Chapter 37: IDEA

INTRODUCTION

As the topical analysis or outline in each chapter indicates, the great ideas are not simple objects of thought. Each of the great ideas seems to have a complex interior structure—an order of parts involving related meanings and diverse positions which, when they are opposed to one another, determine the basic issues in that area of thought.

The great ideas are also the conceptions by which we think about things. They are the terms in which we state fundamental problems; they are the notions we employ in defining issues and discussing them. They represent the principal content of our thought. They are what we think as well as what we think about.

If, in addition to its objects and content, we wish to think about thought itself—its acts or processes—we shall find in the tradition of the great books a number of related terms which indicate the scope of such inquiry. Some of them are: idea, judgment, understanding, and reasoning; perception, memory, and imagination; sense and mind. Here we are concerned with one of these—the idea idea. It is probably the most elementary of all these related terms, for according to different conceptions of the nature and origin of ideas, the analysis of thought and knowledge will vary. Different positions will be taken concerning the faculties by which men know, the acts and processes of thinking, and the limits of human understanding.

DOES THE WORD ‘idea,’ when it is used in the technical discourse of metaphysics or psychology, signify that which is known or understood? Does it signify, not the object of thought, but the thought itself? Or both? Certainly in popular speech the word is used both ways, for men speak of understanding an idea and note differences in their understanding of the same idea; and they also say that they have different ideas about the same thing, meaning that they understand the same thing differently.

The word “idea” has many other oppositions of meaning in its tremendous range of ambiguity. It is sometimes used exclusively for the eternal types in the divine mind or the intelligible forms that exist apart from material things which are their copies; sometimes for concepts in the human mind, abstracted from sense-experience; sometimes for the seeds of understanding which belong innately to the intellect and so do not need to be derived from sense. Sometimes “idea” means a sensation or a perception as well as an abstract thought, and then its connotation extends to almost every type of mental content; sometimes it is denied that there are any abstract or general ideas; and sometimes “idea” has the extremely restricted meaning of an image which is the memory of a sense-impression.

Kant vigorously protests against what he thinks is a needless abuse of the term idea. “I beg those who really have philosophy at heart,” he writes, “to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification.” There is, he insists, “no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation without encroaching upon terms which are proper to others.”

Kant proposes a “graduated list” of such terms. He begins with perception, which he divides into sensation and cognition, according as it is subjective or objective. A cognition, he then goes on, “is either an intuition or a conception,” according as it has either an immediate or a mediate relation to its object. Dividing conceptions into the empirical and the pure, Kant finally reaches the term idea as one sub-division of pure conceptions. If the pure conception “has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image,” it is a notio or notion; and “a conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason.”

According to Kant, anyone “who has accustomed himself to these distinctions,” will find it “quite intolerable to hear the representation of the color red called an idea.” Tolerable or intolerable, the word “idea” has been used quite persistently with the very meaning that Kant abominates, as well as with a variety of others. The reader of the great books must be prepared for all these shifts in meaning and, with them, shifts in doctrine; for according to these differences in meaning, there are different analyses of the nature or being of ideas, different accounts of their origin or their coming to be in the human mind, and different classifications of ideas. These three questions—what ideas are, how ideas are obtained, and of what sorts they are—are so connected that the answer given to one of them tends to circumscribe the answers which can be given to the other two.

THE UNITY OF EACH chapter in this guide to the great books depends on some continuity of meaning in its central term, some common thread of meaning, however thin or tenuous, which unites and makes intelligible the discussions of various authors about the same thing. Without this, they would not move in the same universe of discourse at all. Nor could they even disagree with one another, if the words they used were utterly equivocal, as for example the word “pen” is equivocal when it designates a writing instrument and an enclosure for pigs.

The extraordinary ambiguity of the word ‘idea’ as it is used in the great books puts this principle to the test. Are Plato and Hume talking about the same thing at all, when the one discusses ideas as the only intelligible reality and the other treats ideas as the images derived through memory from the original impressions of sense-experience? Is there any common ground between Aristotle and Berkeley—between the identification of human ideas with abstract or general conceptions, quite distinct from the perceptions or images of sense, and the identification of ideas with particular perceptions, accompanied by a denial of abstract or general notions?

Do writers like Locke or William James, for whom ideas of sensation and abstract ideas (or percepts and concepts) belong to the one faculty of understanding or to the single stream of consciousness, communicate with writers like Plotinus, Descartes, and Spinoza, for whom ideas belong to the intellect or to the thinking being, separate from matter and from sensations which are only bodily reactions? Or with writers like Aristotle and Aquinas, for whom there is a sharp distinction between the faculties of sense and intellect? Can Aristotle and Aquinas in turn explain the origin of concepts or intelligible species by reference to the intellect’s power of abstracting them from experience or sensible species, and still carry on discussion with Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, who regard the intellect as in some way innately endowed with ideas, with the principles or seeds of understanding?

The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive inventory. It fails, for example, to ask about the sense in which the theologians speak of ideas in the mind of God and of the illumination of the angelic or the human intellect by ideas divinely infused. (What is the common thread of meaning between such discourse and that concerned with the formation of abstract concepts or with the revival of sense-impressions in images?) It fails also to question the meaning of idea in Kant’s tripartite analysis of the faculties of intuition, judgment, and reasoning; or in Hegel’s ultimate synthesis of all nature and history in the dialectical life of the Absolute Idea. (What do these meanings of ‘idea’ have in common with the sense in which Freud distinguishes between conscious and unconscious ideas?)

The inventory is also incomplete in that it does not indicate the many divergent routes taken by authors who seem to share a common starting point. Even those who, on certain points, seem to talk the same language, appear to have no basis for communication on other points in the theory of ideas. But the questions which have been asked suffice for the purpose at hand. However great the ambiguity of “idea,” it does not reach that limit of equivocation which would destroy the universe of discourse. There is a slender thread of meaning which ties all the elements of the tradition together—not in a unity of truth or agreement, but in an intelligible joining of issues.

This unity can be seen in two ways. It appears first in the fact that any consideration of ideas—whether as objects or contents of the mind—involves a theory of knowledge. This much is common to all meanings of “idea.”

Those, like Plato and Berkeley, for whom ideas constitute a realm of intelligible or sensible being, make knowledge of reality consist in the apprehension or understanding of ideas. Those, like Aristotle and James, for whom ideas have no being except as perceptions or thoughts, make them the instruments whereby reality is known. On either view, knowledge involves a relationship between a knower and a known, or between a knowing faculty and a knowable entity; but on one view ideas are the reality which is known, and on the other they are the representations by which is known a reality that does not include ideas among its constituents. These two views do not exhaust the possibilities.

Ideas are sometimes regarded both as objects of knowledge and as representations of reality. Some writers (as, for example, Plato) distinguish two orders of reality—the sensible and the intelligible—and two modes of apprehension—sensing and understanding; and they use the word “idea” for both the intelligible object and the understanding of it. Locke, begging the reader’s pardon for his frequent use of the word “idea,” says that it is the term “which serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks.” But Locke also distinguishes between knowledge of real existences through ideas “that the mind has of things as they are in themselves,” and knowledge of the relations among our own ideas, which the mind “gets from their comparison with one another.” For Hume, too, ideas as well as impressions are involved in our knowledge of matters of fact, but relations between ideas may also be objects of knowledge, as in “the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic.”

This double use of “idea” is sometimes accompanied, as in Aquinas, by an explicit acknowledgement and ordering of the two senses. For Aquinas, concepts are primarily the means of knowledge, not the objects of knowledge. A concept, Aquinas writes, “is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands”—that by which something else is known. Secondarily, however, concepts become that which we know when we reflexively turn our attention to the contents of our own mind. Using the phrase “intelligible species” to signify concepts, Aquinas explains that “since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands not only its own act of intelligence but also the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness.”

It is possible, therefore, to have ideas about things or ideas about ideas. In the vocabulary of this analysis by Aquinas, the ideas or concepts whereby real things are understood are sometimes called the “first intentions” of the mind. The ideas whereby we understand these ideas or first intentions are called the mind’s “second intentions.” An idea is always a mental intention, an awareness or representation, never an independent reality for the mind to know.

Locke’s differentiation between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection seems to parallel the mediaeval distinction between first and second intentions; but whereas second intentions are ideas engaged in a reflexive understanding of ideas as objects to be understood, Locke’s ideas of reflection comprise “the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got.” A closer parallel, perhaps, is to be found in Locke’s distinction between our knowledge of reality or of real existences and our knowledge of the relations existing between our own ideas.

THE SECOND WAY of seeing a connection among meanings of “idea” depends on recognizing what is common to contrary views.

The word “pen” is utterly equivocal, as we have noted, when it names a writing instrument and an animal enclosure. Hence men cannot contradict one another no matter what opposite things they may say about pens in one sense and pens in the other. The two meanings of “pen” are not even connected by being opposed to one another. But all the meanings of “idea” do seem to be connected by opposition at least, so that writers who use the word in its different senses and have different theories of idea cannot avoid facing the issues raised by their conflicting analyses.

The root of this opposition lies in the positive and negative views of the relation of ideas to sensations—or, more generally, to sense and the sensible. Though there are different analyses of sensation, one or both of two points seems to be agreed upon: that sensations are particular perceptions and that sensations result from the impingement of physical stimuli upon the sense organs of a living body.

Berkeley insists upon the first point while emphatically denying the second. Ideas or sensations are always particulars; but, he says, “the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them,” and their cause is neither physical matter nor the perceiving mind, but “some other will or spirit that produces them.” Others, like Lucretius and Hobbes, who regard sensations as particular perceptions, do not use the word “idea,” as Berkeley does, for perceptions of external origin, but restrict it to inner productions of the mind itself in its acts of memory or imagination.

The various theories of idea thus range from those which identify an idea with a sensation or perception or with the derivatives of sensation, to those which deny the identity or even any relationship between ideas and sensations or images of sense.

THE FIRST POSITION is taken by writers who conceive mind or understanding, in men or animals, as the only faculty of knowledge. It performs all the functions of knowing and thinking. It is sensitive as well as reflective. It perceives and remembers as well as imagines and reasons.

Within this group of writers there are differences. Berkeley, for example, thinks “the objects of human knowledge” include “either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination—either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.” Hume, on the other hand, divides “all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force or vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other species want a name in our language and in most others … Let us, therefore, use a little freedom and call them Impressions.” By this term, Hume explains, “I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.”

Another use of terms is represented by Locke, who distinguishes between ideas of sensation and reflection, simple and complex ideas, particular and general ideas, and uses the word “idea” both for the original elements of sense-experience and for all the derivatives produced by the mind’s activity in reworking these given materials, whether by acts of memory, imaginative construction, or abstraction. Still another variation is to be found in William James. Despite the authority of Locke, he thinks that the word “‘idea’ has not domesticated itself in the language so as to cover bodily sensations.” Accordingly, he restricts the word “idea” to concepts, and never uses it for sensations or perceptions. Nevertheless, like Locke, he does not think that the development of concept from percept needs the activity of a special faculty. Both concept and percept belong to the single “stream of thought” and are “states of consciousness.”

THE SECOND POSITION is taken by writers who in one way or another distinguish between sense and intellect and regard them as quite separate faculties of knowing. The one is supposed to perform the functions of perception, imagination, and memory; the other, the functions of thought—conception, judgment, and reasoning, or if not these, then acts of intellectual vision or intuition. Here, too, there are differences within the group.

Just as the extreme version of the first position is taken by those who identify ideas with perceptions, so here the opposite extreme consists in the denial of any connection between ideas and all the elements of sense-experience. The ideas in the divine mind, or the ideas infused by God into the angelic intellects, have no origin in experience, nor any need for the perceptions, memories, or images of sense. They are not abstract ideas, that is, they are not concepts abstracted from sense-materials.

“Our intellect,” Aquinas writes, “abstracts the intelligible species from the individuating principles”—the material conditions of sense and imagination. “But the intelligible species in the divine intellect,” he continues, “is immaterial, not by abstraction, but of itself.” The divine ideas, Aquinas quotes Augustine as saying, “are certain original forms or permanent and immutable models of things which are contained in the divine intelligence.” Following Augustine’s statement that “each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it,” Aquinas restricts the word “idea” to the “exemplars existing in the divine mind” and to the species of things with which God informs the angelic intellects. He uses the word “concept” where others speak of “ideas” in the human mind.

Descartes, on the other hand, endows the human mind with ideas—not concepts abstracted from and dependent on sense, but intuitive apprehensions which, since they cannot be drawn in any way from sense-experience, must be an innate property of the human mind. He does not, however, always use the word “idea” in this strict sense. Some ideas, he says, “appear to be innate, some adventitious, and others to be formed or invented by myself.” The ideas called “adventitious” are those which seem to come from the outside, as when “I hear some sound, or see the sun, or feel heat.” Those which we form or invent ourselves are “constructions of the imagination.” Only innate ideas, in Descartes’ view, are truly ideas in the sense of being the elements of certain knowledge and the sources of intellectual intuition. “By intuition,” he says, “I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of the imagination,” but “the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind” which “springs from the light of reason alone.”

As mind and body are separate substances for Descartes—mind being conceived by him as a res cogitans or thinking substance, quite separate from a res extensa or the extended matter of a bodily substance—so ideas and sensations are independent in origin and function. Like infused ideas in the angelic intellect, innate ideas in the human mind are not abstract, for they are not abstracted. But unlike the angelic intellect, the human mind, even when it employs innate ideas, is discursive or cogitative. It is never conceived as entirely free from the activities of judgment and reasoning, even when its power is also supposed to be intuitive—that is, able to apprehend intelligible objects without analysis or without recourse to the representations of sense.

The doctrine of innate ideas does not always go as far as this in separating intellectual knowledge—or knowledge by means of ideas—from sense-experience. In the theories of Plato and Augustine, for example, sense-experience serves to awaken the understanding to apprehend the intelligible objects for the intuition of which it is innately equipped.

“To learn those things which do not come into us as images by the senses,” Augustine writes, “but which we know within ourselves without images … is in reality only to take things that the memory already contains scattered and unarranged … and by thinking bring them together.” Moreover, the memory contains, not only “images impressed upon it by the senses of the body, but also the notions of the very things themselves, which notions we never received by any avenue of the body.”

This process of learning by remembering appears to be similar to the process which Plato also calls “recollection” or “reminiscence.” In the Meno Socrates demonstrates that a slave-boy, who thinks he knows no geometry, can be led simply by questioning to discover that he knew all the while the solution of a geometric problem. “There have always been true thoughts in him,” Socrates tells Meno, thoughts “which only needed to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him.” Hence “his soul must always have possessed this knowledge.” Learning, according to this doctrine of innate ideas, must therefore be described as an attempt “to recollect,” not “what you do not know,” but “rather what you do not remember.”

Learning by recollection or reminiscence seems to be a process in which latent ideas (whether they are retained by the soul from a previous life or are part of the soul’s endowment at its creation) become active either through the questioning of a teacher or through being awakened by the perceptions of the bodily senses. Though such bodily stimulation of thought implies a functional connection between body and soul, nevertheless both Plato and Augustine hold that ideas are independent in origin. They are not derived from sense, though their appearance may be occasioned by events in the world of sense.

ONE OTHER VIEW still remains to be considered. It denies that ideas are innate in the human mind at the same time that it distinguishes between the intellect and the senses as separate faculties of knowing. Having to explain whence the intellect gets its ideas, writers like Aristotle and Aquinas attribute to the human intellect an abstractive power by which it draws “the intelligible species” from sensory images, which Aquinas calls “phantasms.”

The concepts by which “our intellect understands material things,” we obtain “by abstracting the form from the individual matter which is represented by the phantasms.” Through the universal concept thus abstracted, we are able, Aquinas holds, “to consider the nature of the species apart from its individual principles.” It should be added here that abstractions are not vehicles of intuitive apprehension. Conception, which is the first act of the mind, yields knowledge only when concepts are used in subsequent acts of judgment and reasoning.

Abstract or universal concepts are as different from the ideas which belong to intellects separate from bodies—the divine or angelic intellects—as they are different from the particular perceptions or images of sense. They occupy an intermediate position between the two, just as, according to Aquinas, “the human intellect holds a middle place” between angelic intelligence and corporeal sense. On the one hand, the human intellect is for Aquinas an incorporeal power; on the other hand, it functions only in cooperation with the corporeal powers of sense and imagination. So the concepts which the human intellect forms, being universal, are immaterial; but they are also dependent, in origin and function, on the materials of sense. Not only are universal concepts abstracted from the phantasms, but for the intellect to understand physical things, “it must of necessity,” Aquinas writes, “turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual.”

This theory of abstract ideas seems not far removed from the position of Locke, who distinguishes between particular and general ideas (which he calls “abstract”) or that of William James, who distinguishes between universal concepts and sense-perceptions. Yet on one question the difference between them is radical, namely, whether particular sensations and universal ideas belong to the same faculty of mind or to the quite distinct faculties of sense and intellect.

This difference seems to have considerable bearing on the way in which these writers explain the process of abstraction or generalization, with consequences for certain subtleties, acknowledged or ignored, in the analysis of the grades of abstraction. Nevertheless, the resemblance between the positions of Locke and Aquinas, or those of William James and Aristotle, each affirming in his own way that the mind contains nothing not rooted in the senses, serves to mediate between the more extreme positions.

THE DISPUTE ABOUT innate ideas and the controversy over abstract ideas are issues in psychology inseparable from fundamental differences concerning the nature and operation of the faculty or faculties of knowing. There are other issues which concern the being or the truth of ideas. Here the first question is not whether ideas are objects of knowledge, but whether the existence of ideas is real or mental—outside the mind or in it.

One aspect of this controversy is considered in the chapter on Form, viz., the argument between Aristotle and Plato about the being of the Ideas or Forms apart from both matter and mind. It is in the context of this argument that the traditional epithet “realism” gets one of its meanings, when it signifies the view that ideas or universals have an independent reality of their own. The various opponents of this view are not called “idealists.” If they deny any existence to universal ideas outside the mind, they are usually called “conceptualists”; if they deny the presence of universals even in the mind, they are called “nominalists.” These doctrines are more fully discussed in the chapters on Same and Other and Universal and Particular.

The controversy about the being of ideas has another phase that has already been noted in this chapter; and it is in this connection that the epithet “idealism” gets one of its traditional meanings. The doctrine is not that ideas have real existence outside the mind. On the contrary, it is that the only realities are mental—either minds or the ideas in them.

Berkeley’s famous proposition—esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived—seems intended to permit only one exception. The perceiving mind has being without being perceived, but nothing else has. Everything else which exists is an idea, a being of and in the mind. According to this doctrine (which takes different forms in Berkeley and in Hegel, for example), the phrase “idea of” is meaningless. Nothing exists of which an idea can be a representation. There is no meaning to the distinction between thing and idea. The real and the ideal are identical.

Plato is sometimes called an “idealist” but not in this sense. He has never been interpreted as completely denying reality to the changing material things which imitate or copy the eternal ideas, the immutable archetypes or Forms. Applied to Plato or to Plotinus, “idealism” seems to signify the superior reality of ideal (as opposed to material or physical) existence. Just as “idealism” has these widely divergent meanings, so does “realism” when it designates, on the one hand, those who attribute independent reality to ideas and, on the other hand, those who affirm the existence of an order of real existences independent of the ideas which represent them in the mind.

Writers who distinguish between things and ideas, or between the order of reality and the mind’s conception of it, face the problem of differentiating between these two modes of being. To say that ideas or concepts exist only in the mind is not to say that they do not exist at all, but only that they do not exist in the same way as things outside the mind.

Does an entity in its real existence apart from knowledge have the same character that it has when, as an object known, it somehow belongs to the knowing mind? Is there a kind of neutral essence which can assume both modes of existence—real existence, independent of mind, and ideal existence, or existence in the mind, as an object conceived or known? Is an idea or concept in the mind nothing but the real thing objectified, or transformed into an object of knowledge; or is the real thing, the thing in itself, utterly different from the objects of experience or knowledge—neither knowable nor capable of representation by concepts?

These questions, relevant to the consideration of ideas as representations of reality, are, of course, also relevant to problems considered in the chapters on Being, Experience, and Knowledge. The issues indicated are there discussed.

Intimately connected with them are questions about the truth of ideas. Can ideas or concepts be true or false in the sense in which truth and falsity are attributed to propositions or judgments? Under what conditions is an idea true? In what does its truth consist, and what are the signs or marks of its truth? These matters are discussed in the chapter on Truth. Here it is sufficient to point out that the traditional distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas, and the comparison of clear and distinct with obscure and confused ideas, are used to determine the criteria of truth. It may be the truth of a concept taken by itself or of the judgment into which several concepts enter. To the extent that ideas are regarded as representative, their truth (or the truth of the judgments they form) seems to consist in some mode of agreement or correspondence with the reality they represent, or, as Spinoza says, its ideatum.

Within the conceptual or mental order itself, there is a further distinction between ideas which do not perform a representative function and those which do. The former are treated as fantasies, fictions, or chimeras; the latter are called, by contrast, “real ideas,” or ideas having some reference to reality. The question of the reality of ideas takes precedence over the question of their truth, at least for those who regard the division into true and false as applicable only to representations. Yet the criteria of the distinction between the real and the imaginary are difficult to separate from the criteria of true and false. The separation is made most readily by those who use “idea” to mean memory image. They can test the reality of an idea by tracing it back to the impression from which it originated.

Another sort of test is applied by those who measure the reality of abstract ideas by their fidelity to the sense-perceptions from which they were abstracted. Still another criterion, proposed by William James, is that of freedom from contradiction. An idea has truth and its object has reality if it “remains uncontradicted.” The idea of a winged horse illustrates the point.

“If I merely dream of a horse with wings,” James writes, “my horse interferes with nothing else and has not to be contradicted…. But if with this horse I make an inroad into the world otherwise known, and say, for example, ‘That is my old mare Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall,’ the whole case is altered; for now the horse and place are identified with a horse and place otherwise known, and what is known of the latter objects is incompatible with what is perceived with the former.”

THE CONSIDERATION of ideas or concepts belongs to logic as well as to psychology and metaphysics. The logician sometimes deals with concepts directly and with the judgments into which they enter; sometimes he deals with them only as they find verbal expression in terms and propositions.

The distinction between concepts and judgments (or between terms and propositions) is discussed in the chapter on Judgment. There also we see that the classification of judgments or propositions depends in part on the acceptance or rejection of the notions of subject and predicate in the analysis of concepts or terms; and, if they are accepted, on the way in which terms are distinguished both as subjects and as predicates.

This in turn depends upon certain traditional divisions which are applicable to terms, if not always to concepts, such as the familiar distinctions between concrete and abstract, and particular and universal, terms. When the concept, which is sometimes called the “mental word,” is regarded as by its very nature abstract and universal, these distinctions are applicable only to the physical words which are terms. Concrete and particular terms are then treated as verbal expressions of sense-perceptions or images; abstract and universal terms, as verbal expressions of ideas or concepts. But when ideas are identified with sense-perceptions or images, and abstract concepts are denied, the existence of general names in ordinary discourse suffices for the distinction between particular and universal terms, even though the latter do not express any actual content of the mind.

Unlike the foregoing, other divisions of terms, as, for example, the distinction between the univocal and the analogical, or between species and genera, do not occur throughout the tradition of logic. They tend to be characteristic of the logic of Aristotle and its mediaeval development. Of these two distinctions, that between univocal and analogical terms or concepts appears explicitly, so far as this set of great books is concerned, only in the Summa Theologica. Nevertheless, Aquinas does have some background for his special theory of analogical terms in Aristotle’s treatment of univocal and equivocal names, and in his separation of terms which predicate a sameness in species or genus from those which predicate a sameness by analogy. The analysis of these distinctions is undertaken in the chapters on Same and Other and Sign and Symbol.

Other writers, in dealing with universal terms, recognize that they have different degrees of generality. They sometimes formulate this as an order of more and less inclusive classes. Sometimes they refer to the intension and extension, or connotation and denotation, of terms. The more general terms have a less restricted connotation and hence represent more extensive or inclusive classes. The more specific terms have a more determinate meaning and so also have a narrower denotation and represent less inclusive classes. What seems to be peculiar to Aristotle’s analysis of species and genera is the setting of upper and lower limits to the hierarchy of universal terms, with a small number of irreducible categories (or summa genera) under which all species fall, and, at the other extreme, with a finite number of lowest (or infimae) species which are incapable of subsuming other species.

The terms which fall under the lowest species must either be particulars or accidental classes. Those which seem to be predicable of the categories themselves, such as being or one, cannot be genera. These are the terms which Aristotle’s mediaeval followers call “transcendental” and “analogical.” Using the word “transcendental” in a different sense, Kant enumerates a set of concepts which bear some resemblance to Aristotle’s summa genera, but which he treats as transcendental categories.

The difference among concepts with respect to generality is of interest to the psychologist as well as the logician, for it raises the problem of whether the more or the less general takes precedence in the order of learning. The order and relation of ideas is even more the common ground of both logic and psychology. Both, for example, deal with the position and sequence of terms or concepts in reasoning, though the logician aims to prescribe the forms which reasoning must take in order to be valid, whereas the psychologist tries to describe the steps by which thinking actually goes on.

Only the logician, however, is concerned with the way in which terms are ordered to one another as positive and negative, or as contraries; just as from Aristotle to Freud, only the psychologist deals with the association of ideas in the stream of thought by relationships of contiguity and succession, similarity and difference. According as the logical connection of ideas or their psychological association is made the primary fact, radically divergent interpretations are given of the nature of mind, the life of reason, and the process of thought.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. Doctrines of idea

• 1a. Ideas, or relations between ideas, as objects of thought or knowledge: the ideas as eternal forms
• 1b. Ideas or conceptions as that by which the mind thinks or knows
• 1c. Ideas as the data of sense-experience or their residues
• 1d. Ideas as the pure concepts of reason: regulative principles
• 1e. Ideas in the order of supra-human intelligence or spirit: the eternal exemplars and archetypes; the modes of the divine mind
• 1f. Idea as the unity of determinate existence and concept: the Absolute Idea

2. The origin or derivation of ideas in the human mind

• 2a. The infusion of ideas: divine illumination
• 2b. The innate endowment or retention of ideas: the activation of the mind’s native content or structure by sense, by memory, or by experience
• 2c. The acquirement of ideas by perception or intuition: simple ideas or forms as direct objects of the understanding
• 2d. Reflection as a source of ideas: the mind’s consideration of its own acts or content
• 2e. The genesis of ideas by the recollection of sense-impressions: the images of sense
• 2f. The production of ideas by the reworking of the materials of sense: the imaginative construction of concepts or the formation of complex from simple ideas
• 2g. The abstraction of ideas from sense-experience: the concept as the first act of the mind; the grades of abstraction
• 2h. The derivation of transcendental ideas from the three syllogisms of reason

3. The division of ideas according to their objective reference

• 3a. Ideas about things distinguished from ideas about ideas: the distinction between first and second intentions
• 3b. Adequate and inadequate ideas: clear and distinct ideas as compared with obscure and confused ideas
• 3c. Real and fantastic or fictional ideas: negations and chimeras

4. The logic of ideas

• 4a. The verbal expression of ideas or concepts: terms
• 4b. The classification of terms: problems in the use of different kinds of terms
  • (1) Concrete and abstract terms
  • (2) Particular and universal terms
  • (3) Specific and generic terms: infimae species and summa genera
  • (4) Univocal and analogical terms
• 4c. The correlation, opposition, and order of terms

5. Ideas or concepts in the process of thought

• 5a. Concept and judgment: the division of terms as subjects and predicates; kinds of subjects and predicates
• 5b. The position and sequence of terms in reasoning
• 5c. The dialectical employment of the ideas of reason
• 5d. The order of concepts in the stages of learning: the more and the less general
• 5e. The association, comparison, and discrimination of ideas: the stream of thought or consciousness

6. The being and truth of ideas

• 6a. The distinction between real and intentional existence, between thing and idea: ideas as symbols, or intentions of the mind
• 6b. The nature and being of ideas in relation to the nature and being of the mind
• 6c. The agreement between an idea and its object: the criterion of adequacy in correspondence
• 6d. Clarity and distinctness in ideas as criteria of their truth
• 6e. The criterion of genesis: the test of an idea’s truth or meaning by reference to its origin
• 6f. The truth and falsity of simple apprehensions, sensations, or conceptions: contrasted with the truth and falsity of judgments or assertions

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283], 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

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BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

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1. Doctrines of idea

1a. Ideas, or relations between ideas, as objects of thought or knowledge: the ideas as eternal forms

• 7 Plato: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 125a-126d / Symposium, 167a-d / Euthyphro, 193a-c / Phaedo, 224a-c; 228d-230c; 231c-232a; 242b-243c / Republic, BK III, 333b-334b; BK V, 368c-373c; BK VI, 383d-388a; BK VII, 392b-393b; 397a-398c / Timaeus, 455c-458b / Parmenides, 486a-511d / Theaetetus, 534d-536a / Sophist, 571a-574c / Statesman, 595a-c / Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, TR IX, CH 1, 136a-d / Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 1-2, 228b-229d; TR IX, CH 6-9, 249a-250b / Sixth Ennead, TR II, CH 21, 279b-280a
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 16-38, 75b-81a passim / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6-7, 268d-269d; BK XII, CH 7, 346c-d
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, AA 1-2, 440d-443c; A 4, ANS, 444d-446b; AA 5-7, 446c-450b; Q 85, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2, 451c-453c; A 2, ANS, 453d-455b; A 3, REP 1,4, 455b-457a; A 8, ANS, 460b-461b; Q 86, A 4, REP 2, 463d-464d; Q 87, A 1, ANS, 465a-466c; Q 88, A 1, ANS, 469a-471c; A 2, ANS, 471c-472c
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, I, 71d-72a; III, 82d-83a; VI, 96d-97a / Objections and Replies, 121a-c; DEF I-II, 130a-b; AXIOM V-VI, 131c-132a; 137d; 157b-158a; 212c-213a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 8, 95c-d; BK II, CH VIII, SECT 8, 134b-c; CH IX, SECT 1, 138b-c; CH XXI, SECT 5, 179c-d; BK III, CH V, SECT 12, 266d-267a; SECT 14, 267b-c; BK IV, CH I, SECT 1-CH IV, SECT 12, 307a-326d passim, esp CH I, SECT 1-7, 309b-311a, SECT 14, 312d-313a, CH III, SECT 31, 323c-d; CH IV, SECT 18, 328d-329a; CH VI, SECT 13, 335c-d; SECT 16, 336d; CH VII, SECT 1-7, 337a-338c esp SECT 2, 337a; CH XI, SECT 13-14, 357d-358c; CH XVIII, SECT 2, 371d-372b; SECT 8, 377b-d
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, 404a-444d passim, esp INTRO, SECT 21-25, 411b-412a,c, SECT 1, 413a-b, SECT 18, 416b-c, SECT 23, 417b-c, SECT 86-91, 429c-431a, SECT 135-142, 440c-441c
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20, 458b
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 16a-c esp 16b; 113b-115c esp 113c-d; 173b-174a esp 173b-d / Critique of Practical Reason, 352c-353a / Critique of Judgement, 551a-552c
• 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 140, 53a-b
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 300a-301a; 307a

1b. Ideas or conceptions as that by which the mind thinks or knows

• 8 Aristotle: On Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-8], 25a / On the Soul, BK III, CH 4, 661b-662c
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 2, 51c-52c; AA 9-10, 58b-59d; Q 13, A 1, ANS, 62c-63c; A 5, ANS, 66b-67d; Q 14, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 75d-76c; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3, 76d-77d; A 4, ANS, 78b-79a; A 5 esp REP 2-3, 79a-80a; A 6, REP 1, 80a-81c; A 8, ANS, 82c-83b; A 12, ANS, 85d-86d; Q 16, A 2, 95c-96b; Q 17, A 3, ANS, 102d-103c; Q 27, A 1, ANS and REP 2-3, 153b-154b; A 2, ANS and REP 2, 154c-155b, Q 32, AA 2-3, 178a-180b; Q 34, A 1, 185b-187b; QQ 55-58, 288d-306b; Q 82, A 3, ANS, 433c-434c, Q 84, 440b-451b; Q 85, A 2, 453d-455b; A 4, 457a-d; A 8, REP 3, 460b-461b; Q 86, A 1, ANS, 461c-462a; A 2, ANS and REP 2-4, 462a-463a; Q 87, A 1, 465a-466c; Q 88, A 1, REP 2, 469a-471c; Q 89, A 2, ANS and REP 2, 475a-d; A 6, ANS and REP 2, 478b-d
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, I, 71d-72a; III, 82d-83a / Objections and Replies, 108b-109d; 121a-c; DEF II-III, 130a-b; AXIOM V-VI, 131d-132a; 137d; 157b-158a; 212c-213a
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, DEF 3, 373b
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH IV, SECT 3, 324b-c
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 15b-c; 22a,c; 30b-c; 31a-d; 38a-39c; 41c-42a; 53b-54b; 58c-59b; 85d-93c; 109d-113b esp 112d-113b; 115b-c; 130b-c; 197a-b
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 300a-314b esp 300a-301b, 302b-303a, 307a, 313a-314a

1c. Ideas as the data of sense-experience or their residues

• 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [722-817], 53d-54d
• 18 Augustine: City of God, BK VIII, CH 7, 269c-d
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a; 52c; 54b-c; PART IV, 261a; 262a-b
• 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 137d
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 48, SCHOL, 391b-c; PROP 49, SCHOL, 392a-c
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15, 98d-99a; BK II, CH I, SECT 1-8, 121a-123a; SECT 17, 125c-d; CH III, SECT 20-CH IV, SECT 1, 126d-129c; CH IV, SECT 6-CH V, 131a-b; CH VII-IX, 131c-141a passim, esp CH IX, SECT 1-7, 138b-139b, SECT 15, 141a; CH XII, SECT 1-2, 147b-d passim; SECT 8, 148c-d; CH XIII, SECT 2, 149a; CH XIV, SECT 31, 161d-162a; CH XX, SECT 1-2, 176b-c; SECT 15, 177d; CH XXI, SECT 1, 204a-b; SECT 3, 204c-d; SECT 7, 205d-206a; SECT 9, 206b-c; SECT 15, 208c-d; SECT 29-30, 211d-212b; SECT 32-37, 212c-214b passim; CH XXX, SECT 14-16, 245c-246b; BK III, CH I, SECT 5, 252b-c; CH IV, SECT 7-15, 260d-263b esp SECT 11-15, 261d-263b; CH VI, SECT 46-47, 281d-282b; CH XI, SECT 21-23, 304d-305b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 11-13, 311c-312b; CH III, SECT 23, 320a-c; CH IV, SECT 4, 324c
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1, 413a-b; SECT 18, 416b-c; SECT 29-33, 418c-419a; SECT 36, 419c-d; SECT 88-91, 430a-431a
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, 455b-457b; SECT VII, DIV 49, 471c-d; DIV 61, 477c-478a
• 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 45b-46a esp 45d-46a; 48b-c; 54b-55a; 101b-102a esp 102a; 115b-c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 282b-c
• 54 Freud: The Unconscious, 442b-443a / The Ego and the Id, 700a-701a; 701d

1d. Ideas as the pure concepts of reason: regulative principles

• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 15c-16a; 37b-39c; 108a-209d esp 108a-109c, 113b-115c, 117b-119a, 129c-131c, 158a-159d, 166c-171a, 173b-174a, 187a-c, 193b-d, 200d-202a, 203b-d, 209b-d; 237b; 239a-240b / Critique of Practical Reason, 310d-311d; 329a-d; 343a; 349b-355d esp 349b-350c / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 390b / Critique of Judgement, 461a-462d; 464c-467a; 489b-c; 504d-505a; 506a-511a esp 509d-510a; 528c-530c; 542b-544c; 570b-572c; 581a-582c; 596c-598b; 604a-b

1e. Ideas in the order of supra-human intelligence or spirit: the eternal exemplars and archetypes; the modes of the divine mind

• 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK V [181-200], 63b-c
• 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR III, CH 1-2, 10a-d: TR VI, CH 2-3, 21d-23a; CH 9, 26a / Third Ennead, TR IX, CH 1, 136a-c / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 13, 164d-165b / Fifth Ennead, 208a-251d passim, esp TR III, 215d-226c, TR V-VI, 228b-239b, TR VIII, CH 7, 242d-243c, TR IX, 246c-251d / Sixth Ennead, TR II, CH 21, 279b-280a; TR VI, CH 2-17, 322b-331a
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, par 9, 3a; BK XII, par 38, 108d-109a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 3-4, 266a-267c; BK XI, CH 10, 328c-d; BK XII, CH 17-18, 353a-354d / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 38, 654b-c
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, PREAMBLE, 75c-d; A 4, ANS, 78b-79a; A 5, 79a-80a; A 6 esp REP 3, 80a-81c; A 8, ANS, 82c-83b; A 11, REP 1-2, 84c-85c; A 14, ANS and REP 2, 88d-89b; Q 15, 91b-94a; Q 16, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 94b-95c; Q 18, A 4, 107d-108c; QQ 22-24, 127c-143c passim; Q 34, A 3, REP 4, 188b-189a; Q 44, A 3, 240b-241a; Q 47, A 1, REP 2, 256a-257b; QQ 55-56, 288d-294d; Q 58, 300b-306b passim; Q 74, A 3, REP 5, 375a-377a,c; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 442b-443c; A 3, REP 1, 443d-444d; AA 4-5, 444d-447c; Q 85, A 4, ANS, 457a-d; Q 87, A 1, ANS and REP 2-3, 465a-466c; Q 89, A 3, ANS and REP 1,3, 475d-476c; Q 105, A 3, ANS, 540c-541b; Q 106, A 1, ANS and REP 1, 545d-546d; Q 107, 549b-552b; Q 108, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 552c-553c; Q 115, A 2, ANS, 587c-588c
• 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 5, ANS, 58b-59d; PART III, Q 9, A 3, ANS, 765b-766b
• 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XI [52-87], 126a-b
• 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 23, 108c; APH 124, 133c-d; BK II, APH 15, 149a
• 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 137d
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, PROP 17, SCHOL, 362c-363c passim; PART II, PROP 3, DEMONST, 374a-b; PROP 4-5, 374c-d; PROP 9, 376a-c; PROP 19-20, 382b-d
• 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK II [146-151], 114b; BK V [469-505], 185b-186a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, SECT 3, 268d; CH XI, SECT 23, 305a-b
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 29-33, 418c-419a esp SECT 33, 419a; SECT 70-71, 426d-427a, SECT 75-76, 427d-428a; SECT 81, 428c-d
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 113c-118a; 173b-174a esp 173b-c / Critique of Judgement, 551a-552c; 575b-577a; 580c-d
• 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 169d-170b

1f. Idea as the unity of determinate existence and concept: the Absolute Idea

• 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6a-7a; INTRO, par 1-2, 9a-10a; par 31-32, 19c-20b; PART III, par 279, 93b-c; par 345, 111b; par 352-353, 112b-c; par 360, 113d-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 2, 115d; 19, 119c-d / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-162a esp 156d-157b, 158c, 160b-162a; 163a-165b esp 165a-b; 166b-c; 169d-171b; 176b-c; 182d

2. The origin or derivation of ideas in the human mind

2a. The infusion of ideas: divine illumination

• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK IV, par 25, 25c; BK VII, par 8, 45d; par 16, 48c-49a; par 23, 50b-c; BK XI, par 19, 115c-d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 7, 269c-d; CH 9, 270d-271a; BK X, CH 2, 299d-300a; BK XI, CH 24-25, 335c-336d; CH 27, 337d
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 4, 444d-446b; Q 89, A 1, REP 3, 473b-475a; A 2, REP 2, 475a-d; A 4, ANS, 476c-477a; A 7, ANS, 478d-479c
• 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 9, A 3, 765b-766b; A 4, REP 2-3, 766b-767b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS, 1025c-1032b
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, VI, 99a-b
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 26-33, 418a-419a; SECT 57, 423d-424a; SECT 67, 426a-b
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 113b-c

2b. The innate endowment or retention of ideas: the activation of the mind’s native content or structure by sense, by memory, or by experience

• 7 Plato: Phaedrus, 124a-126c esp 126a-c / Meno, 179d-183a; 188d-189a / Phaedo, 228a-230d / Theaetetus, 515d-517b
• 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1, 97a-d; BK II, CH 19 [99b20-33], 136a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b24-993a11], 511a-c
• 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 22, 127c-128c; BK II, CH 11, 150a-151b
• 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR II, CH 4, 8b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 25, 155b; TR IV, CH 5, 160d-161b / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 2, 216b
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 15-19, 75a-76b; par 26-38, 78a-81a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 55, A 2, 289d-290d; A 3, REP 1, 291a-d; Q 57, A 1, REP 3, 295a-d; Q 84, A 3, 443d-444d; A 4, ANS, 444d-446b; A 6, ANS, 447c-449a; Q 89, A 1, REP 3, 473b-475a; Q 117, A 1, ANS and REP 4, 595d-597c
• 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 333d-335a esp 334c-d
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 1b-c
• 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, IV, 5c-d; 6d; VIII, 13c-d / Discourse on Method, PART IV, 53b; PART V, 54c / Meditations, I, 77d-81d; III, 83b, 88c-d; VI, 96d-97a: 99a-c / Objections and Replies, 120c-d; 140c; 215b-c; 224b,d
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK I, CH I, SECT 1, 95b,d-96a; SECT 15, 98d-99a; SECT 23-24, 101b-102b; CH II, SECT 12, 107b-d; CH III, 112c-121a,c passim, esp SECT 21, 118b-119a; BK II, CH I, SECT 1, 121a-b; SECT 6, 122b-c; SECT 9, 123a; SECT 17, 125c-d; CH IX, SECT 6, 139a; CH XI, SECT 16, 147a
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 17, 457b,d [fn 1]
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 14a-b, 22a,c, 23a-34c, 41c-42b, 48d-51d, 53b-55a, 58d-59a, 61a-62c, 66d-93c; 113b-115a / Critique of Practical Reason, 352c-353a / Critique of Judgement, 551a-589c
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 851a-890a esp 851b-852a, 856a-b, 859a-860b, 867a-868b, 879b, 889a
• 54 Freud: A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 512b-513b esp 512b; 526c-d; 532b; 599a-b / Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 688d-689a; 689b [fn 1] / The Ego and the Id, 707c-708b esp 708b

2c. The acquirement of ideas by perception or intuition: simple ideas or forms as direct objects of the understanding

• 7 Plato: Phaedo, 224a-c / Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a; BK VII, 392b-393c / Timaeus, 457c-458a / Parmenides, 487d-488a / Theaetetus, 535b-d
• 18 Augustine: City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c; BK XII, CH 7, 346c-d
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 84, A 1, ANS and REP 1, 440d-442a; A 2, ANS, 442b-443c; A 4, ANS and REP 1-2, 444d-446b; AA 5-7, 446c-450b
• 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, III, 4a-b / Meditations, VI, 99a-c
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 14-23, 380c-383c
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15, 98d-99a; CH III, SECT 21, 118b-119a; BK II, CH I-IX, 121a-141b passim, esp CH I, SECT 1-8, 121a-123a, SECT 17, 125c-d, CH III, SECT 20-CH IV, SECT 1, 126d-129c, CH IV, SECT 6-CH V, 131a-b, CH IX, SECT 1-7, 138b-139b, SECT 15, 141a; CH XI, SECT 17-CH XII, SECT 2, 147a-d; CH XII, SECT 8, 148c-d; CH XIII, SECT 2, 149a; CH XIV, SECT 2, 155b-c; SECT 31, 161d-162a; CH XV, SECT 9, 164b-d; CH XVI, SECT 1, 165c-d; CH XVII, SECT 22-CH XVIII, SECT 1, 173d-174a; CH XVIII, SECT 6, 174c-d; CH XX, SECT 1-2, 176b-c; SECT 15, 177d; CH XXI, SECT 75, 200b-d; CH XXIII, SECT 1, 204a-b; SECT 3, 204c-d; SECT 5, 205a-b; SECT 7, 205d-206a; SECT 9, 206b-c; SECT 15, 208c-d; SECT 29-30, 211d-212b; SECT 32-37, 212c-214b passim; CH XXV, SECT 9, 216d; SECT 11, 217a; CH XXX, SECT 2, 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2, 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 14-16, 245c-246b; BK III, CH I, SECT 5, 252b-c; CH IV, 260a-263c passim, esp SECT 11-15, 261d-263b; CH V, SECT 2, 263d-264a; CH VI, SECT 46-47, 281d-282b, CH XI, SECT 21-23, 304d-305b; BK IV, CH II, SECT 11-13, 311c-312b; CH III, SECT 23, 320a-c; CH IV, SECT 4, 324c; CH XVIII, SECT 3, 381b-c
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1, 413a-b; SECT 18, 416b-c; SECT 25-33, 417d-419a passim; SECT 36, 419c-d; SECT 88-91, 430a-431a passim
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, 455b-457b; SECT VII, DIV 49, 471c-d; DIV 61, 477c-478a
• 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 14a-b, 23a-33d esp 25b-c, 27c, 28d-29d, 32a-c; 34a-c; 41c-42a; 45b-46a; 53b-55a; 66d-72c esp 69c-72c; 85d-93c; 99a-107b; 131a-c; 186d-187a / Critique of Judgement, 465a-c; 528c-530c; 570c-572b
• 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1c-d
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 502a-505b esp 502a

2d. Reflection as a source of ideas: the mind’s consideration of its own acts or content

• 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429b26-430a9], 662b-c
• 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 1, 105a-106c; CH 17, 122d-124a; CH 20, 126c-127b
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 12-31, 74b-79d
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 9, REP 2, 58b-59a; Q 28, A 4, REP 2, 160c-161d; Q 85, A 2, 453d-455b; Q 87, A 3, 467b-468a
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, VI, 96d-97a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 1-8, 121a-123a; SECT 17, 125c-d; SECT 24, 127b-c; CH III, SECT 1, 128d; CH VI-VII, 131b-133b; CH IX, SECT 1-2, 138b-c; CH XI, SECT 14, 146d, CH XII, SECT 1-2, 147b-d; SECT 8, 148c-d; CH XIV, SECT 2-6, 155b-156c; SECT 31, 161d-162a; CH XVII, SECT 22, 173d-174a; CH XVIII, SECT 6, 174c-d; CH XX, SECT 1-2, 176b-c; SECT 15, 177d; CH XXI, SECT 4, 178d-179c; SECT 75, 200b-d; CH XXIII, SECT 1, 204a-b; SECT 5, 205a-b; SECT 15, 208c-d; SECT 29-30, 211d-212b; SECT 32-37, 212c-214b passim; CH XXV, SECT 9, 216d; SECT 11, 217a; BK III, CH I, SECT 5, 252b-c; CH V, SECT 2, 263d-264a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 23, 320a-c
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1, 413a-b
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 14, 456b
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 55a-56c; 99a-107b; 121a-123b
• 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 138, 48c-d; ADDITIONS, 89, 129d-130a
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 121a-b; 122b-126a passim, esp 122b-124b

2e. The genesis of ideas by the recollection of sense-impressions: the images of sense

• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 8-18, 73b-76a
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; PART IV, 258b-c; 262a-b
• 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 26, 156a-157a
• 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 19a-20d
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17-18, 380d-382b, PROP 40, SCHOL 2, 388a-b; PROP 49, SCHOL, 391d-392c
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 21, 118b-119a; BK II, CH X, 141b-143d passim, esp SECT 2, 141b-c, SECT 7, 142c-d; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14, 312b-d
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, 455b-457b; SECT VII, DIV 49, 471c-d; DIV 61, 477c-478a
• 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 341d-342a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 54b-55a
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 480a-501b esp 480a-b
• 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 351c-352d esp 351d-352a; 363c-364b; 367b-c; 384c-385c esp 385b-c / The Unconscious, 442d-443a / A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 518c-d / The Ego and the Id, 700a-701d

2f. The production of ideas by the reworking of the materials of sense: the imaginative construction of concepts or the formation of complex from simple ideas

• 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [722-748], 53d-54a
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 14, 74d-75a
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 9, REP 2, 58b-59a
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50d
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, I, 76a-b; III, 83b / Objections and Replies, 210d
• 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK V [95-128], 177b-178a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 5, 122a-b; SECT 24, 127b-c; CH III, SECT 1-2, 127d-128b; CH VII, SECT 10, 133a-b; CH XI, SECT 6-7, 145a-b; CH XII-XXVII, 147b-233d passim, esp CH XII, SECT 1, 148d-149a, SECT 4-6, 149b-d, SECT 27, 154c-d, CH XIV, SECT 27-31, 160d-162a, CH XV, SECT 2-3, 162c-d, SECT 9, 164b-d, CH XVI, SECT 1-2, 165c-d, SECT 5, 166b-c, SECT 8, 167c, CH XVII, SECT 3, 168b, SECT 5, 168d-169a, SECT 22, 173d-174a, CH XXI, SECT 75, 200b-d, CH XXII, SECT 2, 201a-b, SECT 9, 202c-203a, CH XXV, SECT 9, 216d, SECT 11, 217a, CH XXVII, SECT 14, 231d-232a, SECT 18, 232d-233b; CH XXX, SECT 3-5, 238c-239b; CH XXXI, SECT 3-14, 240a-243c passim, CH XXXII, SECT 12, 245b-c; SECT 17-18, 246b-247a; SECT 22-25, 247c-248a passim; BK III, CH II, SECT 3, 253c; CH IV, SECT 12-14, 262b-263a; CH IV, SECT 17-CH V, SECT 16, 263c-268b; CH VI, SECT 11, 271b-d; SECT 26-51, 274d-283a passim; CH XI, SECT 15, 303b-c; SECT 18, 304a-b; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 5-8, 324d-325c; SECT 11-12, 326b-d
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 10, 406d-407b; SECT 1, 413a-b; SECT 28, 418b-c
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, DIV 13-14, 455d-456b; SECT III, DIV 18, 457c-d; SECT V, DIV 39, 466c-d; DIV 40, 467b; SECT VII, DIV 49, 471d
• 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 338a, 341d-342a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 5d-6b; 31c-d; 45d-46a; 65d-108a,c esp 66d-91d, 101b-107b; 193a-195a; 211d-216c / Critique of Judgement, 493c-495a,c
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 104a-106b, 149b-153b esp 150a, 153a-b; 179b-181a esp 181b [fn 1]; 362a-363b; 480a-481a
• 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 270c-271a

2g. The abstraction of ideas from sense-experience: the concept as the first act of the mind; the grades of abstraction

• 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19 [99b20-100b4], 136a-d / Physics, BK II, CH 2 [193b22-194a11], 270a-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a28-981b13], 499a-500a; BK IV, CH 4 [1006a12-b12], 525b-d; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b28-1026a6], 547d-548a; BK VII, CH 10 [1035b35-1036a12], 559b-c; BK XI, CH 3 [1061a29-b12], 589c-d; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077b1]-CH 3 [1078b5], 608d-610a / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a2-16], 632a-b; BK III, CH 4 [429b10-23], 661d-662a; CH 7 [431b14-19], 663d-664b; CH 8, 664b-d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [449b30-450a25], 690c-691a
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 1, A 1, REP 2, 3b-4a; Q 12, A 13, ANS, 61c-62b; Q 14, A 11, REP 1, 84c-85c; Q 40, A 3, ANS, 215c-216d; Q 54, A 4, ANS and REP 2, 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2, 289d-290d; Q 57, A 1, REP 3, 295a-d, Q 75, A 2, REP 3, 379c-380c; A 3, REP 2, 380c-381b; A 5, ANS, 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4, 388c-391a, Q 79, AA 3-4, 416a-418c; A 5, REP 2, 418c-419b, Q 84, A 2, ANS, 442b-443c; A 6, 447c-449a; Q 85, AA 1-3, 451c-457a; AA 5-6, 457d-459c; A 8, 460b-461b; Q 89, A 1, REP 3, 473b-475a; A 4, ANS and REP 1, 476c-477a; A 7, ANS, 478d-479c; Q 117, A 1, 595d-597c; PART I-II, Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3, 748b-749a
• 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 9, A 4, 766b-767b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS, 1025c-1032b
• 28 Harvey: On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals, 305a / On the Generation of Animals, 332a-335c
• 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XIV, 29b-30d / Discourse on Method, PART IV, 53b / Objections and Replies, 215b-c; 216d-217d
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2, 388a-b
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15, 98d-99a; BK II, CH XI, SECT 9-11, 145b-146a; CH XII, SECT 1, 147b-c; CH XXXII, SECT 6-8, 244b-d; BK III, CH III, SECT 6-9, 255c-256c; CH VI, SECT 32-33, 277c-278c; BK IV, CH VII, SECT 9, 338d-339b; CH IX, SECT 1, 349a
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, 405a-412a,c esp SECT 6-19, 405d-410c; SECT 5, 414a-b; SECT 97-100, 431d-432c; SECT 118-120, 436b-d; SECT 143, 441c-d
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 122, 505e-d; DIV 124-125, 506a-507a esp DIV 125, 507b [fn 1]
• 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 341b-342b
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 45d-46a; 115b-c; 193a-195a
• 49 Darwin: The Descent of Man, 296c-297b passim
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 305a-312a passim; 329a-331b esp 331b
• 54 Freud: The Unconscious, 442b-443d

2h. The derivation of transcendental ideas from the three syllogisms of reason

• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 109d-120c esp 110d-111c

3. The division of ideas according to their objective reference

3a. Ideas about things distinguished from ideas about ideas: the distinction between first and second intentions

• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 9, REP 2, 58b-59a; Q 14, A 6, REP 1, 80a-81c; A 13, REP 2-3, 86d-88c; Q 15, A 2, ANS and REP 2, 92a-93b; Q 29, A 1, REP 3, 162a-163b; Q 30, A 4, ANS, 170c-171b; Q 66, A 2, ANS and REP 2, 345d-347b; Q 84, A 1, REP 1, 440d-442a; Q 85, A 2, 453d-455b
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART IV, 270a
• 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 79c; BK III, 150a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH III, 252d-254c passim, CH IV, SECT 2, 260b; CH V, SECT 12, 266d-267a; SECT 14, 267b-c; CH VI, SECT 19, 273b, SECT 48-50, 282b-d; CH XI, SECT 10, 302b; SECT 24, 305b-d
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 15d-16c esp 16c; 55a-56c; 99a-101b; 121a-123b
• 46 Hegel: The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-158a
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 300b

3b. Adequate and inadequate ideas: clear and distinct ideas as compared with obscure and confused ideas

• 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK I, CH 1, 259a-b
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 6, ANS and REP 3, 55b-56a; Q 13, 62b-75b, Q 14, A 6, 80a-81c; A 12, REP 2, 85d-86d; Q 55, A 3, 291a-d; Q 85, A 3, 455b-457a; A 4, REP 3, 457a-d; A 8, ANS, 460b-461b; Q 89, A 1, ANS, 473b-475a; A 2, ANS and REP 2, 475a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 2,4, 475d-476c; A 4, ANS and REP 2, 476c-477a; Q 94, A 1, REP 3, 501d-503a; Q 117, A 1, REP 4, 595d-597c
• 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 10, A 2, REP 3, 768b-769c; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, REP 2, 1025c-1032b
• 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-333d
• 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14-17, 107d-108a
• 31 Descartes: Discourse on Method, PART IV, 51b-52a / Meditations, I, 73d-74a; III, 82a-d; 85b-86b, VI, 99a-c / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE V-VI, 131b-c
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, DEF 4, 373b; PROP 34-36, 385d-386b; PROP 38, 386c-d; PROP 40-43, 387a-389b; PART III, DEF 1-3, 395d-396a; PROP 1, 396a-c; PROP 3, 398b-c; PART IV, APPENDIX, II, 447b; PART V, PROP 3-4, 453a-d
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 91d-92c; BK I, CH III, SECT 19, 117c-d; BK II, CH XIII, SECT 17-20, 152a-d; CH XVII, SECT 3-4, 165d-166b; CH XVIII, SECT 7-8, 169b-170a; SECT 12-21, 170d-173d passim, esp SECT 15, 171b-172a; CH XXV, SECT 8, 216b-c; CH XXVIII, SECT 19, 233b-c; CH XXIX, 233d-238a; CH XXXI, 239b-243c passim; CH XXXII, SECT 18, 246d-247a; BK III, CH VI, SECT 37, 279b; SECT 40, 280a-b; SECT 43-51, 280c-283a; CH X, SECT 2-4, 291d-292c; CH XI, SECT 24, 305b-d; BK IV, CH II, SECT 15, 312d-313a; CH III, SECT 26, 321b-c; CH XII, SECT 14, 362d-363a
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 30, 418c; SECT 33, 419a; SECT 36, 419c-d
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 48-49, 470d-471d; SECT XII, DIV 125, 506d-507a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 30b-31a; 125b [fn 1]; 193a-b / Critique of Judgement, 603c-d
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 311b-312b [fn 1]; 480b-484a

3c. Real and fantastic or fictional ideas: negations and chimeras

• 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [722-748], 53d-54a
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 9, REP 2, 58b-59a; Q 17, A 2, REP 2, 102a-d
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50d; 57b-c; PART IV, 258b-d; 261a; 262a-c
• 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 60, 112c-113a
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, I, 76a-77c; III, 83b / Objections and Replies, 210d
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII, SECT 1-6, 133b-134a; CH XVIII, SECT 12-21, 170d-173d esp SECT 15, 171b-172a; CH XXX, 238a-239b; BK III, CH I, SECT 4, 252a; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 1-12, 323d-326d passim; CH V, SECT 7-8, 330b-d
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 29-30, 418c; SECT 33-34, 419a-c; SECT 36, 419c-d; SECT 82-84, 428d-429c, SECT 86-91, 429c-431a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 62d-63a; 174d-175b; 193a-c
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 300b; 639a-644a esp 640a-641b, 642b [fn 2], 643b [fn 1]; 646b-655a; 659a-660b
• 54 Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams, 158a-d; 270c-271a / A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 597b-598a

4. The logic of ideas

4a. The verbal expression of ideas or concepts: terms

• 7 Plato: Cratylus, 85a-114a,c / Phaedrus, 138c-140c / Sophist, 575d-577b / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
• 8 Aristotle: Categories, 5a-21d / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 1 [24b16-18], 39c; CH 35, 66c-d
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK XI, par 36, 120c-d
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 34, A 1, ANS, 185b-187b; Q 85, A 2, REP 3, 453d-455b; Q 107, A 1, ANS, 549b-550b
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 54c-58a; PART IV, 270a
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 57d-58a; 60b-c; 61b-c; 62c-d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14, 107d-108a; APH 59, 112b-c
• 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XIII, 26b-c / Objections and Replies, 137a
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 49, SCHOL, 392a-c
• 33 Pascal: Pensées, 392, 239b-240a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXII, 200d-204a passim, esp SECT 3-10, 201b-203c; CH XXXII, SECT 7-8, 244c-d; BK III, 251b,d-306d passim, esp CH I-VIII, 251b,d-285a, CH XI, 300a-306d; BK IV, CH V, SECT 4, 329b-d; CH VI, SECT 1-3, 331b-d
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 11-12, 407b-408b; SECT 15, 409a-b; SECT 18-19, 410a-c
• 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 340a-342c
• 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1b-c
• 49 Darwin: On the Origin of Species, 40c-d
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 127b-128a; 153b-154a; 158a-159b; 181b-183a; 332b-334a
• 54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 662a-b

4b. The classification of terms: problems in the use of different kinds of terms

• 4b(1) Concrete and abstract terms
  • 8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 34, 66b-c
  • 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 3, REP 1, 16a-d; Q 13, A 1, REP 2, 62c-63c; A 9, ANS, 71b-72c; Q 32, A 2, 178a-179b; Q 39, AA 4-5, 205c-208c; Q 54, A 1, REP 2, 285a-d
  • 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 57a
  • 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH VIII, 284b-285a
  • 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 341b-c
  • 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 305a-308b esp 308b-309b [fn 1-3]; 689a
  • 54 Freud: A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 516b-c
• 4b(2) Particular and universal terms
  • 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 2 [1a20-b9], 5b-c; CH 5 [2a11-3a23], 6a-8a / On Interpretation, CH 7 [17a37-40], 26d / Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 10 [1035b28-32], 559b; CH 11 [1037a5-9], 560c
  • 17 Plotinus: Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 12, 251a
  • 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 9, 71b-72c; Q 29, A 1, 162a-163b; A 4, ANS and REP 4, 165c-167a; Q 30, A 4, 170c-171b; Q 33, A 3, REP 1, 182c-183c; Q 36, A 1, ANS, 191a-192a; Q 40, A 3, ANS, 215c-216d; Q 55, A 3, REP 3, 291a-d; Q 57, A 2, REP 3, 295d-297a; Q 76, A 2, REP 3, 388c-391a; Q 85, A 2, REP 2, 453d-455b; A 3, REP 1,4, 455b-457a; Q 86, A 2, REP 4, 462a-463a; PART I-II, Q 30, A 4, REP 2, 751c-752b
  • 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 7, A 13, REP 3, 755c-756c; Q 10, A 3, REP 2, 769d-771b
  • 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c
  • 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1, 387b-388a
  • 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15, 98d-99a; BK II, CH XI, SECT 8-11, 145b-146a; CH XVI, SECT 1, 165c-d; BK III, CH I, SECT 3, 251d-252a; CH III, 254d-260a; CH VI, SECT 1, 268b-c; SECT 32-33, 277c-278c; BK IV, CH III, SECT 31, 323c-d; CH VI, SECT 9, 338d-339b
  • 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 11-12, 407b-408b; SECT 15-16, 409a-d; SECT 18-19, 410a-c; SECT 122, 437b-c
  • 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 341b-342b
  • 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 307a-312a
• 4b(3) Specific and generic terms: infimae species and summa genera
  • 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 3-9, 5d-16d / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 27 [43a25-44], 60c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 19-22, 111c-115b / Topics, BK I, CH 9, 147a-b; CH 15 [107a3-11], 151a; BK IV, CH 1 [120b36-121a9], 168d-169a; CH 2 [122a3-19], 170a-b; CH 4 [124b15-22], 173c; CH 4 [125a5]-CH 5 [125b19], 173d-174d; CH 6 [128a13-29], 177d-178a; BK V, CH 3 [132a10-23], 182d-183a; CH 4 [132b35-133a11], 184a; BK VI, CH 5, 196b-d; BK VII, CH 1 [152a38-39], 207b / On Sophistical Refutations, CH 22, 245a-246c / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a20-b4], 260a-b; BK III, CH 1 [200b32-201a3], 278b; BK IV, CH 3 [210a17-19], 289a; BK VII, CH 4, 330d-333a esp [249a8-b26], 332a-333a / On the Heavens, BK IV, CH 4 [312a12-17], 403d / On Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 3, 413c-416c / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 1 [995b27-31], 514b; CH 3, 517a-518a; BK V, CH 3 [1014b3-13], 534d; CH 7 [1017a24-31], 537d-538a; CH 8, 538b-c; CH 13-15, 541b-543a; CH 19-21, 543d-544b; CH 25 [1023b22-25], 545c; CH 28 [1024b10-16], 546c: BK VII, CH 3 [1029a11-26], 551c-d; CH 12-13, 561b-563a; BK VIII, CH 6, 569d-570d; BK IX, CH 1 [1045a27-33], 570b; BK XI, CH 1 [1059b21-1060a1], 587d-588a; BK XIV, CH 1 [1088a23-b4], 620c-d; CH 2 [1089b6-1090a3], 621b-622c / On the Soul, BK I, CH 1 [402a23-25], 631b-c; CH 5 [410a12-23], 640a-b
  • 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 3 [642b20-643b28], 166a-d
  • 18 Augustine: On Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 34, 670c-671a
  • 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 1, 16d-17c; A 5, 17c-18b; A 6, REP 2, 18c-19a; Q 5, A 3, REP 1, 25a-d; A 6, REP 1, 27c-28b; Q 11, A 1, REP 1, 46d-47d; Q 12, A 9, REP 2, 58b-59a; Q 13, A 7, ANS, 68d-70d; Q 15, A 3, REP 4, 93b-94a; Q 28, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2, 157c-158d; A 2, 158d-160a; Q 29, A 2, REP 4, 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4, ANS and REP 3, 170c-171b; Q 50, A 2, REP 1, 270a-272a; Q 66, A 2, REP 2, 345d-347b; Q 76, A 3, REP 4, 391a-393a; A 6, REP 1-2, 396a-d; Q 77, A 4, REP 1, 403a-d; Q 85, A 3, ANS and REP 4, 455b-457a; A 4, ANS, 457a-d; A 5, REP 3, 457d-458d; Q 88, A 2, REP 4, 471c-472c; PART I-II, Q 18, A 7, REP 3, 698c-699c; Q 35, A 8, ANS and REP 3, 779c-780c
  • 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 1, 1b-2b; Q 61, A 1, REP 1, 54d-55c: PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, ANS, 1025c-1032b
  • 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 55b-c
  • 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 28, 158d-159a
  • 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK III, CH III, SECT 8-9, 256a-c; CH IV, SECT 16, 263b-c; CH VI, SECT 11-12, 271b-272b; SECT 32-33, 277c-278c; SECT 36-41, 279a-280b
  • 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 341b-342b
  • 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 42b-43b; 193a-200c
  • 49 Darwin: On the Origin of Species, 30d-31b; 64a; 207a-208a esp 207d; 210b-211b, 238b-c; 241d-242a / The Descent of Man, 332b-c; 347a-b
  • 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 345a-b; 870b-871a
• 4b(4) Univocal and analogical terms
  • 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 1, 5a-b / Topics, BK I, CH 15 [107a3-18], 151a-b; BK VI, CH 10 [148a23-25], 202b; [148a38-b4], 202c; BK VIII, CH 3 [158b8-159a2], 215b-c / On Sophistical Refutations, CH 1 [165a6-12], 227b-c; CH 33 [182b13-21], 251d / Physics, BK I, CH 2 [185a20]-CH 3 [187a10], 260a-262a; BK VII, CH 4 [249a3-24], 331d-332b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1003a33-b15], 522b-c; BK VII, CH 4 [1030a32-3], 553a-b; BK XI, CH 3 [1060b34-1061a10], 589a-b; BK XII, CH 4-5, 599d-601a
  • 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 6, REP 1, 18c-19a; Q 13, AA 5-6, 66b-68c; A 10, 72c-73c; Q 16, A 6, ANS, 98b-d; Q 29, A 4, REP 4, 165c-167a; Q 32, A 1, REP 2, 175d-178a
  • 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 1, REP 1, 54d-55c; PART III, Q 60, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 847b-848a
  • 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a
  • 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 60b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 43, 109d-110a; APH 59-60, 112b-113a
  • 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 1-2, 387b-388b
  • 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH IV, SECT 5, 131a; CH XIII, SECT 18, 152a-c; CH XXIX, SECT 6-12, 234d-236c; BK III, CH VI, SECT 28, 276a-b; SECT 47-51, 282a-283a; CH IX, 285a-291c
  • 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 62-63, 478b-d
  • 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 307b-308b
  • 42 Kant: Critique of Judgement, 547b-548c; 602b-603a
  • 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 549b-550a; 689a-b

4c. The correlation, opposition, and order of terms

• 7 Plato: Protagoras, 49a-50b / Phaedo, 226d-227a; 242d-245c / Republic, BK IV, 350c-353d esp 351b-352b; BK VII, 392b-393b / Sophist, 573b-574a
• 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 5 [3b24-31], 8a; CH 6 [5b11-6a18], 10a-c; CH 7, 11a-13d; CH 8 [10a11-25], 15d; CH 10-15, 16d-21d / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 46, 70b-71d / Topics, BK II, CH 7-8, 158b-160a; BK IV, CH 3 [123b1-124a10], 171d-172c; CH 4 [124a35-b34], 173a-d; [125a5-14], 173d-174c; BK V, CH 6, 187a-188c; BK VI, CH 8, 200b-201a; CH 9 [147b23-148a9], 201b-202a; CH 12 [149b4-23], 203d-204a / Physics, BK III, CH 1 [201a4-8], 278c / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [1004a9-17], 523a-b; [1004b27-1005a2], 523d-524a; BK V, CH 10, 539a-c; CH 15, 542a-543a; BK IX, CH 1 [1046a29-36], 571b; CH 2 [1046b7-15], 571c-d; BK X, CH 3 [1054a23]-CH 10 [1059a15], 581c-586d; BK XI, CH 3 [1061a18-28], 589b-c; BK XII, CH 10 [1075b20-24], 606c
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 7, 68d-70d; Q 16, AA 3-4, 96b-97c; Q 17, A 1, ANS, 100d-101d; A 4, ANS, 103c-104b; Q 28, 157c-161d passim; Q 32, A 2, ANS, 178a-179b; Q 33, A 4, REP 1-3, 183c-185a; QQ 40-41, 213a-224a passim; Q 48, A 1, ANS and REP 1, 259b-260c; A 3, REP 3, 261b-262a; Q 49, A 3, ANS and REP 1, 266d-268a,c; Q 103, A 3, REP 2, 530a-c; A 8, REP 3, 533d-534b; PART I-II, Q 18, A 8, REP 1, 699d-700b; Q 29, A 2, REP 1, 745c-746b; Q 35, A 4, ANS and REP 2, 774d-775d; Q 36, A 1, ANS, 780c-781b; Q 46, A 1, REP 2, 813b-814a
• 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 64, A 3, REP 3, 68b-69b; Q 67, A 3, ANS, 83b-84d; Q 71, A 6, REP 1, 110b-111b; Q 72, A 6, 116b-117a; PART III-II, Q 21, A 3, REP 2-3, 479c-480b
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 57b-c; 58a-c
• 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 12d-13b
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 869a-872b; 878a-879b

5. Ideas or concepts in the process of thought

5a. Concept and judgment: the division of terms as subjects and predicates; kinds of subjects and predicates

• 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 2-3, 5b-d; CH 5 [2a11-3a24], 6a-8a / On Interpretation, 25a-36d / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 27 [43a25-44], 60c-d / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 4, 100a-101b; CH 19 [81b23-30], 111d / Topics, BK I, CH 4-9, 144b-147b / Physics, BK I, CH 3 [186b22-187a10], 261b-262a; CH 6 [189a28-33], 264d
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK IV, par 28-29, 26a-b
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, ANS, 10d-11d; Q 3, A 4, REP 2, 16d-17c; Q 13, A 12, 74c-75b; Q 16, A 2, 95c-96b; Q 58, A 2, 301b-d; A 4, 302d-303c; Q 76, A 3, ANS, 391a-393a; Q 85, A 2, REP 3, 453d-455b; AA 5-6, 457d-459c; A 8, ANS, 460b-461b
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART IV, 270a-c
• 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XIII, 22a-b / Meditations, III, 83a / Objections and Replies, DEF IX, 130d
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 39a-44c; 51d-52b; 59c-66d esp 63d-64a; 180c-182b / Critique of Judgement, 480d-482b; 562a-d; 572b-575b
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 144a-b; 178a-179a; 313a-b; 638b; 861b; 870b-873a

5b. The position and sequence of terms in reasoning

• 8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 4 [25b31-26a2], 40d-41a; CH 5 [26b34-27a2], 42a; CH 6 [28a10-16], 43b-c
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 58a-c
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 59c-60a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVII, SECT 4, 373a-375a; SECT 8, 377c-d
• 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 110d-111c; 118a-c
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 667b-668a, 672b-673b; 868b-879b esp 869b-873a, 878a-879b, 889b

5c. The dialectical employment of the ideas of reason

• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c esp 1a-b; 7a-8b; 15c-16c; 20a; 53b-54b, 59c-d; 93c-99a; 101b-107b; 108a-209d esp 108a-112d, 120c-121a, 129c-130b, 133d, 173b-174a, 175c-d, 185b-c, 190a-209d; 217d-218a; 219a-223d; 227a-235a esp 229b-c, 231c-232a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261c; 283d-284d / Critique of Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 296a-d, 309b; 310d-311d; 313b-314d, 320c-321b, 335c-337a,c; 337a-355d esp 337a-338c, 343b-c, 347d-348a, 348d-355d / Critique of Judgement, 461a-c; 540a-542a; 551a-552c; 562a-564c; 570b-572b; 606d-607c

5d. The order of concepts in the stages of learning: the more and the less general

• 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK I, CH 1 [184a21-b14], 259b
• 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b12-b32], 161b-d
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 2, 24b-25a; Q 10, A 1, ANS and REP 1,5, 40d-41d; Q 14, A 6, ANS, 80a-81c; Q 33, A 3, REP 1, 182c-183c, Q 55, A 3, REP 2, 291a-d, Q 85, A 3, 455b-457a
• 28 Harvey: On the Generation of Animals, 332a-334d
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 68d-69c / Novum Organum, PREF, 105a-106d
• 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 167c-d
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15, 98d-99a; SECT 20, 100d; SECT 23, 101b-102a; CH II, SECT 13, 116a-b; BK II, CH I, SECT 6-8, 122b-123a; SECT 20-24, 126d-127c; CH XI, SECT 8-9, 145b-c; BK III, CH III, SECT 7-9, 255d-256c; BK IV, CH VII, SECT 9, 338d-339b; SECT 11, 342c-d; CH XII, SECT 3, 358d-359c esp 359a
• 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 338a-342b passim, esp 341b-342b
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 193a-200c esp 195d-197c / Critique of Practical Reason, 294a-b / Critique of Judgement, 572a-b; 601d-602b
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 315a-319a esp 317b-319a; 327a-329a; 360a; 522b-525a esp 524a-b
• 54 Freud: Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 412a-b / The Unconscious, 442b-443a / The Ego and the Id, 700d-701a

5e. The association, comparison, and discrimination of ideas: the stream of thought or consciousness

• 8 Aristotle: On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [451b7-453a31], 692d-695d
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 52b-53b
• 30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 26, 156a-157a
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 18, 381d-382b
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 9, 133a; CH XI, SECT 2, 144a-c; CH XIV, SECT 1-16, 155b-158a; CH XXXIII, 248b-251d; BK IV, CH II, 309b-313a passim, esp SECT 1-7, 309b-311a; CH III, SECT 2-4, 313a-c; CH VI, SECT 13, 335c-d; CH VII, SECT 1-7, 337a-338c esp SECT 2, 337a; CH XI, SECT 13-14, 357d-358c; CH XVI, SECT 2-3, 371d-372b; SECT 4, 373a-375a passim; SECT 8, 377b-d
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 26, 418a; SECT 30, 418c
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT III, 457c-458a; SECT V, DIV 41-45, 467d-469c
• 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 194a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 51c-d / Critique of Judgement, 493c-d; 528c-529b
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 15b-19b esp 15b-17a, 19a-b; 35b-37a esp 36b; 146a-187b; 291a-295a passim, esp 293a-294a; 315a-395a esp 315a-331b, 344b-348a, 360a-395a; 427b-431a; 502a-507a passim, 525a-526b; 664a-665a; 677a-678b; 827a-835a esp 828b, 831b-834a; 867a-873a esp 867a-b; 878a-879a
• 54 Freud: Studies on Hysteria, 65d-67b; 74a-75a; 76c-d / The Interpretation of Dreams, 180a-181b; 347b-350a passim; 352b-c; 373a-385c esp 375b-378b, 382a-384c / A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 486b-489c passim

6. The being and truth of ideas

6a. The distinction between real and intentional existence, between thing and idea: ideas as symbols, or intentions of the mind

• 7 Plato: Parmenides, 489a-b
• 8 Aristotle: On Interpretation, CH 1 [16a4-9], 25a / Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 36 [48a40-b9], 66d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 7 [1017a31-34], 538a; BK VI, CH 4, 550a,c; BK IX, CH 3 [1047a30-b2], 572c; CH 10, 577c-578a,c; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b18-24], 602d-603a; CH 9 [1074b35-1075a11], 605c-d / On the Soul, BK III, CH 2 [425b17-26], 657d-658a; CH 3 [427a16-b6], 659c-d; CH 4, 661b-662c; CH 8, 664b-d / On Memory and Reminiscence, CH 1 [450b25-451a19], 691a-692b
• 11 Archimedes: On the Sphere and Cylinder, BK I, 403b
• 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 8, 132d-133c
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 16-26, 75b-78a
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 2, 10d-11d; Q 3, A 4, REP 2, 16d-17c; Q 5, A 2, ANS, 24b-25a; Q 11, A 1 esp REP 3, 46d-47d; A 3, REP 2, 49a-c; Q 12, A 2, 51c-52c; Q 13, A 1, ANS, 62c-63c; A 3, ANS and REP 3, 64d-65c; A 4, 65c-66b; A 7, ANS and REP 2,4-6, 68d-70d; A 9, ANS and REP 2, 71b-72c; A 11, ANS, 73c-74b; A 12, 74c-75b; Q 14, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 75d-76c; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3, 76d-77d; A 6, REP 1, 80a-81c; A 8, ANS, 82c-83b; A 9, ANS, 83b-d; A 13, REP 2-3, 86d-88c; Q 15, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3, 91b-92a; A 3, REP 4, 93b-94a; Q 16, A 2, 95c-96b; A 7, REP 2, 99a-d;Q 17, A 3, ANS, 102d-103c; Q 18, A 4, 107d-108c; Q 19, A 3, REP 6, 110b-111c; Q 27, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 153b-154b; A 2, ANS and REP 2, 154c-155b; A 3, ANS, 155c-156a; A 4, ANS and REP 2, 156b-d; Q 28, 157c-161d passim; Q 29, A 1, REP 3, 162a-163b; Q 30, A 1, REP 4, 167a-168a; A 4, 170c-171b; Q 32, AA 2-3, 178a-180b; Q 34, A 1, 185b-187b; A 3, ANS, 188b-189a; Q 37, A 1, ANS, 197c-199a; Q 50, A 2, ANS, 270a-272a; QQ 55-58, 288d-306b passim; Q 66, A 2, REP 2, 345d-347b; Q 67, A 3, ANS, 351b-352a; Q 74, A 3, REP 5, 375a-377a,c; Q 76, A 3, REP 4, 391a-393a; A 6, REP 2, 396a-d; Q 78, A 3, ANS, 410a-411d; A 4, ANS and REP 2, 411d-413d; Q 79, A 4, REP 4, 417a-418c; Q 82, A 3, ANS, 433c-434c; Q 84, 440b-451b; Q 85, A 2, 453d-455b; A 3, REP 1,4, 455b-457a; A 4, 457a-d; A 5, REP 3, 457d-458d; A 8, REP 3, 460b-461b; Q 86, A 1, ANS, 461c-462a; Q 87, A 1, 465a-466c; Q 88, A 1, REP 2, 469a-471c; A 2, REP 4, 471c-472c; Q 89, A 2, ANS and REP 2, 475a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 1,3, 475d-476c; A 5, ANS, 477a-478b; PART I-II, Q 5, A 6, REP 2, 641a-642a; Q 6, A 6, ANS and REP 2, 649a-650a; Q 8, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 655b-656a; Q 12, A 3, REP 2-3, 670d-671b; Q 17, A 4, ANS, 688d-689c; Q 22, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 721c-722c; Q 28, A 1, REP 3, 740b-741a
• 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93, A 1, REP 2, 215b,d-216c; PART III, Q 2, A 5, REP 2, 715a-716b; PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A 3, ANS and REP 2, 971a-972d
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53c; PART III, 172a-d; PART IV, 262a-d; 270a-c
• 26 Shakespeare: Richard II, ACT V, SC V [1-41], 349d-350a
• 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, esp PART I, 1a-8c, 18d-22a, PART II, 285a-288c
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, I, 71d-72a; III, 83b-86a; V, 93a-94a / Objections and Replies, 108b-109d, 121a-c; DEF I-IV, 130a-b; AXIOM V-VI, 131d-132a; 157b-158a; 212c-213a
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 369b-372d esp 371c-372c; PART II, PROP 5-9, 374c-376c
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII, 133b-138b passim, esp SECT 8, 134b-c; CH XXII, SECT 2, 201a-b; CH XXX, SECT 2, 238b-c; CH XXXI, SECT 2, 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 8, 244d; SECT 14-18, 245c-247a; BK III, CH III, SECT 12-20, 257b-260a; CH IV, SECT 2, 260b; CH V, SECT 12, 266d-267a; CH VI, 268b-283a passim; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14, 312b-d; CH IX, SECT 1, 349a; CH XI, SECT 4-9, 355b-357a
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 1-96, 413a-431d esp SECT 1-24, 413a-417d, SECT 29-44, 418c-421a, SECT 48-49, 422a-b, SECT 82-84, 428d-429c, SECT 86-91, 429c-431a
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 44, 468d-469c; SECT XII, DIV 117-123, 504a-506a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 23a-33d; 85d-93c; 95a-d; 97a-b; 117b-118a; 200c-209d; 211c-212a / Critique of Practical Reason, 295b-d / Critique of Judgement, 528c-d; 551a-553c; 604a-b
• 44 Boswell: The Life of Samuel Johnson, 134c-d
• 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6a-7a / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-c; 158a-160b; 188d-189a; PART I, 219d-220a; 236a-c; 257c-d, PART IV, 354b, 364b-c
• 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 385b
• 50 Marx: Capital, 11b-c
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 128a-b; 142a-b; 176a-184a passim, esp 176a-b, 178a-181a, 191b-192a; 299a-302a esp 302b [fn 1], 307a-311a esp 311b-312b [fn 1], 639a-645b esp 640a, 659a-b, 852a; 865b-866a, 868b, 878a-882a esp 880b-882a, 889a-890a
• 54 Freud: A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 467d, 597d-598a

6b. The nature and being of ideas in relation to the nature and being of the mind

• 7 Plato: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c / Phaedrus, 125a-b / Republic, BK V, 369a-373c; BK VI, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 457b-458a / Parmenides, 486a-491d / Sophist, 567a-569a
• 8 Aristotle: On the Soul, BK III, CH 4, 661b-662c
• 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [722-817], 53d-54d
• 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK X, par 16-38, 75b-81a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c / On Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 38, 654c
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 15, A 1 esp REP 1, 91b-92a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2, 99a-d; Q 29, A 2, REP 4, 163b-164b; Q 76, A 2, REP 3, 388c-391a; Q 79, A 3, ANS, 416a-417a; Q 84, A 1, ANS, 440d-442a; QQ 85-89, 451b-480c passim; Q 110, A 1, REP 3, 564c-565d
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c
• 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 162b; 212c-213a
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, DEF 3, 373b; PROP 11, DEMONST, 377b; PROP 49, SCHOL, 392a-c
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK I, CH I, SECT 15, 98d-99a; BK II, CH VIII, 133b-138b passim; CH XXII, SECT 2, 201a-b; CH XXX, 238a-239b passim, esp SECT 2-3, 238b-d, CH XXXI, SECT 2, 239b-d; CH XXXII, SECT 14-16, 245c-246b; BK III, CH V, 263d-268a; CH VI, SECT 26-51, 274d-283a passim; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 4-5, 324c-d; SECT 11-12, 326b-d; CH XI, SECT 4-9, 355b-357a
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, 404a-444d esp SECT 2-4, 413b-414a, SECT 25-33, 417d-419a, SECT 48-49, 422a-b, SECT 86-91, 429c-431a
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 14c-15c; 34a-35b; 113c-118a; 173b-174a; 179c-182b / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 281c-282d; 285a-287d / Critique of Judgement, 461a-462d; 542b-544c; 551a-552c; 604a-b
• 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6a-7a / The Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b
• 50 Marx: Capital, 11b-c
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 104a-115a passim, esp 105b-106b, 110a-b, 113a-115a; 149b-154a esp 151b-153b; 325a-327a esp 326a-b [fn 1], 394a-b
• 54 Freud: The Unconscious, 430d-432c esp 431c-432c; 442b-443a

6c. The agreement between an idea and its object: the criterion of adequacy in correspondence

• 31 Descartes: Meditations, III, 83a; 84a-85a; VI, 99a-c / Objections and Replies, 108b-109d; 121a-c; DEF I-III, 130a-b; AXIOM V-VI, 131d-132a, 153a-c; 157b-158a
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 6, 355d; PART II, DEF 1-4, 373a-b; PROP 24-40, 383c-388b; PROP 43, 388c-389b, PART IV, PROP 1, 424c-425a
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH VIII, 133b-138b passim, esp SECT 2, 133c, SECT 7, 134b, SECT 15, 135c; CH XXIII, SECT 8-11, 206a-207a passim; SECT 37, 214a-b; CH XXX-XXXI, 238a-243c, CH XXXII, SECT 8, 244d, SECT 13-18, 245c-247a passim; BK III, CH VI, SECT 9, 270d-271a; SECT 28-31, 276a-277c passim; SECT 37, 279b; SECT 40, 280a-b, SECT 46-47, 281d-282b; CH XI, SECT 24, 305b-d; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 1-12, 323d-326d esp SECT 3, 324b-c
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 44, 468d-469c esp 469b-c
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 36b-37a; 77b-d, 85d-88a esp 86b-87c; 91d-93c
• 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 1b-c
• 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 231a
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 141a-142a; 301b-302a; 307a-b; 480b-484a
• 54 Freud: The Unconscious, 430b-c

6d. Clarity and distinctness in ideas as criteria of their truth

• 31 Descartes: Meditations, I, 73d-74a; III, 82a-d; 85b-86d; IV, 89a-b; V, 93a-96a esp 93a-94a; VI, 99a-c / Objections and Replies, 120a-c; POSTULATE VI-VII, 131c; 210b-c, 237c-238b
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, DEF 4, 373b; PROP 24-40, 383c-388b; PART V, PROP 4, COROL and SCHOL, 453b-d
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 91d-92c; BK II, CH XIII, SECT 11, 150d-151b; CH XXIII, SECT 32, 212d; CH XXIX, 233d-238a
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 30, 418c; SECT 33, 419a; SECT 36, 419c-d
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV 125, 506d-507a

6e. The criterion of genesis: the test of an idea’s truth or meaning by reference to its origin

• 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK I [690-700], 9c; BK IV [469-521], 50b-51a
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 49a; 54b-c
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 43d-44c, 57d-58b
• 31 Descartes: Meditations, VI, 99a-c
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXX, SECT 2, 238b-c; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 4, 324c
• 35 Berkeley: The Principles of Human Knowledge, SECT 29-30, 418c; SECT 33, 419a; SECT 36, 419c-d; SECT 82-84, 428d-429c; SECT 86-91, 429c-431a
• 35 Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, SECT II, 455b-457b; SECT VII, DIV 49, 471c-d
• 50 Marx-Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party, 427a-b; 428b-d

6f. The truth and falsity of simple apprehensions, sensations, or conceptions: contrasted with the truth and falsity of judgments or assertions

• 7 Plato: Cratylus, 85a-86b; 107c-108b / Republic, BK VII, 392b-393b / Sophist, 575d-577b
• 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 4 [2a4-10], 6a / On Interpretation, CH 1 [16a9-18], 25a-b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [1010a14-29], 530b-c; BK V, CH 29 [1024b27-38], 546d-547a; BK VI, CH 4 [1027b18-28], 550a,c; BK IX, CH 10, 577c-578a,c; BK XIII, CH 3 [1078a14-32], 609c-d / On the Soul, BK II, CH 6 [418a6-18], 648d-649a; BK III, CH 3 [427b6-15], 659d-660a; [428b5-429a2], 660b-661a; CH 6, 662d-663c
• 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK IV [324-521], 48c-51a esp [469-521], 50b-51a
• 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 16, A 2, 95c-96b; Q 17, AA 2-3, 102a-103c; Q 58, A 4, ANS, 302d-303c; Q 85, A 1, REP 1, 451c-453c; A 6, 458d-459c; Q 89, A 5, ANS, 477a-478b; Q 94, A 4, 505a-506a
• 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 56b
• 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 57d-58b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 14, 107d-108a
• 31 Descartes: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, XII, 18b-25a passim / Discourse on Method, PART IV, 52a / Meditations, III, 83a; IV, 89a-93a / Objections and Replies, 123d-125c; 157b-158a, 215d-216c, 229d-230d
• 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, PROP 32-35, 385c-386b; PROP 49, SCHOL, 392a-d
• 35 Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXII, 243c-248b; BK III, CH VII, SECT 1, 283a-b; BK IV, CH V, 329a-331b; CH VI, SECT 16, 336d
• 42 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 36b-37d; 64d-65c; 108a-d; 179c-180c; 193a-b; 211c-218d / Critique of Judgement, 570b-571c
• 53 James: The Principles of Psychology, 299a-314b passim; 638b; 640b; 668a-671a

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

• The theory of Ideas as eternal forms existing apart from mind and matter, see Change 15a; Eternity 4c; Form 1a, 2a-2b; Universal and Particular 2a.
• The theory of ideas as universal conceptions abstracted from the materials of sense, see Form 3a-3b; Memory and Imagination 5b, 6c(1); Sense 5a; Universal and Particular 2b, 4c-4d; and for abstraction in relation to generalization and induction, see Experience 2b; Induction 1a, 3.
• The theory of ideas as sense impressions or sense images, see Memory and Imagination 1a, 5a; Sense 1d, 5a.
• The doctrine of innate ideas and the related theory of reminiscence and intuitive knowledge, see Knowledge 6c(3); Memory and Imagination 3a; Mind 4d(2).
• The theory of the transcendental concepts or ideas as constitutive or regulative principles, see Form 1c, 3a; Knowledge 6b(4), 6c(4); Mind 4d(3); Principle 2b(3); and for the dialectical employment of the ideas of pure reason, see Dialectic 2c(2).
• The theory of the Absolute Idea, see History 4a(3); Mind 10f-10f(2).
• The theory of the divine ideas as eternal exemplars, or of the ideas infused into angelic intellects, see Angel 3d; Form 2b; God 5f; Knowledge 7a-7b; Mind 10e, 10g; Universal and Particular 4b.
• The issue concerning the distinction of, and the relation between, sense and intellect, see Being 8a-8b; Knowledge 6a(1), 6b-6b(4); Memory and Imagination 5b, 6b, 6d; Mind 1-1g(3); Sense 1a-1b, 4a, 5c.
• Another discussion of the distinction between first and second intentions, and of the related distinction between first and second impositions, see Sign and Symbol 2a-2b.
• Other discussions of adequate and inadequate, or clear and distinct ideas, see Knowledge 6d(3); Opinion 3b; Truth 1a; and for other considerations of mental fictions or chimeras, see Being 7d(5); Memory and Imagination 5a.
• The consideration of the expression of ideas in words or terms, see Language 1a, 7; Sign and Symbol 1f; for the distinction of concrete and abstract terms, see Sign and Symbol 2e; for the distinction of particular and universal terms, see Sign and Symbol 2d; Universal and Particular 5c; for the distinction of species and genera, see Relation 5a(4); Same and Other 3a(1); Universal and Particular 5b; and for the distinction between univocal, equivocal, and analogical terms, see Relation 1d; Same and Other 3b, 4c; Sign and Symbol 3d.
• The treatment of the definition of terms as the expression or analysis of concepts, see Definition 1, 1b.
• The correlation and opposition of concepts or terms, see Opposition 1a-1b; Relation 1c, 4e.
• The role played by concepts in the acts of judgment and reasoning, or for terms in relation to propositions and syllogisms, see Judgment 5b-5c; Reasoning 2a(1).
• Other discussions of the association of ideas, see Memory and Imagination 2c; Mind 1g(1); Relation 4f.
• The metaphysical problem of the being of ideas, and for the theory of intentional existence, see Being 7d-7d(5); Sign and Symbol 1b; Universal and Particular 2c.
• Another consideration of the truth or reality of ideas, see Truth 3b(1).

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• Aquinas. On the Trinity of Boethius, QQ 5-6
• Aquinas. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, Q 3
• Aquinas. De Natura Verbi Intellectus
• Descartes. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 9-10, 45-47
• Spinoza. Of the Improvement of the Understanding
• Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK I, PART I
• Berkeley. Siris
• Kant. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, PAR 39, 56
• Hegel. The Phenomenology of Mind
• Hegel. Science of Logic, VOL II, SECT I, CH 1; SECT III, CH 1(C), 3
• Hegel. Logic, CH 9
• J. S. Mill. A System of Logic, BK IV, CH 2
• W. James. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 4-6

II.

• Cicero. Academica
• Philo Judaeus. On the Creation of the World (De Opificio Mundi), par 16
• Porphyry. Introduction to Aristotle’s Predicaments
• Boethius. In Isagogem Porphyrii Commenta
• Eriugena, John Scotus. De Divisione Naturae, BK III
• John of Salisbury. Metalogicon, BK II, CH 17
• Bonaventure. On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology
• Duns Scotus. Opus Oxoniense, BK I, DIST 35 (1)
• Cajetan. De Nominum Analogia
• Cajetan. De Conceptu Entis
• Suárez. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXV
• John of St. Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica, PART II, QQ 3-5, 23
• Arnauld. Logic or the Art of Thinking, PART I
• Malebranche. De la recherche de la vérité, BK III (II), CH 1-8
• Malebranche. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, III
• Leibniz. What Is “Idea”?
• Leibniz. Discourse on Metaphysics, XXIV-XXIX
• Leibniz. Philosophical Works, CH 3 (Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas)
• Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK I; BK II, CH 1-8, 12, 30-33
• Voltaire. “Idea,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
• T. Reid. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, IV-V
• J. G. Fichte. The Science of Knowledge
• Coleridge. Biographia Literaria, CH 5-8
• Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, VOL I, BK I, III; VOL II, SUP, CH 14; VOL III, SUP, CH 29
• J. Mill. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, CH 2-3, 6, 9
• W. Hamilton. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL I (34-36); VOL II (7-12)
• Whewell. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, VOL I, BK I, CH 7
• Sigwart. Logic, PART I, CH 1; PART II, CH 1; PART III, CH 1-2
• Lotze. Microcosmos, BK V, CH 3
• Lotze. Logic, BK I, CH I
• C. S. Peirce. Collected Papers, VOL V, par 388-410
• Venn. The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, CH 7
• Ribot. The Evolution of General Ideas
• Royce. The World and the Individual, SERIES I (7)
• Croce. Logic as the Science of Pure Concept
• Titchener. Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes
• Cassirer. Substance and Function, PART I, CH I
• Husserl. Logische Untersuchungen
• Husserl. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology
• Bradley. The Principles of Logic, BK II, PART II, CH I
• Bradley. Collected Essays, VOL I (12)
• Bradley. Essays on Truth and Reality, CH 3
• Dewey. Essays in Experimental Logic, VII-VIII
• Dewey. The Quest for Certainty, CH 5-6
• Whitehead. Science and the Modern World, CH 10
• Whitehead. Process and Reality, PART I
• Maritain. Réflexions sur l’intelligence et sur sa vie propre, CH I
• Maritain. An Introduction to Logic, CH I
• Maritain. The Degrees of Knowledge, CH 2
• Blondel. La pensée