Chapter 8: CAUSE

INTRODUCTION

EXPLANATION is an inveterate human tendency. Even philosophers who think that we cannot attain to knowledge of causes get involved in explaining why that is so. Nor will their disputes about the theory of causes ever remove the word “because” from the vocabulary of common speech. It is as unavoidable as the word “is.” “The impulse to seek causes,” says Tolstoy, “is innate in the soul of man.”

The question “Why?” remains after all other questions are answered. It is sometimes the only unanswerable question—unanswerable either in the very nature of the case or because there are secrets men cannot fathom. Sometimes, as Dante says, man must be “content with the quia,” the knowledge that something is without knowing why. “Why?” is the one question which it has been deemed the better part of wisdom not to ask; yet it has also been thought the one question which holds the key to wisdom. As Virgil writes, in one of his most famous lines, Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas (Happy the man who has been able to know the causes of things).

The question “Why?” takes many forms and can be answered in many ways. Other knowledge may prove useful in providing the answers. A definition, for example, which tells us what a thing is, may explain why it behaves as it does or why it has certain properties. A narrative, which tells us how something happened by describing a succession of events, may also be part of the total explanation of some event in question.

In other circumstances, a demonstration or a statement of grounds or reasons may be explanatory. “How do you know?” is often a concealed form of the “Why” question. To answer it we may have to give our reasons for thinking that something or other is the case; or perhaps give the genesis of our opinion. Things as different as a logical demonstration and a piece of autobiography seem to be relevant in accounting for our convictions; as, in accounting for our behavior, we may refer to our purposes and to our past.

THE GREEK WORD for cause, from which our English word “aetiology” is derived, came into the vocabulary of science and philosophy from the language of the law courts. In its legal sense it was used to point out where the responsibility lay. A suit at law is based upon a cause of action; he who demands redress for an injury suffered is expected to place the blame. The charge of responsibility for wrongdoing—the blame or fault which is the cause for legal redress or punishment—naturally calls for excuses, which may include a man’s motives.

In the context of these legal considerations, two different meanings of cause begin to appear. One man’s act is the cause of injury to another, in the sense of being responsible for its occurrence. If the act was intentional, it probably had a cause in the purpose which motivated it.

These two types of cause appear in the explanations of the historians as well as in trials at law. Herodotus and Thucydides, trying to account for the Persian or the Peloponnesian war, enumerate the incidents which led up to the outbreak of hostilities. They cite certain past events as the causes of war—the factors which predisposed the parties toward conflict, and even precipitated it. The historians do not think they can fully explain why the particular events become the occasions for war except by considering the hopes and ambitions, or, as Thucydides suggests, the fears of the contestants. For the ancient historians at least, finding the causes includes a search for the motives which underlie other causes and help to explain how other factors get their causal efficacy.

Thucydides explicitly distinguishes these two kinds of causes in the first chapter of his history. After noting that the “immediate cause” of the war was the breaking of a treaty, he adds that the “real cause” was one “which was formally most kept out of sight,” namely, the “growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon.”

It is sometimes supposed that Thucydides owes his conception of causes to the early medical tradition. That might very well be the case, for Hippocrates constantly seeks the “natural causes” of disease; and in his analysis of the various factors involved in any particular disease, he tries to distinguish between the predisposing and the exciting causes.

But the classification of causes was not completed in the Athenian law courts, in the Greek interpretation of history, or in the early practice of medicine. Causes were also the preoccupation of the pre-Socratic physicists. Their study of nature was largely devoted to an analysis of the principles, elements, and causes of change. Concerned with the problem of change in general, not merely with human action, or particular phenomena such as crime, war, or disease, Greek scientists or philosophers, from Thales and Anaxagoras to Empedocles, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle, tried to discover the causes involved in any change. Aristotle carried the analysis furthest and set a pattern for all later discussions of cause.

THE EXPLANATION OF a thing, according to Aristotle, must answer all of the queries “comprehended under the question ‘why.’” This question can be answered, he thinks, in at least four different ways, and these four ways of saying why something is the case constitute his famous theory of the four causes.

“In one sense,” he writes, “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called ‘cause’”—the material cause. “In another sense, the form or the archetype” is a cause—the formal cause. “Again the primary source of the change or coming to rest” is a cause—the efficient cause. “Again the end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done” is a cause—the final cause. “This,” he concludes, “perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term ‘cause’ is used.”

The production of works of art, to which Aristotle himself frequently turns for examples, most readily illustrates these four different kinds of causes. In making a shoe, the material cause is that out of which the shoe is made—the leather or hide. The efficient cause is the shoemaker, or more precisely the shoemaker’s acts which transform the raw material into the finished product. The formal cause is the pattern which directs the work; it is, in a sense, the definition or type of the thing to be made, which, beginning as a plan in the artist’s mind, appears at the end of the work in the transformed material as its own intrinsic form. The protection of the foot is the final cause or end—that for the sake of which the shoe was made.

Two of the four causes seem to be less discernible in nature than in art. The material and efficient causes remain evident enough. The material cause can usually be identified as that which undergoes the change—the thing which grows, alters in color, or moves from place to place. The efficient cause is always that by which the change is produced. It is the moving cause working on that which is susceptible to change, e.g., the fire heating the water, the rolling stone setting another stone in motion.

But the formal cause is not as apparent in nature as in art. Whereas in art it can be identified by reference to the plan in the maker’s mind, it must be discovered in nature in the change itself, as that which completes the process. For example, the redness which the apple takes on in ripening is the formal cause of its alteration in color. The trouble with the final cause is that it so often tends to be inseparable from the formal cause; for unless some extrinsic purpose can be found for a natural change—some end beyond itself which the change serves—the final cause, or that for the sake of which the change took place, is no other than the quality or form which the matter assumes as a result of its transformation.

THIS SUMMARY of Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes enables us to note some of the basic issues and shifts in the theory of causation.

The attack on final causes does not, at the beginning at least, reject them completely. Bacon, for example, divides natural philosophy into two parts, of which one part, “physics, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is metaphysics, handleth the formal and final causes.” The error of his predecessors, of which he complains, is their failure to separate these two types of inquiry. The study of final causes is inappropriate in physics, he thinks.

“This misplacing,” Bacon comments, “hath caused a deficiency, or at least a great improficiency in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery.” On this score, he charges Plato, Aristotle, and Galen with impeding the development of science, not because “final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that tract.”

Such statements as “the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight,” or that “the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit,” or that “the clouds are for watering of the earth,” are, in Bacon’s opinion, “impertinent” in physics. He therefore praises the mechanical philosophy of Democritus. It seems to him to inquire into the “particularities of physical causes” better “than that of Aristotle and Plato, whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, the other as a part of logic.”

As Bacon’s criticisms indicate, the attack on final causes in nature raises a whole series of questions. Does every natural change serve some purpose, either for the good of the changing thing or for the order of nature itself? Is there a plan, analogous to that of an artist, which orders the parts of nature, and their activities, to one another as means to ends? A natural teleology, which attributes final causes to everything, seems to imply that every natural thing is governed by an indwelling form working toward a definite end, and that the whole of nature exhibits the working out of a divine plan or design.

Spinoza answers such questions negatively. “Nature has set no end before herself,” he declares, and “all final causes are nothing but human fictions.” Furthermore, he insists, “this doctrine concerning an end altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth the cause it considers as the effect, and vice versa.” He deplores those who “will not cease from asking the causes of causes, until at last you fly to the will of God, the refuge of ignorance.”

Spinoza denies that God acts for an end and that the universe expresses a divine purpose. He also thinks that final causes are illusory even in the sphere of human action. When we say that “having a house to live in was the final cause of this or that house,” we do no more than indicate a “particular desire, which is really an efficient cause, and is considered as primary, because men are usually ignorant of the causes of their desires.”

Though Descartes replies to Pierre Gassendi’s arguments “on behalf of final causality,” by saying that they should “be referred to the efficient cause,” his position more closely resembles that of Bacon than of Spinoza. When we behold “the uses of the various parts in plants and animals,” we may be led to admire “the God who brings these into existence,” but “that does not imply,” he adds, “that we can divine the purpose for which He made each thing. And although in Ethics, where it is often allowable to employ conjecture, it is at times pious to consider the end which we may conjecture God set before Himself in ruling the universe, certainly in Physics, where everything should rest upon the securest arguments, it is futile to do so.”

The elimination of final causes from natural science leads Descartes to formulate Harvey’s discoveries concerning the motion of the heart and blood in purely mechanical terms. But Harvey himself, as Boyle points out in his Disquisition About the Final Causes of Natural Things, interprets organic structures in terms of their functional utility; and Boyle defends the soundness of Harvey’s method—employing final causes—against Descartes.

Guided as it is by the principle of utility or function, Harvey’s reasoning about the circulation of the blood—especially its venal and arterial flow in relation to the action of the lungs—appeals to final causes. He remarks upon the need of arguing from the final cause in his work on animal generation. “It appears advisable to me,” he writes, “to look back from the perfect animal, and to inquire by what process it has arisen and grown to maturity, to retrace our steps, as it were, from the goal to the starting place.”

Kant generalizes this type of argument in his Critique of Teleological Judgement. “No one has ever questioned,” he says, “the correctness of the principle that when judging certain things in nature, namely organisms and their possibility, we must look to the conception of final causes. Such a principle is admittedly necessary even where we require no more than a guiding-thread for the purpose of becoming acquainted with the character of these things by means of observation.” Kant criticizes a mechanism which totally excludes the principle of finality—whether it is based on the doctrine of “blind chance” of Democritus and Epicurus, or the “system of fatality” he attributes to Spinoza. Physical science, he thinks, can be extended by the principle of final causes “without interfering with the principle of the mechanism of physical causality.”

THE TENDENCY TO dispense with final causes seems to prevail, however, in the science of mechanics and especially in the domain of inanimate nature. Huygens, for example, defines light as “the motion of some sort of matter.” He explicitly insists that conceiving natural things in this way is the only way proper to what he calls the “true Philosophy, in which one conceives the causes of all natural effects in terms of mechanical motions.”

Mechanical explanation is distinguished by the fact that it appeals to no principles except matter and motion. The material and the moving (or efficient) causes suffice. The philosophical thought of the 17th century, influenced by that century’s brilliant accomplishments in mechanics, tends to be mechanistic in its theory of causation. Yet, being also influenced by the model and method of mathematics, thinkers like Descartes and Spinoza retain the formal cause as a principle of demonstration, if not of explanation. Spinoza, in fact, claims that the reliance upon final causes “would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity, if mathematics, which does not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had not placed before us another rule of truth.”

Nevertheless, the tendency to restrict causality to efficiency—a motion producing a motion—gains headway. By the time Hume questions man’s ability to know causes, the term cause signifies only efficiency, understood as the energy expended in producing an effect. Hume’s doubt concerning our ability to know causes presupposes this conception of cause and effect, which asserts that “there is some connection between them, some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other.” The identification of cause with the efficient type of cause becomes a commonly accepted notion, even among those who do not agree with Hume that “we are ignorant . . . of the manner in which bodies operate on each other”; and that “their force and energy is entirely incomprehensible” to us.

The narrowing of causality to efficiency also appears in the doctrine, more prevalent today than ever before, that natural science describes, but does not explain—that it tells us how things happen, but not why. If it does not require the scientist to avoid all reference to causes, it does limit him to the one type of causality which can be expressed in terms of sequences and correlations. The exclusion of all causes except the efficient tends furthermore to reduce the causal order to nothing but the relation of cause and effect.

The four causes taken together as the sufficient reason for things or events do not as such stand in relation to an effect, in the sense in which an effect is something separable from and externally related to its cause. That way of conceiving causation—as a relation of cause to effect—is appropriate to the efficient cause alone. When the efficient cause is regarded as the only cause, having a power proportionate to the reality of its effect, the very meaning of cause involves relation to an effect.

In the other conception of causation, the causal order relates the four causes to one another. Of the four causes of any change or act, the first, says Aquinas, “is the final cause; the reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent, for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except from the intention of an end.” Hence in operation the order of the four causes is final, efficient, material, and formal; or, as Aquinas states it, “first comes goodness and the end, moving the agent to act; secondly the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form.”

THE THEORY OF causes, as developed by Aristotle and Aquinas, proposes other distinctions beyond that of the four causes, such as the difference between the essential cause or the cause per se and the accidental or coincidental cause. As indicated in the chapter on CHANCE, it is in terms of coincidental causes that Aristotle speaks of chance as a cause.

A given effect may be the result of a number of efficient causes. Sometimes these form a series, as when one body in motion sets another in motion, and that moves a third, or, to take another example, a man is the cause of his grandson only through having begotten a son who later begets a son. In such a succession of causes, the first cause may be indispensable, but it is not by itself sufficient to produce the effect. With respect to the effect which it fails to produce unless other causes intervene, it is an accidental cause. In contrast, an essential cause is one which, by its operation, immediately brings the effect into existence.

Sometimes, however, a number of efficient causes may be involved simultaneously rather than successively in the production of a single effect. They may be related to one another as cause and effect rather than by mere coincidence. One cause may be the essential cause of another which in turn is the essential cause of the effect. When two causes are thus simultaneously related to the same effect, Aquinas calls one the principal, the other the instrumental cause; and he gives as an example the action of a workman sawing wood. The action of the saw causes a shaping of the wood, but it is instrumental to the operation of the principal cause, which is the action of the workman using the saw.

These two distinctions—between essential and accidental causes and between principal and instrumental causes—become of great significance in arguments, metaphysical or theological, concerning the cause of causes—a first or ultimate cause. Aristotle’s proof of a prime mover, for example, depends upon the proposition that there cannot be an infinite number of causes for a given effect. But since Aristotle also holds that the world is without beginning or end and that time is infinite, it may be wondered why the chain of causes cannot stretch back to infinity.

If time is infinite, a temporal sequence of causes reaching back to infinity would seem to present no difficulty. As Descartes points out, you cannot “prove that that regress to infinity is absurd, unless you at the same time show that the world has a definite beginning in time.” Though it is a matter of their Jewish and Christian faith that the world had a beginning in time, theologians like Maimonides and Aquinas do not think the world’s beginning can be proved by reason. They do, however, think that the necessity of a first cause can be demonstrated, and both adopt or perhaps adapt the argument of Aristotle which relies on the impossibility of an infinite regression in causes.

The argument is valid, Aquinas makes clear, only if we distinguish between essential and accidental causes. “It is not impossible,” he says, “to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes… . It is not impossible for man to be generated by man to infinity.” But, he holds, “there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity.” In the latter case, it should be observed, the cooperating causes are simultaneous and so if there were an infinity of them, that would not require an infinite time. The crux of the argument, therefore, lies either in the impossibility of an infinite number of simultaneous causes, or in the impossibility of an infinite number of causes related to one another as instrumental to principal cause.

Among causes so related, Descartes, like Aquinas, argues that there must be one first or principal cause. “In the case of causes which are so connected and subordinated to one another, that no action on the part of the lower is possible without the activity of the higher; e.g., in the case where something is moved by a stone, itself impelled by a stick, which the hand moves … we must go on until we come to one thing in motion which first moves.” But for Descartes, unlike Aquinas, this method of proving God as the first cause of all observable effects has less elegance than the so-called “ontological argument” in which the conception of God as a necessary being, incapable of not existing, immediately implies his existence.

The argument from effect to cause is traditionally called a posteriori reasoning, in contrast to a priori reasoning from cause to effect. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, the latter mode of reasoning can only demonstrate the nature of a thing, not its existence. Aquinas, furthermore, does not regard the ontological argument as a form of reasoning at all, but rather as the assertion that God’s existence is self-evident to us, which he denies.

The various forms which these arguments take and the issue concerning their validity are more fully discussed in the chapters on BEING, GOD, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. But here it is worth noting that Kant questions whether the a posteriori method of proving God’s existence really differs from the ontological argument. It is, according to him, not only “illusory and inadequate,” but also “possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi—professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal, but bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the old path which we had deserted at its call.” Hence the causal proof does not, in Kant’s opinion, succeed in avoiding the fallacies which he, along with Maimonides and Aquinas, finds in the ontological argument.

THE ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION figures critically in the speculation of the theologians concerning creation, providence, and the government of the world.

The dogma of creation, for example, requires the conception of a unique type of cause. Even if the world always existed—a supposition which, as we have seen, is contrary to Jewish and Christian faith but not to reason—the religious belief in a Creator would remain a belief in that unique cause without whose action to preserve its being at every moment the world would cease to be.

On the assumption that God created the world in the beginning, it is, perhaps, easy enough to see with Augustine how “the creating and originating work which gave being to all natures, differs from all other types of causation which cause motions or changes, or even the generation of things, rather than their very existence.” It may, however, be more difficult to understand the creative action of God in relation to a world already in existence.

But a theologian like Aquinas explains that “as long as a thing has being, so long must God be present to it” as the cause of its being—a doctrine which Berkeley later reports by saying that this makes “the divine conservation… to be a continual creation.” Aquinas agrees that “the conservation of things by God is not by a new action, but by the continuation of that action whereby He gives being.” But in the conservation of things Aquinas thinks that God acts through natural or created causes, whereas in their initiation, being is the proper effect of God alone.

The dogma of divine providence also requires a theory of the cooperation of the first cause with natural or secondary causes. Dante, in describing the direction which providence gives to the course of nature, uses the image of a bow. “Whatsoever this bow shoots falls disposed to its foreseen end, even as a thing directed to its aim.” That God governs and cares for all things may be supposed to reduce nature to a puppet show in which every action takes place in obedience to the divine will alone. Natural causes would thus cease to be causes or to have any genuine efficacy in the production of their own effects.

Some theologians have tended toward this extreme position, but Aquinas argues contrariwise that natural causes retain their efficacy as instrumental causes, subordinate to God’s will as the one principal cause. “Since God wills that effects be because of their causes,” he writes, “all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God”; and, in another place, he says, “whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects . . . so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.”

In addition to the role of divine causality in the regular processes of nature, still another kind of divine causation is presupposed by the religious belief in supernatural events, such as the elevation of nature by grace and the deviations from the course of nature which are called “miracles.” All these considerations, and especially the matter of God’s miraculous intervention in the regular course of nature, have been subjects of dispute among theologians and philosophers (and sometime physicists and historians). Some of those who do not deny the existence of a Creator, or the divine government of the universe through natural law, nevertheless question the need for divine cooperation with the action of every natural cause, or God’s intervention in the order of nature.

Throughout these controversies, the theory of causes defines the issues and determines the lines of opposing argument. But since other basic notions are also involved in the debate of these issues, the further consideration of them is reserved for other chapters, especially GOD, NATURE, and WORLD.

THE DISCUSSION OF CAUSE takes a new turn in modern times. The new issues arise, not from different interpretations of the principle of causality, but from the skeptic’s doubts concerning our ability to know the causes of things, and from the tendency of the physical sciences to limit or even to abandon the investigation of causes.

According to the ancient conception of science, knowledge, to be scientific, must state the causes of things. The essence of scientific method, according to the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, consists in using causes both to define and to demonstrate. Sometimes genus and differentia are translated into material and formal cause; sometimes a thing is defined genetically by reference to its efficient cause, and sometimes teleologically by reference to its final cause.

The degree to which this conception of science is realized in particular fields may be questioned. The treatises of the astronomers, for example, do not seem to exemplify it as much as do Aristotle’s own physical treatises or Harvey’s work on the circulation of the blood. Yet until modern developments in mathematical physics, the ascertainment of causes seems to be the dominant conception of the scientific task; and until the separation widens between the experimental and the philosophical sciences, the possibility of knowing causes is not generally doubted.

Galileo’s exposition of the new mechanics explicitly announces a departure from the traditional interest of the natural philosopher in the discovery of causes. The aim, he says in Two New Sciences, is not “to investigate the cause of the acceleration of natural motion, concerning which various opinions have been expressed by various philosophers”; but rather “to investigate and to demonstrate some of the properties of accelerated motion.” The “various opinions” about causes are referred to as “fantasies” which it is “not really worthwhile” for the scientist to examine.

This attitude toward causes, especially efficient causes, characterizes the aim of mathematical physics, both in astronomy and mechanics. For Newton it is enough—in fact, he says, it “would be a very great step in philosophy”—“to derive two or three general principles of motion from phenomena … though the causes of those principles were not yet discovered. And, therefore, I scruple not to propose the principles of motion … and leave their causes to be found out.” In other passages Newton disparages the search for “hidden or occult causes” as no part of the business of science.

Hume goes further. He insists that all causes are hidden. By the very nature of what causes are supposed to be and because of the manner in which the human mind knows, man can have no knowledge of how causes really produce their effects. “We never can, by our utmost scrutiny,” he says, “discover anything but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect.”

All that men can be referring to when they use the words “cause” and “effect,” Hume thinks, is the customary sequence of “one object followed by another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.” So far as any knowledge based upon reason or experience can go, the relation of cause and effect is simply one of succession, impressed upon the mind “by a customary transition.” That one event leads to another becomes more and more probable—but never more than probable—as the sequence recurs more and more frequently in experience.

Hume’s skepticism about causes, and his reinterpretation of the meaning of cause, gains wide acceptance in subsequent thought, especially among natural scientists. William James, for example, considering “the principle that ‘nothing can happen without a cause,’” declares that “we have no definite idea of what we mean by cause, or of what causality consists in. But the principle expresses a demand for some deeper sort of inward connection between phenomena than their merely habitual time-sequence seems to be. The word ‘cause’ is, in short, an altar to an unknown god; an empty pedestal still marking the place for a hoped-for statue. Any really inward belonging-together of the sequent terms,” he continues, “if discovered, would be accepted as what the word cause was meant to stand for.”

Though Hume holds that we cannot penetrate beyond experience to the operation of real causes embedded in the nature of things, he does not deny the reality of causation as a principle of nature. On the contrary, he denies that anything happens by chance or that any natural occurrence can be uncaused. “It is universally allowed,” Hume says with approval, “that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature.” But “though there is no such thing as chance in the world, our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.”

In other words, Hume’s position seems to be that man’s ignorance of real causes, and the mere probability of his opinions about customary sequences of “cause” and “effect,” indicate human limitations, not limits to causal determination in the order of nature itself. Adversaries of Hume, coming before as well as after him in the tradition of the great books, take issue with him on both points.

Against Hume’s determinism, which is no less complete than Spinoza’s, Aristotle, for example, affirms the existence of chance or real contingency in the happenings of nature. Against Hume’s reduction of statements about causes to probable opinion, Kant insists that, in the metaphysics of nature, such judgments can be made with absolute certainty. These related issues are discussed in the chapters on CHANCE, FATE, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY.

In the development of the natural sciences since Hume’s day, his translation of cause and effect into observed sequences or correlations reinforces the tendency, which first appears with Galileo and Newton, to describe rather than to explain natural phenomena. Yet to the extent that the findings of science bear fruit in technology, man’s control over nature seems to confirm Bacon’s view of science rather than Hume’s—at least to the extent that the application of scientific knowledge to the production of effects implies a knowledge of their causes.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY—that nothing happens without a cause or sufficient reason, or, as Spinoza puts it, “nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow”—has been made the basis for denials of human freedom as well as of chance or contingency in the order of nature. The problem of man’s free will is discussed in the chapters on FATE, LIBERTY, and WILL, but we can here observe how the problem is stated in terms of cause, with respect to both divine providence and natural causation.

If God’s will is the cause of everything which happens, if nothing can happen contrary to His will or escape the foresight of His providence, then how is man free from God’s foreordination when he chooses between good and evil? If, as the theologians say, “the very act of free choice is traced to God as to a cause,” in what sense can the act be called “free”? Is it not necessarily determined to conform to God’s will and to His plan? But, on the other hand, if “everything happening from the exercise of free choice must be subject to divine providence,” must not the evil that men do be attributed to God as cause?

The problem takes another form for the scientist who thinks only in terms of natural causes, especially if he affirms a reign of causality in nature from which nothing is exempt—just as, for the theologian, nothing is exempt from God’s will. Since the realm of nature includes human nature, must not human acts be caused as are all other natural events? Are some human acts free in the sense of being totally uncaused, or only in the sense of being caused differently from the motions of matter? Are causality and freedom opposed principles within the order of nature, appropriate to physical and psychological action; or do they constitute distinct realms—as for Kant, the realms of phenomena and noumena, the sensible and the supra-sensible; or as for Hegel, the realms of nature and history?

The different answers which the great books give to these questions have profound consequences for man’s view of himself, the universe, and his place in it. As the issue of necessity and chance is central in physics or the philosophy of nature, so the issue of determinism and freedom is central in psychology and ethics, in political theory and the philosophy of history, and above all in theology. It makes opponents of James and Freud, of Hegel and Marx, of Hume and Kant, of Spinoza and Descartes, of Lucretius and Marcus Aurelius. It raises one of the most perplexing of all theological questions for Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, and for the two great poets of God’s will and man’s freedom—Dante and Milton.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The general theory of causation 1a. The kinds of causes: their distinction and enumeration 1b. The order of causes: the relation of cause and effect
2. Comparison of causes in animate and inanimate nature
3. Causality and freedom
4. The analysis of means and ends in the practical order
5. Cause in relation to knowledge 5a. Cause as the object of our inquiries 5b. Cause in philosophical and scientific method: the role of causes in definition, demonstration, experiment, hypothesis 5c. The nature and sources of our knowledge of causes 5d. The limits of our knowledge of causes
6. The existence and operation of final causes
7. The causality of God or the gods 7a. Divine causality in the origin and existence of the world: creation and conservation 7b. Divine causality in the order of nature or change: the first cause in relation to all other causes 7c. Divine causality in the government of the universe: providence and free will 7d. Divine causality in the supernatural order: grace, miracles
8. The operation of causes in the process of history

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

Page Sections: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 James: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 Plato: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

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1. The general theory of causation

7 Plato: Euthyphro, 195c-d / Phaedo, 226d-228a; 240b-246c / Timaeus, 447b-d / Philebus, 615c-619d / Laws, BK X, 760a-765c 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 11-12 128d-131b / Physics, BK II, CH 3-9 271a-278a,c / Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 [996b18-997a14] 514d-515d; BK V, CH 1-2 533a-534c; BK VI, CH 2 [1026b24-1027a15] 549a-b; BK VII, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK VIII, CH 3 [1043b5-14] 567d-568a; CH 4 568d-569b; CH 6 569d-570d; BK X, CH 1 [1052b8-14] 579a; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a; BK XIV, CH 6 625d-626d 9 Aristotle: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 5 [1361b39-1362a11] 602c-d; CH 10 [1369b5-27] 612b-613a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK VI [703-711] 89c-d 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, TR I, CH 1 78a-c; CH 4 79d-80a; CH 10 82b / Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 31 174d-175c / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 2 322b-323a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3 12c-14a; Q 3, A 4, ANS 16d-17c; Q 33, A 1, REP 1 180d-181c; Q 49 264d-268a,c passim; Q 52, A 3, ANS 280a-d; Q 65, A 1 339b-340b; Q 82, A 3, REP 1 433c-434c; Q 87, A 2, REP 3 466c-467b; Q 103, A 7 533b-d; Q 104, AA 1-2 534c-537b; Q 105, AA 1-2 538d-540c; A 5 542a-543b; Q 106, A 3 547c-548b; Q 115, AA 1-2 585d-588c; Q 115, A 6-Q 116, A 4 591d-595c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, AA 2-3 13c-15a; Q 75, A 1 137d-138c; A 4 140a-d; Q 76, A 1 141a-c; PART III SUPPL, Q 76, A 1 939d-941a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 80b-c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 42a-46a 31 Descartes: Meditations, III, 84b-86b / Objections and Replies, 111d-112a; 121b-c; AXIOM I-IV 131d; 212a; 212c 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, DEF 1 355a; DEF 7 355b; AXIOM 3-5 355d; PROP 3 356a; PROP 8, SCHOL 2, 357b-d; PROP 36 369b; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 7, COROL and SCHOL 375a-c 34 Newton: Principles, BK III, RULE I-II 270a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 1-5 178b-179d; SECT 19 182b-c; CH XXII, SECT 11 203c-d; CH XXVI, SECT 1-2 217a-d 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim; SECT 60-66 424b-426a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT III, DIV 18-SECT VIII, DIV 75 457c-485a passim 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 46d-47c; 57c-d; 58d-59b; 63b; 67d-68b [fn 1]; 76c-83b; 95a-d; 133a; 140b,d-143a; 152a-153a; 164a-171a; 187c-189a; 214b,d [fn 1]; 225c-226b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 279b,d-287d esp 285c-286a / Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 294c-295d; 311d-314d; 339a / Judgement, 550a-578a esp 550a-551a,c, 555a-558b, 564a-c, 566a-b, 568c-570a, 577c-578a, 587a-591b; 592a-d; 597a-599d; 611d-613a,c 53 James: Psychology, 885b-886a

1a. The kinds of causes: their distinction and enumeration

7 Plato: Phaedo, 240c-245c / Timaeus, 447b-c; 455a-458a; 465d-466a / Sophist, 577d-578b / Statesman, 592d-593a; 596a-b / Philebus, 615c-619d; 637c-d / Laws, BK X, 760a-765c esp 762b-763b 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a6] 98b-c; BK II, CH 11 128d-129d / Physics, BK II, CH 3-7 271a-275d esp CH 3 271a-272c; BK III, CH 7 [207b35-208a4] 286c; BK IV, CH 1 [209a18-23] 288a / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 9-10 436d-439c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3-10 501c-511d; BK II, CH 2 [994a28-31] 513b; BK III, CH 2 [996a18-b26] 514d-515b; BK V, CH 2 533b-534c; CH 18 543c-d; CH 30 547a-d; BK VI, CH 2-3 548c-549d; BK VII, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK VIII, CH 2 566d-567d; CH 3 [1043b5-24] 567d-568b; CH 4 568d-569b; BK XI, CH 8 [1065a26-b4] 593d; BK XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b8-642a4] 161d-165d / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715a1-18] 255a-b; CH 20 [729a10]-CH 22 [730b33] 269b-271a passim; BK V, CH 1 [778a16-b19] 320a-321a / Ethics, BK III, CH 3 [1112b30-33] 358b / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1369a31-b5] 612c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3 12c-14a; Q 3, A 8, REP 1 19d-20c; Q 4, A 3, ANS 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP 1-2 24b-25a; A 4 25d-26c; Q 11, A 3, ANS 49a-c; Q 13, A 5, ANS and REP 1 66b-67d; Q 14, A 8, ANS and REP 1 82c-83b; A 11, ANS 84c-85c; A 16, REP 1 90b-91b; Q 19, A 6, ANS 113c-114d; Q 25, A 2, REP 2-3 144c-145b; Q 36, A 3, ANS 194c-195d; Q 39, A 2, REP 5 203b-204c; Q 44 238a-241d; Q 46, A 2, REP 7 253a-255a; Q 48, A 1, REP 4 259b-260c; Q 49, A 1, ANS 264d-265d; Q 51, A 1, REP 3 275b-276b; Q 52, A 3, ANS 280a-d; Q 65 339a-343c; Q 75, A 5, REP 3 382a-383b; Q 82, A 4, ANS 434c-435c; Q 87, A 2, REP 3 466c-467b; Q 104 534c-538c; Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a-543b; PART I-II, Q 2, A 5, REP 3 618d-619c; Q 7, A 3, ANS 653c-654b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 60, A 1, ANS 49d-50c; Q 72, A 3 113b-114a; Q 75, A 1, ANS and REP 2 137d-138c; Q 76, A 1, ANS and REP 1 141a-c; Q 85, A 1, REP 4 178b-179b; A 5, ANS and REP 1 181d-182d; PART III, Q 62, A 1 858c-859d; A 4 861a-862a; PART III SUPPL, Q 76, A 1, ANS 939d-941a 22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, PAR 37 417b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78c-d 28 Gilbert: Loadstone, BK II, 36d 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 335d; 407c; 408b; 415b-417a; 425a-429b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43a-d; 45a-46a 31 Descartes: Meditations, III, 87c-88c; IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 110c-111d; AXIOM VII 132b; 158b-161d passim, esp 158c-161b; 212a; 213b-c; 214c; 229c-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, DEF 1 355a; PROP 11 358b-359b; PROP 17, SCHOL-PROP 18 362c-363c; PROP 28, SCHOL 366a; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 45, SCHOL 390b; PART III, DEF 1-3 395d-396a; PROP 1-3 396a-398c; PART IV, PREF 422b,d-424a; DEF 7 424b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVI, SECT 2 217b-d 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 51-53 422d-423a 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 229b-230a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 133a; 164a-171a / Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 553c-555a; 556b-558b; 577c-578a; 584c-d; 594b-c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-166b

1b. The order of causes: the relation of cause and effect

7 Plato: Lysis, 24b / Phaedrus, 124b-c / Euthyphro, 195c-d / Gorgias, 267c-268a / Timaeus, 455a-b; 460c; 465d-466a / Theaetetus, 521b-522b / Philebus, 617b-c / Laws, BK X, 760a-765c esp 762b-763b 8 Aristotle: Categories, CH 12 [14b10-22] 20b / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a6] 98b-c; BK II, CH 12 129d-131b; CH 16-18 134b-136a / Physics, BK II, CH 6 [198a5-13] 275a; CH 8-9 275d-278a,c; BK III, CH 2 [202a21]-CH 3 [202b22] 279c-280c; BK VII, CH 1-2 326a-329a; BK VIII 334a-355d / Heavens, BK I, CH 7 [275a1-b29] 366a-367a / Generation and Corruption, BK I, CH 7 421d-423b / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 1 [993b23]-CH 2 [994a30] 512a-513b; BK V, CH 2 [1013b3-16] 533c-d; [1014a20-25] 534b-c; BK XI, CH 8 [1065b2-4] 593d; BK XII, CH 3 [1070a20-24] 599c; CH 4 [1070b22-35] 600b; CH 6-8 601b-605a / Soul, BK I, CH 3 [406a2-12] 635b-c; [406b5-9] 635d-636a; CH 4 [408b29-33] 638a 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b13-642a24] 161d-165b esp [639b13-32] 161d-162a; BK II, CH 1 [646a25-b10] 170b-c / Motion of Animals, CH 5 235c-d / Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742a16-b17] 283b-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 7 [1364a33-36] 606a; BK II, CH 23 [1400a28-35] 649a-b 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 168b-c; CH 4 169a 16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 854b; 940b-941a 17 Plotinus: Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 1 214c-215a / Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 2 322b-323a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XI, CH 24-25 358a-359a; BK XXII, CH 2 587b-588a; CH 24 609a-612a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3 12c-14a; Q 3, A 1, ANS 14b-15b; A 2, ANS 15c-16a; A 4, ANS 16d-17c; A 6, ANS 18c-19a; A 7, ANS and REP 1 19a-c; A 8, ANS and REP 1-2 19d-20c; Q 4, A 2, ANS 21b-22b; A 3, ANS and REP 4 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP 1 24b-25a; A 4, ANS 25d-26c; Q 8, A 1 34d-35c; Q 13, A 5, ANS and REP 1 66b-67d; A 11, REP 2 73c-74b; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, AA 4-5 111c-113c; A 6, ANS and REP 3 113c-114d; A 7, REP 2 114d-115d; A 8 116a-d; Q 22, AA 2-3 128d-131c; Q 23, A 5, ANS 135d-137d; Q 36, A 3, ANS and REP 4 194c-195d; Q 39, A 2, REP 5 203b-204c; Q 41, A 1, REP 2 217d-218c; A 2, ANS 218c-219d; Q 42, A 2, ANS 225d-227a; A 3, ANS and REP 2 227a-d; Q 44, A 1, REP 1 238b-239a; A 2 239b-240a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; A 3 244a-d; A 5, ANS 245c-247a; Q 46, A 1, REP 6 250a-252d; A 2, REP 1 253a-255a; Q 48, A 1, REP 4 259b-260c; Q 50, A 1, ANS 269b-270a; Q 52, A 3, ANS 280a-d; Q 63, A 8, REP 1 332c-333b; Q 65, A 3 341c-342b; Q 75, A 1, REP 1 378b-379c; Q 82, A 3, REP 1 433c-434c; A 4 434c-435c; Q 87, A 2, REP 3 466c-467b; Q 88, A 3, REP 2 472c-473a; Q 90, A 3 482c-483a; Q 103, AA 6-8 532b-534b; Q 104, A 1, ANS 534c-536c; A 2 536c-537b; Q 105 538d-545b; Q 112, A 1, ANS 571d-573a; Q 114, A 3, ANS 583b-d; QQ 115-116 585c-595c; Q 118, A 2, REP 3 601c-603b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2 610b-611b; Q 46, A 1, ANS 813b-814a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 66, A 6, REP 3 80c-81b; Q 75, A 4 140a-d; Q 112, AA 1-3 356c-358d; Q 113, A 8 367d-368c; PART II-II, Q 1, A 7, REP 3 385c-387a; Q 9, A 2, ANS 424b-425a; PART III, Q 6, A 1, ANS 740b-741b; A 5, ANS 744a-d; Q 18, A 1, REP 2 810a-811c; Q 19, A 1, ANS and REP 2 816a-818b; Q 62 858b-864c passim; Q 64, A 1, ANS 870c-871b; A 8, REP 1 876c-877c; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 3, ANS 897d-900d; Q 74, A 3, REP 2 927c-928d; Q 76, A 1, REP 1 939d-941a; A 2 941b-942b; Q 80, A 1, REP 1 956c-957c; Q 86, A 3, REP 2 994d-996a,c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, II [112-148] 109a-b 22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus, PAR 37 417b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78c-79a; 79d-80a 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 135c-136b 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 390c; 415b-416c; 426a-429b; 442c-443c; 445c; 447a-b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43a-d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART V, 55d-56a / Meditations, III, 84b-86b; 87c-88c / Objections and Replies, 110a-112a esp 111d-112a; 120b-121c; AXIOM I-V 131d-132a; AXIOM VIII 132b; PROP II 132c; 158b-161d passim; 212a; 213b-d; 229c-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, DEF 1 355a; AXIOM 3-5 355d; PROP 3 356a; PROP 8, SCHOL 2, 357b-d; PROP 11 358b-359b; PROP 21-29 364a-366c esp PROP 28 365c-366a; PROP 33 367b-369a; PROP 36 369b; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, DEF 5 373b-c; DEF 7 373c; PROP 7, COROL and SCHOL 375a-c; LEMMA 3 378d-379a; PROP 48, DEMONST 391a; PART III, DEF 2-3 395d-396a; PROP 1-3 396a-398c; PART V, AXIOM 2 452c 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK V [469-490] 185b-186a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 505 261a-b / Vacuum, 369a 34 Newton: Principles, BK III, RULE I-II 270a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 1-5 178b-179d; SECT 19 182b-c; CH XXII, SECT 11 203c-d; CH XXVI, SECT 1-2 217a-d 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim; SECT 65-66 425d-426a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT III, DIV 18-SECT VIII, DIV 75 457c-485a passim, esp SECT VII, DIV 60 477a-c; SECT XI 497b-503c passim, esp DIV 105 498d-499a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 47b-c; 57c-d; 58d-59b; 63b; 67d-68b [fn 1]; 76c-83b esp 81c-d; 95a-d; 140b,d-145c; 152a-153a; 187c-189c; 214b,d [fn 1] / Practical Reason, 311d-314d; 339a / Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 553c-555a; 561c-562a,c; 577c-578a; 582c-583b 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 582b-584a passim 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 9b-c; 10d; 65a-66a / Descent of Man, 285b-c 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK X, 447c-448d; BK XI, 470a-c; EPILOGUE I, 650b-c; EPILOGUE II 675a-696d 53 James: Psychology, 772b; 884b-885a

2. Comparison of causes in animate and inanimate nature

7 Plato: Phaedo, 241d-242b / Laws, BK X, 763a-765d 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK II, CH 8-9 275d-278a,c; BK VIII, CH 2 [252b16-28] 336c-d; [253a6-21] 337a-b; CH 4 [254b12-33] 339a-b / Heavens, BK II, CH 12 383b-384c / Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12 493d-494d / Metaphysics, BK V, CH 4 [1014b20-26] 535a; BK VII, CH 9 [1034a32-b8] 557c-d; CH 10 [1035b14-28] 559a-b; CH 16 [1040b5-16] 564c; BK IX, CH 2 571c-572a; CH 5 573a-c; CH 7 [1049a12-19] 574d / Soul, BK II, CH 4 [415b8-28] 645d-646a; BK III, CH 9-13 664d-668d / Sleep, CH 2 [455b13-28] 698b-c 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b12-642a14] 161d-165b / Gait of Animals, CH 2 [704b12-18] 243c / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715a1-7] 255a; BK II, CH 1 [734b17-735a4] 274c-275c 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 12 172d-173c; CH 14-17 177a-183d; BK III, CH 1-7 183b,d-191b passim; CH 9, 197b 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK II [700-729] 23d-24b 16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 930b-931b; 959a-960a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 1, REP 3 34d-35c; Q 14, A 8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 70, A 3 365b-367a; Q 98, A 1, ANS 516d-517c; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2 610b-611b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, REP 4 938a-939d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-39] 80a-b; PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d; II [112-148] 109a-b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50a; PART IV, 271d 27 Shakespeare: Othello, ACT V, SC I [7-14] 239a 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 385a-c 31 Descartes: Meditations, IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 215a-b 34 Newton: Principles, BK III, RULE I-II 270a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII, SECT 28-29 211b-212a 42 Kant: Judgement, 555a-558b esp 557c-558b; 564a-c; 566a-b; 578d-580a; 581a-582c 45 Faraday: Researches in Electricity, 540a-541a,c 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 9b-10d 53 James: Psychology, 4a-6b; 84a-94b esp 85a-87b, 88b-90b

3. Causality and freedom

8 Aristotle: Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 5 573a-c 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK III, CH 3 [1112a18-b12] 358a-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 10 [1368b7-1369a27] 611d-613a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK II [251-293] 18b-d; BK V [306-310] 65a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 49c; BK IV, 69a; BK VI, 91b-d 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, TR I 78a-82b esp CH 4 79d-80a, CH 9-10 82a-b 18 Augustine: City of God, BK V, CH 9-10 213b-216c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, AA 3-10 110b-118b passim; Q 41, A 2 218c-219d; Q 46, A 1, REP 9-10 250a-252d; Q 47, A 1, REP 1 256a-257b; Q 59, A 3 308b-309a; Q 62, A 8, REP 2 323c-324a; Q 83, A 1 436d-438a; Q 103, A 1, REP 1,3 528b-529a; Q 115, A 6, ANS 591d-592d; PART I-II, Q 10 662d-666a,c; Q 13, A 6 676c-677b 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 71, A 4, ANS and REP 3 108b-109a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVI [52-84] 77b-d 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 138-154 106b-108b / Nun’s Priest’s Tale [15238-256] 456b-457a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 112d-113c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 452a-d 26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, ACT I, SC II [135-141] 570d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, DEF 7 355b; PROP 16-17 362a-363c; PROP 26-36 365b-369b; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 48-49 391a-394d; PART III, 395a-d; PART IV, PREF, 423b-c 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 154b-159a / Pensées, 821 331b-332a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK I, CH II, SECT 14, 108d-109a; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 7-27 180a-184c; SECT 48-53 190c-192b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VIII 478b-487a 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 337d-338a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 113b-115a; 132d-133a; 140b,d-145c; 164a-171a; 234c-235a; 236d-237a; 238b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265a; 275b; 279b,d-287d esp 282c, 286a-c / Practical Reason, 292a-293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 310b-321b esp 314b-d, 320c-321b; 327d-329a; 331c-337a,c / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 383c; 386b-387a,c; 390b; 392d-393c / Judgement, 463a-465c; 571c-572a; 587a-588a; 594d [fn 1] 44 Boswell: Johnson, 392d-393a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 39 21d; PAR 66, 29a; PART II, PAR 139 48d-49b; PART III, PAR 187 65a-c; PAR 352 112b; ADDITIONS, 90 130b-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c-164d; 170c-172b; 178a-d 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 158b-159a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 342a-344b; BK X, 389a-391c; BK XI, 469a-472b; BK XIII, 563a-572a; BK XV, 619d-621b; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE II, 688a-696d 53 James: Psychology, 84a-94b esp 85a-87b, 88b-90b; 291a-295b; 388a; 820b-826a esp 825b-826b [fn 2] 54 Freud: Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis, 13c / General Introduction, 454b-c; 486c-487a

4. The analysis of means and ends in the practical order

7 Plato: Lysis, 23a-b / Laches, 29b-c / Gorgias, 262a-264b; 280b-d / Republic, BK II, 310c-d 8 Aristotle: Topics, BK III, CH 1 [116a22-36] 163b-c / Heavens, BK II, CH 12 [292a14-b26] 383d-384b / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 2 [994b8-16] 512d-513a; BK V, CH 2 [1013a32-b3] 533c; [1013b25-28] 533d-534a; BK IX, CH 8 [1050a4-b1] 575d-576b / Soul, BK III, CH 10 665d-666d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK I, CH 1-2 339a-d; CH 5 340d-341b esp [1096a5-10] 341a-b; CH 6 [1096b8-26] 341d-342a; CH 7 342c-344a passim; CH 9 [1099b25-32] 345b; BK III, CH 3 358a-359a; BK VI, CH 2 [1139a17-b5] 387d-388a; CH 5 389a-c passim; CH 9 [1142b17-33] 391d-392b / Politics, BK VII, CH 13 [1331b24-38] 536b-c / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 6-7 602d-607d; CH 8 [1366a3-16] 608b-c; CH 10 [1369a5-b27] 612b-613a 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK III, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 10 185d-187a; CH 14, 189d; BK IV, CH 4 225a-228a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK V, SECT 16 271c-d; BK VI, SECT 40-45 277d-278c; BK VII, SECT 44 282b-c; BK VIII, SECT 19-20 286d-287a 17 Plotinus: First Ennead, TR IV, CH 6 15a-b 18 Augustine: City of God, BK VIII, CH 4 266d-267c; CH 8 270a-d; BK XIX, CH 1-3 507a-511a; CH 13-17 519a-523a; CH 20 523d-524a / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 3-5 625b-626a; CH 22 629b-630a; CH 31-33 633b-634b; CH 35 634c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5, A 4 25d-26c; A 6, ANS 27c-28b; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 2, REP 2 109c-110b; A 3, ANS 110b-111c; AA 4-5 111c-113c; Q 23, A 7, ANS 138d-140a; Q 44, A 4 241a-d; Q 65, A 2 340b-341b; Q 82, AA 1-4 431d-435c; Q 83, A 3, ANS 438d-439c; A 4, ANS 439c-440b; Q 103, A 2 529a-530a; PART I-II, QQ 1-2 609a-622b; Q 3, A 1, ANS 622c-623a; Q 4, AA 1-4 629d-632c; Q 5, A 6, REP 1 641a-642a; Q 6, AA 1-2 644d-646c; Q 8, AA 2-3 656a-657c; Q 9, A 1, ANS 657d-658d; A 3, ANS 659c-660a; Q 10, A 2, REP 3 663d-664d; Q 11, A 3 667d-668d; Q 12, AA 2-4 670b-672a; Q 13, A 3 674c-675a; Q 14, A 2 678b-c; Q 15, A 3 682c-683b; Q 16, A 3 685b-686a 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 54, A 2, REP 3 23d-24c; Q 57, A 5, ANS 39a-40a; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; A 4, ANS 223d-224d; Q 95, A 3 228c-229b; Q 107, A 1, ANS 325c-327b; Q 114, A 4, REP 1 373a-d; PART II-II, Q 27, A 6, ANS 524c-525c 22 Chaucer: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53a-b; 76c-d; 90a; PART III, 237d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 330b-332a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 91d-92a 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART III, 44c-45b; PART VI, 50b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 369b-370a; PART IV, DEF 7 424b 33 Pascal: Pensées, 98 190b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 52-53 191d-192b; SECT 62 194c-d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 235a-b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254c; 256a-b; 257c-d; 260a-c; 265c-268b; 271c-279d esp 274d-275b; 282c; 286a-287b / Practical Reason, 307a-d; 314d-329a esp 320c-321b, 327d-329a; 357c-360d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 367c / Science of Right, 397b-398a / Judgement, 477b-c; 478a-b; 557d [fn 2]; 586a-b; 588b [fn 2]; 594b-595c; 605d-606b [fn 2] 43 Federalist: NUMBER 23, 85b; NUMBER 31, 103c-d 43 Mill: Utilitarianism, 445a-d; 446d-447a; 461c-463c 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART I, PAR 45 23c-d; PAR 61 27b-c; PART II, PAR 119-128 43b-45d esp PAR 122 44a; PAR 140 49b-54a; PART III, PAR 182 64a; PAR 191-193 66b-c; PAR 328 108b-c; PAR 340 110b-c; ADDITIONS, 38 122c-d; 76-81 128a-129a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 162a-170c; PART III, 267a-b 53 James: Psychology, 4a-6b; 203a; 381b-382a; 788a-789a

5. Cause in relation to knowledge

5a. Cause as the object of our inquiries

7 Plato: Meno, 188b-189a / Phaedo, 240a-246c / Gorgias, 260a-262a / Timaeus, 465d-466a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b19-33] 98a-b; CH 13 107c-108c; BK II, CH 1-2 122b,d-123c / Physics, BK I, CH 1 [184a10-16] 259a; BK II, CH 3 [194b16-23] 271a-b; [195b21-28] 272b; CH 7 275b-d / Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12 [390a14-19] 494d / Metaphysics, BK I 499a-511d esp CH 1-2 499a-501c, CH 7 506b-d, CH 10 511c-d; BK III, CH 2 [996a18-b26] 514d-515b; BK IV, CH 2 [1003b33-c19] 522b-c; BK VI, CH 1 [1025b1-18] 547b,d; BK VII, CH 17 [1041a10-b11] 565b-d; BK VIII, CH 4 [1044a33-b20] 569a-b; BK XI, CH 1 [1059a17-23] 587a; [1059b34-38] 587b; CH 7 [1063b36-1064a9] 592b; BK XII, CH 1 598a-c 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK II, CH 1 [646a6-13] 170a / Gait of Animals, CH 1 243a-b / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715a1-18] 255a-b; BK II, CH 6 [742b17-743a1] 283d-284a; BK IV, CH 1 [765b35-c6] 306c; BK V, CH 1 [778a7-10] 320d / Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098a34-b2] 343d; BK III, CH 3 [1112b15-24] 358c-d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 1 [1354a1-11] 593a 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 2, 168b-c; CH 4 169a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK II [1053-1075] 43c-d; BK V [526-533] 67d-68a 13 Virgil: Georgics, I [475-493] 65a-b 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a 16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 959a-960a 17 Plotinus: Third Ennead, TR I, CH 2, 78d / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 11, 348b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; Q 85, A 7, CONTRARY 459c-460b; PART I-II, Q 3, A 8, ANS 628d-629c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS 424b-425a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53a-b; 60a-c; 63a; 78a-80a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 497d-498a 28 Gilbert: Loadstone, BK I, 5a-7a passim 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 202a-203a 28 Harvey: Circulation of the Blood, 316a-b; 319c / On Animal Generation, 335c-336c; 425a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 42a-46a; 46c-47c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a; APH 117-119 131a-132a; BK II 137a-195d esp APH 2 137b-c / New Atlantis, 210d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART VI, 61d-62c / Meditations, IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 110a; 110c-d; AXIOM I 131d; 158b-162a; 215a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 40, DEMONST 387a; PROP 45, DEMONST 390b 34 Newton: Principles, 1b-2a / Optics, BK III, 543a-b 34 Huygens: Light, CH I, 553a-b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH II, SECT 16 317a-c 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 32 418d-419a; SECT 102-109 432d-434b passim, esp SECT 107 433d-434a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 9 454c-455a; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c; SECT VII, DIV 60 477a-c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 42 Kant: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 285c-d / Practical Reason, 311d-314d 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 169a 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 6d-7a passim 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 342a-344b; BK XIII, 563a-b; EPILOGUE II 675a-696d 53 James: Psychology, 2a; 89b-90a; 745b; 885b-886a 54 Freud: General Introduction, 454b-c

5b. Cause in philosophical and scientific method: the role of causes in definition, demonstration, experiment, hypothesis

7 Plato: Phaedo, 240b-246c / Timaeus, 455a-b; 465d-466a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c esp BK I, CH 13 107c-108c, BK II 122b,d-137a,c / Topics, BK VI, CH 6 [145a32-b20] 199a-b / Physics, BK I, CH 7 275b-d; CH 9 [200a30-b9] 277d-278a,c; BK IV, CH 4 [211a6-11] 290a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [983a24-32] 501c; BK III, CH 2 [996a18-b26] 514d-515b; BK V, CH 5 [1015a6-9] 535d-536a; BK VIII, CH 4 [1044b12-15] 569b / Soul, BK I, CH 1 [403a25-b7] 632b-c; BK II, CH 2 [413a11-19] 643a-b 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 161a-165d esp [642a14-b4] 165b-d / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715a1-18] 255a-b; BK II, CH 6 [742b17-743a1] 283d-284a; BK IV, CH 1 [765b35-c6] 306c; BK V, CH 1 [778a7-11] 320d 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 4 169a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [526-533] 67d-68a; BK VI [703-711] 89c-d 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a 16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 846b-847b; 959a-960a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 11d-12c; Q 14, A 7 81d-82b; A 11, ANS 84c-85c; Q 19, A 5, ANS 112d-113c; Q 44, A 1, REP 1 238b-239a; Q 57, A 2, ANS 295d-297a; PART I-II, Q 14, A 5, ANS 680a-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 55, A 4 28c-29d; PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS 424b-425a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-b; PART IV, 267a-b 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 202a-203a; FOURTH DAY, 252a-b 28 Harvey: Circulation of the Blood, 316a-b; 319c / On Animal Generation, 335c-336c; 393b-c; 425a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43a-d; 56c-59c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 73 117d-118a; APH 117, 131a-b; BK II, APH 2 137b-c / New Atlantis, 210d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART IV, 52a-d; PART VI, 61d-62c, 66a-b / Meditations, III 81d-89a esp 84b-85a, 87c-88c; IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 108a-115a,c; 120c-122c; AXIOM V 131d-132a; 212c; 215a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 2,4 355d; PROP 8, SCHOL 2 356d-357d esp 357b-d; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART III, 395a-d; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423c; APPENDIX, I 447a 33 Pascal: Vacuum, 368b-369a 34 Newton: Principles, 1b-2a; DEF VIII 7b-8a; BK III, RULE I-II 270a / Optics, BK III, 531b; 541b-542a; 543a-b 34 Huygens: Light, CH I, 553b-554a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH III, SECT 9-17 315c-317c; SECT 28-29 322a-323a; CH XI, SECT 9 360d-361b; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-372b 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 50-53 422c-423a passim; SECT 60-66 424b-426a passim; SECT 102-109 432d-434b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 57, 475d-476b [fn 2]; DIV 60, 477a; SECT VIII, DIV 70, 481d-482a; SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XI, DIV 115 503b-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 348a,c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 46d-47c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 285c-286a / Practical Reason, 311d-314d; 339a / Judgement, 574a-b; 578a-d; 579b-c 45 Lavoisier: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 9b-10b 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-184a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 3 116a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c-158a; PART IV, 361a-b 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 217d-218a; 239c-240d 50 Marx: Capital, 10b-11b 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK XI, 470a-c; BK XIII, 563b; EPILOGUE II 675a-696d passim, esp 677b-680b, 687b-688a, 694d-695c 53 James: Psychology, 89b-90a; 324b; 668a-671a esp 670a-b; 745b; 824b-825a; 884b-886a 54 Freud: General Introduction, 454b-c; 483d-484a

5c. The nature and sources of our knowledge of causes

7 Plato: Meno, 188b-189a / Phaedo, 240c-245c / Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 455a-c; 465d-466a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2 [71b33-72a6] 98b-c; BK II, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 1-2 499a-501c; BK II, CH 1 [993b19-31] 512a-b; BK III, CH 2 [996a18-b26] 514d-515b 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 4 169a 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XI, CH 7 326a-c; CH 29 339a-b 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 13, A 5, ANS 66b-67d; Q 14, A 8, REP 1 82c-83b; Q 19, A 5, ANS 112d-113c; Q 57, A 2, ANS 295d-297a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53a-b; 60a-b; 63a; 78c-d; 79b-80a 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 442c; 443c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 42a-c; 43a-c; 45a-46a; 46c-47c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a; APH 99 127b-c; BK II 137a-195d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART VI, 62a-b / Objections and Replies, 110a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 4 355d; APPENDIX 369b-372d 33 Pascal: Pensées, 234-235 216b / Great Experiment, 388b 34 Newton: Optics, BK III, 543a-b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 1-7 178b-180a; CH XXV, SECT 11-CH XXVI, SECT 2 217a-d 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT III, DIV 18-SECT VIII, DIV 75 457c-485a passim; SECT IX 487b-488c passim; SECT XI 497b-503c passim, esp DIV 105 498d-499a, DIV 115 503b-c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-337a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 46d-47c; 57c-58b; 58d-59b; 66d-67b; 76c-83b; 85a-b; 86c-d; 95a-d; 110b; 164a-171a; 194d-195a; 214b,d [fn 1]; 225c-226b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 285c-286a / Practical Reason, 294c-295d; 311d-314d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-b / Judgement, 562d-563b 53 James: Psychology, 88a-90b passim

5d. The limits of our knowledge of causes

OLD TESTAMENT: Job, 38-39—(D) Job, 38:1-39:30 7 Plato: Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 447b-d 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK II, CH 4 [196b5-7] 273a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b28-983a11] 501a-b; BK III, CH 2 [996a18-b26] 514d-515b 9 Aristotle: Generation of Animals, BK II, CH 6 [742b17-743a1] 283d-284a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK V [526-533] 67d-68a; BK VI [703-711] 89c-d 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 505a-506a 17 Plotinus: Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 11 348b-c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12, A 8, ANS 57b-58b; Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, III [24-45] 56a-b; XVIII [49-60] 80b-c 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 54a; 78a-80c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 80b-82b; 271b-273b; 497b-502c passim 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 45a-46a / Novum Organum, BK II, APH 2 137b-c 31 Descartes: Meditations, IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 110a-b; 215a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423c 33 Pascal: Pensées, 184-241 205a-217b passim, esp 233-241 213b-217b 34 Newton: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 4 178d-179c; SECT 70 197a-b; CH XXIII, SECT 28-29 211b-212a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 10-16 315c-317c; SECT 28-29 322a-323a; CH VI, SECT 5-16 332b-336d passim; CH XVI, SECT 12, 370b-c 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 102-109 432d-434b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT IV-VII 458a-478a; SECT VIII, DIV 71-72 482c-483c; SECT XI 497b-503c passim, esp DIV 105 498d-499a, DIV 115 503b-c; SECT XII, DIV 127 507b-c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 348a,c 39 Smith: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 335b-336c 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 46d-47c; 140b,d-145c; 171a-172c; 234c-235a / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 267d-268a; 285c-d / Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 294c-295d; 313b-314d / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 390b / Judgement, 550a-551a,c; 557c-558b; 564a-c; 584c-d; 611d-613a,c 45 Fourier: Theory of Heat, 169a 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 65a; 92d-94c passim 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 342a-344b; BK X, 405a-b; BK XI, 469a-470c; BK XIII, 563a-b; EPILOGUE I, 646c-647b; 650b-c; EPILOGUE II 675a-696d esp 687d-688a, 693c 53 James: Psychology, 90a; 822b; 885b-886a

6. The existence and operation of final causes

7 Plato: Phaedo, 241b-242b / Timaeus, 447d-448a; 465d-466a 8 Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 11 [94b8-95a9] 129b-d / Physics, BK I, CH 9 [192a16-24] 268b-c; BK II, CH 1 [193a12-19] 269d-270a; CH 2 [194a27-b8] 270d-271a; CH 3 [194b33-195a2] 271b-c; [195a22-26] 271d; CH 8-9 275d-278a,c / Heavens, BK II, CH 12 [292a14-b26] 383d-384b / Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12 [389b22-390a2] 493d-494c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b4-11] 500d; CH 7 [988b6-15] 506c-d; CH 9 [992a29-34] 510c; BK II, CH 2 [994b8-16] 512d-513a; BK III, CH 2 [996a22-36] 514d-515a; BK V, CH 2 [1013a33-b2] 533c; CH 4 [1014b34-1015a10] 535b; BK XII, CH 7 [1072b1-4] 602c; CH 10 [1075a12-b16] 605d-606c / Soul, BK II, CH 4 [415b15-22] 645d-646a; CH 8 [420b16-23] 652a; BK III, CH 9 [432b21-26] 665b-c; CH 12-13 667a-668d passim / Sleep, CH 2 [455b13-28] 698b-c 9 Aristotle: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [639b8-640a12] 161d-162b; [641b10-642a4] 164c-165d; CH 5 [645a23-26] 169a; BK II-IV 170a-229d passim, esp BK II, CH 1 [646b25-27] 170b-d, BK III, CH 2 [663b22-23] 191b, BK IV, CH 2 [677a15-19] 206d-207a / Gait of Animals, CH 2 [704b12-18] 243c; CH 12 249b-d passim / Generation of Animals, BK I, CH 1 [715a1-11] 255a; CH 4-13 257a-260b; BK II, CH 5 [741b2-4] 282c; CH 6 [742a16-b17] 283b-d; [744b36-745a28] 285c-286a; BK III, CH 4 296b-c; BK IV, CH 3 [767b6-15] 309a; BK V, CH 1 [778a15-b19] 320a-321a; CH 8 [788b22-789b15] 330c-331a,c / Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1252b30-1253a1] 446a-b; CH 8 [1256b8-26] 450b-c 10 Galen: Natural Faculties, BK I, CH 6, 170b-c; CH 10 171b-172b; CH 12 172d-173c; CH 13, 174d-175c; BK II, CH 3 185a-186d; CH 4, 187c; BK III, CH 1 199a-c; CH 3 200a-201a 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [1022-1037] 13c-d; BK II [1052-1063] 28b-c; BK IV [823-857] 55a-b; BK V [76-90] 62a-b; [156-234] 63a-64a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK VI, SECT 40 277d 16 Copernicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, BK I, 511b 16 Kepler: Epitome, BK IV, 846b-847a; 857b-860b; 863b-887a passim; 913a-b; 915b-916a; 925b-928a; 932a-933a / Harmonies of the World, 1023b-1080b esp 1049b-1050a 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, TR II, CH 1 40a-41a / Fifth Ennead, TR VIII, CH 7 242d-243c 18 Augustine: City of God, BK XI, CH 22 333d-334c; BK XII, CH 4-5 344b-345b; BK XIX, CH 12-14, 518c-520c; BK XXII, CH 24, 610c-611c 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3, ANS and REP 2 12c-14a; Q 5, A 2, REP 1-2 24b-25a; A 4 25d-26c; Q 6, A 1, REP 2 28b-d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 1, ANS 108d-109c; A 4, ANS 111c-112c; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 23, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 132c-133b; Q 36, A 3, ANS 194c-195d; Q 44, A 4 241a-d; Q 48, A 1, REP 4 259b-260c; Q 59, A 1, ANS 306c-307b; Q 60, A 5, ANS 313b-314c; Q 65, A 2 340b-341b; Q 70, A 3, ANS 365b-367a; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A 1, REP 3 407b-409a; Q 82, A 4, ANS 434c-435c; Q 85, A 3, REP 1 455b-457a; Q 91, A 3 486b-487d; Q 92, A 1, REP 1 488d-489d; Q 98, A 1, ANS 516d-517c; Q 103 528a-534b passim; Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a-543b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2 610b-611b; A 3, ANS and REP 3 611b-612a; A 6, ANS 614a-c; A 8 615a-c; Q 2, A 5, REP 3 618d-619c; Q 8, A 1, ANS 655b-656a; Q 9, A 1, ANS 657d-658d; Q 12, A 5, ANS 672a-c; Q 21, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 717a-d 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL, Q 75, A 3, ANS and REP 4 938a-939d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-39] 80a-b; PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 50a; PART IV, 271d 28 Harvey: Motion of the Heart, 302c / Circulation of the Blood, 309b-d / On Animal Generation, 349a-b; 355c-d; 390b-c; 402c; 418b-c; 439c-440a; 442d-443c; 447a-b; 453c; 454b-c; 461a-c; 462c-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 43a-d; 45a-46a / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART III, 44c-45a / Meditations, IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 215a-b 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART IV, PREF 422b,d-424a; DEF 7 424b 33 Pascal: Pensées, 72, 184b; 75 185b-186a 34 Newton: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 371a / Optics, BK III, 528b-529a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH I, SECT 15, 125b 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 60-66 424b-426a passim; SECT 107 433d-434a 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT V, DIV 44, 469b-c; SECT XI, DIV 111 501b-c 36 Sterne: Tristram Shandy, 229b-230a 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 187a-190a; 205a-209b; 239a-240b / Judgement, 467d-470b; 473a-474b; 523c-d; 550a-613a,c esp 550a-562a,c, 568c-570b, 575b-578a, 587a-588a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 157b-c; 161d-162a 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 40c-d; 41c-42a; 60b-61d passim; 95d-97a esp 96b; 217d-218a / Descent of Man, 593d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, EPILOGUE I, 646c-647b; 650b-c; EPILOGUE II, 687d-688a 53 James: Psychology, 4a-6b; 671b [fn 1] 54 Freud: Narcissism, 401b / Instincts, 415b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 651d-654c passim, esp 654a-c

7. The causality of God or the gods

7a. Divine causality in the origin and existence of the world: creation and conservation

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2; 7:4 / Nehemiah, 9:6—(D) II Esdras, 9:6 / Job, 26:7; 37:18; 38:1-42:2 / Psalms, 8 esp 8:3-5; 19:1; 33:6-9; 74:16-17; 89:11-12; 95:4-5; 96:5; 102:25; 104; 115:3; 119:73; 121:2; 136:5-9; 146:5-6; 148:1-6—(D) Psalms, 8 esp 8:4-6; 18:2; 32:6-9; 73:16-17; 88:12-13; 94:4-5; 95:5; 101:26; 103; 113:3; 118:73; 120:2; 135:5-9; 145:5-6; 148:1-6 / Proverbs, 3:19-20; 8:23-29 / Isaiah, 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 48:13; 65:17—(D) Isaias, 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 48:13; 65:17 / Jeremiah, 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; 51:15-16—(D) Jeremias, 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; 51:15-16 / Amos, 5:8 / Zechariah, 12:1—(D) Zacharias, 12:1 APOCRYPHA: Judith, 16:14—(D) OT, Judith, 16:17 / Rest of Esther, 13:10—(D) OT, Esther, 13:10 / Wisdom of Solomon, 1:14; 11:17—(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 1:14; 11:18 / Ecclesiasticus, 24:8-9; 33:10-13; 39:16-35; 43—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 24:12-14; 33:10-14; 39:21-41; 43 / Bel and Dragon, 5—(D) OT, Daniel, 14:4 / II Maccabees, 7:23,28—(D) OT, II Machabees, 7:23,28 NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 7:49-50; 14:15; 17:22-28—(D) Acts, 7:49-50; 14:14; 17:22-28 / Colossians, 1:16-17 / Hebrews, 1:10; 3:4; 11:3 / II Peter, 3:5 / Revelation, 4:11; 14:7—(D) Apocalypse, 4:11; 14:7 7 Plato: Timaeus, 447a-452d; 465d-466a / Sophist, 577d-578b 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [146-158] 2d-3a; BK V [146-234] 63a-64a 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 1-12 65d-73d / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 1 214c-215a; TR VIII, CH 7 242d-243c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, PAR 10 3b-c; BK VII, PAR 16-23 48c-50c; BK XI, PAR 4-11 90a-92b; BK XII, PAR 2-9 99c-101c; PAR 14-40 102b-110a; BK XIII, PAR 6-48 112a-124a / City of God, BK VII, CH 29-31 261a-262a; BK XI, CH 4-24 324a-336a; BK XII, CH 10-27 348b-360a,c; BK XXII, CH 1 586b,d-587b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 32 633c-d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8, A 1 34d-35c; A 2, ANS 35c-36b; A 3, ANS and REP 1 36b-37c; Q 9, A 2, ANS 39c-40d; Q 21, A 4, REP 4 126c-127c; QQ 44-46 238a-255d; Q 50, A 1, ANS 269b-270a; A 3, ANS 272a-273b; Q 56, A 2, ANS and REP 4 292d-294a; Q 57, A 2, ANS and REP 2 295d-297a; Q 61 314d-317c; Q 65 339a-343c; Q 75, A 6, REP 2 383c-384c; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; QQ 90-93 480c-501c; Q 94, A 3, ANS 504a-505a; Q 104, A 1 esp REP 4 534c-536c; Q 118, AA 2-3 601c-604b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XXV [37-78] 91d-92a; PARADISE, VII [121-148] 116b-c; X [1-6] 120b; XIII [52-84] 126a-b; XIX [40-51] 135c; XXIX [13-45] 150b-c 22 Chaucer: Knight’s Tale [2987-3010] 209a-b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART II, 173d; PART IV, 251a-b 28 Galileo: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 245b-d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 17b-d 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART V, 54d-56a / Meditations, III, 87b-88c / Objections and Replies, AXIOM IX 132b; PROP III 132d-133a; 137d-138a; 214c; 215a-b; 228a-c; 229c-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, PROP 16-18 362a-363c; PROP 25 365b; PROP 33, SCHOL 2, 368c-369a 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK I [650-659] 107b; BK II [345-353] 118b-119a; BK III [708-735] 150b-151b; BK IV [720-735] 168a-b; BK V [468-505] 185b-186a; [577-594] 187b-188a; [800-868] 192b-194a; BK VII [59-640] 218b-231a esp [139-161] 220a-b, [216-550] 221b-229a 33 Pascal: Pensées, 482 258a 34 Newton: Optics, BK III, 542a-543a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XV, SECT 12, 165c; BK IV, CH X, SECT 15 352d-353a; SECT 18-19 353c-354c 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33 417d-419a esp SECT 29-33 418c-419a; SECT 45-46 421b-c; SECT 48 422a passim; SECT 57 423d-424a; SECT 146-150 442a-443b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV 132, 509d [fn 1] 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 81d-82a; 143a-145c / Judgement, 597a-599d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART I, 245d-246c; PART IV, 361a-b 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 239c-d; 243d

7b. Divine causality in the order of nature or change: the first cause in relation to all other causes

7 Plato: Timaeus, 455a-b; 465d-466a / Statesman, 587a-589c 8 Aristotle: Physics, BK VII, CH 1-2 326a-329a; BK VIII 334a-355d / Heavens, BK II, CH 12 383b-384c / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 10 [336b25-34] 438d; [337a15-23] 439a-b / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [983a7-9] 501b; BK XII, CH 4 [1070b22-35] 600b; CH 5 [1071a30-36] 601a; CH 6-10 601b-606d 10 Hippocrates: Sacred Disease, 154a-156a; 160b-d 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [146-158] 2d-3a; BK II [167-183] 17a-b; [1090-1104] 29a; BK VI [43-95] 80d-81c; [379-422] 85b-d 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 6 110c-112b; CH 14 120d-121c 16 Kepler: Harmonies of the World, 1049b-1050a 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, TR II, CH 2 41a-c / Third Ennead, TR II-III 82c-97b passim; TR VIII 129a-136a / Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 2 208c-209b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, PAR 10 3b-c; BK VII, PAR 16-23 48c-50c / City of God, BK VII, CH 29-31 261a-262a; BK X, CH 14 307c-308a; BK XI, CH 22 333d-334c; BK XII, CH 25 358b-359a; BK XIX, CH 12-17 517b-523a; BK XXII, CH 24 609a-612a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3 12c-14a; Q 3, A 1, ANS 14b-15b; A 2, ANS 15c-16a; A 4, ANS 16d-17c; A 6, ANS 18c-19a; A 7, ANS and REP 1 19a-c; A 8, ANS and REP 1-2 19d-20c; Q 4 20c-23b; Q 12, A 1, ANS 50c-51c; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 5 112d-113c; Q 23, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 132c-133b; Q 46, A 2, REP 7 253a-255a; Q 47, AA 1-2 256a-258c; Q 49, A 2 266a-c; Q 51, A 1, REP 3 275b-276b; A 3, REP 3 277a-278c; Q 52, A 2 279b-280a; Q 60, A 1, REP 2-3 310b-311a; Q 75, A 1, REP 1 378b-379c; Q 76, A 5, REP 1 394c-396a; Q 83, A 1, REP 3 436d-438a; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4, REP 1 444d-446b; A 5 446c-447c; Q 88, A 3, REP 2 472c-473a; Q 89, A 1, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 92, A 1, REP 1 488d-489d; A 2, REP 2 489d-490c; A 4 491b-d; Q 94, A 3, ANS 504a-505a; QQ 104-105 534c-545b; Q 116 592d-595c; PART I-II, Q 2, A 3, ANS 617b-618a; A 5, REP 3 618d-619c; Q 6, A 1, REP 3 644d-646a; Q 9, A 6 662a-d; Q 12, A 5, ANS 672a-c; Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a-c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 79, A 2, ANS 157b-158a; Q 85, A 6 182d-184a; Q 109, A 1, ANS 338b-339c; Q 110, A 1, REP 2 347d-349a; PART II-II, Q 9, A 2, ANS 424b-425a; Q 18, A 4, ANS 464c-465a; PART III, Q 6, A 1, REP 1 740b-741b; Q 13, A 3, CONTRARY 782b-783b; PART III SUPPL, Q 74, A 2, REP 3 926c-927c 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d; II [112-148] 109a-b; XIII [52-84] 126a-b; XXVII [97-120] 148b-c 22 Chaucer: Knight’s Tale [2987-3040] 209a-210a / Tale of Melibeus, PAR 37-38 417b-418a 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a; 79d-80a; PART III, 241c-242a; PART IV, 272b-c 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 390d-391a; 406b-407b; 416b-c; 426a-429b; 443a-c; 490d-493a 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 2c-d; 4b-c / New Atlantis, 203a-b 31 Descartes: Discourse, PART V, 55d-56a / Meditations, III, 87c-88c; IV, 90a-b / Objections and Replies, 110a; 123b; AXIOM IX 132b; 158a-162a; 213b-d; 229c-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, PROP 16-18 362a-363c; PROP 24-29 365a-366c; PROP 33 367b-369a; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 5-7 374c-375c; PROP 9-10 376a-377a; PROP 45 390a-b 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK V [468-474] 185b 33 Pascal: Pensées, 77 186a; 513, 262a 34 Newton: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 369b-371a / Optics, BK III, 528b-529a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI, SECT 2 178c; CH XXIII, SECT 28 211b-d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 28-29 322a-323a 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-33 417d-419a passim, esp SECT 29-33 418c-419a; SECT 51-53 422d-423a; SECT 57 423d-424a; SECT 60-66 424b-426a; SECT 105-109 433b-434b passim; SECT 146-153 442a-444a passim, esp SECT 150 442d-443b 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 54-57 474b-475d 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 140b,d-145c; 164a-165c; 171a-172c; 177b-179b; 183b [fn 1]; 184b-c; 187a-189c esp 188c-189a; 190a-b; 191a-d; 205a-209a; 239a-240b / Practical Reason, 334b-335c; 345a-c / Judgement, 564a-567b; 572b-578a; 581b-582c; 587a-592d; 597a-599d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 161d-162a; PART I, 245d-246c 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 396b-397a 49 Darwin: Origin of Species, 243b-d

7c. Divine causality in the government of the universe: providence and free will

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-3; 4:5-7; 6-9 esp 8:21-22; 12-13 esp 12:1-3, 12:7, 13:14-18; 15 esp 15:13-21; 17-18; 21-22 esp 22:1-19; 26:1-6,22-25; 28:10-22; 35:9-15; 37-50 esp 45:7-8 / Exodus, 3; 4:21; 7-14 esp 7:3, 9:12, 10:1, 10:20, 10:27, 11:10, 12:1-51, 13:21-22, 14:4, 14:8, 14:17; 15:18; 19-20 esp 19:3-9; 23:20-33; 33:18-19; 40:34-38—(D) Exodus, 3; 4:21; 7-14 esp 7:3, 9:12, 10:1, 10:20, 10:27, 11:10, 12:1-51, 13:21-22, 14:4, 14:8, 14:17; 15:18; 19-20 esp 19:3-9; 23:20-33; 33:18-19; 40:32-36 / Numbers, 9:15-23; 12; 22-24 / Deuteronomy, 4:1-40; 5-11 esp 11:26-28; 29:1-31:8 esp 30:1-4, 30:19-20 / Joshua, 1-11; 23-24 esp 24:14-28—(D) Josue, 1-11; 23-24 esp 24:14-28 / Judges, 1-16 / I Samuel, 8-10; 15-16—(D) I Kings, 8-10; 15-16 / II Samuel, 7—(D) II Kings, 7 / I Kings, 11; 13-22 passim—(D) III Kings, 11; 13-22 passim / II Kings passim—(D) IV Kings passim / I Chronicles, 17:4-14; 29:11-12—(D) I Paralipomenon, 17:4-14; 29:11-12 / II Chronicles, 11-36 passim, esp 36 —(D) II Paralipomenon, 11-36 passim, esp 36 / Esther esp 4:12-17—(D) Esther, 1:1-10:3 esp 4:12-17 / Job esp 1-2, 24, 27, 38-41 / Psalms passim, esp 3-4, 9-11, 13, 17-18, 20, 23, 65, 104—(D) Psalms passim, esp 3-4, 9-10, 12, 16-17, 19, 22, 64, 103 / Proverbs, 16:33 / Ecclesiastes, 3; 8-9; 11-12 / Isaiah, 36-37; 46; 51; 52:7—(D) Isaias, 36-37; 46; 51; 52:7 / Jeremiah, 17:5-8; 18-19; 31; 45—(D) Jeremias, 17:5-8; 18-19; 31; 45 / Ezekiel, 18—(D) Ezechiel, 18 / Daniel esp 3, 6—(D) Daniel, 1:1-3:23 esp 3:11-23; 3:91-12:13 esp 3:91-97, 6:1-28 / Jonah, 1-2—(D) Jonas, 1-2 APOCRYPHA: Tobit—(D) OT, Tobias / Judith esp 5-6, 8-16—(D) OT, Judith esp 5-6, 8-16 / Rest of Esther—(D) OT, Esther, 10:4-16:24 / Ecclesiasticus, 15:11-20—(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 15:11-22 / Song of Three Children—(D) OT, Daniel, 3:24-90 / Susanna—(D) OT, Daniel, 13:1-64 / Bel and Dragon—(D) OT, Daniel, 13:65-14:42 / I Maccabees, 3:13-26—(D) OT, I Machabees, 3:13-26 / II Maccabees, 6:1-16—(D) OT, II Machabees, 6:1-16 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 6:25-34; 10:29-33; 23:37 / Luke, 12:4-7,22-34; 21:12-19 esp 21:18 / John, 6:22-71 esp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:64-65—(D) John, 6:22-72 esp 6:40, 6:44-45, 6:65-66 / Acts, 6:8-7:60 esp 7:51; 13:48—(D) Acts, 6:8-7:59 esp 7:51; 13:48 / Romans, 8:28-11:36 / Ephesians, 1:4-2:10; 4:1-7 / Philippians, 2:12-13 / II Timothy, 1:9 / Hebrews, 13:5-6 / I Peter, 1:1-5 / Revelation, 11:15-18—(D) Apocalypse, 11:15-18 4 Homer: Iliad, BK VIII [130-144] 52c; BK XXIV [522-551] 176d-177a 5 Euripides: Helen [703-733] 304d-305a 6 Herodotus: History, BK II, 112d-113b 7 Plato: Republic, BK II, 321d-322d; BK X, 439b / Critias, 479c 8 Aristotle: Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH 10 [336b25-34] 438d / Metaphysics, BK XII, CH 10 605d-606d 9 Aristotle: Ethics, BK X, CH 8 [1179a23-32] 434a / Politics, BK VII, CH 4 [1326a29-32] 530b-c 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK II [167-183] 17a-b; [1090-1104] 29a; BK V [146-234] 63a-64a; [1161-1240] 76b-77b; BK VI [43-95] 80d-81c; [379-422] 85b-d 12 Epictetus: Discourses, BK I, CH 6 110c-112b; CH 12 118d-120b; CH 16 121d-122d; BK II, CH 14 153d-155b; BK III, CH 17 191d-192a; CH 22 195a-201a; BK IV, CH 3 224b-d; CH 5 228a-230b; CH 7 232c-235a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK II, SECT 3 257a-b; SECT 11 258a-b; BK III, SECT 11 262a-b; BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK VI, SECT 8 274b; SECT 11 274c; SECT 40-45 277d-278c; SECT 58 279d; BK VII, SECT 8 280b; SECT 58 283c-d; SECT 68 284c-d; BK VIII, SECT 17 286d; SECT 35 288b; SECT 46-47 289b-c; SECT 51 289d-290a; BK X, SECT 3 296d; SECT 6 297a-b; SECT 25 299c; SECT 35 301b; BK XII, SECT 3 307b-d; SECT 5 307d-308a; SECT 11-14 308b-c 13 Virgil: Aeneid, BK I [254-296] 110a-111a; BK IV [332-363] 176a-177a; BK IX [123-139] 282a-b 14 Plutarch: Coriolanus, 189a-c / Nicias, 435b-d 17 Plotinus: Second Ennead, TR III, CH 7 44c-45a / Third Ennead, TR II-III 82c-97b passim / Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 13 149b-d; TR IV, CH 31, 175b-c 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK II, PAR 14 12a-b; BK IX, PAR 1 61c-d / City of God, BK I, CH 8-9 133a-135a; BK IV, CH 33 206c-d; BK V, CH 1-11 207d-216d; CH 21-22 226a-227a; BK VII, CH 30 261b-d; BK IX, CH 22 296d-297a; BK X, CH 14-15 307c-308b; BK XI, CH 17 331c-d; CH 22 333d-334c; BK XII, CH 1-9 342b,d-348b; CH 22 357c; CH 25 358b-359a; CH 27 359c-360a,c; BK XIV, CH 27 396c-397a; BK XIX, CH 12-17 517b-523a; BK XXII, CH 1-2 586b,d-588a 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 3, ANS 12c-14a; Q 3, A 1, REP 1 14b-15b; Q 8, A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 36b-37c; Q 13, A 8, ANS and REP 1 70d-71b; Q 15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q 19, A 3 110b-111c; QQ 22-24 127c-143c; Q 63, A 7, ANS 331c-332b; Q 96, A 1, ANS and REP 2 510b-511b; QQ 103-119 528a-608d esp QQ 103-105 528a-545b; PART I-II, Q 9, A 6 662a-d; Q 10, A 4 665d-666a,c; Q 19, A 4 705b-c; Q 21, A 4, REP 2 719d-720a,c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91, AA 1-2 208b-209d; Q 93 215b,d-220d passim; PART II-II, Q 1, A 7, ANS 385c-387a; Q 25, A 11, REP 3 508d-509c; PART III, Q 61, A 1, ANS 855a-d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96] 10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-114] 77b-78a; XXI [40-72] 85b-d; PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d; II [112-148] 109a-b; VIII [85-148] 117c-118c; XI [28-39] 122b; XII [37-45] 124a; XX [118-138] 138a 22 Chaucer: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA 137-154 106b-108b / Knight’s Tale [1251-1267] 180b; [1303-1333] 181b-182a; [1663-1672] 187b; [2987-3046] 209a-210a / Friar’s Tale [7064-7085] 281a-b / Franklin’s Tale [11177-206] 353b-354a / Monk’s Tale 434a-448b / Nun’s Priest’s Tale [15236-256] 456b-457a 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XXV, 35a-b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 53d; 96b; PART II, 113b-c; 160b-c; 163d-164a; PART IV, 254b; 271b; 272b-c 25 Montaigne: Essays, 98b-99a 27 Shakespeare: Hamlet, ACT V, SC II [7-11] 68a; [230-235] 70a 28 Harvey: On Animal Generation, 491d-492a 29 Cervantes: Don Quixote, PART II, 408c 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 38a; 94b-c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 93 125d-126a 31 Descartes: Meditations, IV 89a-93a; VI, 99c / Objections and Replies, 229c-d 31 Spinoza: Ethics, PART I, DEF 7 355b; PROP 17, COROL 1-2 and SCHOL 362b-363c; APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, PROP 3, SCHOL 374b-c 32 Milton: Sonnets, XVI 66b-67a / Paradise Lost, BK II [310-328] 118a; BK III [80-134] 137a-138a; BK V [600-615] 188b; BK VI [171-188] 200a; BK VII [139-173] 220a-221a; BK X [1-62] 274b-275b / Samson Agonistes [667-709] 354a-355a / Areopagitica, 394b-395b 33 Pascal: Pensées, 205 211a; 619-641 284b-290a; 876 345a 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXVIII, SECT 8 230a 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 3 405b-c; SECT 29-33 418c-419a passim; SECT 57 423d-424a; SECT 60-66 424b-426a; SECT 93-94 431b-c; SECT 105-109 433b-434b passim; SECT 146-155 442a-444c passim 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 54-57 474b-475d; SECT VIII, DIV 78-81 485c-487a; SECT XI 497b-503c passim, esp DIV 108-109 500b-501a 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 75c-d 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 1a-2b 38 Rousseau: Social Contract, BK III, 414d; BK IV, 437d-438b 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 292d-293b 42 Kant: Practical Reason, 334a-335c / Judgement, 594d [fn 1] 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-160b; 161d-168b; 168d-170b; 182d-184d; PART IV, 368d-369a,c 47 Goethe: Faust, PROLOGUE [243-270] 7a-b 48 Melville: Moby Dick, 85a; 237a; 396b-397a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK VI, 272a-b; BK VIII, 303d-304b; BK IX, 342a-344b; 357b-358b; BK X, 389a-391c; 447c-448a; 465c-467a passim; BK XIII, 563a-b; BK XV, 619d-620a; 631a-c; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c passim, esp 646c-647b, 650b-c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-676a; 680b-c; 684b-d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 127b-137c passim; BK XI, 343b-c 54 Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents, 771a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 878a-b

7d. Divine causality in the supernatural order: grace, miracles

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 19:24-26; 21:1-8 / Exodus, 3-12 passim, esp 3:2, 3:20; 14; 16-17 / Numbers, 9:15-23; 11-12; 16-17; 20:1-13; 21:5-9; 22:21-34 / Joshua, 3:13-4:24; 6:1-20; 10:12-14; 24:6-7—(D) Josue, 3:13-4:25; 6:1-20; 10:12-14; 24:6-7 / Judges, 6:36-40 / I Samuel, 12:17-19—(D) I Kings, 12:17-19 / I Kings, 17; 18:30-39—(D) III Kings, 17; 18:30-39 / II Kings, 1-6; 13:20-21; 20:1-11—(D) IV Kings, 1-6; 13:20-21; 20:1-11 / Nehemiah, 9—(D) II Esdras, 9 / Psalms, 78; 84:11; 85:1-3; 86:5; 103:1-5; 105; 106:7-11; 130—(D) Psalms, 77; 83:12; 84:2-4; 85:5; 102:1-5; 104; 105:7-11; 129 / Proverbs, 3:1-4,21-26 / Isaiah, 38; 44:22; 55:7—(D) Isaias, 38; 44:22; 55:7 / Jeremiah, 33:1-14—(D) Jeremias, 33:1-14 / Daniel, 3:11-4:33; 5-6; 9:9—(D) Daniel, 3:11-23,91-100; 5-6; 9:9 / Joel, 2:30-31 / Jonah—(D) Jonas / Micah, 7:18-20—(D) Micheas, 7:18-20 / Zechariah, 12:10—(D) Zacharias, 12:10 APOCRYPHA: Song of Three Children—(D) OT, Daniel, 3:24-90 / Bel and Dragon, 28-42—(D) OT, Daniel, 14:27-42 / II Maccabees, 1:18-22; 2:10—(D) OT, II Machabees, 1:18-22; 2:10 NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 8-9; 12:22-29; 14:13-36; 15:22-39; 17:1-8; 20:29-34 / Mark, 1:29-34,40-44; 2:3-12; 4:34-41; 5; 6:34-56; 7:24-8:26; 9:2-10,17-30; 10:46-52; 13:24-26—(D) Mark, 1:29-34,40-44; 2:3-12; 4:34-40; 5; 6:34-56; 7:24-8:26; 9:1-9,16-29; 10:46-52; 13:24-26 / Luke, 1:5-66; 4:31-5:26; 7:1-16; 8:22-56; 9:12-17,28-42; 11:14-26; 13:11-17; 14:1-6; 17:11-19; 18:35-43—(D) Luke, 1:5-66; 4:31-5:26; 7:1-16; 8:22-56; 9:12-17,28-43; 11:14-26; 13:11-17; 14:1-6; 17:11-19; 18:35-43 / John, 1:14-17; 2:1-11; 4:46-54; 14:1-45 / Acts, 2:1-22; 3:1-16; 4:33; 5:12-16; 9:36-43; 14:8-10; 19:11-12; 20:7-12; 28:1-10—(D) Acts, 2:1-22; 3:1-16; 4:33; 5:12-16; 9:36-43; 14:7-9; 19:11-12; 20:7-12; 28:1-10 / Romans, 1:3-5; 3:19-7:25; 11 / I Corinthians, 3:11-15; 15:9-10 / II Corinthians, 4:15; 8-9 passim; 12:1-10 / Galatians, 5:4 / Ephesians, 2:1-11 / Philippians, 2:12-13; 4:13 / II Thessalonians, 2:16-17—(D) II Thessalonians, 2:15-16 / I Timothy, 2:1 / Titus, 2:11-15; 3:3-9 / Hebrews, 2:9; 12:14-29 / James, 4:6 / I Peter, 5:5 14 Plutarch: Coriolanus, 191d-192b 18 Augustine: Confessions, BK I, PAR 5-6 2b-c; BK II, PAR 15 12b-c; BK VI, PAR 4 36a-b / City of God, BK X, CH 8 303a-d; CH 12-18 306d-310d; BK XIII, CH 3-5 361a-362c; CH 7 362d-363b; CH 14-15 366b-d; CH 20 370c-371a; BK XIII, CH 23-BK XIV, CH 1 372a-377a; BK XIV, CH 26-27, 396b-397a; BK XV, CH 1-3 397b,d-399c; BK XVI, CH 26 438c-439a; CH 37 444b-445a; BK XVIII, CH 11 477c-d; BK XXI, CH 5-8 563d-568d; CH 15-16 572c-574a; BK XXII, CH 5-10 589a-599b / Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 1 624b,d 19 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A 2, REP 1 11d-12c; Q 8, A 3, ANS and REP 4 36b-37c; Q 12, A 2 51c-52c; AA 4-5 53b-55b; A 13 61c-62b; Q 62 317c-325b; Q 89, A 1, REP 3 473b-475a; A 2, REP 3 475a-d; A 8, REP 2 479c-480c; Q 92, A 4, ANS 491b-d; Q 95 506b-510a; Q 104, A 4, ANS 538a-c; Q 105, AA 6-8 543b-545b; Q 106, A 3, ANS 547c-548b; Q 108, A 8, ANS and REP 1-2 561a-562a; Q 110, A 4 567c-568b; Q 113, A 1, REP 2 576a-d; Q 114, A 4 584a-585a; Q 119, A 1, ANS 604c-607b; PART I-II, Q 5, A 6, REP 2 641a-642a; Q 10, A 4, REP 2 665d-666a,c 20 Aquinas: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51, A 4 15a-d; Q 55, A 4, ANS and REP 6 28c-29d; Q 58, A 3, REP 3 43b-44a; Q 62, A 1 60a-d; Q 63, A 2, ANS and REP 1-2 64b-65a; Q 65, A 3, ANS 72d-73d; Q 66, A 2, REP 1 76c-77c; Q 76, A 2, REP 2 141d-142c; Q 79, A 3, ANS 158a-d; Q 81, A 3, REP 3 165d-166b; A 4 166b-167a; Q 85, A 6, ANS 182d-184a; Q 98, A 1, ANS 239b-240c; Q 106, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3 321a-322a; QQ 109-114 338a-378a,c esp Q 113, A 10 369c-370b; PART II-II, Q 24, A 3, REP 1 491a-d; PART III, QQ 7-8 745c-763b; Q 61, A 1, REP 2 855a-d; Q 62 858b-864c; PART III SUPPL, Q 75, A 3 938a-939d; Q 83, A 3 978c-980d; Q 92, A 1 1025c-1032b 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, VII [16-120] 115b-116b; XIII [52-87] 126a-b; XX [79-138] 137c-138a; XXIX [58-66] 150d-151a; XXXII [40-87] 155a-c; XXXII [139]-XXXIII [145] 156a-157d 22 Chaucer: Tale of Man of Law 236b-255b esp [4869-4924] 242b-243b, [5247-5253] 249b / Prioress’s Tale [13418-620] 392a-395b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 83c; 88c-89a; PART II, 137b-c; 149c-d; 160b-c; PART III, 165d-167b; 172a-177c passim; 183d-187a; 188a-191a; 241c-242a; PART IV, 249b-250a; 264a 25 Montaigne: Essays, 212a-d; 267d-268a; 273a-b; 294a-b 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 19b-c; 33c-d; 41b-c / New Atlantis, 201d-203c 31 Descartes: Objections and Replies, 125d-126a 32 Milton: Paradise Lost, BK II [1024-1033] 133b; BK III [56-415] 136b-144b esp [130-134] 138a, [167-184] 139a-b, [227-238] 140b; BK XI [1-21] 299a-b; [251-262] 304b-305a; BK XII [173-222] 323a-324a / Samson Agonistes [356-372] 347b; [652-666] 353b-354a 33 Pascal: Provincial Letters, 1a-14a; 19a-26b; 29b; 154b-159a / Pensées, 202 211a; 430-435 245a-251a; 458 254a; 505 261a-b; 508-511 261b; 513-517 262a-263b; 520-524 263b-264a; 643-644 290b-291b; 803-856 328b-341b; 876 345a; 881 345b 35 Locke: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 13 371a-b 35 Berkeley: Human Knowledge, SECT 62-63 425a-c; SECT 84 429b-c 35 Hume: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV 54 474b-c; SECT X 488d-497b 37 Fielding: Tom Jones, 38d 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 180b-c; 189b-191a; 206b-d; 295b-296b; 465d-467a; 605b-d 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 227d-228a; 232a-c; 398b-399b 42 Kant: Pure Reason, 238b 44 Boswell: Johnson, 126b-c; 359a 46 Hegel: Philosophy of History, PART III, 307a-b; PART IV, 338b-c; 348d-349a 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK V, 219b-220a 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 11a-b; BK V, 127b-137c passim; BK VII, 171a-177b; 189d-190a

8. The operation of causes in the process of history

6 Herodotus: History, BK I, 21d-22a; BK IX, 291b-c 6 Thucydides: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 354d-355a; BK IV, 462a-b 7 Plato: Statesman, 587a-589c / Laws, BK III, 663d-666d; BK IV, 679a-c 9 Aristotle: Politics, BK V 502a-519d passim 12 Lucretius: Nature of Things, BK I [449-482] 6c-7a 12 Aurelius: Meditations, BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK VII, SECT 1 279b; SECT 49 282d; BK IX, SECT 28 293d-294a; BK X, SECT 27 299d 13 Virgil: Aeneid 103a-379a esp BK I [254-296] 110a-111a, BK VI [713-853] 230a-234a 14 Plutarch: Camillus, 107c / Timoleon, 201a-203b 15 Tacitus: Annals, BK III, 49c; BK VI, 91b-d / Histories, BK I, 190a-b 18 Augustine: City of God, BK I, PREF 129a-d; CH 36 149c-d; BK II, CH 2-3 150c-151c; BK IV, CH 33 206c-d; BK V, CH 1 207d-208c; CH 11-26 216c-230a,c; BK XI, CH 1 322b,d-323a; CH 18 331d-332a; BK XIV, CH 28-BK XV, CH 1 397a-398c; BK XV, CH 21-22 415b-416c; BK XVIII, CH 1-2 472b,d-473d 21 Dante: Divine Comedy, HELL, VII [61-96] 10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-114] 77b-78a; PARADISE, VI [28-111] 113d-114d 23 Machiavelli: Prince, CH XIV, 21b; CH XXV 35a-36b 23 Hobbes: Leviathan, PART I, 76c-d 25 Montaigne: Essays, 464b-465c passim 26 Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, ACT IV, SC III [215-224] 590d 30 Bacon: Advancement of Learning, 34c 33 Pascal: Pensées, 505 261a-b; 619-641 284b-290a 36 Swift: Gulliver, PART II, 121a-b 38 Montesquieu: Spirit of Laws, BK VIII, 56b-57c; BK XVIII 122a-125a,c 38 Rousseau: Inequality, 348a,c 40 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 456d-457a,c; 609b-c; 630b,d-634a,c 41 Gibbon: Decline and Fall, 451c-453a,c; 590a-b 43 Federalist: NUMBER 3, 33c 43 Mill: Representative Government, 327b,d-332d passim, esp 331b-332d 46 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, PART III, PAR 115 42b-c; PART III, PAR 340-360 110b-114a,c esp PAR 342 110c-d, PAR 347 111b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 155c; 156d-170b; 173a-175c; 190b-201a,c esp 190b-d, 194b-196a; 203a-206a,c; PART I, 235d-237a; 258b-d; PART II, 262c-263d; 274a-275a; 281d-282d; 283c-284a,c; PART III, 300a-301c; PART IV, 337d-342a 49 Darwin: Descent of Man, 323a-b; 327a-328d 50 Marx: Capital, 7b; 8a-11d passim; 377c-378d 50 Marx-Engels: Communist Manifesto, 416c-417a,c; 419b,d-425b passim; 428b-d 51 Tolstoy: War and Peace, BK IX, 342a-344b; BK X, 389a-391c; 430b-432c; 447c-448c; BK XI, 469a-472b; BK XIII, 563a-575a; BK XIV, 588a-590c; 609a-613d; BK XV, 618b-621b; EPILOGUE I, 645a-650c; EPILOGUE II 675a-696d 52 Dostoevsky: Brothers Karamazov, BK V, 127b-137c 54 Freud: War and Death, 761a-c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 781a-782d; 787a-788d; 791b-d; 799a-802a,c esp 801d-802a,c / New Introductory Lectures, 834b-c; 882b-884c

CROSS-REFERENCES

For:

• The consideration of cause in relation to principle and element, see ELEMENT 2; PRINCIPLE 1a.
• The distinction between necessary and contingent causes, and for the conception of chance in relation to cause, see CHANCE 1a-1b; NATURE 3c-3c(1); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 3a-3c.
• The issue concerning determinism in nature or history, see FATE 5-6; HISTORY 4a(1); MECHANICS 4c(1); NATURE 2f, 3c(2).
• Other discussions of the controversy concerning causality and free will, and of the problem of man’s freedom in relation to God’s will, see FATE 2, 4; HISTORY 4a(1); LIBERTY 4a-4b, 5a, 5d; WILL 5a(3)-5a(4), 5b(2), 5c, 7c.
• The theory of divine causality in creation, providence, and the performance of miracles, see ASTRONOMY 8d; GOD 5a, 7a-7e; MATTER 3d; NATURE 3c(4); WORLD 4b, 4d-4e.
• The role of ends or final causes in the order of nature and the structure of the universe, see DESIRE 1; GOD 5b; NATURE 3c(3); WORLD 1c, 6c; and for the general theory of means and ends, see GOOD AND EVIL 4b, 5c; JUDGMENT 3; PRUDENCE 3a, 4b; WILL 2c(2)-2c(3).
• The discussion of cause as an object of knowledge and in relation to the methods and aims of philosophy, science, and history, see ASTRONOMY 3a-3b; DEFINITION 2d; HISTORY 3b; KNOWLEDGE 5a(3); MECHANICS 2c; PHYSICS 2b; REASONING 5b(4)-5b(5); SCIENCE 1b(1), 4c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: I. Works by authors represented in this collection. II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.

I.

• Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, BK III, CH 1-16, 64-83, 88-98
• Descartes. The Principles of Philosophy, PART I, 28
• Hobbes. Concerning Body, PART II, CH 9
• Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK I, PART III, SECT II-IV, XV
• Berkeley. Siris
• Kant. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, DIV II
• Gibbon. An Essay on the Study of Literature, XLVI-LV, LXXVIII-LXXXII
• Hegel. Science of Logic, VOL I, BK II, SECT I, CH 3; SECT III, CH 3(B); VOL II, SECT II, CH 3
• J. S. Mill. A System of Logic, BK III, CH 4-6, 9-10, 15, 21
  • —. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, CH 16
• Freud. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, CH 12
• W. James. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 12-13

II.

• Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, BK III, CH 1-20
  • —. Against the Physicists, BK I (Concerning Cause and the Passive)
• Proclus. The Elements of Theology, (8,c,1)
• Maimonides. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART I, CH 69; PART II, CH 48
• Duns Scotus. Tractatus de Primo Principio (A Tract Concerning the First Principle)
• Bruno. De la causa, principio, e uno
• Suárez. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XI (3), XII-XXVII, XXIX, XXXI (8-10), XXXIV(6-7), XLVIII (1)
• John of Saint Thomas. Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Philosophia Naturalis PART I, QQ 10-13, 25-26
• Boyle. A Disquisition About the Final Causes of Natural Things
• Malebranche. De la recherche de la vérité, BK VI(II), CH 3; Eclaircissement 15
  • —. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, VII
• Leibniz. Discourse on Metaphysics, XV-XXII
  • —. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, BK II, CH 26
• Voltaire. Candide
  • —. “Change or Generation of Events,” “Final Causes,” in A Philosophical Dictionary
• T. Reid. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, I
• Schopenhauer. On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
  • —. The World as Will and Idea, VOL III, SUP, CH 26; APPENDIX
• Brown. An Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect
  • —. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, VOL I, pp 189-220; VOL II, pp 128-134
• Comte. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO, CH 1; BK III, CH I
• W. Hamilton. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, VOL I (38-40)
• Whewell. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, VOL I, BK III, CH 1-4; BK IX, CH 6; BK X, CH 5; VOL II, BK XI, CH 7
• Helmholtz. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, VII
• Wundt. Die Prinzipien der mechanischen Naturlehre
• Jevons. The Principles of Science, CH 11
• Lotze. Logic, BK I, CH 2 (B)
• P. A. Janet. Final Causes
• C. S. Peirce. Collected Papers, VOL VI, PAR 66-87, 393-394
• Domet de Vorges. Cause efficiente et cause finale
• Watts. The Reign of Causality
• Venn. Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, CH 2
• Frazer. The Golden Bough, PART I, CH 3
• Pearson. The Grammar of Science, CH 4
• Bradley. The Principles of Logic, BK III, PART II, CH 2
  • —. Appearance and Reality, BK I, CH 6
• Bosanquet. Science and Philosophy, 8
• Bergson. Creative Evolution
• Broad. Perception, Physics, and Reality, CH 1-2
• Henderson. The Order of Nature
• W. E. Johnson. Logic, PART III, CH 3-11
• Meyerson. Identity and Reality, CH 1
  • —. De l’explication dans les sciences
• Ducasse. Causation and the Types of Necessity
• Whitehead. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge, CH 16
  • —. Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effects
• Eddington. The Nature of the Physical World, CH XIV
• McTaggart. The Nature of Existence, CH 24-26
• Santayana. The Realm of Matter, CH 7
• M. R. Cohen. Reason and Nature, BK I, CH 4(2); BK II, CH 2
• Lenzen. The Nature of Physical Theory, PART IV, CH 16
• Weyl. The Open World, LECT II
• Maritain. A Preface to Metaphysics, LECT V-VII
• A. J. Toynbee. A Study of History
• Planck. Where Is Science Going?, CH 4-5
  • —. The Philosophy of Physics, CH 2
• Dewey. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, CH 22
• B. Russell. Principles of Mathematics, CH 55
  • —. Our Knowledge of the External World, VIII
  • —. Mysticism and Logic, CH 9
  • —. The Analysis of Matter, CH 30-31, 35
  • —. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART IV, CH 9-10; PART VI, CH 5-6