Chapter 34: HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

“In our language the term History,” Hegel observes, “unites the objective with the subjective side…. It comprehends not less what has happened than the narration of what has happened. This union of the two meanings we must regard as of a higher order than mere outward accident; we must suppose historical narrations to have appeared contemporaneously with historical deeds and events.”

Our daily speech confirms Hegel’s observation that “history” refers to that which has happened as well as to the record of it. We speak of the history of a people or a nation, or of the great events and epochs of history; and we also call a history the book which gives a narrative account of these matters.

It is as if we used the word “physics” to name both the object of study and the science of that object; whereas normally we tend to use “physics” for the science and refer to its subject matter as the physical world. We do not say that matter in motion is physics, but that it is the object of physics, one of the things a physicist studies. We might similarly have adopted the convention of using “history” in a restricted sense to signify a kind of knowledge or a kind of writing, and then called the phenomena written about or studied “historical” but not “history.”

That, however, is not the prevailing usage. The word “history” seems to have at least four distinct meanings. It refers to a kind of knowledge. It refers to a type of literature. It means an actual sequence of events in time, which constitutes a process of irreversible change. This can be either change in the structure of the world or any part of nature, or change in human affairs, in society or civilization.

Historical knowledge and historical writing can be about natural history or human history. In his classification of the kinds of knowledge, Francis Bacon makes this distinction when he divides history into “natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary.” Whereas the last three deal with human things, the first is concerned with the non-human part of the natural world. At the same time, this natural history is not, in Bacon’s judgment, the same thing as “natural philosophy,” or what we would now call “natural science.”

In this set of great books, natural history, even cosmic history, makes its appearance in works which we ordinarily classify as science or philosophy; for example, Darwin’s Origin of Species, Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things, or Plato’s Timaeus. The great books of history deal with man and society, not nature or the universe. For the most part this is true also of the great philosophies of history. They, too, are primarily concerned with human civilization, not the physical world.

In its original Greek root, the word “history” means research, and implies the act of judging the evidences in order to separate fact from fiction. The opening line of Herodotus is sometimes translated not “these are the histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus,” but “these are the researches…”

The word “research” can, of course, mean any sort of inquiry—into what is the case as well as into what has happened. The title of one of Aristotle’s biological works, the History of Animals, suggests that it is concerned with researches about animals. The book does not deal with natural history; it is not a history of animals in the sense of giving the stages of their development in the course of time. The redundancy of “historical research” can therefore be excused on the ground that it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of inquiry or research—scientific and historical.

Originally, research set the historian apart from the poet and the maker of myths or legends. They told stories, too; but only the historian restricted himself to telling a story based on the facts ascertained by inquiry or research. Herodotus deserves the title “father of history” for having originated a style of writing which differs from poetry in this extraordinary respect. He tries to win the reader’s belief not by the plausibility of his narrative, but rather by giving the reader some indication of the sources of information and the reliability of the evidence on which the narrative is based.

The poet tries to tell a likely story, but the historian tries to make credible statements about particular past events. He makes an explicit effort to weigh the evidence himself or, as Herodotus so frequently does, to submit conflicting testimony to the reader’s own judgment. “Such is the account which the Persians give of these matters,” he writes, “but the Phoenicians vary from the Persian statements”; or “this much I know from information given me by the Delphians; the remainder of the story the Milesians add”; or “that these were the real facts I learnt at Memphis from the priests of Vulcan”; or “such is the truth of this matter; I have also heard another account which I do not at all believe”; or again, “thus far I have spoken of Egypt from my own observation, relating what I myself saw, the ideas that I formed, and the results of my own researches. What follows rests on accounts given me by the Egyptians, which I shall now repeat, adding thereto some particulars which fell under my own notice.”

Herodotus seems quite conscious of the difference between himself and Homer, especially on those matters treated by the poet which fall within his purview as an historian. The Trojan War lies in the background of the conflict with which Herodotus is directly concerned—the Persian invasion of Greece—for the Persians “trace to the attack upon Troy their ancient enmity towards the Greeks.”

Herodotus does not doubt that the siege of Troy took place as Homer relates, but he learns from the Egyptians a legend about the landing of Paris and Helen on Egyptian soil and the detention of Helen by Proteus, king of Memphis. “Such is the tale told me by the priests concerning the arrival of Helen at the court of Proteus. It seems to me that Homer was acquainted with this story, and while discarding it, because he thought it less adapted for epic poetry than the version which he followed, showed that it was not unknown to him.”

Herodotus cites passages in the Iliad and the Odyssey to corroborate this point. He is willing to use the Homeric poems as one source of information, but not without checking them against conflicting accounts. “I made inquiry,” he writes, “whether the story which the Greeks tell about Troy is a fable or not.” When he comes to the conclusion that Helen was never within the walls of the city to which the Greeks laid siege for ten years, he tells the reader his reasons for thinking so. Homer, however, when he narrates Helen’s actions during the siege, does not bother to establish the facts of the matter or to give the reader contrary versions of what took place. That is not the poet’s task, as Herodotus recognizes. It belongs to the historian, not the poet. The story which may have greater probability in fact may not be the better story for the poet.

Since he is both an investigator and a storyteller, the historian stands comparison with the scientist in one respect and with the poet in another. The special character of history as a kind of knowledge distinct from science or philosophy seems clear from its object—the singular or unique events of the past. The scientist or philosopher is not concerned with what has happened, but with the nature of things. Particular events may serve as evidences for him, but his conclusions go beyond statements of particular fact to generalizations about the way things are or happen at any time and place. In contrast, the historian’s research begins and ends with particulars. He uses particulars directly observed by himself or testified to by others as the basis for circumstantial inference to matters which cannot be established by direct evidence. The method of investigation developed by the early historians may be the precursor of scientific method, but the kind of evidence and the mode of argument which we find in Hippocrates or Plato indicate the divergence of the scientist and philosopher from the procedure of the historian.

The contrast between history and science—or what for the purpose of comparison may be the same, philosophy—is formulated in Aristotle’s statement concerning poetry, that it is “more philosophical than history, because poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular.” History deals with what has actually happened, whereas poetry, like philosophy, may be concerned with whatever is or can be.

One comparison leads to another. Unlike poetry, history and science are alike in that they both attempt to prove what they say. But in distinction from science or philosophy, history resembles poetry, especially the great epic and dramatic poems, in being narrative literature. The historian and the poet both tell stories.

If the poet and the historian—including, of course, a biographer like Plutarch—are also moralists, they are moralists in the same way. Their works do not contain expositions of ethical or political doctrine, but rather concrete exemplifications of theories concerning the conduct of human life and social practices. That fact explains why much of the content of the great historical books is cited in other chapters dealing with moral and political, even psychological, topics. But in this chapter we are concerned with history itself rather than with the particulars of history. We are concerned with the methods and aims of history as a kind of knowledge and literature; and we are concerned with the historical process as a whole, the consideration of which belongs to the philosophy of history.

The aims and methods of writing history are discussed by the historian himself, as well as by the philosopher. Philosophers like Hobbes, Bacon, or Descartes consider history largely from the point of view of the kind of knowledge it is and the contribution it makes to the whole of human learning. Historians like Herodotus, Thucydides, Tacitus, and Gibbon state more specifically the objectives of their work, the standards of reliability or authenticity by which they determine what is fact, and the principles of interpretation by which they select the most important facts, ordering them according to some hypothesis concerning the meaning of the events reported.

Herodotus writes, he tells us, “in the hope of preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the barbarians from losing their due meed of glory.” Thucydides proceeds in the belief that the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians “was the greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind.” Not very different is the declaration of Tacitus: “My purpose is not to relate at length every motion, but only such as were conspicuous for excellence or notorious for infamy. This I regard as history’s highest function, to let no worthy action be uncommemorated, and to hold out the reprobation of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds.”

But though there seems to be a striking similarity in the purpose of these historians, Tacitus alone of the three avows a moral purpose. Furthermore, each of the three is conscious of the individual way in which he has put his intention into effect. Thucydides, for example, seems to have Herodotus in mind when he fears that “the absence of romance in my history will detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past… I shall be content.” Like Thucydides, Tacitus is an historian of contemporary events and he fears comparison with the historian of antiquity who can “enchain and refresh a reader’s mind” with “descriptions of countries, the various incidents of battle, glorious deaths of great generals.” His own work may be instructive, he thinks, but it may also give very little pleasure because he has “to present in succession the merciless biddings of a tyrant, incessant prosecutions, faithless friendships, the ruin of innocence, the same causes issuing in the same results, and [he is] everywhere confronted with a wearisome monotony in [his] subject-matter.”

As we have already noted, Herodotus seems satisfied to let the reader decide between conflicting accounts. Only occasionally does he indicate which is more likely in his own judgment. Thucydides claims that he has made a greater effort to determine the facts. “I did not even trust my own impressions,” he writes; the narrative “rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labor from the want of coincidence between the accounts of the same occurrences by different eye-witnesses.” But he thinks that his conclusions “may safely be relied on,” undisturbed “either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers which are attractive at truth’s expense.”

The historians are aware of the difficulty of combining truth-telling with storytelling. Most men, Thucydides remarks, are unwilling to take enough pains “in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand.” The difficulty, according to Tacitus, is the obscurity of the greatest events, “so that some take for granted any hearsay, whatever its source, others turn truth into falsehood, and both errors find encouragement with posterity.”

Reviewing the enormous scope of his work, Gibbon at the very end concludes that “the historian may applaud the importance and variety of his subject; but, while he is conscious of his own imperfections, he must often accuse the deficiency of his materials.” Because of the scarcity of authentic memorials, he tells us in another place, the historian finds it hard “to preserve a clear and unbroken thread of narration. Surrounded with imperfect fragments, always concise, often obscure, and sometimes contradictory, he is reduced to collect, to compare, and to conjecture; and though he ought never to place his conjectures in the rank of facts, yet the knowledge of human nature, and of the sure operation of its fierce and unrestrained passions, might, on some occasions, supply the want of historical materials.”

Clearly, the historians have different criteria of relevance in determining the selection and rejection of materials and different principles of interpretation in assigning the causes which explain what happened. These differences are reflected in the way each historian constructs from the facts a grand story, conceives the line of its plot and the characterization of its chief actors. Herodotus, for example, has been compared with Homer as writing in an epic manner; Thucydides, with the dramatic writers of tragedy. Even if they all agreed on the ascertainment of fact, the great historians would differ from one another as the great poets do; each has a style and a vision as personal and poetic as Homer or Virgil, Melville or Tolstoy.

Only one of the great books is, by title and design, devoted entirely to the philosophy of history—to the formulation of a theory which embraces the whole of man’s career on earth. This is Hegel’s Philosophy of History. Augustine’s City of God presents an equally comprehensive vision, but a comparison of the two suggests that they differ from one another as philosophy from theology.

The point of this comparison is not that God and His providence are omitted from the philosopher’s view. On the contrary, Hegel regards the history of the world as a “process of development and the realization of Spirit—this is the true theodicy, the justification of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World—viz., that what has happened and is happening every day is not only not ‘without God’ but is essentially His Work.”

The difference is rather to be found in the ultimate source of insight concerning human development and destiny. Augustine sees everything in the light of God’s revelation of His plan in Holy Writ; Hegel and other philosophers of history from Vico to Toynbee seek and sometimes claim to find in the records of history itself the laws which govern and the pattern which inheres in the procession of events from the beginning to the end of human time.

For Augustine, the great epochs of history are defined religiously. They are stages in the development of the city of God on earth, not the city of man. Man is viewed as dwelling on earth under four distinct dispensations from God: (1) in Paradise before the Fall; (2) in the world after expulsion from Eden and before the Promise and the Law were given to the Jews; (3) under the Law and before the coming of Christ; (4) between the first and second coming under the dispensation of grace.

Augustine sometimes makes other divisions of history, but they are always primarily religious. For example, he divides all of time into seven ages, corresponding to the seven days of creation. “The first age, as the first day, extends from Adam to the deluge; the second from the deluge to Abraham,… From Abraham to the advent of Christ there are, as the evangelist Matthew calculates, three periods, in each of which are fourteen generations—one period from Abraham to David, a second from David to the captivity, a third from the captivity to the birth of Christ in the flesh. There are thus five ages in all. The sixth is now passing, and cannot be measured by any number of generations…. After this period God shall rest as on the seventh day, when He shall give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in Himself…. The seventh shall be our Sabbath, which shall be brought to a close, not by an evening, but by the Lord’s day, as an eighth and eternal day, consecrated by the resurrection of Christ, and prefiguring the eternal repose not only of the spirit, but also of the body… This is what shall be in the end without end.”

This same projection of history—in all essentials, at least—is laid before Adam by the archangel Michael in Milton’s Paradise Lost, just before Adam leaves the Garden of Eden.

Unlike the four major dispensations of which Augustine and Milton speak, Hegel’s four stages of the world are epochs in the development of Spirit as manifested in the State. They are secularly defined as the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, and the German world and are seen as a “progress of the consciousness of Freedom.” The “various grades in the consciousness of Freedom,” Hegel writes, “supply us with the natural division of universal History…. The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man as such—is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free… that one is therefore only a Despot; not a free man. The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free; but they, and the Romans likewise, knew only that some are free—not man as such…. The Greeks, therefore, had slaves and their whole life and the maintenance of their splendid liberty, was implicated with the institution of slavery…. The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness that man, as man, is free.”

With the complete emancipation of man in the German-Christian world, history is consummated for Hegel. “The grand principle of being is realized,” he declares; “consequently the end of days is fully come.” Another sign of the finality of the German-Christian world seems to be its reconciliation of Church and State: “European history is the exhibition of the growth of each of these principles severally… then of an antithesis on the part of both… lastly, of the harmonizing of the antithesis.” In the German-Christian world, the secular and the religious modes of life are ultimately harmonized, fused in a single order of “rational Freedom.”

Apart from the opposition between the philosophical and theological approaches, here represented by Hegel and Augustine, there seem to be two main issues in the general theory of human history. The first concerns the pattern of change; the second, the character of the causes at work.

The pattern most familiar because of its prevalence in modern speculations is that of progress or evolution. The progress may be conceived as a dialectical motion in the realm of Spirit, contrasted by Hegel with the realm of Matter or Nature, according as “the essence of Matter is Gravity… and the essence of Spirit is Freedom.” But it may also be thought to occur, as in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, through the resolution of conflicting material or economic forces.

“The whole history of mankind,” Engels writes in his preface to the Communist Manifesto, “since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership, has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, now-a-days, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class, the proletariat, cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class, the bourgeoisie, without, at the same time, and once for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class-distinction and class-struggle.” The four great economic systems—the systems of slave labor, feudal serfdom, industrial capitalism, and the communistic or classless society—are thus seen as the stages of progress toward an ultimate perfection in which history comes to rest because it has at last fully realized its controlling tendency.

The pattern of progress may be conceived not as a dialectical motion involving conflict and synthesis, but rather, as by Kant, in terms of an increasing actualization of the potentialities for good in human life. Giving the name of culture to “the production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing,” Kant declares, “it is only culture that can be the ultimate end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race.” The progressive realization of culture consists in “the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires whereby, in our attachment to certain natural things, we are rendered incapable of exercising a choice of our own.” In these terms history moves toward a perfection which can never be fully achieved on earth, for man’s “own nature is not so constituted as to rest or be satisfied in any possession or enjoyment whatever.”

As conceived by the evolutionist, progress may or may not attain its limit, but in either case its manifestation in human history appears to be analogous to as well as an extension of the line of development along which the world or all of living nature has gradually advanced.

These views are given further discussion in the chapters on EVOLUTION, PROGRESS, and WORLD. Whether or not the same pattern of change obtains in the historical order of nature as in the history of man and society, is a question to be answered by those who deny as well as by those who affirm progress. There is cyclical change in nature, the same pattern of birth, growth, decay, and death repeating itself generation after generation. That history too repeats itself with the rise and decline of cities and civilizations, seems to be the ancient view. It reappears in our day with Spengler and, somewhat qualified by the possibility of progress, with Toynbee.

“The cities which were formerly great,” Herodotus observes, “have most of them become insignificant; and such as are at present powerful were weak in olden time. I shall, therefore, discourse equally of both, convinced that prosperity never continues long in one stay.” Lucretius finds the cyclical pattern both in the succession of worlds and in the succession of civilizations. The myth of the golden age of Kronos and the earth-bound age of Zeus, which Plato tells in the Statesman, also applies both to nature and society.

According to the myth, “there is a time when God himself guides and helps to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction.” Thus the history of the world runs through “infinite cycles of years,” and one age succeeds another in an endless round.

There is still a third view which sees history as neither cyclical nor simply progressive. Virgil reverses the order of the Platonic myth by placing the golden age in the future. It dawns with Rome, where, in the words of the 4th Eclogue, “the majestic roll of circling centuries begins anew: Justice returns, returns old Saturn’s reign, with a new breed of men sent down from heaven… and the iron shall cease, the golden race arise.”

Rome for Virgil is not only the beginning of the golden age; it is also the consummation of history. In the Aeneid Jupiter himself declares that he has given the Romans “dominion without end”—that he has ordained for them “neither period nor boundary of empire.” The “gowned race of Rome” shall be “the lords of the world”; then “war shall cease, and the iron ages soften.” Thus, Jupiter says, “is it willed,” and so “a day will come in the lapse of cycles.” The perpetuity of Rome seems to leave little room for any further essential progress and no chance for another cycle of decay and regeneration.

The Christian dogma of the fall of man from grace and his return through divine mediation to grace and salvation seems to give history a pattern that is partly Platonic in the sequence which makes the loss of a golden age the occasion for striving to regain it. But it also seems to be Virgilian in part. The epochal transitions of history happen only once. The coming of Christ is an absolutely singular event, after which there is no essential progress in man’s condition until the Last Judgment at the end of the world.

Common to these diverse conceptions of the pattern of history is the problem concerning the causes which are at work as history unfolds. Whatever the factors, they will operate in the future as they have in past, unless the millennium is already upon us or about to dawn. From the knowledge of their own past or from their dim perception of divine providence, men derive a sense of the future; but they look forward to that future differently according as some part of it will stem from choices freely made, or according as all of it is inexorably determined by causes beyond their control.

The basic alternatives of fate and freedom, of necessity and contingency, God’s will and man’s choice, are considered in the chapters on CHANCE, FATE, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. Sometimes the issue is resolved in the same way for the course of nature and the course of history: necessity reigns in both; as there is contingency in the events of nature, so there is freedom in the acts of history. Sometimes the processes of nature and history are distinguished: the motions of matter are governed by inviolable laws; whereas the motions of men are directed by laws which leave them free to work out a destiny which is determined by, rather than determines, the human spirit.

Those who do not deny freedom entirely in the realm of history seldom give it unlimited scope. What men can do is conditioned from below by the operation of material forces, and from above by what Hegel calls “God’s purpose with the world.” The vast “arras-web of Universal History” is woven by the interaction between God’s will (the Absolute Idea) and human purposes or interests, which Hegel calls “the complex of human passions.”

History for him is “the union of Freedom and Necessity,” where “the latent abstract process of Spirit is regarded as Necessity, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain of freedom.” But this freedom which coheres with necessity seems to belong more to the human race as a whole than to individual men. The individual man is tossed aside if he tries to obstruct the path of history. He is powerless to change its course.

Not even great men can make or determine history. They are great only because, sensing the next phase of the historical process, they identify themselves with the wave of the future and conform their purposes to the march of events—the dialectical development of the Absolute Idea. A few men thus become “world-historical individuals” because their own “particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World-Spirit.” They have “an insight into the requirements of the time—what was ripe for development… the very Truth for their age, for their world; the species next in order, so to speak, and which was already formed in the womb of time.”

Like Hegel and unlike the ancient historians, Tolstoy also regards the leadership of great men as illusory. To believe in the efficacy of heroes or great men, he thinks, is to commit the fallacy of the man “who, watching the movements of a herd of cattle and paying no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage in different parts of the field, or to the driving of the herdsman, attributes the direction the herd takes to the animal which happens to be at its head.”

Great men are only celebrated puppets, pushed ahead on the moving front of history. The motion of history derives its force and direction from the individual acts of the innumerable nameless men who comprise the human mass. The act of the individual counts little. The mass motion is a complex resultant of slight impulses tending in many directions. But however slight the impulse each man gives, his contribution to history is a free act, conditioned only by the circumstances under which he makes a choice and by the divine providence which grants him the freedom to choose. Like “every human action,” history, according to Tolstoy, thus “appears to us as a certain combination of freedom and inevitability.”

Different from speculations on a grand scale concerning the whole historical process is that type of philosophizing about history which considers its place in education—the light it affords to the mind, and the lessons it teaches for the guidance of conduct.

Montaigne, for example, makes the reading of history and biography the window through which a man looks out upon the world. “This great world,” he writes, “is the mirror wherein we are to behold ourselves, to be able to know ourselves as we ought to do in the true bias.” Only against the large scene history reveals and amidst the variety of human nature it exhibits can a man truly know himself and his own time. In a similar vein, Gibbon declares that “the experience of history exalts and enlarges the horizon of our intellectual view.” Hegel, on the other hand, insists that “what experience and history teach is that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.”

On the practical side, political writers like Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and the Federalists use history to exemplify or confirm their generalizations. They agree with Thucydides that “an exact knowledge of the past is an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it.” Most men, adds Tacitus, “learn wisdom from the fortunes of others.”

It is on these grounds that the great books of history belong with treatises on morals and politics and in the company of philosophical and theological speculations concerning the nature and destiny of man. Liberal education needs the particular as well as the universal, and these are combined in the great historical narratives. Apart from their utility, they have the originality of conception, the poetic quality, the imaginative scope which rank them with the great creations of the human mind.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

History as knowledge and as literature: its kinds and divisions; its distinction from poetry, myth, philosophy, and science
The light and lesson of history: its role in the education of the mind and in the guidance of human conduct
The writing of history: research and narration
- 3a. The determination and choice of fact: the classification of historical data
- 3b. The explanation or interpretation of historic fact: the historian’s treatment of causes
The philosophy of history
- 4a. Theories of causation in the historical process
  - (1) The alternatives of fate or freedom, necessity or chance
  - (2) Material forces in history: economic, physical, and geographic factors
  - (3) World history as the development of Spirit: the stages of the dialectic of history
  - (4) The role of the individual in history: the great man, hero, or leader
- 4b. The laws and patterns of historical change: cycles, progress, evolution
- 4c. The spirit of the time as conditioning the politics and culture of a period
The theology of history
- 5a. The relation of the gods or God to human history: the dispensations of providence
- 5b. The city of God and the city of man; church and state

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as part, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases, e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows: e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. History as knowledge and as literature: its kinds and divisions; its distinction from poetry, myth, philosophy, and science

6 Herodotus: History, BK II, 71a-73b esp 72a-b; 75b; BK IV, 127a-b; BK VII, 242c-d 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 354a 7 Plato: Cratylus, 112b / Republic, BK II, 323d-324a / Timaeus, 447a / Critias, 479d / Laws, BK III, 663d-677a 9 Aristotle: Poetics, CH 9 [1451b3-6], 686a-c; CH 23, 695a-c 14 Plutarch: Theseus, 1a-c / Romulus, 15a-30a,c passim, esp 15a-18d / Themistocles, 102a,c / Pericles, 128d-129a / Timoleon, 195a-b / Cimon, 390b-d / Alexander, 540b,d-541a / Dion, 794c-795a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 60d; BK IV, 71d-72b; BK XI, 107c; BK XIII, 133b / Histories, BK II, 228a-b 18 Augustine: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 27-28, 650a-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 67b-c; 71c-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 24a-c; 41c-42a; 199a-200d; 305d-306a; 347c-350d; 457a-b 26 Shakespeare: Richard III, ACT III, SC 1 [72-88], 123c-d / Henry V, PROLOGUE, 532b,d 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 473b 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 213b-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 32a-39a esp 32d-33a, 38c-39a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 87, 123b 31 Descartes: Rules, 1, 3b-d / Discourse, PART 1, 43a-b 33 Pascal: Pensées, 628, 287a / Vacuum, 355a-356a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 7-11, 368d-370a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 65, 479b-c; SECT XII, DIV 132, 509c 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49b-50c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 97c-98d passim; 211a; 398b; 471c-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 337c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 203a-b; 258d-259a; 353b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3, 10a-11c; PART III, par 355, 112d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-158a; 182d-183d; 193d-194a; PART I, 230c-231b; 248c; PART III, 285d-286a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 430d-431a; BK XI, 469a-470c; BK XIII, 563a-b; EPILOGUE II, 675a-696d passim 53 James: Psychology, 863b [fn 2]

2. The light and lesson of history: its role in the education of the mind and in the guidance of human conduct

OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 6:20-25; 7:6-11,17-19; 8; 16:1-12; 29 / Joshua, 24:1-27—(D) Josue, 24:1-27 / I Samuel, 12:6-25—(D) I Kings, 12:6-25 / Ezra, 4:7-23—(D) I Esdras, 4:7-23 / Nehemiah, 9—(D) II Esdras, 9 / Psalms, 44:1-3; 78; 81; 105-106; 136 esp 136:10-24—(D) Psalms, 43:1-4; 77; 80; 104-105; 135 esp 135:10-24 / Ecclesiastes, 1:11; 2:16 / Isaiah, 46:8-11—(D) Isaias, 46:8-11 / Jeremiah, 2:1-9—(D) Jeremias, 2:1-9 / Ezekiel, 20:1-44—(D) Ezechiel, 20:1-44 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:2-4—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 2:2-4 NEW TESTAMENT: II Peter, 2 / Jude 4 Homer: Iliad, BK IX [485-605], 62a-63b 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 2b; BK V, 175b; BK VIII, 273b-c; BK IX, 309d-310a 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 354b-c; 379c-d 7 Plato: Timaeus, 452b / Statesman, 587d / Philebus, 612a / Laws, BK III, 663d-677a esp 667a-b; BK XII, 788a 8 Aristotle: Sophistical Refutations, CH 34 [183b16-184b8], 253a-d / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3-10, 501c-511d esp CH 3 [983b17], 501c-d, CH 10, 511c-d; BK II, CH 1 [993b30-31], 511b,d-512a; BK III, 513b,d-522a,c passim, esp CH 1 [995a23-24], 513b,d; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a25-29], 598b, CH 8 [1074b1-14], 604d-605a / On the Soul, BK I, 631a-641d passim, esp CH 2 [403b20-23], 633a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 9 [1181b12-24], 436c / Politics, BK VII, CH 10 [1329b40-1330a35], 533d-534b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 4 [1360a30-37], 600d; BK II, CH 20 [1393a25-b3], 641a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK VI, SECT 46, 278c-d; BK VII, SECT 5, 279b; SECT 49, 282d; BK IX, SECT 28, 293d-294a; BK X, SECT 27, 299d; BK XI, SECT 26, 306b 14 Plutarch: Pericles, 121a-122b / Timoleon, 195a-b; 201b-202c / Nicias, 423a-c / Alexander, 540b,d-541a / Cato the Younger, 634a-c / Demetrius, 726a-d 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 58b-d; 60d; BK IV, 71d-72b / Histories, BK I, 189d-190a; BK II, 255b-c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, par 1, 9a; BK X, par 3-6, 72a-73a; BK XI, par 1, 89b-c / City of God, BK I, CH 8-9, 133a-135a; BK IV, CH 33-34, 206c-207a,c; BK V, CH 25, 228b-c; BK XI, CH 18, 331d-332a; BK XV, CH 21, 415b-416a; BK XVII, 449a-472a,c esp CH 3, 450c-451c; BK XXII, CH 30, 618a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 28, 650a-d; CH 39, 654c-655b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS, 236a-d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, VI [31-111], 113d-114d; XI [43-139], 122c-123c; XII [22-126], 123d-125a; XV [88]-XVI [154], 129b-132a; XVII [103-142], 133b-c 22 Chaucer: Monk’s Tale, 434a-448b 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH VI, 8c-d; CH XIV-XV, 22a-b; CH XVII, 25a-26a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-54a 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 58a-59d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 24a-c; 41b-42a; 68b-69d; 198c-200d; 455d-456b 26 Shakespeare: 2 Henry IV, ACT III, SC 1 [45-96], 483b-d 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 23c-d; 32c-33a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 4c-6c; 32d-34b; 85a-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 98, 126d-127b 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART I, 43a-b 32 Milton: Areopagitica, 384b-386b 33 Pascal: Pensées, 619-641, 284b-290a / Vacuum, 355a-358b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VIII, SECT 100-112, 47c-51b passim, esp SECT 103, 48b-c / Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 11, 369d-370a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 65, 479b-c 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 420a-c; BK IV, 428a-435a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 334c-343d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 33c; 211a; 632a-b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 13d; 194a-d; 311a-312b; 326d-328a,c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 5a-8d; 248d-250a,c / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 266d [fn 2] / Practical Reason, 357c-d 43 Federalist: NUMBER 1, 30b; NUMBER 5, 37b-c; NUMBER 6, 39a; NUMBER 17, 70a-d; NUMBER 18-20, 71a-78b; NUMBER 30, 102b; NUMBER 70, 211b-d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 456a-b 44 Boswell: Johnson, xiia-c; 3c-4c; 116b; 258d-259a; 314c-315b; 347c-d; 458d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 155b-156a; 157b-c; 168d-169d; 174d-175d; 178a-184b; PART I, 230c-231b; PART IV, 368d-369a,c 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [570-585], 16a 50 Marx: Capital, 7b-d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 415a-425b 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK X, 291b-d

3. The writing of history: research and narration

APOCRYPHA: II Maccabees, 2:22-31—(D) OT, II Machabees, 2:23-32 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 1a-48a,c passim, esp 1a,c, 2b, 4d-5a, 23a-b; BK II, 68b-d; 75b; BK VII, 242c-d 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-355a passim; 373c; BK V, 489a-b 9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, BK III, CH 9 [1409b23-34], 660d; CH 16, 670c-672a 14 Plutarch: Themistocles, 102a,c / Pericles, 128d-129a / Timoleon, 195a-b / Cimon, 390b-d / Nicias, 423a-c / Demosthenes, 691b,d-692b / Dion, 794c-795a 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 1a-b; BK II, 44d-45a; BK III, 48c; 49c-d; 60d-61a; BK IV, 66b-d; 71d-72b; BK XI, 118d; BK XVI, 179d / Histories, BK I, 189a-b; 190a; BK III, 255b-c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 67b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 24a-c; 41b-42a; 68b-69a; 198c-200d; 347c-350d; 455d-457b 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 23c-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 32d-38c esp 34b-35a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 97-98, 126c-127b; APH 101-103, 127c-128a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 622-628, 286a-287a 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 209b-210b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49a-50c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 1b; 87a; 96c-d; 213a-214b; 234b; 240b-c; 648d-649c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 112a-b; 161a-163d; 186a-b; 255b-c; 598a,c; 635d [n 57]; 639a-d [n 1]; 755d-756a [n 41]; 756d-757a [n 61]; 790d-791a,c [n 98] 44 Boswell: Johnson, xia-xiiia; 1a-4c; 5c-d; 99a; 120c; 217a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-158a; 181b-182c; PART I, 230c-231b; PART III, 285d-286a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 195a-201a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK III, 134a-c; BK IX, 366d-367b; BK X, 405a-406c

3a. The determination and choice of fact: the classification of historical data

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 2b; 17c; 23a-b; BK II, 49a-56b passim; 59a; 60a; 60c-61b; 69b-d; 71a-73b; 76a-b; 76d; 77b-c; 80b-c; BK III, 89c-d; 97d-98a; 99b-c; 114a-b; 115b-d; BK IV, 127a-b; 142c-d; 150b-151c; 158a-b; BK V, 161b, 168b-c; BK VII, 221b-c; 242c-d; 254c-d; BK VIII, 261b-c; 281d-282b; BK IX, 305d; 306b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-355a; 373c; BK II, 391c-d; 399c; BK III, 439b; 442c-443a; BK V, 487d; 500d-501a; BK VI, 523c-524d passim 14 Plutarch: Theseus, 1a-15a,c passim, esp 1a-c / Romulus, 15a-30a,c passim, esp 15a-18d / Lycurgus, 32a-b / Numa Pompilius, 49a-b / Themistocles, 102a,c / Camillus, 111a-b; 116a-117a passim / Pericles, 128d-129a / Coriolanus, 191d-192b / Aristides, 262b,d-263c / Cimon, 390b-d / Nicias, 423a-c / Pompey, 502d / Alexander, 540b,d-541a / Cato the Younger, 634a-c / Demosthenes, 691b,d-692b; 698b-699a / Galba, 859d 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 48c; 49c; 60d-61a; BK IV, 66b-d; 71d-72b; BK VI, 87d; BK XI, 107c; BK XIII, 133b; BK XIV, 157c; BK XVI, 179d / Histories, BK I, 189a-b; 190a-b; BK II, 228a-b; BK III, 255b-c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, par 1, 9a; BK X, par 4-5, 72a-c / City of God, BK X, CH 14, 307c-308a; BK XV, CH 1-5, 397b,d-400c; BK XVI, CH 1-2, 449a-450c; BK XVIII, CH 40, 495a-b; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 67b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 41b-42a; 68b-69a; 81a-c; 199a-c; 305b-306a; 347c-350d; 457a-b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 13d-14b; 32d-39c esp 32d-33d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART VI, 64a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 626, 286b; 628, 287c; 786-787, 325b 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 209b-210b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49b-50c 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK IV, 428a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 88a-d; 96b,d; 97c-98d passim; 103c; 201b-204d passim, esp 203a-b; 212b-214b esp 729b-c [n 31], 213a-d; 232b-234a,c esp 232c, 736d [n 182]; 295c-296c; 354c-d; 413b-d; 428b-c; 471c-d; 648d-649b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 311a-312b; 337c; 501c-503a; 639a-d [n 1]; 660d [n 149]; 710a-b [n 1]; 756d [n 60] 44 Boswell: Johnson, 1b-c; 2d-4b; 5c-d; 27c-d; 119a; 139a; 177d-178a; 210d; 254b; 286b; 311d-312a; 347c-d; 359d-360a; 425a; 488d; 575b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153c-154c, 155b; 180c-182c; 196d-199d esp 199d; 203b-206a,c; PART I, 209b-210c; 230c-231b; 247d-248a; PART IV, 319a-b 50 Marx: Capital, 86d [fn 4] 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XIII, 582b-d; 584a-b 54 Freud: General Introduction, 450d-451a

3b. The explanation or interpretation of historic fact: the historian’s treatment of causes

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 51a-54b; BK III, 96c; 97d-98a; BK VI, 201b-c; 204b-c; BK VII, 221a-b; 226c; 237a-b; 238d-239c; 250b-d; BK VIII, 265b; BK IX, 289c; 292a; 309d-310a 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-355c; 371b-c; 384b-386d passim; BK V, 489a-b; BK VIII, 586b-d 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 17b-18d / Camillus, 107b-d; 109c-110a / Coriolanus, 191d-192b / Timoleon, 201c-d / Flamininus, 307d-308a / Cimon, 390b-d / Demosthenes, 698a-699a / Dion, 794d-795a / Marcus Brutus, 818b-c; 822a-b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 58b-d; BK VI, 91b-d; BK XVI, 179d / Histories, BK I, 189b-190b 18 Augustine: City of God, BK I, PREF, 129c-d; CH 36, 149c-d; BK V, CH 1, 207d-208c; CH 11-26, 216c-230a,c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 200b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 34c; 37a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VIII, SECT 100-112, 47c-51b 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK IV, 428a 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK II, 148d-149a; BK V, 305b-309a,c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 179a-d; 190a-d; 200a-201b; 207b; 211a-c; 232b-233c; 294a-296d; 409b-410a; 456c-457a,c; 630b,d-634a,c esp 631a-632a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 244b-245a; 386a-b; 451c-453a,c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 166c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 3, 10a-11b; PART II, par 124, 44b-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 154c-158a; 165a-166d; 182d-184b; PART IV, 368d-369a,c 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 430b-433d passim 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 342a-344b; BK X, 389d-390a; 405a-b; 430b-432c; 447c-448c; BK XI, 469a-470c; BK XIII, 563a-564a; 582b-d; BK XIV, 588a-589a; 610d-611c; BK XV, 619c-620a; EPILOGUE II, 675a-696d

4. The philosophy of history

4a. Theories of causation in the historical process

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK V, 502a-519d passim 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK I [449-482], 6c-7a; BK III [1105-1174], 29a-30a,c; BK V [65-199], 62a-c; [170-194], 63b-c; [772-1457], 71a-80a,c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK V, SECT 8, 269d-270b; BK IX, SECT 28, 293d-294a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK I, PREF, 129a-d; CH 36, 149c-d; BK II, CH 2-3, 150c-151c; BK IV, CH 33, 206c-d; BK V, CH 1, 207d-208c; CH 11-26, 216c-230a,c; BK XI, CH 18, 331d-332a; BK XII, CH 21, 357a-b; BK XIV, CH 28-BK XV, CH 1, 397a-398c; BK XV, CH 21-22, 415b-416c; BK XVIII, CH 1-2, 472b,d-473d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96], 10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-114], 77b-78a 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XIV, 21b 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 348a,c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 456d-457a,c; 630b,d-634a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 451c-453a,c 43 Federalist: NUMBER 3, 33c 43 Mill: Representative Government, 327b,d-332d passim 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 115, 42b-c; PART III, par 340-360, 110b-114a,c esp par 342, 110c-d, par 347, 111b-c; ADDITIONS, 153, 141d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-170b; 190b-201a,c esp 190b-d, 194b-196a; PART I, 258b-d; PART II, 262c-263d; 274a-275a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a-328d 50 Marx: Capital, 6d-7d; 8a-11d passim; 35b-c; 36c-d [fn 2]; 181d [fn 3]; 377c-378d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-417a,c; 419b,d-425b passim; 428b-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 342a-344b; BK XI, 469a-472b; BK XIII, 563a-575a; BK XIV, 588a-590c; 609d-613d; BK XV, 618b-621b; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-696d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 345a-c 53 James: Psychology, 361b 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 781a-789b esp 787a-788d; 791b-d, 799a-802a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 834b-c; 882b-884c

4a(1) The alternatives of fate or freedom, necessity or chance

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 21d-22a; BK IX, 291b-c 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK IV, 462a-b 7 Plato: Laws, BK IV, 679a-c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK V, SECT 8, 269d-270b 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK I [254-296], 110a-111a 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 18d, 20b-c / Camillus, 109c-110a / Coriolanus, 188d-192b / Timoleon, 195a-213d esp 201a-203b / Philopoemen, 300b-c / Demosthenes, 698b-699a / Marcus Brutus, 814d-815c; 822a-b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 49c; BK IV, 69a-b; BK VI, 91b-d / Histories, BK I, 194b; BK II, 232d-233a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK V, CH 1, 207d-208c; CH 11-26, 216c-230a,c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96], 10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-129], 77b-78a 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH VI, 8d-9b; CH XXV, 35a-36b 26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, ACT IV, SC III [215-224], 590d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 609b-c; 630b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 590a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 340, 110b-c; par 342-345, 110c-111b; par 348, 111d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-190b esp 156d-158a, 158c-160b, 161d-162a, 166b-168b, 170d-172b, 178a-179c; 203a-206a,c; PART I, 258b-d; PART II, 283d-284a,c; PART III, 285a-b, 300a-301c 47 Goethe: Faust, PART II [10849-10872], 264a-b 50 Marx: Capital, 6d; 7b-c; 10b-11b; 174a-c; 378b-d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 421d-422c passim 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK III, 143a-c; BK IX, 342a-344b; BK X, 389a-391c; BK XIII, 563a-b; BK XV, 618b-621b; 626d-630a; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-696d

4a(2) Material forces in history: economic, physical, and geographic factors

6 Herodotus: History, BK II, 50a-56c esp 51b-d; BK III, 114b-c; BK VII, 237b-c; BK IX, 314a,c 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349b-d; 350d; 352a-d; 372c-d 7 Plato: Timaeus, 444d-445b / Statesman, 587b-589c / Laws, BK III, 663d-666d; BK IV, 677a-678c 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3c-d; BK VIII, 56b-57c; BK XIV, 102b,d-108d; BK XVIII-XIX, 122a-129c; BK XXI, 153a-173d 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 3a-6d; 8b-10b; 34a-b; 71a-d; BK III, 173b-d; 177c-179a; BK IV, 189c-191a; 243b,d-246d; BK V, 305b-309a,c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 89b-d; 90c-d; 236c-237a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 220b-225a passim, esp 224b; 338b-c; 355c-d; 427b-428a 43 Mill: Representative Government, 327b,d-332d passim, esp 331b-332d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 336, 110b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 190b-201a,c esp 190b-d, 194a-195c, 199d-201a,c; 203a-b; PART I, 236d-237a; 243d-244c; 248c-d; PART II, 259d-260a; PART III, 286b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a-328c passim, esp 323a-b 50 Marx: Capital, 6d-7d; 10b-11d; 25c-d; 35b-36c; 86c; 181d [fn 3]; 187a-c; 239b-241a; 377c-378d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 415a-434d esp 416c-d, 419b,d, 421d-422a, 427a-b, 428b-d 54 Freud: New Introductory Lectures, 834c; 882c-883b, 884c

4a(3) World history as the development of Spirit: the stages of the dialectic of history

46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 279, 94b-d; par 340-360, 110b-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 153, 141d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-162a; 163a-165b; 166b-c; 169d-171b; 176b-c; 177d-190b; 203a-206a,c; PART IV, 368d-369a,c

4a(4) The role of the individual in history: the great man, hero, or leader

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1253a29-31], 446d 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK VI [756-892], 231a-235a; BK VIII [608-731], 275a-278b 14 Plutarch: Theseus, 1a-15a,c esp 9a-d / Romulus, 15a-30a,c / Lycurgus, 32a-48d esp 47a-48c / Numa Pompilius, 49a-61d esp 59c-60b / Solon, 64b,d-77a,c / Pericles, 121a-141a,c esp 129c-130b, 140c-141a,c / Timoleon, 195a-213d esp 212c-213d / Flamininus, 307d-308a / Lysander, 358b-d / Pompey, 499a-538a,c / Caesar, 577a-604d / Antony, 748a-779d esp 750a-b / Marcus Brutus, 802b,d-824a,c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 44d-45a 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH VI, 8c-10a; CH XX, 30d; CH XXV-XXVI, 35c-37d 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 267c-270b 32 Milton: To the Lord General Cromwell, 69a-b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK X, 65d-68a 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 362a-b / Political Economy, 373c-374a / Social Contract, BK II, 400c-402a 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 633d-634a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 220b; 251d-253a,c; 327d-328a,c; 492a 43 Federalist: NUMBER 72, 217d-218a 43 Mill: Representative Government, 332a-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 93, 36a-b; par 102, 39a-b; PART II, par 124, 44b-d; PART III, par 167, 60b; par 318, 105b; par 344, 111a; par 348, 111d; par 350, 112a; ADDITIONS, 58, 125c; 186, 149b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 162a-170b; 184b-d; PART I, 241d-242b; PART II, 259b-c; 273a; 275d-276a; 280b-281a; 281d-282d; 283c-d; PART III, 298a-b; 300a-301c; PART IV, 360b-c; 361d-362a; 366b 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [570-580], 16a 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 107a-b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace passim, esp BK I, 8d-10d; BK III, 143a-c, 162b-164a,c; BK IX, 342a-344b; BK X, 389a-391c, 405a-b, 430b-432c, 447c-448c, 465c-467a; BK XI, 469a-470c, 497c-499c, 507a; BK XIII, 563a-575a; BK XIV, 610d-611c; BK XV, 619c-621b; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-696d passim 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 800a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 834b-c

4b. The laws and patterns of historical change: cycles, progress, evolution

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 2b 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 349a-352a 7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII, 403a-d / Timaeus, 444d-445b / Statesman, 587b-589c / Laws, BK III, 663d-666d 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK IV, CH 14 [223b24-30], 303c-d / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 8 [1074b11-13], 605a 12 Lucretius: On the Nature of Things, BK III [1105-1174], 29a-30a,c; BK V [65-109], 62a-c; [170-194], 63b-c; [772-1457], 71a-80a,c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 14, 258d; BK VI, SECT 46, 278c-d; BK VII, SECT 1, 279b; SECT 49, 282d; BK IX, SECT 28, 293d-294a; BK X, SECT 27, 299d 13 Virgil: Eclogues, IV, 14a-15b / Aeneid, BK VIII [306-336], 267b-268a 14 Plutarch: Sulla, 372a-c 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b-52b; 58b-d 18 Augustine: City of God, BK X, CH 14, 307c-308a; BK XI, CH 18, 331d-332a; BK XV-XVIII, 397b,d-507a,c; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS, 236a-d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [67-96], 10b-c; XIV [94-120], 20c-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 439c-440b; 443a-b; 465a-c 26 Shakespeare: 2 Henry IV, ACT III, SC 1 [45-91], 483b-c / Julius Caesar, ACT IV, SC III [218-224], 590d 36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART II, 79a-80a; PART III, 121a-b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 544d-545d; 632a-634a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 62c-d; 349a 42 Kant: Critique of Judgement, 584d-587a 43 Mill: On Liberty, 300d-301c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 340, 110b-c; par 344, 111a; par 347, 111b-c; par 354-360, 112c-114a,c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 161a-c; 174d-175c; 178a-179c; 187a-c; 203b-206a,c; PART I, 235d-236a, 258b-d; PART II, 259c-d; 282d-284a,c; PART III, 286c-287a; 308a-b; PART IV, 315b-317d; 342d-343a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a; 327a-330a,c esp 327b 50 Marx: Capital, 10b-11d; 377c-378d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-472b; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-696d 54 Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-652d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781a-789b esp 785c; 799a-802a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 834c; 882c-883a; 883c

4c. The spirit of the time as conditioning the politics and culture of a period

33 Pascal: Pensées, 354, 234b 38 Rousseau: Discourse on Inequality, 362a-d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6c-7a; INTRO, par 3, 10a-12c; PART III, par 218, 72c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-175c; 177c-178a; 182d-183a; 185a-186d; 187d-189a; PART I, 211a-219d esp 219c-d; 219d-235c esp 220b-221a, 222a-223a, 233b-235c; 247b-257c; PART II, 259d-260c; 263d-281b; PART III, 286c-298a 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [570-580], 16a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 645a-646c 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK XI, 345a-c

5. The theology of history

5a. The relation of the gods or God to human history: the dispensations of providence

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3; 6-9 passim; 16-17; 21:1-24; 22:1-18 esp 22:15-18; 28:11-16; 35:9-13; 45:1-13; 46:1-4 / Exodus, 3-20 passim; 23:20-33 / Deuteronomy, 4:1-40; 7-11 passim; 29 / Joshua, 6:1-20; 10; 24:1-25—(D) Josue, 6:1-20; 10; 24:1-25 / I Samuel, 12:6-25—(D) I Kings, 12:6-25 / Nehemiah, 9:1-10:29—(D) II Esdras, 9:1-10:29 / Psalms, 44:1-3; 78; 81; 105-106; 136 esp 136:10-24—(D) Psalms, 43:1-4; 77; 80; 104-105; 135 esp 135:10-24 / Jeremiah, 43:8-13; 44:30; 46—(D) Jeremias, 43:8-13; 44:30; 46 APOCRYPHA: Judith passim, esp 5-6, 8-16—(D) OT, Judith passim, esp 5-6, 8-16 NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 1-11 / I Corinthians, 15:19-55 / Galatians, 3-4 / II Thessalonians, 1:7-2:14 / Hebrews passim / II Peter, 3:3-13 / Revelation—(D) Apocalypse 5 Aeschylus: The Persians, 15a-26d esp [737-908], 23a-24d / Prometheus Bound, 40a-51d esp [436-502], 44c-45a 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 21d-22a; BK VI, 204b-c; BK VII, 214d-220b esp 218b-220b; 237a-b, 238d-239a; 250b-d; BK VIII, 273b-c; BK IX, 309d-310a 7 Plato: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Symposium, 157b-159b / Republic, BK VI, 378a-b / Critias, 478a-485d / Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, BK IV, 679a-b; 682d-683d; BK X, 765d-768d 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK III, CH 22, 195a-201a; BK IV, CH 1, 213a-223d; CH 3, 224b-d; CH 7, 232c-235a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 11, 258a-b; BK III, SECT 11, 262a-b; BK VI, SECT 44, 278b-c 13 Virgil: Aeneid, 103a-379a 14 Plutarch: Romulus, 18d; 28b-29c / Numa Pompilius, 50d-51c / Camillus, 107b-d / Coriolanus, 188d-192b / Sulla, 372a-c / Demosthenes, 698a-699a / Marcus Brutus, 822a-b 15 Tacitus: Histories, BK I, 189b-190a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK XIII, par 49-51, 124a-d / City of God, BK I, PREF, 129a-d; CH 36, 149c-d; BK II, CH 2-3, 150c-151c; BK IV, CH 33-34, 206c-207a,c; BK V, CH 11-26, 216c-230a,c; BK X, CH 14, 307c-308a; BK XI, CH 1, 322b,d-323a; CH 18, 331d-332a; BK XII, CH 21, 357a-b; BK XV, CH 1, 397b,d-398c; CH 21-22, 415b-416c; BK XVII, CH 1-3, 449a-451c; BK XVIII, CH 1-2, 472b,d-473d; BK XXII, CH 30, 618c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 73, A 1, REP 1, 370a-371a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 98, A 6, 244c-245b; Q 106, AA 3-4, 323a-325c; PART II-II, Q 1, A 7, 385c-387a; PART III, Q 1, AA 5-6, 707a-709c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, III [13-27], 2d; VII [61-96], 10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-129], 77b-78a; XXIX, 97d-99b; XXX [37]-XXXIII [78], 102d-105a; PARADISE, VI [1-111], 113c-114d; VII [91-148], 117d-118c; XI [28-39], 122b; XIII [37-45], 124a; XVIII [52]-XX [148], 134a-138b passim; XXX [124]-XXXII [138], 153a-156a 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XXVI, 36b-37a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 306a-d 26 Shakespeare: Richard III, 105a-148a,c esp ACT V, SC III, 143b-147d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 19b-d; 35b; 37c-38a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 93, 125d-126a 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 369b-372d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, 93a-333a esp BK I [1-26], 93b-94a; BK III [80-134], 137a-138a; BK V [224-245], 180a-b, [519-543], 186b-187a; BK VI [169-188], 200a; BK VII [139-173], 220a-221a; BK X [1-21], 274b-275a, [616-640], 288a-b, [720-844], 290a-292b; BK XI [334]-BK XII [605], 306b-332a / Samson Agonistes, [60-67], 340b-341a; [300-325], 346a-b; [373-419], 347b-348b; [667-709], 354a-355a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 611-613, 282b-283a; 619-736, 284b-317b esp 655, 292b; 699, 302b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 292d-293b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 343, 110d-111a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-160b; PART III, 303c-309d; PART IV, 321b-d; 368d-369a,c 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 85a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 343b-c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-677b, 680b-c, 684b-d

5b. The city of God and the city of man; church and state

OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 2; 46:4; 48:1,8; 72:8-11; 87:3; 101:8; 127:1—(D) Psalms, 2; 45:5; 47:1,9; 71:8-11; 86:3; 100:8; 126:1 / Isaiah, 60:14—(D) Isaias, 60:14 / Daniel, 2:44; 4:3,34; 7:14—(D) Daniel, 2:44; 3:100; 4:31; 7:14 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 6:2-4—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 6:3-5 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:33; 17:24-27; 22:15-22—(D) Matthew, 6:33; 17:23-26; 22:15-22 / Mark, 12:13-17 / Luke, 12:31; 20:21-26 / John, 18:33-37 / Acts, 5:29 / Romans, 13:1-8 / I Corinthians, 15:24-25 / Ephesians, 2:19 / Colossians, 1:12-13 / I Timothy, 2:1-3 / Titus, 3:1 / I Peter, 2:13-19 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 9, 143d-144a; CH 14, 155a-b 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 11, 262a-b; BK IV, SECT 23, 265c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK I, PREF, 129a-d; CH 35, 149b-c; BK IV, CH 33-34, 206c-207a,c; BK V, CH 15-16, 220d-221b; CH 25, 228b-c; BK XI, CH 1, 322b,d-323a; BK XIV, CH 28-BK XV, CH 5, 397a-400c; BK XV, CH 21-22, 415b-416c; BK XVII, CH 1-3, 449a-451c; BK XVIII, CH 1-2, 472b,d-473d; BK XIX, CH 5, 513d-514b; CH 11, 516d-517b; CH 14, 520a-d; CH 17, 522b-523a; CH 19-26, 523b-529a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 10, 627b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, III [20-30], 2d-3a; XIV [94-120], 20c-d; XXXIV [61-68], 51d-52a; PURGATORY, VI [91-96], 61d; XIII [94-96], 72d; XVI [52-132], 77b-78b; XXIX, 97d-99b; XXX [37]-XXXIII [78], 102d-105a; PARADISE, VI [1-111], 113c-114d; XVIII [52]-XX [148], 134a-138b passim; XXX [124]-XXXII [138], 153a-156a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 151a-c; 160a-c; PART III, 177c-180a; 191b-204a; 240a-c; PART III-IV, 245c-249b; PART IV, 266a-c; 275a-278d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XII [485-551], 329b-331a 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK IV, 435a-439c esp 437c-438c 42 Kant: Science of Right, 442c-d; 444a-c / Critique of Judgement, 509d-510a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 175c-177d, 205d-206a,c; PART I, 245d-247b; PART III, 308b-c; 311b-d; PART IV, 315d, 316a-d; 331b-342a, 348a-369a,c 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 28d-32c

CROSS-REFERENCES

For the general consideration of history as a kind of knowledge, see KNOWLEDGE 5a(5); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3d; TIME 6c; and for other comparisons of history with poetry, science, and philosophy, see NATURE 4c; PHILOSOPHY 1d; POETRY 5b; SCIENCE 2b.
For the educational significance of history or of historical examples, see EDUCATION 4d; VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(4).
For other discussions of the logic or method of historical research, see LOGIC 4c; REASONING 6d.
For the theory of historical causation, see CAUSE 8; and for the factors of chance and fate, freedom and necessity, see CHANCE 6b; FATE 6; LIBERTY 6a; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5f; PROGRESS 1a; WILL 7b.
For the idea of progress in the philosophy of history, see EVOLUTION 7c; PROGRESS 1-1c; and for a cyclical theory of history, see LABOR 1a; MAN 9a; PROGRESS 1c.
For other discussions of a materialist philosophy of history, see DIALECTIC 2d; LABOR 7c-7c(3); MATTER 6; OPPOSITION 5b; PROGRESS 1a; WAR AND PEACE 2c; WEALTH 1f.
For other considerations of history as a dialectical process in the development of Spirit, see DIALECTIC 2d-2d(2); LIBERTY 6a; MIND 10f-10f(2); PROGRESS 4b.
For the role of the great man or hero in history, see HONOR 5d.
For the historian or philosopher of history as a prophet, see FATE 6.
For other expressions of historical relativism, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 9-9b; RELATION 6-6c; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7-7c.
For divine providence in relation to the events of history and to the issue of necessity and freedom in history, see FATE 4; GOD 7b; LIBERTY 5a-5b; WILL 7b.
For other discussions of the city of God and the city of man, or of the issue of church and state, see RELIGION 4; STATE 2g.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

Montesquieu. Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans
Gibbon. An Essay on the Study of Literature, LXXVIII-LXXXII
Kant. The Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-Political Plan
Hegel. The Philosophy of Mind, SECT II, SUB-SECT C (c. y)
J. S. Mill. A System of Logic, BK VI, CH 10-11
W. James. “Great Men and Their Environment,” in The Will to Believe

II.

Polybius. Histories, VOL III, BK XII (XVII-XXVII)
Lucian. The Way to Write History
Bodin. Method for the Easy Comprehension of History
Bossuet. Discours sur l’histoire universelle
Vico. The New Science
Voltaire. “History,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
Voltaire. The Philosophy of History
Herder. Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man
Condorcet. Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind
Schelling. The Ages of the World
Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, VOL I, SUP, CH 38
Guizot. General History of Civilization in Europe, LECT I-II
Macaulay. “History,” in Miscellaneous Essays
F. Schlegel. The Philosophy of History
Michelet. Introduction à l’histoire universelle
Buchez. Introduction à la science de l’histoire
T. Carlyle. On History
T. Carlyle. On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History
Emerson. “History,” in Essays, I
Comte. The Positive Philosophy, BK VI
Comte. System of Positive Polity, VOL III, Social Dynamics
Ranke. Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte
Lotze. Microcosmos, BK VII
Buckle. History of Civilization in England
Froude. The Science of History
Burckhardt. Force and Freedom, CH 4-6
Nietzsche. The Use and Abuse of History
Renouvier. Essais de critique générale, IV
Renouvier. Uchronie
Bernheim. Lehrbuch der historischen Methode
B. Adams. The Law of Civilization and Decay
Acton. Essays on Freedom and Power
Langlois and Seignobos. Introduction to the Study of History
Bradley. Collected Essays, VOL I(1)
Fiske. Essays: Historical and Literary, VOL I(1)
H. Adams. The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma
Bury. The Science of History
Lamprecht. What Is History?
T. Hardy. The Dynasts
Petrie. Revolutions of Civilization
Pareto. The Mind and Society, VOL IV, CH 13
Spengler. The Decline of the West
Penty. A Guildsman’s Interpretation of History
Bukharin. Historical Materialism
Beard. The Economic Basis of Politics
Shotwell. The History of History
Berdyaev. The Meaning of History
Troeltsch. Der Historismus und seine Überwindung
Teggart. Theory of History
Dawson. Progress and Religion
Becker. Everyman His Own Historian
Sturzo. The Inner Laws of Society, INTRO
Collingwood. The Idea of History
Croce. History, Its Theory and Practice
Croce. History as the Story of Liberty
Hulme. Writing History
Ortega y Gasset. Toward a Philosophy of History
Cassirer. The Myth of the State, PART III (15-17)
M. R. Cohen. The Meaning of Human History
Neff. The Poetry of History
Schilcher. Work and History
A. J. Toynbee. A Study of History
A. J. Toynbee. Civilization on Trial, CH 1-3, 13
Löwith. Meaning in History

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