Chapter 19: DUTY

INTRODUCTION

LOCKE, discussing in the course of his essay on Human Understanding “why a man must keep his word,” notes that we meet with three different answers to this question. “If a Christian be asked, he will give as reason: Because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if a Hobbist be asked why? he will answer: Because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And if one of the old philosophers had been asked, he would have answered: Because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise.”

With these three answers Locke introduces us to some of the alternative views on what is perhaps the central problem concerning duty. All three acknowledge the existence of duty and the force of obligation. By accepting the question they affirm the proposition that a man must or ought to keep his word. But why? What creates the ought or obligation?

Two of the answers Locke cites—that of the Christian and that of the Hobbist—seem to derive duty from the commands of law, the law of God or of the state, in either case a law to be enforced by the sanctions of a superior power. Accordingly, the citizen has duties to the state, the religious man to God. Yet it does not seem to be entirely the case that such duties rest exclusively on the superior power of God or the state. Men who obey either divine or civil law from fear of punishment alone, are said to act not from duty but from expediency—in terms of a calculation of risks and consequences.

Obedience to law would appear to be acknowledged as a duty only by those who recognize the authority of the law or the right of the lawmaker to command. They would be willing to obey the law even if no external sanction could be enforced against them by a superior power. Those whom the law binds in conscience rather than by its coercive force obey the law because it is morally right to do so. The sense of the law’s moral authority is for them the sense of duty from which the dictates of conscience flow.

Locke’s third answer—that of the ancient philosophers—shows that duty is sometimes understood without reference to law, divine or human. We share this understanding whenever, having made a promise or contracted a debt, we feel an obligation to discharge it even if no superior commands the act. Here, furthermore, the obligation seems to be to another individual—to a person who may be our equal—rather than to the state or God.

As indicated by Locke’s statement of this ancient view, it is the honest or just man who acknowledges such obligations apart from the law or his relation to any superior. Virtue may, of course, also direct a man to act for the common welfare and to obey the laws of the state or the commandments of God. But the immediate source of the obligation to act in a certain way toward one’s fellow men is placed by the ancients, according to Locke, in “virtue, the highest perfection of human nature.” On this view, virtue alone provides the motivation. Without it men would act lawfully only because of the law’s coercive force. Without it men would recognize no obligations to their fellow men or to the state.

THESE two conceptions of duty—for the moment grouping the Christian and Hobbist answers together against the ancient view—may seem at first to be only verbally different. It seems certain that dutiful conduct would frequently be the same on either view. Yet they do conflict with one another, and each, if examined further, presents difficulties.

The theory that duty arises from a man’s own virtue receives its classic expression, as Locke intimates, in the ancient philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle. It appears in the Republic, for example, when Socrates has to meet Glaucon’s argument that men abide by moral rules, not simply because they ought to, but in order to avoid the pain of censure and punishment. Glaucon claims that, given the possession of Gyges’ ring which can render a man invisible to others, “no man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked.” He could “in all respects be like a God among men.”

Against this Socrates sets his conception of the “just man” who does what he ought to do because it is just, and because justice is essential to the very life and health of the soul. According to Socrates’ way of thinking, it is ridiculous to ask “which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust…. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meat and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice?”

On this view, it seems to be the virtue of justice which lies at the root of duty or obligation. But for Plato justice, though only one of the virtues, is inseparable from the other three—temperance, courage, and wisdom. It is almost indifferent therefore whether one attributes moral obligation to the particular virtue of justice or to virtue in general. As the chapters on JUSTICE and VIRTUE indicate, Aristotle differs from Plato, both with respect to the virtues in general and to justice in particular. For Aristotle it is justice alone, not virtue in general or any other particular virtue, which gives rise to duty or obligation.

Justice differs from the other virtues, according to Aristotle, in that it “alone of the virtues is thought to consider ‘another’s good’ because it concerns the relation of a man to his neighbor.” The other virtues, such as temperance and courage, do not give rise to obligations, unless they are somehow annexed to or united with justice. Whenever Aristotle speaks of duties he does so with reference to the obligations that follow from justice—“the duties of parents to children and those of brothers to each other … those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens.”

Whereas for Aristotle justice always refers to the good of another, or to the common good of all, such virtues as temperance and courage, when they are isolated from justice, concern the well-being of the individual himself. That is why only justice entails duties, which are obligations to act in a certain way for the welfare of others. If the good of no other individual is involved, it seems that a man has no duty to be temperate or courageous, even when he possesses these virtues.

Precisely because of the essentially social character of justice, Aristotle raises the question “whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not.” He is willing to admit that a man can do justice or injustice to himself only in a metaphorical sense. What he calls “metaphorical justice” is not a relation between a man and himself, but a relation between one part of himself and another.

Aquinas seems to follow Aristotle in connecting duty with justice and with no other virtue. “Justice alone of all the virtues,” he writes, “implies the notion of duty.” If he also intimates that duty may somehow enter into the acts of other virtues—as when he says that “it is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice”—his position still remains fundamentally Aristotelian. Referring to that “kind of metaphorical justice” to which Aristotle appeals in stating the sense in which a man can treat himself unjustly, Aquinas explains how “all the other virtues” can be said to “involve the duty of the lower powers to reason.” Apart from this metaphorical duty of the passions to obey reason, duty in the strict sense comes, in the opinion of Aquinas, only from the precepts of justice, which concern the relation of one person to another.

ON THIS THEORY, duty is not coextensive with morality, the sense of duty is not identical with the moral sense, and specific duties obligate a man to other men even when no general law exists to be obeyed. Difficulty is found with this theory by those critics who think that the whole of morality, not simply one part of it, involves duties. Does not the sense of duty operate, they ask, in matters which do not affect any other individual or even the common good? Does a man, for example, have a duty to tell the truth only to others, but not to seek it for himself? Kant, as we shall see, holds that there are private as well as public duties, or, in his language, internal duties in the realm of ethics as well as external duties in the realm of jurisprudence.

The Hobbist theory of duty seems to face similar difficulties. The specific duties which are determined by the precepts of justice may, as we have seen, not always be the same as the specific duties imposed by civil law, though they will be identical whenever the law of the state is itself an expression or determination of justice. But when law rather than justice is the principle, duty seems to consist primarily in obedience to the law or rather to the lawgiver who has superior power and authority. Only secondarily, or in consequence, does it involve obligations to other men who are one’s equals.

With Hobbes, for example, justice, and obligation as well, begin only with the establishment of a constituted authority with the power of making laws. “Where there is no Commonwealth,” he writes, “there is nothing unjust. So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants; but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them.” Duty and justice are both said to be “laws of nature,” but, Hobbes adds, they “are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience,” until “a Commonwealth is once settled,” and then they become “the commands of the Commonwealth.” In other words, “it is the Sovereign power that obliges men to obey them,” and obedience, which is said to be “part also of the law of nature,” is its proper expression.

So far the two conceptions conflict or at least diverge. But if the legal theory of duty goes no further than the enactments of the state, the same question arises here as before. Does a man have no duties apart from his relation to the state? Can duty be co-extensive with morality if the only rules of conduct to be obeyed are laws imposed from without—regulations which have authority simply because they come from one who has the right to command? Again, as we shall see, Kant would say No.

WE HAVE now stated the questions about duty which raise difficulties for Aristotle and Hobbes. Though they differ in their theories of law and justice, as well as in their conceptions of duty, they seem to concur in thinking that doing one’s duty does not exhaustively solve all moral problems.

The same questions do not, however, seem to present difficulties to other moralists—to Kant and to the Stoics of antiquity, such as Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. On the contrary, their moral philosophy, by making the sphere of duty co-extensive with the whole of the moral life, seems to prevent such questions from being raised.

As we turn to examine their conception of duty, we must observe that, in two respects, it alters Locke’s threefold division of the answers to the question, Why must a man keep his word? In the first place, Locke’s statement of the answer given by “the ancient philosophers” seems to have only Plato and Aristotle in mind, certainly not the Stoics. In the second place, Locke’s statement of the Christian position seems to associate it with the Hobbist answer, against that of Plato and Aristotle. That association may be justified on the ground that duty to God, like duty to the state, involves obligation to a superior. But Aquinas, as we have seen, seems to agree with Aristotle about justice as a source of duty; and, as we shall see, he also seems to agree with Kant and the Stoics about the pervasiveness of duty in the realm of morals. Locke’s statement of the Christian position, which selects one aspect of it only, may therefore be inadequate.

The point which unites Kant, the Stoics, and Aquinas is their agreement concerning the existence of a law which is neither enacted by the state nor proclaimed by God in his revealed commandments. This law the Stoics speak of as “the law of reason,” Aquinas calls “the natural law,” and Kant conceives to be “the moral law within.” The common conception thus variously expressed is more fully treated in the chapter on LAW; but that ampler discussion is not needed to perceive that the law of reason or of nature is a moral law, in that its general principles and detailed precepts govern the entire range of moral acts.

“Morality,” according to Kant, “consists in the reference of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible.” By this he means that “the will is never to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a universal law.” This law is also moral in the sense that it exercises only moral authority and should prevail even without the support of the external sanctions which accompany the positive commands of a superior. “The idea of duty,” Kant declares, “would alone be sufficient as a spring [of action] even if the spring were absent which is connected by forensic legislation . . . namely external compulsion.”

Making the natural or moral law the principle of duty introduces the element of obligation into every moral act. Whatever is right to do we are obliged to do in conformity to the law of nature or in obedience to the commands of the moral law. We need no external promulgation of this law—i.e., no express formulation in words by a lawgiver—for this law is inherent in reason itself. Its various maxims or precepts can be deduced from what Aquinas calls the “first principle . . . of the practical reason” and Kant “the categorical imperative.” Or, as the Stoics say, since reason is the “ruling principle” in man, man’s duty consists in “holding fast” to it and “going straight on” so that it has “what is its own.”

On this theory, we are obliged in conscience to do whatever reason declares right, whether or not others are directly involved. The distinction between public and private morality—between the spheres of justice and the other virtues—is irrelevant to conscience. Conscience, according to Kant, functions equally in the spheres of internal and external duty. In both the realm of ethics and the realm of jurisprudence, conscience, applying the moral law, dictates our duty in the particular case. We stand in no different relation to ourselves and others, since the moral law is universally and equally binding on all persons. The obligation is in every case to obey the law. It is not a duty to persons, except as the moral law commands us to respect the dignity of the human person, ourselves and others alike.

The element of a superior commanding an inferior seems to be present in this conception of duty through the relation of reason to the will and appetites of man. Acting dutifully consists in the submission of the will to reason, and in overcoming all contrary inclinations or desires. But though Kant sometimes speaks in these terms, he also conceives duty as carrying with it an obligation to God. “The subjective principle of a responsibility for one’s deeds before God,” he says, is “contained, though it be only obscurely, in every moral self-consciousness.”

Nevertheless, Kant insists that “the Christian principle of morality itself is not theological.” It rests, in his opinion, on the “autonomy of pure practical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and his will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum, on the condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the conception of duty, as that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences.”

It is “through the summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason” that, in Kant’s view of Christian morality, we pass from moral philosophy to “religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands.” A Christian theologian like Aquinas, however, seems to go further than Kant in equating conformity to the moral law—or the natural law of reason—with religious obedience to God. Nor does he explain this equivalence by reference to the fact that God has made man’s attainment of the summum bonum—or eternal happiness—depend on his free compliance with the moral law. Rather, for Aquinas, the natural law is “nothing else than the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” of God—the “imprint on us of the divine light.” As God is the author of man’s nature and reason, so is He the ultimate authority behind the commands of the natural law which He implanted in man’s reason at creation.

For a Christian theologian like Aquinas, duty to God involves obedience to the moral law which reason can discover by itself, no less than obedience to those positive commandments which God has revealed to man. Aquinas seems to think that violation of the natural law is as much a sin as violation of the divine law. Both involve a rupture of that order laid down by God, the one “in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason,” the other “in relation to the rule of the divine law.” Thus, in all moral matters, it would appear that duty is, in Wordsworth’s phrase, “stern daughter of the voice of God.” If the natural law commands us to use our faculties to the ends for which they were created, then the possession of a mind imposes upon us what Socrates in the Apology calls man’s “duty to inquire.” If we fail to seek the truth, we sin against God by sinning against our nature, even though “Thou shalt seek the truth” is nowhere explicitly prescribed in Holy Writ.

ETHICAL DOCTRINES can be classified according to the role which they assign to duty as a moral principle. There is perhaps no more fundamental issue in moral philosophy than that between the ethics of duty and the ethics of pleasure or happiness. This issue obviously belongs to the chapters on HAPPINESS and PLEASURE as well as the present one. All three must be read together—and perhaps also the chapters on DESIRE, LAW, and VIRTUE—to complete the picture.

According to the morality of duty, every act is to be judged for its obedience or disobedience to law, and the basic moral distinction is between right and wrong. But where pleasure or happiness are central, the basic distinction is between good and evil, and desire rather than law sets the standard of appraisal. An analysis of means and ends and a theory of the virtues are usually found in the ethics of happiness, as a theory of conscience and sanctions is usually prominent in the ethics of duty.

At one extreme, there is the position which totally excludes the concept of duty. This fact more than any other characterizes the Epicureanism of Lucretius. The good life for him is one where “nature craves for herself no more than this, that pain hold aloof from the body, and she in mind enjoy a feeling of pleasure exempt from care and fear.” The life he describes—so disciplined and moderated that all but the simplest pleasures are relinquished in the effort to avoid pain—seems to leave no place for obligation or social responsibility.

In the much more elaborate moral philosophy of Aristotle, virtue entails moderation in the avoidance of pain as well as in the pursuit of pleasure. Though he admits that “most pleasures might perhaps be bad without qualification,” Aristotle claims that “the chief good,” which is happiness, “would involve some pleasure.” But even as a good, pleasure is not the only good, for there are other objects of desire.

The happy man, according to Aristotle, is one who somehow succeeds in satisfying all his desires by seeking the various kinds of goods in some order and relation to one another. Happiness itself is something that “we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else.” Although we may also choose other things in some sense for themselves, such as “honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue,” still they are chosen “for the sake of happiness,” since we judge them as “the means by which we shall be happy.”

In Aristotle’s ethics of happiness, duty is not entirely excluded, but neither is it given any independent significance. As we have seen, it is merely an aspect of the virtue of justice, and amounts to no more than the just man’s acknowledgment of the debt he owes to others; or his recognition that he is under some obligation to avoid injuring other men and to serve the common good.

At the other extreme, there is the position which identifies the sense of duty with the moral sense. In the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, to live well is to do one’s duty, and to set aside all contrary desires. “It is thy duty,” the Emperor writes, “to order thy life well in every single act; and if every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be content; and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.” Man is not destined to be happy; his happiness consists rather in doing what is required of him at his post of duty in the order of the universe. The only good is a good will, a dutiful will, a will which conforms itself to the law of nature.

Kant’s much more elaborate moral philosophy presents the same fundamental teachings. This is indicated by the fact that he associates what he calls eudaemonism (i.e., the ethics of happiness) with hedonism (i.e., the ethics of pleasure). Happiness, he writes, is “a rational being’s consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence,” and its basis is “the principle of self-love.” Therefore, according to Kant, both eudaemonism and hedonism commit the same error. Both “undermine morality and destroy its sublimity, since they put the motives to virtue and to vice in the same class, and only teach us to make a better calculation.” Both admit desire as a moral criterion of good and evil. Both are utilitarian in that they are concerned with consequences, with means and ends. Both measure the moral act by reference to the end it serves.

For Kant, “an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without any regard to any object of desire. … Duty,” he goes on to say, “is the necessity of acting from respect for the law.” From this he argues that duty, and consequently all moral action, must be done because it is right, because the law commands it, and for no other reason. The recommendation of any action solely on the ground that it will contribute to happiness as satisfying the inclination of the person and achieving the object of the will, is completely ruled out. That would be a judgment of pure expediency. Worse than not moral, it is, in the opinion of Kant, immoral.

“An action done from duty,” Kant writes, “must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations. … The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will.”

This law, which is the source of duty and of all moral action, is Kant’s famous “categorical imperative”—or, in other words, reason’s unconditional command. According to its decree, Kant declares, “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” By obeying the categorical imperative, we can know and do our duty and rest assured that our will is morally good. “I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do,” Kant writes, “in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself, or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation.”

To say that a man ought to do this or refrain from doing that in order to achieve happiness is, for Kant, at best a conditional obligation, ultimately a specious one since he is not unconditionally obliged to be happy. Kant does not totally exclude happiness or the summum bonum. In fact he says that there is no need to maintain “an opposition” between them and morality. But he claims that “the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness.” Just as Aristotle treats duty only in terms of justice, so Kant considers happiness to have a moral quality only insofar as to be worthy of it is an end set by the moral law.

TWO OTHER voices join in this great argument concerning duty and happiness. One is that of John Stuart Mill, whose Utilitarianism recognizes Kant as the chief opponent of an ethics of happiness. Though Mill differs from Aristotle on many points, particularly in regard to the virtues as means to happiness, Mill’s answer to Kant can be read as a defense of Aristotle as well as of his own theory.

From Kant’s point of view, they are both utilitarians. They both argue in terms of means and ends. They both make purely pragmatic, not moral, judgments—judgments of expediency instead of judgments of right and wrong.

From Mill’s point of view, Aristotle like himself needs no other principle of morality than happiness, an ultimate end which justifies every means that tends towards its realization. “The ultimate sanction of all morality, external motives apart,” Mill writes, “is a subjective feeling in our own minds.” He asserts that “when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard,” it will appeal to “a powerful natural sentiment.” Man’s nature as a social being, he holds, “tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow-creatures.”

This conviction, in persons who have it, “does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education, or a law despotically imposed by the power of society, but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without.” This conviction, rather than an internal sense of obligation or fear of external sanctions imposed by a superior power, is for Mill “the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality”—which aims at the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

Where Mill answers Kant by excluding duty—even from considerations of justice—Aquinas seems to develop an analysis in which every moral act can be regarded as obeying or disobeying the natural law and yet, at the same time, be judged as a means which serves or fails to serve the ultimate end of man’s natural desire. “The order of the precepts of the natural law is,” in the words of Aquinas, “according to the order of natural inclinations.” The dilemma set up by the opposition between duty and happiness seems to be denied, or at least avoided, by a theory which finds a perfect parallelism between the precepts of natural law and the objects of natural desire, a parallelism resulting from their common source in the creation of human nature by God.

THE TENSION between duty and desire—between obedience to rules of conduct and unrestrained indulgence—is one of the burdens which no other animal except man must bear. It is a constant theme in the great poems. It is pivotal to the plot of most of the great love stories. It is a theme of tragedy, for in whichever direction the tension is resolved—whether in the line of duty (as by Aeneas forsaking Dido) or in disobedience to law (as by Adam yielding to Eve in Paradise Lost)—ruin results.

The tragedy of being both rational and animal seems to consist in having to choose between duty and desire rather than in making any particular choice. It may be significant, however, that the tragic heroes of poetry more frequently abandon duty than desire or love, though seldom without mortal punishment, preceded by a deep sense of their transgression. Sometimes, however, they are self-deceived, and cloak desire in the guise of duty.

There is another source of tragic conflict in the sphere of duty. Men are torn by competing loyalties, obligations which pull them in opposite directions. In the basic relationships of the family, the duty a man owes to his parents often cannot be discharged without violating or neglecting obligations to his wife. When the moral law and the law of the state command contrary actions, duty is weighed against duty in an ordeal of conscience. Sometimes, however, one obligation seems to take clear precedence over another, as in the mind of Sophocles’ Antigone, for whom the king’s edict loses its authority when it runs counter to the law of God. Creon the king, not Antigone his subject, may be the play’s more tragic personage. He sacrifices a dearly beloved son to uphold the authority he considers it his duty as a ruler to maintain.

If man is not a rational animal or if, whatever his nature, reason is not its ruling principle, then the sense of duty would appear to be an imposture that draws its driving force from the emotional energies with which certain man-made rules of conduct are invested. Rather than acting as a counterweight to desire, duty is itself the shape which certain desires take to combat others.

Conscience, or the super-ego, according to Freud, is born of the struggle between the ego and the id. Translated into “popular language,” Freud tells us, “the ego stands for reason and circumspection, while the id stands for the untamed passions.” What may originally have had a necessary function to perform in the psychic economy can grow to play too dominant a part. For the psychoanalyst, not tragedy but neurosis results from an overdeveloped sense of duty. When “the ego [is] forced to acknowledge its weakness,” Freud explains, it “breaks out into anxiety: reality anxiety in face of the external world, normal anxiety in face of the super-ego, and neurotic anxiety in face of the strength of the passions in the id.”

THE RELATION of ruler and ruled in the domestic or the political community may seem at first to impose duties or obligations only on the ruled. The ruler commands. His subjects are obliged to obey. Does the ruler in turn have no duties, no obligations to those whom he governs? If he has none, then neither have the persons he rules rights which he must respect. Such absolute rule—defined by a correlative absence of duties in the ruler and rights in the ruled—has been one conception of the relation between master and slave.

In the state rulers who are merely office-holders are obligated by the duties of their office as well as vested with its authority and power. The office-holder, duty-bound by the constitution, is not an absolute ruler. He is, in fact, a servant of the state, not its master. The mediaeval king who pledged himself in his coronation oath to discharge the duties of his office may not have been bound by human law, but so long as his conscience kept him loyal to his pledge, he recognized the supremacy of the natural law or of the law of God. The self-governing citizen of a republic is similarly duty-bound only when he recognizes the supremacy of the common good.

According to the theory of constitutional government, rights and duties are correlative. The acknowledgment of duties signifies that the holder of rights recognizes their limited or conditional character. To consider oneself entirely exempt from duties or obligations is to regard one’s rights as absolute. Can anyone have absolute rights except on condition of being without a superior of any sort? One implied answer to this question is that neither despot nor state, but only God, is autonomous or without duty.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

The concept of duty or obligation: its moral significance
Comparison of the ethics of duty with the ethics of happiness, pleasure, or utility
The divisions of duty: internal and external duty; the realms of ethics and jurisprudence
The sense of duty 4a. The moral and social development of conscience: its dictates 4b. The emotional development of conscience: its morbid manifestations
The derivation of duty from divine, natural, and civil law, and from the categorical imperative of reason
Conflicts between duties of diverse origins
The relation of duty to justice and to rights: oaths and promises
The tension between duty and instinct, desire, or love
The duties of command and obedience in family life
Political obligation: cares, functions, loyalties
Duty to God: piety and worship

REFERENCES

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Author’s Divisions. One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References. The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

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For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The concept of duty or obligation: its moral significance

7 Plato: Gorgias, 269d-270c 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK II, CH 5, 143d-144a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 1 259b,d; SECT 6 261a-c; BK IV, SECT 4 264a; BK V, SECT 6 269b-d; BK VI, SECT 22-23 276a-b; SECT 26 276b-c; BK VII, SECT 5 280a-b; BK VIII, SECT 26 287c; SECT 32 287d-288a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK IX, CH 4, 287d; BK XIX, CH 14-16, 520c-522a; CH 19 523b-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 22-30 629b-633b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 99, A 5 249a-250a; PART II-II, Q 4, A 7, REP 3 407d-409a; QQ 153-189 625a-700d passim, esp Q 183, A 1, REP 3 625a-626a, A 3 627a-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-87c; PART II, 115a-b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 7a-d; 24c-25c; 233a-b; 319b; 383c-385a; 467b-470a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 74b-76a 38 Rousseau: The Social Contract, BK I, 388d-389a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114d-115a; 149d-150a; 190c-d; 236d-237a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254d; 256a-279d esp 276b-277a; 282d-283d / Practical Reason, 305d-307d; 325a-d; 327d-329a / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 366d-367a; 368a-d; 373b-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-390a,c esp 383a-384d, 389a-390a,c; 391a-c; 392b-393a / Science of Right, 397c-398a; 416b-417b / Judgement, 571c-572a; 594c-596c esp 595a-d, 605d-606b [fn 2] 43 Mill: Liberty, 304c-306b passim / Utilitarianism, 453c-454a; 468b-469b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 133-135 47a-d; PART III, PAR 148-150 56a-57a; ADDITIONS, 84 129b; 95 132b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170d-171c; PART I, 224a; PART IV, 362c-d 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 304a; 310d-314c esp 313d-314a; 592b-c

2. Comparison of the ethics of duty with the ethics of happiness, pleasure, or utility

12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 11 150a-151b; CH 19 162c-164b; BK III, CH 24 203c-210a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 11-12 258a-c; BK VIII, SECT 10 286b; SECT 28 287c; SECT 39 288c; BK IX, SECT 1 291a-c; SECT 7 292b 18 Augustine: City of God, BK IX, CH 4-5 287a-289a; BK XIV, CH 8-9 381c-385b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 24, A 2 727d-728c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 65c-66b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 69d-76a 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 62b-68b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 336c-d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 235a-b; 236b-239a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 256a-257d; 258d-264a; 265b; 267b-d; 280d-281a; 282b-283d; 286a-c / Practical Reason, 297a-319b esp 298a-300a, 304d-307d; 325a-331a; 338c-355d esp 345d-347a / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365b-366d; 369c-373b / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 387b-388a; 389a-390a,c / Science of Right, 446b-c / Judgement, 478a-479c; 584d-587a; 588b [fn 2]; 591b-592a; 594c-596c; 605d-606b [fn 2] 43 Mill: Liberty, 296a-297b / Utilitarianism 445a-476a,c esp 457c-461c, 464d-476a,c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 124 44b-d; PAR 134-135 47b-d; ADDITIONS, 85-87 129b-d 53 James: Psychology, 813a-814a 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 800c-801b

3. The divisions of duty: internal and external duty; the realms of ethics and jurisprudence

7 Plato: Gorgias, 269d-270c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 16, A 4, REP 3 97a-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 99, A 5, ANS 249a-250a; Q 100, A 2, REP 2 252b-253a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 95d-96a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 7a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 74b-c 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [1334-1379] 368b-369b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 89d-91a; 96a-b 42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 268d-270c; 272b-273a / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics 365a-379d esp 366d, 367b-368a, 370d-372a, 374a-c, 378a / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 383a-384a,c; 386d-387a,c; 389a-390a,c; 391a-394a,c / Science of Right, 398a-399c; 400b,d-401b 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 458a-d; 468b-469b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 79 33a-c; PART II, PAR 137-141 48a-54d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170d-171c; 186b-c; PART I, 207b-c; 211a-c; 214d-216b; PART III, 290a-b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 689b,c

4. The sense of duty

5 Aeschylus: Choephoroe 70a-80d esp [1010-1047] 80a-c / Eumenides 81a-91d esp [436-666] 86a-88a 5 Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus [1-509] 114a-118d / Antigone 131a-142d / Electra 156a-169a,c / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c 5 Euripides: Hippolytus 225a-236d esp [373-430] 228b-d / Alcestis 237a-247a,c / Heracleidae 248a-257a,c esp [748-783] 254d-255a / Suppliants 258a-269a,c esp [87-597] 258d-263c / Electra 327a-339a,c / Phoenician Maidens [1625-1766] 392b-393d 6 Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, BK II, 397d-398c 7 Plato: Euthydemus, 70d-71b / Meno, 183a-b / Apology, 206b-d / Crito 213a-219a,c / Republic, BK VI, 390b-391b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 5 110b-c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK VIII, SECT 32 287d-288a 14 Plutarch: Marcus Cato 276b,d-290d esp 282a / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c esp 626d-627b, 632b-c 22 Chaucer: Knight’s Tale [859-1004] 174a-176b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 301d-303c; 467d-468b 26 Shakespeare: As You Like It, ACT II, SC III [56-65] 605a 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 86b-88b 32 Milton: Comus [170-229] 37a-38b / Paradise Lost, BK III [194-197] 139b 42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254b / Practical Reason, 325c-327d; 333a-334a / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 375a-b / Judgement, 593a-d; 599b-d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 458b-461c esp 458b-c 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 310a-314a esp 310c-d, 314a; 592b-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VII, 275a; BK X, 465c-467a; BK XII, 513d-514d; 527b-528b 53 James: Psychology, 807a-808a

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 28:1 / Ecclesiastes, 7:21-22—(D) Ecclesiastes, 7:22-23 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 17:11—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 17:10 / Ecclesiasticus, 14:2—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 14:2 NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 2:14-15 / I Corinthians, 8 / I Timothy, 4:1-2 / Titus, 1:15 5 Aeschylus: Choephoroe 70a-80d esp [1010-1076] 80a-d 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 5 257b-c; BK III, SECT 4 260b-261a; BK IV, SECT 18 264d; BK VIII, SECT 32 287d-288a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, PAR 9, 10d; BK IV, PAR 14 22d-23a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 79, AA 12-13 425c-427a; PART I-II, Q 19, AA 5-6 705d-708a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 96, A 4 233a-d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXVII [124-142] 95d-96a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 65d-66a; PART II, 149b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 16a-d; 46b-d; 174d-176a; 306d-307a; 381a-395b esp 384d-385a; 467d-468b 26 Shakespeare: 3rd Henry VI, ACT III, SC I [1-66] 78d-79c / Merchant of Venice, ACT II, SC II [1-33] 412a-b / 2nd Henry IV, ACT V, SC V 501b-502c 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT I, SC III [78-81] 35a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 74b-c; 96a-c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART III, THE AFFECTS, DEF 27, EXPL 419a-b 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 29b-33b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 7-9 105d-106d; BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 10-12 230b-231c esp SECT 12 231b-c 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 255a-266b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 57c-58a; 360d-361a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330a-331c; 343d-345c 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 306d-307d; 321b-329a esp 326b-327d / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 374c-379d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 389a-b / Judgement, 593a-d 43 Mill: Liberty, 295b-d / Utilitarianism, 458b-461c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 219a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 136-138 47d-48d; ADDITIONS, 87-89 129c-130a / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 353c-d 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 304a-305c; 310c-318c; 321b-323a; 592b-593b 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 160b-163c 53 James: Psychology, 190a-191a; 661b; 886b-888a 54 Freud: Ego and Id, 707b-708b / War and Death, 757c-759d esp 758c-d, 759b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 792b-d / New Introductory Lectures, 876b-d

4b. The emotional development of conscience: its morbid manifestations

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 17—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 17 5 Sophocles: Electra [121-633] 157b-161a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK III [1014-1023] 43a-b; BK V [1143-1160] 76a-b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 174d-176a 26 Shakespeare: Richard III, ACT I, SC IV [1-75] 114d-115b; ACT V, SC III [119-206] 144d-145d 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet 29a-72a,c esp ACT II, SC II [617-633] 46c-d, ACT III, SC I [56-90] 47c-d, SC III [36-72] 53d-54a, SC IV 54b-56d, ACT IV, SC IV [32-66] 59a-c / King Lear, ACT III, SC IV [23-36] 264c / Macbeth, ACT III, SC IV 297c-299b; ACT V, SC I 306b-307a; SC III 307c-308b 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [590-605] 352b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 54a-55a 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 306d-307d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 389a-b / Judgement, 593a-d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 458b-c 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [3776-3834] 92a-93b; [4405-4612] 110a-114b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 312d-314b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 373b-374d; BK X, 406c-410c; 416c-417b 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 160b-163c; BK XI, 319b-c; BK XII, 367c-368a 54 Freud: Narcissism, 407b-409a / General Introduction, 622c-d / Group Psychology, 689d-691c / Ego and Id, 703c-708c esp 706b-707d; 712b-717a,c esp 715d-716c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 792a-799a esp 792b-794a, 797c-799a / New Introductory Lectures, 830a-840a esp 838d-839b; 851d-852d

5. The derivation of duty from divine, natural, and civil law, and from the categorical imperative of reason

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 22:1-19 esp 22:18 / Leviticus, 19 esp 19:2, 19:36-37 / Deuteronomy, 5:22-33 esp 5:32-33; 6:17-18,24-25; 11:26-28; 12:28-32 esp 12:32 / Psalms, 17:3-4; 78:1-11; 119 esp 119:4-6, 119:33-40, 119:57-61—(D) Psalms, 16:3-4; 77:1-11; 118 esp 118:4-6, 118:33-40, 118:57-61 / Ecclesiastes, 12:13-14 / Jonah—(D) Jonas NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 7:21 / John, 5:30 5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens 1a-14a,c / Seven Against Thebes [1005-1078] 38b-39a,c / Eumenides [490-565] 86b-87a 5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [863-910] 107b-c / Antigone 131a-142d / Ajax [1316-1345] 154b-c 5 Euripides: Suppliants 258a-269a,c esp [1-41] 258a-b / Phoenician Maidens [1625-1766] 392b-393d 6 Herodotus: History, BK VI, 201d-202c 7 Plato: Apology, 206b-d / Crito, 214d-219a,c 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 16, 157c-158d 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 11 262a-b; BK IV, SECT 1 263a; SECT 4 264a; SECT 39 267a; BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 14-16, 520c-522a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 22-30 629b-633b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 63, A 1, ANS 325c-326c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 96, A 4 233a-d; Q 99, A 5 249a-250a; PART II-II, Q 4, A 7, REP 3 407d-409a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-87c; 95d-96a; PART II, 110a; 113c; 131a-c; 137b-138b; 159d-160d; 164a,c; PART III, 165a; CONCLUSION, 282a; 283c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 46b-d; 233a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK IX [647-654] 261b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 4-6 25d-26c; CH XVI, SECT 186 68d-69a; SECT 195 70a-b / Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 5-6 105a-c; SECT 12-13 107b-108c 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK I, 2a-b; BK XXIII, 187d-188a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 330a-331c; 356b-359a / The Social Contract, BK I, 388d-389a; 392b-393c; BK II, 397d-398a; 399b-c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114d-115a; 236d-237a / Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254d; 260a-261d; 268c-270c; 272a-b; 273d-287d esp 275b-d, 277d-279d, 281c-283d / Practical Reason, 297a-314d esp 307d-314d; 321b-329a / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 366a-d; 369a-c; 373d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d; 388b-c; 390b,d-391c; 392b-393a / Judgement, 571c-572a, 605d-606b [fn 2] 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445d-446d; 470a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART II, PAR 135 47b-d; ADDITIONS, 86 129c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170d-171c; 186b-c; PART IV, 362b-d

6. Conflicts between duties of diverse origins

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:18-25 esp 2:24 / Deuteronomy, 21:18-21 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 8:21-22; 12:46-50; 22:17-21 / Mark, 12:14-17 / Luke, 20:20-26 5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [333-489] 5a-7a / Seven Against Thebes 27a-39a,c / Agamemnon [184-247] 54a-c / Choephoroe [885-930] 78d-79b / Eumenides 81a-91d 5 Sophocles: Antigone 131a-142d esp [1-99] 131a-132a / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [50-122] 182d-183b 5 Euripides: Electra 327a-339a,c esp [962-987] 335d-336a / Phoenician Maidens 378a-393d / Iphigenia at Aulis 425a-439d 6 Herodotus: History, BK II, 71d-72a; BK V, 171d-172a 7 Plato: Crito, 213d-219a,c 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK IV [331-361] 176a-177a 14 Plutarch: Fabius, 152b-d / Coriolanus, 189d-191c / Timoleon, 196b-198b / Agis, 654c-655a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XIX, CH 19 523b-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 101c; 151a-c; PART III, 198d-199a; 240a-246a,c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 381a-388c esp 386a-d; 467b-470a; 486b-488b 26 Shakespeare: Richard II, ACT I, SC II [1-43] 322d-323a 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [843-902] 358a-359a 35 Locke: Toleration, 16c-17b; 18a-b 38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 369c / The Social Contract, BK IV, 435a-439c passim 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 193c-194a; 226a-b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 89b-c 42 Kant: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 392a 43 Mill: Liberty, 304c-d / Utilitarianism, 456d-457b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 145b; 211d; 224a; 542a-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 150 56c-57a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VII, 275a-276b; EPILOGUE I, 668a-669c; 670d-671a

7. The relation of duty to justice and to rights: oaths and promises

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 28:18-22; 29:15-30 / Leviticus, 5:4-13; 27 / Numbers, 6; 30 / Deuteronomy, 23:21-23 / Joshua, 2; 6:22-25; 24:1-28—(D) Josue, 2; 6:22-25; 24:1-28 / Judges, 1-2; 11:28-40 / I Samuel, 1:11-28—(D) I Kings, 1:11-28 / Psalms, 50:14; 66:13-14—(D) Psalms, 49:14; 65:13-14 / Ecclesiastes, 5:4—(D) Ecclesiastes, 5:3 / Zechariah, 8:17—(D) Zacharias, 8:17 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 29:3—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 29:3 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:33-37 / James, 5:12 4 Homer: Iliad, BK IV [153-239] 25c-26b 5 Aeschylus: Choephoroe 70a-80d 5 Sophocles: Philoctetes 182a-195a,c esp [895-1292] 190a-193c 5 Euripides: Hecuba [218-331] 354d-355c / Iphigenia at Aulis [16-140] 425b-426b 6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 90c-d; BK IV, 151a-b; 159a-b; BK VI, 197a-b; 201d-202c; BK IX, 311b-312d 6 Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, BK II, 406a-407b; BK III, 429c-434c; BK V, 490a-b 7 Plato: Apology, 209a-b / Crito, 216d-219a,c / Gorgias, 284a-285a / Republic, BK I, 297a-300b / Laws, BK XII, 787d-788c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 9 [1159b25-1160a9] 411d-412b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 14 [1375a8-11] 619c 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 7 261c 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK XII [175-215] 358b-360a 14 Plutarch: Lysander, 357a-b / Agesilaus, 484a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 16, A 4, REP 3 97a-c; Q 21, A 1, REP 3 124b-125b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 60, A 3 51c-52b; Q 99, A 5 249a-250a; Q 100, A 2, REP 2 252b-253a; A 3, REP 3 253a-d; PART II-II, Q 4, A 7, REP 3 407d-409a; Q 23, A 3, REP 1 485a-d 22 Chaucer: Knight’s Tale [1128-1176] 178b-179a / Franklin’s Tale [11,770-844] 363b-364b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 77b-c; 86c-92b; PART II, 115a-116a; 127b; 138c; 142a-d; 145a-b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 13d-14c; 381a-388c esp 383c-d, 387b-c; 467b-470a 26 Shakespeare: 2nd Henry VI, ACT V, SC I [175-190] 66d-67a / 3rd Henry VI, ACT I, SC II [1-34] 72d-73b / Titus Andronicus, ACT V, SC I [68-86] 193a / Two Gentlemen of Verona, ACT II, SC VI 239a-c / Merchant of Venice, ACT IV, SC I 425c-430b / Julius Caesar, ACT II, SC I [112-140] 575d-576a 27 Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida, ACT II, SC II [165-212] 121d-122b; ACT V, SC III [1-75] 137a-d / Coriolanus, ACT V, SC III 387a-389b / Sonnets, CII 609c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a 35 Locke: Toleration 1a-22d esp 5d-11a / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 4-6 25d-26c; SECT 14 28b-c; CH XVI 65d-70c passim, esp SECT 186 68d-69a, SECT 195 70a-b 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 55c-d 38 Rousseau: The Social Contract, BK I, 388c-391b; 392b-393c; BK II, 396d-398b 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 89d-91c; 532d-533d 42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 267d-268a; 269a-c; 272c-d / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 371b-372a / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 389c-390a,c / Science of Right, 416b-417b; 429d-430a; 432c-433c 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 7, 44a-b 43 Mill: Liberty, 302d-312a esp 305d-306b, 309c-310c; 316b-319d / Representative Government, 392b-393c / Utilitarianism, 464d-476a,c passim, esp 468b-469b, 475a-b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 78-79 32d-33c; PART III, PAR 154-155 57c; PAR 221 73b; PAR 261 83a-d; PAR 293 98b; ADDITIONS, 49 124b-c; 99 133a; 139 139b / Philosophy of History, PART I, 236a-c; PART IV, 362c-d 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [1716-1731] 41a-b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 505a-511b esp 509d-510a

8. The tension between duty and instinct, desire, or love

OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 13:6-11; 21:18-21 / Judges, 11:28-40 / Ruth, 1 / Zechariah, 13:3—(D) Zacharias, 13:3 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 12:46-50 / Acts, 21:7-15 4 Homer: Iliad, BK VI [369-502] 43d-45a 5 Aeschylus: Agamemnon [184-247] 54a-c 5 Euripides: Hippolytus 225a-236d esp [373-430] 228b-d / Iphigenia at Aulis 425a-439d 5 Aristophanes: Lysistrata 583a-599a,c esp [706-780] 592b-593b 6 Herodotus: History, BK VI, 201d-202c 6 Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, BK V, 506b-c 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK IV [1121-1140] 58d-59a 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 3 108b-c; BK II, CH 11 150a-151b; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 24 203c-210a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK VI, SECT 2 274a; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; BK VIII, SECT 32 287d-288a; SECT 39 288c 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK IV 167a-186b 14 Plutarch: Poplicola, 77d-79c / Fabius, 152b-d / Coriolanus, 189d-191c / Timoleon, 196b-198b / Agis, 654c-655a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK IX, CH 4, 287d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 5, REP 3 58b-59d; PART II-II, QQ 25-26 501a-520d; Q 31, AA 2-3 537c-539c; Q 32, A 5-Q 33, A 8 544a-558d; Q 44 592d-598c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, V 7a-8b; PURGATORY, X [70-93] 68a-b; XXX-XXXI 99b-102b 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV 88b-120a esp STANZA 76-79 98b-99a, STANZA 219 117a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, CONCLUSION, 279a-c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 197b-198b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 83a-86c; 467b-470a; 486b-488b 26 Shakespeare: Two Gentlemen of Verona 229a-253a,c esp ACT II, SC IV [192-214] 238b, SC VI 239a-c, ACT III, SC I [1-50] 240b-d / Romeo and Juliet, ACT III, SC V [66-205] 307d-309b / Richard II, ACT V, SC II [56]-SC III [146] 347a-349c / Much Ado About Nothing, ACT II, SC I [182-189] 509a-b / Julius Caesar, ACT II, SC II [11-44] 583d-584a 27 Shakespeare: Macbeth, ACT I, SC VII [1-28] 289b-c / Antony and Cleopatra 311a-350d esp ACT I, SC IV [1-33] 315d-316b / Coriolanus, ACT V, SC III 387a-389b 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART I, 120b-137d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 24b 32 Milton: Samson Agonistes [843-902] 358a-359a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 104 193a 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 4-6 25d-26c 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 77c-78b; 79d-80b 42 Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 261c-d; 262a-d; 264a; 284d-285a / Practical Reason, 306a-b; 325a-327d; 342a-b / Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367a-b / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386b 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 22, 83c-d; NUMBER 72, 217a-b; NUMBER 73, 218d-219a; NUMBER 75, 223c-d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 458d-459b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 222b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 149 56b 47 Goethe: Faust, PART I [3025-3072] 73b-74b 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 311a-314b; 318d-319a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK II, 77c-81b; 89b-d; BK III, 122b-c; BK VII, 275a-276b; 301b-302b; BK IX, 365d-366a; BK XI, 520a-521b; EPILOGUE I, 669b-c 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK IV, 95b-100c 53 James: Psychology, 807a-808a 54 Freud: General Introduction, 452c-d; 573c; 624a-625b / War and Death, 758c-759d esp 759c-d; 764c-765a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-802a,c esp 781a-d, 783c-789b, 791b-d, 793d-794a, 800c-801b / New Introductory Lectures, 853a-b

9. The duties of command and obedience in family life

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:18-25; 9:18-29 / Exodus, 20:12; 21:1-21,26-27 / Leviticus, 19:3 / Deuteronomy, 5:16; 15:12-18; 21:15-23; 22:13-30; 24:1-4,14-15; 25:5-10; 27:16,20,22-23 / Ruth / Proverbs, 20:20; 30:17 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 3:1-18; 4:30; 7:19-28; 30:1-13; 33:24-31—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 3:1-20; 4:35; 7:21-30; 30:1-13; 33:25-33 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 15:3-6 / II Corinthians, 12:14 / Ephesians, 5:22-25; 6:1-9 / Colossians, 3:18-4:1 / I Timothy, 5:8 / Titus, 2:9-11 / Philemon / I Peter, 3:1-7 4 Homer: Odyssey, BK I-II 183a-192d 5 Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus [421-460] 118a-b / Antigone 131a-142d esp [631-680] 136c-137a / Trachiniae 170a-181a,c esp [1157-1258] 180a-181a,c 5 Aristophanes: Clouds [791-885] 498b-499b; [1321-1451] 504c-506b 6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 56c; BK III, 104c-105a; BK VIII, 281c 7 Plato: Laws, BK IV, 683b-c; BK XI, 779b-781c / Seventh Letter, 803d-804a 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 9 [1159b25-1160a9] 411d-412b; CH 10 [1160b23]-CH 11 [1161a29] 413a-c / Politics, BK I, CH 12-13 453d-455a,c 14 Plutarch: Agis, 654c-655a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, PAR 3-8 9b-10d; BK XIII, PAR 47, 123d / City of God, BK XIX, CH 14-16, 520c-522a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 4 318b-321a 22 Chaucer: Tale of Man of Law [4701-4707] 239a / Wife of Bath’s Prologue [5583-6410] 256a-269b esp [5893-5914] 261a-b, [6385-6410] 269a-b / Tale of Wife of Bath [6619-6627] 273a-b / Clerk’s Tale 296a-318a esp [9053-9088] 317a-318a / Merchant’s Tale 319a-338a esp [9249-9266] 321a / Franklin’s Tale [11,041-1110] 351b-352b / Tale of Melibeus, PAR 13-16 404b-407b / Parson’s Tale, PAR 79-80, 541a-b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 109c-110b; 121a; 155b 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 219b-222b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 184a-191c; 410a-422b; 427d-430a 26 Shakespeare: Comedy of Errors, ACT II, SC I [7-43] 152a-c / Taming of the Shrew 199a-228a,c esp ACT V, SC II [136-179] 227d-228a,c / Romeo and Juliet, ACT III, SC V [127-197] 308c-309b / Midsummer-Night’s Dream, ACT I, SC I [1-121] 352a-353c / Merchant of Venice, ACT II, SC II 408b-409c / 1st Henry IV, ACT III, SC I 443b-444b 27 Shakespeare: Othello, ACT I, SC III [175-189] 210d-211a / King Lear 244a-283a,c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 75c / New Atlantis, 207b-209d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK IV [288-301] 158b-159a; [440-502] 162a-163a; [634-638] 166a; BK VIII [452-594] 242a-245a; BK X [144-156] 277b; [867-936] 293b-294b / Samson Agonistes [871-902] 358b-359a; [997-1060] 361b-362b 35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VI, SECT 52-CH VII, SECT 86 36a-44a; CH XV, SECT 169-170 64c-65a; SECT 173-174 65c-d 36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 29b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 6b-c; 21a-22d; 100b-102a; 105a-107b; 108c-110c; 120c-121a,c; 124a-125c; 126d-127b; 136b-c; 283c-d; 312c-313a; 321b-324b; 340c-341d; 359b-362c 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK V, 22d-23a; BK XXIII, 187b,d-189d; BK XXV, 216a-b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 357a-b; 364d-365b / Political Economy, 367a-368c / The Social Contract, BK I, 387d-388a 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 82b-84a, 86b-d 42 Kant: Science of Right, 404d; 419a-422d esp 419b-c, 420a-d; 445c-446a 43 Mill: Liberty, 317c-318a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 174 61b; ADDITIONS, 111 134d-135a / Philosophy of History, PART I, 211c-213a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 249b-d; 267c-d; BK VI-VII, 271c-276b; BK VIII, 291a-292b; 301b-302d; BK VIII, 305b-307a 54 Freud: Interpretation of Dreams, 244a-c / New Introductory Lectures, 876c

10. Political obligation: cares, functions, loyalties

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:13-17 / Leviticus, 19:9-20,32-37; 25:14-55 / Numbers, 35 / Deuteronomy, 5:17-21; 15; 17:8-20; 19; 22:1-4; 23:15-25; 24:10-13; 27:17-19,24-25 / Proverbs, 3:27-28; 16:10-15; 28:15-18; 29:2,4,12,14 / Jeremiah, 29:7—(D) Jeremias, 29:7 / Zechariah, 8:16-17—(D) Zacharias, 8:16-17 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:21-24; 22:17-21 / Mark, 12:14-17 / Luke, 20:20-26 / Romans, 13:1-7 / Titus, 3:1 / I Peter, 2:13-19 4 Homer: Iliad, BK IX [1-172] 57a-58d 5 Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes [1-77] 27a-28a 5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [1-77] 99a-d / Antigone [631-680] 136c-137a / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c 5 Euripides: Suppliants [297-331] 261a-b / Iphigenia at Aulis [1368-1401] 437c-d 6 Herodotus: History, BK VII, 223c-d; 239a-c 6 Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, BK I, 355b-c; 359b-360c; 370d; 378c-d; BK II, 395d-399a; 402b-c; 403b-c; 406a-407b; BK III, 430c; 432c-d; BK VI, 513a; BK VIII, 555d-556a 7 Plato: Apology, 206a-d / Crito 213a-219a,c esp 216d-219a,c / Republic, BK IV, 342a-d; 344a; BK VII, 390b-391b; 401a-b / Seventh Letter, 802b-804b; 814b-c 9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 17 [1391b20-26] 638c-d 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 23 128c-d; BK III, CH 22 195a-201a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK III, SECT 4 260b-261a; BK IX, SECT 42 295c-296a,c 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK III [90-98] 149b; BK IV [189-278] 172a-174b; BK VI [845-853] 233b-234a 14 Plutarch: Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 45a-c, 48a-b / Numa Pompilius, 51c-52b / Solon, 71d / Marcus Cato 276b,d-290d esp 282a / Crassus-Nicias, 455d-456d / Agesilaus, 480b,d-481a; 486d-487b / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c esp 626d-627b, 632b-c / Cleomenes, 659d-660a / Galba, 859a-b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK II, 32b-d / Histories, BK I, 211c-212b; BK II, 234b-235a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, PAR 15 17a-b / City of God, BK XIX, CH 6 514b-515a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 13, A 5, REP 3 675c-676b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 61, A 5, REP 3 58b-59d; Q 96, AA 4-6 233a-235d; Q 105, AA 1-3 307d-318b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, VI [76-151] 61c-62c 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH IX-X 14c-16d passim; CH XIV 21b-22a; CH XVII, 24a-b; CH XVIII, 25a-b; CH XXI, 32d-33a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-96b; PART II, 101a-104d; 110b-117b; 132b-136b; 138c-d; 143c-d; 152d-160a; 164a,c; PART III, 165a; 199b-204a; 245c-246a,c; PART IV, 270c-d; 273b-c; CONCLUSION 279a-283a,c 24 Rabelais: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 127b,d-130a; 131b,d-133b 25 Montaigne: Essays, 7a-d; 24c-25c; 48a-51a passim; 67c-d; 303a-c; 381a-388c esp 383c-d, 386b-d; 486b-488b 26 Shakespeare: Richard II, ACT V, SC II [71]-SC III [146] 347a-349c / 1st Henry IV, ACT I, SC III [218-240] 437c-d; ACT III, SC II [93-161] 453d-454c / 2nd Henry IV, ACT IV, SC V 494b-496d; ACT V, SC II [35-145] 498b-499b; SC V [60-75] 502a / Henry V, ACT IV, SC I [123-301] 552d-554c 27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT IV, SC III 366a-369a; ACT V, SC III [93-209] 388a-389b / Henry VIII, ACT I, SC I [18-102] 552d-553d 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 331a-336a; 340b-343a; 345a-348c; 352b-356d; 360d-364a; 366d-369b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 1a-2c; 24b; 74b-75a 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 51, SCHOL 439d 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK II [430-456] 120b-121a / Samson Agonistes [843-902] 358a-359a 35 Locke: Toleration, 3a; 16c-18c / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 4-6 25d-26c; CH VI, SECT 57-63 36d-38c; CH VIII, SECT 96-98 47a-c; SECT 113-122 51b-53c; CH IX, SECT 128-131 54b-d; CH XI, SECT 134-135 55b-56b; CH XII, SECT 143 58c-d; CH XIII-XIX 59b-81d passim 36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 75b 38 Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws, BK III, 12d-13c; BK XI, 68b,d-75a; BK XII, 93c-95b 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 356b-359a; 366c-d / Political Economy 367a-385a,c passim, esp 369c, 370b-373b, 377b-c / The Social Contract, BK I, 388c-391b; 392b-393c; BK II, 396d-398b; BK III, 414d; 419a; 421c-423a; BK IV, 427b 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 303b-304c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 130b-d; 242c-246c passim; 288b-289a; 292b-d; 338d-339c; 342a-c; 577c-d; 630d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 102d-103a; 504c-505a 42 Kant: Science of Right, 433a-b; 438d-439a; 457a-458a,c 43 Declaration of Independence: 1a-3b passim 43 Articles of Confederation: 5a-9d passim 43 Constitution of the U.S.: 11a-20a,c passim 43 The Federalist: NUMBER 40, 130c-132a; NUMBER 44, 147a-b; NUMBER 62, 190a-b; NUMBER 65 198a-200c passim; NUMBER 70, 212c-213c; NUMBER 75, 223c-d; NUMBER 76, 225d-226b; NUMBER 85, 256d-257a 43 Mill: Liberty, 272b-c; 290d-291a; 302d-303a; 317c-319d / Representative Government, 348c; 350a; 355b-362c; 392b-393c; 401a-406a; 410a-d; 436b-c; 439b-c 44 Boswell: Johnson, 145b; 247c-d; 355b-d; 379b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 290-296 97d-99b; PAR 299 99c-100b; PAR 309-311 103b-104a; PAR 324 107a-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 171b-c; PART I, 211b-214d; PART IV, 342c-d; 365b-c 47 Goethe: Faust, PART II [10,252-259] 249b-250a; [10,455-500] 254b-255b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK II, 89b-d; BK V, 206d-207a; 232a-234a esp 233b-234a; BK IX, 365d-366a; BK XI, 475b-476c; EPILOGUE I, 668a-669c; 670d-671a 54 Freud: War and Death, 757b-c

11. Duty to God: piety and worship

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:2-5; 8:18-22; 12:7-8; 13:1-4; 22:1-19 esp 22:18; 28:18-22 / Exodus, 12-13; 35-40 / Leviticus passim, esp 1-7, 16, 23 / Numbers, 9:1-14; 19 / Deuteronomy, 6; 8; 10-12; 23:21-23 / Joshua, 22:1-6; 24:14-28—(D) Josue, 22:1-6; 24:14-28 / Judges, 11:28-40 / I Samuel, 15:10-35—(D) I Kings, 15:10-35 / III Kings, 12:1-16—(D) IV Kings, 12:1-16 / I Chronicles, 16:29—(D) I Paralipomenon, 16:29 / II Chronicles, 1-7; 29-31—(D) II Paralipomenon, 1-7; 29-31 / Ezra—(D) I Esdras / Nehemiah—(D) II Esdras / Psalms passim / Ecclesiastes, 5:2-7; 12:13—(D) Ecclesiastes, 5:1-6; 12:13 / Isaiah, 1:11-20—(D) Isaias, 1:11-20 / Daniel, 9 / Micah, 6:8—(D) Micheas, 6:8 APOCRYPHA: Tobit, 4:5-11,19; 12:8-10—(D) OT, Tobias, 4:6-12,20; 12:8-10 / Judith, 4; 8-9—(D) OT, Judith, 4; 8-9 / Ecclesiasticus, 18:22-24; 35:4-12—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:22-24; 35:6-15 / Baruch, 1; 4:1-3—(D) OT, Baruch, 1; 4:1-3 / Bel and the Dragon, 2-28—(D) OT, Daniel, 14:1-27 / I Maccabees, 4:38-61—(D) OT, I Machabees, 4:38-61 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 4:1-11; 5:33-36; 6:1-8,16-18; 7:21; 18:23-35; 22:21,34-40 / Mark, 12:28-34 / Luke, 2:21-24; 4:1-13; 9:23-26,57-62; 10:25-42; 17:7-10; 18:1-14; 20:25 / Acts, 5:17-32; 20:22-24 / Romans, 12-13 / Ephesians, 4 esp 4:17-32 / Colossians, 3 / I Timothy, 2:1-8 / II Timothy / James, 5:13-18 / I John esp 2:3-11, 2:15, 3:23, 4:7-5:5 / II John 4 Homer: Iliad, BK I [206-222] 5b; BK IX [485-514] 62a-b; BK XXIV [424-431] 175d / Odyssey, BK XIII [125-184] 256b-257a 5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens 1a-14a,c esp [600-709] 8d-10b / Agamemnon [369-398] 56a-b / Eumenides [490-565] 86b-87a 5 Sophocles: Oedipus the King [863-910] 107b-c / Oedipus at Colonus [461-509] 118b-d / Antigone 131a-142d esp [441-470] 134d-135a, [1347-1353] 142d / Ajax [748-779] 149c-d; [1316-1421] 154b-155a,c / Electra [1058-1097] 164d-165a / Philoctetes [1440-1444] 195a,c 5 Euripides: Suppliants 258a-269a,c esp [1-41] 258a-b, [513-563] 262d-263b / Electra [167-212] 328c-d / Bacchantes 340a-352a,c / Hecuba [799-805] 359d 5 Aristophanes: Birds 542a-563d esp [1170-1266] 557b-558b 6 Herodotus: History, BK V, 171d-172a; BK VI, 201d-202c; BK VIII, 282b-c; BK IX, 308a-c 7 Plato: Euthyphro 191a-199a,c / Apology, 206b-d / Timaeus, 447a / Laws, BK IV, 682d-683b; BK X, 769c-771b 8 Aristotle: Topics, BK I, CH 11 [105a2-6] 148c 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK VII, CH 9 [1329a26-34] 533d 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK VI [56-79] 81a-b 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 16 121d-122d; CH 27, 132c-133a; BK II, CH 16, 158b-d; BK III, CH 24 203c-210a; BK IV, CH 3 224b-d; CH 12 242d-244a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK I, SECT 17 255d-256d; BK II, SECT 13 258c; BK V, SECT 7 269d; BK IX, SECT 1 291a-c; SECT 40 295b 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK V [42-103] 188a-190a 14 Plutarch: Aemilius Paulus, 214b-d 15 Tacitus: Histories, BK IV, 282d-283b 16 Kepler: The Harmonies of the World, 1011a 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, PAR 4 2a; BK II, PAR 15 17a-b / City of God, BK VII, CH 27-31 259c-262a; BK X, CH 1-7 298b,d-303a; CH 16 308b-309c; CH 19 310d-311b; BK XIX, CH 14-16, 520c-522a; CH 19 523b-d / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 10 627b; CH 22-30 629b-633b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 63, A 1, ANS 325c-326c; PART I-II, Q 19, A 5, REP 1-2 705d-707a; A 6, ANS and REP 2 707a-708a; Q 21, A 4 719d-720a,c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, AA 4-5 210c-212c; Q 96, A 4 233a-d; QQ 98-108 239b-337d; PART II-II, Q 4, A 7, REP 3 407d-409a; Q 16 454c-456d; Q 22 480d-482c; Q 44 592d-598c; QQ 183-189 625a-700d; PART III, Q 25 839c-845a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XII [103-129] 73a-b; XVII [82]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; XXX-XXXI 99b-102b; PARADISE, III [1]-V [87] 109b-113a passim; VII [25-33] 115c; [64-102] 115d-116a; XXVI [115-117] 147a 22 Chaucer: Second Nun’s Tale [15,829-16,021] 468a-471b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 80c; PART II, 137b-138b; PART II-III, 159d-167b; PART III, 177c-180d; 198a-207b; 240a-246a,c; PART IV, 261d-262a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 152b-156d; 233a-b 26 Shakespeare: Richard II, ACT I, SC II [1-41] 322d-323a 27 Shakespeare: Henry VIII, ACT III, SC II [435-457] 573c-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a; 100d-101a 31 Descartes: Meditations, 69b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART V, PROP 41 462d-463b 32 Milton: Sonnets, XVI 66b-67a / Paradise Lost 93a-333a esp BK I [242-283] 98b-99b, BK IV [411-439] 161b-162a, [720-739] 168a-b, BK V [136-210] 178a-179b, [506-543] 186a-187a, BK VII [449-518] 227a-228b, BK VIII [311-333] 239a-b, [630-643] 246a, BK IX [647-654] 261b, BK XI [133-161] 302a-b, BK XII [386-410] 327b-328a / Samson Agonistes [1334-1409] 368b-370a / Areopagitica, 402a-b 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b / Pensées, 476 256b-257a; 482 258a; 489,491 259a; 539 265b 35 Locke: Toleration, 2a-b; 3b-4a; 10d-11a; 15d-16a; 16c-17b / Civil Government, CH II, SECT 6 26b-c; CH VI, SECT 56 36d 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 255a-268a 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 187d-188a 38 Rousseau: The Social Contract, BK IV, 435a-439c passim 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81d-82b; 180c-182c esp 181b-c; 184d-185d; 191a-194a passim; 226a-b; 291d-292d; 350b-d; 533b-d; 593b,d-599a passim, esp 593b,d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 226c-227b; 232c-233c; 259b-260a 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 325a-327d; 345c-d / Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, 383b,d-384a,c / Judgement, 502d-503a; 504b-505a; 509a-c; 593a-d; 611a-c 43 Mill: Liberty, 296b-d; 310d-311a 44 Boswell: Johnson, 84b-c; 262b 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART I, 225b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 30a-36b; 39a-b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 50b-c; BK III, 122b-c; BK V, 218b-220a; BK VI, 271c-d; 273c-274a,c; BK XI, 476c-480a 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK IV, 83c-84a; BK V, 127b-137c; BK VI, 164a-165a; 167b-170b

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

Other discussions of the issue between the ethics of duty and the ethics of happiness or pleasure, see HAPPINESS 3; PLEASURE AND PAIN 6-6a, 8b.
Matters relevant to this issue, see DESIRE 2b, 3a; GOOD AND EVIL 3a-3b(2); JUSTICE 1e-1f, 4; LAW 3a(1), 4-4a, 4c-4d; TEMPERANCE 3; VIRTUE AND VICE 1d, 6a; WILL 8b(2), 8c-8d.
Other treatments of conscience, both psychological and ethical, see HONOR 2a; PUNISHMENT 5c; SIN 5; TEMPERANCE 3.
The consideration of duty in relation to law, justice, and rights, see GOD 3d; JUSTICE 1e, 3, 11b; LAW 2, 4a, 4c-4d, 6a; RELIGION 2; WILL 8d.
The conflict between duty and desire or love, see DESIRE 6a-6b; LOVE 3c.
The treatment of specific duties, domestic, political, and religious, see CITIZEN 4; FAMILY 6d; GOD 3d; JUSTICE 11b; RELIGION 2; STATE 8a; TRUTH 8e.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

Epictetus. The Manual
Hobbes. Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, CH 13
Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK III, PART II, SECT VII-X
Fielding. Amelia
A. Smith. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, PART III
Kant. Lectures on Ethics, pp 13-47, 116-25
—. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
Dostoevsky. Crime and Punishment

II.

Cicero. De Finibus (On the Supreme Good)
—. De Officiis (On Duties)
Seneca. Moral Essays
Maimonides. Eight Chapters on Ethics
Boccaccio. Patient Griselda
Beaumont and Fletcher. The Maid’s Tragedy
Sanderson. De Obligatione Conscientiae (On the Obligations of Conscience)
Corneille. Le Cid
—. Horace
—. Polyeucte
J. Taylor. Of Holy Living
—. Ductor Dubitantium
Racine. Andromaque
Baxter. Chapters from A Christian Directory
Pufendorf. De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem (Of the Duties of Man and of the Citizen According to Natural Law)
J. Butler. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, II, X, XII
T. Reid. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, III, PART II, CH 5-8
D. Stewart. Outlines of Moral Philosophy, PART II, CH 2
J. G. Fichte. The Vocation of Man, PART III
Wordsworth. Ode to Duty
Bentham. Deontology
Whewell. The Elements of Morality, BK II, CH 5-12; BK V, CH 2, 10-17
Mazzini. The Duties of Man
Maurice. The Conscience
P. A. Janet. The Theory of Morals, BK I, CH 2
H. Sidgwick. The Methods of Ethics, BK II, CH 5; BK III, CH 2
Bradley. Ethical Studies, IV-V
T. H. Green. The Principles of Political Obligation, (A)
Guyau. Esquisse d’une morale sans obligation ni sanction
Nietzsche. The Genealogy of Morals, II
Brentano. The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, PAR 1-13
Spencer. The Principles of Ethics, VOL I, PART IV, CH 9-29; PART V-VI
Dewey. “The Idea of Obligation,” in Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
—. The Study of Ethics, CH 7-8
Bosanquet. Science and Philosophy, 16
Croce. The Philosophy of the Practical, PART I, SECT I; PART II, SECT I (IV); SECT II (I); PART III (IV)
Royce. The Philosophy of Loyalty
Moore. Principia Ethica, CH 4
—. Ethics, CH 4-5
Prichard. Duty and Interest
N. Hartmann. Ethics, VOL I, Moral Phenomena, SECT 4-6
Kirk. Conscience and Its Problems
Ross. The Right and the Good, I-II, VII
Bergson. Two Sources of Morality and Religion, CH I
Muirhead. Rule and End in Morals

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