Chapter 12: CONSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION

THE idea of a constitution as establishing and organizing a political community; the principle of constitutionality as determining a generic form of government having many varieties; and the nature of constitutional government—these three problems are so intimately connected that they must be treated together. We have used the word “constitution” to express the root notion from which all other matters considered in this chapter are derived.

It is impossible to say precisely what a constitution is in a way that will fit the political reality of the Greek city-states, the Roman republic and its transformation into the empire, mediaeval kingdoms and communes and their gradual metamorphosis into the limited monarchies and republics of modern times. No definition can adequately comprehend all the variations of meaning to be found in the great works of political theory and history. But there are a number of related points in the various meanings of “constitution” which indicate what is common to the understanding of such diverse thinkers as Plato and Locke, Aristotle and Rousseau, Kant and Mill, Montesquieu and Hegel, Aquinas, Hobbes, and the American Federalists.

IT HAS BEEN SAID that the constitution is the form of the state. This can be interpreted to mean that the political, as opposed to the domestic, community requires a constitution in order to exist; just as a work of art has the very principle of its being in the form which the artist imposes upon matter. In the context of his general theory of political association, Aristotle’s remark that “the man who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors,” may imply that the idea of a constitution is the creative principle by which the state was originally formed—or at least differentiated from the tribe and family.

Kant gives explicit expression to the notion that the invention of constitutions is coeval with the formation of states. “The act by which a People is represented as constituting itself into a State,” he writes, “is termed the Original Contract” and this in turn signifies “the rightfulness of the process of organizing the Constitution.”

In this sense, the constitution appears to be identical with the organization of a state. It would then seem to follow that every state, no matter what its form of government, is constitutional in character. But this would leave no basis for the fundamental distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional—or what is usually called “absolute,” “royal,” or “despotic”—government.

That basic distinction among forms of government is as old as Plato and Aristotle. It is first made by Plato in the Statesman in terms of the role of law in government. It occurs at the very opening of Aristotle’s Politics with his insistence on the difference between the king and the statesman, and between royal and political government. But Locke seems to go further than the ancients when he says that “absolute monarchy…is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all.”

In addition to affirming the gravity of the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional government, he seems to be denying that the latter can constitute the form of a truly civil society, as opposed to a domestic society or the primitive patriarchate of a tribe. Yet Locke obviously does not deny the historic fact that there have been communities, which otherwise appear to be states, that have their character or form determined by absolute government. His point, therefore, seems to be that among types of government, absolute monarchy does not fit the nature of civil society.

If “constitution” is used merely as a synonym for “form” or “type,” then even a state under absolute monarchy or despotic government can be said to have a constitution. Since every state is of some type, it can be said that it has a certain constitution, or that it is constituted in a certain way. If, however, we use the word “constitution” to conform to the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional government, we are compelled to say that there are states which do not have constitutions.

With this distinction in mind, the statement that “the constitution is the form of the state” takes on a different and more radical meaning. It signifies that there are communities, larger than and distinct from the family or the tribe, which cannot be called “states” in the strict sense because they do not have constitutions. Hegel, for instance, points out that “it would be contrary even to commonplace ideas to call patriarchal conditions a ‘constitution’ or a people under patriarchal government a ‘state’ or its independence ‘sovereignty.’” In such conditions, what is lacking, he writes, is “the objectivity of possessing in its own eyes and in the eyes of others, a universal and universally valid embodiment in laws.” Without such an “objective law and an explicitly established rational constitution, its autonomy is…not sovereignty.”

From this it would appear that a despotically governed community, such as ancient Persia, is a political anomaly. It is intermediate between the family and the state, for it is like a state in its extent and in the size and character of its population, yet it is not a state in its political form. The truly political community is constitutionally organized and governed. In this sense, the English words “political” and “constitutional” become almost interchangeable, and we can understand how these two English words translate a single word in Greek political discourse.

AS THE FORM of the state, the constitution is the principle of its organization. Whether written or unwritten, whether a product of custom or explicit enactment, a constitution, Aristotle writes, “is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each community.”

The idea of political office—of officials and official status—is inseparable from the idea of constitution. That is why the concept of citizenship is also inseparable from constitution. As the chapter on CITIZEN indicates, citizenship is the primary or indefinite office set up by a constitution. Citizenship is always the prerequisite for holding any other more definite office in a constitutional government, from juryman to chief magistrate. In specifying the qualifications for citizenship, a constitution sets the minimum qualifications for all other offices which usually, though not always, demand more than citizenship of the man who is to fill them.

A political office represents a share of political power and authority. “Those are to be called offices,” Aristotle explains, “to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain measures and of judging and commanding, especially the last; for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate.” As representing a share of political power and authority, a political office can be said to constitute a share of sovereignty. That would not seem to be true, however, for those who, like Rousseau, maintain that “sovereignty is indivisible.” Yet Rousseau also admits that “each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental function” and exercises a “function of sovereignty.”

Since it is an arrangement of offices, a constitution is, therefore, also a division or partition of the whole sovereignty of government—or at least of the exercise of sovereignty—into units which have certain functions to perform, and which must be given the requisite power and authority to perform them. These units are political offices, defined according to their functions, and vested with a certain power and authority depending on their place and purpose within the whole.

Hamilton’s maxim that “every power ought to be in proportion to its object” formulates the equation by which the function of an office, or its duties, determines its rights and powers, privileges and immunities. And except for the provision of a temporary dictatorship in the early Roman constitution, or its modern constitutional equivalent in emergency grants of power, political offices under constitutional government always represent limited amounts of power and authority—limited in that each is always only a part of the whole.

A CONSTITUTION defines and relates the various political offices. It determines the qualifications of office-holders. But it does not name the individuals who, from all those qualified, shall be selected for any office. Because its provisions have this sort of generality, a constitution has the character of law. This is equally true of written and unwritten constitutions, of those shaped by custom and those enacted by constituent assemblies.

Unlike all other man-made laws, a constitution is the law which creates and regulates government itself, rather than the law which a government creates and by which it regulates the conduct of men, their relation to one another and to the state. This is perhaps the basic distinction with regard to the laws of the state. “The fundamental law in every commonwealth,” says Hobbes, “is that which being taken away the commonwealth faileth and is utterly dissolved.” Montesquieu distinguishes what he calls “the law politic,” which constitutes the state, from ordinary legislation; and Rousseau likewise divides the laws into the “political” or “fundamental” laws and the “civil laws”—those “which determine the form of the government” and those which the government, once it is constituted, enacts and enforces.

In addition to being the source of all other positive laws of the state—for it sets up the very machinery of lawmaking—a constitution is fundamental law in that it establishes the standard of legality by which all subsequent laws are measured. Aristotle observes that “the justice or injustice of laws varies of necessity with constitutions.” What may be a just enactment in one state may be unjust in another according to the difference of their constitutions.

In American practice and that modeled upon it, a law which violates the letter or spirit of the constitution is judged to be unconstitutional and is deprived thereby of the authority of law. “Every act of a delegated authority,” Hamilton writes in The Federalist, “contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.”

THE CONCEPTION of a constitution as a law or set of laws antecedent to all acts of government inevitably raises the question of how or by whom constitutions are made. If the provisions of a constitution were precepts of natural law, they would, according to the theory of natural law, be discovered by reason, not positively instituted. But though constitutions have the character of positive law, they cannot be made as other positive laws are made—by legislators, i.e., men holding that office under the constitution.

The generally accepted answer is that a constitution is made by the people who form the political community. But, as Madison observes, some evidence exists to the contrary. “It is not a little remarkable,” he writes, “that in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen of pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity.” He cites many examples from Plutarch to support this observation, but he adds the comment that it cannot be ascertained to what extent these lawgivers were “clothed with the legitimate authority of the people.” In some cases, however, he claims that “the proceeding was strictly regular.”

The writers of The Federalist are, of course, primarily concerned with a constitution that is not the work of one man but the enactment of a constituent assembly or constitutional convention. From their knowledge of British law, they are also well aware that a constitution may sometimes be the product of custom, growing and altering with change of custom. But however it is exercised, the constitutive power is held by them to reside in the constituents of the state, the sovereign people. This power may be exercised through force of custom to produce an unwritten constitution, or through deliberative processes to draft a written one; but it can never be exercised by a government except with popular consent, since all the powers of a duly constituted government derive from its constitution. In the American if not the British practice, the amendment of the constitution also involves, at least indirectly, an appeal to the people.

Rousseau assigns the constitutive power to a mythical figure he calls “the legislator” or “the law-giver,” describing him as the man who “sets up the Republic.” Yet Rousseau says of this special office that it “nowhere enters into the constitution.” He thus reaffirms the essential point that a constitution cannot create the office of constitution-making.

These remarks in the Social Contract have another significance. Rousseau tries to distinguish the formation of a government by the constitution (the political or fundamental law made by the legislator) from the formation of the state by the social contract entered into by the people in their original act of association. But is not the constitution also a formative contract or convention? If it is popular in origin, either through custom or enactment, is there more than a verbal difference between these two contracts—the one which establishes a political society and the one which establishes its government?

For Hobbes, and seemingly also for Locke, the compact by which men abandon the state of nature and establish a civil society results at the same time in the establishment of a government. It is, Hobbes writes, “as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this Man or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.” According to Rousseau, “there is only one contract in the State, and that is the [original] act of association.” For him, “the institution of government is not a contract.”

The reality and significance of the difference between these three political philosophers would seem to depend on the precise historical meaning each gives to the hypothesis of men living in a state of nature prior to political association. If, prior to the state, men live in non-political societies, and if the state, as opposed to the family or the despotically ruled community, begins to exist only when it is constituted, then the formation of the state and the formation of its government would seem to be the product of a single convention.

THE PRINCIPLE of constitutionality is also necessary in order to understand the familiar distinction between government by laws and government by men. Except for the divine sort of government which is above both law and lawlessness, Plato employs “the distinction of ruling with law or without law” to divide the various forms of government into two groups. “The principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all,” the Eleatic Stranger says in the Statesman.

In the ordinary meaning of law as an instrument of government, it is difficult to conceive government by laws without men to make and administer them, or government by men who do not issue general directives which have the character of law. Government always involves both laws and men. But not all government rests upon the supremacy of law, a supremacy which consists in the equality of all before the law and the predominance of regular law as opposed to arbitrary decision. Nor is all government based upon a law that regulates the officials of government as well as the citizens, and determines the legality of official acts, legislative, judicial, or executive. That law is, of course, the constitution.

Locke makes a distinction between governing by “absolute arbitrary power” and governing by “settled standing laws.” It is his contention that “whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions, for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in a state of Nature…. All the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws, that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law, and the rulers, too, kept within their due bounds.”

As Locke states the distinction between government by laws and government by men, it seems to be identical with the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional government. In the latter, an individual man invests himself with sovereignty and, as sovereign, puts himself above all human law, being both its source and the arbiter of its legality. Such government is absolute, for nothing limits the power the sovereign man exercises as a prerogative vested in his person. In constitutional government, men are not sovereigns but office-holders, having only a share of the sovereignty. They rule not through de facto power, but through the juridical power which is vested in the office they hold. That power is both created and limited by the law of the constitution which defines the various offices of government.

ALTHOUGH ABSTRACTLY or in theory absolute and constitutional government are clearly distinct—more than that, opposed—political history contains the record of intermediate types. These can be regarded as imperfect embodiments of the principle of constitutionality, or as attenuations of absolute rule by constitutional encroachments. Despite their incompatibility in principle, historic circumstances have managed to combine absolute with constitutional government. It is this combination which mediaeval jurists and philosophers call “the mixed regime” or the regimen regale et politicum, “royal and political government.”

It may be thought that a foreshadowing of the mediaeval mixed regime can be found in Plato’s Laws, in the passage in which the Athenian Stranger says that monarchy and democracy are the “two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly derived.” He then asserts that, to combine liberty with wisdom, “you must have both these forms of government in a measure.” Since the Persian despotism is cited as the “highest form” of monarchy and the Athenian constitution as the archetype of democracy, the combination proposed would seem to be a mixture of absolute with constitutional government. But the Athenian Stranger also says that “there ought to be no great and unmixed powers” if the arbitrary is to be avoided; and since the whole tenor of the book, as indicated by its title, is to uphold the supremacy of law, it is doubtful that a truly mixed regime is intended—a government which is partly absolute and partly constitutional.

Aristotle, furthermore, gives us reason to think that such a mixture would be unthinkable to a Greek. At least in his own vocabulary, the terms royal and political are as contradictory as round and square. Royal, or kingly, government for Aristotle is “absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all.” In royal government, there are no political offices, and no citizens. The ruler is sovereign in his own person and the ruled are subject to his will, which is both the source of law and exempt from all legal limitations.

To Aristotle, political government means pure constitutionalism. It exists only where “the citizens rule and are ruled in turn,” for “when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think they ought to hold office by turns.” To the generic form of constitutional government, Aristotle sometimes gives the name of “polity,” though he also uses this name for the mixed constitution which combines democratic with oligarchical criteria for citizenship and public office. The mixed constitution is not to be confused with the mixed regime, for it is a mixture of different constitutional principles, not of constitutionalism itself with absolute government. When the word “polity” signifies constitutional government generally, it has the meaning which the Romans express by the word “republic” and which the constitutionalists of the 18th century call “free government.”

The distinctive characteristics of such government—whether it is called political, republican, constitutional, or free—lie in the fact that the citizens are both rulers and ruled; that no man, not even the chief magistrate, is above the law; that all political power or authority is derived from and limited by the constitution which, being popular in origin, cannot be changed except by the people as a whole.

It is perhaps only in the Middle Ages that we find the mixed regime in actual existence. “That rule is called politic and royal,” Aquinas writes, “by which a man rules over free subjects who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands.” These words seem to present an accurate picture of the peculiarly mediaeval political formation which resulted from the adaptation of Roman law (itself partly republican and partly imperial) to feudal conditions under the influence of local customs and the Christian religion.

The mediaeval mixed regime is not to be confused with modern forms of constitutional monarchy any more than with the mixed constitution or polity of the Greeks. “The so-called limited monarchy, or kingship according to law,” Aristotle remarks, “is not a distinct form of government.” The chapter on MONARCHY deals with the nature of constitutional monarchy and its difference from the mixed regime as well as its relation to purely republican government. The mediaeval king was not a constitutional monarch, but a sovereign person, in one sense above the law and in another limited by it.

To the extent that he had powers and prerogatives unlimited by law, the mediaeval king was an absolute ruler. He was, as Aquinas says, quoting the phrase of the Roman jurists, legibus solutus—exempt from the force of all man-made law. Aquinas also describes him as “above the law” insofar as “when it is expedient, he can change the law, and rule without it according to time and place.” Yet he was also bound by his coronation oath to perform the duties of his office, first among which was the maintenance of the laws of the realm—the immemorial customs of the people which define their rights and liberties. The king’s subjects could be released from their oath of allegiance by his malfeasance or dereliction in office.

To this extent, then, the mediaeval king was a responsible ruler, and the mixed regime was constitutional. Furthermore, the king did not have jurisdiction over customary law; yet where custom was silent, the king was free to govern absolutely, to decree what he willed, and even to innovate laws.

MEDIAEVAL IN ORIGIN, the institution of a government both royal and political, or what Fortescue, describing England in the 15th century, called a “political kingdom,” exerted great influence on modern constitutional developments. As late as the end of the 17th century, Locke’s conception of the relation of king and parliament, royal prerogative and legal limitations, may emphasize the primacy of law, but it does not entirely divest the king of personal sovereignty. Locke quotes with approval the speech from the throne in 1609, in which James I said that “the king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom. Tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom, and expressly by his oath at his coronation.” To this extent the British kingdom is, as Fortescue had said, “political.” But the king also retains the prerogative to dispense with law and to govern in particular matters by decree apart from law, and to this extent the government still remains royal.

Locke recognizes the difficulty of combining the absolute power of the king in administration with the limitations on that power represented by Parliament’s jurisdiction over the laws which bind the king. To the question, Who shall be judge of the right use of the royal prerogative? he replies that “between an executive power in being, with such prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth… The people have no other remedy…but to appeal to heaven.”

Montesquieu as well as Locke can conceive monarchy, as distinct from despotism, in no other terms than those of the mixed regime. He separates despotism as lawless, or arbitrary and absolute, government from all forms of government by law, and divides the latter into monarchies and republics. Montesquieu insists that the ancients had no notion of the kind of monarchy which, while it is legal government, is not purely constitutional in the sense of being republican. He calls this kind of monarchy “Gothic government,” and, as Hegel later points out, it is clear that “by ‘monarchy’ he understands, not the patriarchal or any ancient type, nor on the other hand, the type organized into an objective constitution, but only feudal monarchy.”

It is not until the 18th century that the slightest vestige of royal power comes to be regarded as inimical to law. For Rousseau “every legitimate government is republican”; for Kant, “the only rightful Constitution…is that of a Pure Republic,” which, in his view, “can only be constituted by a representative system of the people.” The writers of The Federalist take the same stand. They interpret the “aversion of the people to monarchy” as signifying their espousal of purely constitutional or republican government. In the tradition of the great books, only Hegel speaks thereafter in a contrary vein. Constitutional monarchy represents for him the essence of constitutionalism and the only perfect expression of the idea of the state.

Because modern republics, and even modern constitutional or limited monarchies, have developed gradually or by revolution out of mixed regimes; and because this development came as a reaction against the increasing absolutism or despotism of kings, the principle of constitutionality has been made more effective in modern practice than it was in the ancient world. In addition to asserting limitations upon governments, constitutions have also provided means of controlling them. They have been given the force, as well as the authority, of positive law. They have made office-holders accountable for their acts; and through such juridical processes as impeachment and such political devices as frequent elections and short terms of office, they have brought the administration of government within the purview of the law.

Following Montesquieu, the Federalists recommend the separation of powers, with checks and balances, as the essential means of enforcing constitutional limitations of office and of preventing one department of government from usurping the power of another. The citizens are further protected from the misuse of power by constitutional declarations of their rights and immunities; and constitutional government is itself safeguarded from revolutionary violence by such institutions as judicial review and by the availability of the amending power as a means of changing the constitution through due process of law.

IN THE HISTORY of political change, it is necessary to distinguish change from or to constitutional government and, within the sphere of constitutional government, the change of constitutions.

Republics are set up and constitutions established by the overthrow of despots or with their abdication. Republics are destroyed and constitutions overthrown by dictators who usurp the powers of government. Violence, or the threat of violence, usually attends these changes.

The other sort of change may take place in two ways: either when one constitution replaces another, as frequently occurs in the revolutions of the Greek city-states; or when an enduring constitution is modified by amendment, as is customary in modern republics. Every constitutional change is in a sense revolutionary, but if it can be accomplished by due process of law, violence can be avoided.

All the changes in which constitutional government or constitutions are involved raise fundamental questions of justice. Is republican government always better than absolute monarchy and the mixed regime—better in the sense of being more just, better because it gives men the liberty and equality they justly deserve? Is it better relative to the nature and condition of certain peoples but not all, or of a people at a certain stage of their development, but not always? In what respects does one constitution embody more justice than another? What sorts of amendment or reform can rectify the injustice of a constitution? Without answering such questions, we cannot discriminate between progress and decline in the history of constitutionalism.

Divergent answers will, of course, be found in the great books. Among the political philosophers, there are the defenders of absolutism and those who think that royal government is most like the divine; the exponents of the supremacy of the mixed regime; the republicans who insist that nothing less than constitutional government is fit for free men and equals. And there are those who argue that the justice of any form of government must be considered relative to the condition of the people, so that republican government may be better only in some circumstances, not in all.

The issue arising from these conflicting views concerning constitutional and absolute government is treated in the chapters on CITIZEN, MONARCHY, and TYRANNY. But one other issue remains to be discussed here. It concerns the comparative justice of diverse constitutions. Constitutions can differ from one another in the way in which they plan the operations of government, or in the qualifications they set for citizenship and public office. Usually only the second mode of difference seriously affects their justice.

In Greek political life, the issue of justice as between the democratic and the oligarchical constitution is a conflict between those who think that all free men deserve the equality of citizenship and the opportunity to hold office, and those who think it is unjust to treat the rich and the poor as equals. The latter insist that citizenship should be restricted to the wealthy and that the magistracies should be reserved for men of considerable means.

Finding justice and injustice on both sides, Aristotle favors what he calls “the mixed constitution.” This unites the justice of treating free men alike so far as citizenship goes, with the justice of discriminating between rich and poor with respect to public office. Such a mixture, he writes, “may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy,” since it attempts “to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich.” The mixed constitution, especially if accompanied by a numerical predominance of the middle class, seems to him to have greater stability, as well as more justice, than either of the pure types of constitution which, oppressive to either poor or rich, provoke revolution.

In modern political life, the issue between oligarchy and democracy tends toward a different resolution. The last defenders of the oligarchical constitution were men like Burke, Hamilton, and John Adams in the 18th century. Since then, the great constitutional reforms have progressively extended the franchise almost to the point of universal suffrage. These matters are, of course, further treated in the chapters on DEMOCRACY and OLIGARCHY.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, with a system of periodic elections, seems to be indispensable to constitutional government under modern conditions. The territorial extent and populousness of the nation-state as compared with the ancient city-state makes impossible direct participation by the whole body of citizens in the major functions of government.

Considering the ancient republics of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, the writers of The Federalist try to explain the sense in which the principle of representation differentiates the American republic from these ancient constitutional governments. “The principle of representation,” they say, “was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction between these and the American government lies in the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration of the former.”

The Federalists then go on to say that “the distinction…thus qualified must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.”

In their opinion, representative government is not merely necessitated by the conditions of modern society, but also has the political advantage of safeguarding constitutional government from the masses. As pointed out in the chapter on ARISTOCRACY, where the theory of representation is discussed, the officers of government chosen by the whole body of citizens are supposed—at least on one conception of representatives—to be more competent in the business of government than their constituents. It is in these terms that the Federalists advocate what they call “republican government” as opposed to “pure democracy.”

Like the idea of political offices, the principle of representation seems to be inseparable from constitutionalism and constitutional government. Though the principle appears to a certain extent in ancient republics—whether oligarchies or democracies—ancient political writing does not contain a formal discussion of the theory of representation. That begins in mediaeval treatises which recognize the consultative or advisory function of those who represent the nobles and the commons at the king’s court. But it is only in recent centuries—when legislation has become the exclusive function of representative assemblies—that the idea of representation and the theory of its practice assume a place of such importance that a political philosopher like Mill does not hesitate to identify representative with constitutional government.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

The difference between government by law and government by men: the nature of constitutional government
The notion of a constitution
1. The constitution as the form or organization of a political community: arrangement of offices; division of functions
2. The constitution as the fundamental law: its relation to other laws, as a source or measure of legality or justice
The relation of constitutional government to other forms of government
1. The combination of constitutional with absolute government: the mixed regime; constitutional or limited monarchy
2. The merits of constitutional government compared with royal government and the mixed regime
The constitutional conception of political office: the qualifications and duties of public officials
The diversity of constitutions among the forms of government
1. The justice of different constitutions: the extent and character of citizenship under each
2. The mixed constitution: its advantages
The origin of constitutions: the lawgiver, the social contract, the constituent assembly
The preservation of constitutions: factors tending toward their dissolution
1. The relative stability of different types of constitutions
2. The safeguards of constitutional government: bills of rights; separation of powers; impeachment
The change of constitutions
1. Methods of changing a constitution: revolution, amendment
2. The violation and overthrow of constitutional government
The theory of representation
1. The functions and duties of representatives: their relation to their constituents
2. Types of representation: diverse methods of selecting representatives
The origin, growth, and vicissitudes of constitutional government

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

Author’s Divisions: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.

Bible References: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45—(D) II Esdras, 7:46.

Symbols: The abbreviation “esp” calls the reader’s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; “passim” signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.

1. The difference between government by law and government by men: the nature of constitutional government

5 Aeschylus: Eumenides [681-710] 88b-c
5 Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus [904-931] 122d-123a
5 Euripides: Suppliants [399-462] 261d-262b
5 Aristophanes: Wasps [463-507] 512d-513c
6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 107c-108c; BK VII, 233a-d
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 368c-d; BK III, 425a-c; 438a-b
7 Plato: Republic, BK V, 369c-d; BK VI, 380b-c / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 667c-676b esp 671c; BK IV, 681b-682c; BK VII, 733d-734a; BK IX, 745c-746a; 754a-b / Seventh Letter, 805d; 807a-b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 6 [1134a24-b17] 382a-c esp [1134a35-37] 382b; BK X, CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / Politics, BK I, CH 1 [1252a3-17] 445a-b; CH 5 [1254a34-b9] 448a; CH 7 [1255b15-20] 449b; CH 12 453d-454a; BK II, CH 10 [1272a35-b10] 468d-469a; BK III, CH 10 [1281a29-39] 479a; CH 11 [1282a1-13] 480b-c; CH 15-17 484b-487a; BK IV, CH 4 [1291b30-1292a37] 491a-d; CH 6 492b-493a; BK V, CH 9 [1310a25-36] 512c; BK VII, CH 2 [1324b32-40] 528d-529a
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK I, SECT 14 254b-c
14 Plutarch: Caesar, 591d / Cato the Younger, 635a-b, 638b-639a / Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 1a-2b; BK III, 51b-c; 61c-62a
18 Augustine: Confessions, BK III, par 15 17a-b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 1, REP 3 205b-206b; A 3 207a-c; Q 95, A 1 esp REP 2 226c-227c; Q 96, A 5, REP 3 233d-234d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 104d-106d; 114b-115a; 131d-132a; 138b-c; 149b-151a; PART IV, 272c; 273a-c
26 Shakespeare: 2nd Henry VI, ACT IV, SC II [1-15] 44c-d; ACT III, SC I [223-242] 49c
27 Shakespeare: Henry VIII, ACT I, SC I [91-101] 553d
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a
32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK XII [63-110] 320b-321b
35 Locke: Civil Government, 25a-81d esp CH IV, SECT 21 29d, CH VI, SECT 57 36d-37b, CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c, CH XI 55b-58b, CH XIV 62b-64c, CH XVIII, SECT 199-202 71a-72a
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 268c-269b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a; 7c-9a,c; BK III, 12a-13c; BK IV, 15a-c; BK V, 25d-31a; BK VI, 33a-35a; 36a-b; BK VIII, 54a-b; 57c-58d; BK XI, 69a-c; BK XIX, 137c-d; BK XXV, 211c-d; BK XXVI, 223c-d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 323d-324a; 357b-c; 358b-d; 361c-362a / Political Economy, 370b-371a / Social Contract, BK I, 387b,d-391b; BK II, 400a; 406a-b; BK III, 408c; 419a-c; BK IV, 433a-434b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b passim; 51b-d; 154a-c; 342a-c; 592a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73d-75a; 96d; 125a; 161c-162a
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 113b-115a / Science of Right, 435c-437c; 450d-452a / Judgement, 586a-587a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: passim
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 16, 68b-c; NUMBER 33, 107b-109b passim; NUMBER 44, 146d-147a; NUMBER 47, 153c-154d; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 55, 174c-d; NUMBER 57, 176d-178a; NUMBER 75, 223c-d passim; NUMBER 78, 230d-232a; NUMBER 81, 237d-238b
43 Mill: Liberty, 267d-268b / Representative Government, 327b,d-355b passim
44 Boswell: Johnson, 203d-205d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 260-265 82a-84b, PAR 278 92c-93a; PAR 286 96c-97a; PAR 298-299 99c-100b; ADDITIONS, 132 137d-138b; 171 146b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 198b-199c; PART I, 207d-208c, 213b-214d; PART II, 261d-262c; 271d-272a; PART III, 301c-302d; PART IV, 327a-328a; 342a-d; 363c-365e
54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 780b-d

2. The notion of a constitution

2a. The constitution as the form or organization of a political community: arrangement of offices; division of functions

7 Plato: Laws, BK VI, 697a-705c esp 697a
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 1 [1274b36-37] 471b; CH 3 [1276b35-c14] 473b-c; CH 6 [1278b10-14] 475d; CH 7 476c-477a passim, esp [1279a25-27] 476c; BK IV, CH 3 [1289b15-17] 488a; CH 3 [1290a8-12] 489a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, ANS 307d-309d
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH X-XIV 55a-64c passim; CH XVII, SECT 198 70d-71a; CH XIX, SECT 212-220 74a-75d
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 69d-75a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 406b,d-410a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 1a; 521c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 562b-c
42 Kant: Science of Right, 435a-439a; 450d-452a / Judgement, 557d [fn 2]
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: 11a-20a,c esp ARTICLE I-III 11a-16a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125a-128b passim; NUMBER 47-83 153c-251a passim
43 Mill: Liberty, 321b-c / Representative Government, 327b,d-332d passim; 355b-356a; 401d-402a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 267 84b; PAR 269 84d; PAR 271-273 89c-92a; PAR 290 97d; ADDITIONS, 161 143a-b; 164 144c-145a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-175c

2b. The constitution as the fundamental law: its relation to other laws, as a source or measure of legality or justice

7 Plato: Republic, BK VI, 380b-c / Laws, BK IV, 681b-682c
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 3 [1276b1-15] 473b-c; CH 11 [1282b1-13] 480b-c; BK IV, CH 1 [1289a13-25] 488a-b; CH 11 [1295b40-1296a1] 495c; BK V, CH 9 [1310a12-35] 512b-c; BK VIII, CH 1 [1337a7-19] 542a
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 101a-104d; 138b-c
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XIX, SECT 212 74a-b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I-II, 2d-6b; BK V, 18b,d-25c; BK XXVI, 214b,d; BK XXIX, 265d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 358b-d / Social Contract, BK II, 405d-406d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 113b-115a esp 114b-d / Science of Right, 435a-441d esp 435c-436b, 437c-d, 438d-441d; 450d-452a
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: XIII-CONCLUSION 9c-d
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 8 13a-d esp [254-259] 13c-d; ARTICLE VI [583-590] 16d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 33, 107b-109b; NUMBER 44, 146d-147a; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 78, 229d-233c; NUMBER 80, 236d-237a; NUMBER 81, 237d-238b
43 Mill: Representative Government, 430a-431a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 260-269 82a-84d; PAR 274 92a; PAR 298 99c; PAR 349 111d-112a; ADDITIONS, 166 145b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-175c; PART IV, 364b

3. The relation of constitutional government to other forms of government

3a. The combination of constitutional with absolute government: the mixed regime; constitutional or limited monarchy

5 Aeschylus: Suppliant Maidens [359-422] 5b-6b; [600-624] 8d-9a
5 Euripides: Suppliants [339-358] 261b-c
6 Herodotus: History, BK IV, 152d-153b
7 Plato: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 667a-676b
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 14 483a-484a; CH 15-16 484b-486c esp CH 15 [1286b31]-CH 16 [1287a8] 485b-c; BK V, CH 11 [1313a18-33] 515d-516a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 [1365b39-1366a2] 608b
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 34b-35d / Dion, 800c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 59d
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH IV 7a-8a; CH XIX, 27a-b; 29c-d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 103d-104b; 106d-107c; 151c-152a; PART III, 228a-b
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 94 46a-c; CH X, SECT 132 55a-b; CH XI 55b-58b; CH XIII 59b-62b passim; CH XIV 62b-64c; CH XVIII, SECT 199-206 71a-72c; CH XIX 73d-81d passim, esp SECT 213 74b-c
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 216b
37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 266d
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 7c-8c; BK III, 11c-12b; 13c; BK VI, 36a-b; BK IX, 58b,d-60a; BK XI, 69a-77b esp 69d-75a; BK XIX, 142a-146a,c
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 357b-c / Social Contract, BK III, 414d-415b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 26d-28b; 622d-623a
42 Kant: Science of Right, 439c-440a; 441b-c; 450a-452a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125c; NUMBER 43, 141a-d; NUMBER 47, 154a-c; NUMBER 69, 207a-210c passim; NUMBER 70, 213b-c; NUMBER 71, 216a-b; NUMBER 84, 252b-c
43 Mill: Liberty, 267d-268c / Representative Government, 343c-344a; 351a-c; 353d-354b; 401d-402b
44 Boswell: Johnson, 178a-b; 255a-d; 390a-b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 273 90c-92a; PAR 275-286 92a-97a; ADDITIONS, 170-172 145d-146d / Philosophy of History, PART I, 208b-c; PART IV, 342b-d; 368c-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 238c-243d; BK IX, 384c-388a,c passim

3b. The merits of constitutional government compared with royal government and the mixed regime

5 Euripides: Suppliants [391-460] 261d-262b
6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107c-108c
7 Plato: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 672c-676c; BK IV, 681d-682c; BK IX, 754a-b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 6 [1134a24-b17] 382a-c / Politics, BK I, CH 5 [1254a24-b24] 447d-448b; CH 7 [1255b16-20] 449b; CH 13 [1259b32-1260b7] 454b-455a,c; BK III, CH 7 476c-477a; CH 15-17 484b-487a; BK IV, CH 2 [1289a26-b10] 488b-c; CH 10-11 495a-496d; BK V, CH 8 [1308a10-30] 510d-511a
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b-c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 151c-152a
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 13 28a-b; CH VII, SECT 87-94 44a-46c; CH XI 55b-58b; CH XIV, SECT 162-163 63a-b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 216b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 7c-9a,c; BK III, 12a-13c; BK IV, 13b,d-15c; BK V, 25d-31b; BK VI, 33a-35a; 36a-b; 37d-38c; BK VIII, 45c-46a; 47d-48a; BK XI, 69a-75d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 356b-359c / Social Contract, BK I, 387b,d-391b; BK III, 408b-c; 412c-414d
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b; 32b-34a,c; 68b,d-69b; 521d; 522c-523a,c; 523d-524a
42 Kant: Science of Right, 439c-440a; 450a-452a / Judgement, 586a-587a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 6, 40a-41a; NUMBER 69, 207a-210c passim
43 Mill: Liberty, 267d-269a / Representative Government, 338d-340d; 341d-350a; 351a-354a; 363b-366a; 436b-437a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 301, 101a; ADDITIONS, 180 148b / Philosophy of History, PART I, 213b-214d; PART IV, 359b

4. The constitutional conception of political office: the qualifications and duties of public officials

7 Plato: Laws, BK VI, 697a-705c
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK I, CH 12 [1259b1-9] 454a; BK II, CH 9 [1270b7-1271a18] 466d-467b; CH 10 [1272a35-b10] 468d-469a; BK III, CH 6 [1278b30-1279a22] 476a-c; CH 11 479b-480c passim; CH 12 [1282b15]-CH 13 [1284a2] 480c-482a; BK IV, CH 3 [1290a5-13] 489a; CH 14-16 498b-502a,c; BK V, CH 9 [1309a33-b14] 511c-d; BK VI, CH 4 [1318b21-1319a4] 522b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 [1365b31-36] 608a
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 45c / Cato the Younger, 625b-627b / Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK XI, 105d-107b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 3 207a-c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 122b-124b
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT II, SC I-II 364a-369a
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 94 46a-c; CH IX, SECT 131 54d; CH XII, SECT 143 58c-d; CH XIII 59b-62b; CH XVII, SECT 198 70d-71a; CH XIX, SECT 221-222 75d-76c
36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART I, 28b-29b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 71a-72a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324d-325b; 356a-c; 358b-d / Social Contract, BK III, 423c-424d; BK IV, 427a-428a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 26d-27a; 27d-28a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 73d; 94c-95c; 563d-564b; 586c-587a
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: V 5d-6a; IX [299-310] 8b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 2-6 11b-12d; ARTICLE II-III, SECT 1 14b-15c; ARTICLE VI [583-599] 16d; AMENDMENTS, XII 18a-c; XIV, SECT 2-3 18d-19a; XX-XXI 19d-20a,c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125c-126b; NUMBER 52-80 165a-237d passim, esp NUMBER 57, 176d-177a
43 Mill: Liberty, 268b-c; 320c-323a,c / Representative Government, 354b-362c; 363a-b; 365b-366a; 398d-406a; 409d-417c passim
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 277 92b-c; PAR 293-297 98b-99b; ADDITIONS, 169 145d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 241c-242b

5. The diversity of constitutions among the forms of government

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107c-108c
7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII-IX, 401d-421a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK IV, 679c-682c
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 10 [1160a31-b22] 412c-413a / Politics, BK II, CH 7-11 461d-470b; BK III, CH 5 [1278a3-33] 475a-c; CH 6-9 475d-478d esp CH 8 [1279b17]-CH 9 [1280a33] 477a-d; BK IV, CH 2 [1289b13]-CH 9 [1294b11] 488c-494c; CH 11-12 495b-497b; CH 14 [1297b37-1298a40] 498b-499c; BK V, CH 1 [1301a25-35] 502b; BK VI 520a-526d; BK VII, CH 8-10 532c-534d / Athenian Constitution, CH 41 571c-572a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 608a-c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, ANS 307c-309d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 104d-108a
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH X, SECT 132 55a-b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a-8c; BK III, 9a-12a; BK V, 18d-19d; 23a-c; BK XI, 75d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 359a-d / Social Contract, BK III, 419b-c; BK IV, 427a-428a
42 Kant: Science of Right, 450b-d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 51c-52d passim; NUMBER 14, 60b-d; NUMBER 39, 125b-c
43 Mill: Representative Government, 355b-356b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 273-274, 90d-92a; ADDITIONS, 166 145b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-175c; PART IV, 367c-368b

5a. The justice of different constitutions: the extent and character of citizenship under each

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107c-108c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 395d-399a; BK VI, 520b-c
7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII-IX, 401d-421a / Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK III, 667c-676b; BK IV, 679c-680d; BK VIII, 733d-734a
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK V, CH 3 [1131a24-29] 378d; CH 7 [1135a2-4] 382d; BK VIII, CH 10-11 412c-413d / Politics, BK III, CH 1-2 471b,d-472d; CH 5 475a-d; CH 9 477c-478d; CH 13 [1283b44-1284a3] 482a; BK IV, CH 3 488d-489b; CH 8-9 493c-494d; BK V, CH 1 [1301a25-1302a15] 502b-503b; CH 3 [1303b5-8] 505a; BK VI, CH 3 521c-522a; CH 4 [1319a2-32] 523a-b; CH 6 524b-c / Athenian Constitution, CH 2 553a-c; CH 12 557b-558a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 8 [1365b31-1366a6] 608a-b
12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK I, SECT 14 254b-c
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, ANS 307d-309d
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a-8c; BK III, 9a-11a; BK V, 18b,d-25a; 31b-33a,c passim; BK VI 33a-43d; BK XI, 68b,d-75a; BK XII, 84b,d-85c; BK XIII, 99b-100c
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 405a-406a
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK IV, 271a-b
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 616d-617d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81d-82a; 223c-224a; 403b-404d
42 Kant: Pure Reason, 114b-d / Science of Right, 401b-402a; 436d-437c; 450b-451d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 51c-52d; NUMBER 57, 176d-179b
43 Mill: Representative Government, 350a; 370a-372b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 274 92a; ADDITIONS, 166 145b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-175c; PART III, 272a-d; 273d-274a; 275b-276a; PART IV, 367c-368b

5b. The mixed constitution: its advantages

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VIII, 590a-b
7 Plato: Laws, BK III, 667a-676b; BK IV, 680d-681a; BK VI, 699d-700b
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 6 [1265b25-1266a30] 461b-d esp [1265b33-39] 461b; CH 11 [1272b24]-CH 12 [1274a13] 469b-470d; BK IV, CH 8-9 493c-494d; CH 11-12 495b-497b; BK V, CH 7 [1307a5-28] 509a-b; CH 8 [1308b10-1309a32] 510d-511c
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 34d-35d / Dion, 800c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK IV, 72a; BK VI, 97b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A 1, ANS 307d-309d
23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XIX, 27a-b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART III, 228a-b
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH X, SECT 132 55a-b
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 216b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK IX, 58b,d-60a; BK XI 68b,d-84d esp 69d-75a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 410c; 414d-415b; BK IV, 427a-c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b; 630b,d-631a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71d; 81c-d; 218c-219a; 403c-d; 404c-d; 428a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125c
43 Mill: Representative Government, 355b-356b; 401d-402b

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 14a-c; BK IV, 152d-153b
7 Plato: Republic, BK II, 311b-c / Statesman, 603c / Laws, BK I, 664a-667d / Seventh Letter, 807a-b
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK I, CH 2 445b-446d esp [1253a30] 446d; BK II, CH 12 470b-471d; BK III, CH 15 [1286a8-22] 484d-485a; BK IV, CH 13 [1297b16-28] 498a / Athenian Constitution 553a-584a,c esp CH 5-12 554d-558a, CH 29-31 566b-567d, CH 41 571c-572a
12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [1011-1027] 74b-c
14 Plutarch: Theseus, 9a-d / Romulus, 20c-28a / Lycurgus 32a-48d esp 33c-35d, 47a-c / Solon, 68a-74b / Poplicola-Solon, 86a-87b
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b-c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 84c-90d; 97c-d; PART II, 99a-104d; 109b-c; 133b; PART III, 200a-b
25 Montaigne: Essays, 462d-463b
31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a
35 Locke: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Government, CH VI, SECT 76 42a; CH VII, SECT 87 44a-b; CH VIII 46c-53c esp SECT 96-97 47a-b; CH X, SECT 132 55a-b; CH XI, SECT 141 58a-b; CH XV, SECT 171 65a-b; CH XVI, SECT 175 65d; CH XIX, SECT 220 75c-d; SECT 243 81d
36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 216b; 262a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK IX, 58b,d-60a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 353c-355b; 358b-d / Political Economy, 370b-d / Social Contract, BK I, 391a-393c; BK II, 400a-402a; BK III, 423a-424d
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71d-72d; 403b-c; 562b-c
42 Kant: Science of Right, 434b-c; 435a-436c; 437c-d; 439a-441d; 450d-452a esp 450d-451c
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-28] 1a-b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE 11a,c; ARTICLE VII [604-610] 17a,c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 1, 29a-b; NUMBER 2, 32a-33b; NUMBER 22, 84d-85a; NUMBER 37-38, 117d-124a; NUMBER 40, 128b-132a; NUMBER 49, 159b-c; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 78, 232a-c
43 Mill: Liberty, 302d-303a / Representative Government, 327b,d-332d passim
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 258, 80d-81b; PAR 273, 91d-92a; ADDITIONS, 116 135c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 173a-175c; PART IV, 365c-366b
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 680b-684a

7. The preservation of constitutions: factors tending toward their dissolution

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK II, 396c-d
7 Plato: Republic, BK VI, 380b-c; BK VIII-IX, 401d-421a esp BK VIII, 403a-404a, 405c-406a, 408b-409b, 411d-414b / Laws, BK III, 667c-676b; BK XII, 786c-787d; 794a-799a,c / Seventh Letter, 801b-c; 806d-807b
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 9 [1270b7-26] 466d-467a; CH 10 [1272a35-b11] 468d-469a; BK IV, CH 11-12 495b-497b; BK V 502a-519d passim, esp CH 7-9 508c-512d, CH 11 515d-518c; BK VI, CH 5 [1319b33-1320a4] 523b-c; BK VII, CH 9 [1329a3-12] 533b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 4 [1360a20-29] 600c
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 35c-d; 47a-48a / Coriolanus, 180b-d / Lysander, 361a-d / Agesilaus, 482a-c; 495c-d / Agis, 649b-c
15 Tacitus: Histories, BK I, 210d-212d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, AA 2-3 236d-238b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 148c-153a; 154b-c
25 Montaigne: Essays, 47a-51a; 318c-319b; 462c-465c; 504c-506a
26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar 568a-596a,c
30 Bacon: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 90, 125a / New Atlantis, 205d-207b
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VIII, SECT 97-98 47a-c; CH XIII, SECT 155 60d-61a; CH XIV, SECT 162-168 63a-64c; CH XVIII, SECT 203-210 72a-73c; CH XIX, SECT 223-225 76c-77a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK III, 9b-10c; BK IV, 15d-16a; BK V, 21d-22b; BK VIII, 44d-45b; BK VIII, 51a-57a; BK X, 63b-c; BK XI, 74c-d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 361a-362a / Social Contract, BK II, 403a-404a; 405d-406a; BK III, 408b-c; 418a-421c; BK IV, 432b-435a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 622d-623a
42 Kant: Science of Right, 441b-c; 450d-452a esp 450d-451a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 8, 45a-47a; NUMBER 10, 49c-53a; NUMBER 15-16, 64b-68d; NUMBER 18-22 71a-85a esp NUMBER 20, 77c; NUMBER 25, 91b-d; NUMBER 27-28 94d-98b passim; NUMBER 41, 133a-134c; NUMBER 43, 141a-142d; NUMBER 44, 147a-b; NUMBER 71, 215b-c; NUMBER 78, 229d-233c
43 Mill: Liberty, 320a-c / Representative Government, 327b,d-332d; 350b-356b; 401d-402b; 413c-414d; 425b-d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 120a-c
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 273, 91d-92a / Philosophy of History, PART III, 272c-273a; PART IV, 365c-d; 367c-d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 668a-669c

7a. The relative stability of different types of constitutions

6 Herodotus: History, BK III, 107c-108c
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VIII, 587a-b
7 Plato: Republic, BK VIII-IX, 401d-421a esp BK VIII, 403a-404a, 405c-406a, 408b-409b, 411d-414b / Laws, BK III, 667c-676b / Seventh Letter, 801b-c
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK II, CH 9-11 465b-470b passim; BK III, CH 13 [1284a3-b34] 482a-483a; BK IV, CH 11 [1295b35-1296a2] 496a-c; CH 12 496d-497b; BK V 502a-519d esp CH 1 [1301b5-1302a16] 502d-503b, CH 3 [1302b34-1303a18] 504b-505a, CH 4 [1304a18-b18] 505d-506b, CH 7 [1307a5-27] 509a-b, CH 12 [1315b11-39] 518c-d; BK VI, CH 5 [1319b33-1320a3] 523b-c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK IV, 72a-b / Histories, BK II, 224d-225a
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, ANS 307d-309d
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 105c-106d
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK III, 10c-d; BK VIII, 51a-54b; 57b-c; BK XV, 112c-114a; BK XIX, 142a-143c; 145d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 411b-c; 413d-414c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 48d-49a; 522d-523a,c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 51c-53a; NUMBER 27, 96b; NUMBER 48, 157b-c
43 Mill: Liberty, 321b-c / Representative Government, 355b-356b; 401d-402b
44 Boswell: Johnson, 195c-d; 390a-b

7b. The safeguards of constitutional government: bills of rights; separation of powers; impeachment

14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 34d-35d / Solon, 70c-71c / Coriolanus, 179c-184c / Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 51b-c
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 103d-104a; 150b; 151d-152a
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VIII, SECT 107 49b-d; CH XI, SECT 134-CH XII, SECT 143 55b-58d; CH XIII 59b-62b; CH XVII, SECT 198 70d-71a; CH XIX 73d-81d passim
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 7c-8c; BK V, 29a; 31d; BK VI, 33a-35a; BK VIII, 54b-c; BK XI, 68b,d-75a; 82c-83a; BK XII, 84b,d-85c; BK XIX, 142a-143c
38 Rousseau: Political Economy, 370b-377b / Social Contract, BK III, 407d-408a; 410d-411a; 414d-415b; 423a; 424a-d; BK IV, 432b-433a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b; 25a; 27a-b
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 81c-d; 93a-c; 94c-95c; 96c-d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 435c-441d passim; 450d-452a esp 451d-452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-28] 1a-b; [52-55] 2a; [66-67] 2b; [70-71] 2b; [95-105] 3a
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: V [74]-VI [93] 6a-b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: PREAMBLE 11a,c; ARTICLE I, SECT 2 [45-47] 11d; SECT 3 [81-95] 12a-b; SECT 6 [143] 12c; SECT 7 [169] 12d; SECT 9 [267-275] 13d; [283-295] 13d-14a; SECT 10 [300-303] 14a; ARTICLE II, SECT 1 [331-334] 14b; SECT 4 15c; ARTICLE III, SECT 2 [493]-SECT 3 [511] 15d-16a; ARTICLE IV, SECT 4 16b-c; ARTICLE VI [583-599] 16d; AMENDMENTS, I-X 17a-18a; XII, SECT I-XIV, SECT I 18c-d; XV 19b; XIX 19d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 8, 46c-d; NUMBER 9-10, 47a-53a; NUMBER 21, 78d-79b; NUMBER 25, 90a-b; NUMBER 26-28 92a-98b passim; NUMBER 41, 133a-134c; NUMBER 43, 140c-142d; NUMBER 44, 144d-145a; 146c-d; NUMBER 46-51, 151a-165a; NUMBER 53, 167b-168b; NUMBER 55, 173b-174c; NUMBER 57, 176d-178b passim; NUMBER 58, 180d; NUMBER 62, 189d-191c; NUMBER 63, 192c-193c; NUMBER 65-66, 198a-203a; NUMBER 68, 205d-206a; NUMBER 69, 207b-d; NUMBER 73, 218d-221c; NUMBER 76, 226a-227b; NUMBER 78, 229d-233c; NUMBER 80, 236a-b; NUMBER 81, 237d-239c; NUMBER 83-84 244b-256a
43 Mill: Liberty, 267d-268b; 269a-c / Representative Government, 355b-356b; 361b; 365b-366a; 369b-389b; 392b-401a; 401d-402b; 406c-407d; 412b-c
44 Boswell: Johnson, 195c-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 272 89d-90c; PAR 286 96c-97a; ADDITIONS, 164 144c-145a; 184 149a / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 368c-d

8. The change of constitutions

8a. Methods of changing a constitution: revolution, amendment

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK VIII, 575c-577d
7 Plato: Republic, BK VII, 401c-d; BK VIII-IX, 401d-421a esp BK VIII, 403a-404a, 405c-406a, 408b-409b, 411d-414b / Seventh Letter, 800b-801b; 804a-b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK VIII, CH 10 [1160a31-b22] 412c-413a / Politics, BK II, CH 12 [1273b36-1274a22] 470c-d; BK III, CH 3 [1276a35-b15] 473b-c; BK IV, CH 1 [1288b43-1289a8] 487d-488a; CH 5 [1292b12-22] 492a; BK V, CH 1-2 502a-503d; CH 3 [1303a14-24] 504c-d; CH 4 [1304b8]-CH 7 [1307a25] 506b-509d / Athenian Constitution, CH 5 554d-555a; CH 29 566b-d; CH 33-34 568b-569a; CH 38 570a-c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 6a-b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 97, A 3 237b-238b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 150c-151a; CONCLUSION, 280c-281a
25 Montaigne: Essays, 47a-51a; 462c-465c
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XIX 73d-81d passim
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 77a; 77d
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 424a-d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 441b-c; 450d-451a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-28] 1a-b; [95-108] 3a
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: XIII 9c
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE V 16c; AMENDMENTS, XVIII, SECT 3 19d; XX, SECT 6, XXI, SECT 3 20c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 14, 62a-d; NUMBER 21, 78d-79b; NUMBER 39-40, 127d-132a; NUMBER 43, 143a-b; NUMBER 49-50, 159b-162c; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 78, 232a-c; NUMBER 85, 257a-259a
43 Mill: Liberty, 321a-b / Representative Government, 327b,d-332d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 273-274, 91d-92a; ADDITIONS, 161 143a-b; 166 145b-c; 176 147c-d / Philosophy of History, PART IV, 364a-c
50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 424c-d; 425b-c; 432b-c

8b. The violation and overthrow of constitutional government

6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK III, 438a-b; BK VIII, 579c-583c; 585d-586b; 587a-589a; 590a-c
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK IV, CH 4 [1292a5-37] 491b-d; CH 5 [1292b6-11] 492a; CH 6 [1293a1-10] 492c; [1293a27-34] 492d-493a; BK V, CH 5-7 506b-509d; BK VI, CH 4 [1319a2-31] 523a-b; CH 6 [1320b29-37] 524c / Athenian Constitution, CH 14-19 558d-561d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 4 [1360a17-29] 600c
14 Plutarch: Coriolanus, 180b-d / Lysander, 361a-362a / Agesilaus, 482a-c; 495c-d / Pompey 499a-538a,c / Caesar 577a-604d esp 578b-c / Cato the Younger, 629d-639c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 1a-2a; 3a-b; 23c / Histories, BK I, 210d-212d
25 Montaigne: Essays, 47a-51a; 318c-319b; 462c-465c; 504c-506a
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XII, SECT 149 59b-d; SECT 155 60d-61a; CH XVI-XIX 65d-81d passim
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 51a-52c; 53c-d; BK XI, 82c-83a
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 358b-359d / Social Contract, BK III, 407c; 408b-c; 418a-419c
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b; 51c-d; 153c-154b; 592a
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 74b-d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 450d-451a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 16, 68a-c; NUMBER 20, 77c; NUMBER 21, 78d-79b; NUMBER 25, 91b-d; NUMBER 26, 93c-94d; NUMBER 28, 96c-98b; NUMBER 44, 146c-d; NUMBER 47-48, 153c-159a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 350c-351c
44 Boswell: Johnson, 176a-b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 300b-301c
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK I, 8d-10d

9. The theory of representation

9 Aristotle: Politics, BK IV, CH 8 [1294a9-15] 493d-494a; CH 14 498b-499c passim, esp [1298a21-22] 499b
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 90, A 3, ANS and REP 2 207a-c; Q 97, A 3, REP 3 237b-238b
23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 96c-98a,c; PART II, 101a-b; 105a-c; 117b-121a; 153a-159c
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 88-89 44c-d; CH XI, SECT 140 58a; CH XIX, SECT 222 75d-76c; SECT 240 81b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 4c-5a
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK II, 396b-d; BK III, 421c-423a
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK IV, 269d-271d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 451c-452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [41-47] 2a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I 11a-14b passim
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 51d-53a esp 51d-52a; NUMBER 14, 60a-61b; NUMBER 35, 113a-114b; NUMBER 52-66 165a-203a passim, esp NUMBER 57, 176d-178b, NUMBER 63, 193c-194a; NUMBER 76, 227a; NUMBER 78, 231a-c
43 Mill: Liberty, 268b-c / Representative Government 327a-442d passim, esp 338a-b, 355b-362c, 370a-372b, 401a-406a
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 301-303 100b-102a; PAR 308-311 102c-104a; ADDITIONS, 182 148c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 175b-c

9a. The functions and duties of representatives: their relation to their constituents

23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 97c-98a,c; PART II, 105a-c
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH XII, SECT 143 58c-d
36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART II, 73a-74b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI, 71a-c
38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 421c-423a
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 522c-d
42 Kant: Science of Right, 438d-439a; 441b-c; 450a-b; 451d-452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [35-47] 1b-2a; [109-121] 3a-b
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: V [49-58] 5d; IX-X 7a-9a; CONCLUSION 9c-d
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I 11a-14b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 10, 51d-52c; NUMBER 28, 97b-d; NUMBER 35-36, 113a-115a; NUMBER 44, 146c-d; NUMBER 48, 157c; NUMBER 49, 160c-d; NUMBER 52-66 165a-203a passim, esp NUMBER 53, 168b-169d, NUMBER 62, 190a-b, NUMBER 63, 192b-193a; NUMBER 78, 231a-c
43 Mill: Representative Government, 351a-c; 353b; 355b-362c; 400a-406a
44 Boswell: Johnson, 86a-b; 176a-b

9b. Types of representation: diverse methods of selecting representatives

7 Plato: Laws, BK VI, 697a-705c; BK XII, 786b-787b
9 Aristotle: Politics, BK III, CH 10 478d-479a; CH 13 [1283a21-b34] 481b-d; BK IV, CH 9 [1294b6-13] 494c; CH 14 498b-499c; CH 15 [1300a9-b4] 500d-501b; BK VI, CH 2 [1317b2-16] 520d; CH 3 [1318a19-b5] 521c-522a; CH 4 [1318b21-26] 522b
14 Plutarch: Lycurgus, 45c-46a
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus, ACT II 361a-369a
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VIII, SECT 95-99 46c-47c; CH XIII, SECT 154-158 60c-62b; CH XIX, SECT 216 74d
36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART II, 73a-74b
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK II, 4a-6d; BK XI, 71a-d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 324c-325b / Social Contract, BK I, 391b; BK IV, 425d-428a esp 426c-427a
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: V [49-73] 5d-6a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 2 [5]-SECT 4 [102] 11b-12b; SECT 5 [107-115] 12b; AMENDMENTS, XII 18a-c; XIV, SECT 2 18d-19a; XVII 19b-c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 22, 82a-c; NUMBER 35, 113a-114b, NUMBER 52-63 165a-195b passim, esp NUMBER 54, 170a-172b, NUMBER 62, 188d-191c; NUMBER 68, 205b-207a
43 Mill: Representative Government, 369b-399d; 407d-409c; 412a-414d
44 Boswell: Johnson, 176a-b; 251a; 261c-d
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 311-313 103d-104b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 172d-173c; PART II, 277c-d; PART IV, 365a; 368a-b

10. The origin, growth, and vicissitudes of constitutional government

6 Herodotus: History, BK IV, 152d-153b
6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 396b-397d; BK III, 432b-c; 438a-b; BK VIII, 575c-576c; 579c-583c; 585d-586b; 587a-589a; 590a-c
7 Plato: Laws, BK III, 667c-676b
9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 9 [1181b13-24] 436c / Politics, BK II, CH 12 470b-471d; BK III, CH 15 [1286b8-21] 484d-485a; BK IV, CH 13 [1297b16-28] 498a; BK V, CH 4 [1304a18-38] 505d-506a; CH 5-7 506b-509d / Athenian Constitution, CH 1-41 553a-572a passim, esp CH 41 571c-572a
14 Plutarch: Theseus, 9a-d / Romulus, 20c-28a / Lycurgus 32a-48d / Solon 64b,d-77a,c / Poplicola, 77a-82a / Poplicola-Solon, 86a-87b / Coriolanus 174b,d-193a,c esp 176b-184c / Lysander, 365a-368a,c / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c / Agis 648b,d-656d / Cleomenes, 657a-663c / Tiberius Gracchus 671b,d-681a,c / Caius Gracchus 681b,d-689a,c
15 Tacitus: Annals, BK I, 1a-2a; 3a-b; 21b-22d; BK III, 51b-c; BK IV, 72a-b; BK VI, 97b / Histories, BK I, 210d-212d
20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 105, A 1, ANS 307d-309d
27 Shakespeare: Coriolanus 351a-392a,c
32 Milton: Sonnets, XII 65a-b / To the Lord General Fairfax 68b-69a
35 Locke: Civil Government, CH VII, SECT 94 46a-c; CH VIII, SECT 100-111 47c-51a passim; CH XIV, SECT 162-166 63a-64a
36 Swift: Gulliver’s Travels, PART II, 74a-76b; PART III, 120a
38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK XI 68b,d-84d
38 Rousseau: Inequality, 356a-b; 357b-c / Social Contract, BK III, 420a-c; BK IV, 428a-434b
39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK IV, 269d-271d
40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 1a; 24b,d-28a; 51a-d; 153c-154b; 241b-244a passim, 521a-523a,c; 622d-623c
41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 71d-75b esp 71d-72a, 73b-c; 202a-d, 217a-b; 403b-404d; 562b-565a, 574b-582b; 586c-589a esp 587a
42 Kant: Science of Right, 451d-452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: 5a-9d
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: 11a-20a,c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 2, 31a-33b; NUMBER 9, 47a-d; NUMBER 18-20, 71a-78b passim; NUMBER 37-38, 117d-125a; NUMBER 40, 128b-132a; NUMBER 48, 156d-159a; NUMBER 52, 165d-167b; NUMBER 63, 191d-195b passim; NUMBER 85, 256a-259a,c
43 Mill: Liberty, 267b,d-268c
44 Boswell: Johnson, 176a-b
46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 176 147c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 192d-193a; PART II, 275b-276a; PART III, 295d-296c; PART IV, 335a-336c; 362b-368d
51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 238c-243d; 260b-c; EPILOGUE I, 668a-669c

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

Other considerations of the distinction between government by law and government by men, and for the comparison of constitutional government with other forms of government, see ARISTOCRACY 4; LAW 6b, 7a-7b; LIBERTY 1d, 1f; MONARCHY 1a-1a(2), 4c-4e(4); TYRANNY 5-5d.
The exposition of different types of constitutions and different forms of constitutional government in themselves and in relation to one another, see ARISTOCRACY 1-2e; CITIZEN 2c-3; DEMOCRACY 3-3c, 4a(1)-4a(2), 4d; OLIGARCHY 1-2, 4, 5a.
Other discussions of the mixed regime and the mixed constitution, see ARISTOCRACY 2b; DEMOCRACY 3a-3b; GOVERNMENT 2b; MONARCHY 1b(1)-1b(2).
The idea of citizenship in relation to constitutional government, see CITIZEN 2a-2b; and for the conception of the statesman as a constitutional office-holder, see STATE 8.
The conception of constitutional law and its relation to other bodies of law and legal justice, see JUSTICE 9c, 10a; LAW 7a.
Matters relevant to the conventional character of constitutions and the relation of the idea of a constitution to the theory of the social contract, see CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 6a; LAW 2c; NATURE 2b; STATE 3d.
Constitutional government in relation to the theory of sovereignty, see DEMOCRACY 4b; GOVERNMENT 1g(1)-1g(3); LAW 6b; MONARCHY 4e(3); STATE 2c; TYRANNY 5c.
Other discussions of the safeguards of constitutional government and of the theory and machinery of representation, see ARISTOCRACY 6; DEMOCRACY 4b, 5-5c; GOVERNMENT 1h; LIBERTY 1g.
The problem of constitutional change and the stability of different types of constitution, see ARISTOCRACY 3; DEMOCRACY 7-7a; REVOLUTION 2a, 3c(2); STATE 3g.
The issues involved in the development of constitutional government and the establishment of liberty under law, see GOVERNMENT 6; LIBERTY 6b; MONARCHY 4e(2); PROGRESS 4a; REVOLUTION 3a; TYRANNY 4b, 8.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

Machiavelli. The Discourses, BK I
Milton. The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates
Hume. Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth
J. Adams. A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America
Paine. Rights of Man
Burke. Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol
—. On the Reform of the Representation in the House of Commons
—. An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs
—. Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe
Godwin. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, BK VI, CH 7
Jefferson. Notes on the State of Virginia
Calhoun. A Disquisition on Government
—. A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States
Tocqueville. Democracy in America
—. L’ancien régime (The Ancient Regime)

II.

Polybius. Histories, VOL I, BK VI
Cicero. De Republica (The Republic)
Marsilius of Padua. Defensor Pacis
Fortescue. Governance of England
Guicciardini. Dialogo e discorsi del reggimento di Firenze
Bodin. The Six Bookes of a Commonweale
Bellarmine. The Treatise on Civil Government (De Laicis)
Hooker. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity
Bolingbroke. Dissertation upon Parties, LETTER 18
Vattel. The Law of Nations, BK I, CH 3
J. Wilson. Works, PART I, CH II, V, X-XI; PART II
Bentham. Fragment on Government, CH I (36-48), III
Sieyès. Discours dans les débats constitutionels de l’an III
Whewell. The Elements of Morality, BK V, CH 47-5
Bagehot. The English Constitution
Dicey. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution
Mosca. The Ruling Class
Jellinek. Allgemeine Staatslehre
Bryce. The American Commonwealth
—. Studies in History and Jurisprudence
Beard. The Supreme Court and the Constitution
Duguit. Law in the Modern State
Farrand. The Framing of the Constitution of the United States
J. Dickinson. Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States
Merriam. The Written Constitution and the Unwritten Attitude
McIlwain. The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy
—. Constitutionalism and the Changing World
—. Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern
Kelsen. General Theory of Law and State
Rossiter. Constitutional Dictatorship
Borgese et al. Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution

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