Chapter 29: GOD

Of divine and human mating. These deities exercise superhuman powers, but none is completely omnipotent or omniscient, not even Kronos or Zeus who cannot escape the decrees of Fate. Moreover, with the exception, perhaps, of that of Zeus, the power of one divinity is often challenged and thwarted by another. This aspect of polytheism and its bearing on the intervention of the gods in the affairs of men are discussed in the chapter on FATE.

The extent to which we think of the pagans as idolatrous because they made graven images of their gods in human form, or regard the pagan conceptions of the gods as anthropomorphic, depends on our interpretation of religious symbolism. Plato for one thinks that many of the poets’ descriptions of the gods and their activities should be dismissed as unworthy, precisely because they debase the gods to the human level.

According to Gibbon, a Greek or Roman philosopher “who considered the system of polytheism as a composition of human fraud and error, could disguise a smile of contempt under the mask of devotion, without apprehending that either the mockery or the compliance would expose him to the resentment of any invisible, or, as he conceived them, imaginary powers.” But the early Christians, he points out, saw the many gods of antiquity “in a much more odious and formidable light” and held them to be “the authors, the patrons, and the objects of idolatry.”

Those who take symbols with flat literalism might also attack Christianity as anthropomorphic and idolatrous; in fact they have. The defense of Christianity against this charge does not avail in the case of Roman emperor-worship, which consisted not in the humanization of the divine for the sake of symbolic representation, but in the deification of the merely human for political purposes.

Although there are radical differences, there are also certain fundamental agreements between paganism and Judaeo-Christianity regarding the nature of the divine. As we have already noted, the deities are conceived personally, not in terms of impersonal, brute forces. Conceived as beings with intelligence and will, the gods concern themselves with earthly society; they aid or oppose man’s plans and efforts; they reward men for fidelity and virtue or punish them for impiety and sin.

Despite all other differences between paganism and Christianity, these agreements are substantial enough to provide many common threads of theological speculation throughout our tradition, especially with regard to the abiding practical problems of how man shall view himself and his destiny in relation to the divine or the supernatural. We have therefore attempted to place passages from the great books of pagan antiquity under every heading except those which are specifically restricted to the dogmas of Judaism and Christianity—even under headings which are worded monotheistically, since even here there is continuity of thought and expression from Homer and Virgil to Dante and Milton; from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus to Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant; from Lucretius to Newton and Darwin.

THE DOCTRINES KNOWN as deism and pantheism, like unqualified atheism, are as much opposed to the religious beliefs of polytheism as to the faith of Judaism and Christianity.

Of these two, pantheism is much nearer atheism, for it denies the existence of a transcendent supernatural being or beings. God is Nature. God is immanent in the world and, in the extreme form of pantheism, not transcendent in any way. Certain historic doctrines which are often regarded as forms or kinds of pantheism seem to be less extreme than this, for they do not conceive the physical universe as exhausting the infinite being of God. The world, for all its vastness and variety, may only represent an aspect of the divine nature.

According to Spinoza, the attributes of extension and thought, in terms of which we understand the world or nature as being of the divine substance, are merely those aspects of God which are known to us, for the divine substance consists “of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.” In the conception of Plotinus, the whole world represents only a partial emanation from the divine source. Yet thinkers like Plotinus and Spinoza so conceive the relation of the world to God that—as in the strictest pantheism—the religious doctrines of creation, providence, and salvation are either rejected or profoundly altered.

In the ancient world, the teaching of the Stoic philosophers expresses a kind of pantheism. “There is one universe made up of all things,” Marcus Aurelius writes, “and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth.” He speaks of the “common nature,” which is apparently divine, and of which “every particular nature is a part, as the nature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant.” But, although he stresses the oneness and divinity of all things, Aurelius also at times uses language which seems to refer to a god who dwells apart from as well as in the world, as, for example, when he debates whether the gods have any concern with human affairs.

Another type of ancient pantheism appears in the thought of Plotinus, for whom all things have being only insofar as they participate in, even as they emanate from, the power of The One, or Primal Source. “God is sovranly present through all,” he writes. “We cannot think of something of God here and something else there, nor of all of God gathered at some one spot: there is an instantaneous presence everywhere, nothing containing and nothing left void, everything therefore fully held by the divine.” The relation between The One and every other thing is compared to the number series. “Just as there is, primarily or secondarily, some form or idea from the monad in each of the successive numbers—the latter still participating, though unequally, in the unit—so the series of beings following upon The First bear, each, some form or idea derived from that source. In Number the participation establishes Quantity; in the realm of Being, the trace of The One establishes reality: existence is a trace of The One.”

But although The One is in all things, and all things depend upon it for their very existence, The One itself has no need of them. It is in this sense that Plotinus says that “The One is all things and no one of them. … Holding all—though itself nowhere held—it is omnipresent, for where its presence failed something would elude its hold. At the same time, in the sense that it is nowhere held, it is not present: thus it is both present and not present; not present as not being circumscribed by anything; yet as being utterly unattached, not inhibited from presence at any point.” Thus all things partake of The One in absolute dependence. But The One, considered in itself, is absolutely transcendent. Plotinus even denies it the name of God or Good or Being, saying it is beyond these.

Whether or not Spinoza is a pantheist has long been debated by his commentators. An explicit, even an extreme form of pantheism would seem to be expressed in the proposition that “whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.” But while the one and only substance which exists is at once nature and God, Spinoza identifies God only with the nature he calls natura naturans. God is not reduced to the nature that falls within man’s limited experience or understanding—the nature he calls natura naturata.

By natura naturans,” he explains, “we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence, that is to say, God in so far as He is considered as a free cause. But by natura naturata I understand everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any one of God’s attributes, that is to say, all the modes of God’s attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in God and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived.

God is the infinite and eternal substance of all finite existences, an absolute and unchanging one underlying the finite modes in which it variably manifests itself. Though God for Spinoza is transcendent in the sense of vastly exceeding the world known to man, in no sense does God exist apart from the whole of nature. Spinoza’s view thus sharply departs from that of an orthodox Jewish or Christian theologian. When the latter says that God is transcendent, he means that God exists apart, infinitely removed from the whole created universe. When the latter speaks of God as being immanent in that universe, he carefully specifies that it is not by His substance, but by the power of His action and knowledge. But Spinoza calls God “the immanent, and not the transitive, cause of all things,” for the reason that “outside God there can be no substance, that is to say, outside Him nothing can exist which is in itself.”

These divergent conceptions of God’s immanence and transcendence—so relevant to the question of who is or is not a pantheist—are further discussed in the chapters on NATURE and WORLD.

UNLIKE PANTHEISM, deism affirms gods or a God, personal intelligences existing apart from this world; but, as in the teaching of Lucretius, deism sometimes goes to the extreme of believing in absentee gods who neither intervene in the order of nature nor concern themselves with human affairs.

The nature of the gods,” Lucretius writes, “must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger.

Such gods neither create the world nor govern it; above all they do not reward or punish man, and so they do not have to be feared or propitiated.

To say that for the sake of men they have willed to set in order the glorious nature of the world and therefore it is meet to praise the work of the gods immortal, and that it is an unholy thing ever to shake by any force from its fixed seats that which by the forethought of the gods in ancient days has been established on everlasting foundations for mankind, or to assail it by speech and utterly overturn it from top to bottom; and to invent and add other figments of the kind … is all sheer folly. For what advantage can our gratitude bestow on immortal and blessed beings that for our sakes they should take in hand to administer aught?

Divinity seems to have moral significance to Lucretius only insofar as the gods exemplify the happy life; and religion is immoral because its superstitions concerning divine motives and meddling make men servile and miserable.

When the deism of Lucretius is contrasted with the more familiar modern forms of that doctrine, the influence of Christianity is seen. The modern deist affirms the supremacy of one God, the infinite and eternal Creator of this world, Whose laws are the laws of nature which are laid down from the beginning and which govern all created things. Rousseau speaks of this as “the religion of man” and even identifies it with Christianity—“not the Christianity of today, but that of the Gospel, which is entirely different.” He describes this religion as that “which has neither temples, nor altars, nor rites, and is confined to the purely internal cult of the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality.”

Not all deists, certainly not those of the 17th and early 18th centuries, go to the Lucretian extreme of picturing an uninterested and morally neutral God. Many of them believe in an after-life. But modern deism did tend toward this extreme. By Kant’s time it had even ceased to look upon God as a personal intelligence. Kant therefore takes great pains to distinguish deism from theism.

The deist, according to Kant, “admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone the existence of a supreme being, but at the same time maintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental, and that all we can say of it is, that it possesses all reality, without being able to define it more closely.” The theist, on the other hand, “asserts that reason is capable of presenting us, from the analogy with nature, with a more definite conception of this being, and that its operations, as the cause of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will.”

Kant even maintains that “we might, in strict rigor, deny to the deist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or thing—the supreme cause of all other things.” In any case, deism seems to be an essentially un-Jewish and un-Christian or anti-Jewish and anti-Christian doctrine, for it denies God’s supernatural revelation of Himself; it denies miracles and every other manifestation of supernatural agency in the course of nature or the life of man; it denies the efficacy of prayer and sacrament. In short, it rejects the institutions and practices, as well as the faith and hope, of any religion which claims supernatural foundation and supernatural warrant for its dogmas and rituals. Deism, which “consists simply in the worship of a God considered as great, powerful, and eternal,” is, in Pascal’s opinion, “almost as far removed from the Christian religion as atheism, which is its exact opposite.”

What Pascal and Kant call “deism” and Rousseau “the religion of man,” others like Hume call “natural religion.” His Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion provide a classic statement of rationalism, which is the same as naturalism, in religion; though, as the chapter on RELIGION indicates, it may be questioned whether the word “religion” can be meaningfully used for a doctrine which claims no knowledge beyond that of the philosopher, and no guidance for human life beyond the precepts of the moralist.

THE SYSTEMATIC EXPOSITION of man’s knowledge of God is the science of theology. In addition to considering all things—the whole world and human life—in relation to God, theology treats especially of God’s existence, essence, and attributes. Throughout the range of its subject matter and problems, theology may be of two sorts: it may be either natural knowledge, obtained by ordinary processes of observation and reasoning; or knowledge which is supernatural in the sense of being based on divine revelation. This is the traditional distinction between natural and sacred or, as it is sometimes called, dogmatic theology. The one belongs to the domain of reason; it is the work of the philosopher. The other belongs to the domain of faith, and is the work of the theologian who seeks to understand his faith.

These distinctions are discussed in the chapters on THEOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, and WISDOM. Here we are concerned with different attitudes toward the problem of man’s knowledge of God. The deist, as we have seen, rejects supernatural revelation and faith; theology, like religion, is held to be entirely natural, a work of reason. The agnostic makes the opposite denial. He denies that anything supernatural can be known by reason. It cannot be proved or, for that matter, disproved. The evidences of nature and the light of reason do not permit valid inferences or arguments concerning God or creation, providence or immortality.

It is usually with respect to God’s existence that the agnostic most emphatically declares reason’s incompetence to demonstrate. He often accompanies the declaration with elaborate criticisms of the arguments which may be offered by others. This is not always the case, however. For example, the great Jewish theologian, Moses Maimonides, thinks that God’s existence can be proved by reason entirely apart from faith; but with regard to the essence or attributes of God, his position seems to be one which might be called agnostic.

When men “ascribe essential attributes to God,” Maimonides declares, “these so-called essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes of other things, just as there is no similarity between the essence of God and that of other beings.” Since the meaning of such positive attributes as good or wise is derived from our knowledge of things, they do not provide us with any knowledge of God’s essence, for no comparison obtains between things and God. Hence Maimonides asserts that “the negative attributes of God are the true attributes.” They tell us not what God is, but what God is not.

Even though Maimonides holds that “existence and essence are perfectly identical” in God, he also insists that “we comprehend only the fact that He exists, not His essence. … All we understand,” he goes on to say, in addition to “the fact that He exists,” is the fact that “He is a Being to whom none of his creatures is similar.” This fact is confirmed in all the negative attributes such as eternal (meaning non-temporal), infinite, or incorporeal; even as it is falsified by all the positive attributes, expressed by such names as “good” or “living” or “knowing,” insofar as they imply a comparison between God and creatures. When they cannot be interpreted negatively, they can be tolerated as metaphors, but they must not be taken as expressing an understanding “of the true essence of God,” concerning which Maimonides maintains, “there is no possibility of obtaining a knowledge.”

Aquinas takes issue with such agnosticism about the divine nature in his discussion of the names of God. Although he says that “we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not,” Aquinas disagrees with Maimonides that all names which express some knowledge of God’s essence must be interpreted negatively or treated as metaphors. He denies that “when we say God lives, we mean merely that God is not like an inanimate thing” as “was taught by Rabbi Moses.” On the contrary, he holds that “these names signify the divine substance … although they fall short of representing Him. … For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him.” Therefore, Aquinas concludes, “when we say, God is good, the meaning is not, God is the cause of goodness, or, God is not evil: but the meaning is, Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God, and in a higher way.”

If Maimonides were right that the names which are said positively of both God and creatures are “applied … in a purely equivocal sense” (e.g., having literal meaning when said of creatures but being only metaphorical when said of God), then, according to Aquinas, it would follow that “from creatures nothing at all could be known or demonstrated about God.” Those who say, on the other hand, that “the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal” (i.e., are said in exactly the same sense), claim to comprehend more than man can know of the divine essence. When the term wise “is applied to God,” Aquinas writes, “it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term wise is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and creatures” but rather all positives names “are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense.”

A further discussion of the names of God will be found in the chapter on SIGN AND SYMBOL; and the consideration of the analogical, the univocal, and the equivocal will also be found there as well as in the chapter on SAME AND OTHER. We have dealt with these matters here only for the sake of describing that degree of agnosticism, according to which Maimonides, by contrast with Aquinas, is an agnostic. But agnosticism usually goes further and denies that man can have any natural knowledge of God—either of His existence or of His essence.

So understood, agnosticism need not be incompatible with religion, unless a given religion holds, as an article of faith itself, that the existence of God can be proved by reason. In fact, the agnostic may be a religious man who accepts divine revelation and regards faith as divinely inspired.

Montaigne’s Apology for Raymond de Sebonde illustrates this position. Sebonde had written a treatise on natural theology, which to Montaigne seems “hardy and bold; for he undertakes, by human and natural reasons to establish and make good against the atheists all the articles of the Christian religion.” Though Montaigne says of his work, “I do not think it possible to do better upon that subject,” and though he entertains the conjecture that it may have been “drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas, for, in truth, that mind full of infinite learning and admirable subtlety, was alone capable of such imaginations”; nevertheless, Montaigne does “not believe that means purely human are, in any sort, capable of doing it.”

According to Montaigne, “it is faith alone that vividly and certainly comprehends the deep mysteries of our religion.” In his view, reason by itself is incapable of proving anything, much less anything about God. “Our human reasons,” he writes, “are but sterile and undigested matter; the grace of God is its form; it is that which gives it fashion and value.” The light and value in Sebonde’s arguments come from the fact that faith supervenes “to tint and illustrate” them, and “renders them firm and solid.”

Such arguments, Montaigne says, may serve as “direction and first guide to a learner” and may even “render him capable of the grace of God”; but for himself, skeptical of all arguments, the way of faith alone can provide “a certain constancy of opinion. … Thus have I, by the grace of God, preserved myself entire, without anxiety or trouble of conscience, in the ancient belief of our religion, amidst so many sects and divisions as our age has produced.”

Far from being religious as Montaigne was, the agnostic may be a skeptic about faith as well as reason. He may look upon faith either as superstition or as the exercise of the will to believe with regard to the unknowable and the unintelligible—almost wishful thinking. He may even go so far as to treat religion as if it were pathological.

Freud, for example, regards religion as an illusion to be explained in terms of man’s need to create gods in his own image—to find a surrogate for the father, on whom his infantile dependence can be projected. Freud finds confirmation for this in the fact that in the religions of the west, God “is openly called Father. Psychoanalysis,” he goes on, “concludes that he really is the father, clothed in the grandeur in which he once appeared to the small child.”

Though the grown man “has long ago realized that his father is a being with strictly limited powers and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute,” Freud thinks that he nevertheless “looks back to the memory-image of the overrated father of his childhood, exalts it into a Deity, and brings it into the present and into reality. The emotional strength of this memory-image and the lasting nature of his need for protection”—for, as Freud explains, “in relation to the external world he is still a child”—“are the two supports of his belief in God.”

AT THE OTHER EXTREME from agnosticism is, as the name implies, gnosticism. Like deism, it dispenses with faith, but it exceeds traditional deism in the claims it makes for reason’s power to penetrate the divine mysteries. Between exclusive reliance on faith and an exaltation of reason to the point where there is no need for God to reveal anything, a middle ground is held by those who acknowledge the contributions of both faith and reason. Those who try to harmonize the two usually distinguish between the spheres proper to each, and formulate some principle according to which they are related to each other in an orderly fashion.

Whatever is purely a matter of faith, Aquinas says, is assented to solely because “it is revealed by God.” The articles of Christian faith are typified by “the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God, the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, and the like.” With regard to such matters, which Aquinas thinks belong primarily to faith, some auxiliary use can be made of reason, “not, indeed, to prove faith,” he explains, but to make clear the things that follow from it. Certain matters, such as God’s existence and attributes, he classifies as belonging to “the preambles to faith” because they fall, in his view, within reason’s power to demonstrate, unaided by faith. Yet even here he does not assign the affirmation of the truth to reason alone.

Just as “it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation,” so even with regard to “those truths about God which human reason can investigate,” Aquinas thinks it was also necessary that “man be taught by a divine revelation. For the truth about God, such as reason can know it, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.” Because “human reason is very deficient in things concerning God”—“a sign of which is that philosophers … have fallen into many errors and have disagreed among themselves”—men would have no knowledge of God “free from doubt and uncertainty” unless all divine truths were “delivered to them by the way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.”

In different ways faith supports reason and reason helps faith. On matters which belong to both reason and faith, faith provides a greater certitude. On matters strictly of faith, reason provides some understanding, however remote and inadequate, of the mysteries of religion. “The use of human reason in religion,” Bacon writes, “is of two sorts: the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. … In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason and applieth his inspiration to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter, there is allowed us an use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction.”

In addition to all discursive knowledge of God, whether it be by faith or by reason, there is the totally incommunicable and intimate acquaintance with the supernatural which the mystic claims for his vision in moments of religious ecstasy or which is promised to the blessed as their heavenly beatitude. When, at the culmination of Paradise, Dante sees God, “my vision,” he declares, “was greater than our speech.”

Knowing that his “speech will fall more short … than that of an infant who still bathes his tongue at the breast,” he tries nevertheless to communicate in words “one single spark of Thy glory for the folk to come.” In the presence of God, he writes, his mind, “wholly rapt, was gazing fixed, motionless, and intent, and ever with gazing grew enkindled. In that Light one becomes such that it is impossible he should ever consent to turn himself from it for other sight; because the Good which is the object of the will is all collected in it, and outside of it that is defective which is perfect there.”

THE ARGUMENTS FOR the existence of the gods or of one God constitute one of the greatest attempts of the human mind to go beyond the sensible or phenomenal world of experience. The attempt has been made in every age and by minds of quite different persuasions in religious belief or philosophical outlook. It is possible, nevertheless, to classify the arguments into two or three main types.

Within the domain of pure or speculative reason there seem to be two ways of approaching the problem of God’s existence.

One is in terms of the conception of God as an infinite, perfect, and necessary being, whose non-existence is therefore inconceivable. According to Anselm, God cannot be conceived in any other way than as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” But since “the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God,” how shall he be made to know that the God, which exists in his understanding at the moment when he denies His real existence, also really exists outside his understanding? “For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists.” Hence Anselm considers the consequence of supposing that God exists in the understanding alone.

If that, than which nothing greater can be conceived,” he argues, “exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one than which a greater can be conceived”—for to exist in reality as well as in the understanding is to have more being. But this leads to “an irreconcilable contradiction,” since “if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

Therefore Anselm concludes that a being “than which nothing greater can be conceived” must exist “both in the understanding and reality.”

Anselm summarizes his argument by saying that “no one who understands what God is, can conceive that God does not exist.” Since the non-existence of God is inconceivable, God must exist. Descartes gives the same argument a slightly different statement in terms of the inseparability of God’s essence from God’s existence.

Being accustomed,” he writes, “in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing. But, nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention, I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a rectilinear triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley; and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley.

Spinoza defines a “cause of itself” as “that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.” Since in his conception of substance, substance is necessarily infinite, it is also cause of itself. Hence he concludes that “God or substance … necessarily exists”; for “if this be denied, conceive if it be possible that God does not exist. Then it follows that His essence does not involve existence. But this is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.”

This mode of argument, which takes still other forms, is traditionally called the “ontological argument” or the “a priori proof” of God’s existence. Its critics sometimes deny that it is an argument or proof in any sense at all. Aquinas, for example, interprets Anselm not as proving God’s existence, but rather as asserting that God’s existence is self-evident. Those who say that the proposition “God does not exist” is self-contradictory, are saying that the opposite proposition “God exists” must be self-evident.

Aquinas does not deny that the proposition “God exists” is intrinsically self-evident. On this point he goes further than Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza. Where they say God’s essence involves His existence, Aquinas asserts that in God essence and existence are identical. When Moses asks God, “If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?” the Lord says unto Moses, “I AM THAT I AM,” and adds, “Say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS hath sent me to you.” This name—HE WHO IS—Aquinas holds to be “the most proper name of God” because it signifies that “the being of God is His very essence.”

For this reason he thinks that the proposition “God exists” is self-evident in itself. Its subject and predicate are immediately related. Nevertheless, Aquinas holds that the proposition is not self-evident to us “because we do not know the essence of God.” Even supposing, he writes, “that everyone understands this name God as signifying something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the name signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.”

The writer of the First Set of Objections to Descartes’ Meditations maintains that the criticism advanced by Aquinas applies to Descartes as well as to Anselm. Whether stated in terms of the conception of an absolutely perfect being or in terms of essence and existence, the argument is invalid, he thinks, which asserts that God actually exists because His non-existence is inconceivable. Kant’s later criticism of the ontological argument takes a similar course. A proposition may be logically necessary without being true in fact.

The conception of an absolutely necessary being,” he writes, “is a mere idea, the objective reality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. … The unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing.” From the fact that “existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception,” we cannot conclude that “the existence of the thing … is therefore absolutely necessary—merely,” Kant says, “because its existence has been cogitated in the conception. … Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. … The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a supreme being is therefore insufficient.

THE SECOND MAIN approach to the problem of God’s existence lies in the sort of proof which, Locke thinks, “our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts.” He refrains from criticizing the argument from “the idea of a most perfect being,” but he does insist that we should not “take some men’s having that idea of God in their minds … for the only proof of a Deity.” He for one prefers to follow the counsel of St. Paul, that “the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.”

We have, according to Locke, an intuitive knowledge of our own existence. We know, he says, that “nonentity cannot produce any real being”; and so “from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our constitution, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth—That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being.”

Without labelling it a proof of God’s existence, Augustine in his Confessions presents a similar argument—from the visible creation. “Behold,” he says, “the heavens and the earth are; they proclaim that they were created; for they change and vary. … They proclaim also that they made not themselves: ‘therefore we are, because we have been made; we were not therefore, before we were, so as to make ourselves.’ … Thou therefore, Lord, madest them.”

This second approach to the existence of God by reasoning from the facts of experience or the evidences of nature is called the “a posteriori proof.” In the tradition of the great books, it has been formulated in many different ways. What is common to all of them is the principle of causality, in terms of which the known existence of certain effects is made the basis for inferring the existence of a unique cause—a first cause, a highest cause, an uncaused cause.

Aristotle, for example, in the last book of his Physics, argues from the fact of motion or change to the existence of an unmoved mover. He sums up his elaborate reasoning on this point in the following statement. “We established the fact that everything that is in motion is moved by something, and that the movent is either unmoved or in motion, and that, if it is in motion, it is moved either by itself or by something else and so on throughout the series: and so we proceeded to the position that the first principle that directly causes things that are in motion to be moved is that which moves itself, and the first principle of the whole series is the unmoved.”

Aristotle’s argument, unlike that of Augustine or Locke, does not presuppose the creation of the world, at least not in the sense of the world’s having a beginning. On the contrary, he holds the world and its motions to be as eternal as their unmoved mover. “It is impossible,” he writes in the Metaphysics, “that movement should either have come into being or cease to be.” Precisely because he thinks the world’s motions are eternal, Aristotle holds that the prime mover, in addition to being everlasting, must be immutable. This for him means “a principle whose very essence is actuality.” Only a substance without any potency, only one which is purely actual, can be an absolutely immutable, eternal being.

Whatever has any potentiality in its nature is capable of not existing. If everything were of this sort, nothing that now is need be, for it is possible for all things to be capable of existing, but not yet to exist.

Hence, in still another way, Aristotle seems to reach the conclusion that a purely actual being must exist; and, furthermore, he seems to identify this being with a living and thinking God. “Life also belongs to God,” he writes; “for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal.”

Where Aristotle argues from motion and potentiality to a prime mover and a pure actuality, Newton gives the a posteriori proof another statement by arguing from the design of the universe to God as its designer or architect. “The most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes” seem to him the best way of knowing God. “Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety in things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing.”

In similar fashion Berkeley maintains that “if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but, above all, the never enough admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes, one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the … Spirit, who ‘works all in all,’ and ‘by whom all things consist.’” This seems to him so certain that he adds, “we may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men.”

But, according to Berkeley, all the visible things of nature exist only as ideas in our minds, ideas which, unlike our own memories or imaginations, we do not ourselves produce. “Everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense,” he writes, must have some other cause than our own will, and is therefore “a sign or effect of the power of God.” To the “unthinking herd” who claim that “they cannot see God,” Berkeley replies that “God … is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us.”

The existence of any idea in us is for Berkeley ground for asserting God’s existence and power as its cause. But for Descartes one idea alone becomes the basis of such an inference. He supplements his a priori or ontological argument with what he calls an “a posteriori demonstration of God’s existence from the mere fact that the idea of God exists in us.”

That he is himself imperfect, Descartes knows from the fact that he doubts. Even when doubting leads to knowledge, his knowledge is imperfect, “an infallible token” of which, he says, is the fact that “my knowledge increases little by little.” But the idea which he has of God, he declares, is that of an absolutely perfect being, “in whom there is nothing merely potential, but in whom all is present really and actually.” On the principle that there cannot be more reality or perfection in the effect than in the cause, Descartes concludes that his own imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of a perfect being. “The idea that I possess of a being more perfect than I,” he writes, “must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect.”

The radical imperfection of man, and indeed of all creation, offers Augustine still another proof for God’s existence, which he attributes to the “Platonists.”

They have seen,” he writes, “that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees; or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of beasts; or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels—all can only be through Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another to understand, as though He could live, not understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, are to be. They have understood, from this unchangeableness and this simplicity, that all things must have been made by Him, and that He could Himself have been made by none.

The variety of arguments we have so far examined seems to fit the “five ways” in which, according to Aquinas, the existence of God can be proved a posteriori. “The first and most manifest way is the argument from motion,” which Aquinas attributes to Aristotle. “The second way is from the nature of an efficient cause.” Berkeley’s argument or Locke’s would seem, in some respects, to offer a version of this mode of reasoning. “The third way is taken from possibility and necessity,” and seems to develop the argument from potentiality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and to contain the inference from mutability and contingency which is implicit in the argument attributed to the Platonists by Augustine. “The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.” Proceeding from the existence of the imperfect to absolute perfection, it resembles in principle the reasoning of Descartes concerning the perfection in the cause relative to the perfection in the effect. “The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world”—from the fact that everything acts for an end—and so is like the argument which Newton offers from final causes and the existence of order in the universe.

These “five ways” may or may not be regarded as an exhaustive list of the a posteriori proofs. It may even be questioned whether the five ways are logically distinct and independent. Aquinas himself says that “in speculative matters the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is only one; whereas probable means of proof are many.” Since he considers the argument for God’s existence to be a certain, not a probable proof, it would seem to follow that, in strict logic, only one principle can be involved in that proof.

As already suggested, the principle—common to all the various ways in which such a posteriori reasoning is expressed—seems to be the principle of causality. This appears in the argument from the existence of contingent beings, which cannot cause their own being, to the existence of a being which needs no cause of its being, because its very essence is to exist. This may be the one argument for God’s existence or, if one among many, it may be the core of all the others. It has the distinction at least of conceiving God as the cause of being, rather than of motion or of hierarchy and order in the world.

According to the statement of Aquinas that “being is the proper effect of God,” it establishes God as the unique and direct cause of the being possessed by every finite thing. This formulation of the proof is more fully examined in the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY; and its relation to the question of whether the world had a beginning or is eternal, and if eternal, whether it is created or uncreated, will be seen in the chapters on CAUSE, ETERNITY, and WORLD.

THE VALIDITY OF the a posteriori argument for God’s existence—in one form or another—is questioned by those who think that the causal principle cannot be applied beyond experience, or who think that our knowledge of cause and effect is not sufficient to warrant such inferences.

The existence of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect,” Hume writes; “and these arguments are founded entirely on experience. … It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another.

But Hume doubts “whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect … or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. … If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature,” as Hume thinks is the case, then it follows that “both the effect and the cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know.

“I leave it to your own reflection,” he adds, “to pursue the consequences of this principle.” One seems obvious enough; namely, that God—a unique and unparalleled cause—cannot be proved by reasoning from our experience of effects and their causes. Hume himself draws this conclusion when he declares that theology, insofar as it is concerned with the existence of a Deity, has “its best and most solid foundation,” not in reason or experience, but in “faith and divine revelation.”

Like Hume, Kant thinks that our notions of cause and effect cannot be applied outside experience or to anything beyond the realm of sensible nature. But he offers an additional reason for denying validity to all a posteriori reasoning concerning God’s existence. “It imposes upon us,” he says, “an old argument in a new dress, and appeals to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in fact, it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice.”

The principle of the argument from the contingency of the world or its parts Kant states as follows: “If something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist.” One premise in the argument, namely, that contingent things exist, has its foundation in experience and therefore Kant admits that the reasoning “is not completely a priori or ontological.” But in order to complete the proof, he thinks it must be shown that an ens realissimum, or most perfect being, is the same as an absolutely necessary being, in order for the obtained conclusion (a necessary being exists) to be translated into the conclusion desired (God exists).

That “an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity”—or, in other words, that a perfect being is identical with one which necessarily exists—is, according to Kant, “exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument.” Hence he maintains that the argument from contingency is invalid because it cannot avoid including what is for Kant the invalid premise of the ontological argument as “the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning.”

THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING the proof of God’s existence raises issues in logic, in metaphysics and physics, and in the theory of knowledge. Philosophers are opposed on the question whether a valid demonstration is possible. Those who think it possible differ from one another on the way in which the proof should be constructed. Those who think it impossible do not always go to the opposite extreme of making the affirmation of God’s existence a matter of faith; or of denying with the skeptic that we can have any light on the question at all. Pascal and Kant, for example, reject the theoretic arguments as inconclusive or untenable, but they do not think the problem is totally insoluble. They offer instead practical grounds or reasons for accepting God’s existence.

“The metaphysical proofs of God are so remote from the reasoning of men,” Pascal asserts, “and so complicated, that they make little impression.” He will “not undertake,” he tells us in his Pensées, “to prove by natural reasons … the existence of God.” In his view “there are only three kinds of persons: those who serve God, having found Him; others who are occupied in seeking Him, not having found Him; while the remainder live without seeking Him, and without having found Him.” Since he regards the first as “reasonable and happy,” the last as “foolish and unhappy,” he addresses himself to the middle group whom he regards as “unhappy and reasonable.”

He asks them to consider whether God is or is not. “Reason can decide nothing here,” he says. If a choice is to be made by reason, it must be in the form of a wager. “Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than another, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then, without hesitation, that He is.”

We are incapable of knowing either that God is or what God is, according to Pascal, because “if there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible” and “has no affinity to us.” Nevertheless, proceeding on the practical level of the wager, reason may lead to Christian faith, yet not in such a way as to give adequate reasons for that belief, since Christians “profess a religion for which they cannot give a reason.”

Kant also makes the affirmation of God a matter of faith, but for him it is a “purely rational faith, since pure reason … is the sole source from which it springs.” He defines a matter of faith as any object which cannot be known through the speculative use of reason, but which “must be thought a priori, either as consequences or as grounds, if pure practical reason is to be used as duty commands … Such is the summum bonum,” he says, “which has to be realized in the world through freedom … This effect which is commanded, together with the only conditions on which its possibility is conceivable by us, namely, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are matters of faith and are of all objects the only ones that can be so called.”

For Kant, then, the existence of God is a “postulate of pure practical reason … as the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum.” The moral law commands us to seek the highest good, with perfect happiness as its concomitant; but Kant thinks that “there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as a part of it.” Since man is a part of the world or nature, and dependent on it, “he cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles.” The only possible solution lies in “the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself, and containing the principle of this connexion, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality.” That is why, Kant explains, “it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.”

IN THE TRADITION of the great books, the common ground shared by reason and faith is marked by the convergence of the contributions made by pagan, Jew, and Christian—and by poets, philosophers, and theologians—to the problem of God’s existence and the understanding of the divine nature, the essence of God and His attributes.

Certain attributes of God, such as simplicity, immateriality, eternity, infinity, perfection, and glory, are usually regarded as so many different ways in which the human understanding apprehends the divine nature in itself. Other attributes, such as the divine causality, omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, love, justice, and mercy, are usually taken as ways of considering God’s nature in relation to the world or to creatures. But to divide the attributes in this way, as is done in the Outline of Topics, is to make a division which cannot be fully justified except in terms of convenience for our understanding. God’s will, for example, no less than God’s intellect, can be considered in relation to Himself. God’s intellect, no less than God’s will, can have the world for its object. So, too, the divine goodness can be considered with reference to things, even as God’s love can be considered with reference to Himself.

The difficulties we meet in classifying or ordering the attributes of God confirm the opinion of almost all theologians, that our understanding is inadequate to comprehend the essence of God. The fact that we employ a multiplicity of attributes to represent to ourselves what in itself is an absolute unity is another indication of the same point. The one attribute of simplicity would seem to deny us the right to name others, unless we take the plurality of attributes to signify something about man’s understanding of God rather than a real complexity in the divine nature.

He that will attribute to God,” Hobbes writes, “nothing but what is warranted by natural reason, must either use such negative attributes, as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what He is (for that were to circumscribe Him within the limits of our fancy), but how much we admire Him, and how ready we would be to obey Him; which is a sign of humility and of a will to honor Him as much as we can: for there is but one name to signify our conception of His nature, and that is, I AM: and but one name of His relation to us, and that is GOD; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.

Even when they are discussed by the philosophers and reflected on by the poets, certain matters belong especially to theology because they constitute the dogmas of religion—articles of religious faith based solely on divine revelation, not discovered by human inquiry or speculation. That God created the world out of nothing and of His free will; that the world had a beginning and will have an end are, for example, dogmas of traditional Judaism and Christianity. Philosophers may argue about the freedom or necessity of the creative act, or about the possibility of a beginning or an end to time and the world, but Jewish and Christian theologians find in Sacred Scripture the warrant for believing that which may not be thoroughly intelligible to reason, much less demonstrable by it. What is true of creation applies generally to the religious belief in divine providence and the positive commandments of God, to the gift of grace which God bestows upon men, and to the performance of miracles.

Judaism and Christianity share certain dogmas, though the degree to which Jewish and Christian theologians commonly understand what is apparently the same dogma varies from great similarity of interpretation (as in the case of creation and providence) to differences so great (as, for example, with regard to grace) that there may be some doubt whether the dogma in question is really the same. The line of demarcation between these faiths would seem to be more easily determined than their common ground; yet even here such matters as the resurrection of the body—even when we take differences of interpretation into account—may be regarded as a dogma shared by both.

The basic differences between Jewish and Christian theology center, of course, on the issue between a unitarian and a trinitarian conception of the Godhead, with immediate consequences for disbelief or belief in Christ as the incarnate second person of the Trinity—the Word become flesh. This in turn has consequences for doctrines of salvation, and of the nature and mission of the church, its rituals and its sacraments. Even within Christianity, however, there have been and still are serious doctrinal differences on all these matters. The most fundamental heresies and schisms of early Christianity concerned the understanding of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The great modern schism which divided Christendom arose from issues about the sacraments, the organization and practices of the church, and the conditions of salvation.

It would seem to be just as easy to say what beliefs are common to religious Jews and Christians, as to articulate the faith common to all sects of Christianity. If all varieties of Protestant doctrine are included, little remains in common except belief in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—creator and provider, governor and judge, dispenser of rewards and punishments.

ONE BOOK STANDS OUT from all the rest because, in our tradition, it is—as the use of “Bible” for its proper name implies—the book about God and man. For those who have faith, Holy Writ or Sacred Scripture is the revealed Word of God. Its division into Old and New Testaments represents the historic relation of the Jewish and Christian religions.

Without prejudice to the issue between belief and unbelief, or between Jewish and Christian faith, we have attempted to organize the references to specifically religious doctrines concerning God and His creatures according to their origin and foundation in either the Old or in the New Testament, or in both. On certain points, as we have already seen, the line of distinction can be clearly drawn. For example, the doctrines of God’s covenant with Israel, of the Chosen People, of the Temple and the Torah, are indisputably drawn from the Old Testament; and from the New Testament come such dogmas as those concerning Christ’s divinity and humanity, the Virgin Birth, the Church as the mystical body of Christ, and the seven sacraments.

Under all these topics we have assembled passages from the Bible, interpretations of them by the theologians, and materials from the great books of poetry and history, philosophy and science. Since the criterion of relevance here is the reflection of sacred or religious doctrine in secular literature, the writings of pagan antiquity are necessarily excluded, though they are included in the more philosophical topics of theology, such as the existence and nature of one God.

Despite its length, this chapter by no means exhausts the discussion of God in the great books. The long list of Cross-References, which follows the seventy-three topics comprising the Reference section of this chapter, indicates the various ways in which the idea of God occurs in the topics of other chapters. The reader will find that list useful not only as an indication of the topics in other chapters which elaborate on or extend the discussion of matters treated here, but also as a guide to other Introductions in which he is likely to find the conception of God a relevant part of the examination of some other great idea.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The polytheistic conception of the supernatural order * 1a. The nature and existence of the gods * 1b. The hierarchy of the gods: their relation to one another * 1c. The intervention of the gods in the affairs of men: their judgment of the deserts of men

2. The existence of one God * 2a. The revelation of one God * 2b. The evidences and proofs of God’s existence * 2c. Criticisms of the proofs of God’s existence: agnosticism * 2d. The postulation of God: practical grounds for belief

3. Man’s relation to God or the gods * 3a. The fear of God or the gods * 3b. The reproach or defiance of God or the gods * 3c. The love of God or the gods * 3d. Obedience to God or the gods * 3e. The worship of God or the gods: prayer, propitiation, sacrifice * 3f. The imitation of God or the gods: the divine element in human nature; the deification of men; man as the image of God

4. The divine nature in itself: the divine attributes * 4a. The identity of essence and existence in God: the necessity of a being whose essence involves its existence * 4b. The unity and simplicity of the divine nature * 4c. The immateriality of God * 4d. The eternity and immutability of God * 4e. The infinity of God: the freedom of an infinite being * 4f. The perfection or goodness of God * 4g. The intellect of God * 4h. The happiness and glory of God

5. The divine nature in relation to the world or creatures * 5a. God as first and as exemplar cause: the relation of divine to natural causation * 5b. God as final cause: the motion of all things toward God * 5c. The power of God: the divine omnipotence * 5d. The immanence of God: the divine omnipresence * 5e. The transcendence of God: the divine aseity * 5f. God’s knowledge: the divine omniscience; the divine ideas * 5g. God’s will: divine choice * 5h. God’s love: the diffusion of the divine goodness * 5i. Divine justice and mercy: divine rewards and punishments

6. Man’s knowledge of God * 6a. The names of God: the metaphorical and symbolic representations of God; the anthropomorphic conception of God * 6b. Natural knowledge: the use of analogies; the evidences of nature; the light of reason * 6c. Supernatural knowledge * (1) God as teacher: inspiration and revelation * (2) The light of faith * (3) Mystical experience * (4) The beatific vision

7. Doctrines common to the Jewish, Mohammedan, and Christian conceptions of God and His relation to the world and man * 7a. Creation * 7b. Providence * 7c. Divine government and law * 7d. Grace * 7e. Miracles * 7f. The Book of Life * 7g. The resurrection of the body * 7h. The Last Judgment and the end of the world

8. Specifically Jewish doctrines concerning God and His people * 8a. The Chosen People: Jew and gentile * 8b. God’s Covenant with Israel: circumcision as sign of the Covenant * 8c. The Law: its observance as a condition of righteousness and blessedness * 8d. The Temple: the Ark of the Torah * 8e. The messianic hope

9. Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny * 9a. The Trinity * 9b. The Incarnation: the God-man * (1) The divinity of Christ * (2) The humanity of Christ * (3) Mary, the Mother of God * 9c. Christ the Saviour and Redeemer: the doctrines of original sin and salvation * 9d. The Church: the mystical body of Christ; the Apostolate * 9e. The sacraments * 9f. The second coming of Christ

10. The denial of God or the gods, or of a supernatural order: the position of the atheist

11. The denial of God as completely transcending the world or nature: the position of the pantheist

12. The denial of a revealed and providential God: the position of the deist

13. God as a conception invented by man: its emotional basis

14. The worship of false gods: deification and idolatry

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283], 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR’S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283], 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The polytheistic conception of the supernatural order

• 1a. The nature and existence of the gods

  • 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK V [330-351], 33c-d; [814-909], 38b-39a,c / Odyssey, BK VIII [266-366], 224d-225d
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound, 40a-51d / Agamemnon [158-183], 53d-54a
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [607-614], 120a / Antigone [780-792], 138a
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Helen [1137-1150], 309a / Bacchae [272-327], 342b-c / Heracles Mad [815-874], 371d-372c; [1302-1353], 376c-d / Iphigenia Among the Tauri [354-391], 414a-b; [570-575], 416a
  • 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [263-428], 491a-493d; [813-833], 498c-d; [1462-1477], 506c / Birds [684-736], 551b-552a; [1492-1765], 560c-563d / Plutus [87-93], 630a
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 10a-11d; 31a-b; 48c; BK II, 58b-60d; 75a-b; 79d-80c; 86c; BK III, 95a-c; BK IV, 134a; 140c-d
  • 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 91c-d / Phaedrus, 124c-125b / Symposium, 152b; 153b-c; 159d-161a; 163a-164c / Euthyphro, 193a-c / Apology, 204c-205c; 209a-b / Republic, BK II, 313d-314d; BK II-III, 320c-328a / Timaeus, 451d-452b; 465d / Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, BK VIII, 730a-d; BK X, 757d-769d; BK XII, 787d-788a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK I, CH 3 [270b1-26], 361c-362a; BK II, CH 1, 375b,d-376a / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [1000a8-18], 518d-519a; BK XII, CH 8 [1074b1-14], 604d-605a
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 8 [1178b8-23], 433b-c / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 23 [1397b12-14], 645d; [1398a15-17], 646c; [1398b27-28], 647b; [1399b5-8], 648a-b; BK III, CH 18 [1419a6-13], 673d-674a
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [646-651], 23b; [1090-1104], 29a; BK III [14-24], 30b; BK V [146-173], 63a-b; [306-310], 65a; [1161-1193], 76b-c; BK VI [56-78], 81a-b
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3, 108b-c; CH 12, 118d-119b; BK III, CH 13, 188b-189a; BK IV, CH 4, 227d-228a; CH 11, 240d-241a
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 11, 258a-b
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 140d / Coriolanus, 191d-192b / Pelopidas, 239d-240c
  • 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 59d-60a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR V, CH 2-3, 101c-102c; CH 6, 103b-104a; CH 8-10, 105a-106b / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 7, 212b-c; TR VIII, CH 3, 241a; CH 10, 244c-245a / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 1, 342d-343c; CH 3, 344a-b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK I-X, 129a-322a,c passim, esp BK VI, CH 5-9, 234d-241b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 11, A 3, REP 1, 49a-c; Q 63, A 7, ANS, 331c-332b; Q 115, A 3, REP 1, 588c-589c
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 79a-b; 79d-80a; 81a-b
  • 32 MILTON: On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity, 1a-7b / Lycidas, 27b-32a / Comus, 33a-56b / Paradise Lost, BK I [331-621], 100b-107a / Samson Agonistes [896-902], 359a / Areopagitica, 384b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 15, 116c-d
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 103-110, 498b-501b
  • 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 152a-c
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12b-c; 98a-c; 345b-347a; 461b-c; 584a; 600d-601a
  • 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 226a-227a
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 224a-b; 237a-239c; 244c-245a; 251b-257c; PART II, 263d-265c; 268b-271c; PART III, 290b-292a

• 1b. The hierarchy of the gods: their relation to one another

  • 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK I [493-611], 8a-9a,c; BK VIII [1-52], 51a-c; BK XV [184-217], 105d-106b; BK XVIII [356-367], 133d; BK XIX [74-144], 137d-138c; BK XX [1-160], 142a-143d / Odyssey, BK I [11-79], 183a-d; BK V [1-147], 208a-209c; BK XII [125-158], 256b-d
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [22-28], 1b; [524-600], 7c-8d; [882-894], 12b; [1008-1073], 13d-14a,c / Prometheus Bound, 40a-51d / Agamemnon [158-183], 53d-54a / Eumenides, 81a-91d
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Heracles Mad [1302-1353], 376c-d / Iphigenia Among the Tauri [1234-1283], 422b-c
  • 5 ARISTOPHANES: Peace [403-426], 530d / Birds [684-736], 551b-552a; [1195-1266], 557c-558b; [1494-1693], 560c-562d / Plutus [111-146], 630b-d
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 21d-22a; BK II, 58a-60d; 79d-80c; 82d-83b; BK IV, 134a; BK VI, 155c-156a; BK VIII, 269a
  • 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 91c-d / Phaedrus, 124d-125a / Symposium, 152b; 153b-c; 159d-161a; 163a-164c / Euthyphro, 193a-c / Timaeus, 452b / Laws, BK IV, 683b; BK VIII, 731d-732a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK III, CH 4 [1000a8-18], 518d-519a
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1252b19-27], 446a
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3, 108b; CH 14, 121a-b
  • 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [1-156], 103a-107a; BK X [1-117], 302a-305a; [606-632], 318b-319b
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Pelopidas, 239d-240b / Pompey, 525b
  • 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK IV, 293b-294a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 9, 71b-c / Third Ennead, TR V, CH 6, 103b-104a / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 7, 212b-c
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 17, 645d-646a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 3, ANS, 130d-131c; Q 63, A 7, ANS, 331c-332b
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXI, 46a-47c
  • 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK III, STANZA 1-7, 54b-55b
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Tempest, ACT IV, SC 1 [60-133], 542b-543a
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20b-c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK I [331-621], 100b-107a
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 435b-c
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12b-d; 59c-60a; 346b-d; 461b-c
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 224a-b; 228a-b; 252a-253c; PART II, 262b-c

• 1c. The intervention of the gods in the affairs of men: their judgment of the deserts of men

  • 4 HOMER: Iliad, 3a-179d passim, esp BK I [33-317], 3b-6b; [493-611], 8a-9a,c; BK IV [1-140], 24a-25b; BK V [311-519], 33b-35c; [711-909], 37b-39a,c; BK VIII, 51a-56d; BK XIV-XV, 98a-111d; BK XVI [431-461], 117a-b; [843-867], 121c-d; BK XVIII [356-367], 133d; BK XIX [74-144], 137d-138c; BK XX-XXI, 142a-154d; BK XXIV [507-551], 176c-177a / Odyssey, 183a-322d passim, esp BK II, 188a-192d; BK IX [16-38], 229a-b; [67-81], 229d-230a; BK XVIII [124-150], 285b-c; BK XX, 296a-300a,c; BK XXIV [438-548], 321c-322d
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [79-175], 2a-3a; [1008-1073], 13d-14a,c / Persians [535-547], 20d; [738-842], 23a-24b / Seven Against Thebes, 27a-39a,c esp [790-801], 35d-36a / Prometheus Bound, 40a-51d esp [227-243], 42c; [436-502], 44c-45a; [564-891], 45d-49c / Agamemnon, 52a-69d esp [355-475], 55d-57b; [1200-1222], 64d-65a; [1485-1488], 67d; [1559-1570], 68c / Choephoroe, 70a-80d esp [269-314], 72d-73a; [1021-1076], 80a-d / Eumenides, 81a-91d
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King, 99a-113a,c esp [1297-1415], 111b-112b / Oedipus at Colonus, 114a-130a,c esp [229-253], 116b-c; [939-1015], 123a-d; [1448-1666], 127b-129b / Antigone, 131a-142d esp [100-162], 132a-c; [1348-1353], 142d / Ajax, 143a-155a,c esp [394-459], 146c-147a; [733-783], 149b-d / Electra, 156a-169a,c esp [516-576], 160a-c / Trachiniae, 170a-181a,c esp [94-140], 171a-b; [247-306], 172b-d; [1275-1278], 181c / Philoctetes, 182a-195a,c esp [169-200], 183d-184a; [446-452], 186a; [1408-1471], 194d-195a,c
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus, 203a-211d esp [594-674], 208b-209a; [890-996], 210d-211d / Medea [1415-1419], 224c / Hippolytus, 225a-236d esp [1-55], 225a-c; [520-568], 229c-d; [1202-1466], 234d-236d / Alcestis, 237a-247a,c esp [1-76], 237a-238a; [1159-1163], 247c / Heracleidae [750-1055], 254d-257a,c / Suppliants, 258a-269a,c esp [113-283], 259a-260d; [1183-1234], 268c-269a,c / Trojan Women, 270a-281a,c esp [1-97], 270a-271a; [914-1032], 277d-278d / Ion, 282a-297d esp [1-81], 282a-d; [429-451], 286b-c; [1470-1622], 296a-297d / Helen, 298a-314a,c esp [1-67], 298a-d; [711-715], 304d-305a; [1644-1692], 313d-314a,c / Andromache [1225-1288], 325c-326a,c / Electra, 327a-339a,c esp [1233-1359], 338b-339a,c / Bacchae, 340a-352a,c / Hecuba [488-500], 357a / Heracles Mad, 365a-377d esp [1260-1390], 376a-377b / Phoenician Maidens, 378a-393d esp [1-87], 378a-379a; [930-959], 386c; [1758-1763], 393d / Orestes, 394a-410d esp [317-357], 397a-b; [1625-1693], 410b-d / Iphigenia Among the Tauri, 411a-424d esp [1-41], 411a-b; [939-986], 419b-d; [1435-1499], 424a-d / Iphigenia at Aulis, 425a-439d esp [1185-1194], 435d-436a; [1526-1629], 439a-d
  • 5 ARISTOPHANES: Peace, 526a-541d esp [195-220], 528b-c / Thesmophoriazusae [655-687], 607c-608a / Plutus, 629a-642d esp [86-92], 630a; [489-498], 634c-d; [653-747], 637a-d
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 7b-10a esp 9d-10a; 20b-22a; BK II, 54d-55a; 77a-b; 78d-79c; BK III, 98b-c; BK IV, 124d-125a; 144c-d; 150b-d; 151b-153d; 155b-c; 158d-159d esp 159d; BK VI, 190c-d; 198b-d; 199d-200a; 200c-201a; 201d-202c; 205c-d; 211b-d; BK VII, 216d-217c esp 217c; 218b-220a; 224d-225a; 226d-227a; 239c-240d; 246b-247a; 250a-d; BK VIII, 262b-c; 266a-d; 269c-270a; 270c-271a; 274b-c; 276b-d; 279d-280a; 283d; 284d-285a; BK IX, 302c; 308a-c; 309d-310a
  • 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 355b-c; 378a-b; BK II, 407a-b; 415d-416c; BK V, 506b-c; BK VII, 559d-560a
  • 7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Symposium, 152d-153b / Apology, 211d / Republic, BK II, 313b-314d; 322a-324c; BK VI, 378a-b; BK X, 436c-437a; 437c-438c / Critias, 478a-485d / Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, BK IV, 679a-b; 681b-683b; BK IX, 757a; BK X, 765d-768d; BK XII, 787d-788a
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 9 [1099b9-18], 345a; BK X, CH 8 [1179a23-33], 434a / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 5 [1383a3-8], 629d; CH 17 [1391a30-b3], 638d
  • 10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 154a-155d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1090-1104], 29a; BK V [1194-1240], 76d-77b; BK VI [43-79], 80d-81b; [379-422], 85b-d
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 12, 118d-120b; CH 22, 128a-b; BK II, CH 8, 146a-147c
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK I, SECT 17, 255d-256d; BK II, SECT 3, 257a-b; BK III, SECT 11, 262a-b; BK V, SECT 8, 269d-270b; BK VI, SECT 40-46, 277d-278d; BK X, SECT 5, 296d; BK XII, SECT 5, 307d-308a
  • 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, 103a-379a passim, esp BK I [223-417], 109a-114b; [657-722], 121a-123a; BK II [162-200], 128b-129b; [588-633], 140b-142a; BK III [84-120], 149b-150b; BK IV [90-128], 169b-170b; [173-278], 171b-174b; BK V [604-699], 202b-205b; [779-871], 207b-210a; BK VI [42-101], 212a-213b; BK VII [286-600], 243b-252b; BK VIII [369-453], 269a-271a; [608-731], 275a-278b; BK IX [1-24], 279a-b; [77-122], 281a-282a; [638-663], 296a-297a; BK X [1-117], 302a-305a; [606-688], 318b-321a; BK XI [532-596], 342b-344b; [762-867], 349a-351b; BK XII [134-160], 357b-358a; [405-440], 365a-b; [766-886], 374b-377b
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 27d-29c / Numa Pompilius, 50d-51c; 57b-58a / Solon, 68a / Camillus, 104b-d; 107b-d / Fabius, 142d-143b / Coriolanus, 185b-186a; 188d-191b / Aristides, 268a-273c / Lysander, 365a-366a / Sulla, 370c-371b / Lucullus, 404d-405a / Alexander, 553b-554b / Caesar, 602c-604d esp 604b-d / Phocion, 615b-d / Cato the Younger, 639d / Demosthenes, 698a-699a / Dion, 781d-782a
  • 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 59d-60a; BK VI, 91b-d; BK XVI, 179d; 183d / Histories, BK I, 189d-190a; BK II, 235a-c; BK IV, 284b; 292c-294a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 9, 71a / Third Ennead, TR II-III, 82c-97b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 22, A 3, ANS, 130d-131c
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XIV [43-72], 20a-b; PARADISE, IV [49-63], 111b; VIII [1-12], 116d
  • 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK I, STANZA 30-35, 5a-b; BK III, STANZA 89, 66a / Knight’s Tale, 174a-211a esp [1303-1333], 181b-182a; [2663-2699], 203b-204a; [3099-3108], 211a / Merchant’s Tale [10,093-10,230], 335a-337a
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 81b-c
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT IV, SC 1 [33-39], 269d; [69-74], 270b; SC 2 [38-50], 270d-271a; SC 6 [35-40], 273d; ACT V, SC 3 [166-174], 281a / Antony and Cleopatra, ACT III, SC 1 [1-8], 317d / Cymbeline, ACT V, SC 4 [1-151], 481a-482c; SC 5 [425-485], 488b-d
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 435a-436a
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [8582-8590], 209a; [8610-8637], 209b-210a

2. The existence of one God

• 2a. The revelation of one God

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 17:1-14 / Exodus, 3 esp 3:6, 3:14-16; 6:1-8; 19:9-20:6 esp 20:1-6; 20:18-22 / Deuteronomy, 4:39; 5:1-10; 6 esp 6:4-5; 32:1-47 esp 32:36-43 / I Kings, 8:22-62 esp 8:23, 8:60—(D) III Kings, 8:22-62 esp 8:23, 8:60 / I Chronicles, 16:7-36—(D) I Paralipomenon, 16:7-36 / Psalms, 18 esp 18:30-32—(D) Psalms, 17 esp 17:31-33 / Isaiah, 37:15-20; 43-45 passim, esp 43:3, 43:10-13, 44:6, 44:8, 44:24, 45:5-7, 45:18, 45:21-22; 48:12 / Jeremiah, 10 esp 10:6, 10:10 / Daniel, 6 esp 6:20, 6:26-27 / Hosea, 13:4—(D) Osee, 13:4 / Joel, 2:27 / Zechariah, 14:9—(D) Zacharias, 14:9 / Malachi, 2:10—(D) Malachias, 2:10
  • APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 12:13—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 12:13 / Ecclesiasticus, 1:8 / II Maccabees, 1:24-29—(D) OT, II Machabees, 1:24-29
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 23:9 / Mark, 12:28-34 / John, 1:1-2; 10:30; 17:3 / Acts, 17:22-29 / Romans, 1:14-32 / I Corinthians, 8:4-6; 12:4-6 / Ephesians, 4:5-6 / I Timothy, 2:5-6; 4:10; 6:14-16 / I John, 5:5-9
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, PAR 16, 48c-49a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 11, 272c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 12, 627c-d; CH 32, 633c-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 2, REP 1, 11d-12c; Q 11, A 3, CONTRARY and REP 1, 49a-c; Q 13, A 11, CONTRARY, 73c-74b
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 74, A 10, REP 3, 136c-137c; Q 102, A 5, REP 1, 283c-292c; PART II-II, Q 1, A 5, REP 3, 383b-384b; A 8, ANS and REP 1, 387a-388c
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXIV [115-147], 143d-144a
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38a; 41b-d
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [267-318], 238a-239a; BK X [106-151], 321b-322b; [223-248], 324a-b / Samson Agonistes [472-478], 350a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 242-290, 217b-225a; 428, 244b; 557, 272b
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 245d-247b passim

• 2b. The evidences and proofs of God’s existence

  • NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 1:14-32 esp 1:18-21
  • 7 PLATO: Laws, BK X, 758b-765c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 1, 326a-327b; BK VIII, CH 1-6, 334a-346b; CH 10 [267a21-267b27], 354d-355d / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 2, 512b-513b; BK IX, CH 8, 575b-577a; BK XII, CH 6-7, 601b-603b; CH 8 [1074a33-b1], 604d; CH 10 [1075b35-1076a5], 606d
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 6, 110c-112b; CH 12, 118d-120b; CH 16, 121d-122d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 10, 3b-c; BK V, PAR 1, 27a-b; BK VII, PAR 16-23, 48c-50c; BK X, PAR 8-38, 73b-81a; BK XI, PAR 6, 90c-d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 268d-269c; BK X, CH 14, 307c-308a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 8, 626c-627a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, 10c-14a esp A 3, 12c-14a; Q 3, A 4, REP 2, 16d-17c; Q 8, 34c-38c; Q 11, A 3, 49a-c; Q 19, A 5, REP 3, 112d-113c; Q 44, A 1, REP 1, 238b-239a; Q 65, 339a-343c esp A 1, REP 3, 339b-340b; Q 75, A 1, REP 1, 378b-379c; Q 79, A 4, ANS, 417a-418c; Q 104, AA 1-2, 534c-537b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2, 610b-611b
  • 22 CHAUCER: Knight’s Tale [3003-3016], 209a-b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a; 79d-80a
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38a; 41b-d
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 51b-54b / Meditations, 71d-72a; III, 81d-89a; V, 93a-96a / Objections and Replies, 108a-115a,c passim; 120c-123a; 126b-127c; DEF VIII, 130d; POSTULATE V, 131b-c; AXIOM I, 131d; AXIOM IX-X, 132b; PROP I-III, 132b-133a; 137d-138a; 158b-162a; 168d-169a; 211c-212a; 213a-d; 217d-218a
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 1, 355a; DEF 3, 6, 355b; PROP 7, 356c; PROP 11, 358b-359b; PROP 14, DEMONST and COROL 1, 359d-360a; PROP 20, DEMONST and COROL 1, 363d-364a
  • 32 MILTON: Psalm 136, 8a-10a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 242-244, 217b-218a; 469, 256a; 557, 272b
  • 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 369b-370a / Optics, BK III, 528b-529a; 542a-543a passim
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVII, SECT 17, 172b-c; SECT 20, 173a; BK IV, CH X, SECT 1-11, 349c-352a
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, PREF, 404a; SECT 6-7, 414b-c; SECT 25-33, 417d-419a esp SECT 29-33, 418c-419a; SECT 146-156, 442a-444d passim
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, 497b-503c passim
  • 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 187d-188a
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 143a-b [THESIS]; 177b-192d; 236b-240b esp 239a-240b / Practical Reason, 353a-354d / Judgement, 593c-d; 607d-609b
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 401a-b
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 280, 94d-95a
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3431-3468], 84a-b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 196b-d; 217c-d

• 2c. Criticisms of the proofs of God’s existence: agnosticism

  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 2, 10d-11d; A 2, 11d-12c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 110a-111a; 112d-114c; 137d-138a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 242, 217b-218a; 428, 244b; 543, 266a; 547-549, 266b-267a
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, 497b-503c passim, esp DIV 115, 503b-c
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 33a-d; 143a-145c; 152a-153c; 177b-192d esp 177b-179c, 190a-192d; 200c-203d esp 202a-203b; 205a-208d esp 208a-b; 218d-223d; 234c-240b esp 239a-c; 241d-242c / Practical Reason, 291a-292c; 348b-349b; 351b-352c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 384a,c / Judgement, 567b; 568c-570a; 588a-613a,c esp 588a-593d, 596c-599b, 600d-603d, 607d-613a,c
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 280, 94d-95a
  • 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 593c
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 120d-121c; BK X, 292d-293a; BK XI, 337a-346a esp 341c-342c

• 2d. The postulation of God: practical grounds for belief

  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 184-241, 205a-217b esp 233, 214b-216a; 425-427, 243b-244b; 430, 245a-247b; 436-438, 251a
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 236b-243c esp 239a-240b, 241d-242c / Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 314c-d; 344c-349b esp 345a-c; 351b-352c; 353a-354d / Science of Right, 432c-433a / Judgement, 588a-607c esp 593d-596c, 606d-607c; 608c-611d
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 120b-121c; BK VI, 313c-314a
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 653a

3. Man’s relation to God or the gods

• 3a. The fear of God or the gods

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Leviticus, 19:14, 32; 25:17 / Deuteronomy, 6:1-2, 12-15; 8:6; 10:12-13, 20-22; 31:10-13 / Joshua, 24:14-16—(D) Josue, 24:14-16 / II Samuel, 23:3—(D) II Kings, 23:3 / Nehemiah, 5:7-13—(D) II Esdras, 5:7-13 / Job, 28:12-28 / Psalms, 2:10-12; 19:9; 25:12-14; 34 esp 34:9-11; 111:5, 10; 112; 128—(D) Psalms, 2:10-13; 18:10; 24:12-14; 33 esp 33:10-12; 110:5, 10; 111; 127 / Proverbs, 1:7, 22-33; 2:3-5; 8:13; 9:10; 10:27; 14:26-27; 15:16, 33; 16:6; 19:23; 22:4; 23:17-18; 24:21 / Ecclesiastes, 5:2-7; 8:10-13; 12:13-14 / Isaiah, 8:11-14; 11:1-5; 33:6 / Jeremiah, 2:19; 5:19-31 / Jonah, 1:1-16
  • APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 1-2; 10:19-24; 15:1, 13; 19:20-24; 23:18-28; 25:10-12; 34:13-17; 40:26-27—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 1-2; 10:23-27; 15:1, 13; 19:18-21; 23:25-38; 25:13-16; 34:14-20; 40:26-28
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 10:34-35 / Colossians, 3:22 / I Peter, 2:17 / Revelation, 14:6-7—(D) Apocalypse, 14:6-7
  • 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK V [282-312], 210d-211a; BK XVIII [124-150], 285b-c
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [419-500], 6a-7b / Agamemnon [901-954], 61c-62b / Choephoroe [269-301], 72d-73a; [885-1076], 78d-80d / Eumenides [490-565], 86b-87a
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [863-910], 107b-c / Oedipus at Colonus [258-291], 116c-d; [1448-1485], 127b-c / Electra [221-250], 157d-158a
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Orestes [251-316], 396c-397a
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 78d; BK VI, 211b-c; BK VII, 216d-218a; 218c-220a
  • 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 400d-401a
  • 7 PLATO: Laws, BK IX, 757a
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [62-158], 1d-3a; BK II [1-93], 30a-31b; BK III [978-1023], 42d-43b; BK V [1161-1240], 76b-77b; BK VI [43-95], 80d-81c
  • 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK IV [259-282], 174a-b; BK VIII [445-459], 248b-249a
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 123c-124a / Nicias, 435b-d / Crassus, 445d-446b / Alexander, 575a-576a / Phocion, 615b-d
  • 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK IV, 292c-294a
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, PAR 2, 27b-c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 15, 628b-c; BK II, CH 7, 638d-639c
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 42, A 1, ANS, 801c-802a; A 3, REP 1, 802d-803c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 67, A 4, REP 2, 84d-85d; Q 68, A 4, REP 4, 91b-92c; Q 69, A 3, REP 3, 98c-100c; Q 99, A 6, 250a-251a; PART II-II, Q 7, A 1, 415c-416b; Q 19, 465a-474d; Q 22, A 2, 481d-482c; Q 25, A 1, REP 1, 501b-502a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, III [100-136], 5a-b; PURGATORY, XIII [103-129], 73a-b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 79d-80a; 82b-c; 90b-d
  • 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 267b-c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [561-566], 331b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 262, 221a
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 155-156, 444b-d
  • 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 278b-c / Science of Right, 432c-433a / Judgement, 502d-503a; 504b-505a
  • 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 458a-b
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II, 264c; PART III, 304b
  • 54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 688a-b

• 3b. The reproach or defiance of God or the gods

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:4-9; 11:1-9 / Exodus, 5; 7-12; 14:10-15; 16:1-30 / Numbers, 11; 14; 20:1-13; 21:4-9 / Deuteronomy, 1:26-46; 9 / Joshua, 22—(D) Josue, 22 / I Samuel, 12:14-15; 15:22-23—(D) I Kings, 12:14-15; 15:22-23 / II Kings, 19:22-23—(D) IV Kings, 19:22-23 / Job / Psalms, 2; 5:8-10; 22:1-2; 44; 74; 79:12; 107:10-12—(D) Psalms, 2; 5:9-11; 21:2-3; 43; 73; 78:12; 106:10-12 / Proverbs, 14:31; 17:5 / Isaiah, 1:2-4; 3:8-9; 30-31; 36-37; 45:9; 48:1-9; 59:1-15; 63:10; 65:2-7 / Jeremiah passim / Lamentations, 1:18; 3:42 / Ezekiel, 2:3; 5:5-8; 12-15; 17; 20; 22-23; 28 / Hosea / Jonah
  • APOCRYPHA: Judith, 5; 7:20-8:27—(D) OT, Judith, 5; 7:11-8:27 / Wisdom of Solomon, 12:12
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 27:46 / Mark, 15:34 / Acts, 9:1-6; 11:17 / Romans, 8:7; 9:19-21 / James, 4:4
  • 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK I [1-120], 3a-4b; [428-487], 7c-8a; BK V [431-549], 34c-35d; BK XX [114-148], 149b-c; [200-382], 150b-152a / Odyssey, BK IX [475-535], 234a-d
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [151-175], 2d-3a; [882-894], 12b / Persians [679-842], 22a-24b / Agamemnon [901-954], 61c-62b; [1200-1222], 64d-65a
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [864-910], 107b-c / Antigone [988-1090], 139c-140b / Ajax, 143a-155a,c esp [1-133], 143a-144c; [430-459], 146d-147a; [748-783], 149c-d / Electra [516-576], 160a-c / Trachiniae [1264-1278], 181c / Philoctetes [446-452], 186a
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus, 225a-236d esp [1-55], 225a-c / Heracleidae, 248a-257a,c / Suppliants, 258a-269a,c esp [113-283], 259b-260d / Trojan Women [1-98], 270a-271a / Ion, 282a-297d esp [429-451], 286b-c / Helen [255-305], 300c-d / Andromache [994-1045], 323c-324a / Bacchae, 340a-352a,c / Heracles Mad, 365a-377d esp [339-347], 368a; [750-760], 371c; [1258-1347], 376a-d / Iphigenia Among the Tauri [570-575], 416a
  • 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [263-428], 491a-493d; [813-833], 498c-d; [1462-1477], 506c / Birds, 542a-563d / Thesmophoriazusae [655-687], 607c-608a
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 20d-22a; 39a-b; BK II, 77a-b; BK III, 95a-c; BK IV, 140c-d; 151b-152a; BK VII, 222c-d; 226d-227a; BK VIII, 283d
  • 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 400d-401a
  • 7 PLATO: Laws, BK IX, 757a
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 6, 110c-112b; CH 12, 118d-120b; CH 27, 132c-133a; BK III, CH 22, 195c-d; 198a-b
  • 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [1-11], 103a; BK XII [500-508], 367b
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Agesilaus, 483a-b / Dion, 801b-c
  • 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK IV, 292c-294a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 78, A 1, CONTRARY, 152b-153b; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 2, 175b-176a; PART II-II, QQ 13-14, 444b-452a; PART III, Q 64, A 6, ANS, 874d-875d
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, III [100-136], 5a-b; XI [16-90], 15b-16a; XIV [1-72], 19c-20b; XXV [1-15], 36b-c; XXXI [82-96], 46d-47a
  • 22 CHAUCER: Knight’s Tale [1303-1333], 181b-182a / Monk’s Tale [14,149-14,188], 437a-b
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 10b-11b
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT IV, SC 1 [30-37], 269d
  • 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes [667-709], 354a-355a
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 30a-34a; 123a-b; 370b-371b; 380a-381a
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 121d-127b passim

• 3c. The love of God or the gods

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:5-6 / Deuteronomy, 6:4-9; 7:9-11; 10:12-11:1; 11:13-25; 13:1-3; 19:9; 30:6, 15-20 / Joshua, 22:5; 23:11—(D) Josue, 22:5; 23:11 / Psalms, 5:11-12; 18:1-2; 31:23; 42:1-2; 63; 97:10; 116:1; 119:132; 122:6; 145:20—(D) Psalms, 5:12-13; 17:2-3; 30:24; 41:2-3; 62; 96:10; 114:1; 118:132; 121:6; 144:20 / Isaiah, 26:8-9; 56:6-7 / Jeremiah, 2:1-3
  • APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 13:12-18—(D) OT, Tobias, 13:14-23 / Ecclesiasticus, 2:15-16; 13:14; 25:11-12—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 2:18-19; 13:18; 25:14-16
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 10:37-38; 22:35-38 / Mark, 12:28-33 / Luke, 7:37-47; 10:25-27; 11:42 / John, 5:40-42; 8:42; 14:15-31; 16:26-27; 17:23-26; 21:15-17 / Acts, 20:22-24; 21:7-15 / Romans, 5:5; 8:28-39 / I Corinthians, 2:9; 8:1-3; 13:1-14:1; 16:14, 22 / II Corinthians, 5:14-15 / Ephesians, 1:3-6; 3:14-21; 6:24 / II Thessalonians, 3:5 / I Timothy, 1:5 / II Timothy, 1:13-14; 3:1-5 / James, 1:12; 2:5 / I Peter, 1:7-8 / I John, 2:5, 15-17; 3:17; 4:7-5:3 / II John, 6 / Jude, 20-21
  • 4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK XI [217-351], 257b-258c
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 16, 158b-d; CH 22, 168d; BK IV, CH 1, 219a-b
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK I, SECT 13, 258c
  • 16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, BK I, 510a-b
  • 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1050b; 1080a-b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 5-6, 2b-c; PAR 28, 7d-8a; BK II, PAR 15, 12b-c; BK III, PAR 15, 17a; BK IV, PAR 15-19, 23a-24b; BK V, PAR 1-2, 27a-c; BK VII, PAR 6, 44d-45a; PAR 23, 50b-c; BK VIII, PAR 9, 55a-c; BK IX, PAR 3, 62a-b; BK X, PAR 8-40, 73b-81c; BK XI, PAR 1-4, 89b-90b; BK XIII, PAR 10, 101c; PAR 23, 104b-c / City of God, BK X, CH 1, 298b,d-299d; CH 3, 300b-301a; BK XIV, CH 28, 397a-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 3-5, 625b-626a; CH 10, 627b; CH 15, 628b-c; CH 22-23, 629b-630c; CH 26-27, 631b-d; CH 29-30, 632a-633b; CH 33, 633d-634b; CH 35, 634c-d; CH 37-40, 635b-636a,c; BK II, CH 7, 638d-639c; CH 38, 654c; CH 41, 656a-c; BK III, CH 10-24, 661c-666d passim
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 5, 14b-15b; Q 8, A 3, ANS and REP 4, 36b-37c; Q 60, A 5, 313b-314c; Q 82, A 3, ANS and REP 3, 433c-434c; Q 95, A 4, ANS, 509b-510a; PART I-II, Q 1, A 8, 615a-c; Q 2, A 1, REP 3, 615d-616c; Q 26, A 3, REP 4, 735c-736b; Q 28, A 2, CONTRARY, 741a-742a; A 4, ANS, 742d-743c; Q 35, A 5, REP 1, 775d-777a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 65, A 5, ANS and REP 1, 74c-75a; Q 66, A 6, 80c-81b; Q 68, A 2, ANS, 89c-90c; A 8, REP 2, 95c-96c; Q 69, A 4, ANS, 100c-101c; Q 70, A 3, ANS, 103b-104d; Q 73, A 4, REP 3, 122b-123a; A 5, ANS, 123a-d; Q 77, A 4, CONTRARY and REP 1, 148b-149a; Q 78, A 2, REP 1, 153b-154a; Q 84, A 1, REP 1, 174b-175a; Q 88, A 2, REP 1, 194b-195b; A 6, REP 2, 198a-d; Q 89, A 1, REP 3, 199a-c; A 2, ANS, 199c-200d; Q 99, A 1, REP 2, 245c-246b; Q 100, A 6, REP 1, 257c-258c; A 10, 262b-263b; A 11, REP 1, 263c-264d; Q 102, A 1, REP 1, 270c-271b; Q 109, A 3, 340c-341b; PART II-II, Q 1, A 1, REP 3, 380b-381a; A 3, REP 1, 381d-382c; Q 3, A 2, REP 1, 401a-d; Q 7, A 2, 416b-d; Q 19, A 4, REP 3, 467c-468b; A 12, ANS, 473d-474d; Q 22, A 2, ANS, 481d-482c; QQ 23-27, 482c-527b; Q 180, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 607d-608c; A 2, REP 1, 608c-609c; A 7, ANS, 614d-616a; Q 182, A 2, ANS, 621d-623a; A 4, REP 1, 623d-624d; Q 184, A 2, ANS, 629d-630d; A 3, ANS and REP 3, 630d-632c; A 7, REP 2, 636a-637a; Q 185, A 2, REP 1, 641c-643a; A 4, ANS, 644a-645c; Q 186, A 2, REP 2, 651d-652d; A 7, REP 2, 658d-660a; Q 187, A 2, ANS, 665a-666a; Q 188, A 2, ANS, 675d-677a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XV [40-81], 75d-76a; XVII [91]-XVIII [75], 79b-80c; PARADISE, I [94-142], 107b-d; III, 109b-110c; V [1-12], 112a-b; VIII [12-126], 114d-115a; XX [94-138], 137d-138a; XXI [52-102], 138d-139b; XXVI [1-81], 145d-146c; XXXIII [139]-XXXIII [145], 156a-157d
  • 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK V, STANZA 263-267, 154b-155a / Second Nun’s Tale, 463b-471b / Parson’s Tale, PAR 6, 497a; PAR 21, 509a-b; PAR 31, 517b-518b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 240d
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 210d-211a
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Henry VIII, ACT III, SC 2 [435-457], 573c-d
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 88d-89a / Objections and Replies, 227b-228a
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP 14-16, 456b-c; PROP 18-20, 456d-458a; PROP 32-34, 460b-d; PROP 36-37, 461a-c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII [561-566], 331b
  • 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b / Pensées, 430, 245a-247b; 463, 255a; 468, 255b-256a; 471, 256a-b; 476, 256b-257a; 479, 257b; 482-483, 258a-b; 485, 258b; 487-489, 258b-259a; 491, 259a; 544, 266a; 821, 331b-332a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH VII, SECT 5-6, 132c-d
  • 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 278b-279d / Practical Reason, 321b-329a esp 326b-327a
  • 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 458a-b
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1178-1185], 29b
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 318b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XV, 631a-c
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 54a-b; BK V, 127b-137c passim; BK VI, 164d-165a; BK XI, 313c-314d

• 3d. Obedience to God or the gods

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:15-17; 3; 22:1-18 esp 22:18; 26:4-5 / Exodus, 3:4-4:17; 24:1-8 / Deuteronomy, 4-11 passim; 27-30 passim / Joshua, 22; 24:1-28—(D) Josue, 22; 24:1-28 / I Samuel, 12:14-15; 15 esp 15:22-23—(D) I Kings, 12:14-15; 15 esp 15:22-23 / I Kings, 8:54-62—(D) III Kings, 8:54-62 / I Chronicles, 28:9—(D) I Paralipomenon, 28:9 / Ezra, 7:23—(D) I Esdras, 7:23 / Job / Ecclesiastes, 5:1; 12:13—(D) Ecclesiastes, 4:17; 12:13 / Isaiah, 1:19-20 / Jeremiah passim, esp 3, 7, 11, 35, 42-44 / Daniel, 7:27 / Micah, 6:8—(D) Micheas, 6:8
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:10; 7:21; 12:46-50; 26:36-39 / Mark, 14:32-36 / Luke, 22:40-45 / John, 5:30; 18:10-11 / Acts, 5:29-32; 21:8-15 / Romans, 5:19 / II Corinthians, 10:5-6 / Philippians, 2:1-18 esp 2:7-8 / II Thessalonians, 1:7-9 / Hebrews, 5:8-9; 11:8
  • 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK I [188-222], 5a-b
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [410-434], 6a-b / Choephoroe [269-301], 72d-73a; [885-1076], 78d-80d / Eumenides [490-565], 86b-87a
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [863-910], 107b-c / Antigone, 131a-142d esp [374-378], 134b; [443-495], 134d-135a; [1351-1353], 142d / Ajax [666-676], 148d / Electra, 156a-169a,c esp [23-37], 156b
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [513-563], 262d-263b / Helen [1644-1692], 313d-314a,c / Iphigenia Among the Tauri [67-122], 411d-412b
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 39c-d; BK II, 55a; BK IV, 124d-125a; 126d-127a; 150b-d; 151b-152a; BK VI, 201d-202c; BK VII, 218c-220a; BK IX, 308a-c
  • 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 355b-c; 382c-d
  • 7 PLATO: Apology, 206b-d / Laws, BK IV, 681b-683b
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 16-17, 158a-161a; BK III, CH 24, 204c-d; 208d-210a; BK IV, CH 1, 213a-223d passim, esp 218b-219a; CH 3, 224b-d; CH 7, 234b; CH 12, 242d-243c
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK III, SECT 13, 262c; BK V, SECT 27, 272d; BK VI, SECT 10, 274b-c; BK IX, SECT 1, 291a-c
  • 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK III [84-120], 149b-150b; BK IV [259-282], 174a-b; [356-361], 176b-177a
  • 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK IV, 292c-294a
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, PAR 15, 17a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 15, 628b-c
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 19, A 5, REP 2, 705d-707a; A 6, ANS and REP 2, 707a-708a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 88, A 1, REP 2, 193a-194b; Q 96, A 4, 233a-d; Q 97, A 3, REP 1, 237b-238b; PART II-II, Q 2, A 9, ANS, 398c-399b; Q 4, A 7, REP 3, 407d-409a; Q 33, A 7, REP 5, 556a-557d; Q 186, A 7, REP 3, 658d-660a; PART III, Q 7, A 3, REP 2, 747b-748a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, III [1]-V [87], 109b-113a; VII [19-120], 115b-116b
  • 22 CHAUCER: Tale of Man of Law [5240-5253], 249b / Clerk’s Tale, 296a-318a esp [9018-9038], 316b-317a / Tale of Melibeus, PAR 17, 407b-408a / Parson’s Tale, PAR 24, 511a-b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 82b-d; PART II, 137b-138b; 154b-155c; 159d-160a; 162a; PART III, 199b-204a; 240a-241a; 244d-246a
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 213a-215a; 233a-234a; 238c-239c
  • 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III, ACT I, SC 2 [77-95], 120b-c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, 93a-333a esp BK IV [411-439], 161b-162a; [720-749], 168a-b; BK V [506-543], 186a-187a; BK VI [164-188], 199b-200a; BK VII [449-518], 227a-228b; BK VIII [311-333], 239a-b; [630-643], 246a; BK IX [366-375], 255b; [647-654], 261b; BK X [1013]-BK XI [44], 296b-300a; BK XI [133-161], 302a-b; BK XII [386-410], 327b-328a; [561-566], 331b / Samson Agonistes [373-419], 347b-348b / Areopagitica, 394b-395b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 460, 254b; 476, 256b-257a; 482, 258a; 489, 491, 259a; 531, 264b; 539, 265b
  • 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 15d-16a; 16c / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 6, 26b-c / Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 5-6, 105a-c
  • 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 2a-b; BK XII, 85d-86a
  • 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 259b-260a
  • 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 321b-329a; 345c-d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383b,d-384a,c / Judgement, 504b-505a; 509a-c; 593a-d; 611a-c
  • 43 MILL: Liberty, 296b-d
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 394a
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 30a-36b
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK III, 64c-67a; BK V, 127b-137c passim; BK VII, 177b-180a
  • 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 582a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 776b

• 3e. The worship of God or the gods: prayer, propitiation, sacrifice

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:3-7; 15:7-21; 22:1-18 / Exodus passim, esp 12, 13:1-16, 15:1-21, 23:18-19 / Leviticus passim, esp 2, 4-7, 16-17, 22:1-24:9, 27:1-34 / Numbers, 5-8; 15; 18-19; 28-30 / Deuteronomy, 10-12; 14:22-17:1 / Joshua, 22:10-34—(D) Josue, 22:10-34 / I Samuel, 15 esp 15:22-23—(D) I Kings, 15 esp 15:22-23 / I Kings, 8; 18:21-39—(D) III Kings, 8; 18:21-39 / II Chronicles, 5-8; 29-31—(D) II Paralipomenon, 5-8; 29-31 / Nehemiah, 10:29-39—(D) II Esdras, 10:29-39 / Psalms / Proverbs, 15:8; 21:3 / Isaiah, 1:11-20; 58 / Lamentations, 5 / Ezekiel, 43:18-27; 45:13-46:24 / Hosea, 6 esp 6:6; 8 / Joel, 2:12-18 / Amos, 4 / Micah, 6:6-8—(D) Micheas, 6:6-8 / Malachi, 1:6-14
  • APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 13—(D) OT, Tobias, 13 / Rest of Esther, 13:12-14—(D) OT, Esther, 13:12-14 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:22-23; 35
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:1-18; 9:9-13; 26:36-44 / Mark, 9:14-29 esp 9:29; 12:32-33—(D) Mark, 9:13-28 esp 9:28; 12:32-33 / Luke, 11:1-13; 18:1-14 / John, 17 / Colossians, 4:2-4 / I Thessalonians, 5:17 / Hebrews, 10:1-22; 13:15-16 / Revelation, 5—(D) Apocalypse, 5
  • 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK I [428-487], 7c-8a; BK VI [394-431], 44a-b; BK IX [485-526], 62a-b / Odyssey, BK III [1-68], 193a-d
  • 5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [1-175], 1a-3a; [525-600], 7c-8d; [1018-1073], 13d-14a,c / Seven Against Thebes [80-320], 28a-30d
  • 5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [151-215], 100c-101a; [863-910], 107b-c / Oedipus at Colonus [465-509], 118b-d / Electra [516-576], 160a-c / Philoctetes [1440-1444], 195a,c
  • 5 EURIPIDES: Trojan Women [1277-1283], 280d / Bacchae, 340a-352a,c esp [200-209], 341c; [337-433], 342c-343b / Iphigenia at Aulis, 425a-439d
  • 5 ARISTOPHANES: Peace [173-195], 528a; [922-1126], 536c-539a / Birds, 542a-563d
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 6a; 10a-11d; 20d-22a; 31a-c; 40d-41b; 48c; BK II, 57b-60a; 79a-c; 86c; BK III, 95a-c; BK IV, 126d-127a; 134a; 140c-d; 142b-c; 155c-156a; 156d-157a; BK V, 175d-176a; BK VI, 196d-197a; 199d-200a; 200d; 205c-d; BK VII, 226c; 235a; 248b-c; 250b-d; BK VIII, 267a; 270b-c; 282b-c
  • 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 407a-b; BK VI, 517d-518a
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 127c-128a / Symposium, 156d-157a / Euthyphro, 197d-198c / Phaedo, 251d / Republic, BK I, 295a-d; 297a-b; BK II, 313d-314d; BK IV, 345d-346a / Timaeus, 447a / Laws, BK IV, 683a-b; BK VII, 721a-c; BK VIII, 731d-732d; BK X, 768d-769c; BK XI, 791d-792a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK I, CH 11 [105a2-6], 148c / Heavens, BK II, CH 1 [268b12-15], 359a-b
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 12, 347a-b; BK IV, CH 2 [1132a18-23], 369c; BK VIII, CH 9 [1160a19-29], 412b-c / Politics, BK VII, CH 9 [1329a26-34], 533d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [1-43], 1a-d; [80-101], 2a-b; BK II [589-660], 22c-23b; BK III [41-58], 30c-d; BK V [1194-1240], 76d-77b; BK VI [68-79], 81a-b
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 16, 121d-122d
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK V, SECT 7, 269d; BK IX, SECT 40, 295b; BK XII, SECT 14, 308c
  • 13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, V [62-80], 18a-b / Aeneid, 103a-379a passim, esp BK II [108-125], 127a-b; BK III [84-120], 149b-150b; [543-550], 162a; BK IV [54-67], 168b-169a; [198-221], 172b-173a; BK VI [42-76], 212a-213a; BK VIII [558-584], 274a-b; BK IX [621-631], 295b-296a; BK XI [783-798], 349b
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 1a-15a,c passim / Numa Pompilius, 49a-61d esp 56d-57b / Camillus, 104b-d; 107b-d / Fabius, 142d-143b / Coriolanus, 185b-186a / Aemilius Paulus, 214b-d / Pelopidas, 239d-240c / Marcellus, 247c-249d / Lucullus, 404d-405a / Agesilaus, 483a-b / Alexander, 541a-d
  • 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 59d-60c; BK XII, 112d-113a / Histories, BK II, 214d-215a; BK IV, 282d-283b; 292c-294a; BK V, 296a
  • 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1009a; 1011a; 1050b; 1080a-b; 1085b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 1, 1a-b; BK XII, PAR 1, 110d-111a / City of God, BK VII, CH 27-31, 259c-262a; BK X, 298b,d-322a,c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 6, 626a-b
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 30, A 1, REP 1, 749a-d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 99, A 3, 247a-248a; A 4, REP 2, 248a-d; QQ 101-103, 265d-304a; PART II-II, Q 30, A 4, REP 1, 536a-d; Q 32, A 2, ANS, 541a-542c; QQ 179-189, 606a-700d esp Q 181, A 3, REP 3, 618c-619b; Q 182, A 2, REP 3, 621d-623a; Q 186, A 4, ANS, 655c-656b; A 5, REP 5, 656c-657d; A 6, REP 2, 657d-658d; Q 188, A 1, REP 1, 674d-675d; PART III, QQ 21-22, 823d-833a; Q 25, 839c-845a; Q 60, A 5, ANS, 850b-851b; Q 62, A 5, ANS, 862b-863a; Q 63, A 2, ANS, 865c-866c; A 4, REP 1, 3, 867d-868b; A 5, ANS, 868c-869b; A 6, ANS, 869b-870b; PART III SUPPL, QQ 71-72, 900d-922b; Q 99, A 3, REP 2, 1081d-1083a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, III [133-145], 57b-c; IV [127-135], 58d; VI [25-48], 61a-b; XI [1-36], 68d-69a; PARADISE, V [13-84], 112b-113a; XIV [67-108], 127c-128a; XX [31-138], 137a-138a passim; XXXIII [1-45], 156b-c
  • 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK V, STANZA 263-267, 154b-155a / Knight’s Tale [2209-2437], 196b-200a / Summoner’s Tale [7455-7529], 288a-289a / Franklin’s Tale [11,176-11,206], 353b-354a; [11,340-11,398], 356b-357a / Prioress’s Tale, 391a-395b / Parson’s Tale, PAR 93-94, 547b-548a
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 80c; 81c-d; PART II, 154d-155a; 161b-163d; PART III, 182d-183b; PART IV, 261a-c
  • 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II, 117c-118a; BK IV, 265b-c
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 91b-c; 152b-156d; 446b-d; 300c-d
  • 26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT IV, SC 8 [96-131], 561c-d
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC 1 [36-96], 53d-54b
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 369b-371d passim
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK II [185-197], 139b; BK IV [720-735], 168a-b; BK V [136-208], 178a-179b; BK VII [550-640], 229a-231a; BK X [1086]-BK XI [71], 298a-300b / Areopagitica, 402a-b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 431, 247b; 476, 256b-257a; 487-489, 258b-259a; 491, 259a; 499, 260b; 504, 261a; 513-514, 262a-263a
  • 35 LOCKE: Toleration, 3b-5c; 10c-15a
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 41, 468a-b
  • 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 187d-188a
  • 38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XXV, 209a-b; 209d-210a; 211a-c
  • 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 437a-c
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 59c-60a; 81d-82a; 93b-c; 98a; 121a-b; 180d-182c esp 181b-c; 184d-185d; 208a-211a passim, esp 209a; 327d-328b; 349c-350b; 356d-358a; 457b,d-467d passim; 547a-b; 583d-584b
  • 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 110b-c; 195a-198d; 207a-208c; 226a-228a; 232c-233c
  • 42 KANT: Judgement, 504b-505a; 509a-c
  • 43 MILL: Liberty, 307d-309a
  • 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 52c-53a; 394a; 481d-482d
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 224a-225a; 227c-228a; 234d-235c; 245b-247b; 253c-254b; PART III, 291d-292b; PART IV, 322a-c
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3587-3619], 87b-88a; PART II [8568-8603], 208b-209b
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 30a-36b; 39a-b; 130b-131a; 370b-371b
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 122b-c; BK VIII, 281d-282a; BK VIII, 323b; BK IX, 373b-377b; BK X, 435c-436c; BK XIII, 544b-545a; 553c-554a; BK XIV, 585b-d
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 127b-137c passim; BK VI, 164d-165a; 167b-c
  • 53 JAMES: Psychology, 203a-204b

• 3f. The imitation of God or the gods: the divine element in human nature; the deification of men; man as the image of God

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-27; 3 esp 3:4-5, 3:22; 5:1; 9:6 / Exodus, 7:1 / Leviticus, 11:44-45; 19:2; 20:7-8 / Psalms, 82:6-7—(D) Psalms, 81:6-7 / Isaiah, 40:10-31; 42:8; 46 / Ezekiel, 16:17-19; 28:1-19 / Daniel, 6:7-9
  • APOCRYPHA: Judith, 3:8; 5:23-6:4—(D) OT, Judith, 3:12-13; 5:27-6:4 / Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23; 13-15 / Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-3
  • NEW TESTAMENT: John, 10:34-35 / Acts, 12:21-23; 14:7-18; 17:27-29; 28:3-6 / Romans, 1:14-32 / I Corinthians, 11:7; 15:49 / II Corinthians, 3:18 / Colossians, 3:8-10 / II Thessalonians, 2:3-4 / James, 3:9 / I Peter, 1:15-16 / II Peter, 1:3-4
  • 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 7a-b; 12d-13b; 14a-d; BK II, 79d-80a; BK IV, 140c-141a; BK V, 168d-169a; 183d-184a; BK VII, 217c; 235b-c
  • 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 127c-128a / Ion, 144b-145c / Republic, BK II-III, 320c-328a / Timaeus, 452c-d; 466a-b; 476a-b / Theaetetus, 530b-531a / Laws, BK IV, 681b-683b; BK V, 686d-687c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b28-983a11], 501a-b; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b14-29], 602d-603a; CH 9, 605a-d / Soul, BK II, CH 4 [415a22-b8], 645c-d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 9 [1099b9-18], 345a; CH 12, 347a-b; BK VII, CH 1 [1145a15-33], 395a-b; BK X, CH 8 [1178b8-27], 433b-c
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [1-54], 61a-d
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3, 108b-c; CH 6, 110c-112b; CH 9, 114c-116b; CH 13-14, 120b-121c; CH 17, 122d-124a esp 123d; BK II, CH 7-8, 145b-147c; CH 14, 153d-154c; BK III, CH 13, 188b-d; BK IV, CH 11, 240d-241a
  • 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 1, 256b,d; SECT 13, 258c; BK III, SECT 12-13, 262b-c; BK V, SECT 27, 272d; BK XII, SECT 2-3, 307b-d
  • 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK I [283-290], 110b-111a; [586-593], 119a-b
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 27d-29c / Numa Pompilius, 50d-51c; 52b-53c / Alexander, 541a-542a; 553b-554b / Dion, 784d-785a
  • 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 4c-d; BK IV, 73b-d; 80c-d / Histories, BK IV, 285d-286a; 287b
  • 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 849a-b / Harmonies of the World, 1038a; 1048a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR II, 6b-10a / Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 15, 74d-75b / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 12, 148d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, PAR 14, 12a-b; BK IV, PAR 26, 25c-d; PAR 31, 26c-27a; BK VI, PAR 4, 36a-b; BK XIII, PAR 32, 119a-b / City of God, BK VIII, CH 8, 270a-d; BK XI, CH 26-28, 336d-338d; BK XII, CH 23, 357d-358a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 22, 629b-630a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 2, 14b-15b; Q 14, A 2, REP 3, 76d-77d; Q 26, A 4, 151c-152a,c; Q 27, A 1, ANS, 153b-154b; Q 59, A 1, CONTRARY, 306c-307b; Q 72, A 1, REP 3, 368b-369d; Q 77, A 2, ANS and REP 1, 401b-d; Q 88, A 3, REP 3, 472c-473a; Q 91, A 4, REP 1-2, 487d-488c; Q 92, A 2, ANS, 489d-490c; Q 93, 492a-501c; Q 106, A 1, REP 3, 545d-546d; PART I-II, Q 1, A 8, 615a-c; Q 2, A 4, REP 1, 618a-d; Q 3, A 5, REP 1, 626b-627a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 55, A 2, REP 3, 27a-d; Q 87, A 8, REP 2, 191d-192d; Q 93, A 3, 217b-218a; A 6, ANS, 219d-220d; Q 110, A 4, ANS, 350d-351d; PART II-II, Q 2, A 9, REP 3, 398c-399b; Q 10, A 11, ANS, 435d-436b; Q 19, A 3, REP 1, 466d-467c; Q 31, A 3, REP 2, 538b-539c; PART III, Q 4, A 1, REP 2, 730d-731d; PART III SUPPL, Q 71, A 12, CONTRARY, 914c-915c; Q 75, A 1, REP 4, 935b-937a; Q 91, A 2, CONTRARY, 1017c-1020c; Q 92, A 3, REP 9, 1034b-1037c; Q 93, A 1, REP 1, 1037d-1039a
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [85-90], 77d; XXV [58-78], 92a; PARADISE, V [19-24], 112b; VII [64-84], 115d-116a; XIII [52-78], 126a-b
  • 22 CHAUCER: Franklin’s Tale [11,189-11,192], 353b-354a
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 82b-c; PART IV, 263a-d
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215a; 233b-234a; 248a-c; 256c-d; 294a-b; 541d-543a,c
  • 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT II, SC 2 [314-322], 43d; ACT IV, SC 4 [33-66], 59a-c
  • 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 428b-c
  • 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41b-d; 80b-81a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 214a-d
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK II [345-353], 118b-119a; BK VIII [150-173], 220b-221a; [519-528], 228b; BK XI [466-522], 309b-310b / Areopagitica, 384a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 430-431, 245a-247b; 434-435, 248a-251a; 485, 258b; 537, 265b; 555, 270a
  • 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 6, 26b-c
  • 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 187d-188a
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12b-c; 28b-d; 547a-c
  • 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 136b; 379b-d
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 90, 130d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168b-d; PART I, 224a-228a; 234d-235c; 245a; PART II, 266d-267a; 268b-271c esp 270c-271c; PART III, 306a-d; 308a-b; PART IV, 339b-d; 349c-350c
  • 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [614-736], 17a-19b; [1566-1569], 38a
  • 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 84b-85a
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 525c-526b
  • 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 121d-122c; BK XI, 313c-314d; 345a-c
  • 54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 692a-693a esp 693a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 778d-779a; 790d

4. The divine nature in itself: the divine attributes

• 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 126a / Symposium, 167b-d

• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 8 [1178b8-23], 433b-c

• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 8, 146a; BK III, CH 13, 188b-c

• 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR I-VI, 208a-237d passim / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII-IX, 321b-360d passim

• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 4, 2a; BK IV, PAR 29, 26b; BK VII, PAR 1-8, 43b-45d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 268d-269c

• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QQ 3-11, 14a-50b; Q 84, A 2, ANS, 442b-443c

• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XXXIII [76-145], 157a-d

• 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 162a-163b; PART IV, 271b-c

• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52b-d / Meditations, III, 81d-89a / Objections and Replies, PROP III, 132d-133a; 211c-212a; 232b

• 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, 355a-372d esp DEF 4, 6, 355b; PROP 5, 356b; PROP 8-13, 356d-359d; PROP 14, COROL 2-PROP 15, 360a-361d; PROP 19-20, 363c-364a; PART II, PROP 1-2, 373d-374a

• 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 369b-371a / Optics, BK III, 542a-543a

• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 15, 116c-d; BK II, CH XVII, SECT 1, 167d-168a; CH XXIII, SECT 33-35, 212d-213c; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11-12, 271b-272b

• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 146, 442a-b

• 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 229c-230b

• 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 187a-c; 190c; 236b-240b esp 239a-c / Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 325d-326a; 344b-c; 345a-c; 347d-348b; 350c-351a; 352a-c / Judgement, 592a-c; 608c-611d

• 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 161, 143a-b

• 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 196b-d

• 4a. The identity of essence and existence in God: the necessity of a being whose essence involves its existence

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 3:13-14
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b4-14], 602c-d
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 14, 349d-350c; CH 18-21, 351d-353d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, PAR 23, 50c / City of God, BK VIII, CH 11, 272c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 32, 633c-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3, ANS, 12c-14a; Q 3, A 4, 16d-17c; A 7, ANS and REP 1, 19a-c; Q 4, A 1, REP 3, 20d-21b; A 2, ANS and REP 3, 21b-22b; A 3, REP 3, 22b-23b; Q 6, A 3, 29c-30b; Q 8, A 1, ANS, 34d-35c; Q 10, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 41d-42c; Q 11, A 4, ANS, 49d-50b; Q 13, A 11, ANS, 73c-74b; Q 14, A 13, REP 1, 86d-88c; Q 19, A 3, REP 6, 110b-111c; Q 44, A 1, ANS, 238b-239a; Q 50, A 2, REP 3, 270a-272a; Q 54, A 1, ANS, 285a-d; A 3, REP 2, 286c-287b; Q 75, A 5, REP 4, 382a-383b; PART I-II, Q 3, A 7, ANS, 628a-d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 3, A 2, REP 3, 724a-c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 81d-89a; V, 93a-96a / Objections and Replies, 110a-112a; 112d-114c; 126b-127c; POSTULATE V, 131b-c; AXIOM I, 131d; AXIOM X, 132b; PROP I, 132b-c; 158b-162a; 217d-218a
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 1, 355a; DEF 6-8, 355b-c; PROP 6-8, 356b-357d; PROP 11, 358b-359b; PROP 20, 363d-364a; PROP 24, 365a; PROP 34, 369a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 469, 256a
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 143a-145c; 153a; 177b-192d esp 177b-179c, 187a-c, 192c-d; 205a-b; 239a-c / Practical Reason, 344c-355d esp 353a-354d / Judgement, 570b-571c; 606d-609b esp 608b-609a
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 280, 95a / Philosophy of History, PART III, 305c-306c

• 4b. The unity and simplicity of the divine nature

  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VIII, CH 10, 353b-355d / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1073a2-11], 603a-b; CH 8 [1074a32-39], 604d; CH 9 [1075a5-11], 605c-d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 14 [1154b20-31], 406c
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR IX, 353d-360d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 10, 3b-c; PAR 12, 4a; BK IV, PAR 24, 25b-c; PAR 29, 26b; BK VII, PAR 2, 43c-44a; PAR 16, 48c-49a; PAR 21, 49d-50a; BK XIII, PAR 4, 111c; PAR 19, 115c-d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 268d-269c; CH 11, 272c; BK XI, CH 10, 327d-328d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 5, 625d-626a; CH 32, 633c-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, 14a-20c; Q 4, A 2, REP 1-2, 21b-22b; A 3, 22b-23b; Q 6, A 3, 29c-30b; Q 7, A 2, 31d-32c; Q 8, A 2, REP 2-3, 35c-36b; A 4, 37c-38c; Q 11, 46d-50b; Q 13, A 1, REP 2-3, 62c-63c; A 4, REP 3, 65c-66b; Q 14, A 1, REP 2, 75d-76c; A 4, 78b-79a; Q 26, A 1, REP 1, 150b-c; Q 27, A 1, REP 2, 153b-154b; Q 28, A 2, REP 1, 158d-160a; Q 30, A 1, REP 3-4, 167a-168a; A 3, 169b-170c; Q 40, A 1, REP 1, 213b-214b; Q 44, A 1, ANS, 238b-239a; Q 47, A 1, 256a-257b; Q 50, A 2, REP 3, 270a-272a; A 3, REP 2, 272a-273b; Q 54, A 1, ANS, 285a-d; A 3, REP 2, 286c-287b; Q 57, A 1, ANS, 295a-d; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 442b-443c; Q 88, A 2, REP 4, 471c-472c; PART I-II, Q 18, A 1, ANS, 694a-d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49, A 4, ANS, 5a-6a; Q 50, A 6, ANS, 11a-12a; Q 73, A 1, REP 3, 119c-120c; PART III, Q 2, A 2, ANS and REP 1, 711d-712d; Q 3, A 2, REP 3, 724a-c; A 3, 724c-725b; Q 6, A 5, REP 2, 744a-d
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XIII [52-66], 126a; XXIV [115-154], 143d-144b; XXIX [127-145], 151c-d; XXXIII [76-145], 157a-d
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 151d
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d / Meditations, III, 86a-88b esp 88b / Objections and Replies, 122b-c; 232b
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 2-8, 355d-357d; PROP 12-14, 359b-360a; PART II, PROP 4, 374c; PROP 7, SCHOL, 375b
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 15, 116c-d; BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 35, 213b-c
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307b-c
  • 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 229c-230b
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 176b-c; 192c-d
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 224a-b; 227d-228a; PART III, 306a; PART IV, 322a-c

• 4c. The immateriality of God

  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 6 [1071b2-23], 601b-c; CH 8 [1074a31-39], 604d
  • 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [146-155], 63a
  • 14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 53b-c
  • 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK V, 296a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 26, 266a; CH 27, 266c
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, PAR 29, 26b; PAR 31, 26c-27a; BK V, PAR 19-20, 32b-33a; BK VI, PAR 4, 36a-b; BK VII, PAR 1-2, 43b-44a / City of God, BK VIII, CH 5-6, 267d-269c
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, 14b-15b; A 2, 15c-16a; A 3, ANS, 16a-d; A 8, ANS and REP 3, 19d-20c; Q 7, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 31a-d; Q 14, A 1, ANS, 75d-76c; A 11, 84c-85c; Q 40, A 1, REP 1, 213b-214b; Q 50, A 1, REP 1, 269b-270a; A 2, REP 3, 270a-272a; Q 54, A 1, ANS, 285a-d; A 3, REP 2, 286c-287b; Q 75, A 5, REP 1, 4, 382a-383b; Q 84, A 2, ANS, 442b-443c; A 4, REP 1, 444d-446b; Q 86, A 2, REP 1, 462a-463a; Q 91, A 2, ANS, 485b-486b; Q 105, A 3, ANS, 540c-541b
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 2, A 1, ANS and REP 2, 710a-711c; A 2, ANS, 711d-712d; Q 25, A 3, REP 1, 841c-842d; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, REP 12, 1025c-1032b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 172d-173a
  • 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK V, 105a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 122b-c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 12-15, 359b-361d; PART II, DEF 1, 373a; PROP 1-2, 373d-374a; PROP 5-7, 374c-375c
  • 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 529a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 17, 117a-c; BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 28, 211b-d; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11, 271b-c; BK IV, CH X, SECT 8-17, 351a-353c
  • 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 334b-335b

• 4d. The eternity and immutability of God

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 15:18 / Deuteronomy, 32:39-40 / I Chronicles, 16:34-36—(D) I Paralipomenon, 16:34-36 / Psalms, 9:6-7; 10:16; 29:10-11; 33:10-11; 45:6; 48 esp 48:8, 48:14; 66:7; 90 esp 90:1-4; 93:1-2; 102 esp 102:11-12, 102:26-27; 103:13-18; 136; 145:10-13; 146:5-10—(D) Psalms, 9:7-8; 9:16; 28:10; 32:10-11; 44:7; 47 esp 47:9, 47:15; 65:7; 89 esp 89:1-4; 92:1-2; 101 esp 101:12-13, 101:27-28; 102:13-18; 135; 144:10-13; 145:5-10 / Isaiah, 40:8, 28; 43:10-13; 57:15 / Jeremiah, 10:10 / Lamentations, 5:19 / Daniel, 6:26 / Micah, 5:2—(D) Micheas, 5:2 / Malachi, 3:6
  • APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 36:17; 39:20; 42:21—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 36:19; 39:25; 42:21-22
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 24:35 / Romans, 1:20-25 / Colossians, 1:16-17 / I Timothy, 1:17; 6:15-16 / Hebrews, 1:8-12; 7:23-25; 13:7-8 / James, 1:17 / Revelation, 1:17-18; 10:6; 11:15-17—(D) Apocalypse, 1:17-18; 10:6; 11:15-17
  • 7 PLATO: Republic, BK II, 322d-323c; 324a-b
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VIII, CH 6 [258b10-259a31], 344b-345d / Heavens, BK I, CH 9 [279a23-b4], 370c-d; BK II, CH 3 [286a8-13], 377c / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 10 [337a15-23], 439a-b / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 1 [1069a30-b2], 598b-c; CH 6-7, 601b-603b; CH 9, 605a-d esp [1075a5-11], 605c-d / Soul, BK II, CH 4 [415a22-b8], 645c-d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 14 [1154b20-31], 406c
  • 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK V, 296a
  • 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1071b
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VII, CH 2-6, 119c-122d esp CH 5, 121c-122a / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 11, 348b-c; CH 18-21, 351d-353d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 10, 3b-c; BK IV, PAR 26, 25c-d; PAR 29, 26b; BK VII, PAR 1-7, 43b-45d; PAR 16-18, 48c-49b; PAR 21, 49d-50a; PAR 23, 50b-c; PAR 26, 51c; BK XI, PAR 12-16, 92b-93a; BK XII, PAR 11, 101d; PAR 18, 103a-b; PAR 40, 109b-110a; BK XIII, PAR 44, 122d / City of God, BK VII, CH 30, 261b-d; BK VIII, CH 11, 272c; BK XI, CH 10, 327d-328d; CH 21-22, 333a-334c esp CH 22, 334c; BK XII, CH 1-3, 342b,d-344b; CH 14-17, 350d-354a esp CH 14, 350d-351b; CH 17, 353a-354a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 5-6, 625d-626b; CH 8, 626c-627a; CH 10, 627b; CH 22-23, 629b-630c; CH 32, 633c-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 4, 14b-15b; QQ 9-10, 38c-46d; Q 14, A 9, ANS, 83b-d; A 13, ANS and REP 3, 86d-88c; A 15, 89b-90b; Q 18, A 3, 106b-107c; Q 19, A 7, 114d-115d; Q 22, A 1, REP 2, 127d-128d; Q 26, A 1, REP 2, 150b-c; Q 42, A 2, 225d-227a; Q 43, A 2, 230d-231c; Q 51, A 3, REP 3, 277a-278c; Q 61, A 2, ANS, 315c-316a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 5, ANS, 58b-59d; Q 91, A 1, 208b-d; PART III, Q 1, A 1, REP 3, 701d-703a; A 5, REP 3, 707a-708c; Q 2, A 1, ANS, 710a-711c
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, VII [64-72], 115d; XIII [52-66], 126a; XXIV [130-141], 144a; XXIX [13-36], 150b-c; XXXIII, 156b-157d
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 79d-80a; PART III, 173a
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 293d-294a
  • 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 428c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52b-c / Meditations, III, 84a-b; 86a; V, 94d-95a
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 6, 355b; DEF 8, 355c; PROP 6, 356b-c; PROP 11-13, 358b-359d; PROP 17, 362b-363c; PROP 19-20, 363c-364a; PROP 33, SCHOL 2, 367d-368c esp 368b-c; PART II, PROP 44, COROL 2-PROP 47, 390a-391a; PART V, PROP 17, 456c-d
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK III [1-12], 135b; [372-382], 143b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 469, 256a
  • 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 370a-371a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 3-4, 162d-163b; CH XVII, SECT 16-17, 172a-c; SECT 20, 172d-173c; CH XXIII, SECT 21, 209c; BK IV, CH X, 349c-354c esp SECT 3-5, 349d-350b; SECT 8-11, 351a-352a
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 117, 436a
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 176b-c; 190c; 192c-d / Practical Reason, 334b-335b; 344b-c; 352a-b / Judgement, 592a-c
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-157b; PART III, 306a
  • 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIV, 608a-b; EPILOGUE II, 684c-d

• 4e. The infinity of God: the freedom of an infinite being

  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1073a3-10], 603a-b
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, PAR 19-20, 32b-33a; BK VII, PAR 7, 45a-d; PAR 20-21, 49d-50a; BK XIII, PAR 12, 113b-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3, REP 1, 12c-14a; Q 7, 31a-34c; Q 14, A 1, ANS, 75d-76c; A 3, 77d-78b; Q 25, A 2, ANS and REP 1, 144c-145b; Q 54, A 2, ANS, 285d-286c; Q 75, A 5, REP 1, 4, 382a-383b; Q 79, A 2, ANS, 414d-416a; Q 86, A 2, REP 1, 462a-463a; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 1, 612a-613a
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 64, A 4, REP 3, 69b-70a; Q 87, A 4, REP 2, 188b-d; PART II-II, Q 20, A 2, REP 2, 475d-476c; Q 24, A 8, ANS, 495b-496a; PART III, Q 1, A 2, REP 2, 703a-704d; Q 2, A 1, ANS, 710a-711c; Q 3, A 1, REP 1, 723b-724a; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, REP 6, 12, 1025c-1032b
  • 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 162b-c
  • 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 86a-88d / Objections and Replies, 112a-d; 123c-d; PROP III, 132d-133a
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 2, 355a; DEF 6-7, 355b; PROP 8-14, 356d-360a; PROP 15, SCHOL-PROP 17, 360b-363c; PROP 21, DEMONST, 364a-c; PROP 29, 366b-c; PROP 32-35, 367a-369a; PART II, PROP 1-4, 373d-374c
  • 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [411-421], 241a
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 231-233, 213b-216a; 469, 256a
  • 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 370a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 2-4, 162c-163b; SECT 12, 165b-c; CH XVII, SECT 1, 167d-168a; SECT 16-17, 172a-c; SECT 20, 172d-173c; CH XXIII, SECT 33-36, 212d-213d; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11, 271b-d
  • 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 117, 436a
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 188c; 192c-d; 201b-c; 205a-b / Practical Reason, 325d-326a; 344b-c / Judgement, 590b-d
  • 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 237d-238a; 246b-c

• 4f. The perfection or goodness of God

  • NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:48 / Luke, 18:19
  • 7 PLATO: Republic, BK II, 321d-323a / Timaeus, 447d-448a / Theaetetus, 530b-531a
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7, 602a-603b
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 12, 347a-b
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 8, 146a-147c
  • 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1009a
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 12, 4a; BK III, PAR 12, 16b; BK IV, PAR 24, 25b-c; BK V, PAR 19-20, 32b-33a; BK VII, PAR 1-7, 43b-45d esp PAR 4-7, 44b-45d; PAR 16-23, 48c-50c; BK X, PAR 38, 81a; BK XI, PAR 6, 90c-d; BK XII, PAR 18, 103b; BK XIII, PAR 1-5, 110d-111d; PAR 53, 124d-125a,c / City of God, BK XI, CH 10, 327d-328d; BK XII, CH 1-3, 342b,d-344b; CH 8-9, 346d-348b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 5-7, 625d-626c; CH 31-32, 633b-d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 1, REP 2, 10d-11d; A 3, ANS and REP 1, 12c-14a; Q 3, A 1, ANS, 14b-15b; A 2, ANS, 15c-16a; A 7, REP 2, 19a-c; Q 4, 20c-23b; Q 6, 28b-30d; Q 13, A 2, ANS, 63c-64d; A 11, REP 2, 73c-74b; Q 18, A 3, 106b-107c; Q 19, A 1, REP 1-3, 108d-109c; Q 21, A 1, REP 4, 124b-125b; Q 51, A 1, REP 3, 275b-276b; Q 61, A 3, REP 2, 316a-d; Q 62, A 8, ANS and REP 1-2, 323c-324a; Q 66, A 1, CONTRARY, 343d-345c; Q 84, A 2, ANS and REP 3, 442b-443c; Q 91, A 1, ANS, 484a-485b; Q 100, A 2, ANS, 521c-522b; Q 103, 528a-534b passim; Q 104, A 3, REP 2, 537b-d; A 4, ANS, 538a-c; Q 105, A 4, ANS, 541c-542a; A 5, ANS, 542a-543b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 1, 612a-613a; Q 2, A 4, REP 1, 618a-d; Q 9, A 6, 662a-d; Q 18, A 1, ANS, 694a-d; Q 19, A 4, 705b-c; Q 22, A 2, REP 1, 721c-722c; Q 24, A 3, REP 2, 728c-729c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 5, ANS, 58b-59d; Q 64, A 4, ANS and REP 3, 69b-70a; PART II-II, Q 9, A 4, REP 1, 425d-426c; Q 13, A 1, ANS, 444b-445a; Q 17, A 1, ANS, 457a-d; Q 23, A 4, ANS, 485d-486b; Q 34, A 1, ANS, 559a-c; Q 50, A 2, REP 3, 575b-576b; Q 184, A 2, ANS, 629d-630d; PART III, Q 1, A 1, ANS, 701d-703a; Q 23, A 1, ANS, 833a-d; PART III SUPPL, Q 91, A 2, REP 4, 10, 1017c-1020c; Q 99, A 2, REP 3, 1081a-d
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXVIII [91-93], 97a; PARADISE, VII [64-66], 115d; XIX [40-90], 135c-136a
  • 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 300c-d
  • 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d; 53d / Meditations, I, 76d-77c; III-IV, 86a-93a / Objections and Replies, 123d-124c; DEF VIII, 130d; 142c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 33, SCHOL 2, 367d-369a; PART V, PROP 17, DEMONST, 456c-d
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 580, 276b
  • 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 370a-371a passim
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, SECT 11-12, 271b-272b
  • 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV 78-81, 485c-487a; SECT XI, DIV 106-107, 499b-500b passim; DIV 113, 502a-b
  • 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81b-c
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 205a-b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 263a-b / Practical Reason, 307a-d; 325d-326a; 342c; 345a-c; 351b-352c / Judgement, 592a-c

• 4g. The intellect of God

  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b14-29], 602d-603a; CH 9, 605a-d
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK X, CH 8 [1178b8-23], 433b-c
  • 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 14, 120d-121c; BK II, CH 8, 146a
  • 17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 1, 65d-66d / Fifth Ennead, 208a-251d esp TR V-VI, 228b-237d; TR IX, 246c-251d
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 268d-269c; BK XI, CH 21, 333a-d; BK XII, CH 17, 353a-354a; BK XXII, CH 29, 614b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 13, 627d
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 1, REP 2-3, 14b-15b; Q 14, AA 1-4, 75d-79a; Q 18, A 3, 106b-107c; Q 19, A 1, ANS, 108d-109c; A 2, REP 4, 109c-110b; A 3, REP 6, 110b-111c; A 4, ANS and REP 4, 111c-112c; Q 26, A 2, 150c-151a; Q 27, A 3, REP 3, 155c-156a; Q 46, A 2, REP 3, 253a-255a; Q 50, A 1, ANS, 269b-270a; Q 54, A 2, ANS, 285d-286c; Q 55, A 1, ANS and REP 3, 289a-d; A 3, ANS, 291a-d; Q 57, A 1, ANS, 295a-d; A 2, ANS, 295d-297a; Q 59, A 2, ANS, 307c-308b; Q 79, A 1, ANS, 414a-d; A 2, ANS, 414d-416a; A 4, ANS, 417a-418c; A 10, REP 2, 423d-424d; Q 84, A 2, ANS, 442b-443c; Q 85, A 5, ANS, 457d-458d; Q 87, A 1, ANS, 465a-466c; A 3, ANS, 467b-468a; Q 89, A 1, ANS, 473b-475a; Q 105, A 1, REP 2, 538d-539c; A 3, ANS, 540c-541b; Q 116, A 1, ANS, 592d-593d; PART I-II, Q 1, A 4, REP 1, 612a-613a; Q 19, A 4, ANS and REP 3, 705b-c
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 1, REP 2, 12b-13c; Q 61, A 5, ANS, 58b-59d; Q 93, A 1, 215b,d-216c; PART III, Q 6, A 2, ANS, 741c-742a
  • 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 15, 149a
  • 31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228a-c
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 17, SCHOL, 362c-363c; PROP 21, 364a-c; PROP 32, COROL 2, 367b; PROP 33, SCHOL 2, 368b-c; PART II, PROP 1, 373d-374a; PROP 3-6, 374a-375a
  • 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 10, 123b; CH X, SECT 9, 143a-c
  • 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 33a-d; 52c-53b / Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 344b-c; 350c-351b / Judgement, 590b-d; 592a-c; 600d-601c; 610b-613a,c

• 4h. The happiness and glory of God

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 15:1-21; 33:13-23 / I Chronicles, 16:23-27; 29:11-13—(D) I Paralipomenon, 16:23-27; 29:11-13 / Psalms, 8; 19; 24; 57:5-11; 96:3-6; 104:1; 113:4; 138:5; 145:11-12—(D) Psalms, 8; 18; 23; 56:5-11; 95:3-6; 103:1; 112:4; 137:5; 144:11-12 / Isaiah, 6:1-4; 42:8
  • APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16:13—(D) OT, Judith, 16:16 / Rest of Esther, 13:12-14—(D) OT, Esther, 13:12-14 / Song of Three Children, 28-31—(D) OT, Daniel, 3:51-53
  • NEW TESTAMENT: Mark, 8:38 / John, 5:44; 8:54 / Hebrews, 2:10 / I Peter, 4:7-11 / II Peter, 1:16-18 / Revelation, 5:9-14; 7:9-12; 21—(D) Apocalypse, 5:9-14; 7:9-12; 21
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b13-29], 602d-603a
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 14 [1154b20-31], 406c; BK X, CH 8 [1178b8-23], 433b-c
  • 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XIII, PAR 4, 111c / City of God, BK V, CH 14, 220a-d; BK VIII, CH 6, 268d-269c; BK XII, CH 17, 353a-354a
  • 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 26, 150a-152a,c; Q 62, A 3, REP 3, 319c-320b; A 4, ANS, 320b-321b; Q 63, A 3, 327b-328b; Q 65, A 2, ANS, 340b-341b; Q 70, A 2, ANS, 364b-365a; Q 73, A 2, REP 3, 371b-d; PART I-II, Q 2, A 2, REP 2, 616d-617b; A 3, ANS and REP 1, 617b-618a; Q 3, A 1, REP 1, 622c-623a; A 2, REP 1, 4, 623a-624b; A 8, REP 2, 628d-629c; Q 5, A 3, REP 2, 638b-639a; A 7, ANS, 642a-d
  • 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 8, A 4, ANS, 759b-d; Q 16, A 4, REP 2, 799b-800b; Q 26, A 1, REP 2, 845b-846a; PART III SUPPL, Q 71, A 8, REP 1, 909d-910d; Q 92, A 1, REP 5, 1025c-1032b
  • 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [1-9], 106a; XXXIII [46-145], 156c-157d
  • 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART V, PROP 17, 456c-d; PROP 35-36, 460d-461c
  • 32 MILTON: Upon the Circumcision, 12b-13a / Paradise Lost, BK III [56-415], 136b-144b
  • 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 233, 216a
  • 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 347d-348b / Judgement, 594d [fn 1]

5. The divine nature in relation to the world or creatures

• 7 PLATO: Republic, BK II, 321d-322d / Timaeus, 447b-458b; 465d-466a

• 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VII, CH 1, 326a-327b; BK VIII, CH 1-6, 334a-346b

• 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII, CH 14 [1154b20-31], 406c; BK X, CH 8 [1178b8-27], 433b-c

• 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 22, 195a-b; BK IV, CH 11, 240d-241a

• 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 4, 257b; BK V, SECT 8, 269d-270b; BK VI, SECT 40-46, 277d-278d

• 16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1017b-1018a; 1071b

• 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR I, CH 13, 149b-d

• 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, PAR 4, 2a; PAR 10, 3b-c; BK IV, PAR 25, 25c; BK IV, PAR 31-BK V, PAR 1, 26c-27b; BK VII, PAR 1-8, 43b-45d; PAR 16-23, 48c-50c; BK X, PAR 38, 81a; BK XI, PAR 6, 90c-d; BK XIII, PAR 19, 115c-d / City of God, BK VII, CH 29-31, 261a-262a; BK VIII, CH 1-10, 264b,d-271d; BK X, CH 1-2, 298b,d-300a; BK XI, CH 24, 335c-336a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 9-10, 627a-b

• 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QQ 14-25, 75c-150a; Q 84, A 2, ANS, 442b-443c

• 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [1-3], 106a; [97-142], 107b-d; II [112-148], 109a-b; X [1-27], 120b-c; XIII [52-87], 126a-b; XIX [40-90], 135c-136a; XXVII [100-120], 148b-c; XXVIII, 148d-150b; XXXIII [76-145], 157a-d

• 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 428c-d

• 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38a

• 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d / Objections and Replies, 123c-d; 214a-d; 229c-d

• 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [412-436], 241a-b

• 34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOLIUM, 369b-371a / Optics, BK III, 542a-543a

• 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVII, SECT 1, 167d-168a; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11-12, 271b-272b

• 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 57, 423d-424a

• 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 106, 499b-c; DIV 113, 502a-d

• 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 186c-d; 187d-188a

• 38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK IV, 439a

• 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81b-c; 183c; 307b-c; 346b-347a

• 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 303b-304a; 321b-c; 325d-326a; 327d-328b; 342c; 344b-c; 345a-c; 347d-348b; 350c-351a; 352a-c / Judgement, 592a-c

• 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 120d-121c

• 5a. God as first and as exemplar cause: the relation of divine to natural causation

  • OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2; 7:4 / Nehemiah, 9:6—(D) II Esdras, 9:6 / Job, 9:1-9; 12; 26:7-14; 28:24-29; 36:24-42:2 / Psalms, 8:3; 33:6-9; 65:5-13; 74:16-17; 89:11-12; 95:4-5; 96:5; 102:25-27; 104; 107:23-30; 115:3; 119:73; 121:2; 136:5-9; 146:5-6; 147-148—(D) Psalms, 8:4; 32:6-9; 64:6-14; 73:16-17; 88:12-13; 94:4-5; 95:5; 101:26-28; 103; 106:23-30; 113:3; 118:73; 120:2; 135:5-9; 145:5-6; 146-148 / Proverbs, 3:19 / Isaiah, 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12, 18; 48:13; 51:13; 65:17 / Jeremiah, 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; 51:15-16 / Amos, 5:8 / Zechariah, 12:1—(D) Zacharias, 12:1 / Malachi, 2:10
  • APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16:14—(D) OT, Judith, 16:17 / Rest of Esther, 13:10—(D) OT, Esther, 13:10 / Wisdom of Solomon, 1:14; 2:23; 9:1-2; 11:17—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 1:14; 2:23; 9:1-2; 11:18 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:1; 24:8-9; 33:10-13; 39:16-35; 43—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:1; 24:12-14; 33:10-14; 39:21-41; 43 / Bel and Dragon, 5—(D) OT, Daniel, 14:4 / II Maccabees, 7:23, 28
  • NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1:1-3 / Acts, 7:49-50; 14:14-17; 17:22-28 / Colossians, 1:16-17 / Hebrews, 1:10-11; 2:10; 3:4; 11:3 / II Peter, 3:5-7 / Revelation, 4:11; 10:6; 14:7—(D) Apocalypse, 4:11; 10:6; 14:7
  • 7 PLATO: Republic, BK X, 427c-429c / Timaeus, 447a-448b / Sophist, 577d-578b / Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, BK X, 758b-765c esp 762b-765c
  • 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VIII, CH 1-6, 334a-346b / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 10 [336b25-34], 438d; [337a15-23], 439a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [983a7-9], 501b; BK XII, CH 4 [1070b22-35], 600b; CH 5 [1071a30-36], 601a
  • 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 [699b11]-CH 4 [700a5], 234a-235a