5, REP 3 39a-40a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 57c; 58c; 60a; 65b-c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 240c-242a, 259d-261a; 271b-272c; 292a-d 31 DESCARTES: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII 18b-25a passim / Discourse on the Method, PART IV, 52a / Meditations on First Philosophy, III, 83c; 85c; IV 89a-93a esp 90b-91b / Objections and Replies, 124b-c; 125b-126b; PART IX 130d; 141a, 156d-158a, 168b-d; 215d-216c, 229a; 230d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49 391c-394d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII 243c-248b passim, esp SECT 1-3 243c-244a, SECT 19-26 247a-248b; BK III, CH VII, SECT 1 283a-b; BK IV, CH V 329a-331b; CH VI, SECT 1 331c-d; SECT 16 336d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 99a-100a; 108a-d; 193d; 240b-243c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 460a-469b esp 462b-463a, 468b-469a; 508a; 638a-b; 879a-881a

CROSS-REFERENCES

For: The comparison of judgment with other acts of the mind, see IDEA 2g, 5a; KNOWLEDGE 6b(1); REASONING 1; and for the relation of judgment to other faculties of the mind, see MIND 1e-1e(3).

For: Discussions relevant to the distinction between theoretic and practical judgments, see KNOWLEDGE 6e(1); PHILOSOPHY 2a; PRUDENCE 2a; REASONING 5e-5e(1); THEOLOGY 4b; TRUTH 2c; WISDOM 1b.

For: Other considerations of practical or moral judgments, and of judgment in relation to prudence, see GOOD AND EVIL 5b-5c; KNOWLEDGE 6e(2); PRUDENCE 5a; and for the theory of the categorical imperative, see DUTY 5; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5a(2).

For: Other treatments of language in relation to thought, see IDEA 4a; LANGUAGE 7.

For: The theory of predication and the analysis of subjects and predicates, see IDEA 5a; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5c.

For: The relational theory of propositions, see RELATION 4b.

For: Other discussions bearing on the quantity, quality, and modality of propositions, see INFINITY 2b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4e(1); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5c-5d; and for other considerations of the distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical in judgment and reasoning, see HYPOTHESIS 5; REASONING 2b.

For: Another treatment of the square of opposition, see OPPOSITION 1d(1)-1d(2).

For: The relation of judgments to one another in immediate inference or in reasoning, see REASONING 4a; RELATION 4b.

For: The distinction between self-evident and demonstrable judgments, see INDUCTION 3; KNOWLEDGE 6c(2); PRINCIPLE 2b(2); and for other treatments of the a priori and the a posteriori, see EXPERIENCE 2d; KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); REASONING 5b(3).

For: A discussion relevant to the distinction between existential and non-existential judgments, see KNOWLEDGE 6a(3).

For: The problem of the truth and falsity of judgments, or their certainty and probability, see KNOWLEDGE 6d(1)-6d(2); OPINION 3a-3b; TRUTH 2e, 3b(2)-3c, 7a.

For: Another consideration of the aesthetic judgment, see BEAUTY 5; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

AQUINAS. De Propositionibus Modalibus

HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART I, CH 3

KANT. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, PART 2-3

HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL II, SECT I, CH 2

J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK I, CH 4-6

II.

CICERO. Academics, II (xlvii)

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Logicians

JOHN OF SALISBURY. Metalogicon

SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, VIII-IX

JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica, PART I, QQ 5-7

ARNAULD. Logic or the Art of Thinking, PART II

LEIBNIZ. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH 5

T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, VI

W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL II (13-14)

BOOLE. An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, CH 21

J. H. NEWMAN. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent

SIGWART. Logic, PART I-II

JEVONS. Pure Logic, CH 2, 7, 10, 12 —. Studies in Deductive Logic, CH 3-6

LOTZE. Logic, BK I, CH 2 —. Outlines of Logic, I, CH 2

BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, BK I; Terminal Essays, II-III, VI

J. N. KEYNES. Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic, PART II

BOSANQUET. Logic, VOL I, CH 1-9

VENN. Symbolic Logic, CH 6-8 —. Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, CH 8-10

J. C. WILSON. Statement and Inference, PART II

WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL. Principia Mathematica, PART I, SECT C, D; PART II, SECT B, C, D, E; PART IV-V

ROYCE. The Principles of Logic

W. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART I, CH 1-5, 9-10

MARITAIN. An Introduction to Logic, CH 2

WHITEHEAD. Process and Reality, PART II, CH 9

DEWEY et al. Studies in Logical Theory, I-IV

DEWEY. Essays in Experimental Logic, II-VI, XII-XV —. Reconstruction in Philosophy, CH 6 —. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 6-14

M. R. COHEN. A Preface to Logic, II-III