Chapter 24: EVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

He is concerned with establishing the fact that new species do originate in the course of time, against those who suppose the species of living things to be fixed in number and immutable in type throughout the ages. He is concerned with describing the circumstances under which new species arise and other forms cease to have the status of species or become extinct. He is concerned with formulating the various factors in the differentiation of species, and with showing, against those who think a new species requires a special act of creation, that the origin of species, like their extinction, is entirely a natural process which requires no factors other than those at work every day in the life, death, and breeding of plants and animals. Only as a consequence of these primary considerations does he engage in speculations about the moving panorama of life on earth from its beginnings to its present and its future.

Darwin looks upon the term “species” as “arbitrarily given,” and for that reason does not attempt any strict definition of it. He uses it, moreover, like his predecessors in systematic biological classification, to signify “a set of individuals closely resembling each other”—a class of plants or animals having certain common characteristics. Darwin would probably agree with Locke’s criticism of those who suppose that our definitions of species grasp the real essences or relate to the substantial forms inherent in things. As indicated in the chapter on DEFINITION, Locke insists that our notion of a species expresses only what he calls the “nominal essence”—a set of characteristics we attach to the name we give things of a sort when we group them and separate them in our classifications. “The boundaries of species, whereby man sorts [things], are made by men,” he writes; “the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are … of man’s making.”

Species is not the only term of classification. A genus, for example, is a more inclusive group than a species. Groups which differ specifically belong to the same genus if their difference is accompanied by the possession of common traits. As species differ from one another within a generic group, so genera are in turn subclasses of more inclusive groupings, such as phyla, families, and orders. But there are also smaller groupings within a species. There are races or varieties and sub-varieties, the members of which share the characteristics of the species but differ from one another in other respects. Ultimately, of course, within the smallest class the systematist bothers to define, each individual differs from every other in the same group with whom, at the same time, it shares certain characteristics of the race, the species, the genus, and all the larger classes to which they belong.

This general plan of botanical or zoological classification does not seem to give species peculiar status in the hierarchy of classes or groupings or to distinguish it from other classes except as these are more or less inclusive than itself. Why then should attention be focused on the origin of species, rather than of varieties or of genera?

One part of the answer comes from the facts of generation or reproduction. Offspring tend to differ from their parents, as well as from each other, but they also tend to resemble one another. “A given germ,” Aristotle writes, “does not give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each germ springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny.” This is an early formulation of the insight that in the process of reproduction, the law of like generating like always holds for those characteristics which identify the species of ancestors and progeny.

In other words, a species always breeds true; its members always generate organisms which can be classified as belonging to the same species, however much they vary among themselves as individuals within the group. Furthermore, the sub-groups—the races or varieties—of a species are able to breed with one another, but diverse species cannot interbreed. Organisms different in species either cannot mate productively at all, or if crossbred, like the horse and the ass, they produce a sterile hybrid like the mule.

In the hierarchy of classes, then, species would seem to be distinguished from all smaller groupings by their stability from generation to generation. If species are thus self-perpetuating, they in turn give stability to all the larger

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groupings—the genera, phyla, families—which remain as fixed from generation to generation as the species which constitute them. Hence the question of origin applies peculiarly to species rather than to varieties or to genera.

On the supposition stated, no origin of species would seem to be possible except by a special act of creation. Either all the existing species of organisms have always existed from the beginning of life on earth; or, if in the course of ages new species have arisen, their appearance cannot be accounted for by natural generation. By the law of natural generation, offspring will always be of the same species as the parent organisms.

Spontaneous generation, of course, remains a possibility. A new species of organism might come to be without being generated by other living organisms. But apart from the question of fact (i.e., whether spontaneous generation ever does occur), such origin of a form of life seems to lie outside the operation of natural causes and to imply the intervention of supernatural power.

The possibility of spontaneous generation was entertained in antiquity and the Middle Ages, and was even thought to be supported by observation, such as that of maggots emerging from putrefying matter. But modern science tends to affirm the biogenetic law that living organisms are generated only by living organisms. To Kant, the notion that “life could have sprung up from the nature of what is void of life,” seems not only contrary to fact, but absurd or unreasonable. Yet, while affirming the principle that like produces like by insisting upon “the generation of something organic from something else that is also organic,” Kant does not carry that principle to the point where it would make the generation of a new species impossible. “Within the class of organic beings,” he writes, it is possible for one organism to generate another “differing specifically from it.”

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND of these various suppositions, Darwin is moved to a new insight by the conjunction of certain types of fact: the results of breeding under domestication which exhibit the great range of variation within a species and the tendency of inbred varieties to breed true; his own observations of the geographical distribution of species of flora and fauna, especially those separated from one another by impassable barriers; the facts of comparative anatomy and embryology which reveal affinities in organic structure and development between organisms distinct in species; and the geological record which indicates the great antiquity of life upon the earth, which gives evidence of the cataclysmic changes in the earth’s surface (with consequences for the survival of life), and which above all contains the fossil remains of forms of life now extinct but not dissimilar from species alive in the present age.

Briefly stated, Darwin’s insight is that new species arise when, among the varieties of an existing species, certain intermediate forms become extinct, and the other circumstances are such that the surviving varieties, now become more sharply separated from one another in type, are able to reproduce their kind, and, in the course of many generations of inbreeding, also tend to breed true. They thus perpetuate their type until each in turn ceases to be a species and becomes a genus when its own extreme varieties, separated by the extinction of intermediates, become new species, as they themselves did at an earlier stage of history. For the very same reason that Darwin says “a well-marked variety may be called an incipient species,” a species may be called an incipient genus.

The point is misunderstood if it is supposed that when new species originate from old, both the new and the old continue to survive as species. On the contrary, when in the course of thousands of generations some of the varieties of a species achieve the status of species, the species from which they originated by variation ceases to be a species and becomes a genus.

“The only distinction between species and well-marked varieties,” Darwin writes, “is that the latter are known, or believed, to be connected at the present day with intermediate gradations, whereas species were formerly thus connected… It is quite possible that forms now generally acknowledged to be merely varieties may hereafter be thought worthy of specific names; and in this case scientific and common language will come into accordance. In short, we shall have to treat species in the same manner as those naturalists treat genera who admit that genera are merely artificial combinations made for convenience… Our classifications will come to be, as far as they can be so made, genealogies.”

The origin of species thus seems to be identical with the extinction of intermediate varieties, combined with the survival of one or more of the extreme varieties. These seem to be simply two ways of looking at the same thing. Still another way of seeing the point may be achieved by supposing, contrary to fact, the survival of all the varieties ever produced through the breeding of organisms.

“If my theory be true,” Darwin writes, “numberless intermediate varieties, linking closely together all the species of the same group, must assuredly have existed; but the very process of natural selection constantly tends, as has been so often remarked, to exterminate the parent-forms and the intermediate links.” If one were to suppose the simultaneous co-existence of all intermediate varieties in the present day, the groups now called “species” would be continuously connected by slight differences among their members and would not, therefore, be divided into distinct species, as they now are because certain links are missing.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states the principle of continuity in the following manner. “This principle,” he writes, “indicates that all differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In one word, there are no species or sub-species which… are the nearest possible to each other; intermediate species or sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing between these.” But, Kant adds, “it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience,” partly because “the species in nature are really divided… and if the gradual progression through their affinity were continuous, the intermediate members lying between

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two given species must be infinite in number, which is impossible.”

The Russian geneticist, Theodore Dobzhansky, gives an interpretation of continuity in nature which differs from Kant’s in that it follows and applies Darwin’s conception of species and their origin. According to him, if we suppose the extreme case of all possible genetic variations being alive on earth together, the result would be not an infinite number of species, but no species and genera at all. The array of plants and animals would approach a perfectly continuous series in which there would only be individual differences. There would be no specific or generic groupings of the sort now made in our classification of the forms of life.

On Darwin’s conception of the origin of species its causes divide into two sets of factors: first, those which determine the extinction or survival of organisms and, with their survival, their opportunities for mating and reproduction; second, those which determine the transmission of characteristics from one generation to another and the variation of offspring from their ancestors and from each other. Without genetic variation there would be no range of differences within a group on which the factors of selection could operate. Without the inheritance of ancestral traits there would be no perpetuation of group characteristics in the organisms which manage to survive and reproduce.

For Darwin the operation of the first set of factors constitutes the process of natural selection. This may take place in many ways: through geological catastrophes which make certain areas of the earth’s surface uninhabitable for all organisms, or for those types which cannot adapt themselves to the radically changed environment; through the competition among organisms for the limited food supply available in their habitat; through the struggle for existence in which organisms not only compete for food but also prey upon one another; through the sexual selection which operates within a group when some organisms are prevented by others from mating and reproducing; and through all the obstacles which isolate groups from interbreeding, in-

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cluding geographical and physiological inaccessibility.

The struggle for existence is not only a struggle to survive, but also a struggle to reproduce. Natural selection operates with respect to reproduction as well as survival. Whether the survival is of the fittest alone, or whether the multiplication of inferior organisms also gives evolution another direction, has been disputed since Darwin’s day; but according to his theory, “natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being; all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection… Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death… the production of the higher animals directly follows.”

With respect to the factors of heredity and variation, tremendous advances since Darwin in the experimental science of genetics require revisions in this part of his theory of evolution. This is particularly true of the researches of Mendel, Bateson, and Morgan concerning the ways in which genetic factors operate. But on one major point in the theory of heredity Darwin holds a view which later investigations have tended to confirm. Antedating Weismann, he nevertheless opposes Lamarck’s theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. As William James expresses it, where Lamarck supposes that environmental influences cause changes in the structure or functioning of the organism which then become hereditary, Darwin regards the environment merely as a selective agency, acting upon variations produced entirely by causes operating in the breeding process. James thinks “the evidence for Mr. Darwin’s view… [was]… quite convincing,” even before it received the support of Weismann’s theory, according to which it is “a priori impossible that any peculiarity acquired during the lifetime by the parent should be transmitted to the germ.”

The situation is not the same with regard to Darwin’s views on the mechanism of heredity. Writing before Mendel’s classic experiments in hybridization, Darwin seems to suppose a blending of hereditary factors; whereas, according to Mendel, inheritance is particulate. Distinct genetic factors combine to produce a certain somatic result without losing their separate identities. They can therefore be reassorted and enter into new genetic combinations in the next generation. Most important of all, Darwin thinks that new forms of life arise gradually as the result of a continuous accumulation of slight and imperceptible variations. The opposite view is now taken. The discovery of abrupt mutations in a single generation discountenances Darwin’s maxim natura non facit saltum—“nature does nothing by jumps.”

These advances in genetics since Darwin’s day do not alter the main outlines of his theory. The mechanisms of heredity may be much more complicated than Darwin knew, and involve much of which he was ignorant, such as mutation-rates, or the various types, causes, and effects of hybridization. But that merely leads to a more elaborate or different explanation of genetic variation in offspring and the transmission of ancestral traits. No matter how these are explained, their occurrence is all that is needed to permit new species to originate through natural processes of heredity and selection. “If Darwin were alive today,” Julian Huxley writes, “the title of his book would have to be not the ‘origin’ but the ‘Origins of Species.’ For perhaps the most salient single fact that has emerged from recent studies is that species may arise in a number of quite distinct ways.”

THE READER MUST judge for himself to what extent Darwin’s theory of evolution was anticipated by those who, like Augustine, affirm the appearance of new species of life on earth at various stages in its history, or even by a writer like Kant, who seems to possess the germ of its insight.

The critical test in every case is whether those who affirm the occurrence of new species by natural processes rather than by special creation, think of them as simply added to the organic forms already in existence without any change in the status as species of the pre-existing forms. Those who think in this way do not have Darwin’s idea of the origin of species; for in conceiving an increase in the number of species as merely a matter of addition, they necessarily attribute stability to each species, new as well as old. By this test, not even Kant seems to be near the center of Darwin’s hy-

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pothesis of the origin of species by the extinction of intermediate varieties.

In comparing Darwin with certain of his predecessors, notably Aristotle and Aquinas, it seems necessary to apply another kind of test. Here the problem is not so much one of discovering affinities or disagreements, as one of determining whether they are talking about the same thing and therefore, when they appear to disagree, whether the issue between them is genuine. They do not seem to conceive a species in the same way. Certainly they use the word differently. This affects the way in which the whole problem of origins is understood. The controversies concerning the fixity or mutability of species, concerning evolution and creation, and concerning the origin of man involve genuine issues only if those who seem to disagree do not use the word “species” in widely different senses.

It is possible that certain forms of life do not originate by descent from a common ancestor and do not derive their status as quite distinct types from the mere absence of intermediate varieties—varieties which once must have existed but are now extinct. If such forms were to be called “species,” the word would have a different meaning from the meaning it has when applied to types of pigeons, beetles, or rats.

The first of these two meanings may express the philosophical conception of a living species as a class of organisms having the same essential nature, according to which conception there never could have been intermediate varieties. The second meaning may be that of the scientific taxonomist in botany or zoology who constructs a system of classification, genealogical or otherwise. On this meaning, one million and a half would be a conservative estimate of the number of plant and animal types classified by the systematist as “species.” In contrast, the number of species, in the philosophical sense of distinct essences, would be extremely small.

Darwin, for example, says, “I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification embraces all the members of the same great class or kingdom. I believe that animals are descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number. Analogy would lead me one step farther, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide.” It is immaterial to the theory of evolution, he adds, whether this inference, “chiefly grounded on analogy… be accepted.”

The issue between Darwin and the theologians may or may not be genuine according to the interpretation of this passage, and according to the possibility of a double use of the word “species”—for both the small number of progenitors from which all the extant types of plants and animals have evolved, and for a very large number of those extant types. If the theologians use the word “species” in the first sense, and Darwin in the second, they need not be in disagreement. The “view of life” which Darwin attributes to certain eminent authorities, he himself does not flatly reject, namely, that life, “with its several powers [has] been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one.”

Is there common ground here in the admitted possibility that life may have been originally created in a small number of distinct forms and that these are to be regarded as species in one conception, though not in another? If so, the affirmation of a certain fixity to species would apply only to a few primordial forms. Concerning forms which have appeared with the passage of time, two questions would have to be answered. First, are they species in the philosopher’s sense of distinct and immutable essences, or species in the scheme of systematic biological classification? Second, is their first appearance at an historical moment due to a special act of creation, to spontaneous generation, or to evolution from already existing organic forms by “descent with modification”?

To join issue with Darwin, it would seem to be necessary for the person answering these questions to use the word “species” in the biologist’s sense and at the same time to account for the historical origin of the new species by special creation or spontaneous generation. But in the tradition of the great books, theologians like Augustine and Aquinas do not attribute to God any special acts of creation after the original production of the world,

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except to explain the origin of individual human souls.

“Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God,” Aquinas writes, “but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days… Some existed not only in matter, but also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species also that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare, but even these existed previously in their causes, in the work of the six days.”

WHETHER OR NOT the theologian’s conception of an historical development of the forms of life conforms to the evolutionist’s hypothesis, even though it does not offer the same type of explanation, is a matter which the reader of the texts must decide. But one issue, which still remains to be discussed, can leave little doubt of a basic controversy between Darwin and some of his predecessors, especially the theologians.

It concerns the origin and nature of man. It can be stated in terms of two views of human nature. One is that man is a species in the philosophical sense, essentially and abruptly distinct from brute animals; the other, that man is a species in the biologist’s sense, and differs from other animals only by continuous variation.

On the first view, either man would have to be created, in body as well as soul; or if the human species has an origin which in part or whole involves the operation of natural causes, it must be conceived as emerging from a lower form of life. The rational soul, Aquinas maintains, “cannot come to be except by creation.” But it is not only man’s soul which, according to Aquinas, “cannot be produced save immediately by God.” He also insists that “the first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God.” He does not reject the suggestion of Augustine that the human body may have preexisted in other creatures as an effect preexists in its causes. But he adds the qualification that it preexists in its causes only in the manner of a “passive potentiality,” so that “it can be produced out of pre-existing matter only by God.” A Christian theologian like Aquinas might entertain the hypothesis of emergent evolution as applied to the human organism, but only with the qualification that natural causes by themselves do not suffice for the production of man.

On the second view, which is Darwin’s, man and the anthropoid apes have descended from a common ancestral form which is now extinct, as are also many of the intermediate varieties in the chain of development—unless, as it is sometimes thought, certain fossil remains supply some of the missing links. “The great break in the organic chain between man and his nearest allies, which cannot be bridged over by any extinct or living species, has often been advanced,” Darwin admits, “as a grave objection to the belief that man is descended from some lower form; but this objection,” he continues, “will not appear of much weight to those who, from general reasons, believe in the general principle of evolution. Breaks often occur in all parts of the series, some being wide, sharp and defined, others less so in various degrees, as between the orang and its nearest allies—between the Tarsius and the other Lemuridae—between the elephant, and in a more striking manner between the Ornithorhynchus or Echidna, and all other mammals.” Furthermore, Darwin insists, no one who has read Lyell’s Antiquity of Man “will lay much stress… on the absence of fossil remains”; for Lyell has shown “that in all the vertebrate classes the discovery of fossil remains has been a very slow and fortuitous process. Nor should it be forgotten that those regions which are the most likely to afford remains connecting man with some extinct ape-like creature, have not as yet been searched by geologists.”

On either of these two conflicting views, the organic affinities between man and the most highly developed mammals would be equally intelligible, though they would be differently interpreted by Aquinas and Darwin. But ac-

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cording to the doctrine of man’s creation by God, or even on the hypothesis of emergent evolution, there need not be—strictly speaking, there cannot be—a missing link between ape and man, for the emergent species is a whole step upward in the scale of life. Man is thus not one of several organic types which have become species through the extinction of intermediate varieties, and hence he differs from other animals not in an accidental, but rather in an essential manner—that is, he differs in kind rather than degree.

This issue concerning human nature is discussed from other points of view in the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN. Here the issue, stated in terms of man’s origin, seems to involve three possibilities: special creation, evolution by descent from a common ancestor, and emergent evolution. But these three possibilities apply not only to man, but to the origin of every species which did not exist at the first moment of life on earth.

The hypothesis of special creation does not seem to be held by the theologians, at least not in the tradition of the great books. The hypothesis of emergent evolution raises questions concerning the factors—natural or supernatural—which must be operative to cause the emergence of higher from lower forms of organic matter. Whether or not Aristotle and Aquinas can supply an answer to these questions in terms of their theory of matter’s potentiality for a variety of forms, Darwin’s theory of descent with modification seems to be definitely opposed to the hypothesis of emergent evolution. Speaking as a Darwinian, James says that “the point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are really nothing more than results of the redistribution of the original and unchanging materials… No new natures, no factors not present at the beginning, are introduced at any later stage.”

In this dispute between two theories of evolution, does not the solution depend in every case upon a prior question concerning the relation of the species under consideration—whether or not it is possible for them to be or to have been developmentally connected by intermediate varieties? If, for example, the evidence were to prove that man and ape, as they now exist in the world, are essentially distinct—different in kind—then no intermediate varieties could ever have existed to account for their descent from a common ancestor. If, on the other hand, the evidence were to prove that they differ only in degree, then no difficulty stands in the way of the Darwinian hypothesis. The ultimate issue concerning the origin of species would thus seem to reduce to the problem of which meaning of “species” applies to the organic types in question.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The classification of animals
   • 1a. Comparison of genealogical classification with other types of taxonomy: the phylogenetic series
   • 1b. The criteria for distinguishing races or varieties, species, genera, and all higher taxonomic groupings
2. Genetic variation in the course of generations
   • 2a. Comparison of variation under conditions of natural and artificial breeding
   • 2b. Characteristics which are more and less variable genetically: their bearing on the distinction of races, species, and genera
3. The process of heredity
   • 3a. The inheritance of acquired characteristics: the use and disuse of parts
   • 3b. The inheritance and variability of instincts
   • 3c. Interbreeding and crossbreeding: hybridism and sterility
   • 3d. Atavisms and reversions to ancestral type
   • 3e. Marked and abrupt mutations in a single generation as opposed to the continuous accumulation of slight and imperceptible variations
4. The problem of evolution: the origin of plant and animal species
   • 4a. The question of ultimate origins: the creation of primordial life in one or many forms; the original generation of life from inorganic matter
   • 4b. The fixity or the mutability of species
   • 4c. The origin of new forms of life: special creation, spontaneous generation, or descent with modification from older forms
   • 4d. The direction of evolution: progress and recession
5. The theory of evolution: the origin of new species from a common ancestry
   • 5a. The struggle for existence: its causes and consequences
     • (1) Natural selection: the survival of the fittest
     • (2) The extinction of intermediate varieties
     • (3) Difficulties with the theory of natural selection: its limitations
   • 5b. Competition in mating: sexual selection
   • 5c. The geographical and physiological factors in breeding: accessibility, fertility, and sterility
6. The facts of evolution: evidences bearing on the history of life on earth
   • 6a. The geological record: the significance of fossil remains
   • 6b. The geographical distribution of the forms of life in relation to the genealogy of existing species
   • 6c. Comparative anatomy and embryology: the meaning of rudimentary or vestigial organs and functions
7. The origin and development of man
   • 7a. The doctrine of man’s special creation: in body, in soul
   • 7b. The theory of the evolutionary origin of man from lower forms of animal life: descent from an ancestor common to man and the anthropoids
     • (1) Anatomical, physiological, and embryological evidences of an organic affinity between man and other mammalian forms of life
     • (2) Paleontological evidences: the missing link in man’s ancestry
     • (3) Psychological evidences: the human mind in relation to animal intelligence
   • 7c. Biological evolution in the course of human generation: from prehistoric to historic man

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) I Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The classification of animals

1a. Comparison of genealogical classification with other types of taxonomy: the phylogenetic series

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK V, CH 28 [1024b8-10] 546b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [486a15]-CH 6 [491a5] 7b-12c esp CH 1 [486a15-487a1] 7b-d; BK V, CH 1 [539a4-15] 65b; BK VIII, CH 1 [588b4]-CH 2 [590a19] 114d-116c / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 2-4 [642b5-644b11] 165d-168c / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 1 [732b13-733b17] 272c-274a; BK III, CH 11 [761b14-24] 302c-d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 27, 158b-c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, SECT 23 274b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 31d; 63d-64d; 207a-229a,c esp 207a-212c, 215b-217b, 228c-229a,c; 238b-239a / Descent of Man, 331a-341d esp 332b-c, 337a-338c, 340d-341d

1b. The criteria for distinguishing races or varieties, species, genera, and all higher taxonomic groupings

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 13 [14b32-15a8] 20c-d / Topics, BK VI, CH 6 [144b27-145a2] 197d-198c passim / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 28 [1024b8-10] 546b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [486a15]-CH 6 [491a5] 7b-12c esp CH 1 [486a15-487a1] 7b-d; BK II, CH 1 [497b4-18] 19b,d-20a; BK IV, CH 1 [523b30-524a10] 48b,d / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 4 [644a12-b15] 167d-168a; CH 5 [645b20-28] 169c-d / Politics, BK IV, CH 4 [1290b25-36] 489d-490a 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 813a-b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 50, A 4, REP 1 273b-274b; Q 76, A 5, REP 3 394c-396a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI [3-37] 268b-283a passim, esp SECT 7 270b, SECT 36-37 279a-b; CH X, SECT 21 297a-b; CH XI, SECT 19-20 304b-d 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 193a-200c esp 195d-200c / Judgement, 579b-c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 183c-d 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 12c-13a; 24a-b; 25d-29a; 30d-31d; 55c-60a passim; 64a; 136b-137a; 145c-151a passim, esp 146c-d, 147b-149a, 150c-d; 159c-160a; 207d-229a,c passim, esp 207d-210b; 234d; 241d-242a / Descent of Man, 331b-333a passim; 342a-350b passim, esp 342a-b, 346d-347d

2. Genetic variation in the course of generations

7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 403b-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 15 [1390b24-31] 638a-b

462 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 29 159b-c 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 79b 42 KANT: Judgement, 579b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 6d-7a; 9a-31d esp 9a-12a, 23c-d, 29a-31d; 53b-59d passim; 65a-79d; 99a-103c esp 100d, 149b-150c, 182d-183a; 234a-c / Descent of Man, 266a-271a esp 266a-268a; 275c-d, 284c-285d esp 285b-c; 347d-348c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 857b-858a

2a. Comparison of variation under conditions of natural and artificial breeding

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 29 159b-c / New Atlantis, 211c-212a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 7a-b; 9a-31d esp 9a-b, 12a-c, 24a-c; 40a-42d; 53b-55a; 65a-66a; 117a-c; 149b-d; 233b-d / Descent of Man, 377a; 486d

2b. Characteristics which are more and less variable genetically: their bearing on the distinction of races, species, and genera

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 4 [644a12-644b11] 167d-168c 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH VI, SECT 14-17 272d-273a; SECT 23-27 274b-276a passim 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 24c-25b; 71d-75b; 78c-79d; 236b-d / Descent of Man, 342a; 372d-375a; 486d-488b

3. The process of heredity

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VII, CH 6 [585b29-586a14] 111d-112b / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [640a15-28] 162c-d, [641b37-42] 164d-165a / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 17 [721b6]-CH 18 [724a13] 261b-264b; BK IV, CH 3 [767b36]-CH 4 [770b27] 308d-312c 10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, PAR 14 15a-b / Sacred Disease, 155d-156a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [159-191] 3a-c, [592-598] 8b; BK IV [1209-1232] 60a-b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 367b-368a 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 386d-387b; 391c-393b; 395a-396a; 425b-d; 446b-c; 455d-456a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 191b-192b 42 KANT: Judgement, 578d-580a esp 579b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 10d-12c esp 11a-b, 11d-12a; 69c-71a passim; 222a-224b / Descent of Man, 375a-383a; 413d [fn 61]; 429d-430c; 500a-525a esp 500a-502a, 511a-b; 529d-531a,c; 590c-d 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 653b-c

3a. The inheritance of acquired characteristics: the use and disuse of parts

7 PLATO: Laws, BK VI, 708d-709a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VII, CH 6 [585b29-37] 111d-112a / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 17 [721b18-722a1] 261c-d; CH 18 [724a3-7] 264a 10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, PAR 14 15a-b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 81, A 2 164d-165c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 367c 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 455d-456a 42 KANT: Judgement, 580a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 1c; 10d-12c; 66a-69c esp 66a-c, 69c; 82d-85c; 103c-116d passim, esp 115d, 119c-120a; 223c; 227c-228b / Descent of Man, 258d-259a; 269b-271a; 283a-284b; 299a-c; 318a-c; 319a; 320b-321b; 358d-359a; 587d-588a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 52a; 691a-b; 890b-897a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 594d-595a / Ego and Id, 707d-708b

3b. The inheritance and variability of instincts

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [741-753] 39c-d 42 KANT: Judgement, 580a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 111a; 119a-135a,c esp 121b-122d, 131c-134d; 236d-237a / Descent of Man, 288a-d; 292c-d; 304b,d [fn 5]; 318a-319a passim; 506d-507a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 691a-b; 718a-720b esp 718b; 722b-725a passim; 851b; 890b-897a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 591d-592b; 594d-595b; 613a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-654a / Ego and Id, 707c-708b esp 708b / War and Death, 758a-d esp 758d

3c. Interbreeding and crossbreeding: hybridism and sterility

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 121d-122a 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 8 [1033b29-1034a1] 557a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VI, CH 11 [566a26-30] 92c; CH 23 [577b5]-CH 24 [577b29] 103a-c; BK VIII, CH 28 [606b20-607a9] 132b-c; BK IX, CH 1 [608a31-34] 133d; CH 32 [619b7-11] 144c / Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [641b27-39] 164d-165a / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 4 [738b26-35] 279c-d; CH 7 [746b29-747a20] 287c-288a; CH 8 [747b28-748a35] 288c-290a,c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [700-710] 23d-24a, [920-924] 26d; BK V [878-924] 72c-73a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 73, A 1, REP 3 370a-371a 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 386d-387b; 392b-c; 395b-d; 425c 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 30 159c-d / New Atlantis, 211c-212a 42 KANT: Judgement, 581d-582a 43 MILL: Representative Government, 426d-427a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 14a-c; 16b-d; 23c-d; 47c-50c; 136a-151d; 230b-231b / Descent of Man, 342a-b; 344b-345c esp 345b,d [fn 14]; 356a-b; 482b-483b

463

3d. Atavisms and reversions to ancestral type

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VII, CH 6 [585b32-34] 112a / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 18 [722a8-11] 262a; BK IV, CH 3 [768b9-14] 309c-310a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1218-1225] 60a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 12a-c; 16a-d; 73b-c; 75b-78c; 149d-150c; 236b / Descent of Man, 271c-275c; 325c; 331b; 375c-d; 557a-c; 587a; 590b-c

3e. Marked and abrupt mutations in a single generation as opposed to the continuous accumulation of slight and imperceptible variations

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 29 159b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 3a-b; 10c; 24b-c; 92c-d; 117a-118d; 235b-c; 240d-241a / Descent of Man, 442a-b; 487a-488a passim; 538b-539a; 590d-591a passim

4. The problem of evolution: the origin of plant and animal species

4a. The question of ultimate origins: the creation of primordial life in one or many forms; the original generation of life from inorganic matter

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:11-12,20-28; 2:4-9,19-23 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:14—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 1:14 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK V, CH 1 [539a16-b13] 65b-66a; CH 11 [543a18-19] 70b; CH 15 [546b17-35] 73c; CH 15 [547b12]-CH 16 [548a7] 74b-75b; CH 19 [550b31-551a13] 77d-78a; [551b19-552a27] 78c-79c; CH 31 [556b25]-CH 32 [557b14] 83c-84b; BK VI, CH 15-16 [569a13-570a9] 95a-96a / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715a18-716a1] 255b-256a; CH 16 [721a3-11] 260d-261a; BK II, CH 1 [732a8-14] 272d-273a; CH 3 [737a1-5] 277d; BK III, CH 9 [758b1-759a7] 299b-300a; CH 11 [762a28-763a19] 303d-304b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [783-836] 71b-72a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XIII, PAR 45 123a / City of God, BK XI, CH 10, 348b-c; CH 11 349a-b; CH 21 357a-b; CH 23-27 357d-360a,c; BK XIII, CH 24 373d-376a,c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 69, A 2 361c-362c; QQ 71-72 367a-369d 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK V, 105a-b 28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 299b / On Animal Generation, 338c-d; 400d-401a; 412c-413a; 428c-d; 449a-b; 454d-455a; 468b-469c 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VII [131-640] 220a-231a 34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 542b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 167b 42 KANT: Judgement, 578d-580a esp 579b-580a; 582b-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [7851-7864] 191b 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 2d-4a passim, esp 3c-d; 240c-241d; 243d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b-98a esp 95b, 98a 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 652d

4b. The fixity or the mutability of species

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:11-12,20-28; 2:4-9,19-23 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715b2-17] 255c-d; BK II, CH 1 [731b24-732a1] 272a-b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [577-598] 8a-b; BK II [700-710] 23d-24a; BK V [916-924] 73a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 23, A 7, ANS 138d-140a; Q 98, A 1, ANS 516d-517c 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 29-30 159b-d 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III, CH III, SECT 17 258d-259b; CH VI, SECT 15-17 272d-273a; SECT 23-27 274b-276a passim; BK IV, CH IV, SECT 13-16 326d-328d passim 42 KANT: Judgement, 579b-580b; 581b-582c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 1a-5d passim, esp 1a-2a, 2d-3b, 5a-b; 7d; 160d-180d passim, esp 160d, 165d, 167a-c; 239d-240b

4c. The origin of new forms of life: special creation, spontaneous generation, or descent with modification from older forms

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:11-12,20-28; 2:4-9,19-23 9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK III, CH 11 [762b28-763a19] 303d-304b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [783-836] 71b-72a 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XII, CH 13, 350b-c; BK XVI, CH 7-8 427a-428c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 69, A 2, ANS 361c-362c; Q 71, A 1, ANS and REP 1 367a-368b; Q 72, A 1, ANS and REP 5 368b-369d; Q 73, A 1, REP 3 370a-371a; Q 74, A 2, ANS 373d-375a; Q 115, A 2 587c-588c; Q 118, A 3, REP 1 603b-604b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 338d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 29 159b-c 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 167b 42 KANT: Judgement, 578d-580a esp 579b-580a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 1a-5d passim, esp 1a-d, 3a, 5c-d; 6d-7d esp 7d; 31d; 60d-61a; 64a; 74a-b; 78a-c; 85b-c; 92d; 182a-184d esp 183b-184b; 198b-204d esp 198b-c, 204d; 217d-219a; 228c-229a,c esp 228c, 229c; 234d-243d esp 239b-240d, 242d-243d / Descent of Man, 253a-c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a esp 689d

464

4d. The direction of evolution: progress and recession

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 79a-80a; PART III, 121a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 178a-d 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 1c; 41c-42a; 60b-62a; 63b-64d; 96b-103c esp 96b-98a, 99a-c, 102d-103c; 176b-178a; 243b-d / Descent of Man, 340d-341d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 217c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-654c esp 653d-654a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 768d-769a

5. The theory of evolution: the origin of new species from a common ancestry

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 6a-243d esp 6d-7d, 23c-d, 32a-c, 116d-118d, 228c-243d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b-98a esp 95b, 98a

5a. The struggle for existence: its causes and consequences

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 112d-113a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK IX, CH 1 [608b19]-CH 2 [610b20] 134a-136b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 58a-b; 79b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 334b,d-337d passim; 348d-349d 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 33c-34a 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 7b; 32a-64d esp 33a-b, 38b-39a,c, 63b-64d, 182d-183a, 243c-d / Descent of Man, 275d-277c; 320a-328c passim, esp 320a-321b, 328b-c; 350d-351a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 573c; 592a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 791c-d

5a(1) Natural selection: the survival of the fittest

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 8 [198b16-33] 275d-276a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [855-877] 72b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 335a-b 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 510a-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 2a-b; 7b-d; 32a-c; 40a-64d esp 40a-c, 44d-47c, 63b-64d; 95d-97a; 134d-135a,c; 214b-d; 233d-239c esp 233d-234a, 234c, 235b / Descent of Man, 277c-286d passim, esp 277c-278a, 284c-285c; 320a-328d esp 327c-328c; 424a-425d passim; 430d-432c; 442d-443b; 525b-527c; 554d-555b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 90b-93a esp 92a-b; 94a-b; 208a-209b esp 209b

5a(2) The extinction of intermediate varieties

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [837-877] 72a-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 5a; 52c-53a; 58b-60a esp 58b-59a; 63d-64d; 80b-82d; 84a-b; 97a-b; 152a-153a; 168d-171a; 231d-232d / Descent of Man, 341a; 350b-356a 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 768d-769a

5a(3) Difficulties with the theory of natural selection: its limitations

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 80a-118d esp 80a-b; 131c-134c; 152a-153a; 160d-166a,c passim, esp 165d-166a,c; 230a-233b / Descent of Man, 284d-285c

5b. Competition in mating: sexual selection

7 PLATO: Republic, BK V, 361b-363b 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 454a-c; 477b 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 166a-b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 346b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 43d-44c / Descent of Man, 359c-d; 364a-589d esp 364a-368b, 373b-375a, 381d-383a, 432c-434d, 486a-c, 529a-530c, 561a-d, 582d-585d, 588d-589d, 593d-596a, 598a-600a,c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 14b

5c. The geographical and physiological factors in breeding: accessibility, fertility, and sterility

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [700-729] 23d-24b; BK V [837-854] 72a-b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 229d 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 10a-c; 47c-52b; 68d-69c; 136a-151d esp 136a-b, 141b-142c, 143b-145c, 150d-151d; 230b-231c / Descent of Man, 344b-345c; 351c-355d; 365b-c

6. The facts of evolution: evidences bearing on the history of life on earth

6a. The geological record: the significance of fossil remains

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 79a-b 42 KANT: Judgement, 583d-584c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 80c-81a; 152a-180d esp 179b-180d; 231d-233a; 237a-c; 242c-243a

6b. The geographical distribution of the forms of life in relation to the genealogy of existing species

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 51a-52b passim; 80c-82d; 181a-206a,c esp 204d-206a,c; 231b-c; 237c-238b / Descent of Man, 343c-344a

6c. Comparative anatomy and embryology: the meaning of rudimentary or vestigial organs and functions

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK I, CH 9 [491b26-35] 13c; BK IV, CH 8 [532b34-533a14] 59d-60a; BK VII, CH 7 [586a15-586b11] 112b-c 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 375b-c; 451c-453a passim 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 7, 139c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 334b,d

465 42 KANT: Judgement, 579b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 82d-94c; 177d-178a; 212a-229a,c; 238c-239a; 241b-d; 242c / Descent of Man, 255c-265d; 271c-275c passim, esp 274a-b, 275a-c; 278c-284b; 300a-b; 333b-334c; 338b-340c; 347d-348c 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 652a

7. The origin and development of man

7a. The doctrine of man’s special creation: in body, in soul

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-27; 2:7,18,21-23; 5:1-2 / Job, 10:8-12 / Psalms, 8 esp 8:4-6; 100 esp 100:3; 119:73; 139:14-16—(D) Psalms, 8 esp 8:5-7; 99 esp 99:3; 118:73; 138:14-16 / Isaiah, 29:15-16; 43:7; 45:12—(D) Isaias, 29:15-16; 43:7; 45:12 / Jeremiah, 27:5—(D) Jeremias, 27:5 / Malachi, 2:10—(D) Malachias, 2:10 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:14; 2:23; 6:7; 10:1; 15:10-11—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 1:14; 2:23; 6:8; 10:1; 15:10-11 / Ecclesiasticus, 17:1; 33:10—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 17:1; 33:10 / II Maccabees, 7:23,28—(D) OT, II Machabees, 7:23,28 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 19:4 / Mark, 10:6 / Acts, 17:24-26 / I Corinthians, 15:45 / Colossians, 3:10 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 3 108b-c; CH 6, 111a-c; CH 13 120b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK VII, CH 29-30, 261a-c; BK X, CH 31 319b-d; BK XII, CH 20-27 355b-360a,c; BK XIII, CH 24 373d-376a,c; BK XXII, CH 1, 586d-587b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 22, 629c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 72, A 1, REP 1,3-4 368b-369d; Q 73, A 1, REP 3 370a-371a; Q 75, A 6, REP 1 383c-384c; QQ 90-92 480c-491d; Q 118 600a-604b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [85-90] 77d; XXV [34-78] 91d-92a; PARADISE, VII [64-78] 115d-116a; [121-148] 116b-c; XIII [31-87] 125d-126b 22 CHAUCER: Monk’s Tale [14,013-020] 434b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 176d; PART IV, 251a-b 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41c; 54b-c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 56a-b / Meditations, II, 87b-88b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK I [650-659] 107b; BK II [345-353] 118b-119a; BK VII [139-161] 220a-b; [499-550] 228a-229a; BK VIII [452-499] 242a-243a 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH I, SECT 6, 26b; CH VI, SECT 56 36d 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 187d-188a 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 228a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689b-d 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 562d

7b. The theory of the evolutionary origin of man from lower forms of animal life: descent from an ancestor common to man and the anthropoids

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 334b,d 42 KANT: Judgement, 578d-580a esp 579b-c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [8245-8264] 201a; [8321-8326] 202b-203a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 253a-341d esp 253a-254d, 255a-c, 265a-d, 285c-286d, 331a-b, 337a-338c, 340d-341d; 590a-592a; 596d-597a,c 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 509d-510a; 562d

7b(1) Anatomical, physiological, and embryological evidences of an organic affinity between man and other mammalian forms of life

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK II, CH 8-9 [501b17-502b23] 24c-25b / Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 10 [689b31-35] 221d 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 451c-453a passim; 482b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 334b,d 42 KANT: Judgement, 579b-c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 255a-265d; 271a-275c; 278c-284b; 300a-b; 333b-335a; 338d-340c; 563a-564a; 587b-c; 590b-591d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a-52b passim

7b(2) Paleontological evidences: the missing link in man’s ancestry

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 336a-337a

7b(3) Psychological evidences: the human mind in relation to animal intelligence

42 KANT: Judgement, 602b,d [fn 1] 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287a-320c esp 287a-303d, 319b-d; 591d-592a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 689c-690a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a-52b passim, esp 41b, 49b, 51a-52b; 95b-98a

7c. Biological evolution in the course of human generation: from prehistoric to historic man

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [925-987] 73b-74a 36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART II, 79b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-330a; 334b,d-337d 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 266a-275d passim; 323b-324d; 336c; 338d-339a; 342a-359d esp 342b-343c, 347b-348c, 356a-359b; 578a-589d esp 586a-589a; 590c-591e 54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 782a-b [fn 1]; 785b [fn 1]

466

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

• Other discussions of the classification of animals, see ANIMAL 2a-2c; LIFE AND DEATH 3-3b; and for the distinction between species and genera in relation to definition and classification, see DEFINITION 1a, 2b, 2d; RELATION 5a(4); SAME AND OTHER 3a(1).
• Other considerations of the problem of heredity, see ANIMAL 10; FAMILY 6b; HABIT 3e.
• Matters relevant to the origin of life, and of the major forms of life, see ANIMAL 1b, 8a-8b; LIFE AND DEATH 2, 3a.
• Another treatment of the conflict of organisms in the struggle for existence, see OPPOSITION 3c.
• Matters relevant to the origin of man and to his affinity with other animals, see ANIMAL 1c-1c(2); MAN 1a-1c, 4b-4c, 8-8c; MIND 3a-3b; SOUL 2c(2)-2c(3).
• Evolution in relation to the idea of progress, see PROGRESS 2; and for matters bearing on social and mental evolution in human history, see HISTORY 4b; MAN 9c; MIND 3c; PROGRESS 1b, 6; TIME 8a.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• AUGUSTINE. De Genesi ad Litteram
• GOETHE. Metamorphose der Pflanzen
• C. R. DARWIN. Foundations of the Origin of Species
  • —. A Posthumous Essay on Instinct
  • —. The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication
• ENGELS. Dialectics of Nature

II.

• LINNAEUS. Systema Naturae
• E. DARWIN. Zoonomia
• BUFFON. “Epochs of Nature,” in Natural History
• LAMARCK. Zoological Philosophy
• CUVIER. The Animal Kingdom
• CHAMBERS. Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation
• TENNYSON. Locksley Hall
  • —. In Memoriam
• SPENCER. Progress: Its Law and Cause
• WALLACE. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection
• LYELL. Principles of Geology
  • —. The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man
• MENDEL. Experiments in Plant Hybridization
• BAGEHOT. Physics and Politics
• E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (C) X
• LEWES. Problems of Life and Mind
• ROMANES. Mental Evolution in Animals
• S. BUTLER. Darwin Among the Machines
  • —. Evolution, Old and New
  • —. Note-Books
• C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL VI, PAR 13-17, 287-317
• FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART II, CH 7; PART VII
• WEISMANN. Studies in the Theory of Descent
  • —. Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems
  • —. The Germ-Plasm
• T. H. HUXLEY. Man’s Place in Nature
  • —. Darwiniana
  • —. Evolution and Ethics
• COPE. The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution
• FISKE. Essays: Historical and Literary, VOL II (9)
• DE VRIES. The Mutation Theory
• DEWEY. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Title Essay
• HOBHOUSE. Mind in Evolution
  • —. Morals in Evolution
• BERGSON. Matter and Memory
  • —. Creative Evolution
• DRIESCH. The Science and Philosophy of the Organism
• POULTON. Essays on Evolution
• GALTON. Natural Inheritance
  • —. Essays in Eugenics
• D. H. SCOTT. The Evolution of Plants
• BATESON. Problems of Genetics
• HENDERSON. The Fitness of the Environment
• D. W. THOMPSON. On Growth and Form
• SHAW. Man and Superman
  • —. Back to Methuselah
• C. L. MORGAN. Emergent Evolution
• L. T. MORE. The Dogma of Evolution
• SMUTS. Holism and Evolution
• McDOUGALL. Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution
• H. G. WELLS, J. HUXLEY, AND G. P. WELLS. Reproduction, Genetics and the Development of Sex
• M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK II, CH 3
• T. H. MORGAN. Evolution and Genetics
  • —. The Physical Basis of Heredity
  • —. The Theory of the Gene
  • —. The Scientific Basis of Evolution
• MARETT. Head, Heart and Hands in Human Evolution
• DOBZHANSKY. Genetics and the Origin of Species
• ADLER. Problems for Thomists: The Problem of Species
• MAYR. Systematics and the Origin of Species from the Viewpoint of a Zoologist
• J. S. HUXLEY. Evolution, the Modern Synthesis, CH 10
  • —. Evolutionary Ethics
• B. RUSSELL. Religion and Science, CH 3
  • —. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART I, CH 4
• KEITH. A New Theory of Human Evolution