Chapter 17: DESIRE

INTRODUCTION

In Darwin, Mill, James, and Freud, at the modern end of the great tradition, the word “desire” primarily signifies a cause of animal and human behavior. It is one of the basic terms in psychological analysis, covering that whole range of phenomena which are also referred to by such terms as wanting, needing, craving, wishing, willing, all of which are discussed in connection with theories of instinct and emotion, libido and love, motivation and purpose.

If we turn to traditional beginnings, to the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and Plotinus, we find that the psychological consideration of desire is part of a much larger context. The ancients are, of course, concerned with the role of desire in causing animal or human behavior, and with the causes of such desire, but they are also interested in cravings which seem to be present in plants as well as animals. Plato, for example, attributes to plants “feelings of pleasure and pain and the desires which accompany them.” The vegetative activities of nutrition, growth, and reproduction seem to spring from basic appetites—or, in modern phraseology, “biological needs”—inherent in all living matter.

Because hunger and thirst so readily symbolize the essence of desire (or certainly represent its most general manifestation in living things), the words “appetite” and “desire” are frequently used as synonyms in the earlier phase of the tradition. As Hobbes observes, when he proposes to use “appetite” and “desire” as synonyms, desire is “the general name,” and appetite is “oftentimes restrained to signify the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst.” So, too, Spinoza says that “there is no difference between appetite and desire,” yet he adds, “unless in this particular, that desire is generally related to men in so far as they are conscious of their appetites, and it may therefore be defined as appetite of which we are conscious.”

Spinoza here seems to be reflecting the distinction made by earlier writers between natural appetite and conscious desire, which we today would, perhaps, express in terms of “need” and “wish.” The ancient conception of tendencies inherent in all things—inanimate as well as living—which seek a natural fulfillment broadens the meaning of appetite or desire. When Aristotle says that “each thing seeks its own perfection” and that “nature does nothing in vain,” he is thinking of non-living as well as living bodies. Wherever in the physical world things seem to have a natural tendency to move in a certain direction or to change in a certain way, there appetite, belonging to the very nature of the moving thing, operates as a cause. Adopting this view, Dante declares that “neither Creator nor creature was ever without love, either natural or of the mind”; and in his Convivio he shows how each thing has its “specific love.” The love, or desire, of the elements is their “innate affinity to their proper place”; minerals desire “the place where their generation is ordained” with the result that “the magnet ever receives power from the direction of its generation.”

According to this view it is possible to speak of the natural desire of raindrops to fall or of smoke to rise. Such a manner of speaking may at first seem metaphorical—an expression of primitive animism or anthropomorphism—but the ancients, observing different natural tendencies in heavy and light bodies, mean this literally.

The sense of such statements is no different from what is meant when it is said that the sunflower, without consciousness, naturally tends to turn toward the sun, or that all men by nature desire to know.

From its narrowest meaning with reference to the behavior of animals and men, desire gains a wider connotation when it is conceived as covering the appetites found in living organisms. But in its broadest significance, it refers to the innate tendency inherent in matter itself. As we shall presently see, appetite, desire, or tendency is seated in matter according to that conception of matter which identifies it with potentiality or potential being. These considerations are more fully treated in the chapters on BEING, CHANGE, and MATTER, but their significance for the notion of desire can be briefly indicated here.

Plotinus suggests the basic insight when he describes matter as “in beggardom, striving as it were by violence to acquire, and always disappointed.” Matter is that in natural things which is the reason for their motion and change. Considering natural change, Aristotle names what he thinks are its three principles. In addition to “something divine, good, and desirable,” he writes, “we hold that there are two other principles, the one contrary to it, the other such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it.” These are respectively form, privation, and matter. The relation between matter and form is expressed by Aristotle in terms of desire. “The form cannot desire itself,” he says, “for it is not defective; nor can the contrary desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The truth is that what desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male.”

Conceived most generally as natural appetite or tendency, desire becomes a physical or metaphysical term. “Natural appetite,” says Aquinas, “is that inclination which each thing has of its own nature.” The significance of desire in this sense extends, far beyond psychological phenomena, to all things in motion under the impetus or inclination of their own natures, rather than moved violently by forces impressed on them from without.

In ancient physics every natural tendency has an end or fulfillment in which the motion governed by that tendency comes to rest. Eros and telos—desire and end—are complementary concepts, each implying the other as principles of physics, i.e., as factors operating together throughout nature in the order of change. The telos of each thing is the perfection which satisfies the tendency of its nature. That nature does nothing in vain means simply that no natural desire—need or appetite—exists without the possibility of fulfillment.

Considering the design of the universe and the relation of creatures to God, theologians like Augustine and Aquinas use the concept of desire in both its psychological and its metaphysical sense.

Considered metaphysically, desire can be present only in finite beings, for to be finite is to be in want of some perfection. Hence desire can in no way enter into the immutable, infinite, and perfect being of God. In desire, Aquinas points out, “a certain imperfection is implied,” namely, the lack “of the good which we have not.” Since God is perfect, desire cannot be attributed to Him, “except metaphorically.” Love, however, implies perfection rather than imperfection, since it flows from the act of the will “to diffuse its own goodness among others.” For that reason, although the infinite perfection of God precludes desire, it does not preclude love.

The theologian goes beyond the metaphysician or physicist when he carries the analysis of desire to the supernatural plane. As God is the supernatural efficient cause of all created things, so God is also the supernatural final cause—the end or ultimate good toward which all creatures tend. The metaphysical maxim that each thing seeks its own perfection is then transformed. “All things,” Aquinas writes, “by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being… . Of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.”

The existence in the creature of a desire for God raises difficult questions concerning the manner in which this desire is fulfilled. A supernatural end cannot be attained by purely natural means, i.e., without God’s help. The vision of God in which the souls of the blessed come to rest is, according to the theologian, the ultimate gift of grace. Hence, in man’s case at least, it becomes necessary to ask whether he can have a purely natural desire to see God if the goal of such desire cannot be achieved by purely natural means.

The question is not whether men to whom God has revealed the promise of ultimate glory can consciously desire the beatific vision. Clearly that is possible, though to sustain such desire the theological virtue of hope, inseparable from faith and charity, may be required. Rather the question is whether the beatific vision which is man’s supernatural end can be the object of natural desire. On this the theologians appear to be less clearly decided.

Aquinas holds that “neither man, nor any creature, can attain final happiness by his natural powers.” Yet he also seems to maintain that man has a natural desire for the perfect happiness of eternal life. “The object of the will, i.e., of man’s appetite,” he writes, “is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is the universal truth.” Man’s natural desire to know the truth—not just some truths but the whole truth, the infinite truth—would seem to require the vision of God for its fulfillment. Aquinas argues similarly from the will’s natural desire for the infinite good. “Naught can lull man’s will,” he writes, “save the universal good . . . to be found not in any creature, but in God alone.” Some writers find this confirmed in the fact that whatever good a man sets his heart upon he pursues to infinity. No finite amount of pleasure or power or wealth seems to satisfy him. He always wants more. But there is no end to wanting more of such things. The infinity of such desires must result in frustration. Only God, says the theologian, only an infinite being, can satisfy man’s infinite craving for all the good there is.

Seeing man’s restlessness, no matter where he turns to find rest, Augustine declares: “Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee.” Pascal reaches the same conclusion when he considers the ennui of men which results from the desperation of their unending search. “Their error,” he writes, “does not lie in seeking excitement, if they seek it only as a diversion; the evil is that they seek it as if the possession of the objects of their quest would make them really happy.” With regard to the frantic pursuit of diversions, he claims that “both the censurers and the censured do not understand man’s true nature” and the “misery of man without God.” In such restlessness and vain seeking, the theologian sees evidence of man’s natural desire to be with God.

Admitting the same facts, the skeptics interpret the infinity of man’s desire as a craving to be God. If this is not every man’s desire, it is certainly Satan’s in Paradise Lost. Skeptic or believer, every man understands the question which Goethe and Dante among the great poets make their central theme. At what moment, amid man’s striving and restlessness, will the soul gladly cry, “Ah, linger on, thou art so fair?” Confident that there can be no such moment, Faust makes that the basis of his wager with Mephistopheles.

The two poets appear to give opposite answers to the question. Faust finds surcease in an earthly vision of progressive endeavor. Heavenly rest comes to the soul of Dante at the very moment it relinquishes its quest, winning peace through surrender.

In the broadest or theological sense of the word, God alone does not desire. In the narrowest or psychological sense, only animals and men do. The contrast of meanings is useful. Natural appetite or tendency throws light on the nature of conscious desire.

In order to “determine the nature and seat of desire,” Socrates in the Philebus considers such things as “hunger, thirst, and the like” as “in the class of desires.” He points out that “when we say ‘a man thirsts,’ we mean to say that he ‘is empty.’ ” It is not drink he desires, but replenishment by drink, which is a change of state. This insight Socrates generalizes by saying that “he who is empty desires … the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full.” In the Symposium, using the words “love” and “desire” as if they were interchangeable, Socrates declares that “he who desires something is in want of something” and “love is of something which a man wants and has not.”

In the psychological sphere, desire and love are often identified—at least verbally. The one word is frequently substituted for the other. Here the fact already noted, that God loves but does not desire, suggests the root of the distinction between desire and love. Desire always involves some lack or privation to be remedied by a change; whereas love, certainly requited love, implies the kind of satisfaction which abhors change. Love and desire are, of course, frequently mixed, but this does not affect their essential difference as tendencies. They are as different as giving and getting. Love aims at the well-being of the beloved, while desire seeks to enjoy a pleasure or possess a good.

Not all writers, however, contrast the generosity of love with the acquisitiveness of desire. Locke, for example, finds self-interest and self-seeking in both. The meaning of love, he observes, is known to anyone who reflects “upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him. … For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them, or in spring when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him.” The meaning of desire is, in Locke’s opinion, closely related. It consists in “the uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it.” We desire, in short, the things we love but do not possess.

The distinction between love and desire, the question whether they are distinct in animals as well as in men, and their relation to one another when they are distinct, are matters more fully discussed in the chapter on LOVE. It is enough to observe here that when writers use the two words interchangeably, they use both words to signify wanting and seeking.

In the case of animals and men, the thing wanted is an object of conscious desire only if it is something known. In addition to being known as an object of science is known, it must also be deemed good or pleasant—in other words, worth having. For Locke, desire, as we have seen, is no more than “an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good,” which is measured in terms of pleasure and pain. “What has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil.” That which we consciously desire, that which we judge to be desirable, would thus be something we regard as good for us, while the “bad” or “evil” would be that which we seek to avoid as somehow injurious rather than beneficial to us.

There is no question that desire and aversion are psychologically connected with estimations of good and evil or pleasure and pain. This is the case no matter how we answer the moralist’s question, Do we desire something because it is good, or do we call it “good” simply because we desire it? The ethical significance of the question, and of the opposite answers to it, is discussed in the chapter on GOOD AND EVIL.

The metaphysical conception of natural desire provides terms for the psychological analysis of conscious desire and its object. Viewed as belonging to the very nature of a thing, appetite, according to Aristotle, consists in the tendency toward “something we do not have” and “which we need.” Both factors are essential—the privation and the capacity, or potentiality, for having what is lacked. Privation in the strict sense is always correlative to potentiality.

The writers who use these terms would not speak of the sunflower being deprived of wisdom, even as they would not call a stone blind. Blindness is the deprivation of sight in things which have by nature a capacity to see. So when it is said that man by nature desires to know, or that certain animals, instinctively gregarious, naturally tend to associate with one another in herds or societies, the potentiality of knowledge or social life is indicated; and precisely because of these potentialities, ignorance and solitariness are considered privations.

We observe here two different conditions of appetite or desire. As the opposite of privation is possession—or of lacking, having—so the opposite states of appetite are the drive toward the unpossessed and satisfaction in possession. We do not strive for that which we have, unless it be to retain our possession of it against loss; and we do not feel satisfied until we get that which we have been seeking.

“If a man being strong desired to be strong,” says Socrates in the Symposium, “or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is.” This would be a misconception which we must avoid. To anyone who says “I desire to have simply what I have,” Socrates thinks we should reply: “You, my friend, having wealth and health and strength, want to have the continuance of them… . When you say, ‘I desire that which I have and nothing else,’ is not your meaning that you want to have in the future what you now have?” This “is equivalent to saying that a man desires something which is for him non-existent, and which he has not got”; from which Socrates draws the conclusion that everyone “desires that which he has not already, which is future and not present … and of which he is in want.”

The object of desire—natural or conscious—thus seems to be an altered condition in the desirer, the result of union with the object desired. Man’s natural desire to know impels him to learn. Every act of learning which satisfies this natural desire consists in a changed condition of his mind, a change which both Plato and Aristotle describe as a motion from ignorance to knowledge.

When we consciously desire food, it is not the edible thing as such we seek, but rather the eating of it. Only the eating of it will quiet our desire, with that change in our condition we call “nourishment.” That the edible thing is only incidentally the object of our desire may be seen in the fact that no way in which we can possess food, other than eating it, satisfies hunger.

The distinction between natural and conscious desire is complicated by other closely related distinctions which psychologists have made. Freud, for example, distinguishes between conscious and unconscious desire; Darwin separates instinctive from learned desires; and James observes how a conscious desire may become habitual and operate almost automatically, without our awareness of either its object or its action.

Part of the complication is verbal and can be removed by referring to natural desires as non-conscious rather than un-conscious. The word “conscious” literally means with knowledge. Creatures which lack the faculty of knowing cannot desire consciously. It does not follow, however, that sentient or conscious beings cannot have natural appetites. Man’s natural desire to know is a case in point. That natural human tendency is not excluded by the fact that many men also consciously seek knowledge, knowing what knowledge is and considering it something worth having.

The instinctive desires of animals are not generally thought to operate apart from the perception of the object toward which the animal is emotionally impelled. The instinctive desire works consciously, both on the side of perception and on the side of the emotionally felt impulse. If, because it is innate rather than learned, or acquired through experience, we call the instinctive desire “natural,” it is well to remember that we are not here using the word to signify lack of consciousness. Yet both instinctive and acquired desires may operate unconsciously.

What Freud means by a repressed desire illustrates this point. The repressed desire, whether instinctual in origin or the result of some acquired fixation of the libido on object or ego, would be a conscious tendency if it were not repressed. Freud compares the process of repression to the efforts of a man to get from one room to another past the guard of a doorkeeper. “The excitations in the unconscious… to begin with, remain unconscious. When they have pressed forward to the threshold and been turned back by the door-keeper, they are ‘incapable of becoming conscious’; we call them then repressed… . Being repressed, when applied to any single impulse, means being unable to pass out of the unconscious system because of the door-keeper’s refusal of admittance into the preconscious.”

The repressed desire is made to operate unconsciously by being repressed, which does not prevent it from influencing our conduct or thought, but only from intruding its driving force and its goal upon our attention. In contrast, the desire which works habitually and therefore to some extent unconsciously, is not repressed, but merely one which no longer demands our full attention.

Desire and emotion are often identified in our description of the behavior of animals and men. Sometimes, however, desire along with aversion is treated as just one of the emotions, and sometimes all the emotions are treated as manifestations of just one type of conscious appetite, namely, animal as opposed to rational desire.

The appetitive or driving aspect of emotions is indicated by William James in his analysis of instinctive behavior. The functioning of an instinct may be viewed, according to James, as a train of psychological events of “general reflex type… called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animal’s body, or at a distance in his environment,” arousing “emotional excitements which go with them.” The emotional part of the instinctive behavior is at once an impulse to perform certain acts and the feeling which accompanies the acts performed. The sheep, instinctively recognizing the wolf as dangerous, fears and flees. It runs away because it is afraid and feels fear in the act of flight. When, in his theory of the emotions, James goes so far as to say that the feeling of fear results from running away, he does not mean to deny that the emotion of fear involves the impulse to flee.

In its aspect as impulse—or tendency to act—an emotion is a desire, consciously aroused by sense-perceptions and accompanied by conscious feelings. This conception of emotion has been variously expressed in the tradition of the great books. Aquinas, for example, calls all the emotions or passions “movements of the sensitive appetite.” But he also uses the words “desire” and “aversion” along with “love” and “hate,” “anger” and “fear” to name specific emotions.

Hobbes recognizes the appetitive tendency which is common to all the emotions when he finds at their root what he calls “endeavor”—“those small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions. … This endeavor,” he goes on to say, “when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE or DESIRE.” Spinoza makes the same point in somewhat different terms. “Desire,” he writes, “is the essence itself or nature of a person in so far as this nature is conceived from its given constitution as determined towards any action… . As his nature is constituted in this or that way, so must his desire vary and the nature of one desire differ from another, just as the affects from which each desire arises differ. There are as many kinds of desire, therefore, as there are kinds of joy, sorrow, love, etc., and in consequence… as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected.”

Those psychologists who find in man two distinct faculties of knowledge—the senses and the reason or intellect—also find in him two distinct faculties of appetite or desire. The distinction is perhaps most sharply made by Aristotle and Aquinas, who claim that “there must be one appetite tending towards the universal good, which belongs to reason, and another with a tendency towards the particular good, which appetite belongs to sense.” The traditional name for the intellectual appetite, or the faculty of rational desire, is “will.” In Spinoza’s vocabulary, the effort of desire, “when it is related to the mind alone, is called WILL, but when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is called APPETITE.”

Psychologists who attribute these diverse modes of desire, as they attribute sensation and thought, to a single faculty called “mind” or “understanding,” nevertheless deal with the whole range of appetitive phenomena, including both the animal passions and acts of will. James, for example, treats the instinctive acts associated with the emotions as “automatic and reflex” movements, and separates them from “voluntary movements which, being desired and intended beforehand, are done with full prevision of what they are to be.” In so doing, he draws a line between emotional impulses and acts of will, even though he does not distinguish two appetitive faculties.

With or without the distinction in faculties, almost all observers of human experience and conduct seem to agree upon a distinction in types of conscious desire, at least insofar as they recognize the ever-present conflict between the passions and the will. These matters are more fully considered in the chapters on EMOTION and WILL.

The role of desire in human life—especially emotional desire—is so intimately connected with problems of good and evil, virtue, duty, and happiness, that until quite recently the subject was discussed mainly in books on ethics, politics, or rhetoric rather than psychology. Even Freud, who tries to separate psychological description and explanation from moral principles or conclusions, cannot avoid treating the effects of morality upon the dynamics of desire and the life of the passions. Many of the fundamental terms of psychoanalysis—conflict, repression, rationalization, sublimation, to name only some—carry the connotation of moral issues, even though they imply a purely psychological resolution of them.

Contrary to a popular misconception, Freud expressly declares that “it is out of the question that part of the analytic treatment should consist of advice to ‘live freely.’” The conflict “between libidinal desires and sexual repression,” he explains, is “not resolved by helping one side to win a victory over the other.” Although Freud thinks that “what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth,” he also declares that “we must beware of overestimating the importance of abstinence in effecting neurosis.”

What Freud calls emotional infantilism resembles to some degree what a moralist like Aristotle calls self-indulgence or incontinence. To give vent to all the promptings of desire, without regard to the demands of society or reality is to revert to infancy—a state characterized, according to Freud, by “the irreconcilability of its wishes with reality.” Because children “live at the beck and call of appetite, and it is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest,” Aristotle thinks it fitting that we should speak of self-indulgence when it occurs in an adult as a “childish fault.”

Aristotle and Freud seem to be looking at the same facts of human nature and seeing them in the same light. What Freud describes as the conflict between the “pleasure-principle” and the “reality-principle,” Aristotle—and with him Spinoza—treats as a conflict between the passions and the reason, and Kant conceives in terms of the opposition between desire and duty. What Freud says of the reality-principle—that it “demands and enforces the postponement of satisfaction, the renunciation of manifold possibilities, and the temporary endurance of pain”—parallels traditional statements concerning the role of reason or of duty in the moral life. Where the moralists speak of the necessity for regulating or moderating emotional desires, Freud refers to the need of “domesticating” them, as one would train a beast to serve the ends of human life.

The implication, in Aristotle and Spinoza as well as in Freud, does not seem to be that man’s animal appetites are in themselves bad, but that, if they are undisciplined or uncontrolled, they cause disorder in the individual life and in society. Some moralists, however, take an opposite view. For them desire is intrinsically evil, a factor of discontent, and fraught with pain.

“While what we crave is wanting,” Lucretius writes, “it seems to transcend all the rest; then, when it has been gotten, we crave something else”; yet as often as a man gains something new, he discovers afresh that “he is not better off.” Either our desires are unsatisfied, and then we suffer the agony of frustration; or they are satiated and so are we—desperate with ennui. Hence, freedom from all desires, not just their moderation, seems to be recommended for peace of mind; as centuries later Schopenhauer recommended the negation of the will to live in order to avoid frustration or boredom.

Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics, and later Kant, similarly urge us “not to yield to the persuasions of the body … and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses or of the appetites.” But whereas the Stoics would restrain desire “because it is animal” and in order to avoid pain, Kant argues that the renunciation of desire should be undertaken “not merely in accordance with duty … but from duty, which must be the true end of all moral cultivation.”

The opposition between these two views of desire in the moral life represents one of the major issues in ethical theory, further discussed in the chapters on DUTY and VIRTUE. The doctrine of natural appetite is crucially relevant to the issue. If the naturalist in ethics is right, he is so by virtue of the truth that natural tendencies are everywhere the measure of good and evil. If, however, there is no truth in the doctrine of natural desire, then the impulses which spring from man’s animal passions can claim no authority in the court of reason.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. Desire and the order of change: eros and telos
2. The analysis of desire or appetite
   • 2a. The roots of desire in need, privation, or potency: the instinctual sources of the libido
   • 2b. The objects of desire: the good and the pleasant
   • 2c. Desire as a cause of action: motivation or purpose; voluntariness
   • 2d. The satisfaction of desire: possession and enjoyment
3. The modes of desire or appetite
   • 3a. Natural appetite: desires determined by nature or instinct
   • 3b. Desires determined by knowledge or judgment
     • (1) The distinction between sensitive and rational desire: emotional tendencies and acts of the will
     • (2) Conscious and unconscious desires: habitual desire
   • 3c. Desire and love: their distinction and connection
   • 3d. Desire and aversion as emotional opposites
4. The economy of desire in human life
   • 4a. The conflict of desires with one another
   • 4b. The attachment of desires: fixations, projections, identifications, transferences
   • 4c. The focusing of desires: emotional complexes
   • 4d. The discharge of desires: catharsis and sublimation
5. Desire as ruler
   • 5a. Desire ruling imagination: daydreaming and fantasy
   • 5b. Desire ruling thought: rationalization and wishful thinking
   • 5c. Desire ruling action: the unchecked expression of desires; incontinence
6. Desire as subject to rule
   • 6a. The regulation of desire by reason: the discipline of moral virtue or duty
   • 6b. The restraint or renunciation of desire: abstention, inhibition, repression
   • 6c. The results of repression: dreaming, symbolic over-reactions, neuroses
7. Desire and infinity
   • 7a. The infinite tendency of desires
     • (1) The pursuit of pleasure
     • (2) The lust for power
     • (3) The accumulation of wealth
   • 7b. The restless search for the infinite: the desire for the vision of God

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference. Line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. Desire and the order of change: eros and telos

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 103c-d / Symposium, 165c-166b / Phaedo, 241b-242b 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a16-24] 268b-c; BK II, CH 8-9 275d-278a,c; BK VIII, CH 4 [255b30-b31] 340a-c / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 6 [333b35-334a9] 434b-435a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [984b8]-CH 4 [985a28] 502d-503c; CH 7 [988a6-16] 506c-d; BK IX, CH 8 [1050a3-6] 575d-576b; BK XII, CH 5 [1070b36-1071a4] 600b-c; CH 7 [1072a20-b3] 602b-d; CH 10 [1075a1-10] 606b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 6 202d-203a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [1-61] 1a-d; [1022-1037] 13c-d; [1052-1082] 14a-c; BK II [167-183] 17a-b; [1048-1066] 28b-c; BK IV [823-857] 55a-b; BK V [156-194] 63a-c; [416-431] 66c-d; [509-533] 67d-68a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR V 100c-106b / Fourth Ennead, TR I, CH 18-21 166d-168c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 1, 1a; BK IV, par 15-17 23a-c / City of God, BK XII, CH 4-5 344b-345b; BK XIX, CH 12-14 517b-520d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QQ 5-6 23b-30d passim; QQ 19-20 108d-124a passim; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a; Q 48, A 1, ANS and REP 4 259b-260c; QQ 59-60 306b-314c passim; Q 62, A 1, ANS 317d-318c; Q 104, A 3, REP 1 537b-d; Q 105, A 4, ANS 541c-542a; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2 610b-611b; A 8 615a-c; Q 2, A 5, REP 3 618d-619c; Q 26, A 1, ANS and REP 3 734a-d; Q 27, A 3, ANS and REP 3-4 738c-739c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50a; 61a-c; PART IV, 271d 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK II, 38a-d 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 426d-427a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 73a-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PREF 422b,d-424a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72, 184b; 75 185b-186a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 29-41 184d-188c 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 293d [fn 3]; 304b-d; 315b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-386d / Judgement, 465c-466c esp 466b,d [fn 1]; 483d-484b; 577c-578a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 161d-168b esp 162a-163d, 164c, 165b-c 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 40c-42a; 96b-98a,c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-7a esp 4b-5a 54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle 639a-663d esp 651d-654c, 662c-663d / Ego and Id, 708d-712a esp 711c-712a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 790a-791d; 799a-800a / New Introductory Lectures, 849c-851d

2. The analysis of desire or appetite

2a. The roots of desire in need, privation, or potency: the instinctual sources of the libido

7 PLATO: Lysis, 24a-c / Symposium, 162a-166b / Republic, BK IV, 352b-d / Philebus, 621c-622b 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a16-24] 268b-c 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [581a21-b22] 107a-b / Parts of Animals, BK III, CH 14 [675a25-30] 205b / Ethics, BK III, CH 11 [1118b8-18] 365a-b / Rhetoric, BK II, CH 13 [1389b32-35] 637b 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 6 202d-203a; CH 8 205a-207b; CH 13, 211d-212d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [858-876] 55b-c; BK V [156-173] 63a-b 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR V, CH 1 100c-101c; CH 10 105d-106b / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 18-21 166d-168c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 1-6 1a-2c; BK III, par 1 13b-c; par 10 15b-d; BK IV, par 15-19 23a-24b; BK V, par 1-2 27a-c; BK VII, par 16-23 48c-50c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 3, REP 3 25a-d; Q 19, A 1, REP 2 108d-109c; Q 59, A 2, ANS 307c-308b; Q 81, A 2 429c-430c; PART I-II, Q 27, A 3, ANS and REP 3-4 738c-739c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; XX [124]-XXI [75] 84c-85d passim; PARADISE, I [103-120] 107b-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-d 27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT III, SC IV [263-274] 261c 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c; 349a-350a; 402a-d 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, VI, 97d-98a; 99d-102d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 2-7 425a-426b 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 100 191a-192b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 6 177a-b; CH XXI, SECT 30-35 185a-186d esp SECT 31 185c-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 346b 43 MILL: Liberty, 295b-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 190-195 66a-67a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XII, 577a-578b esp 577d-578a; BK XIV, 605b-d; BK XV, 630c-631c; EPILOGUE I, 665a-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 51a-b; 767a 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363c-d / Narcissism, 400c-402c / Instincts, 412c-413a; 414a-d / General Introduction, 574a; 580a-d; 591d-592b; 615b-616b, 618d-619a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 654a-c; 657d-659a / Group Psychology, 673b-c / Ego and Id, 710c-711b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 789c-791c esp 791a / New Introductory Lectures, 846a-851d esp 846a-847b, 849b-851c

2b. The objects of desire: the good and the pleasant

7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 69a-71a / Phaedrus, 120a-122a / Symposium, 161d-166b / Meno, 177d-178b / Gorgias, 262a-264b; 275b-280d / Republic, BK II, 310c-d; BK IV, 351b-352d; BK IX, 422c-425b esp 423b-424d / Philebus, 614a / Laws, BK V, 689c-690c; BK VI, 712b; BK VIII, 735c-736c 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK II, CH 3 [110b38-111a6] 155d; BK III, CH 1-4 162a-166b; BK VI, CH 8 [146a37-b19] 200b-c; [146b36-147a11] 200d-201a / Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a16-24] 268b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b12-27] 500d-501a; [983a14-21] 501b-c; BK XII, CH 7 [1072a23-b3] 602b-d / Soul, BK II, CH 3 [414b28-b5] 644c; BK III, CH 7 [431a1-12] 663c-664b; CH 10 [433a3-19] 665d-666c 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [589a3-10] 115b / Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 17 [661a6-8] 188a / Motion of Animals, CH 6 [700b23-30] 236a / Ethics, BK I, CH 1 [1094a1-3] 339a; CH 2 [1094a17-22] 339b; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; BK VII, CH 11-14 403c-406a,c; BK X, CH 2 426c-427b; CH 3 [1174a4-11] 428b; CH 4 [1175a10-22] 429c; CH 5 [1175b24-33] 430b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 6-7 602d-607d; CH 10 [1369b1-4] 612b; CH 11 [1370a17-28] 613c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-61] 15a-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 4 108d-110a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VI 21a-26a passim / Third Ennead, TR V 100c-106b / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 35, 177d-178a / Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH 12 234a-d / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 30 336b-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 9-18 10d-13a; BK X, par 29-33 78d-80b / City of God, BK XII, CH 6 345b-346c; BK XIX, CH 1 507a-509a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 3-4 625b-c; CH 22-30 629b-633b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, QQ 5-6 23b-30d passim; Q 16, A 1, ANS 94b-95c; A 4 97a-c; QQ 19-20 108d-124a passim; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a; Q 48, A 1, ANS and REP 4 259b-260c; QQ 59-60 306b-314c passim, esp Q 60, AA 3-5 311d-314c; Q 62, A 1, ANS 317d-318c; Q 63, A 4 328b-329a; QQ 80-83 427a-440b passim; Q 104, A 3, REP 1 537b-d; Q 105, A 4, ANS 541c-542a; Q 106, A 2, ANS 546d-547c; PART I-II, QQ 1-5 609a-643d passim; Q 8 655a-657c; Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-722c; A 3, REP 2 722d-723b; Q 23 723c-727a; Q 26, A 1, ANS and REP 3 734a-d; Q 27 737a-740a; Q 30 749a-752b passim; Q 33, A 2 766a-767a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; PART III SUPPL, Q 98, A 3 1074a-c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; PARADISE, V [1-12] 112a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-62c; 76c-77b; 96a; PART IV, 272c 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 381d-382a 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 73a-74a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 50b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 4-13 398d-400d; PROP 39, SCHOL 408b-d; PROP 56 414a-d; THE AFFECTS, DEF 1-3 416b-417a; PART IV, DEF 1-2 424a; PROP 9-13 426d-428a; PROP 19-28 429d-431c; PROP 63 443d-444a; PROP 65-66 444b-d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 81 186b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 3 104b-d; BK II, CH VII, SECT 3 131d-132a; CH XX, SECT 6 177a-b; CH XXI, SECT 29-48 184d-190d passim, esp SECT 31 185c-d, SECT 42 188c; SECT 55-56 192c-193b; SECT 61-62 194b-d; SECT 70 197a-b; SECT 73 198c-199c 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265b / Practical Reason, 298a-300d; 315c-317b; 330c-331a; 341c-342a / Judgement, 605d-606b [fn 2] 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-450b; 461c-464d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 123-124 44a-d / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 319b-320a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1194-1216] 29b-30a; PART II [11559-586] 281b-282a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-b; 316a-317a; 592d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 524c-527a; BK XII, 560a-561c; BK XIII, 577a-578b esp 577d-578a; BK XIV, 605b-d; BK XV, 630c-631c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 198b-211a; 808b-814b esp 812b-813a 54 FREUD: Instincts, 414a-b; 418d-420b esp 420a-b / General Introduction, 592c-593a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639a-640c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 772a-b

2c. Desire as a cause of action: motivation or purpose; voluntariness

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 95a-b / Symposium, 163a-166b / Republic, BK IV, 352d-353b / Timaeus, 474b-d / Laws, BK VI, 712b; BK IX, 751b-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK II, CH 2 [994b9-16] 512d-513a; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b23-25] 547d; BK IX, CH 5 [1047b35-1048a24] 573b-c; CH 7 [1049a5-12] 574c-d / Soul, BK III, CH 7 [431a8-12] 663c-664b; CH 9-11 664d-667a 9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 6-11 235d-239d esp CH 6 235d-236b, CH 10 238c-239a / Ethics, BK III, CH 1 355b,d-357b esp [1111a21-a3] 357a-b; CH 12 365d-366a,c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b / Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1267a3-8] 462c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 611c-613a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [251-293] 18b-d; BK IV [877-906] 55d-56a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR V, CH 10 105d-106b / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 18-21 166d-168c / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 4 344b-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 25 25c; BK VIII, par 19-27 58b-60c / City of God, BK XI, CH 6 345b-346c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14, A 8, ANS and REP 1 82c-83b; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 4 111c-112c; Q 41, A 2 218c-219d; Q 57, A 4, REP 3 298a-299a; Q 59, A 1, REP 3 306c-307b; Q 75, A 3, REP 3 380c-381b; Q 78, A 1, ANS and REP 4 407b-409a; Q 80, A 2, REP 3 428a-d; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; PART I-II, Q 1, AA 1-6 609b-614c; Q 6 644a-651c; QQ 16-17 684a-693d; Q 22, A 2, REP 2 721c-722c; Q 28, A 6 744b-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-75] 80a-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a; 61a-c; 64a-c; 76c; PART II, 112d-113c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 60b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, THE AFFECTS, DEF 1 416b-d; PART IV, DEF 7 424b; PROP 19 429d; PROP 59 442b-d 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 24b-26b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 3 104b-d; SECT 13 107d-108c; BK II, CH XX, SECT 6 177a-b; CH XXI, SECT 29-48 184d-190d passim, esp SECT 33 186a; SECT 73 198c-199c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338c-339b 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 262a-c; 271c-d; 279b; 282d-283d / Practical Reason, 293d [fn 3]; 298d-300a; 303b-304b; 341c-342a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-386d 43 MILL: Representative Government, 346c-348c / Utilitarianism, 461c-464d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 11 15a-b; par 17 16c; PART II, par 123 44a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 162a-c; 164b-166b 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-314c passim; 316a-317a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 4a-7a; 8a-9a; 13a-15a; 51a-b; 767a-768a; 788a-799b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363b-364d; 377c-378b / Instincts, 412c-413a; 418d-419a / General Introduction, 453b-476a,c passim, esp 469a-470c, 473b-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 768b-c

2d. The satisfaction of desire: possession and enjoyment

7 PLATO: Symposium, 162b-c / Gorgias, 275b-276b / Republic, BK IX, 421a-425b / Philebus, 620a-b 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, CH 8 [146a13-19] 200c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 10-11 364b-365d; BK X, CH 4-5 428b-430d esp CH 4 [1175a10-22] 429c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [1003-1010] 43a; BK IV [1073-1120] 58a-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 2-4 9b-d; BK IV, par 15 23a-b; BK VI, par 9-10 37c-38b; par 26 42d-43a; BK VIII, par 6-8 54c-55a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 3-4 625b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 6, ANS and REP 2 27c-28b; PART I-II, Q 1, AA 7-8 614c-615c; Q 2, A 6 619d-620d; Q 3, A 4 625a-626b; Q 4, AA 1-2 629d-631a; Q 5, A 8, REP 3 642d-643d; Q 11 666b,d-669b; Q 27, A 3, ANS 738c-739c; Q 30, A 4, REP 3 751c-752b; QQ 31-34 752b-772b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, QQ 28-29 527b-533a; PART III SUPPL, Q 69, A 4, ANS 889c-890c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-39] 80a-b; PARADISE, III [34-90] 109d-110b; XXXII [52-72] 155b-c; XXXIII [46-48] 156c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 76c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP 32 406b-c; PROP 35-36 406d-407c; PROP 39, SCHOL 408b-d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 109 193b-194a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 346b 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 298a-300a; 341c-342a / Judgement, 470a-471b 43 MILL: Representative Government, 347b-348b / Utilitarianism, 448d-449c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 45 23c-d; par 59 27a-b; PART II, par 124 44b-d; PART III, par 154 57c; par 182 64a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165b-166a 47 GOETHE: Faust esp PART I [2605-3216] 63b-79a, PART II [9192-9573] 223b-232a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 308a-309d passim; 312b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 725b-726a; 812a-813b 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363c-d; 377c-d / Instincts, 412d-413a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 663a / Ego and Id, 711d-712a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773b-d

3. The modes of desire or appetite

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 9 [432b5-7] 665a 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370a17-27] 613c 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 4-5 108c-109d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 29-33 78d-80b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 1, REP 2 28b-d; Q 19, A 1, ANS 108d-109c; Q 59, A 1, ANS 306c-307b; Q 78, A 1, REP 3 407b-409a; Q 80 427a-428d; PART I-II, Q 5, A 8, REP 3 642d-643d; Q 8, A 1, ANS 655b-656a; Q 26, A 1 734a-d 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c esp XVII [91-96] 79b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-62a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 9 399b-c; PROP 56-57 414a-415b; THE AFFECTS, DEF 1 416b-d; PART IV, PROP 59 442b-d; APPENDIX, I-III 447a-b; PART V, PROP 4, SCHOL 453b-d 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 119a-b / Descent of Man, 287d-289a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a-17b esp 8a-9a, 13a-15a; 47b-52b esp 49b-50a, 51a-52a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 591d-593b / War and Death, 757d-759d esp 758d-759a

3a. Natural appetite: desires determined by nature or instinct

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120b-c / Symposium, 165b-c / Republic, BK II, 311b-312b / Timaeus, 474b-d / Philebus, 621c-622b / Laws, BK VI, 712b 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a16-24] 268b-c; BK VIII, CH 4 [255b30-b31] 340a-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1 [980a22-28] 499a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK V, CH 8 [542a17-b4] 68d-69a; BK VI, CH 18-BK VII, CH 2 97b-108c passim, esp BK VI, CH 18 97b-99c, BK VII, CH 1 106b,d-108a; BK VIII, CH 1 [589a4-9] 115b / Ethics, BK III, CH 11 [1118b8-18] 365a-b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370a18-25] 613c; BK II, CH 7 [1385b21-25] 631d 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 6 202d-203a; CH 8 205a-207b; CH 13, 211d-212d 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK II [1-61] 15a-d; BK IV [858-876] 55b-c; [1037-1057] 57d 15 TACITUS: Histories, BK II, 224d-225a 17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR V 100c-106b / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 28, 157a-b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 1, REP 2 28b-d; Q 12, A 1, ANS 50c-51c; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 19, A 1, ANS 108d-109c; A 4 111c-112c; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a; Q 59, A 1, ANS 306c-307b; Q 60 310a-314c; Q 62, A 1, ANS 317d-318c; Q 63, A 3 327b-328b; Q 75, A 6, ANS 383c-384c; Q 78, A 1, REP 3 407b-409a; Q 80, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3 427b-428a; Q 82, A 1 431d-432c; PART I-II, Q 5, A 8 642d-643d; Q 8, A 1, ANS 655b-656a; Q 10, A 2 663d-664d; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 673c-674c; Q 26, A 1, ANS and REP 3 734a-d; A 2, ANS 734d-735c; Q 27, A 2, REP 3 737d-738c; Q 30, AA 3-4 750d-752b; Q 34, A 1, REP 2 768c-769d; Q 36, AA 1-2 780c-782b; Q 40, A 3 794c-795a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94, A 2, ANS and REP 2 221d-223a; Q 109, A 3 340c-341b; PART III SUPPL, Q 93, A 1, ANS 1037d-1039a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; XX [124]-XXI [75] 84c-85d passim; PARADISE, I [103-120] 107b-c 22 CHAUCER: Manicple’s Tale [17104-144] 490a-b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 50a; 61a-d; 76c-d; PART IV, 271d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 224d-225a; 489b-d 28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c; 349a-350a; 402a-d; 405c-406a; 476c-477a 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 60b / Meditations, VI, 97d-98a; 99d-103d / Objections and Replies, 124b; 156a-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, 395a-d; PROP 7 399a; PART IV, PROP 19 429d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 81 186b / Geometrical Demonstration, 440b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 3 104b-d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 3 405b-c 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338c-339b; 346b 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 130b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 11 15a-b: ADDITIONS, 121 136c-d 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 119a / Descent of Man, 287d-289a; 304a-313a passim, esp 304b,d [fn 5], 307d-309d, 310c-311b; 371c-372c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 198b-199a; 204b-211a esp 205b-206a, 209a-b; 700a-737a esp 700a-701a, 712b-737a; 799a-b; 890b-892a esp 891b [fn 1] 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 18d-19a / Interpretation of Dreams, 363c-d / Narcissism, 400c-402c esp 401b-c / Instincts, 414b-421c passim, esp 414c-415d / General Introduction, 569c-576d esp 574a-d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-654c; 658b-659d / War and Death, 758a-759a; 764d-765a / Civilization and Its Discontents, 787a-788d esp 787a-c; 789b-791d / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-d; 846a-851d esp 846a-847b; 883b-c

3b. Desires determined by knowledge or judgment

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 59a-62d / Phaedrus, 120b-c / Philebus, 621c-622b 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK VI, CH 8 [146b36-147a11] 200d-201a / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 7 [1072a26-30] 602b / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [413b19-24] 643d; CH 3 [414b28-b16] 644c-d; BK III, CH 3 [427b21-24] 660a; CH 7 [431a8-12] 663c-664b 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 3 [1113a3-13] 359a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 11 [1370a17-28] 613c 17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 28, 157a-b; TR IV, CH 20, 168a-b / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 2-4 343c-344d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 29-33 78d-80b / City of God, BK XIV, CH 6 380b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 78, A 1, REP 3 407b-409a; QQ 80-83 427a-440b; PART I-II, Q 27, A 2 737d-738c; Q 40, A 2 793a-794c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61c-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 50b / Meditations, III, 82d-83a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, AXIOM 3 373d; PART IV, PROP 59 442b-d; PROP 61-62 443a-d; APPENDIX, III 447b; PART V, PROP 4, SCHOL 453b-d 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338c-339b 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265b esp 265b,d [fn 1] 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310c-313a passim, esp 312a-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a-15a; 51a-52a; 729b-730a 54 FREUD: General Introduction, 501d-504b; 593a / War and Death, 758a-759a

3b(1) The distinction between sensitive and rational desire: emotional tendencies and acts of the will

7 PLATO: Republic, BK IX, 421a-425b 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 5 573a-c; BK XII, CH 7 [1072a27-29] 602b / Soul, BK III, CH 7 [431a8-b12] 663c-664b; CH 9 [432b5-7] 665a; CH 10 [433a5-13] 666b; CH 10 [433b27]-CH 11 [434a22] 666c-667a / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453a15-31] 695b-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1368b28-1369a4] 612a-b; CH 11 [1370a17-28] 613c 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VI 21a-26a passim / Third Ennead, TR V, CH 1 100c-101c; TR VI, CH 4-5 108c-109d / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 28 172a-173b / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 2-4 343c-344d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A 1, ANS 108d-109c; Q 59, A 1, ANS and REP 1 306c-307b; Q 79, A 1, REP 2 414a-d; Q 80, A 2 428a-d; Q 82, A 2, REP 3 432d-433c; A 5 435c-436c; Q 106, A 2, REP 3 546d-547c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 6, A 2 646a-c; Q 11, A 2 667b-d; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 673c-674c; Q 15, A 2 682a-c; Q 16, A 2 684d-685b; Q 17, A 2 687d-688b; Q 22, A 3 722d-723b; Q 24, A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 26, A 1, ANS 734a-d; Q 30, A 1 749a-d; A 3 750d-751c; Q 31, AA 3-4 754a-755c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 18, A 2 811d-812b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-75] 80a-c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 63a; 64a-c; PART II, 162c 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 50b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 48, SCHOL 391b-c; PART III, PROP 9, SCHOL 399c; PROP 58-59 415c-416b; THE AFFECTS, DEF 1, EXPL 416c-d; PART V, PROP 32 460b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 30 185a-c 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265b esp 265b,d [fn 1]; 271c-d; 279b; 282d-283b; 284d-285a / Practical Reason, 301a-c; 303b-304b; 314d-317c; 330c-331a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386b / Judgement, 483d-484b; 605d-606b [fn 2] 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 463c-464d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 19 16d-17a; par 25-26 18a-c; PART II, par 139 48d-49b; PART III, par 194 66c-d; ADDITIONS, 121 136c-d; 131 137d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 163a-164a; PART IV, 362b-c 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 310c-314c; 592d-593a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 8a-9a; 13a-15a; 767b-768a; 790a-799b passim, esp 794a-798b 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 110c / Interpretation of Dreams, 377c-380d esp 377c-378b, 379d-380b / General Introduction, 501d-504b; 590a-593b; 607d-608c; 615b-616c / Ego and Id, 702c / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-838d; 843d-844b

3b(2) Conscious and unconscious desires: habitual desire

7 PLATO: Republic, BK IX, 416a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK II, CH 1 348b,d-349b; CH 5 351b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VIII, par 10-11 55c-56b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 87, A 2 466c-467b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 6, REP 3 614a-c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3 8b-9a; A 5 10b-d; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; A 6 34b-35a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 9, SCHOL 399c; THE AFFECTS, DEF 1, EXPL 416c-d 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 262a-c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385c-386b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 463d-464d 49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 119a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK X, 407c-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 8b-9a; 90b-93a passim; 788a-792a 54 FREUD: Hysteria, 110b-c / Interpretation of Dreams, 357b-358c; 363b-365c esp 364; 369a-b; 377b-387a,c passim, esp 386d-387a / Unconscious, 428a-443d esp 428a, 429d-430b, 432c-433d, 436b-437c / General Introduction, 452a-c; 453b-476a,c esp 468a-469c, 473c-d; 501d-503d esp 503b-c; 531d-532b; 599d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 643d-646a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a

3c. Desire and love: their distinction and connection

5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia at Aulis [543-589] 429d-430a 7 PLATO: Lysis, 20c-d; 23d-24d / Phaedrus, 115a-129d esp 120b-c, 123b-124a / Symposium, 164c-165b / Laws, BK VIII, 735c-736c 8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 22 [68a25-7] 89d-90a / Topics, BK VI, CH 7 [146a9-12] 199d; BK VII, CH 1 [152a6-9] 207c 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 11 [1118b8-18] 365a-b; BK VIII, CH 1-8 406b,d-411d passim; CH 13-14 414d-416d; BK IX, CH 1 416b,d-417c passim; CH 5 420a-c; CH 8 421d-423a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1037-1062] 57d-58a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 24 203c-210a 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR V, CH 7-TR VI, CH 9 20a-26a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 1-BK III, par 1 9a-13c / City of God, BK XIV, CH 7 380c-381c / Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 10, 661d-662a 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A 1, REP 2 108d-109c; A 2, ANS 109c-110b; Q 20, A 1, ANS and REP 2 120a-121b; A 2, REP 3 121b-122a; Q 60, A 3, ANS 311d-312b; PART I-II, Q 2, A 1, REP 3 615d-616c; Q 23, A 2 724c-725c; A 4 726a-727a; Q 25, A 2 731b-732a; A 3, ANS 732a-733a; Q 26 733d-737a; Q 27, AA 3-4 738c-740a; Q 28, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 740b-741a; A 2, ANS 741a-742a; A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 742a-d; A 4 742d-743c; Q 30, A 2 749d-750d; Q 32, A 3, REP 3 760d-761c; A 8, ANS 764c-765b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 62, A 3, ANS and REP 3 61c-62b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XV [40-81] 75d-76a; XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61c; 63a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 83d-84a; 398c-399d; 424d-425a; 473a-b 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT I, SC I [308-321] 107d-108a 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 79d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, THE AFFECTS, DEF 6 417b-c; PART IV, APPENDIX, I-II 447a-b; XIX-XX 449a 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 4-6 176d-177b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 345c-346b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 204b-209b passim 54 FREUD: Narcissism, 404d-406b; 409b-411a,c / Instincts, 420a-421a / General Introduction, 581b; 617c-618a / Group Psychology, 673b-674a; 679a-b; 681c-683a; 693a-694b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 783b-c / New Introductory Lectures, 847d-848a

3d. Desire and aversion as emotional opposites

7 PLATO: Republic, BK IV, 352d-353a 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 7 [431a8-b9] 663c-664a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 2 [1139a21-31] 387d-388a; BK X, CH 2 [1173a5-13] 427a-b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIV, CH 6 380b-c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 23, A 2 724c-725c; A 4 726a-727a; Q 25, AA 1-2 730b-732a; A 3, REP 3 732a-733a; Q 30 749a-752b; Q 35, A 6 777b-778c 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 61a-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III 395a-422a,c esp PROP 12-13 400b-d, PROP 15-48 401a-411a, PROP 51 411c-412a, THE AFFECTS, DEF 2-3 416d-417a, DEF 6-7 417b-d; PART IV, DEF 5 424b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XX, SECT 4-5 176d-177a 42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 385a-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 708a-709a 54 FREUD: Instincts, 418c-421a,c esp 418c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 659b-d / Group Psychology, 677c-678c / Ego and Id, 708d-710c esp 709d-710c / War and Death, 766a-b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 790a-791b

4. The economy of desire in human life

4a. The conflict of desires with one another

APOCRYPHA: Susanna, 22-24—(D) OT, Daniel, 13:22-24 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:24; 8:21-22; 26:36-45 / Romans, 7:14-25 / Philippians, 1:21-26 / James, 4:1-10 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 128a-d 8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 5 [1048a21-24] 573c / Soul, BK III, CH 10 [433b5-13] 666b; CH 11 [434a10-15] 666d-667a / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453a15-31] 695b-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII 395a-406a,c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1073-1085] 58a-b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK IV [332-360] 176a-177a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 11-12 21d-22b; BK X, par 39 81b-c; par 41-64 81c-87d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 6, AA 6-7 649a-650d; Q 9, A 2, REP 3 658d-659c; Q 10, A 3 664d-665c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 77, A 1 145a-d; PART II-II, Q 29, A 1 530b-531a; PART III, Q 18, A 6 814d-815d; PART III SUPPL, Q 96, AA 11-12 1063d-1065b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [1-27] 110d-111a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 297b-d; 350d-354b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III-IV 395a-450d passim, esp PART III, PROP 31 405d-406a, PART IV, DEF 5 424b, PROP 7, COROL 426b, PROP 15-18 428a-429d, PROP 60-61 442d-443b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 17 16c; ADDITIONS, 13 118c 47 GOETHE: Faust esp PART I [354-513] 11a-14b, [614-685] 17a-18a, [1110-1117] 27b-28a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 394a-397a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 309c-313a; 318d-319a 50 MARX: Capital, 293c-294a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK III, 53d-54b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 199b-204b; 705a-706b; 717a-718a; 720b; 734b-735a; 791a-798b passim, esp 794a-795a 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 7a-8a / Hysteria, 65c-66a; 82c-83a; 117a / Interpretation of Dreams, 370b / Narcissism, 407a-c / Unconscious, 433d-436c esp 436b-c / General Introduction, 467b-476a,c esp 469c-470c, 474d-475a; 501d-504b; 589c-593b esp 589c-591d; 599d-600d; 615b-616c; 624b-d; 633d-635d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640c-d / Ego and Id, 699a-c; 704d; 712a-717a,c passim / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-733c passim, esp 722b-d, 724a-725a, 731c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 783d-784a; 789b-791d passim / New Introductory Lectures, 843d-845a

4b. The attachment of desires: fixations, projections, identifications, transferences

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1058-1072] 57d-58a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 15 155c-156b 14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 66c-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 10b-11b 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT III, SC II [123-195] 87c-88a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 13-17 400c-402a; PROP 46 410c; PART IV, PROP 6 426a; PROP 44, SCHOL 437d-438a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 81 186b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 196d-197c 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1583-1606] 38b-39a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick esp 135a-136b, 156b-158b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 648b-650b; 707a-712b esp 707b-708a; 734b-735b 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 16b-18a; 19a-c / Narcissism 399a-411a,c esp 404d-406c, 409d-410d / Instincts, 414b / General Introduction, 557b-558d esp 558a-b; 569c-589c esp 574c-d, 580a-581c, 585b-586d, 589a-c; 593d-597c; 599d-600d; 616d-622b; 623c-631b esp 628d-630d; 634b-d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 644d-645d; 648c / Group Psychology, 678d-684a esp 678d-681a, 681b,d [fn 4] / Ego and Id, 703c-706c esp 704d-705c; 711b-c; 712b-c / New Introductory Lectures, 832b-834b esp 832d-833b; 847b-849b; 855d-856d; 862d-863c

4c. The focusing of desires: emotional complexes

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 10c; 16b-17d / Interpretation of Dreams, 246a-248c / Instincts, 415d-418c / General Introduction, 529d-531d; 557b-558d; 569c-585a esp 574a-576d, 580a-584c; 593d-600d; 607b-623c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 644d-646a / Group Psychology, 680c-d / Ego and Id, 704d-706d / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 724a-742a esp 724a-727c, 733c-734d, 739a-740b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 774c-d; 792b-796c esp 794c-796c / New Introductory Lectures, 833c-834a; 847b-849b; 855d-863c esp 856b-860a

4d. The discharge of desires: catharsis and sublimation

9 ARISTOTLE: Poetics, CH 6 [1449b28] 684a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK III, 190a-c 32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes, 337a 42 KANT: Judgement, 509b-d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 308b-c 53 JAMES: Psychology, 718a-719a 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 2b-6c esp 4c-5a; 8d-9a; 11c-17b; 20a-d / Hysteria, 26c-31a esp 27a-c, 62c-64a / Interpretation of Dreams, 189b-193b; 356d-373a esp 363c-d, 364d-365c, 369a-370a / Narcissism, 407c-408a / General Introduction, 452c-d; 495a-499b esp 496a-497b; 527c-539c esp 532d-535d; 587d-588b; 592c-593a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 641d-643c / Group Psychology, 693b-694b / Ego and Id, 704b-c; 710c-712a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 739a-c; 745a; 751b-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773d-774c; 781a-c / New Introductory Lectures, 847a-b

5. Desire as ruler

5a. Desire ruling imagination: daydreaming and fantasy

7 PLATO: Republic, BK V, 361a 8 ARISTOTLE: Dreams, CH 2 [460b3-27] 704b-d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 42 82a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 77, A 1, ANS 145a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52d-53a; PART II, 138d-139a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 37a-b; 405d-406a 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT III, SC II [123-195] 87c-88a / Richard III, ACT V, SC V [1-41] 349d-350a 29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote esp PART I, 1b-2b, 18d-19b, 50b-52d, 134b-135d 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [95-128] 177b-178a / Samson Agonistes [599-605] 352b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 220c-221a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [7271-7312] 178b-179a; [10039-066] 245a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 82a-d; BK II, 125b-c; 146d-148c; BK VI, 254b-c; BK X, 394d; 443c-444a; BK XI, 497c-499c; BK XII, 542d-543a; 544a-b; BK XIV, 601c-602d; BK XV, 615a-617a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 374a-375a 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 18c-d / Hysteria, 115a-116a / Interpretation of Dreams, 333c-336a esp 333c-d; 347d-349c / General Introduction, 483b-c; 486b-489c esp 486d-487a, 487d-488a; 597b-601b esp 599b-600b, 600d-601b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 774a-c

5b. Desire ruling thought: rationalization and wishful thinking

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 11b-d, 21d-22a 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 427d-428a; BK IV, 474a-c; BK V, 506b; 507a-c 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK III, CH 16 [1287a20-5] 485c-486a 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [1141-1191] 59a-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 18 161a-162b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS and REP 2 658d-659c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 74, AA 5-10 131d-137c; Q 77, A 1, ANS 145a-d 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52d-53a 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 148d-150d; 154a-156c, 159d-163c; 166a-168a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 210b-212a; 273b-276a; 490d-491d 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT III, SC II [123-195] 87c-88a 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT V, SC II [106-114] 136a 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK III, 60d-61a 28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 306a-c; 309d 30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 49 111a 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, IV 89a-93a / Objections and Replies, 215d-216a 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 39, SCHOL 408b-d 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 82-87 186b-189a; 99-100 191a-192b / Geometrical Demonstration, 439b-442a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 12 180d-181a; SECT 65-67 195b-196c; BK IV, CH XX, SECT 12 392c 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1, 29b-30a; NUMBER 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER 50, 162a-b 43 MILL: Liberty, 269d-270a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 103b-c; 106d 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 15b-16a; BK II, 82d-83a; BK III, 134a-c; BK IV, 170d-171c; BK VI, 238a-c; BK IX, 366d-367b; BK X, 426b; BK XI, 505a-511b esp 509d-510a; BK XIII, 585b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 314b; 381b-385b; 643a-646a; 652a-657b; 668a-671a 54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363d-364b; 379a-380d / Narcissism, 400a / Group Psychology, 682b-d / Ego and Id, 716a / War and Death, 760d-761a; 765a-766b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 774c-d / New Introductory Lectures, 873d-879c passim, esp 874a-d, 876d-877b, 878b-c

5c. Desire ruling action: the unchecked expression of desires; incontinence

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:1-16; 25:29-34; 34; 39:7-20 / Exodus, 16:1-3 / Numbers, 11:4-35; 16:1-35—(D) Numbers, 11:4-34; 16:1-35 / I Samuel, 18:5-12; 19:8-10—(D) I Kings, 18:5-12; 19:8-10 / II Samuel, 11; 13—(D) II Kings, 11; 13 APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:6-9—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 2:6-9 NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 1:18-32 / Philippians, 3:18-19 / I Timothy, 6:9-10 / James, 4:1-4 / I John, 2:15-17 5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [653-719] 34b-35a 5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1047-1090] 152a-b / Trachiniae [431-492] 174a-c 5 EURIPIDES: Medea [623-641] 217c 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [882-1104] 499b-502a 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 95d-98b; BK VII, 222c-d 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 436d-438b 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120a-122a; 128a-129c / Republic, BK II, 311b-312b; BK III, 326c-327b; BK IV, 352b-354d; BK IX, 416a-418c; 425c-427b / Timaeus, 474b-d / Seventh Letter, 801b-c 8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 9 [433a1]-CH 11 [435a21] 665c-667a 9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK VIII, CH 1 [581a21-b22] 107a-b / Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701a6]-CH 8 [702a22] 236b-237c / Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1102b13-26] 348a-b; BK III, CH 11 [1118b8-19] 365a-b; CH 12 [1119a34-b19] 366a,c; BK VII, CH 1-10 395a-403c; CH 14 [1154b2-15] 405d-406a / Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1267a3-8] 462c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1369b5-22] 612b-c; BK II, CH 12 [1389a3-b11] 636b-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 18 161a-162b 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 10 257d-258a 14 PLUTARCH: Antony 748a-779d 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 57b-58d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IV, par 25 25c; BK VI, par 11-13 38b-39c; BK VIII, par 25-27 60a-c; BK X, par 40-70 81c-89a / Christian Doctrine, BK III, CH 18-21 664d-666b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3, REP 1-2 430c-431d; Q 83, A 1, REP 1 436d-438a; PART I-II, Q 6, A 7 650a-d; Q 9, A 2 658d-659c; Q 10, A 3 664d-665c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 75, AA 2-3 138c-139d; Q 77 144d-152a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, V [1]-VIII [64] 7a-11c, XI [67-90] 15d-16a; PURGATORY, XVII [91-139] 79b-d; XIX-XXVI 81c-94c 22 CHAUCER: Manicple’s Tale [17104-144] 490a-b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 65c-66b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 107a-112d; 159a-167a; 232b-238d; 350d-354b; 413a-416c; 486b-495a; 527b-528a; 538a-543a,c 26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT III, SC II [123-195] 87c-88a; ACT V, SC VI [61-93] 103d-104a / Richard III 105a-148a,c / Romeo and Juliet, ACT II, SC VI [1-15] 300c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC I [61-79] 49c-d; SC IV [65-81] 55b-c / Troilus and Cressida, ACT I, SC III [101-124] 109b; ACT III, SC III 113c-115d / Othello 205a-243a,c esp ACT IV, SC I 229d-233a, ACT V, SC II [291-356] 242b-243a / King Lear, ACT IV, SC VI [109-134] 274c-d / Antony and Cleopatra 311a-350d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 1-18 424c-429d; PROP 44 437c-438a; PROP 60-61 442d-443b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [521-594] 243b-245a; BK IX [990-1066] 269a-270b; BK XII [79-90] 321a / Samson Agonistes [521-540] 351a-b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 3 104b-d; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 29-48 184d-190d passim; SECT 65-67 195b-196c 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 239b-243a 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 109c; 122d-123a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 34d-39d passim, esp 35a-b, 38a-b; 60a-c 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 174c-175a; 559a-c 42 KANT: Judgement, 586a-587a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 135c-136a; 301c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 162b-c; 171c-172b 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [2605-2677] 63b-65a; PART II [9695-9944] 235a-241b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK I, 15b-16a; BK V, 201a-c; BK VI, 248b-250a; 251d-252d; BK VIII, 321d-322d; 329c-333a; 334d-335a; 336b-337d 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 4a-d; BK II, 39b-40a; BK VI, 164b-d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 718a-720a; 799a-807a 54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 690b-c / Ego and Id, 702c-d / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-839b

6. Desire as subject to rule

6a. The regulation of desire by reason: the discipline of moral virtue or duty

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 20:14,17 / Numbers, 15:38-41 / Deuteronomy, 5:18,21 / Psalms, 37:1-13 esp 37:7-8—(D) Psalms, 36:1-13 esp 36:7-8 / Proverbs, 7; 23:1-8; 25:16; 30:7-9 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-31; 23:5-6; 31:1-17—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 18:30-31; 23:5-6; 31:1-17 NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 8:1-13 / I Corinthians, 13:4-8 / Galatians, 5:16-24 / Colossians, 3:5-15 / I Thessalonians, 4:3-8 / I Timothy, 6:3-12 / Titus, 2:11-14; 3:3-7 / James, 4:1-7 / I Peter, 2:11 5 AESCHYLUS: Eumenides [490-565] 86b-87a 5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia at Aulis [543-589] 429d-430a 5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [882-1104] 499b-502a / Lysistrata 583a-599a,c 7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 128a-d / Phaedo, 225d-226c / Gorgias, 275b-280d / Republic, BK III, 326c-327b; BK IV, 346a-356a; BK IX, 416a-c; 425c-427b / Laws, BK VI, 712b; BK VIII, 735c-738c 8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK V, CH 1 [129a10-16] 179a / Soul, BK III, CH 9 [433b5-8] 665c; CH 11 [434a10-15] 666d-667a 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 13 [1102b13-1103a3] 348a-c; BK III, CH 10-12 364b-366a,c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; BK VII, CH 1-10 395a-403c passim / Politics, BK II, CH 7 [1266b26-1267b17] 462b-d 11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 826d-827a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK II, SECT 16 259a, BK IV, SECT 24 265c-d, BK VI, SECT 55 283b-c 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK IV 167a-186b 14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 174b,d-175a / Caius Marius, 353d-354a,c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK III, 57b-58d 17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 1-2 246c-247b 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 2-4 9b-d; BK III, par 1 13b-c; BK VI, par 18-26 40d-43a; BK VIII, par 1-2 52c-53b; par 10-11 55c-56b; par 25-27 60a-c; BK X, par 40-70 81c-89a / City of God, BK IX, CH 4-5 287a-289a; BK XIV, CH 8-9 381c-385b; BK XIX, CH 4, 511d-512a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 24 630c-631a; CH 27 631d; BK III, CH 18-21 664d-666b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; Q 95, A 2 507c-508a; Q 98, A 2 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 10, A 3 664d-665c; Q 17, A 7 690d-692a; Q 24 727a-730a; Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3 8b-9a; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; A 5, REP 1 33c-34b; QQ 59-60 45d-54d; PART III, Q 15, A 4 790d-791c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY 53a-105d esp XV [40]-XVIII [75] 75d-80c 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 82 99a / Parson’s Tale, par 80 541b-542a 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 95d-96b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 89b-90c; 159a-167a; 184a-d; 200d-205b; 232b-238d; 431c-432d; 486b-495a; 538a-543a,c 26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT I, SC I [24-69] 533b-c 27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT I, SC III [5-51] 34b-d; ACT III, SC III [61-79] 49c-d / Troilus and Cressida, ACT I, SC III [101-124] 109b; ACT III, SC III 113c-115d / Othello, ACT I, SC III [322-337] 212b-c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26a-c; 78a-d 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 49b-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 1 396a-c; PROP 9, SCHOL 399c; PART IV, PREF 422b,d-424a; PROP 14-18 428a-429d; PROP 44-73 437c-447a; APPENDIX, I-III 447a-b; XXXII 450c-d; PART V, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 1-16 452d-456c; PROP 42 463b-d 32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 390b-391a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 104 193a; 502 260b-261a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III, SECT 13 107d-108c; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 46-54 189d-192c; SECT 71 197b-198a; SECT 73 198c-199c 42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 256b; 258b-c; 259a-c; 264d-265b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 378b-c / Judgement, 586a-587a 43 MILL: Liberty, 295a-d / Representative Government, 348a-b / Utilitarianism, 463d-464d 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 135c-136a; 176d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 19 16d-17a; PART III, par 149 56b; par 187 65a-c; ADDITIONS, 13-14 118c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 162a-172b; PART III, 312d-313a 49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 304a-305a; 310c-319a esp 310c-312c, 313d-314b, 318d-319a; 592b-593b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI, 245b-c; 248b-250a; EPILOGUE I, 655c-656b 53 JAMES: Psychology, 80a-83b passim; 202a-204b; 797b-798a; 807a-808a; 816a-819a 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 9a; 16c / Hysteria, 110b-c / Interpretation of Dreams, 386d-387a / Narcissism, 407b-c / General Introduction, 452c-d; 501d-504b esp 504b; 590a-593b; 624a-625b esp 625a-b / Ego and Id, 701d-702d; 704a-707d esp 706d-707c; 715a-716c esp 715c-d / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721d-722c; 744a / War and Death, 757c-759d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773b-774a esp 773c; 780b-781d; 783c-785a; 785d-789a esp 787b-c; 792a-796c esp 792a-b, 793a-b, 793d-794b; 800c-801b / New Introductory Lectures, 837d-840a

6b. The restraint or renunciation of desire: abstention, inhibition, repression

5 ARISTOPHANES: Lysistrata 583a-599a,c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses 105a-245a,c esp BK I, CH 1 105a-106c, CH 3-4 108b-110a; BK II, CH 2 140c-141c, CH 17-18 158d-162b; BK III, CH 24 203c-210a; BK IV, CH 4 225a-228a 12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK II, SECT 5 257b-c; BK VII, SECT 2 279b,d; SECT 55-57 283b-c; BK IX, SECT 7 292b 13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK IV [393-449] 178a-179b 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IX, CH 4-5 287a-289a; BK XIV, CH 8-9 381c-385b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 10, A 3 664d-665c; Q 24 727a-730a esp A 2 727d-728c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 186 650b-663b; PART III SUPPL, Q 96 1049d-1066a 22 CHAUCER: Wife of Bath’s Prologue [5587-5743] 256a-258b 24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I, 188d-191c 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 89b-91b; 99b-c; 107a-112d; 166a-d; 200d-205b; 232b-238d; 297d-300c; 353c-354b; 432b-d; 538a-543a,c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71d-72b 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 49b-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 9-18 426d-429d; PART V, PROP 2 452d-453a; PROP 6 453d-454a; PROP 42 463b-d 32 MILTON: Comus [420-475] 42b-44a; [716-765] 49a-50a / Areopagitica, 390b-391a 33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 64b-65b 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 192a-193c; 596c-d 42 KANT: Practical Reason, 346a-d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 378d-379a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 283a 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 224a-225a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1544-1571] 37b-38a 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK III, 122b-c; BK V, 201a-c; BK VI, 248b-250a; BK IX, 373b-374a; BK XIII, 577a-578b esp 577d-578a; BK XIV, 605b-d; BK XV, 630c-631a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 164d-165a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 80b-83b esp 81a; 199b-202a esp 200b-201a; 720a; 725a; 734b-735b; 799a-800a 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 6d-8b esp 7a-c; 16c / Interpretation of Dreams, 377d-378d esp 378b-d / Repression 422a-427a,c esp 422c-d / Unconscious, 432d-436b / General Introduction, 566a-568a; 573c-d; 585b-586d esp 586d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 640c / Ego and Id, 699a; 706b-c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718a-722b esp 719b-c, 720a-d; 726a-728b; 741d [fn 1]; 747b-c; 750a-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 773b-d; 781a-d; 782a-b,d [fn 1]; 793a-795c esp 793d-794b / New Introductory Lectures, 834d-835b; 842a-845b esp 842b-d, 843d-844c

6c. The results of repression: dreaming, symbolic over-reactions, neuroses

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIV, CH 8-9 381c-385b esp CH 9, 384b, 385b 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [28-128] 176a-178a 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 598a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 220b-c; 233b-234a; BK VI, 238a-c; 248b-250a; BK VII, 292b-296a; BK VIII, 338b-339c esp 338d 53 JAMES: Psychology, 753b-754b 54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis 1a-20d esp 4c-5a, 6d-9a, 11c-12b, 13a-b, 14b-15a, 20c-d / Hysteria 25a-118a,c esp 27a-28c, 35b-c, 38a-b, 52c-53c, 65c-66a, 75a-d, 82c-87a, 90d-96a, 97b-102a, 111a-115a, 116d-118a,c / Interpretation of Dreams, 164d-168d esp 167d-168a; 176a-b; 189b-205c passim; 216b-219a; 234d-235d; 240d-249b esp 240d-241a, 248c-249a; 294d-295b; 323b-c; 328a-d; 331d-332a; 352d-382a esp 356d-365c, 375c-376a, 380d-382a, 386b-387a / Repression, 423b-427a,c esp 423b-424b, 425c-426a / Unconscious, 434c-436b / General Introduction, 469c-470b; 476a-544d esp 489c-491b, 495a-504d, 532d-539b; 557b-631b esp 563a-569c, 586b-590a, 593b-600d, 614b-615a; 633d-635d / Group Psychology, 690a-c / Ego and Id, 712c-715c esp 713c-714b, 715a-b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 718a-754a,c esp 720a, 721c-d, 722c-723d, 728b-733c, 741d [fn 1], 745d-747b / War and Death, 759c-d / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781c-d; 793a-794a; 796a-c; 798c-799a; 800d-801c / New Introductory Lectures, 810d-813c esp 811b-812b; 817a-818b; 840a-846a

7. Desire and infinity

7a. The infinite tendency of desires

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 27:20 / Ecclesiastes, 6:7 / Habakkuk, 2:5—(D) Habacuc, 2:5 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 14:9—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 14:9 NEW TESTAMENT: John, 4:13-14 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 275b-277c / Republic, BK V, 370a-c; BK IX, 416a-418c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [1003-1010] 43a; [1076-1094] 44a,c; BK VI [1-42] 80a-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH 9, 185d; BK IV, CH 9, 237d-238a 14 PLUTARCH: Caius Marius, 353d-354a,c 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 19 5d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 1, A 4 612a-613a; Q 2, A 1, REP 3 615d-616c; Q 30, A 4 751c-752b 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 149b-d; 297d-299c; 429a-b; 489b-d; 503b-d 27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT III, SC II [82-90] 121a / Macbeth, ACT IV, SC III [57-99] 304a-c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART III, PROP 6-9 398d-399c 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 109 193b-194a; 125-183 195b-204b 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 236b-238a 42 KANT: Judgement, 584d-585c 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 185 64b-d; ADDITIONS, 118 136a-b 47 GOETHE: Faust esp PART I [354-481] 11a-14a, [602-784] 16b-20b, [1671-1706] 40a-41a; PART II [11433-466] 278a-279a, [11559-586] 281b-282a 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK VI, 164b-d

7a(1) The pursuit of pleasure

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 23:16-17—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 23:21-24 NEW TESTAMENT: John, 4:13-14 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 275b-277c / Philebus, 628a-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH 12 [1119a6-12] 366c / Politics, BK I, CH 9 [1257b38-1258a14] 452a-b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [1003-1010] 43a; [1076-1094] 44a,c; BK IV [1073-1120] 58a-d; BK V [1405-1435] 79b-d 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH 9, 237d-238a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 2-4 9b-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 30, A 4 751c-752b 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, V [25-45] 7b-c 22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK I, STANZA 58-66 8b-9b / Wife of Bath’s Prologue [5953-5960] 262a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 429a-b 27 SHAKESPEARE: Antony and Cleopatra, ACT I, SC I [1-55] 311b-312a 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 42-45 188c-189d 37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 283a-b 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 364a-b 42 KANT: Judgement, 584d-585b; 586d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 185 64b-d 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [3217-3250] 79a-b 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK III, 53b-54b

7a(2) The lust for power

OLD TESTAMENT: Isaiah, 14:12-14—(D) Isaias, 14:12-14 / Habakkuk, 2:5—(D) Habacuc, 2:5 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VII, 215c-216b 6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK V, 506b-c 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 275b-277c 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [59-86] 30d-31b; [995-1002] 42d-43a 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH 9, 237d-238a 14 PLUTARCH: Pyrrhus, 319b-321a / Pompey, 525a-b; 533a-c / Caesar, 599b-d / Cicero, 706b-c 18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIV, CH 13 387c-388c 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 63, A 3 327b-328b 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 76c-d 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 350d-354b 26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard III 105a-148a,c / Julius Caesar, ACT III, SC I [10-34] 574c-d 32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK I [242-270] 98b-99a 35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH XIX, SECT 229 78a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 364a-b

7a(3) The accumulation of wealth

OLD TESTAMENT: Ecclesiastes, 5:10; 6:7—(D) Ecclesiastes, 5:9; 6:7 / Habakkuk, 2:5-11—(D) Habacuc, 2:5-11 APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 11:10; 14:9—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 11:10; 14:9 / Baruch, 3:16-19—(D) OT, Baruch, 3:16-19 NEW TESTAMENT: Luke, 12:16-21 5 ARISTOPHANES: Plutus [143-197] 630d-631b 7 PLATO: Gorgias, 275b-277c / Republic, BK VIII, 405c-408a, 412a / Laws, BK VIII, 733b-d; BK IX, 751b-d 9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 9 [1257b38-1258a14] 452a-b; BK II, CH 7 [1266b27-1267b5] 462b-463b 12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK III [59-93] 30d-31b; BK VI [1-42] 80a-c 12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK IV, CH 9, 237d-238a 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK II, par 19 5d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 2, A 1, REP 3 615d-616c; Q 30, A 4, ANS 751c-752b 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 84, A 1 174b-175a 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [52-66] 10a-b 22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus, par 18, 408a 25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 122a-124c 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, APPENDIX, XXVIII-XXIX 450a 36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 237a 38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 364a-b 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 71b-d 40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 510b 43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 462c-463a 44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 125a-b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 185 64b-d; par 195 66d-67a 47 GOETHE: Faust, PART II [5505-6172] 136a-151a; [11151-287] 271b-274b esp [11151-162] 271b, [11239-258] 273b-274a 50 MARX: Capital, 60d-62d esp 62a-b; 71d-72c esp 72a-c; 292c-295a esp 293c-294a

7b. The restless search for the infinite: the desire for the vision of God

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33:11-23 / Psalms, 27 esp 27:4, 27:8; 42-43; 63; 73:25-28; 84—(D) Psalms, 26 esp 26:4, 26:8; 41-42; 62; 72:25-28; 83 / Isaiah, 26:8-9—(D) Isaias, 26:8-9 NEW TESTAMENT: John, 4:13-14; 6:35 / Philippians, 3:7-21 / I John, 3:1-3 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163a-167d 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VI 21a-26a passim / Sixth Ennead, TR IX 353d-360d 18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions 1a-125a,c esp BK I, par 1-6 1a-2c, BK II, par 15 12b-c, BK III, par 1 13b-c, par 8 14d-15a, BK IV, par 15-19 23a-24b, BK V, par 1-2 27a-c, BK VII, par 16-23 48c-50c, BK VIII, par 17-18 57d-58a, BK IX, par 3 62a-b, BK X, par 1-40 71c-81c, BK XI, par 1-4 89b-90b, BK XIII, par 10 101c, par 23 104b-c, BK XIII 110d-125a,c / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 38 635c-d 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 6, A 1, REP 2 28b-d; Q 12, A 1, ANS 50c-51c; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 26, A 2, ANS 150c-151a; Q 54, A 2, ANS 285d-286c; Q 60, A 5 313b-314c; Q 62, A 1, ANS 317d-318c; PART I-II, Q 2, A 1, REP 3 615d-616c; Q 5, A 1, ANS 636d-637c; Q 8 655a-657c 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 109, A 3 340c-341b; PART II-II, Q 27, A 6 524c-525c; Q 28, A 3 528d-529c; PART III SUPPL, Q 69, A 4 889c-890c 21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XV [40-81] 75d-76a; XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c; PARADISE, IV [115]-V [12] 111d-112b; XXII [52-72] 140b; XXVI [1-78] 145d-146c; XXXIII 156b-157d esp [46-48] 156c 30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a 31 DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 88c-d 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, APPENDIX, IV 447b-c; PART V, PROP 36 461a-c 32 MILTON: Sonnets, XIV 66a 33 PASCAL: Pensées, 72, 183a-b; 125-183 195b-204b; 463 255a; 468-492 255b-259b 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 45-47 189b-190b 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 224a-225a; PART III, 304c-306a 47 GOETHE: Faust esp PART I [354-481] 11a-14a, [602-784] 16b-20b, [1671-1706] 40a-41a, PART II [11433-466] 278a-279a, [11559-586] 281b-282a 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 78a-b 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XII, 560a-561d; BK XIV, 608a-b; BK XV, 631a-c 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK III, 53b-54b

CROSS-REFERENCES

For: Matters relevant to the metaphysical conception of desire, see BEING 7c-7c(3); CHANGE 13; MATTER 1a, 3b.

For: Discussions bearing on the theory of natural appetite or desire, see HABIT 3a; HAPPINESS 1; NATURE 1a, 2d, 3c(3).

For: Other discussions of the distinction between conscious and natural desire, and of animal appetite in contrast to the human will, see ANIMAL 1a(3); MAN 4b; SENSE 3e; WILL 1, 2b(2).

For: The consideration of voluntary acts or movements, see ANIMAL 4b; NATURE 3c(2); WILL 3a(1)-3a(2).

For: Other treatments of the objects of desire in general, see BEING 3b; GOOD AND EVIL 1a, 3c; HAPPINESS 1, 4-4b; PLEASURE AND PAIN 6a-6b; and for particular objects of desire, see HONOR 2b; LIFE AND DEATH 8b; WEALTH 10a-10b, 10e(3).

For: The conception of pleasure as the satisfaction of desire, see PLEASURE AND PAIN 6d.

For: Another comparison of desire and love, see LOVE 1c, 2a-2a(4).

For: Further psychological analysis of emotional desires and impulses, see EMOTION 3-3c(4); LOVE 2a(3)-2a(4); MEDICINE 6c(2).

For: Other discussions of the influence of emotional desires on imagination and thought, see EMOTION 3b; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8c, 8e; OPINION 2a; WILL 3b(1).

For: The psychological or ethical consideration of problems arising from the conflict between desire and reason or duty, see DUTY 8; EMOTION 4-4b(2); LIBERTY 3a-3b; MIND 1e(3), 9b; VIRTUE AND VICE 5a; WILL 2b(2), 9b.

For: The discussion of man’s relation to the infinite, see INFINITY 6a; MAN 10d; and for the theological conception of man’s ultimate rest in the vision of God, see GOD 5b, 6c(4); HAPPINESS 7c-7c(1); LOVE 5a(2); WILL 7d.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• EPICTETUS. The Manual
• GOETHE. Sorrows of Young Werther
• HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, III (3)
• FREUD. Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, CH I

II.

• EPICURUS. Letter to Menoeceus
• BOCCACCIO. Decameron
• VILLON. The Debate of the Heart and Body of Villon
• ERASMUS. The Philosophy of Love, DIALOGUE I
• P. SIDNEY. Astrophel and Stella
• MARLOWE. Tamburlaine the Great
• SUÁREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, X (1), XXIII-XXIV, XXX (16), XLVII (14)
• JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART IV, Q 12
• MOLIÈRE. L’avare (The Miser)
• MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la vérité, BK IV
• RACINE. Phèdre
• RACINE. Athalie
• BOSSUET. Traité de la concupiscence
• LEIBNIZ. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH 21
• J. BUTLER. Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature, I-II
• HUTCHESON. A System of Moral Philosophy, BK I, CH 2-3; BK II, CH 2
• HUTCHESON. An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections
• HELVÉTIUS. Traité de l’esprit, I, CH 9-11
• T. REID. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, III, PART II, CH 1-2
• J. G. FICHTE. The Vocation of Man
• SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea
• BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, VOL II, pp 153-179
• D. STEWART. Outlines of Moral Philosophy, PART II, CH 1 (1-4)
• D. STEWART. Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, BK I, CH 1-3
• J. MILL. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, CH 19
• STENDHAL. The Red and the Black
• BENTHAM. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, CH 10
• BENTHAM. Deontology
• PUSHKIN. The Queen of Spades
• WHEWELL. The Elements of Morality, BK I, CH 2
• BALZAC. Cousin Bette
• SPENCER. The Principles of Psychology, VOL I, PART I, CH 6 (50); PART IV, CH 8
• BAIN. The Emotions and the Will
• E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious
• H. SIDGWICK. The Methods of Ethics, BK I, CH 4
• ZOLA. Nana
• FRANCE. The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard
• T. H. GREEN. Prolegomena to Ethics, BK II, CH 2
• L. STEPHEN. The Science of Ethics, CH 2
• IBSEN. The Master Builder
• CHEKHOV. The Sea-Gull
• RIBOT. The Psychology of the Emotions
• BRADLEY. Collected Essays, VOL I (14)
• MOORE. Principia Ethica, CH 2 (39-47)
• SCHELER. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik
• B. RUSSELL. The Analysis of Mind, LECT 3
• DEWEY. Human Nature and Conduct, PART III (8)
• FITZGERALD. The Great Gatsby
• O’NEILL. Desire Under the Elms
• F. ALEXANDER. Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality
• BEEBE-CENTER. The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness
• NYGREN. Agape and Eros
• ROUGEMONT. Love in the Western World
• MARITAIN. Scholasticism and Politics, CH VI
• D’ARCY. The Mind and Heart of Love