Chapter 22: EMOTION

INTRODUCTION

THE emotions claim our attention in two ways. We experience them, sometimes in a manner which overwhelms us; and we analyze them by defining and classifying the several passions, and by studying their role in human life and society. We seldom do both at once, for analysis requires emotional detachment, and moments of passion do not permit study or reflection.

With regard to the emotions the great books are similarly divided into two sorts—those which are theoretical discussions and those which concretely describe the passions of particular men, exhibit their vigor, and induce in us a vicarious experience. Books of the first sort are scientific, philosophical, or theological treatises. Books of the second sort are the great epic and dramatic poems, the novels and plays, the literature of biography and history.

We customarily think of the emotions as belonging to the subject matter of psychology—proper to the science of animal and human behavior. It is worth noting therefore that this is largely a recent development, which appears in the works of Darwin, James, and Freud. In earlier centuries, the analysis of the passions occurs in other contexts: in treatments of rhetoric, as in certain dialogues of Plato and in Aristotle’s Rhetoric; in the Greek discussions of virtue and vice; in the moral theology of Aquinas and in Spinoza’s Ethics; and in books of political theory, such as Machiavelli’s Prince and Hobbes’ Leviathan.

Descartes’ treatise on The Passions of the Soul is probably one of the first discourses on the subject to be separated from the practical considerations of oratory, morals, and politics. Only subsequently do the emotions become an object of purely theoretic interest in psychology. But even then the interest of the psychiatrist or psychoanalyst—to the extent that it is medical or therapeutic—has a strong practical bent.

In the great works of poetry and history no similar shift takes place as one goes from Homer and Virgil to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, from Greek to Shakespearean tragedy, from Plutarch and Tacitus to Gibbon. What Wordsworth said of the lyric poem—that it is “emotion recollected in tranquillity”—may not apply to the narratives in an identical sense. Yet they too re-enact the passions in all their vitality. Their pages are filled with the emotions of men in conflict with one another or suffering conflict within themselves.

This is no less true of historical narrative than of fiction. The memorable actions of men on the stage of history did not occur in calm and quiet. We would certainly not remember them as well if the historian failed to re-create for us the turbulence of crisis and catastrophe, or the biographer the storm and stress which accompanies the inward resolution of heroic lives.

It is impossible, of course, to cite all the relevant passages of poetry and history. In many instances, nothing less than a whole book would suffice. The particular references given in this chapter, which are far from exhaustive, have been selected for their peculiar exemplary significance in relation to a particular topic; but for the whole range of topics connected with emotion, the reader should certainly seek further in the realms of history and poetry for the raw materials which the scientists and philosophers have tried to analyze and understand.

To the student of the emotions, Bacon recommends “the poets and writers of histories” as “the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other like particularities.”

Four words—‘passion,’ ‘affection’ or ‘affect,’ and ‘emotion’—have been traditionally used to designate the same psychological fact. Of these, ‘affection’ and ‘affect’ have ceased to be generally current, although we do find them in Freud; and ‘passion’ is now usually restricted to mean one of the emotions, or the more violent aspect of any emotional experience. But if we are to connect discussions collected from widely separated centuries, we must be able to use all these words interchangeably.

The psychological fact to which they all refer is one every human being has experienced in moments of great excitement, especially during intense seizure by rage or fear. In his treatise On the Circulation of the Blood, Harvey calls attention to “the fact that in almost every affection, appetite, hope, or fear, our body suffers, the countenance changes, and the blood appears to course hither and thither. In anger the eyes are fiery and the pupils contracted; in modesty the cheeks are suffused with blushes; in fear, and under a sense of infamy and of shame, the face is pale” and “in lust how quickly is the member distended with blood and erected!”

Emotional experience seems to involve an awareness of widespread bodily commotion, which includes changes in the tension of the blood vessels and the muscles, changes in heartbeat and breathing, changes in the condition of the skin and other tissues. Though some degree of bodily disturbance would seem to be an essential ingredient in all emotional experience, the intensity and extent of the physiological reverberation, or bodily commotion, is not the same or equal in all the emotions. Some emotions are much more violent than others. This leads William James to distinguish what he calls the “coarser emotions… in which every one recognizes a strong organic reverberation” from the “subtler emotions” in which the “organic reverberation is less obvious and strong.”

This fact is sometimes used to draw the line between what are truly emotions and what are only mild feelings of pleasure and pain or enduring sentiments. Nevertheless, sentiments may be emotional residues—stable attitudes which pervade a life even during moments of emotional detachment and calm—and pleasure and pain may color all the emotions. “Pleasure and pain,” Locke suggests, are “the hinges on which our passions turn.” Even though they may not be passions in the strict sense, they are obviously closely connected with them.

That the emotions are organic disturbances, upsetting the normal course of the body’s functioning, is sometimes thought to be a modern discovery, connected with the James-Lange theory that the emotional experience is nothing but the “feeling of… the bodily changes” which “follow directly the perception of the exciting fact.” On this view, the explanation of emotion seems to be the very opposite of “common sense,” which says, “we meet a bear, are frightened, and run.” According to James, “this order of sequence is incorrect,” and “the more rational statement is that we feel… afraid because we tremble.” In other words, we do not run away because we are afraid, but are afraid because we run away.

This fact about the emotions was known to antiquity and the Middle Ages. Aristotle, for example, holds that mere awareness of an object does not induce flight unless “the heart is moved,” and Aquinas declares that “passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation.” He describes at some length the bodily changes which take place in anger and fear. Only very recently, however, have apparatus and techniques been devised for recording and, in some cases, measuring the physiological changes accompanying experimentally produced emotions—in both animals and men.

Modern theory also tries to throw some light on these organic changes by pointing out their adaptive utility in the struggle for existence. This type of explanation is advanced by Darwin in The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals, and is adopted by other evolutionists. “The snarl or sneer, the one-sided uncovering of the upper teeth,” James writes, “is accounted for by Darwin as a survival from the time when our ancestors had large canines, and unfleshed them (as dogs now do) for attack…. The distention of the nostrils in anger is interpreted by Spencer as an echo of the way in which our ancestors had to breathe when, during combat, their ‘mouth was filled up by a part of the antagonist’s body that had been seized’… The reddening of the face and neck is called by Wundt a compensatory arrangement for relieving the brain of the blood-pressure which the simultaneous excitement of the heart brings with it. The effusion of tears is explained both by this author and by Darwin to be a blood-withdrawing agency of a similar sort.”

Reviewing statements of this sort, James is willing to concede that “some movements of expression can be accounted for as weakened repetitions of movements which formerly (when they were stronger) were of utility to the subject”; but though we may thus “see the reason for a few emotional reactions,” he thinks “others remain for which no plausible reason can even be conceived.” The latter, James suggests, “may be reactions which are purely mechanical results of the way in which our nervous centres are framed, reactions which, although permanent in us now, may be called accidental as far as their origin goes.”

Whether or not all the bodily changes which occur in such emotions as anger or fear serve the purpose of increasing the animal’s efficiency in combat or flight—as, for example, the increase of sugar in the blood and the greater supply of blood to arms and legs seem to do—the basic emotions are generally thought to be connected with the instinctively determined patterns of behavior by which animals struggle to survive. “The actions we call instinctive,” James writes, “are expressions or manifestations of the emotions”; or, as other writers suggest, an emotion, whether in outward expression or in inner experience, is the central phase of an instinct in operation.

The observation of the close relation between instinct and emotion does not belong exclusively to modern, or post-Darwinian, thought. The ancients also recognize it, though in different terms. Following Aristotle’s analysis of the various “interior senses,” Aquinas, for example, speaks of the “estimative power” by which animals seem to be innately prepared to react to things useful or harmful.

“If an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense”—that is, the exterior senses—“there would be no need to suppose,” Aquinas writes, “that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror.” But animals need to seek or avoid certain things on account of their advantages or disadvantages, and such emotional reactions of approach or avoidance require, in his opinion, a sense of the useful and the dangerous, which is innate rather than learned. The estimative power thus seems to play a role which later writers assign to instinct. The relation of instinct to the emotions and to fundamental biological needs is further considered, from other points of view, in the chapters on DESIRE and HABIT.

Like DESIRE, emotion is neither knowledge nor action, but something intermediate between the one and the other. The various passions are usually aroused by objects perceived, imagined, or remembered, and once aroused they in turn originate impulses to act in certain ways. For example, fear arises with the perception of a threatening danger or with the imagination of some fancied peril. The thing feared is somehow recognized as capable of inflicting injury with consequent pain. The thing feared is also something from which one naturally tends to flee in order to avoid harm. Once the danger is known and until it is avoided by flight or in some other way, the characteristic feeling of fear pervades the whole experience. It is partly a result of what is known and what is done, and partly the cause of how things seem and how one behaves.

Analytically isolated from its causes and effects, the emotion itself seems to be the feeling rather than the knowing or the doing. But it is not simply an awareness of a certain bodily condition. It also involves the felt impulse to do something about the object of the passion.

Those writers who, like Aquinas, identify emotion with the impulse by which “the soul is drawn to a thing,” define the several passions as specifically different acts of appetite or desire—specific tendencies to action. Aquinas, for instance, adopts the definition given by Damascene: “Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil.”

Other writers who, like Spinoza, find that “the order of the actions and passions of our body is coincident in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind,” stress the cognitive rather than the impulsive aspect of emotion. They accordingly define the passions in terms of the characteristic feelings, pleasant and unpleasant, which flow from the estimation of certain objects as beneficial or harmful. Spinoza goes furthest in this direction when he says that “an affect or passion of the mind is a confused idea… by which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before.”

There seems to be no serious issue here, for writers of both sorts acknowledge, though with different emphasis, the two sides of an emotion—the cognitive and the impulsive, that which faces toward the object and that which leads into action. On either view, the human passions are regarded as part of man’s animal nature. It is generally admitted that disembodied spirits, if such exist, cannot have emotions. The angels, Augustine writes, “feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger.” When we do ascribe emotions to spirits, it is, Augustine claims, because, “though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us.”

In connection with the objects which arouse them, the emotions necessarily depend upon the senses and the imagination; and their perturbations and impulses require bodily organs for expression. That is why, as indicated in the chapter on DESIRE, some writers separate the passions from acts of the will, as belonging to the sensitive or animal appetite rather than to the rational or specifically human appetite. Even those writers who do not place so high an estimate on the role of reason, refer the emotions to the animal aspect of human behavior, or to what is sometimes called “man’s lower nature.” When this phrase is used, it usually signifies the passions as opposed to the reason, not the purely vegetative functions which man shares with plants as well as animals.

There seems to be no doubt that emotions are common to men and animals and that they are more closely related to instinct than to reason or intelligence. Darwin presents many instances which, he claims, prove that “the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed, condition in the lower animals.” Where Darwin remarks upon “the fewness and the comparative simplicity of the instincts in the higher animals… in contrast with those of the lower animals,” James takes the position that man “is the animal richest in instinctive impulses.” However that issue is decided, the emotions seem to be more elaborately developed in the higher animals, and man’s emotional life would seem to be the most complex and varied of all.

The question then arises whether particular passions are identical—or are only analogous—when they occur in men and animals. For example, is human anger, no matter how closely it resembles brute rage in its physiology and impulses, nevertheless peculiarly human? Do men alone experience righteous indignation because of some admixture in them of reason and passion? When similar questions are asked about the sexual passions of men and animals, the answers will determine the view one takes of the characteristically human aspects of love and hate. It may even be asked whether hate, as men suffer it, is ever experienced by brutes, or whether certain passions, such as hope and despair, are known to brutes at all?

In the traditional theory of the emotions, the chief problem, after the definition of emotion, is the classification or grouping of the passions, and the ordering of particular passions. The vocabulary of common speech in all ages and cultures includes a large number of words for naming emotions, and it has been the task of analysts to decide which of these words designate distinct affects or affections. The precise character of the object and the direction of the impulse have been, for the most part, the criteria of definition. As previously noted, it is but recently that the experimental observation of bodily changes has contributed to the differentiation of emotions from one another.

Spinoza offers the longest listing of the passions. For him, the emotions, which are all “compounded of the three primary affects, desire, joy, and sorrow,” develop into the following forms: astonishment, contempt, love, hatred, inclination, aversion, devotion, derision, hope, fear, confidence, despair, gladness, remorse, commiseration, favor, indignation, overestimation, envy, compassion, self-satisfaction, humility, repentance, pride, despondency, self-exaltation, shame, regret, emulation, gratitude, benevolence, anger, vengeance, ferocity, audacity, consternation, courtesy, ambition, luxuriousness, drunkenness, avarice, lust.

Many of the foregoing are, for Hobbes, derived from what he calls “the simple passions,” which include “appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief.” There are more emotions in Spinoza’s list than either Aristotle or Locke or James mentions, but none which they include is omitted. Some of the items in Spinoza’s enumeration are treated by other writers as virtues and vices rather than as passions.

The passions have been classified by reference to various criteria. As we have seen, James distinguishes emotions as “coarse” or “subtle” in terms of the violence or mildness of the accompanying physiological changes; and Spinoza distinguishes them according as “the mind passes to a greater perfection” or “to a less perfection.” Spinoza’s division would also seem to imply a distinction between the beneficial and the harmful in the objects causing these two types of emotion, or at least to involve the opposite components of pleasure and pain, for in his view the emotions which correspond to “a greater or less power of existence than before” are attended in the one case by “pleasurable excitement” and in the other by “pain.”

Hobbes uses another principle of division. The passions differ basically according to the direction of their impulses—according as each is “a motion or endeavor… to or from the object moving.” Aquinas adds still another criterion—“the difficulty or struggle… in acquiring certain goods or in avoiding certain evils” which, in contrast to those we “can easily acquire or avoid,” makes them, therefore, “of an arduous or difficult nature.” In these terms, he divides all the passions into the “concupiscible,” which regard “good or evil simply” (i.e., love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, sorrow), and the “irascible,” which “regard good or evil as arduous through being difficult to obtain or avoid” (i.e., fear, daring, hope, despair, anger).

Within each of these groups, Aquinas pairs particular passions as opposites, such as joy and sorrow, or hope and despair, either according to the “contrariety of object, i.e., of good and evil… or according to approach and withdrawal.” Anger seems to be the only passion for which no opposite can be given, other than that “cessation from its movement” which Aristotle calls “calmness” and which Aquinas says is an opposite not by way of “contrariety but of negation or privation.”

Using these distinctions, Aquinas also describes the order in which one passion leads to or generates another, beginning with love and hate, passing through hope, desire, and fear, with their opposites, and, after anger, ending in joy or despair. On one point, all observers and theorists from Plato to Freud seem to agree, namely, that love and hate lie at the root of all the other passions and generate hope or despair, fear and anger, according as the aspirations of love prosper or fail. Nor is the insight that even hate derives from love peculiarly modern, though Freud’s theory of what he calls the “ambivalence” of love and hate toward the same object, seems to be part of his own special contribution to our understanding of the passions.

The role of the emotions or passions in human behavior has always raised two questions, one concerning the effect of conflict between diverse emotions, the other concerning the conflict between the passions and the reason or will. It is the latter question which has been of the greatest interest to moralists and statesmen. Even though human emotions may have instinctive origin and be innately determined, man’s emotional responses seem to be subject to voluntary control, so that men are able to form or change their emotional habits. If this were not so, there could be no moral problem of the regulation of the passions; nor, for that matter, could there be a medical problem of therapy for emotional disorders. The psychoanalytic treatment of neuroses seems, moreover, to assume the possibility of a voluntary, or even a rational, resolution of emotional conflicts—not perhaps without the aid of therapeutic efforts to uncover the sources of conflict and to remove the barriers between repressed emotion and rational decision.

The relation of the passions to the will, especially their antagonism, is relevant to the question whether the actions of men always conform to their judgments of good and evil, or right and wrong. As Socrates discusses the problem of knowledge and virtue, it would seem to be his view that a man who knows what is good for him will act accordingly. Men may “desire things which they imagine to be good,” he says, “but which in reality are evil.” Hence their misconduct will be due to a mistaken judgment, not to a discrepancy between action and thought. Eliminating the case of erroneous judgment, Socrates gets Meno to admit that “no man wills or chooses anything evil.”

Aristotle criticizes the Socratic position which he summarizes in the statement that “no one… when he judges acts against what he judges best—people act badly only by reason of ignorance.” According to Aristotle, “this view plainly contradicts the observed facts.” Yet he admits that whatever a man does must at least seem good to him at the moment; and to that extent the judgment that something is good or bad would seem to determine action accordingly. In his analysis of incontinence, Aristotle tries to explain how a man may act against what is his better judgment and yet, at the moment of action, seek what he holds to be good.

Action may be caused either by a rational judgment concerning what is good or by an emotional estimate of the desirable. If these two factors are independent of one another—more than that, if they can tend in opposite directions—then a man may act under emotional persuasion at one moment in a manner contrary to his rational predilection at another. That a man may act either emotionally or rationally, Aristotle thinks, explains how, under strong emotional influences, a man can do the very opposite of what his reason would tell him is right or good. The point is that, while the emotions dominate his mind and action, he does not listen to reason.

These matters are further discussed in the chapter on TEMPERANCE. But it should be noted here that the passions and the reason, or the “lower” and the “higher” natures of man, are not always in conflict. Sometimes emotions or emotional attitudes serve reason by supporting voluntary decisions. They reinforce and make effective moral resolutions which might otherwise be too difficult to execute.

The ancients did not underestimate the force of the passions, nor were they too confident of the strength of reason in its struggle to control them, or to be free of them. They were acquainted with the violence of emotional excess which they called “madness” or “frenzy.” So, too, were the theologians of the Middle Ages and modern philosophers like Spinoza and Hobbes. But not until Freud—and perhaps also William James, though to a lesser extent—do we find in the tradition of the great books insight into the pathology of the passions, the origin of emotional disorders, and the general theory of the neuroses and neurotic character as the consequence of emotional repression.

For Freud, the primary fact is not the conflict between reason and emotion, or, in his language, between the ego and the id. It is rather the repression which results from such conflict. On the one side is the ego, which “stands for reason and circumspection” and has “the task of representing the external world,” or expressing what Freud calls “the reality-principle.” Associated with the ego is the super-ego—“the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which the ego measures itself, towards which it strives, and whose demands for ever-increasing perfection it is always striving to fulfill.” On the other side is the id, which “stands for the untamed passions” and is the source of instinctual life.

The ego, according to Freud, is constantly attempting “to mediate between the id and reality” and to measure up to the ideal set by the super-ego, so as to dethrone “the pleasure-principle, which exerts undisputed sway over the processes in the id, and substitute for it the reality-principle, which promises greater security and greater success.” But sometimes it fails in this task. Sometimes, when no socially acceptable channels of behavior are available for expressing emotional drives in action, the ego, supported by the super-ego, represses the emotional or instinctual impulses, that is, prevents them from expressing themselves overtly.

Freud’s great insight is that emotions repressed do not atrophy and disappear. On the contrary, their dammed-up energies accumulate and, like a sore, they fester inwardly. Together with related ideas, memories, and wishes, the repressed emotions form what Freud calls a “complex,” which is not only the active nucleus of emotional disorder, but also the cause of neurotic symptoms and behavior—phobias and anxieties, obsessions or compulsions, and the various physical manifestations of hysteria, such as a blindness or a paralysis that has no organic basis.

The line between the neurotic and the normal is shadowy, for repressed emotional complexes are, according to Freud, also responsible for the hidden or latent psychological significance of slips of speech, forgetting, the content of dreams, occupational or marital choices, and a wide variety of other phenomena usually regarded as accidental or as rationally determined. In fact, Freud sometimes goes to the extreme of insisting that all apparently rational processes—both of thought and decision—are themselves emotionally determined; and that most, or all, reasoning is nothing but the rationalization of emotionally fixed prejudices or beliefs. “The ego,” he writes, “is after all only a part of the id, a part purposively modified by its proximity to the dangers of reality.”

The ancient distinction between knowledge and opinion seems to be in essential agreement with the insight that emotions can control the course of thinking. But at the same time it denies that all thinking is necessarily dominated by the passions. The sort of thinking which is free from emotional bias or domination may result in knowledge, if reason itself is not defective in its processes. But the sort of thinking which is directed and determined by the passions must result in opinion. The former is reasoning; the latter what Freud calls “rationalization” or sometimes “wishful thinking.”

Because they can be ordered when they get out of order, the emotions raise problems for both medicine and morals. Whether or not there is a fundamental opposition between the medical and the moral approaches to the problem, whether psychotherapy is needed only when morality has failed, whether morality is itself partly responsible for the disorders which psychotherapy must cure, the difference between the medical and the moral approaches is clear. Medically, emotional disorders call for diagnosis and therapy. Morally, they call for criticism and correction.

Human bondage, according to Spinoza, consists in “the impotence of man to govern or restrain the affects… for a man who is under their control is not his own master.” A free man he describes as one “who lives according to the dictates of reason alone,” and he tries to show “how much reason itself can control the affects” to achieve what he calls “freedom of mind or blessedness.” While moralists tend to agree on this point, they do not all offer the same prescription for establishing the right relation between man’s higher and lower natures.

The issue which arises here is also discussed in the chapters on DESIRE and DUTY. It exists between those who think that the passions are intrinsically evil, the natural enemies of a good will, lawless elements always in rebellion against duty; and those who think that the passions represent a natural desire for certain goods which belong to the happy life, or a natural aversion for certain evils.

Those who, like the Stoics and Kant, tend to adopt the former view recommend a policy of attrition toward the passions. Their force must be attenuated in order to emancipate reason from their influence and to protect the will from their seductions. Nothing is lost, according to this theory, if the passions atrophy and die. But if, according to the opposite doctrine, the passions have a natural place in the moral life, then the aim should be, not to dispossess them entirely, but to keep them in their place. Aristotle therefore recommends a policy of moderation. The passions can be made to serve reason’s purposes by restraining them from excesses and by directing their energies to ends which reason approves.

As Aristotle conceives them, certain of the virtues—especially temperance and courage—are stable emotional attitudes, or habits of emotional response, which conform to reason and carry out its rule. The moral virtues require more than a momentary control or moderation of the passions; they require a discipline of them which has become habitual. What Aristotle calls continence, as opposed to virtue, consists in reason’s effort to check emotions which are still unruly because they have not yet become habituated to reason’s rule.

The fact of individual differences in temperament is of the utmost importance to the moralist who is willing to recognize that universal moral rules apply to individuals differently according to their temperaments. Both psychologists and moralists have classified men into temperamental types by reference to the dominance or deficiency of certain emotional predispositions in their inherited makeup. These temperamental differences also have a medical or physiological aspect insofar as certain elements in human physique—the four bodily humors of the ancients or the hormones of modern endocrinology—seem to be correlated with types of personality.

One of the great issues in political theory concerns the role of the passions in human association. Have men banded together to form states because they feared the insecurity and the hazards of natural anarchy and universal war, or because they sought the benefits which only political life could provide? In the political community, once it is formed, do love and friendship or distrust and fear determine the relation of fellow citizens, or of rulers and ruled?

Should the prince, or any other man who wishes to get and hold political power, try to inspire love or to instill fear in those whom he seeks to dominate? Or are each of these emotions useful for different political purposes and in the handling of different kinds of men?

Considering whether for the success of the prince it is “better to be loved than feared or feared than loved,” Machiavelli says that “one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to ‘unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with…. Nevertheless,” he continues, “a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated.”

According to Hobbes, when men enter into a commonwealth so that they can live peacefully with one another, they are moved partly by reason and partly by their passions. “The passions that incline men to peace,” he writes, “are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.” But once a commonwealth is formed, the one passion which seems to be the mainspring of all political activity is “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death”; for a man “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he has present, without the acquisition of more.”

Not all political thinkers agree with the answers which Machiavelli and Hobbes give on such matters; nor do all make such questions the pivots of their political theory. But there is general agreement that the passions are a force to be reckoned with in the government of men; that the ruler, whether he is despotic prince or constitutional officeholder, must move men through their emotions as well as by appeals to reason.

The two political instruments through which an influence over the emotions is exercised are oratory (now sometimes called ‘propaganda’) and law. Both may work persuasively. Laws, like other discourses, according to Plato, may have preludes or preambles, intended by the legislator “to create good-will in the persons whom he addresses, in order that, by reason of this good-will, they will more intelligently receive his command.” But the law also carries with it the threat of coercive force. The threat of punishment for disobedience addresses itself entirely to fear, whereas the devices of the orator—or even of the legislator in his preamble—are not so restricted. The orator can play upon the whole scale of the emotions to obtain the actions or decisions at which he aims.

Finally, there is the problem of whether the statesman should exercise political control over other influences which affect the emotional life of a people, especially the arts and public spectacles. The earliest and perhaps the classic statement of this problem is to be found in Plato’s Republic and in his Laws. Considerations relevant to the question he raises, and the implications of diverse solutions of the problem, are discussed in the chapters on ART, LIBERTY, and POETRY.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature and causes of the emotions or passions

   • 1a. Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain
   • 1b. Bodily changes during emotional excitement
   • 1c. Instinctive emotional reactions in animals and men

2. The classification and enumeration of the emotions

   • 2a. Definitions of particular passions
   • 2b. The order and connection of the passions
   • 2c. The opposition of particular emotions to one another

3. The disorder or pathology of the passions

   • 3a. Madness or frenzy due to emotional excess: excessively emotional or emotionally over-determined behavior
   • 3b. Rationalization or the emotional determination of thought
   • 3c. Particular emotional disorders: psychoneuroses due to repression
     • (1) Hysterias
     • (2) Obsessions and compulsions
     • (3) Phobias and anxieties
     • (4) Traumas and traumatic neuroses
   • 3d. The alleviation and cure of emotional disorders

4. The moral consideration of the passions

   • 4a. The conflict between reason and emotion
     • (1) The force of the passions
     • (2) The strength of reason or will
   • 4b. The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason
     • (1) Moderation of the passions by reason: virtue, continence, avoidance of sin
     • (2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions: the liberation of reason
   • 4c. The moral significance of temperamental type or emotional disposition

5. The political consideration of the passions

   • 5a. The causes of political association: fear or need
   • 5b. The acquisition and retention of power: love or fear
   • 5c. The coercive force of law: fear of punishment
   • 5d. The devices of oratory: emotional persuasion
   • 5e. The regulation of art for the sake of training the passions

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

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1. The nature and causes of the emotions or passions

7 Plato: Republic, BK IV, 350c-353d; BK IX, 416b-c; 421a-b / Timaeus, 466b-d / Philebus, 621c-622b; 627c-628a; 628d-630c / Laws, BK IX, 748a

8 Aristotle: Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a2-b3] 632a-c; CH 4 [408b4-31] 638b-d; BK III, CH 3 [427b21-24] 660a; CH 9 [432b26-433a2] 665c

9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 11 [692a22-27] 224b-c / Ethics, BK II, CH 5 [1105b19-1106a6] 351b-c / Politics, BK VII, CH 7 [1327b40-1328a18] 532a-c / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 1 [1378a20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [136-160] 31d-32a; [231-322] 33a-34b

13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK VI [724-734] 230b

17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR I, CH 1 1a-b; CH 5 2d-3c, CH 9-11 4c-5c / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 3-4 108a-109b / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 18 166d-167b; CH 20-21 167d-168c; CH 28 172a-173b / Sixth Ennead, TR I, CH 19-22 262a-264c

18 Augustine: City of God, BK IX, CH 4-5 287a-289a

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 2-3 429c-431d; PART I-II, QQ 22-48 720b,d-826a,c

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A 1, ANS 968a-970c; Q 86, A 3, ANS and REP 3-4 994d-996a,c

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, INTRO, 47c-d; PART I, 61a-65b esp 61a-c, 68b-c; 77b-c; PART II, 162c

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 55b-c

31 Descartes: Meditations, III, 82d-83a

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART II, AXIOM 3 373d; PART III 395a-422a,c esp 395a-d, DEF 1-3 395d-396a, PROP 1 396a-c, PROP 3 398b-c, PROP 56 414a-d, THE AFFECTS 416b-422a,c; PART IV, DEF 7 424b; PROP 1-4 424c-425d; PROP 9-13 426d-428a; APPENDIX, I-II 447a-b; PART V, AXIOM 2 452c; PROP 34 460c-d

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX 176b-178a esp SECT 3 176d; CH XXXIII, SECT 5-15 248d-250c

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338c-d

42 Kant: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 378b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-d; 386b-d / Judgement, 483d-484b; 508d [fn 1]

43 Federalist: NUMBER 17, 69c

53 James: Psychology, 49b-50a; 87b; 209a-b; 327b-328a, 738a-766a esp 738a-b, 742a-746a, 758a-759a, 761a-765b

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 4a-5a / Interpretation of Dreams, 363c-d / Repression, 424d-425b / Unconscious, 432c-433d esp 433b / General Introduction, 608d; 623b-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720c-721b; 736d-741c / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-d

1a. Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain

7 Plato: Phaedrus, 120b-c / Phaedo, 220b-221a / Republic, BK IV, 352d / Timaeus, 463d-464b / Philebus, 628d-630c / Laws, BK IX, 748a

8 Aristotle: Topics, BK IV, CH 5 [125b28-34] 175a; CH 6 [127b26-32] 177b / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413b17-24] 643d

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 3 [1104b29-1105a16] 350b-c; CH 5 [1105b19-28] 351b; BK VII, CH 6 [1149b20-24] 400b / Politics, BK V, CH 10 [1312a24-33] 515b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370b28-1372a1] 613c-615c passim; BK II, CH 1 [1378a20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a passim

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [1073-1085] 58a-b

14 Plutarch: Coriolanus, 184a-c

17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 18-20 166d-168b; CH 28 172a-173b

18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, par 2-4 13c-14b; BK VIII, par 7-8 54c-55a; BK X, par 39 81b-c

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 2, A 6, ANS and REP 2 619d-620d; Q 22, A 1, ANS 720d-721c; Q 23 723c-727a; QQ 31-39 752b-792d; Q 48, A 1 822d-823b

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-62c

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, PROP 4-57 398d-415b

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX 176b-178a passim, esp SECT 3 176d; CH XXI, SECT 40 187d-188b

35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 1 413a-b

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 338c-d

42 Kant: Practical Reason, 298d-300a; 341c-342a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-386b / Judgement, 477b-478a

53 James: Psychology, 197a-b; 391b-392a; 739b-740a; 754b-758a passim; 808a-812b passim, esp 808b-809a

54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 378b-d / Instincts, 418d-420b esp 420a / Repression 422a-427a,c esp 422a-d, 424d-425c / General Introduction, 608d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639a-641a esp 640b-d; 641d-643c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-721c; 736d-737b; 739b-c; 752c-754a,c passim

1b. Bodily changes during emotional excitement

7 Plato: Ion, 145a-b / Symposium, 155c-157a / Timaeus, 466c-d / Philebus, 628c

8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 8 [9b9-34] 14c-15a / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a3-b3] 632a-c; CH 4 [408b4-31] 638b-d; BK III, CH 9 [432b26-433a1] 665c / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453a15-31] 695b-d / Dreams, CH 2 [460b32-461a8] 704b-c

9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK IV, CH 1 [524b17-19] 50c; BK V, CH 18 [550b29-31] 77b; BK VI, CH 18 [572a8-b28] 97d-98c; BK IX, CH 37 [621b28-622a10] 147c / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 4 [650b18-651a15] 175c-176a; BK IV, CH 5 [679a5-31] 209a-c; CH 11 [692a22-27] 224b-c / Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701b3]-CH 8 [702a21] 236d-237c; CH 11 239a-d / Ethics, BK IV, CH 9 [1128b10-14] 375d-376a; BK VII, CH 3 [1147b14-17] 397b

10 Hippocrates: Sacred Disease, 158a; 159d-160a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [1037-1057] 57d

14 Plutarch: Demetrius, 740d-741a

17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 3, 108a-b / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 23 153d-154b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 75, A 3, REP 3 380c-381b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 7, REP 2 690d-692a; Q 22 720b,d-723b passim, esp A 2, REP 3 721c-722c; Q 35, A 8, ANS 779c-780c; Q 37, A 2, ANS 784c-785b; A 4 785d-786d; Q 41, A 1, ANS 798b-d; Q 44, A 1 807a-808b; A 3 809a-c; Q 48, A 2 823b-824c; A 4 825b-826a,c

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, REP 2,5 896a-897d

24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 15a-b; BK III, 192b-193a

25 Montaigne: Essays, 345b-c; 405b-d

28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 271a-b; 288b; 292d-293a; 296d / Circulation of the Blood, 322c-d / On Animal Generation, 431d-432a

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 49b-c

31 Descartes: Meditations, VI, 99d-100a

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, DEF 3-POSTULATE I 395d-396a; PROP 2, DEMONST and SCHOL, 396d; PART IV, PROP 7-8 426a-c; PART V, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 34, DEMONST 460c-d

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 17 177d

36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 234a-b

37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 234a-b; 253d

42 Kant: Judgement, 509c-d

44 Boswell: Johnson, 169d-170b

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 274a; 546b

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 48c; BK IV, 178d-179a; BK VI, 247d-248a; 256b-c; 264c-d; BK VIII, 334a; BK IX, 350d-354a passim, esp 351d-352a, 353b-d; BK XIII, 567d-568c; BK XV, 616a-618b

53 James: Psychology, 198a; 327b-328a; 694a-699a; 738a-766a esp 738b-745b, 754b-759a

54 Freud: Hysteria, 59c / Interpretation of Dreams, 323b / Unconscious, 433d [fn 2] / General Introduction, 608d-609a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 736d-738a esp 737a-b

1c. Instinctive emotional reactions in animals and men

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 111d-112c esp 112c; BK VII, 236c

7 Plato: Symposium, 157b-159b esp 158a-159a; 165b-166b / Republic, BK I, 320b-c / Laws, BK VI, 712b

8 Aristotle: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 27 [70b6-39] 92c-93a,c

9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK IV, CH 1 [524b17-19] 50c; BK V, CH 8 [542a17-b4] 68d-69a; CH 18 [550b29-31] 77b; BK VI, CH 18-BK VII, CH 2 97b-108c passim, esp BK VI, CH 18 97b-99c, BK VII, CH 1 106b,d-108a; BK IX, CH 1 [608a21-b20] 133b,d-134a; CH 37 [621b28-622a10] 147c / Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 5 [679a5-32] 209a-c; CH 11 [692a22-27] 224b-c / Generation of Animals, BK III, CH 2 [753a6-17] 294a-b / Ethics, BK III, CH 8 [1116b24-1117a3] 363a-b; BK VII, CH 6 [1149b24-1150a8] 400b-c

10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12, 173a-c

12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 23 128c-d; BK III, CH 7, 183c-d

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK IX, SECT 9 292b-d

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 81, A 2-3 429c-431c; Q 96, A 1, REP 2 510b-511b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 2, REP 3 687d-688b; Q 40, A 2-3 793d-795a; Q 41, A 1, REP 3 798b-d; Q 46, A 4, REP 2 815b-d; A 5, REP 1 815d-816d

21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-75] 80a-c

22 Chaucer: Nun’s Priest’s Tale [15,282-287] 457b / Manciple’s Tale [17,104-144] 490a-b

25 Montaigne: Essays, 184a-b

28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 346a-347d; 349a-350a; 361b-362a; 381b-c; 402a-d; 405c-406a; 476c-477a

31 Descartes: Meditations, VI, 99d-100a; 102b-103a / Objections and Replies, 156a-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, PROP 57, SCHOL 415b

35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 80 486c-d

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 343d-346d

43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 469c-d

44 Boswell: Johnson, 124b; 174b; 347a-c; 386a

48 Melville: Moby Dick, 144a-b

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 287d-291a esp 289a-291a; 304b-313a esp 305c-309a, 312b,d [fn 27]; 371c-372c

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 499c-500c

53 James: Psychology, 49b-51a; 198a-199a; 204b-211a passim, esp 206a, 208a-209b; 700a-738b esp 717a-731b, 734b-735a, 738a-b

54 Freud: General Introduction, 591d-592c; 607d-609b esp 608d-609b; 613a; 615b-616c; 623b-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721a-b; 737c-739c; 752a-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 782a-b,d [fn 1]; 787a-b; 789b-791d esp 789c-790b / New Introductory Lectures, 840a-853b esp 840b-c, 846b-849b, 851a-c

2. The classification and enumeration of the emotions

7 Plato: Philebus, 628d-630c

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 5 351b-c / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 1 [1378a20-30] 623b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 2 429c-430c; PART I-II, Q 23 723c-727a, Q 24, A 4 729c-730a; Q 30, A 2, ANS and REP 1 749d-750d

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 62c-64a

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, THE AFFECTS 416b-422a,c

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 1-3 176b-d; SECT 18 178a

53 James: Psychology, 127b; 656a; 742a-743a; 745b-746a; 766a

2a. Definitions of particular passions

7 Plato: Cratylus, 103b-d / Phaedrus, 120a-c / Symposium 149a-173a,c esp 161d-168a / Euthyphro, 193d-194b / Apology, 202a / Philebus, 628d-630c / Laws, BK I, 650a; 651a-c

8 Aristotle: Topics, BK II, CH 7 [113a33-b3] 158d-159a; BK IV, CH 5 [125b28-34] 175a; CH 6 [127b26-32] 177b; BK VII, CH 13 [151a14-19] 205d-206a; BK VIII, CH 1 [156a26-b3] 212b-c / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a25-33] 632b-c

9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK IV, CH 11 [692a22-27] 224b-c / Ethics, BK III, CH 6 [1115a7-14] 361a-b; CH 8 [1116b24-1117a3] 363a-b; BK IV, CH 9 [1128b10-14] 375d-376a; BK VIII, CH 6 [1158a10-14] 409d-410a; BK IX, CH 10 [1171a11-13] 424d, CH 12 [1171b29-33] 425d / Politics, BK V, CH 10 [1312a24-33] 515b / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 1 [1378a20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a

17 Plotinus: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 28 172a-173b

18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, par 13 11d-12a; BK III, par 2 13c-d; BK IV, par 7-14 20d-23a esp par 11 21d-22a

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, QQ 26-48 733d-826a,c

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-65b esp 61a-62c

25 Montaigne: Essays, 5a-6c; 25c-26d; 344a-347c; 409d-434d passim, esp 424d-425a

27 Shakespeare: Othello, ACT III, SC III [165-192] 223d-224a; [322-357] 225c-226a; SC IV [155-162] 229a

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, PROP 11-59 399d-416b; THE AFFECTS 416b-422a,c; PART IV, APPENDIX, XXI-XXV 449a-c

33 Pascal: Pensées, 262 221a

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 3-18 176d-178a

36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 453a-456a; 502a-b

37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 198d-199a; 237b-c

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 345c-346d

42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259a; 259d-260b [fn 2] / Judgement, 502d-503d

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 308d-309a; 312b,d [fn 27]; 313a-b

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 561b

53 James: Psychology, 717a-736b passim, esp 717a-721a, 733b-735a; 738b-741b

54 Freud: Instincts, 418c-421a,c / General Introduction, 558d; 607d-609c; 612c-614b; 623b-c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 641b-c / Group Psychology, 673b-674a; 681c-683a; 693a-694d passim / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 736d-739c; 751a-754a,c esp 753d-754a,c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 783c; 795d-796b; 798a

2b. The order and connection of the passions

7 Plato: Philebus, 628d-630c

8 Aristotle: Topics, BK II, CH 7 [113a33-b3] 158d-159a

18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, par 2-4 13c-14b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 2 429c-430c; PART I-II, Q 25 730b-733d, Q 27, A 4 739c-740a; Q 29, A 2 745c-746b, Q 30, A 2 749d-750c; Q 32, A 3-4 760d-762a; Q 33, A 2 766a-767a; Q 36, A 2 781c-782b; Q 40, A 7 797a-c; Q 43, A 1 805d-806b; Q 45, A 2 810d-811b; Q 46, A 1-2 813b-814d; Q 48, A 1 822d-823b

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-65b esp 61a-62c

25 Montaigne: Essays, 105c-107a

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, 395a-422a,c esp PROP 11-59 399d-416b, THE AFFECTS 416b-422a,c; PART IV, DEF 5 424b; PROP 7 426a-b

33 Pascal: Pensées, 262 221a

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 3-18 176d-178a

37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 237b-c

53 James: Psychology, 742a-b

54 Freud: Instincts, 415d-421a,c esp 420c-421a,c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 659b-c / Group Psychology, 677c-678c / Ego and Id, 709d-710c / War and Death, 758a-b; 766a-b

2c. The opposition of particular emotions to one another

7 Plato: Symposium, 153b-157a / Phaedo, 220b-221a / Republic, BK IV, 350d-353d

8 Aristotle: Soul, BK III, CH 7 [431a8-16] 663c-d; [431b2-9] 664a

9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 1 [1378a20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a passim

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [1073-1085] 58a-b

18 Augustine: Confessions, BK IV, par 7-11 20d-22a esp par 11 21d-22a; BK X, par 39 81b-c

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 23, A 2-4 724c-727a; Q 25, A 4 733a-d; Q 29, A 2-3 745c-747a; Q 32, A 4 761c-762a; Q 35, A 6 777b-778c; Q 46, A 1, REP 2 813b-814a

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 61b-d; 62b-c; 63b-d; CONCLUSION, 279a-c passim

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, PROP 17 401d-402a; PROP 51 411c-412a; PART IV, DEF 5 424b; AXIOM 424c; PROP 1, SCHOL-PROP 7 424d-426b; PROP 9-18 426d-429d esp PROP 15-18 428a-429d; PROP 60 442d-443a; APPENDIX, XXI-XXV 449a-c

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 3-18 176d-178a passim

37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 127b-c

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK V, 19a

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 312b,d [fn 27]

53 James: Psychology, 197b-198a; 708a-709a; 720b; 729a-b; 734b-735a

54 Freud: Instincts, 415d-421a,c passim, esp 419d-421a,c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 659b-c / Group Psychology, 677c-678c / Ego and Id, 709c-710c / War and Death, 758a-b

3. The disorder or pathology of the passions

3a. Madness or frenzy due to emotional excess: excessively emotional or emotionally over-determined behavior

4 Homer: Iliad, BK I [1-445] 3a-7c; BK IX [189-429] 59a-61c

5 Aeschylus: Choephoroe [1010-1063] 80a-c

5 Sophocles: Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [282-332] 145c-146a / Electra 156a-169a,c

5 Euripides: Medea 212a-224a,c / Electra 327a-339a,c / Bacchantes [1024-1297] 348c-351a / Heracles Mad [815-1015] 371d-373d / Orestes 394a-410d esp [1-424] 394a-398b

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 95d-98a; 103b-d; BK VII, 222c-d

7 Plato: Charmides, 2b-c / Lysis, 14b-15d / Protagoras, 59b-61c / Phaedrus, 120a-129d / Ion, 145a-c / Symposium, 168c / Phaedo, 220d-221a; 232d-233c / Timaeus, 474b-c

8 Aristotle: Dreams, CH 2 [460b32-461a8] 704b-c

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VII, CH 3 [1147b14-17] 397b / Politics, BK VIII, CH 7 [1341b33-1342a18] 547c-548a,c esp [1342a6-12] 547d / Poetics, CH 17 [1455a29-36] 690c

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [31-93] 30b-31b; [1045-1075] 43c-d; BK IV [1073-1120] 58a-d

13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK IV [296-303] 175a; [450-477] 179b-180b; BK VII [323-474] 245a-249a; BK XII [1-80] 354a-356a; [593-611] 370a

15 Tacitus: Histories, BK I, 206b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 28, A 3, ANS 742a-d; Q 37, A 2, ANS and REP 3 784c-785b; A 4, REP 3 785d-786d

22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida 1a-155a esp BK IV, STANZA 32-49 92b-95a, BK V, STANZA 33-39 124b-125b

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 63b; 68b-71a

24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 192b-d

25 Montaigne: Essays, 5a-6c; 10b-11b; 25c-26d; 166a-167a; 275c-d; 289b-290a; 344a-347c; 418c-d; 420d-421d

26 Shakespeare: 3rd Henry VI, ACT II, SC I [104-195] 87b-88a; ACT V, SC VI [61-93] 103d-104a / Richard III 105a-148a,c / Romeo and Juliet 285a-319a,c esp ACT III, SC II [1-115] 304d-306a / Merchant of Venice, ACT IV, SC I [40-62] 426a

27 Shakespeare: Hamlet 29a-72a,c esp ACT IV, SC V 59c-62a / Othello 205a-243a,c esp ACT IV, SC I 229d-233a / King Lear 244a-283a,c esp ACT I 244a-254c, ACT II, SC IV [274-289] 261c-d, ACT III, SC IV 264a-266b, ACT IV, SC VI [80-207] 274b-275c / Macbeth, ACT V, SC I 306b-307a; SC III [37-46] 308a / Antony and Cleopatra, ACT III, SC V 322a-323d / Timon of Athens, ACT IV, SC III-ACT V, SC IV 410c-420d

29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 83a-c; 88c-89a

35 Locke: Toleration, 7d-8c / Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 12 180d-181a; SECT 69 196d-197a

37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 231c-232b; 234a-b

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 216a-c; 509d-510c esp 509d

44 Boswell: Johnson, 481d

46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART IV, 323a-c

47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [3374-3413] 82b-83a; [4405-4612] 110a-114b

48 Melville: Moby Dick esp 135a-136b, 148b-150a

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 51d; BK III, 119a-120c; 159b-162b esp 160d; BK IV, 178b-179a; BK V, 207b-208a; 233b-234a; BK VI, 238a-c; 245d-246a; 266c-d; 271b-273c; BK VII, 277a-278a; 292b-296a; BK VIII, 305b-307d; BK IX, 350d-354a; BK XI, 505a-511b; 531a-532a,c; BK XII, 549d-551c; BK XIII, 567d-568c; BK XV, 616a-617a; 642d-643b

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 4a-d; BK II, 17b-21b; 21d-22b; 41c-45d; BK III 46a-82a,c esp 50c-62a; BK VIII, 200c-201c; 206a-207d; 228d-235d; BK IX, 259c-265a; BK XII, 395a-396a; 397c-398d

53 James: Psychology, 204b; 653a-b; 716b; 718a-719a; 750a-b; 754a; 797a-b

54 Freud: Hysteria, 27a-c / Interpretation of Dreams, 210c-d; 328a-b / General Introduction, 547b-549d / Group Psychology, 670d-671c; 675b-676b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 743b-744a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 787a-b

3b. Rationalization or the emotional determination of thought

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 427d-428a; BK IV, 474a-c; BK V, 506b; 507a-c

7 Plato: Phaedrus, 118d

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 16 [1287a20-b5] 485c-486a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [1356a11-18] 595c; BK II, CH 1 [1377b28-1378a5] 622d-623a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [1141-1191] 59a-d

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 52d-53a; 58a; 68c; 78a-b; PART II, 154a

24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 148d-150d; 154a-156c; 159d-163c; 166a-168a

25 Montaigne: Essays, 210b-212a; 273b-276a; 447c-448c; 490d-491d

28 Harvey: Circulation of the Blood, 306a-c; 309d

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 38d-39a; 66c-d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 49 111a

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, PROP 39, SCHOL 408b-d

33 Pascal: Pensées, 82-87 186b-189a; 99-100 191a-192b / Geometrical Demonstration, 439b-442a

35 Locke: Toleration, 2d-3a / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 13 28a-b / Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXIII, SECT 1-9 248b-249d; BK IV, CH XX, SECT 12 392c

35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 6, 453c

43 Federalist: NUMBER 1, 29c-30b; NUMBER 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER 50, 162a-b

43 Mill: Liberty, 270a

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK II, 82d-83a; BK III, 134a-c; BK IV, 170d-171c; BK V, 233b-234a; BK VI, 238a-b; BK X, 426b; BK XI, 497c-499c; 505a-511b esp 509c-510d; BK XIII, 585b, EPILOGUE II, 686c-687a

53 James: Psychology, 371b; 374a-377a passim, esp 376b-377a; 439a; 643a-646a; 652a-657b

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 13d-14a / Interpretation of Dreams, 210c-d; 379a-380d / General Introduction, 486b-488b esp 487d-488a / Group Psychology, 682b-c / War and Death, 760d-761a / New Introductory Lectures, 874a-879b esp 874a-d, 878b-879b

3c. Particular emotional disorders: psychoneuroses due to repression

28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 347c-d

53 James: Psychology, 244b-253b esp 248a; 645b-646a; 746b-748a; 749a-750b; 753b-754b; 759b-760a; 799b-807a; 838a-839b

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis 1a-20d esp 4d-5a, 7a-9a, 14b-19a / Hysteria 25a-118a,c esp 35b-c, 37d-38d, 52c-53c, 65a-72b, 81c-87a, 111b-115a / Interpretation of Dreams, 320b-c; 328c; 380d-382a / Narcissism, 402c-404d / Repression 422a-427a,c / Unconscious, 432d-436b / General Introduction, 545a-638a,c esp 557b-569c, 585b-600d, 604c-606a, 611a-615a, 632b-635d / Group Psychology, 690a-691c esp 690c-d; 695b-696a,c / Ego and Id, 712c-715c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 718a-754a,c esp 720a-723d, 728b-731d, 741d [fn 1], 745d-747b, 750a-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 792b-799a esp 797a-b, 798d-799a / New Introductory Lectures, 840a-846a; 851d-852d; 859c-860c

3c(1) Hysterias

10 Hippocrates: Regimen in Acute Diseases, APPENDIX, par 35 43d

53 James: Psychology, 131b-137b esp 135a, 137a; 248a-252a; 747b [fn 3]; 768b-770a esp 770b [fn 3]; 789b-790b [fn 2]; 802b-803a

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 1a-5d esp 4c-5d / Hysteria, 25a-62b esp 35b-c, 37d-38d, 53b-c; 72d-73b; 76c-d, 81d-83c; 97b-99c; 111b-118a,c / Interpretation of Dreams, 200a-d / Repression, 426b-c / Unconscious, 434c-436a esp 435d-436a / General Introduction, 572a-b; 586d-587b; 610d-612b passim / Ego and Id, 713d-714a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718c-719c; 728b-729a; 741c-742a; 747c-748a; 750b

3c(2) Obsessions and compulsions

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [59-93] 30d-31b; [1053-1075] 43c-d

27 Shakespeare: Macbeth, ACT V, SC I 306b-307a, SC III [37-46] 308a

29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 2b

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 44, SCHOL 437d-438a

33 Pascal: Pensées, 139 196b-199a; 142-143 199b-200a

44 Boswell: Johnson, 138c-139a

48 Melville: Moby Dick esp 135a-136b

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 513d-515a

53 James: Psychology, 733b [fn 1]; 801a-805b

54 Freud: Hysteria, 83d-86a; 90a-b; 99c-102a / Repression, 426d-427a,c / Unconscious, 436b / General Introduction, 550d-557b esp 551b-552c; 561c-562c; 568a-569a; 572b-c; 587b-c; 600d; 612a-b / Ego and Id, 713c-715c passim / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718b-719b passim; 721c; 723c-d; 729a-733c; 735c-d; 747c-d; 750b-d / New Introductory Lectures, 841b-c

3c(3) Phobias and anxieties

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [102-158] 2b-3a; BK III [59-93] 30d-31b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 35, A 8, ANS 779c-780c

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 68d

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXIII, SECT 10 249d

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 210b-211a; BK XV, 618a

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK IX, 260d-262a; BK XI, 318a-348d; BK XII, 376b-d

53 James: Psychology, 722a-725a passim, esp 723a, 724b; 733b [fn 1]

54 Freud: Hysteria, 83d-86a passim, esp 84d-85a; 87a-97b / Interpretation of Dreams, 205a-c; 235b-d; 276c; 370b-373a / Repression, 425d-426b / Unconscious, 434c-435d / General Introduction, 607b-615b esp 610d-612d; 623b-c / Ego and Id, 715d-717a,c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-754a esp 724a-728b, 733c-742a, 744b-748b / New Introductory Lectures, 840a-846a

3c(4) Traumas and traumatic neuroses

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 3a-5a esp 4b-c; 14d-15a / Hysteria, 25a-30a esp 26a-c, 27c-d / General Introduction, 558a-d; 603a-b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 641a-d; 648d-650c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 735d-736c; 741a-b; 744b-745d; 749b-c; 751b-752b / New Introductory Lectures, 817c-818b; 845b-846a

3d. The alleviation and cure of emotional disorders

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [31-93] 30b-31b esp [87-93] 31b; BK VI [1-42] 80a-c

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 38 786d-789d

25 Montaigne: Essays, 37c-39a; 401b-406a

27 Shakespeare: Macbeth, ACT V, SC I 306b-307a; SC III [37-46] 308a

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXXIII, SECT 13 250a-b

44 Boswell: Johnson, 13b-c; 127a-b; 284c-d; 297d-298a

48 Melville: Moby Dick, 357b-358b

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 271b-c; BK XII, 551c-554a; BK XV, 614a-d; 616a-618b esp 617a-b

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 21d-23c

53 James: Psychology, 132b; 135a-b

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 1a-4d; 6c-7a; 10c-13d; 14d-15a; 18a-20d / Hysteria, 25a-81c passim, esp 30d-31a, 59d-60a, 62c-72d, 75d-81c; 106c-111b / Psycho-Analytic Therapy 123a-127a,c / “Wild” Psycho-Analysis 128a-130d / General Introduction, 546b-c; 550a-c; 560b-561b; 603b-604c; 623c-638a,c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 643d-644d; 651c-d / Ego and Id, 712c-713a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 748b-d / New Introductory Lectures, 840a; 851d-852d; 864a-873d esp 871a-873d

4. The moral consideration of the passions

7 Plato: Gorgias, 275d-277c / Republic, BK IV, 350c-353d; BK X, 433d

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK II, CH 1-BK III, CH 1 348b,d-357b passim; BK III, CH 6-BK IV, CH 9 361a-376a,c; BK V, CH 8 [1135b17-1136a9] 383c-384a; BK VII 395a-406a,c; BK X, CH 8 [1178a8-21] 432d / Politics, BK VII, CH 15 [1334b8-28] 539b-d / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 12-14 636a-638a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [288-322] 33d-34b

12 Epictetus: Discourses 105a-245a,c passim, esp BK I, CH 3-5 108b-110c, CH 22 127c-128c, CH 25, 129d-130a, BK II, CH 5, 142c-143b, CH 13 152c-153d, CH 17-18 158d-162b, BK III, CH 15, 190c-d, BK IV, CH 4-6 225a-232c, CH 9 237d-238d

12 Aurelius: Meditations 253a-310d passim

18 Augustine: City of God, BK IX, CH 4-6 287a-289b; BK XIV, CH 3-9 378a-385b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 24 630c-631a

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 24 727a-730a; Q 34 768c-772b

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; Q 58, A 2, ANS 42a-43a; A 3, REP 2 43b-44a; Q 59 45d-49d; Q 60, A 2 50d-51b; A 4-5 52b-54d; Q 62, A 2, REP 1,3 60d-61b, Q 63, A 4, ANS 65d-66c; Q 64, A 1 66d-67c; Q 66, A 3, ANS and REP 2 77c-78b; Q 67, A 1 81c-82c

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 61d-62a; 79a-80a; 85d; 95d-96b; PART II, 138d-139a; PART IV, 272c

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 26a-27c; 78a-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, APPENDIX, I-III 447a-b; XXXII 450c-d; PART V, PROP 1-4 452d-453d esp PROP 4, SCHOL 453b-d

33 Pascal: Pensées, 203 211a; 262 221a; 412-413 242a; 423 243b; 502 260b-261a

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330d-331a; 343b-346d; 362a-d / Political Economy, 375d-376b

42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-279d esp 256a-c, 259b-c, 264d-265b, 266d-267d, 268d-271d; 284d-285a / Practical Reason, 297a-307d esp 298a-300a, 304a-307d; 321b-329a esp 321b-324b; 341c-342a; 356a-360d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386d; 389a-b

43 Mill: Liberty, 295b-297b / Utilitarianism, 457c-461c; 464d-465c; 469b-471b

46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 150 56c-57a / Philosophy of History, PART I, 251b-c; PART IV, 321b-d

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310c-319a esp 311a-d, 313d-314b, 318d-319a; 592b-593b

53 James: Psychology, 81b-83a; 202a-203a; 798b-808a esp 807a-808a; 816a-818a

54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 386c-387a / General Introduction, 501d-504b esp 503d-504b; 624d-625b / War and Death, 757d-761c

4a. The conflict between reason and emotion

5 Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus [655-663] 120b-c

7 Plato: Phaedrus, 120b-c; 128a-129c / Republic, BK IV, 350c-355a; BK IX, 416a-c

9 Aristotle: Motion of Animals, CH 11 239a-d / Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1102b13-1103a10] 348a-d; BK III, CH 1 [1111a35-b4] 357b; BK VII 395a-406a,c / Politics, BK III, CH 15 [1286a17-20] 484b-c; [1286b33-37] 484d

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [307-322] 34a-b

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 5 257b-c; SECT 10 257d-258a; SECT 16-17 259a-d; BK III, SECT 4 260b-261a; SECT 12 262b-c; BK V, SECT 8-9 269d-270c; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; SECT 68-69 284c-d; BK VIII, SECT 39 288c

13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK IV 167a-186b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 95, A 2, ANS and REP 1 507c-508a; Q 111, A 2, ANS 569c-570b; PART I-II, Q 9, A 2 esp REP 3 658d-659c; Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 17, A 7 690d-692a; Q 33, A 3 767a-d; Q 34, A 1, REP 1 768c-769d; Q 48, A 3 824c-825b

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 61, A 3, ANS 56b-57a; Q 77 144d-152a esp A 2 145d-147c, A 4 148b-149a, A 7 150d-151c; Q 80, A 2 160d-161c; Q 91, A 6 212c-213c; Q 93, A 6 219d-220d; Q 94, A 6, ANS 225d-226b; PART II-II, Q 186, A 4, ANS 655c-656b

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 57d-58a; 58c-d; PART II, 105d-106a; 141a-b, 151b-c

25 Montaigne: Essays, 20d-22a; 159a-167a esp 161a-c, 165c-166a; 184b-d; 200d-205b; 273b-276a, 486b-495a

27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II 113c-115d; ACT III, SC III [74-81] 121a / Othello, ACT I, SC III [306-337] 212b-c

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 55b-d; 66c-d; 67a-b; 78a-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 1-18 424c-429d; PROP 59-73 442b-447a; APPENDIX, I-III 447a-b; XXXII 450c-d; PART V, PROP 1-20 452d-458a

32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [500-643] 243a-246a; BK XII [80-110] 321a-b

33 Pascal: Pensées, 104 193a; 412-413 242a; 423 243b

35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 13 28a-b / Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 54 192b-c; BK IV, CH XX, SECT 12 392c

35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 3 451d

42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386b / Judgement, 586a-587a

43 Federalist: NUMBER 15, 65b-c

46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 312d-313a

47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [3217-3373] 79a-82a esp [3217-3250] 79a-b

48 Melville: Moby Dick, 411a-412a

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 318d-319a

53 James: Psychology, 799a-808a esp 799a-b, 807a-b; 816a-819a esp 816a-817a

54 Freud: Unconscious, 433b-c / General Introduction, 501d-504b esp 503b-c, 504b; 589c-593b passim / Ego and Id, 702c-d; 704a-c; 708b-c; 715a-716c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721d-722c / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-839b esp 838a-d; 843d-846a esp 845b

4a(1) The force of the passions

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:1-16; 25:29-34; 34; 39:7-20 / Exodus, 32:15-20 / I Samuel, 18:6-12; 19:8-10—(D) I Kings, 18:6-12; 19:8-10 / II Samuel, 11; 13—(D) II Kings, 11; 13 / Job, 5:2 / Proverbs, 15:13; 27:4

NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 1:18-32 / II Corinthians, 7:8-16 / I Timothy, 6:9-10 / I John, 2:15-17; 3:14-16

4 Homer: Odyssey, BK XII [153-200] 251d-252b

5 Euripides: Medea [627-641] 217c / Hippolytus 225a-236d

5 Aristophanes: Lysistrata 583a-599a,c

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 100b-101b; BK VII, 218c; 222c-d

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 438a-b

7 Plato: Charmides, 2b-c / Protagoras, 59b-61c / Phaedrus, 120a-122a / Symposium, 168a / Phaedo, 232d-234c / Republic, BK I, 296b-c; BK IX, 416a-418c / Timaeus, 474b-d / Laws, BK VIII, 735a-738c passim

8 Aristotle: Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453a15-31] 695b-d / Dreams, CH 2 [460b32-461a8] 704b-c

9 Aristotle: History of Animals, BK VII, CH 1 [581a11-22] 107b / Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b29-1095a12] 340a-b; BK III, CH 1 [1109b30-1110a15] 355b,d-356b; [1111b21-b3] 357a-b; BK IV, CH 9 [1128b15-20] 376a; BK VI, CH 5 [1140b8-19] 389b-c; BK VII, CH 1-10 395a-403c passim; BK VIII, CH 3 [1156a31-b5] 408a; BK IX, CH 8 [1168b11-28] 422a-b; BK X, CH 9 [1179b4-1180a24] 434b-435a / Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1253a31-37] 446d; BK III, CH 15 [1286a16-20] 484b-c; [1286b33-37] 484d; CH 16 [1287a28-32] 485d; BK V, CH 10 [1312b25-33] 515b; CH 11 [1315a25-31] 518a-b; BK VII, CH 7 [1327b40-1328a18] 532a-c / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 12 [1389a3-b11] 636b-d

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [307-322] 34a-b

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 10 257d-258a; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c

13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK IV 167a-186b; BK XII [1-80] 354a-356a; [593-611] 370a

14 Plutarch: Pericles, 139a-c / Coriolanus 174b,d-193a,c / Lysander, 362b-365a / Pompey, 533a-c / Antony 748a-779d

15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 58a; BK XII, 137b-c / Histories, BK IV, 267d

18 Augustine: Confessions, BK IV, par 9-14 21b-23a; BK VI, par 11-13 38b-39c; BK VIII, par 10-11 55c-56b / City of God, BK IV, CH 3 190a-c; BK XIX, CH 15 521a-c

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, REP 1-2 430c-431d; Q 111, A 2, ANS 569c-570b; PART I-II, Q 6, A 6-7 649a-650d; Q 9, A 2 658d-659c; Q 10, A 3 664d-665c; Q 24, A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 37 783c-786d

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 72, A 2 112b-113a; Q 73, A 5 123a-d; Q 74, A 5-10 131d-137c; Q 77 144d-152a; Q 82, A 3 169c-170b; Q 83, A 4 173c-174b

21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, V 7a-8b; VII [97]-VIII [64] 10c-11c

22 Chaucer: Manciple’s Tale [17,104-144] 490a-b

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 65a; 89a; PART II, 104d; 105c; 138d-139a; 141a-b

25 Montaigne: Essays, 5a-6c; 20d-22a; 25c-26d, 36c-41a passim, esp 39b-40a; 109a-c; 159a-167a; 184a-d; 200d-205b esp 203c-205b; 232b-238d passim; 273b-276a; 346b-347c; 350d-354b; 402c-404b; 418c-d; 420d-421d; 435b-d; 491c-495a

26 Shakespeare: 3rd Henry VI, ACT I, SC III 73d-74b / Romeo and Juliet 285a-319a,c / Merchant of Venice, ACT I-IV 406a-430c

27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida 103a-141a,c / Othello 205a-243a,c / Antony and Cleopatra 311a-350d

28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 347c-d

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 67a-b; 78a-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 1-18 424c-429d

32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [561-594] 244b-245a; BK IX [990-1066] 269a-270b; BK XII [80-110] 321a-b / Samson Agonistes [521-576] 351a-352a

33 Pascal: Pensées, 360 235a

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 39 187c-d; SECT 54 192b-c; BK IV, CH XX, SECT 12 392c

35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 3 451d

36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 239b-243a

37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 109c

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 329b

42 Kant: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386b / Judgement, 586a-587a

43 Federalist: NUMBER 1, 29d-30a; NUMBER 6, 40a-b; NUMBER 50, 162a-b; NUMBER 55, 173a

44 Boswell: Johnson, 174b-c; 176d; 214b-c; 341c-d

46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 167c-168a; PART III, 300c-d

47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [1110-1117] 27b-28a; [3217-3373] 79a-82a; PART II [6566-6569] 161a

48 Melville: Moby Dick, 135a-136b; 411a-412a

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 311d-312b

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 15b-16a; BK III, 122b-c; BK VII, 251d-252d; EPILOGUE I, 655c-656b

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 4a-d; BK II, 39b-40a; BK III, 50c-62a; BK VII, 177c; BK XII, 397c-398d

53 James: Psychology, 799a-b

54 Freud: Hysteria, 110c / General Introduction, 502a-504b esp 503d-504a / Group Psychology, 690a-c / Ego and Id, 701d-702d; 715d-716a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 745d-747b / War and Death, 760d-761a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 787b-c / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-839b esp 838c-839b

4a(2) The strength of reason or will

4 Homer: Odyssey, BK IV [265-295] 201d-202a; BK IX [82-104] 230a; BK XIX [203-219] 291b

7 Plato: Symposium, 168a-173a,c / Apology, 205d-206d / Crito, 214d-215d / Phaedo, 220b-221a; 225b-226c; 232b-234c; 250b-251d / Laws, BK I, 649d-650b

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK IX, CH 8 [1168b28-1169a11] 422b-d / Politics, BK I, CH 5 [1254b1-8] 447d-448a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [307-322] 34a-b

12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 3 108b-c; BK II, CH 23 170a-172d

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; BK VIII, SECT 39 288c; BK IX, SECT 7 292b; BK XI, SECT 18 304b-305b

14 Plutarch: Pericles, 139a-140d

18 Augustine: Confessions, BK VI, par 11-13 38b-39c; par 16 40a-c, BK VIII, par 10-11 55c-56b; par 19-27 58b-60c / City of God, BK IX, CH 4-5 287a-289a; BK XIV, CH 8-9 381c-385b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; Q 111, A 2, ANS 569c-570b; PART I-II, Q 10, A 3 664d-665c; Q 17, A 7 690d-692a

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 141a-b

25 Montaigne: Essays, 20d-22a; 36c-41a esp 39b-40a; 159a-167a; 184a-d; 200d-205b; 273b-276a

27 Shakespeare: Othello, ACT I, SC III [322-337] 212b-c

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 15-17 428a-d; PROP 59-73 442b-447a; APPENDIX, I-III 447a-b; XXXII 450c-d; PART V 451a-463d

32 Milton: Comus [414-475] 42b-44a / Paradise Lost, BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b

33 Pascal: Pensées, 350 234a

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 54 192b-c

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 344d-345c

42 Kant: Pure Reason, 164a-165c; 235c-d / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 259a-c; 264d-265b; 271c-d; 279b; 282d-283d; 284d-285a / Practical Reason, 303b-304b; 314a-d; 315b-c; 346b,d [fn] / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b-366a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d / Judgement, 483d-484b; 586a-587a; 605d-606b [fn 2]

43 Mill: Representative Government, 332c-d / Utilitarianism, 463d-464c

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 312a-c; 313d-314a; 318d-319a

53 James: Psychology, 798b-800a; 807a-808a

54 Freud: Hysteria, 110c / Interpretation of Dreams, 384c-385c; 386d-387a / Unconscious, 433b-c / Group Psychology, 690a-c / Ego and Id, 702c-d; 715c-716c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721d-722c; 744a / War and Death, 760d-761a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 800d-801a / New Introductory Lectures, 837d-839b; 845b; 880a

4b. The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason

4b(1) Moderation of the passions by reason: virtue, continence, avoidance of sin

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:14,17; 23:4-5 / Leviticus, 19:17-18 / Numbers, 15:37-41 / Deuteronomy, 5:18,21 / Psalms, 32:8-10; 37:1-8—(D) Psalms, 31:8-10; 36:1-8 / Proverbs, 7, 15:1; 23; 30:7-9 / Ecclesiastes, 7:8-9—(D) Ecclesiastes, 7:9-10

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-33; 31; 38:16-23—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-33; 31; 38:16-24

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:21-26,43-48 / I Corinthians, 13:4-8 / Ephesians, 4:31-32 / Colossians, 3:5-15 / I Thessalonians, 4:3-8 / I Timothy, 6:3-12 / Titus, 2:11-14; 3:1-7 / James, 4:1-7 / I Peter, 2:11-12

5 Aristophanes: Clouds [866-1114] 499a-502b

7 Plato: Charmides, 5a-b / Laches, 31d-37a / Protagoras, 59b-64a / Phaedrus, 120b-c / Symposium, 153b-157a; 168a-173a,c / Phaedo, 225b-226c; 233c-234c / Republic, BK III, 325b-326b; BK IV, 346a-356a; BK IX, 416a-c; BK X, 431b-434a / Timaeus, 466a-467a / Laws, BK I, 649d-650b; BK VII, 713c-716a esp 715d-716a, BK VIII, 735c-738c

8 Aristotle: Topics, BK IV, CH 5 [125b20-28] 174d-175a

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 347b-348d; BK II, CH 1-BK III, CH 1 348b,d-357b; BK III, CH 6-BK IV, CH 9 361a-376a,c; BK VII 395a-406a,c; BK IX, CH 8 [1168b28-1169a11] 422b-d / Politics, BK I, CH 5 [1254b1-8] 447d-448a / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 14 637d-638a

11 Nicomachus: Arithmetic, BK I, 826d-827a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [1-61] 1a-d; BK III [307-322] 34a-b; [1053-1094] 43c-44a,c; BK V [1-54] 61a-d; [1117-1135] 75d; BK VI [1-42] 80a-d

12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 1 105a-106c; CH 3 108b-c; BK II, CH 2 140c-141c; CH 11, 151a-b; CH 18 161a-162b

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 5 257b-c; BK IV, SECT 24 265c-d; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; BK VIII, SECT 39 288c; BK IX, SECT 7 292b

14 Plutarch: Dion, 798b-d

18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, par 2-4 9b-d; BK III, par 1 13b-c; BK IV, par 25 25c; BK VI, par 18-26 40d-43a; BK VIII, par 1-2 52c-53b; par 10-11 55c-56b; par 25-27 60a-c / City of God, BK IV, CH 3 190a-c; BK IX, CH 5-6 288b-289b; BK XIV, CH 6-9 380b-385b, BK XIX, CH 15 521a-c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 24 630c-631a

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 95, A 2-3 507c-509b; Q 98, A 2 esp REP 3 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 20, A 4, ANS 714c-715b; Q 24 727a-730a

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; Q 59 45d-49d; Q 60, A 4-Q 61, A 5 52b-59d; Q 64, A 1-2 66d-68b; Q 65, A 1 70b-72a; PART III, Q 15, A 4-9 790d-795b

21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-75] 80a-c

22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, par 4-7 401b-402b / Parson’s Tale, par 12, 503b-504a

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 93d-94a; 95d-96b

24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK IV, 234a-240a

25 Montaigne: Essays, 20d-22a; 89b-91b; 159a-167a; 184a-d, 200d-205b; 232b-238d; 251a-c; 346b-347c; 353c-354b; 402c-404b; 431c-432d; 486b-495a

26 Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet, ACT II, SC VI [1-15] 300c / Henry V, ACT I, SC I [24-69] 533b-c

27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT I, SC III [5-51] 34c-d; ACT III, SC II [68-79] 49c-d

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 27b-c; 67a-b; 71d-72b; 78a-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 1-18 424c-429d esp PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 59-73 442b-447a; APPENDIX 447a-450d; PART V 451a-463d esp PROP 1-20 452d-458a, PROP 38-42 461d-463d

32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b; BK XI [334-369] 306b-307a; [527-551] 310b-311a / Samson Agonistes [541-576] 351b-352a / Areopagitica, 390a-391a

33 Pascal: Pensées, 104 193a; 203 211a; 413 242a; 423 243b; 502-503 260b-261a

35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 46-54 189d-192c esp SECT 54 192b-c; SECT 69 196d-197a

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 32a-b

42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 368d-369a / Judgement, 586d-587a

44 Boswell: Johnson, 92b-c

46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 105 133d-134a / Philosophy of History, PART III, 312d-313a; PART IV, 365d-366a

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310c-319a esp 313d-314b, 318d-319a; 322c-d; 592b-c; 593a-b

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 122b-c; BK V, 201a-c; BK VI, 245b-c; 247d-250a; EPILOGUE I, 655c-656b

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 164a-167a

53 James: Psychology, 807a-808a; 816a-819a esp 817a-818a

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 9a; 20a-c / Hysteria, 110c / Narcissism, 407b-408a / Ego and Id, 702c; 706d-707d; 715a-716a / War and Death, 757d-759c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773b-c / New Introductory Lectures, 838c-839b, 844b-c

4b(2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions: the liberation of reason

7 Plato: Phaedo, 233c-234c / Republic, BK I, 295d-296c

9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 13 [1389b12-1390a24] 637a-c

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1-54] 61a-d

12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 1 105a-106c; CH 4 108d-110a, BK II, CH 2 140c-141c; CH 17-18 158d-162b; BK III, CH 8 184b-c, CH 22 195a-201a; BK IV, CH 4 225a-228a; CH 12 242d-244a

12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 2 257a; SECT 5 257b-c; SECT 10 257d-258a; SECT 16-17 259a-d; BK III, SECT 4 260b-261a; SECT 6 261a-c; SECT 12 262b-c; BK IV, SECT 39 267a; BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b; SECT 26 272c; BK VI, SECT 40-46 277d-278d; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; SECT 68-69 284c-d; BK IX, SECT 7 292b

17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 4-5 108c-109d esp CH 5, 109c-d

18 Augustine: City of God, BK IX, CH 4-5 287a-289a; BK XIV, CH 8-10 381c-385d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 24 630c-631a

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 24, A 2 727b-728c

24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 152a-d; 188d-191c

25 Montaigne: Essays, 89b-91b; 99b-100a; 107a-112d; 165d-167a; 200d-205b; 232b-238d esp 235c-236a; 251a-c; 402c-404b; 432b-d; 486b-495a esp 491d-495a

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 26b-c; 71d-72b

32 Milton: Comus [414-475] 42b-44a; [706-755] 49a-50a / Areopagitica, 390a-391a

33 Pascal: Pensées, 413 242a

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK V, 19a

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 344d-345c

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 32a-b

42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256b / Practical Reason, 346b,d [fn 1] / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 378d-379a / Judgement, 586a-587a

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XIII, 577a-578b; BK XIV, 605b-d; BK XV, 630c-631a

53 James: Psychology, 751a-752a; 753b-754b; 760a-b

54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 20b-c / Hysteria, 110c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 745d-746c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773b-c / New Introductory Lectures, 839d-840a

4c. The moral significance of temperamental type or emotional disposition

7 Plato: Charmides, 3b-d / Republic, BK I, 296b-c; BK II, 319c-320c; BK III, 338a-339a / Timaeus, 474b-d / Statesman, 607a-608d

8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 8 [9b34-10a6] 15a

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK IV, CH 9 [1128b10-20] 375d-376a; BK VI, CH 13 [1144b1-17] 394b; BK VII, CH 4 [1148a18-22] 398c; CH 5 399a-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1369a5-29] 612b-c; BK II, CH 12-14 636a-638a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [288-322] 33d-34b

12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 5 110b-c; BK II, CH 15 155c-156b

17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR III, CH 1-3 10a-11a / Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 1-2 246c-247b

19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 46, A 5, ANS and REP 1 815d-816d

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 51, A 1, ANS 12b-13c; Q 63, A 1 63a-64a; Q 65, A 1, ANS 70b-72a

21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXX [100-145] 100b-d

22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK III, STANZA 129 71a-b / Wife of Bath’s Prologue [6191-6208] 266a

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 68b-c; 77c-78a

25 Montaigne: Essays, 200d-205b esp 203a-204a; 434d-435d; 491d-495a esp 494d-495a

26 Shakespeare: Richard II, ACT III, SC II 335b-337d / 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [146-189] 451c-452a / 2nd Henry IV, ACT IV, SC V 494b-496d

27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT IV, SC IV [32-66] 59a-c

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 49b-50b; 76d-77c

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XIV 102b,d-108d

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 435b-d

42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256a; 258b-c / Practical Reason, 356a-360d

43 Mill: Liberty, 303d-304d / Representative Government, 346c-348c

46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 150 56c-57a / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 323b-c; 357b-c

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 311c

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VIII, 321d-322d; 336b-337d; BK IX, 362d-363a; BK XI, 514c-d; 519a-c; 527b-528b; EPILOGUE I, 655c-656b

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 38a-40c; BK III, 48b-50b; 53a-60a esp 54a-b, 57b-c; 69c-71c

53 James: Psychology, 799b-808a passim, esp 802b-803a, 806b-807a

5. The political consideration of the passions

5 Sophocles: Antigone [162-210] 132c-d

5 Aristophanes: Lysistrata 583a-599a,c

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 436d-438b

7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII-IX, 404a-418a passim, esp BK VIII, 404d-405c, 407a-408a, 409d-411a, BK IX, 416a-418a / Laws, BK I-II, 643c-663d esp BK I, 651a-652d; BK III, 665a-c; 668a-670c; 671a-672c; 674c-675c, BK IV, 681b-d; 682b; BK V, 686d-691b esp 689c-690c; BK VI, 707c-708a; BK VII, 718c-719d, 726d-728b; BK VIII, 732d-738c esp 735c-736c, 738a-c, BK IX, 747d-748d

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK IV, CH 1 [1121b28-30] 368c / Politics, BK III, CH 9 [1271a9-17] 467b; BK III, CH 15 [1286a17-20] 484b-c; [1286b33-37] 484d; CH 16 [1287a28-39] 485d; BK V 502a-519d passim, esp CH 2-3 503b-505b, CH 10-11 512d-518c, BK VII, CH 7 [1327b40-1328a18] 532a-c

14 Plutarch: Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Dion, 784d-785a

15 Tacitus: Histories, BK III, 257c-d

23 Machiavelli: The Prince, 3a-37d passim

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d, PART I, 85c-d; 90b-d; 93d-94a; 95d-96b; PART II, 104b-d, 105c-106b; 113b; 140c-142a, 151b-c, PART IV, 272c; CONCLUSION, 279a-c

27 Shakespeare: Timon of Athens, ACT III, SC V 406d-408a

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d; 78a-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, PROP 46 410c; PART IV, PROP 35, SCHOL 433d-434a; APPENDIX, VIII-XVII 447d-448d

33 Pascal: Pensées, 291-338 225a-233a

35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XI, SECT 136-137 56c-57b

36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 28b-29a; 37a-b; PART III, 112a-114b; 119b-121a

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 6a-b; BK III, 9a; 10a; 10c-11a; 12b-d; BK V, 18d-19d; BK VII, 47c-48a; BK XIII, 96a; BK XIX, 135d-139c passim; BK XXVIII, 259b; BK XXIX, 269a,c

38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 368a-b; 375d-376b

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 4a-5a

43 Federalist: NUMBER 1 29a-31a passim; NUMBER 5-6 37a-41c passim, esp NUMBER 6, 40a-b; NUMBER 10 49c-53a esp 50a-d; NUMBER 15, 65b-d; NUMBER 17 69a-70d; NUMBER 27, 95c-d; NUMBER 31, 103d-104a; NUMBER 34, 110c-d; NUMBER 46, 150b-152a; NUMBER 49, 160b-161a; NUMBER 50, 162a-b; NUMBER 55, 173a-b; NUMBER 63, 192c-193a; NUMBER 70, 211d-212a; NUMBER 76, 225d-226a

43 Mill: Representative Government, 329b-c; 336c-337a; 346c-348c

46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 166b-167c; PART I, 241d-242a; PART III, 300c-d; PART IV, 323b-c

53 James: Psychology, 201a

54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-802a,c esp 780c-d, 781c, 783c-784b, 785d-787c, 792a-b, 800c-802a,c

5a. The causes of political association: fear or need

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 23b-d

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 402b-404a

7 Plato: Protagoras, 44a-45b / Republic, BK II, 311b-c; 316c-319a

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 6 [1278b15-30] 475d-476a; CH 9 [1280b32-1281a2] 477d-478c; BK V, CH 8 [1308a25-30] 510b-c

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1011-1027] 74b-c

15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b

18 Augustine: City of God, BK I, CH 30 147b-d

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 77a; 77c; 84c-87b esp 86b; 90b-91b; PART II, 99a-101a; 109b-c; 116c-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 1-2 434d-436a

35 Locke: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 13-15 28a-c; CH VIII, SECT 95 46c-d; CH IX 53c-54d

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 2b-d

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 354c-355a / Political Economy, 370-374a-b / Social Contract, BK I, 393b-c

39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 309a-c; 311b-c

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 91b-c

42 Kant: Science of Right, 435c-d

43 Federalist: NUMBER 10, 50a-d; NUMBER 15, 65b-d; NUMBER 17 69a-70d passim; NUMBER 27, 95c-d; NUMBER 29, 101a; NUMBER 46, 150b-152a; NUMBER 51, 163b-c

43 Mill: Representative Government, 424c-425b / Utilitarianism, 471a-b

46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 183 64a; par 261, 83c-d / Philosophy of History, PART II, 262a; 283b-c; PART III, 289b-d; PART IV, 328b-c

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 308a-310d; 321b-c

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 133c-d passim; BK VI, 158b-159a

54 Freud: Group Psychology 664a-696a,c esp 665c, 672a-676b, 687b-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781d-782d; 783b-c; 785c-788d; 796a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 884a

5b. The acquisition and retention of power: love or fear

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 95d-96b; 103d-104a; 107c-d

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 368b-d; BK II, 402a-404a; BK III, 425d-426d; BK VI, 519a-520d; 523c-524c; BK VIII, 580b-c

7 Plato: Republic, BK II, 311c-312b / Laws, BK III, 671a-c; 674c-d; BK IV, 682b / Seventh Letter, 806d-807a

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK V, CH 2 [1302a16]-CH 3 [1302b34] 503b-504b; CH 8 [1308a25-34] 510b-c; CH 10 512d-515d; CH 11 [1313a34-1315b11] 516a-518c

12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK IV, CH 4, 225a-226c; CH 9 237d-238d

14 Plutarch: Coriolanus, 180d-181b / Pyrrhus 314b,d-332d esp 319b-321a / Lysander, 362b-365a / Sulla, 384a-c / Crassus 438b,d-455a,c / Sertorius, 462a-c; 466d-467a / Agesilaus, 482d-484a / Pompey, 517d-518a; 533a-c / Caesar, 577d-583a / Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Cicero, 717a-b / Demetrius, 737b-d / Dion, 784d-785a / Artaxerxes, 856b-c

15 Tacitus: Histories, BK II, 224d-225a

23 Machiavelli: The Prince, CH VI, 9b-d; CH VII, 11b-c; 12b-d; CH XVII 23d-24d; CH XIX 26a-30a; CH XX, 31b-c

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d; PART I, 76d; PART II, 100d; 109b-c; 156c

24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 132a-d

25 Montaigne: Essays, 51a-55d passim

26 Shakespeare: Richard III, ACT V, SC III [238-270] 146b-c / 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC I [39-84] 453b-d

27 Shakespeare: Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [37-114] 303d-304c

29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 40d

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 78a-d

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK III, 12b-13c; BK IV, 15a-c; BK V, 26d-27d; BK VI, 43c-d; BK XII, 93d-94a; 94c-95a

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 364a-b / Social Contract, BK III, 412d-413a

39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 348a-349c

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 263a-b; 436a-b

41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 549a

43 Federalist: NUMBER 6, 39a-b; NUMBER 15, 65b-d; NUMBER 17, 69a-d; NUMBER 72, 217a-c

43 Mill: Representative Government, 354b-355b / Utilitarianism, 462d

46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 287a-d; PART IV, 365d-366b

54 Freud: Group Psychology, 669a-c; 686c-689b esp 687a-b

5c. The coercive force of law: fear of punishment

5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [681-710] 88b-c

5 Sophocles: Ajax [1047-1090] 152a-b

6 Herodotus: History, BK VII, 233a-d

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 396c-d; 400d-401a; BK III, 426b; 426d; 427c-428d esp 427d-428a

7 Plato: Protagoras, 45b-d / Gorgias, 293b-d / Laws, BK III, 674d-675c / Seventh Letter, 807a

9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK III, CH 8 [1116a15-b3] 362b-d; BK X, CH 9 [1179b12-1180a24] 434b-435a

12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1136-1160] 76a-b

14 Plutarch: Agesilaus, 494a-c / Cleomenes, 659d-660a

15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 57b-58d

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 92, A 2, ANS and REP 4 214d-215a,c; Q 95, A 1, ANS and REP 1 226c-227c; Q 99, A 6 250a-251a; Q 100, A 7, REP 4 258c-259c; Q 107, A 1, REP 2 325c-327b

23 Machiavelli: The Prince, CH XI, 18a; CH XVII, 24b

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 87c; 89a-b; 91a-b; PART II, 99a-b; 113b; 116c-d; 132a; 141b; PART IV, 273b-c

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 69d-70a; 78a-d

31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a

33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 109a; 116b-117a / Pensées, 297-304 227a-228a; 878 345a-b

35 Locke: Toleration, 3a / Civil Government, CH IX, SECT 125-131 54a-d

36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 28a-b

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VI, 37d-38b, 38d-39c; BK XXV, 212b-c

38 Rousseau: Inequality, 345d; 359d-360b / Political Economy, 370d-373a / Social Contract, BK II, 406c

39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 309a-c

41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 92a-b

42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254b / Practical Reason, 321b-329a esp 325d-326b / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-b

43 Federalist: NUMBER 15, 65a-d; NUMBER 16 66c-68d passim, esp 67d-68a; NUMBER 17, 69d-70a; NUMBER 27, 95b-96a

43 Mill: Liberty, 295d-296a / Representative Government, 329c-330a

46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART IV, 328b-329c

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 314a-b

52 Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov, BK II, 30d-31a

54 Freud: War and Death, 757c

5d. The devices of oratory: emotional persuasion

5 Euripides: Orestes [866-956] 402d-403d

5 Aristophanes: Knights 470a-487a,c

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 425c-d; 426c; BK VII, 557a-b; 559d-560b

7 Plato: Euthydemus, 74d-75a / Apology, 208c-209b; 210b-d / Gorgias, 260c-262a; 280d-283c, 291b-d

9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354a13-1355a3] 593b-594a; CH 2 [1356a13-18] 595c; BK II, CH 1-11 622b,d-636a; BK III, CH 7 [1408a23-b21] 659b-660a; CH 14 [1415b25]-CH 15 [1416b14] 668c-670c; CH 16 [1417a37-b7] 671c-d; CH 19 [1419b10-27] 674c-d

14 Plutarch: Pericles, 129b-130b / Sertorius, 462a-c, 466d-467a / Caesar, 577d-583a / Caius Gracchus, 681b,d-685c

15 Tacitus: Histories, BK I, 207d-208a

20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 99, A 6, ANS 250a-251a

23 Machiavelli: The Prince, CH VI, 9c

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 67c; PART II, 105d-106b; 127d-129d; CONCLUSION, 279a-c

25 Montaigne: Essays, 147b-148a; 306a-d

26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, ACT III 580b-587a

30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 24d-25c; 66b-67c; 78a-b

40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 303c-304a

42 Kant: Judgement, 535b-c

43 Federalist: NUMBER 1 29a-31a passim; NUMBER 24, 87b-88c passim; NUMBER 58, 181b-c; NUMBER 62, 190b

43 Mill: Liberty, 292b-293b

46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART II, 273d-274a; 279d-280b

47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [521-557] 15a-b

49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 570c-571b

51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 533a-534d; BK XV, 622a-c

54 Freud: General Introduction, 450b

5e. The regulation of art for the sake of training the passions

7 Plato: Republic, BK II-III, 320c-339a; BK IV, 344b-d; BK X, 431b-434a / Laws, BK VII, 717b-721a; 726d-728b

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK VII, CH 17 [1336b12-23] 541c-d; BK VIII, CH 5 [1339a11-1340b19] 545a-546a; CH 7 547b-548a,c

17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR III, CH 1-2 10a-d

29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 184a-187c passim

32 Milton: Areopagitica, 384b-386b; 387b-394b

38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK IV, 17b-18d

44 Boswell: Johnson, 308b-c

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

• The general theory of instinct, see HABIT 3-3e; and for the consideration of instinctual drives, see DESIRE 2a, 3a.
• The relation of pleasure and pain to the emotions, see PLEASURE AND PAIN 4a.
• The conception of the emotions as forms of animal appetite or sensitive desire, see DESIRE 3b(1); WILL 2b(2).
• The analysis of the one emotion which is held to be the root of all the others, see LOVE 2a-2a(3).
• Other discussions of the conflict between the passions and reason, or between one emotion and another, see DESIRE 3d, 4a, 6c; DUTY 8; MIND 9b-9c; OPPOSITION 4a-4b, 4d.
• Other discussions of emotional disorder from a psychological or medical point of view, see DESIRE 4a-4d; MEDICINE 6c(2); MIND 8b; ONE AND MANY 3b(5); OPPOSITION 4c.
• The influence of the emotions upon imagination or thought, see DESIRE 5a-5b, 6c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8c, 8d(1); OPINION 2a; TRUTH 3d(2).
• The moral problems raised by the conflict between reason and emotion, see DESIRE 6a-6b; DUTY 4-4b; LIBERTY 3a-3b; MIND 9c-9d; SIN 5; SLAVERY 7; TYRANNY 5d; VIRTUE AND VICE 5a.
• The significance of the passions in relation to law, government, and the state, see LAW 5, 6a; PUNISHMENT 1c-1d; STATE 3e-3f; and for the problem of political censorship or regulation of the arts because of their emotional influence, see ART 10b; LIBERTY 2a; POETRY 9b.
• The consideration of emotion by the orator, see RHETORIC 4b.
• Emotion in relation to artistic inspiration or expression, see ART 8; POETRY 3.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

Plutarch. “Whether the Passions of the Soul or Diseases of the Body Are Worse,” in Moralia

Epictetus. The Manual

Augustine. Of Continence

Aquinas. Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate, QQ 25-26

F. Bacon. “Of Anger,” in Essays

Descartes. The Passions of the Soul

Pascal. Discours sur les passions de l’amour

Hobbes. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, PART I, CH 12

• The Whole Art of Rhetoric, BK II, CH 1-13

Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK II, PART III

• A Dissertation on the Passions

A. Smith. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, PART I, SECT 1

Sterne. A Sentimental Journey

Goethe. Sorrows of Young Werther

Hegel. The Phenomenology of Mind, III, B (3)

Dostoevsky. Notes from Underground

C. R. Darwin. The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals

W. James. Collected Essays and Reviews, XV, XXV

Freud. The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis

II.

Cicero. Tusculan Disputations, III-IV

Ben Jonson. Every Man in His Humour

Burton. The Anatomy of Melancholy

Malebranche. De la recherche de la vérité, BK V

Shaftesbury. Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times

Hutcheson. An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections

Collins. The Passions

Voltaire. “Passions,” in A Philosophical Dictionary

T. Reid. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, III, PART III, CH 3-7

Brown. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, VOL III, pp 26-473

D. Stewart. Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man

W. Hamilton. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL II (41-46)

Comte. System of Positive Polity, VOL IV, Theory of the Future of Man, CH 2

Lotze. Microcosmos, BK V, CH 5

Bain. The Emotions and the Will

E. Hartmann. Philosophy of the Unconscious, (B) II-III

Frazer. The Golden Bough, PART VI, CH 8

Wundt. Outlines of Psychology, (12-13)

Bradley. Collected Essays, VOL II (23)

Strindberg. The Dance of Death

Titchener. Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention

Cannon. Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage

Crile. The Origin and Nature of the Emotions

Carlson. The Control of Hunger in Health and Disease

Pareto. The Mind and Society, VOL III, CH 9

Proust. Remembrance of Things Past

Jung. Psychological Types

McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, CH 41, 57

B. Russell. The Analysis of Mind, LECT 3, 14

• Skeptical Essays, VI